PS 2212: U.S. Executive Branch Politics - University …gkrause/PS 2212.US Executive...

PS 2212: U.S. Executive Branch Politics

Professor George Krause Class: Monday: 9:30am–12:00pm

Office Location: 4442 Posvar Hall Class Room: 4625 Posvar Hall

Office Hours: Monday: 12:30pm–2:30pm Office Phone: 648–7278 or by Appointment

E–Mail Address: [email protected]

Course Overview

The executive branch of government in a system of separated and shared powers in theUnited States is a unique institutional actor insofar that it is charged with both making andimplementing public policies. Specifically, in PS 2212 we will examine both the theoretical andempirical literature on the American presidency/executive branch politics, with some attentiondevoted to executive politics in the American states. This course focuses primarily on U.S.federal executive branch politics by analyzing bureaucratic organizations and the Americanpresidency. In this course, we will restrict our attention to both modern organizational andinstitutional theories used to explain U.S. executive branch performance. That is, this course isfocused exclusively on the study of political institutions and organizations – material on politicalbehavior related topics under the rubric of U.S. executive branch politics (e.g., presidentialnominations, presidential elections, popular support) are covered in other Ph.D. seminars onElectoral Behavior and Mass Political Behavior taught by Professors Barker and Hurwitz,respectively. The theories and concepts covered in this course are directly applicable to the studyof presidential systems (e.g., Latin American nations), and also useful for understandingexecutive branch politics in parliamentary systems (e.g., many European nations).

This course is divided into three sections. The first unit will cover the relevant inter–disciplinary theoretical research on organizations and institutions from both economics andsociology traditions. The second unit consists of the study of public bureaucracy. This unit willfocus on both the internal and external functioning of U.S. public agencies and boards/commissions. Topics include task activities, intra-organizational relations, bureaucraticautonomy versus political control perspectives, and the problem of multiple principals andcommon agency. The third unit covers the study of the American presidency. This unit consistsof analyzing topics such as the process of institutionalization, staffing and termination of publicagencies; delegation, lawmaking, appointments, vetoes, unilateral action, and presidentialpolicymaking.

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Course Pedagogy

Class sessions will be designed in the following manner. I will make a list of researchquestions available for each class the week prior to the discussion of the assigned readings. These assigned course readings will come from required books students are expected to purchaseand/or journal articles which can be downloaded from the Internet (except in rare circumstancesin which the instructor will make such materials available to students). All students will usethese research questions to serve as the basis for class discussion. The student class leader willlead discussion for the remainder of the seminar session. As instructor, I will reserve the right torefocus/redirect/expound upon the discussion as I deem appropriate throughout the seminarsession. Students will utilize both the assigned readings and corresponding class discussions tomotivate their short paper assignments.

I expect Ph.D. students to behave as professional political scientists who are engaged inthe acquisition and creation of social scientific knowledge. As a result, students are required tofully participate in a professional manner during class seminar discussions – i.e., fully read all ofthe assigned required readings for a given class before we meet, and to be able to competentlydiscuss this material within a classroom setting. A seminar where students are not well preparedand willing to engage the material with one another is unacceptable graduate student behavior,and thus will adversely affect a student’s final course grade. Although the class seminardiscussions are a collaborative enterprise, written assignments will be done independently byeach student. That is, implicit or covert collaboration on all writing assignments is forbidden.

The assigned texts required for this course are as follows and can be purchased at theuniversity bookstore.

Required Texts/Books

Presidency–Oriented Texts (P)

Cameron, Charles. 2000. Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power. NewYork: Cambridge University Press. ISBN#(Paperback): 0521625505. (P)

Edwards, George C. III, John H. Kessel, and Bert A. Rockman. 1993. Researching thePresidency: Vital Questions, New Approaches. Pittsburgh, PA: University of PittsburghPress. ISBN#(Paperback): 0472086308 .(P)

Howell, William G. 2003. Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ISBN#(Paperback): 0300115814 (P)

Lewis, David E. 2008. The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control andBureaucratic Performance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.ISBN#(paperback): 978–0–691–13544–1 (P)

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Light, Paul C. 1999. The President’s Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton.ISBN#(Paperback): 0801860660 (P)

Rudalevige, Andrew. 2002. Managing the President’s Program: Presidential Leadership andLegislative Policy Formulation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.ISBN#(Paperback): 0691095019 (P)

Skowronek, Stephen. 1997. The Politics Presidents Make: Presidential Leadership andLegislative Policy Formulation from John Adams to Bill Clinton. Cambridge, MA:Harvard University (Belknap) Press. ISBN#(paperback): 0674689372 (P)

Bureaucracy–Oriented Texts (B)

Carpenter, Daniel P. 2001. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputation, Networks, andPolicy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress. ISBN#(paperback): 0–691–07010–5 (B)

Horn, Murray. 1995. The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice in thePublic Sector. ISBN#(paperback): 0–521–48436–7 (B)

Miller, Gary J. 1992. Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy. New York:

Cambridge University Press. ISBN#(paperback): 0–521–45769–6 (B)

Simon, Herbert A. 1997. Administrative Behavior. Fourth Edition. New York: Macmillan.ISBN#(paperback): 0–684–83582–7 (B)

Wilson, James Q. 1995. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. Second Edition. New York: Basic Books. ISBN#(paperback): 0–465–00785–6 (B)

In addition, the remainder of the assigned readings for this course will come in the formof journal articles, book chapters, and working papers made available either through the Internet,or through the electronic reserve room in Hillman Library (e–password: execpol). For ourseminar sessions, students are only expected to read the “required readings” list prior to eachclass session – the “recommended additional readings” list are strictly for informationalpurposes if you seek further exploration on a given topic.

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Course Grading Requirements

Students will be expected to master the following tasks during the course of the semester:(1) comprehend, synthesize, and critique the current state of knowledge on this subject matter;(2) set forth creative, persuasive, and well–grounded original ideas that extends our currentstate of knowledge on this subject matter (in the form of rethinking an “existing” researchproblem or addressing a “brand new” research problem); and (3) demonstrate the ability toconduct quality original scholarship that possess the potential to eventually result inpublications in quality referred academic journals.

Each student’s final course grade will reflect the three goals of the course describedabove. Specifically, the class session leader role, group discussions, and critique of aclassmate’s original research paper will hone each student’s ability to comprehend, synthesize,and critique the current state of knowledge on this subject matter. Each student’s ability to setforth creative, persuasive, and well–grounded original ideas that extends our current state ofknowledge on this subject matter will be evaluated from the several short papers on varioustopics assigned throughout the semester. Finally, each student’s ability to conduct qualityoriginal scholarship will be evaluated through an original research paper project andcorresponding paper presentation to the entire class during finals week.

A. Evaluation of Comprehension, Synthesis, & Critique of the Existing Literature:

A.1 Seminar Session Leader: 25%

A.2 Discussant for Research Paper: 10%

The seminar session leader will lead discussion on a given seminar session meeting. Thisstudent is expected to be able to effectively lead and facilitate discussion based upon theassigned course readings and literature review questions made available by the instructor. At thesame time, however, all other participants will also be held responsible for actively participatingin a professional manner. Failure to regularly participate in a productive manner as anon–leader participant will adversely affect one’s course grade.

The discussant role pertains to critiquing a colleague’s original research paper at the endof the semester. This should appear in the form of a 2–3 single spaced typed pages of commentssubmitted jointly to both the author and instructor at the time of the original research paperpresentations during the Monday following the completion of finals week during the Spring2009 semester (Monday April 27, 2009). The first 10%–25% of these remarks should bededicated to a preamble consisting of a brief statement about what the paper is about, and what isgood about it. The remaining 75%–90% of your remarks should entail constructive comments &suggestions intended to improve the author’s current research paper.

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B. Evaluation of Extensions & New Ideas to the Existing Literature:

B.1 Short Essays: 25% (5 Papers × 5% Per Essay)

Each short essay will be motivated by 1–2 questions posed by the instructor. Thesequestions are intended to push students beyond the Comprehension, Synthesis, & Critique of theLiterature that occurs with the course readings and class seminar sessions by having each studentbegin to think systematically about original research ideas that are grounded in the substantiveliterature, yet theoretically motivated in some viable sense. These short essays will be 5 pageslong (double–spaced – excluding endnotes & references), and must confirm to acceptableprofessional standards in accordance with the APSA Style Manual. These short essays arerequired to be submitted to the instructor at the very beginning of class the following week afterour seminar discussion when that particular topic/material is covered.

C. Evaluation of Original Scholarship:

C.1 Completed Draft Version of Research Paper: 10% (Due Monday March 30, 2009) C.2 Final Version of Research Paper: 30% (Due Monday April 20, 2009)

The research paper will consist of an original scholarly inquiry into a substantiveproblem relating to the topics broadly covered in the course. This paper should be written as ajournal-style article manuscript and must comprise the following components: (1) stating aresearch puzzle/ question [incorporating a literature review]; (2) A theory used to explain thepuzzle/question (including central hypotheses); (3) substantive information on the empiricallaboratory used to analyze the linkage between theory and puzzle/question; (4) data, ancillaryhypotheses, and methods; (5) empirical findings; and (6) conclusion/implications. I will not grantstudents an “I” (Incomplete) grade unless under dire circumstances as deemed by the instructor.This means that students should immediately begin looking into research topics and select aresearch paper topic that can be completed during the course of the semester as early as possible.Paper Topics Must Be Approved By The Instructor No Later than Friday February 6, 2009. Failure to complete any assignment (including the Research Paper topic approval) in a timelymanner consistent with the instructor’s deadlines will automatically result in zero points for thatassignment/project.

Research Presentations and Corresponding Discussant Roles will take place on Monday April 27 (9:30am–12:00pm).

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CLASS 1

FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR

Class Leader: Nestor Castaneda–Angarita

Required Readings:

Simon, Herbert A. 1976. Administrative Behavior. New York: Macmillan.(Chapters1–4, 6–7, 9)

Hammond, Thomas H. 1990. “In Defense of the Luther Gulick’s ‘Notes on the Theory ofOrganization=.@ Public Administration 68(Summer): 143–173. [E–Reserves]

DiMaggio, Paul, and Walter Powell. 1983. AThe Iron Cage Revisited: InstitutionalIsomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields.@ American SociologicalReview 48(April): 147–160. [JSTOR]

Hannan, Michael, and John Freeman. 1977. AThe Population Ecology of Organizations.@ American Journal of Sociology 85(March): 929–964. [JSTOR]

Wilson, James Q. 1995. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They DoIt. Second Edition. New York: Basic Books. (Chapters 2, 4–6)

Recommended Additional Readings:

Cyert, Richard M., and James G. March. 1963. A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Englewood, NJ: Prentice–Hall.

Gulick, Luther H. 1937. ANotes on the Theory of Organization.” In Papers on TheScience of Administration. Luther Gulick and Lyndal Urwick, eds. New York: Instituteof Public Administration, Columbia University.

Perrow, Charles M. 1986. Complex Organizations. New York: Random House.

Stinchcombe, Arthur M.1990. Information and Organizations. Berkeley, CA: Universityof California Press.

Thompson, James D. 2003 (Original: 1967). Organizations in Action: Social ScienceBases of Administrative Theory. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

CLASS 2

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NEW INSTITUTIONAL THEORIES & THE ECONOMICS OF ORGANIZATION

Class Leader: Brandon Myers

Required Readings:

Moe, Terry M.1984. AThe New Economics of Organization.” American Journal ofPolitical Science 28(November) 739–777. [JSTOR]

Moe, Terry M. 1995. “The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward A Theory of PublicBureaucracy.” In Organizational Theory: from Chester Barnard to the Present andBeyond. Oliver E. Williamson, ed. New York: Oxford University Press. [E–Reserves]

Williamson, Oliver E. 1995. ATransactions Cost Economics and Organization Theory.@ InOrganizational Theory: from Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond. Oliver E.Williamson, ed. New York: Oxford University Press. [E–Reserves]

Horn, Murray J. 1995. The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice in the Public Sector. New York: Cambridge University Press. (Chapters 1–3,7–8)

Barro, Robert J., and David Gordon. 1983. ARules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Modelof Monetary Policy.@ Journal of Monetary Economics. 12(July): 101–122. [JSTOR]

Wilson, James Q. 1995. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They DoIt. Second Edition. New York: Basic Books. (Chapters 4–5, 18–19)


Alchian, Armen, and Harold Demsetz. 1972. AProduction, Information Costs, andEconomic Organization.@ American Economic Review. 62(December): 777–795.

Bertelli, Anthony M., and Laurence Lynn, Jr. 2006. “Public Management: TheMadisonian Solution.” Administration & Society 38(1).

Krause, George. 2009. “Organizational Dilemmas and Coordination in U.S. ExecutivePolitics” Presidential Studies Quarterly. 39(March): Forthcoming.

Meier, Kenneth J., and George A. Krause. 2003. “The Scientific Study of Bureaucracy:An Overview.” In Politics, Policy, and Organizations: Frontiers in the Scientific Study of

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Public Bureaucracy. George A. Krause and Kenneth J. Meier. Editors. Ann Arbor, MI:University of Michigan Press.

Meier, Kenneth J., and George A. Krause. 2003. “Conclusion: An Agenda for theScientific Study of Bureaucracy.” In Politics, Policy, and Organizations: Frontiers in theScientific Study of Public Bureaucracy. George A. Krause and Kenneth J. Meier. Editors.Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Miller, Gary J., and Terry M . Moe. 1983. “Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size ofGovernment.” American Political Science Review. 77(June): 297–322.

Pratt, John W., and Richard Zeckhauser. 1985. Principals and Agents. Boston, MA:Harvard University Business School Press. (Chapter 1)

CLASS 3

INTERNAL FUNCTIONING OF BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATIONS, I:TASK ACTIVITIES

Class Leader: Ben Melusky

Required Readings:

Carpenter, Daniel P. 2002. “Groups, the Media, Agency Waiting Costs, and FDA DrugApproval.” American Journal of Political Science 46(July): 490–505. [JSTOR]

Brehm, John, and Scott Gates. 1993. “Donut Shops and Speed Traps: Evaluating Modelsof Supervision on Police Behavior.” American Journal of Political Science 37(May): 555– 581. [JSTOR]

Krause, George A., and J. Kevin Corder. 2007. “Explaining Bureaucratic Optimism:Theory and Evidence from U.S. Federal Executive Agency Macroeconomic Forecasts.”American Political Science Review 101(February): 129–142. [APSR website]

Scholz, John T., and B. Dan Wood. 1999. AEquity, Efficiency, and Politics: DemocraticControls on the Tax Collector.@ American Journal of Political Science 43(October):1166–1188. [JSTOR]

Ting. Michael M. 2008. “Organizational Capacity.” Typescript. Columbia University.http://www.columbia.edu/~mmt2033/organizational_capacity.pdf

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Wilson, James Q. 1995. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They DoIt. Second Edition. New York: Basic Books. (Chapters 3, 9, 12, 17)


Kaufman, Herbert A. 1960. The Forest Ranger. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UniversityPress.

Downs, Anthony. 1967. Inside Bureaucracy. Boston, MA: Little, Brown

Scholz, T., Jim Twombly, and Barbara Headrick. 1991. AStreet Level Political Controlsover the Federal Bureaucracy.@American Political Science Review 85: (September):829B850.

Brehm, John, and Scott Gates. 1997. Working, Shirking, and Sabotage: BureaucraticResponse to a Democratic Public. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Huber, Gregory A. 2007. The Craft of Bureaucratic Neutrality: Interests and Influence ofGovernment Regulation in Occupational Safety. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Krause, George A., and James W. Douglas. 2006. “Does Agency Competition Improve theQuality of Policy Analysis? Evidence from OMB and CBO Current Year FiscalProjections.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. 25(Winter): 53–74.

CLASS 4

INTERNAL FUNCTIONING OF BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATIONS, II:INTRA–ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS & COORDINATION

Class Leader: Brandon Lenoir

Required Readings:

Hammond, Thomas H., and Paul A. Thomas. 1989. “The Impossibility of a NeutralHierarchy.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 5(Spring): 155–184. [JLEOwebsite]

Miller, Gary J., and Andrew B. Whitford. 2007. “The Principal’s Moral Hazard:Constraints on the Use of Incentives in Hierarchy.” Journal of Public AdministrationResearch and Theory 17(April): 213–233. [JPART website]

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Krause, George A. 2003. ACoping with Uncertainty: Analyzing Risk Propensities of SECBudgetary Decisions, 1949–1997.” American Political Science Review 97(February)171–188. [JSTOR]

Krause, George A., David E. Lewis, and James W. Douglas. 2006. “PoliticalAppointments, Civil Service Systems, and Bureaucratic Competence: OrganizationalBalancing and Executive Branch Revenue Forecasts in the American States.” AmericanJournal of Political Science 50(July): 770–787. [JSTOR]

Miller, Gary J. 1992. Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy. NewYork: Cambridge University Press. (Chapters 1–3, 5–9)

Wilson, James Q. 1995. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They DoIt. Second Edition. New York: Basic Books. (Chapters 7–8, 10)


Aberbach, Joel D., and Bert A. Rockman. 2000. In the Web of Politics: Three Decades ofthe U.S. Federal Executive. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Bendor, Jonathan. 1985. Parallel Systems: Redundancy in Government. Berkeley, CA:University of California Press.

Hammond, Thomas H. 1986. AAgenda Control, Organizational Structure, and BureaucraticPolitics.@ American Journal of Political Science 30(May): 379B420.

Heclo, Hugh. 1977. A Government of Strangers: Executive Politics in Washington.Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Heimann, C.F. Larry. 1997. “Understanding the Challenger Disaster: OrganizationalStructure and the Design of Reliable Systems.” American Political Science Review87(June): 421–435.

Kaufman, Herbert A. 1981. The Administrative Behavior of Federal Bureau Chiefs.Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Light, Paul C. 1995. Thickening Government: Federal Hierarchy and the Diffusion ofAccountability. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Seidman, Harold, and Robert Gilmour. 1986. Politics, Position, and Power. New York:Oxford University Press.

Ting, Michael M. 2003. “A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy.” AmericanJournal of Political Science 47(April): 274–292.

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Ting, Michael M. 2002. “A Theory of Jurisdictional Assignments in Bureaucracies.” American Journal of Political Science 46(April): 364–378. [JSTOR]

Whitford, Andrew B. 2007. “Decentralized Policy Implementation.” Political ResearchQuarterly 60(March): 17–30. [PRQ website]

CLASS 5

BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY PERSPECTIVES

Class Leader: Kristen Coopie

Required Readings:

Bawn, Kathleen. 1995. “Political Control versus Bureaucratic Expertise: CongressionalChoices About Administrative Procedures.” American Political Science Review89(March): 62–73. [JSTOR]

Carpenter, Daniel P. 2001. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputation, Networks,and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928. Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press. (Chapters 1–2, 8–10, Conclusion)

Gailmard, Sean, and John W. Patty. 2007. Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, PolicyDiscretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise.” American Journal of Political Science.51(October): 873–889.

Furlong, Scott, R. 1998. “Political Influence on the Bureaucracy: The BureaucracySpeaks.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 8(January): 39–65.[JPART website]

Krause, George A. 1994. “Federal Reserve Policy Decision Making: Political andBureaucratic Influences.” American Journal of Political Science 38(February): 124–144.[JSTOR]

Wilson, James Q. 1995. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do

It. Second Edition. New York: Basic Books. (Chapters 11–12)

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Bendor, Jonathan B., Serge Taylor, and Roland Van Gaalen. 1985. “BureaucraticExpertise versus Legislative Authority: A Model of Deception and Monitoring inBudgeting.” American Political Science Review 79(December): 1041–1060.

Hammond, Thomas H., and Gary J. Miller. 1985. “A Social Choice Perspective onAuthority and Expertise in Bureaucracy.” American Journal of Political Science29(February): 611–638.

Keiser, Lael R. 1996. “The Influence of Women’s Political Power on Bureaucratic Output:The Case of Child Support Enforcement.”British Journal of Political Science 27(January):136–148.

Krause, George A. 1996. “The Institutional Dynamics of Policy Administration:Bureaucratic Influence over Securities Regulation.” American Journal of Political Science40(November): 1083–1121.

Niskanen, William. 1975. “Bureaucrats and Politicians.” Journal of Law and Economics18: 617–643.

Rourke, Francis. 1984. Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy. Boston, MA: Little,Brown.

Ting, Michael M. 2008. “Whistleblowing.” American Political Science Review 102(June):249–267.

CLASS 6

EXTERNAL CONTROL OF PUBLIC AGENCIES:PRESIDENTS, LEGISLATURES, INTEREST GROUPS, & COURTS


Required Readings:

Balla, Steven J. 1998. “Administrative Procedures and Political Control of theBureaucracy.” American Political Science Review 92(September): 663–673. [JSTOR]

Canes–Wrone, Brandice. 2003. “Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of theLower Courts.” American Journal of Political Science 47(April): 205–214. [JSTOR]

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Carpenter, Daniel P. 1996. “Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and BudgetaryControl in Federal Regulation.” American Political Science Review 90(June): 283–302.[JSTOR]

McCubbins, Mathew D., and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. “Congressional OversightOverlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms.” American Journal of Political Science28(February): 165–179. [JSTOR]

McNollgast (McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast).1987.“Administrative Procedures as instruments of Political Control.” Journal of Law,Economics, and Organization 3(April): 243–277. [JLEO website]

Miller, Gary J. 2000. “Above Politics: Credible Commitment and Efficiency in the Designof Public Agencies.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 10(April):289–328. [JPART website]

Moe, Terry M. 1985. “Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of theNLRB.” American Political Science Review 79(December): 1094–1116. [JSTOR]

Shipan, Charles R. 2004. “Regulatory Regimes, Agency Actions, and the ConditionalNature of Congressional Influence.” American Political Science Review 98(August):467–480. [JSTOR]


Wilson, James Q. 1995. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They DoIt. Second Edition. New York: Basic Books. (Chapters 13–16)

Plus, additional readings too numerous to list here but can be obtained from me ifyou wish to write a research paper on this topic.

CLASS 7

MULTIPLE PRINCIPALS & COMMON AGENCY:SEPARATION OF POWERS (HORIZONTAL & VERTICAL)


Required Readings:

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Epstein, David, and Sharyn O’‘Halloran. 1996. “Divided Government and the Design ofAdministrative Procedures: A Formal Model and Empirical Test.” Journal of Politics 58:393–417. [JSTOR]

Huber, John D., Charles R. Shipan, and Madelaine Pfahler. 2001. “Legislatures andStatutory Control of the Bureaucracy.” American Journal of Political Science 45(April):330–345. [JSTOR]

Long, Norton E. 1952. “Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism”. American Political ScienceReview 46(September): 808–818. [JSTOR]

Miller, Gary. 2000. Above Politics: Credible Commitment and Efficiency in the Design ofPublic Agencies.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 10(April):289–328. [

Wood, B. Dan. 1992. “Modeling Federal Implementation as a System: The Clean AirCase.” American Journal of Political Science 36(February): 40–67. [JSTOR]

Volden, Craig. 2002. “A Formal Model of the Politics of Delegation in a Separation ofPowers System.” American Journal of Political Science 46(January): 111–133. [JSTOR]

Whitford, Andrew B. 2005. “The Pursuit of Political Control by Multiple Principals.”Journal of Politics 67(February): 29–49. [JSTOR]

Additional Recommended Readings:

Epstein, David, and Sharyn O’Halloran. 1999. Delegating Powers: A Transaction CostPolitics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers. New York: CambridgeUniversity Press.

Gailmard, Sean. 2009. “Multiple Principals and Oversight of Bureaucratic Policymaking.” Journal of Theoretical Politics (Forthcoming)http://polisci.berkeley.edu/faculty/gailmard/ca_rev.pdf

Hammond, Thomas H., and Jack H. Knott. 1996. “Who Controls the Bureaucracy?Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model ofMulti–Institutional Policymaking.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization12(April): 119–166.

Huber, John D., and Charles R. Shipan. 2002. Deliberate Discretion? The InstitutionalFoundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

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Morris, Irwin, L. 1999. Congress, the President, and the Federal Reserve: The Politics ofAmerican Monetary Policymaking. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Potoski, Matthew, and Neal D. Woods. 2001. “Designing Clean Air Agencies:Administrative Procedures and Bureaucratic Autonomy.” Journal of Public AdministrationResearch and Theory 11(April): 203–222.

Whitford, Andrew B. 2002. “Decentralization and Political Control of the Bureaucracy.” J ournal of Theoretical Politics 14(April): 167–193.

Wood, B. Dan, and Richard W. Waterman. 1994. Bureaucratic Dynamics: The Role of aBureaucracy in a Democracy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

CLASS 8

STATE OF AMERICAN PRESIDENCY RESEARCH & HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM


Required Readings:

Edwards, George C., III, John H. Kessel, and Bert A. Rockman. 1993. “Introduction.” inEdwards, Kessel, and Rockman, eds. Researching the Presidency: Vital Questions, NewApproaches. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Moe, Terry M. 1993. “Presidents, Institutions, and Theory.” in Edwards, Kessel, andRockman, eds. Researching the Presidency: Vital Questions, New Approaches.Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

James, Scott C. 2005. “The Evolution of the Presidency: Between the Promise and theFear.” in Joel D. Aberbach and Mark A. Peterson, Editors. The Executive Branch. NewYork: Oxford University Press. [E–Reserves]

Whittington, Keith E., and Daniel P. Carpenter. 2003. “Executive Power in AmericanInstitutional Development.” Perspectives on Politics 1(September): 495–513. [E–Reserves]

Skowronek, Stephen. 1997. The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adamsto Bill Clinton. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University (Belknap) Press. (Chapters 1–3, & 7–8).

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Neustadt, Richard. 1990. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics ofLeadership from Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: The Free Press.

Rudalevige, Andrew. 2005. The New Imperial Presidency: Renewing Presidential PowerAfter Watergate. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Hager, Gregory L., and Terry Sullivan. 1994. “President–Centered and Presidency–Centered Explanations of Presidential Public Activity.” American Journal of PoliticalScience 38(November): 1079–1103.

Dickinson, Matthew J., and Andrew Rudalevige. 2004/2005. “Presidents,Responsiveness, and Competence: Revisiting the “Golden Age” at the Bureau of theBudget.” Political Science Quarterly 119(Winter): 633–654.

King, Gary. 1993. “The Methodology of Presidential Research.” in Edwards, Kessel, andRockman, eds. Researching the Presidency: Vital Questions, New Approaches.Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Miller, Gary J. 1993. “Formal Theory and the Presidency.” in Edwards, Kessel, andRockman, eds. Researching the Presidency: Vital Questions, New Approaches.Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Hargove, Erwin C. 1993. “Presidential Personality and Leadership Style.” in Edwards,Kessel, and Rockman, eds. Researching the Presidency: Vital Questions, NewApproaches. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

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CLASS 9

INTERNAL FUNCTIONING OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, I:EOP UNITS & EXECUTIVE BRANCH INSTITUTIONALIZATION


Required Readings:

Feldman, Martha. 1993. “Organizational Theory and the Presidency.” in Edwards,Kessel, and Rockman, eds. Researching the Presidency: Vital Questions, NewApproaches. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Dickinson, Matthew J., and Kathryn Dunn–Tepas. 2002. “The Revolving Door at theWhite House: Explaining Increasing Turnover Rates Among Presidential Advisers,1929–1997.” Journal of Politics. 64(May): 434–448. [J–STOR]

Dickinson, Matthew J., and Matthew J. Lebo. 2007. “Reexamining the Growth of theInstitutional Presidency, 1940–2000.” Journal of Politics 69(February): 206–219. [JOPwebsite]

Rudalevige, Andrew. 2005. “The Structure of Leadership: Presidents, Hierarchies, andInformation Flows.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 35(June): 333–360. [PSQ website]

Rudalevige, Andrew. 2002. Managing the President’s Program: Presidential Leadershipand Legislative Policy Formulation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (All)


Burke, John, P. 1992. The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the WhiteHouse from FDR to Clinton. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Dickinson, Matthew. 1997. Bitter Harvest: Presidential Power and the Growth of thePresidential Branch. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Ragsdale, Lyn, and John J. Theis, III. 1997. “The Institutionalization of the AmericanPresidency.” American Journal of Political Science 41(October): 1280–1318.

Krause, George A. 2002. “Separated Powers and Institutional Growth in the Presidentialand Congressional Branches: Distinguishing Between Short–Run versus Long–RunDynamics.” Political Research Quarterly 55(March) 27–57.

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Krause, George A. 2004. “The Secular Decline in Presidential Domestic Policy Making:An Organizational Perspective.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 34(4): 79–92.

Walcott, Charles E., and Karen M. Hult. 2005. “White House Structure and DecisionMaking: Elaborating the Standard Model.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 35(June):303–318.

CLASS 10

INTERNAL FUNCTIONING OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, II:STAFFING/APPOINTMENTS/REORGANIZATIONS/TERMINATIONS

Class Leader: Kristen Coopie

Required Readings:

Heclo, Hugh. 1975. “OMB and the Presidency – The Problem of ‘Neutral Competence’.”The Public Interest. 38(Winter): 80–99. [E–Reserves]

Rourke, Francis E. 1992. “Responsiveness and Neutral Competence in AmericanBureaucracy.” Public Administration Review 52(November/December): 539–546.[E–Reserves]

Lewis, David E. 2008. The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control andBureaucratic Performance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Chapters 1–4,7–8)

Lewis, David E. 2002. The Politics of Agency Termination: Confronting the Myth ofAgency Immortality.” Journal of Politics 64(February): 89–107. [J–STOR]

Meier, Kenneth J. 1980. “Executive Reorganization of Government: Impact onEmployment and Expenditures.” American Journal of Political Science 24(August):396–412. [J–STOR]

Moe, Terry M. 1985. “The Politicized Presidency.” in John E. Chubb and Paul E.Peterson, eds. Can Government Govern? Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.. [E–Reserves]

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Bertelli, Anthony M. 2007. “Determinants of Bureaucratic Turnover Intention: Evidencefrom the Department of Treasury.” Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory17(April).

Carpenter, Daniel P., and David E. Lewis. 2004. “Political Learning from Rare Events:Poisson Inference, Fiscal Constraints, and the Lifetime of Bureaus.” Political Analysis. 12(Summer): 201–232.

Cohen, Davd B., and George A. Krause. 2000. "Presidents, Chiefs of Staff, and WhiteHouse Organizational Behavior: Survey Evidence From the Reagan and BushAdministrations.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 30(September): 421–442.

Gill, Jeff, and Richard W. Waterman. 2005. “Solidary and Functional Costs: Explainingthe Presidential Appointment Contradiction.” Journal of Public Administration Researchand Theory 14(October): 547–569

Kernell, Samuel. 1986. “The Evolution of the White House Staff.” in John E. Chubb andPaul E. Peterson, eds. Can Government Govern? Washington, D.C.: BrookingsInstitution..

Walcott, Charles, E., and Karen M. Hult. 2004. Empowering the White House: Governingunder Nixon, Ford, and Carter. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.

CLASS 11

PRESIDENTIAL–CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS:LAWMAKING


Required Readings:

Canes–Wrone, Brandice, and Scott DeMarchi. 2002. “Presidential Approval andLegislative Success.” Journal of Politics 64(May): 491–509. [J–STOR]

Canes–Wrone, Brandice. 2001. “The President’s Legislative Influence from Public Appeals.” American Journal of Political Science 45(April): 313–329. [J–STOR]

Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. Where’s the Party? British Journal of Political Science.23(April): 235–266. [JSTOR]

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Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1988. “Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriation Decisions. ” American Journal of Political Science 32(August): 713–736. [J–STOR]

Sullivan, Terry. 1988. “Headcounts, Expectations, and Presidential Coalitions inCongress.” American Journal of Political Science 32(August): 713–736. [J–STOR]


Bond, Jon R., and Richard Fleisher. 1990. The President in the Legislative Arena.University of Chicago Press.

Edwards, George C. III. 1989. At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Peterson, Mark A. 1990. Legislating Together: The White House and Capitol Hill fromEisenhower to Reagan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

CLASS 12

PRESIDENTIAL–CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS:APPOINTMENTS & VETOES


Required Readings:

Cameron, Charles. 2000. Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of NegativePower. New York: Cambridge University Press. (Chapters 1–3, 5–7)

Gilmour, John B. 2002. “Institutional and Individual Influences on the President’s Veto.”Journal of Politics 64(February): 198–218. [J–STOR]

McCarty, Nolan, and Keith Poole. 1995. “Veto Power and Legislation: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Executive–Legislative Bargaining from 1961–1986.” Journal of Law,Economics, and Organization 11(April): 282–312. [E–Reserves]

McCarty, Nolan. 2004. “The Appointments Dilemma.” American Journal of PoliticalScience. 48(July): 413–428. [J–STOR]

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Moraski, Bryon J., and Charles R. Shipan. 1999. “The Politics of Supreme CourtNominations: A Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices.” American Journal ofPolitical Science 43(October): 1069–1095. [J–STOR]

Nokken, Timothy P., and Brian R. Sala. “Confirmation Dynamics: A Model ofPresidential Appointments to Independent Agencies, 1953–1988.” Journal of TheoreticalPolitics 12(January): 91–112. [E–Reserves]


Feldmann, Sven, and Anthony M. Bertelli. 2007. “Strategic Appointments.” Journal ofPublic Administration Research & Theory 17(January).

Krutz, Glen., Richard Fleisher, and Jon R. Bond. 1998. “From Abe Fortas to Zoe Baird:Why Some Presidential Nominations Fail in the Senate.” American Political ScienceReview 92(December): 871–881.

McCarty, Nolan, and Rose Razaghian. 1999. “Advice and Consent: Senate Responses toExecutive Branch Nominations, 1885–1996.” American Journal of Political Science43(July): 1122–1143.

Shipan, Charles R., and Megan L. Shannon. 2003. “Delaying Justice(s): A DurationModel of Supreme Court Confirmations.” 47(October): 654–668.

Woolley, John T. 1991. “Institutions, the Election Cycle, and the Presidential Veto.” American Journal of Political Science 35(May): 279–304.

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CLASS 13

UNILATERAL PRESIDENTIAL ACTION:


Required Readings:

Deering, Christopher, and Forrest Maltzman. 1999. “The Politics of Executive Orders:Legislative Constraints on Executive Orders.” Political Research Quarterly52(December): 767–783. [J–STOR]

Howell, William G. 2003. Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct PresidentialAction. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Chapters 1–5)

Krause, George A., and Jeffrey E. Cohen. 2000. “Opportunity, Constraints, and theDevelopment of the Institutional Presidency: The Case of Executive Order Issuance,1939–1996." Journal of Politics 62(February): 88!114. [J–STOR]

Mayer, Kenneth. 1999. “Executive Orders and Presidential Power.” Journal of Politics61(May): 445– 466. [J–STOR]


Krause, George A., and David B. Cohen. 1997. "Presidential Use of Executive Orders,1953-1994.” American Politics Quarterly 25(October): 458–481.

Mayer, Kenneth. 2001. With a Stroke of the Pen: Executive Orders and PresidentialPower. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Moe, Terry M., and William G. Howell. 1999. “Unilateral Action and PresidentialPower: A Theory.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 29(December): 850–872.

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CLASS 14

PRESIDENTS, PUBLIC POLICYMAKING, & POLICY OUTCOMES


Requires Readings:

Canes–Wrone, Brandice, William G. Howell, and David E. Lewis. 2008. “Toward aBroader Understanding of Presidential Power: A Re–Evaluation of the Two PresidenciesThesis.” Journal of Politics 70(February): 1–16 [JOP website]

Edwards, George C. III, and B. Dan Wood. 1999. “Who Influences Whom? ThePresident, Congress, and the Media.” American Political Science Review 93(June):327–344. [J–STOR]

Krause, George A. 2005. “Electoral Incentives, Political Business Cycles, andMacroeconomic Performance: Empirical Evidence from Postwar U.S. Personal IncomeGrowth.” British Journal of Political Science 35(January): 77–101. [BJPS website]

Light, Paul C. 1999. The President’s Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy toClinton. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. (Chapters 1–7)


Alesina, Albert, Nouriel Roubini, [with Gerald D. Cohen]. 1997. Political Cycles and theMacroeconomy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Fleisher, Richard, and Jon R. Bond. 1988. “Are There Two Presidencies? Yes, but onlyfor Republicans.” Journal of Politics 50(August): 747–767.

Light, Paul C. 1993. “Presidential Policy Making.” in Edwards, Kessel, and Rockman,eds. Researching the Presidency: Vital Questions, New Approaches. Pittsburgh, PA:University of Pittsburgh Press.

Meernik, James. 1994. “Presidential Decision Making and the Political Use of Military Force.” International Studies Quarterly 38(March): 121–138.

Whitford, Andrew B., and Jeff Yates. 2003. “Policy Signals and Executive Governance:Presidential Rhetoric and the War on Drugs.” Journal of Politics 65(November):995–1012.

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