PROVINCIAL RESPONSE PLAN KIRKUK GOVERNORATE · 2019-03-23 · Table 10 Main social support...

Local Area Development Programme in Iraq

Financed by the European Union

Implemented by UNDP

PROVINCIAL RESPONSE PLAN KIRKUK GOVERNORATE

February 2018

LADP in Iraq – Kirkuk PRP

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FOREWORD BY THE GOVERNOR

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CONTENT

PRP Kirkuk Governorate

Foreword by the Governor ............................................................................................................................... 3

Content ............................................................................................................................................................ 5

List of Figures ................................................................................................................................................... 7

List of Tables .................................................................................................................................................... 8

Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................................... 9

Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 11

1. Organisation of the PRP ............................................................................................................................... 11 2. Purpose of the PRP ...................................................................................................................................... 11 3. Methodology ................................................................................................................................................ 11 4. PRP development process ........................................................................................................................... 12

I. Context .................................................................................................................................................... 15

1. Location and administrative division .......................................................................................................... 15 2. Geography and natural resources .............................................................................................................. 17 3. Historical significance .................................................................................................................................. 20 4. Conflict ......................................................................................................................................................... 22

II. Social profile ............................................................................................................................................ 28

1. Population .................................................................................................................................................... 28 2. Living conditions .......................................................................................................................................... 31 3. IDP and Returnees ....................................................................................................................................... 36

3.1. Profile .............................................................................................................................................................. 36 3.2. Challenges facing IDPs and returnees ........................................................................................................... 37 3.3. Support to IDPs and returnees ...................................................................................................................... 41 3.4. Return process ............................................................................................................................................... 43

4. Disadvantaged host community groups ..................................................................................................... 44

4.1. Profile .............................................................................................................................................................. 44 4.2. Social protection and support for vulnerable groups through government bodies .................................. 46 4.3. Social support through international organisations and CSOs .................................................................... 48

5. Community peace-building and reconciliation .......................................................................................... 50

III. Economic profile ...................................................................................................................................... 53

1. Economic development ............................................................................................................................... 53 2. Industry ........................................................................................................................................................ 56 3. Agriculture .................................................................................................................................................... 60 4. Trade ............................................................................................................................................................. 62 5. Tourism ......................................................................................................................................................... 64 6. Private sector ............................................................................................................................................... 66 7. Investment ................................................................................................................................................... 67

IV. Public service delivery ............................................................................................................................. 71

1. Housing ......................................................................................................................................................... 71 2. Transport network ....................................................................................................................................... 72 3. Electricity service ......................................................................................................................................... 74 4. Water supply service ................................................................................................................................... 76 5. Wastewater management ........................................................................................................................... 79 6. Waste management .................................................................................................................................... 82 7. Communications .......................................................................................................................................... 83 8. Healthcare .................................................................................................................................................... 84 9. Education ..................................................................................................................................................... 89


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V. Governance ............................................................................................................................................. 95

1. Local governance bodies ............................................................................................................................. 95 2. Decentralisation process ............................................................................................................................. 95 3. Departments of the Governorate Administration ..................................................................................... 96 4. Governorate budget .................................................................................................................................... 98 5. Toward effective local governance ............................................................................................................. 98

VI. SWOT analysis ....................................................................................................................................... 102

VII. Strategic objectives................................................................................................................................ 103

VIII. Programmes (priority sectors) ............................................................................................................... 104

1. Programme 1: Ensure reconciliation between communities .................................................................. 104 2. Programme 2: Ensure the return of IDPs ................................................................................................. 105 3. Programme 3: Provide support to vulnerable groups to help overcome social challenges .................. 107 4. Programme 4: Restore and develop the transport network ................................................................... 109 5. Programme 5: Restore and improve the electricity service .................................................................... 110 6. Programme 6: Restore and develop the water supply and wastewater management service ............ 112 7. Programme 7: Expand and develop waste management........................................................................ 114 8. Programme 8: Improve health services quality and access .................................................................... 115 9. Programme 9: Improve education quality and access............................................................................. 117 10. Programme 10: Encourage investment and economic development .................................................... 118 11. Programme 11: Improve public governance ............................................................................................ 121

IX. Implementation of the PRP.................................................................................................................... 124

1. Implementing structures ........................................................................................................................... 124 2. Monitoring and evaluation ........................................................................................................................ 124 3. Financial resources .................................................................................................................................... 124

Sources ........................................................................................................................................................ 125

Annex: Proposed projects per sector ............................................................................................................ 127

A.1 Transport sector projects ......................................................................................................................... 127 A.2 Electricity sector projects ......................................................................................................................... 128 A.3 Water supply sector projects ................................................................................................................... 130 A.4 Wastewater management sector projects .............................................................................................. 131 A.5 Waste management sector projects ....................................................................................................... 131 A.6 Health sector projects .............................................................................................................................. 132 A.7 Education sector projects ........................................................................................................................ 134


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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Kirkuk Governorate on Iraq’s administrative map 15

Figure 2 Administrative map of Kirkuk Governorate 16

Figure 3 Physical map of Kirkuk province, Iraq 17

Figure 4 Map of climate types, precipitation levels and surface water resources, Kirkuk province 17

Figure 5 Minerals and hydrocarbons in Kirkuk province 19

Figure 6 ISIL control (2014–2016) and IDP formal settlements (Dec 2017) in Kirkuk province 25

Figure 7 Population pyramid of Kirkuk Governorate, 2016 29

Figure 8 Distribution of main ethno-religious groups in Kirkuk province 30

Figure 9 Access to services indicators for Kirkuk province 32

Figure 10 Income and poverty indicators for Kirkuk province 32

Figure 11 Human development scores for Kirkuk province (range 0–1) 32

Figure 12 Spatial disparity in development in Kirkuk province in 2013 – poverty and illiteracy mapping by nahia 33

Figure 13 Education attainment levels and labour market outcomes, Kirkuk province 34

Figure 14 Most important needs of IDPs and returnees in Kirkuk province 39

Figure 15 Profile of locations where IDPs and returnees live in Kirkuk province 39

Figure 16 Structure of Kirkuk’s Administration 97


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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Administrative division of Kirkuk Governorate 15

Table 2 Population indicators for Kirkuk Governorate compared to the national average, 2016 29

Table 3 Population of Kirkuk Governorate by administrative division, sex and urban/rural, 2016 29

Table 4 IOM IDP and returnee statistics for Kirkuk as of 31 Oct 2017 36

Table 5 Operational camps in Kirkuk Governorate as of end-2017 – population and needs 39

Table 6 Main organisations active in providing support to populations in Kirkuk 42

Table 7 Main IDP return push and pull factors for Kirkuk Governorate (in descending importance) 43

Table 8 Capacity for special needs care (under MoLSA) in Kirkuk province 47

Table 9 Youth Centres in Kirkuk Governorate 48

Table 10 Main social support programmes through international organisations 49

Table 11 Conference on Peaceful Coexistence Mechanisms in southwest Kirkuk province – conclusions (15 Jan 2017) 51

Table 12 Large and small industrial plants, Kirkuk province, 2013 (COSIT) 57

Table 13 Private industry indicators, Kirkuk province, 2016 57

Table 14 Arable land, cultivated land and productivity in plant agriculture in Kirkuk province for 2015 61

Table 15 Agriculture indicators for selected production, 2014 (COSIT) 61

Table 16 Tourism indicators for Kirkuk, 2013 (COSIT) 64

Table 17 Road infrastructure indicators, Kirkuk province – main, secondary and rural roads 73

Table 18 Electricity sector indicators, Kirkuk province, 2016 75

Table 19 Power transmission infrastructure affected in the context of ISIL 75

Table 20 Water supply indicators for Kirkuk Governorate 77

Table 21 Water supply service coverage in rural areas 78

Table 22 Kirkuk city sewer network 79

Table 23 Wastewater management service indicators for Kirkuk province 80

Table 24 Communications indicators for Kirkuk province, 2014 (COSIT) 84

Table 25 Public cummunications service infrastructure (telephone and optical fibre), Kirkuk province, 2017 84

Table 26 Healthcare indicators for Kirkuk province, 2014 (COSIT) 85

Table 27 Specialised medical clinics in Kirkuk province (2016) 86

Table 28 Health services provided to IDPs by health institutions in Kirkuk province in 01 July 2014–31 Oct 2015 87

Table 29 Education indicators (pre-school, primary, secondary), Kirkuk Directorate of Education, 2015/16 92

Table 30 Students enrolled in initial university studies, 2014/15, Kirkuk Governorate (COSIT) 93

Table 31 Achievements under DG Education in Kirkuk in responding to the IDP crisis in 2014/15 academic year 93

Table 32 Status of the governance decentralisation process per Law 21 95


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ABBREVIATIONS

bpd Barrels of crude oil per day

COSIT Central Organisation for Statistics and Information Technology (Iraq)

CBSP Community Based Strategic Planning (process/methodology)

CSOs Civil Society Organisations

DG Directorate General

FFES Funding Facility for Extended Stabilisation (UNDP)

FFIS Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilisation (UNDP)

GoI Government of Iraq

GSP Governance Strengthening Programme, Iraq (USAID)

HE/HEI Higher education/ Higher Education Institution

IDPs Internally displaced persons

IED Improvised explosive device

IHSES Iraq Household and Socio-Economic Survey

IOM International Organisation for Migration

IRC International Rescue Committee

ISIL Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (aka ISIS)

KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party

KRG Kurdistan Regional Government

KRI Kurdistan Region of Iraq

LADP Local Area Development Programme (EU funded, UNDP implemented)

Law 21 Law of Governorates Not Incorporated into a Region – aka. Provincial Powers Act (2008)

MoCHPMW Ministry of Construction, Housing, Municipalities and Public Works (Iraq)

MoE Ministry of Education (Iraq)

MoHESR Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (Iraq)

MoLSA Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (Iraq)

MoMD Ministry of Migration and Displacement (Iraq)

MoP Ministry of Planning (Iraq)

MoT Ministry of Trade (Iraq)

MoTC Ministry of Transport and Communications (Iraq)

MoWR Ministry of Water Resources (Iraq)

MoYS Ministry of Youth and Sports (Iraq)

MPs Members of Parliament (Iraq)

NFI Non-food items

OPF Operation Iraqi Freedom

Peshmerga Iraqi Kurdish militias of the KDP and PUK, both loyal to the KRG

PMFs Popular Mobilisation Force units

PPP Public-Private Partnership

PRP Provincial Response Plan

PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

PwDs Persons with disability

QC Qadha Centre

TDS Total dissolved solids

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund

UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services

UNWTO World Tourism Organisation (United Nations agency)

USAID United States Agency for International Development

UXO Unexploded ordnance

WASH Water, sanitation and hygiene

WHO World Health Organisation

WWTP Wastewater treatment plant


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INTRODUCTION

Kirkuk is one of Iraq's governorates worst affected by the 2013–2014 ISIL invasion. Heavy combat drove waves of displaced people from and into Kirkuk. Kirkuk hosted the second highest number of IDPs from other Iraqi provinces (after the KRI); IDPs in Kirkuk province numbered almost half a million at the height of displacement; while more than a fifth of Kirkuk’s population remain in displacement. The toll on infrastructures and the economy has been significant as well. Fighting in the province continued through Oct 2017. In the post-ISIL context, attention turns to (1) rebuilding of communities and (2) sound solutions to public service delivery – in order to set the basis for longer-term development of the governorate. In this regard, with support from LADP, the authorities of Kirkuk Governorate have set out to elaborate a Provincial Response Plan (PRP) for the period 2018–2022.

1. Organisation of the PRP

The Plan consists of two main integral parts – vulnerability assessment and strategic part:

The vulnerability assessment reviews the situation – prior to and following ISIL – in three strategic areas: (1) community development, (2) economic development, and (3) provision of public services.

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strategic area, a number of indicators have been researched in order to provide a full picture of the conditions in the governorate.

Based on the vulnerability assessment, the strategic part includes: SWOT analysis; a list of identified strategic objectives; and a list of identified priority areas for development (programmes). Several projects have been identified in series of workshops and consultations by the working groups with the support from the experts for each programme that will help return people in the governorate to normal life.

2. Purpose of the PRP

The Provincial Response Plan (PRP) sets a framework for actions to be taken by the governorate with support from the central authorities and international donors. It provides provincial authorities with an instrument to help them:

Better monitor the progress of the reconstruction, planning and prioritisation of development actions;

Coordinate the efforts of international donors – given the limited resources of the national and provincial budget;

Better recognise what additional technical support they need.

At the same time, the PRP aims to direct the efforts of the provincial authorities from immediate post-conflict stabilisation toward longer-term development. Currently, Kirkuk is mainly a recipient of international aid and central budged instalments. Through the Plan, the Governorate will become the leading partner in its development process and it will proactively pursue its objectives – including through implementation of public-private partnerships (PPPs) and cooperation with the international donors and investors and local community.

The PRP is a living document that will be periodically reviewed and updated as required. As Kirkuk Governorate moves forward in addressing pressing developmental issues, it will be more important than ever to ensure that the efforts of government and international agencies are synchronised and leveraged as part of a holistic and sustainable response.

3. Methodology

Traditionally in Iraq the planning process is highly centralised. Therefore, LADP supports the development of a participatory planning approach to formulate prioritised objectives and strategies to address the key security, governance, economic, and social challenges that the target governorates are facing (Anbar, Diyala, Nineveh, Salah al-Din and Kirkuk). Through the participatory approach several goals are achieved: help strengthen

1 Data collection toward Vulnerability Assessment was not possible in Al-Hawiga Qadha and Al-Rashad (Daquq Qadha) due to these areas still being under ISIL control at the time (they were liberated in Oct 2017).


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democracy; reduce corruption; limit differences among various political and ethnic groups; and empower citizens by promoting greater interaction between stakeholders within communities. Participatory planning creates a fair process to prioritise development and implementation of projects and fosters a sense of ownership of development programmes.

Therefore, the development of PRPs under LADP has followed the Community Based Strategic Planning methodology (CBSP).

Strategic planning. Strategic planning was the selected approach because it differs from the traditional model of comprehensive planning in several important ways:

Strategic planning is pro-active. Through the strategic planning process, the community seeks to shape its future – not just prepare for it;

Strategic planning focuses only on the critical strategic issues and directs resources to the highest priority activities. Setting priorities is necessary because the resources available to the local government (governorate) are less than the demands on them. By contrast, comprehensive planning covers all activities that must be done without indicating which ones are the most important;

Strategic planning is led by those tasked to implement the resultant strategic plan; it entails ownership. By contrast, a comprehensive plan prescribes who should implement it but it does not require the inclusion of those entities in the strategic planning process.

Community-based planning. Community involvement strengthens strategic planning in several ways:

Transparency: While the strategic plan establishes priority areas for development, it has political as well as economic dimensions. Community involvement contributes to a transparent process.

Implementation/resource mobilisation. Community involvement promotes the plan implementation. Beyond government resources, it helps mobilise the resources of the community toward achieving the economic goals. Successful strategic planning involves the entities that will be tasked with the implementation of the plan.

Support and credibility: Participation of community leaders in plan development gives the resulting plan credibility in the community. Consensus among Project Steering Committee members promotes a community consensus in support of the Plan.

4. PRP development process

The development of PRP following CBSP methodology entails the process of (1) establishment of a coordination group, (2) collection of baseline information, and (3) identification of strategic areas of intervention by involving relevant stakeholders.

However, due to the specifics in the environment in the LAPD target cluster of governorates (i.e. post-war conditions of damaged infrastructure, security, fragility and large number of IDPs), the main priority areas were set at the beginning of the planning process – rather than identifying them based on detailed research on the current situation in the governorate. They are based on the initial meetings with the established Steering Committee and Technical Group for the preparation of the PRP in Sept 2016. The main priority areas identified are: community development, economic development, and provision of public services.

The Project SC in each province has had to weigh in many factors while integrating the summary action plans into a coherent strategic plan for development. In some cases, the availability of resources could only be assumed – e.g. financial allocations from the central budget, grants from international donors and (PPP-based) private investments.

Implementing the CBSP methodology for the development of the PRP has embedded two key concepts: on-the-job-training and learning-by-doing. E.g. Kirkuk Governorate staff and other stakeholders have benefited from trainings and support from the LADP experts; while people from the governorate involved in the preparation of the PRP have contributed information and findings. These two concepts have been streamlined throughout the process of PRP preparation – from the first meetings with the PSC until the completion of the PRP.

The thirteen-step approach to Community-Based Strategic Planning has been integrated into the main activities of the preparation of the response plan.


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13-step CBSP process

Initiate process and make decision on strategic planning activity; 1.

Organise the Public-Private Strategic Planning Task Force (Steering Committee); 2.

Develop vision of the economic and social future of the province in the next planning period; 3.

Identify stakeholders (stakeholders management); 4.

Develop and analyse baseline data – including, in parallel: 5.

Collect data on socio-economic trends;

Collect data on Key industries;

Collect data on economic development infrastructure; and

Conduct business survey;

Conduct SWOT Analysis; 6.

Identify strategic issues; 7.

Identify critical strategic issues; 8.

Establish Action Groups around critical strategic issues; 9.

Apply Logical Framework Approach (LFA): 10.

Develop a problem tree;

Develop an objective tree (and identify strategic objectives);

Build Log Frame Matrix for each activity;

Develop Action Plans to address critical strategic issues – incl. build an Action Planning Group around 11.each critical strategic issue;

Integrate Action Plans into PRP (this document); 12.

Prepare Plan for implementation, evaluation and updating the PRP. 13.


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I. CONTEXT

1. Location and administrative division

Located 255 km north of Baghdad, Kirkuk is an important economic centre, key to Iraq’s oil industry. The location of Kirkuk province is of particular importance for Iraq as a link between the northern mountainous areas and the southern plains; as such, it is strategic for security and trade. Highways Baghdad–Kirkuk-Erbil-Mosul-Turkey and Kirkuk-Suleimaniah-Tehran provide quick access to all Iraqi territories.

Kirkuk has undergone a number of administrative transfers, linked to economic priorities and demographic shifts, but also very much to struggles for political-economic control and power – particularly, the establishment and recognition of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Its borders with Kurdistan areas are still contested today.

Currently, Kirkuk Governorate covers an area of 8404.3 km2 (1.92% of Iraq).2 It has joint administrative borders

with Suleimaniah, Salah al-Din, Nineveh and Erbil governorates (see Figure 1). It is sub-divided into four qadhas – Kirkuk, Al-Hawiga, Daquq and Dibis – and 16 nahias (see Table 1, Figure 2). The main cities are Kirkuk (the capital) and Al-Hawiga.

Table 1 Administrative division of Kirkuk Governorate

N Qadhas (regions) Nahias (districts) Nahias (n) 1 Kirkuk Kirkuk Qadha Centre, Yaychi, Alton Kobry, Al-Multaka (Mula Abdullah), Taza Khormato,

Laylan, Shwan, Qara Hanjeer (Al-Rabee) 8

2 Al-Hawiga Al-Hawiga Qadha Centre, Al-Abbasi, Al-Riyadh, Al-Zab 4 3 Daquq Daquq Qadha Centre, Al-Rashad 2 4 Dibis Dibis Qadha Centre, Sarkran (Al-Qudis) 2

Figure 1 Kirkuk Governorate on Iraq’s administrative map

Legend: Yellow – Kirkuk; Beige – KRG-controlled areas; Stripes – contested areas.

2 The total area of Kirkuk province (8404.3 km2) is given as the sum of areas per nahia provided in Kirkuk Governorate (2016), Strategy of Kirkuk Governorate for Re-stabilization, Sheltering Displaced and Rebuilding of Liberated Areas. We note that this differs from the total governorate area provided by COSIT for 2015: 9679 km2 (or 2.2% of Iraq’s territory).


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Figure 2 Administrative map of Kirkuk Governorate


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2. Geography and natural resources

Landscape and geology

Kirkuk province is part of the foothills fold and thrust zone of the Taurus-Zagros Belt formed during the collision of the Arabian and Eurasian Plates, with the Zargos mountain rising toward the east (the border with Iran). This is a basin of molasse sediment accumulation, characterised by long folds and broad synclines. The area presents with folding and cycles of sedimentary rocks mainly from Neogene/Miocene (sandstone, gypsum). Faults are very significant in groundwater movements, while the sedimentary rocks hold high potential for groundwater storage. The depositional environment and tectonic history condition the formation and trapping of petroleum.

In terms of landscape, except in the very east of the province, this is a level plain (see Figure 3), interspersed with a series of long low mountains with SE–NW orientation as defining features, e.g. (E–>W): the Hamrin Mountains (410 m.a.s.l), which stretch along the Kirkuk–Salah al-Din border from Beygee in Salah al-Din to Adhaim in Diyala; Mount Twsaqali (360 m.a.s.l.) south of Kirkuk city, which marks the border between Kirkuk and Daquq qadhas; Mount Batiwa west of Kirkuk city (355 m.a.s.l.), which connects north to Qarachuq Mountain in Makhmoor (Nineveh); Qani Domlan Ridge (ca. 440 m.a.s.l.), which starts east of Kirkuk city, crosses Dibis Qadha and further north forms part of the Nineveh–Erbil border; and. The highest point of the Zagros mountain range in Kirkuk province is in Mount Sufa Pach on the border with Suleimaniah (ca. 1120 m.a.s.l.).

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Figure 3 Physical map of Kirkuk province, Iraq4

Figure 4 Map of climate types, precipitation levels and surface water resources, Kirkuk province

Climate

The majority of Kirkuk qadha falls in the belt of warm semi-arid climate (BSh by Köppen–Geiger) (see Figure 4). This is positioned in ecological characteristics and agricultural potential between desert and humid climates, allowing relatively extensive rain-fed agriculture. The annual average temperature is ca. 20°C, and precipitation is overall minimal – ca. 300 mm. In Kirkuk city, the annual average temperature is 21.6°C; temperatures are highest in July (ca. 34.6°C average) and lowest in January (8.7°C average); the annual precipitation is 365mm (low), none in the summer, and peaking in March.

5 Toward the south-east of the province, the annual

precipitation is less (ca. 250mm), which requires irrigation to sustain crops growth.

In the very north-east of the province, near the border Salah al-Din–Erbil–Suleimaniah border, limited areas of cold semi-arid climate (BSk) present with temperate climate, bordering on Mediterranean: with hot summers, cold winters, major temperature swings between day and night (sometimes by as much as 20°C), annual average temperature of ca. 18°C, and moderately low precipitation (ca. 550mm), with wetter autumns and springs than elsewhere in the province.

3 To compare, Kirkuk city is located at ca. 340 m.a.s.l. 4 Adapted from Fatih, S. (May 2016 – in the frame of UNDP/LADP), Overview of Kirkuk Governorate (محة ظة عن عامة ل وك محاف رك .(ك5 https://en.climate-data.org/location/2920.


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Overall, in Kirkuk province, temperatures range between 5–8°C in the winter and 40–45°C in the summer. The wet season lasts from November to April; the dry season – from May to October. During the winter rains, rivers carry brief but torrential floods. The flooding season peaks in April and ends in May. Sand and dust storms rage for 20–50 days each summer. Precipitation is overall minimal. Except in the north-east, the actual precipitation is less than half the level of potential evapotranspiration,

6 and it is virtually none in the summer. Precipitation in

the BSk zone upstream of the Little Zab from Salah al-Din is key to securing the water flow and aquifer recharge in the province. At the same time, there has been significant decline in rainfall in recent years.

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Water resources

Kirkuk province is strategically located with regard to surface water resources (see Figure 2). It is located in the east of the Tigris catchment area. The main perennial rivers are the Tigris and the Little Zab. The Khasa (which flows through Kirkuk city) and Daquq rivers are winterbourne; they tend to dry up in the summer, but can turn into raging rivers in late winter.

The governorate increasingly depends on groundwater for domestic and agricultural activities. However, with regard to groundwater resources, Kirkuk Governorate faces deficiency due to drought and pollution of surface and groundwater resources (from poor waste/wastewater management, including households, agriculture and industries), in addition to the irrational use of water. In the low folded zone, the aquifer consists of sedimentary formations and there is hydraulic continuity across the formation; groundwater movement is typically from north–northwest to south–southeast. Precipitation is the main form of groundwater recharge – while precipitation has been declining. Generally, the salinity of the groundwater increases from north to south, and from recharge sources in the high land areas toward discharge areas in the south and west of the province. Groundwater quality is mainly bicarbonate at recharge areas, and it becomes sulphuric at discharge areas. Due to effects of human, animal and agricultural activities, throughout the province, the Water Quality Index (WQI) values for wells decline from “good” to “poor” along the downstream of rivers. TDS

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from natural sources, but particularly from sewage, urban run-off, agriculture, industrial wastewater, outdated water supply systems, etc. Therefore, groundwaters toward the south and west of the province have particularly high levels of TDS, especially organic contamination, as well as increase in the concentration of heavy metals.

Soils and vegetation

Two ecological regions present in the province: (1) Mesopotamian shrub desert in the south-west (dominant); and (2) Middle East steppe in the north-east.

The Mesopotamian shrub desert is characterised by deserts and xeric shrublands. Because biomass productivity is low, the litter layer is almost non-existent and the organic content of surface soil layers is very low. Also, evaporation tends to concentrate salts at the soil surface. Sensitivity to disturbance – from grazing, soil disturbance, burning, ploughing, and other cover alteration – is very high, and restoration and regeneration potential tend to be very low. The conversion of productive drylands to desert conditions (desertification) can occur from due to intensive agricultural tillage or overgrazing. A tendency to desertification becomes more pronounced with climate change.

The Middle East steppe is characterised by temperate grasslands, savannas, and shrublands. Soils are relatively fertile and richer in nutrients and minerals. Herbaceous and dwarf shrub communities tend to dominate in deeper, non-saline soils and often occur in association with short grasses where disturbed by grazing. The combination of arid steppe and riverine habitat allow this area to support a tremendous diversity of bird species that depend on both arid areas and wetlands. Extensive overgrazing by domestic livestock contributes to the alteration and degradation of vegetation communities.

Overall, the conditions are present for development of plant agriculture (especially in the north-east of Kirkuk province, as well pastures/animal herding. However, increasingly toward the south-west: (1) organic matter and nitrogen in soils decrease, and calcareous content and salt concentration increase; (2) the soil climate is extreme, surface soil horizons are very dry and hot, making chemical weathering and soil formation extremely slow (physical weathering predominates); (3) the potential productivity of soils depends on the supply of adequate water and nutrients; while (4) soils become more vulnerable, including to desertification.

6 The amount of water that would be evaporated and transpired if there were sufficient water available. 7 It is estimated that precipitation in the Middle East has dropped by 30% between 2005 and 2009 alone. See UN-ESCWA (Nov 2012), Groundwater and Water Management Issues in the Middle East – presentation: https://bit.ly/2KBH8E6. 8 Total dissolved solids (TDS) is a measure of the combined content of all inorganic and organic substances contained in a liquid in molecular, ionized or micro-granular suspended form. TDS refers to any minerals, salts, metals, cations or anions dissolved in water - including inorganic salts (salt, calcium, magnesium, sulphates, etc.) and organic matter.


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In Kirkuk province, the sustainability of water resources is at risk, with severe impact on the environment, economy and human health. Both water conservation and degradation of water quality need to be a concern.

With regard to water quantity, dams and water projects constructed upstream (KRI, Turkey) have significantly reduced river flow into Kirkuk province. Fluctuations in the Tigris water flow are caused by non-compliance with water quotas among the countries on the river; while recharge of the Little Zab and Khasa rivers and associated groundwaters has been increasingly limited by decline in precipitation. In this context, groundwater overuse and groundwater mining are further threats. In turn, reduced river flow factors in increased soil erosion and increased incidence of heat and dust storms, with impact on health, productivity, and soil and vegetation status.

With regard to water quality, the decreasing river flow and high temperatures increase the salinity level of water. Also, while the rivers are the main source of drinking water for people in Kirkuk, the lack of wastewater treatment plants in cities along the river poses a massive threat to the environment, public health, human and economic development in the governorate.

Soil degradation is another major problem in the province related to industrial pollution, water use and inappropriate agricultural practices. In irrigated areas, soil salinization results from accumulation of soluble salts in the upper parts of the soil profile – mainly linked to poor drainage systems. Both are exacerbated by the dry hot climate and high evaporation rates. It has impact on agricultural production, food security, environmental health, and economics. Desertification is also a concern, caused by a combination of natural (drought conditions, wind erosion) and human-driven factors (e.g. over-grazing, vegetation stripping).

All these threats are only going to increase in the context of climate change, the effects of which are already evident across Kirkuk province – including increased severity of droughts. E.g. by IOM data, in 2010, displacement due to drought in Kirkuk province was among the highest in Iraq (500+ families).

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Measures to improve the management of soil and water resources are required. It is important that together the provincial and central authorities work to develop short- and long-term solutions to ensure sustainability of soil and water resources, e.g.: conserve freshwater ecosystems; expand wastewater treatment; limit pollution from agriculture and industry; develop rainwater collection; reuse all forms of water and (treated) wastewater; raise public awareness regarding water use; research and development in sustainable agriculture and irrigation methods; etc. Certain measures to address desertification are already underway by the Ministry of Agriculture – e.g. the establishment of desert oases.

Mineral and hydrocarbon resources

Figure 5 Minerals and hydrocarbons in Kirkuk province10

9 IOM infographic in UN-ESCWA (Nov 2012), Groundwater and Water Management Issues in the Middle East, p5: https://bit.ly/2KBH8E6. 10 Adapted from (1) Minerogenic map of Iraq, Geoserv-Iraq (available at: http://bit.ly/2BYxbLs), (2) EIA (2012), Major fields and infrastructure in Iraq – map available at: https://fanack.com/fanack-energy/Iraq; and (3) Platts.com (2014 data): https://bit.ly/2rkT8B4.


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Kirkuk has vast deposits of oil (see Figure 5). The giant Kirkuk oil field discovered 1927 has estimated reserves of 8.5 billion barrels of recoverable oil. Most of the oil deposits are associated with natural gas.

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environment, abundant asphalt and bitumen deposits exists as well (for asphalt production/road construction). Hydrocarbons are used in the petrochemicals industry; natural gas can also serve for production of electricity. Oil and gas are strategic resources in the province, linked to conflict and border disputes.

Kirkuk province is relatively poor in the variety of mineral deposits additional to hydrocarbons. Nevertheless it does have substantial reserves of gravel and sand (for use in construction) and gypsum (for production of plaster for decoration and in the cement industry), which provide a basis for industrial activities.

Industrial pollution – including pollution of water resources, soils and air – is a major problem in the governorate, with impact on public health and the resources available for agriculture. E.g. in the case of oil and natural gas production, so-called “produced water” comprises the largest by-product stream; this may contain hundreds of individual chemicals, some known to be detrimental to public health and the environment. In the context of weak environmental regulation, most of this ends up in surface/groundwater resources and soils. Asphalt production in the province is particularly polluting.

Pollution from industry has been exacerbated in the context of conflict. E.g. in 2005, Kirkuk was covered with a thick pall of smoke after fighters attacked the oil and gas infrastructure. Post-ISIL, there is specifically concern regarding environmental and health hazards related to burning of oil fields, bombed refineries, and the destruction of sensitive industrial locations (such as chemical plants, etc.). E.g. destruction of Beygee oil refinery in Salah al-Din drove fumes of toxins and water resource pollution in Kirkuk province. Post ISIL., in many areas, residents return to extremely polluted air, poisoned soil, and waterways clogged with crude oil.

With additional effect on air quality, the dramatic increase in population (especially urban population) has led to huge increase in the number of vehicles and the rates of gasoline and fuel consumption, posing an additional threat to public health.

The Governorate Authorities need to recognise that the environment is a crucial part of people’s lives; and in rural areas, it is their livelihood. Measures to contain and reduce pollution – increased control, modern technology adoption for pollution reduction and beneficial reuse of industrial waste/wastewater, etc. – are central if the governorate is to achieve improved living conditions and sustainable growth across sectors. Air pollution from traffic can be targeted by e.g. introduction of green belts on urban areas, increase in park areas, and improvement of public transportation systems.

3. Historical significance

Kirkuk’s archaeological remains date back to the 7th c. BC. The site Qal'at Jarmo (dated ca. 6750 BC by latest estimates) is Iraq’s most important Neolithic site and site of the earliest agricultural community in West Asia. Thus, Kirkuk is the oldest site of continuous human occupation in modern-day Iraq. According to the Department of Antiquities, Kirkuk province contains 700 archaeological sites, of both historical and religious value.

Antiquity

The modern-day city of Kirkuk sits on the ruins of the ancient city of Arrapha (Arava) on Khasa River (first mentioned ca. 2400 BC). The area became a part of the Akkadian Empire (2335–2154 BC) which united all Akkadian- and Sumerian- speaking Mesopotamians under one rule. After the collapse of the empire, the area was successively ruled by Guti (Kurdish ancestors), Neo-Sumerians, Assyrians, Babylonians, and Hurri-Mitanni. In the 18th c. BC under Assyrian and Babylonian rule, Arrapha was an important commercial centre; it reached great prominence in the 11th and 10th c. BC as a part of Assyria and an important garrison town; and it was one of the last strongholds of the Neo-Assyrian Empire (911 BC–609 BC). Thereafter, Arrapha fell successively to Persian, Macedonian and Seleucid rule. Under the Seleucid Empire (312–63 BC), the settlement was refounded under the Syriac name Karka. In ca. 150 BC–280 AD, Arrapha-Karka was the capital of a small Neo-Assyrian kingdom. This was subsumed under Sassanid-ruled Assuristan (Assyria) until the Byzantine–Sassanid War of 602–628 AD and the consequent Arab Islamic conquest, when Assuristan was dissolved and Arrapha-Karka eventually became Kirkuk.

11 Detailed information on the field – including oil quality, geology, production constraints, cf. e.g. Al-Rawi, Munim (2014), “Reservoir Management: Kirkuk – A Silent Giant Oilfield”: https://www.geoexpro.com/articles/2015/02/kirkuk-a-silent-giant-oilfield in GEO ExPro, Vol. 11, No. 6 (2014).


21

Ancient Arrapha has never been excavated. The Kirkuk Citadel dates in part to the Neo-Assyrian and Seleucid periods (see Box below). Yorgan Tepe near Kirkuk is the site of the ancient city Nuzi – a centre of provincial administration in the Hurri-Mitanni empire. Excavations have revealed a palace, decorated with mural paintings, elaborate provisions for drainage/sanitation, temple, and an archive of 20 000 cuneiform tablets in Akkadian.

Islamic period

In the 7–10h c. AD, the area of Kirkuk remained part of the Islamic Caliphate under the rule of Seljuk Turks. After the Mongol invasion of the 13th c, the area became a part of the Mongol Ilkhanate, which was in turn conquered by Kara Koyunlu Turkomen and Ak Koyunlu Turkomen. During the Umayyad (661–750 AD) and Abbasid (750–1258 AD) periods, Turkmen began migrating to Kirkuk, and they have comprised a significant ethnic minority since the 11 c. AD (further waves of Turkic migration followed in the Ottoman period). A minority of Arabs and Assyrians/Christians inhabited the region too, while Kurds formed the majority of the population.

Sites from this period include e.g. Sheikh Hammad and Imam Ismail b(in Hawiga) (Abbasid period); the domes and minarets of Nabi Daniel Mosque (13 c.); Khatoon Baghdi (Gok Kumbet) built around a Seljuk mausoleum (1361); the Green Dome Mosque (1362); the ruins of the Em Al Ahzan Chaldean Catholic Cathedral (known as the “Red Church” – 13 c.); etc. (see Box below). A number of Arabic scripts are also preserved.

Ottoman period

Kirkuk was assimilated into the Ottoman Empire in 1538, under Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent, Kirkuk was capital of the province of Shahrzur of the Ottoman Empire until the formation of Wilayat Mosul in 1879, which included Kirkuk. Ottoman authorities empowered the local elite (Kurdish and Turcoman families), who they perceived as key agents in maintaining a cohesive, unified empire. The majority of the elite families preserved Sunni orthodoxy; Shia populations were sometimes persecuted in the context of the Ottoman-Persian wars; but overall there was peaceful multi-cultural coexistence. In the early 1900s, Kirkuk city was inhabited mainly by Turkomen and the surrounding areas by Kurds.

Historical sites from this period are abundant (e.g. the gates of the Tash Kopru bridge across the Khasa in Kirkuk). Among the key ones, the Qishla of Kirkuk was built in 1863 to be the headquarters of the Ottoman army in Kirkuk. Al-Qaysareyah Market – the oldest market in Kirkuk – was built in ca. 1855; its layout symbolizes the hours, days, and months of the year.

The Kirkuk Citadel – the oldest structure in Kirkuk city – is a symbol of Kirkuk’s rich multi-cultural past. The Citadel holds great importance in Kirkuk province and city as a symbol of shared heritage, unity and peaceful coexistence of the different groups in the community – Kurds, Assyrians, Turkomen and Arabs.

The Citadel goes back to the dawn of the Sumerian dynasties. Its tell is believed to have been built by the Assyrian King Ashurnasirpal II (9 c. BC) as a military defence line of Arrapha. Under Seleucus I Nicator (3 c. BC), a strong rampart was built with 72 towers and 2 entries into the citadel. The modern walls go back to the Ottoman period.

The site occupies ca. 200 000 m2 in the heart of Kirkuk city. Until the 1990s, it was inhabited by Kurdish and Turkomen families, both groups in their own streets which had been inhabited for centuries; in the Hamam neighborhood, Muslims and Christians had lived together. In 1997–1998, the Regime carried out a "beautification" programme of the area; in result, inhabitants were expelled; structures within the Citadel walls were largely demolished; of more than 650 traditional houses, only 45 remain.

A jewel of the citadel is the “Red Church,” distinguished by pre-Muslim mosaic engravings. The citadel also houses the two principal religious sites in Kirkuk: Nabi Daniel Mosque and Green Dome Mosque (Islamic period). Nabi Daniel Mosque includes a tomb, attributed to the biblical Prophet Daniel. The site was a Jewish synagogue, then a Christian church, and finally a Muslim mosque.

Kirkuk Citadel and Al Qaysareyah Market, Kirkuk.


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Aftermath of WWI

During WWI, the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement divided Ottoman Arab provinces into areas of British or French influence, without regard to ethnic-religious characteristics; Kirkuk fell into British control. In the wake of WWI, the area became part of the British Mandate over Mesopotamia. The British attempted to create an autonomous Kurdish entity including Kirkuk.

12 Ultimately, the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne made no provision for a

Kurdish state, leaving large Kurdish populations as minorities in their respective countries. Kirkuk was not a part of the Kurdish uprisings of 1920-24; the province was however strongly disputed between the Turks and the British. Iraq's possession of Wilayat Mosul (including Kikruk) was brokered between Turkey and Great Britain in 1925, and in 1926 Kirkuk became part of the Kingdom of Iraq.

In 1927, drillers working for the British-led Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) struck a huge oil gusher at Baba Gurgur near Kirkuk, and so the giant Kirkuk oilfield was discovered. The oilfield was brought into production by the IPC in 1934 when 12-inch pipelines from Kirkuk to Haifa and Tripoli (Lebanon) were completed. Thereafter, the political and economic importance of the region grew steadily, linked to the discovery of oil. Oil extraction and trade increasingly became the leading economic factor in the province.

The presence of the oil industry had a huge effect on Kirkuk's demographics. Population and urbanisation both quickly increased; many Kurds and Arabs moved to Kirkuk city; the share of Arabs in the province increased; while Kurdish populations from the mountains increasingly populated uninhabited but cultivatable parts of the province. In the 1940s and 1950s, the IPC played a central role in the urbanization of Kirkuk, initiating housing and development projects in collaboration with Iraqi authorities. According to the 1957 census, the population of Kirkuk province included 48.2% Kurds, 28.2% Arabs, 21.4% Turkomen, and 2.2% minorities (Assyrian/Chaldean Christians, Yazidis, Jews, etc.) (in total 97% Muslims); while Kirkuk city included 37.6% Turkomen, 33.3% Kurds, with Arabs and Assyrians making up less than 23% of its population.

4. Conflict

Kirkuk is particularly ethnically heterogeneous territory. Given Kirkuk’s history (above), it is understandable that Kurds, Turkomen and Arabs all ascribe great symbolic importance to Kirkuk city as a central element of each group’s history, culture and identity. Historically, the province has witnessed many periods of peaceful and tolerant living together of all the different ethno-religious groups. However, from the 1920s on, Kirkuk’s rich multi-ethnic culture has been overshadowed by oil-driven conflict.

Particularly since the 1970s, the oil riches of Kirkuk have been at the basis ethnopolicy, ethnic-based disputes and conflict in the region – all seeking to increase political control of and thereby economic gains from the Kirkuk region. These have politicised ethnic divisions. Thus, from the 1970s, Kirkuk has been an arena of internal displacements and (often violent) demographic shifts, which have weakened community ties in the province. In post-Baathist Iraq, Kirkuk is a microcosm of the most significant unresolved issues: territorial disputes, the allocation of budgets and division of hydrocarbon resources, and the power of the provinces vis-a-vis Baghdad.

In this context, tensions among Arabs, Kurds, and Turkomen have continued potential to escalate into intercommunal violence – especially as they have been fuelled in the context of ISIL.

Ba’athist regime (1968–2003), Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) and Gulf War I (1990–1991)

Following the 17 July Revolution coup in Iraq (1968), Arabisation (Ta’rib) was pursued by the Ba’athist regime – systematic effort to instil national unity via collective Arab identity. The process included suppression of Kurdish nationalism and forced displacement of Kurds from Kirkuk and other (mainly oil-rich) parts of Iraq; Arabs were encouraged to relocate to vacated areas. Also, the lands of (Shi’a) Turkomen (e.g. in Taza and Daquq areas of Kirkuk) were seized and subsequently leased to Arab settlers. Also, “national correction” was initiated, whereby Kurds and Turkomen were forced to register as Arabs.

At the same time, amid regional power struggle, Iran and Iraq both encouraged separatist activities by Kurdish nationalists in the other state. Following the Iranian Revolution (1979), Iraq initiated a military campaign to take over Iran’s south-western oil fields, which quickly turned into the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988).

12 The (abandoned) Treaty of Sevres from 1920 envisioned Kurdistan borders roughly corresponding to areas claimed by the KRG today. The rise of Atatürk in Turkey weakened Kurdish efforts for autonomy in the region.


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The war amplified tensions between Ba'athist Iraq and the Peshmerga and sparked large-scale uprising against the Regime. The Regime responded with a ‘purification’ campaign in Iraq that included systematic destruction of settlements, mass killings, mass deportations, concentration camps, executions, and chemical warfare against Kurds, but also heavily targeting Yazidis, Assyrians/Christians and Shabaks – culminating in the Anfal campaign (1986–1989). After the collapse of the uprising in March 1991, as Iraqi troops advanced into Kurdish areas, and a vast wave of 1.5 million Kurds abandoned their homes and fled to the Turkish and Iranian borders.

By 1988, falling oil prices and war debts contributed to a worsening economic crisis in Iraq, precipitating Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the Gulf War I (1990–1991). In the aftermath of the Gulf War, sanctions were imposed on Iraq (1991–2003). Iraq was banned from importing anything not expressly permitted by the UN; foreign companies were stopped from doing business with Iraq; oil production dropped by 85%; non-oil industry and agriculture severely contracted. GDP per capita – USD 2836 in 1989 -- fell to USD 174 by 1994. Public service delivery was made near impossible; public spending on e.g. roads, water supply, healthcare and education plummeted. The impact on human development was great. Poverty, infant/child mortality, and malnutrition soared; and enrolment rates and quality declined at all levels of the education system.

Because of its oil and strategic value to the government, as well as its ethic mix, Kirkuk was particularly affected by this entire process:

In March 1970, an Autonomy Agreement was signed, which recognised the legitimacy of Kurdish participation in government and Kurdish language teaching in schools, while it reserved judgment on the territorial extent of Kurdistan, pending a new census. In 1972, the Iraqi Government nationalised the Iraqi Petroleum Company (Kirkuk petroleum only). In 1974, the Iraqi Government unilaterally decreed a new statute, where the definition of Kurdish autonomous area excluded the oil-rich areas of Kirkuk, Khanaqin (Diyala) and Sinjar(Nineveh). Violence broke out;

At this time, the Regime also carried out a comprehensive administrative reform, whereby Kirkuk governorate border changes were enacted to support Ta’rib: the old Kirkuk province was split in half; Kurdish-dominated districts were added to Erbil and Suleimaniah provinces; Arab-dominated districts – to Kirkuk; and Turkomen villages – to Diyala and Salah la-Din. In 1976, Kirkuk Governorate was renamed to At-Ta'mim Governorate, which means “nationalisation” and refers to the importance of national ownership of the regional oil and natural gas reserves (Kirkuk retained this name till 2006);

In 1986, Kirkuk became a battleground as Iranian forces and Kurdish PUK guerrillas attacked several objectives in the area including oil refineries;

Persecution by the Regime of Kurds, Shi’ia Turkomen and minorities continued late into the 1990s. Estimations show that ca. 150 000 Kurds were forcibly evicted in 1991 alone;;

The overall impact on the population profile of Kirkuk has been profound change. The UN estimates that almost 500 000 Kurds in total were forced to flee Kirkuk during the Ba’athist regime. The share of minority groups decreased drastically – e.g. the share of Turkomen fell from 21.4% to 7%. At the same time, between 1957 and 1997 the share of Arab population of the province grew from 28.2% to 72% – with almost five-fold growth in absolute numbers (from 110 000 to 544 000).

All these events have a direct bearing on Kirkuk’s security today. The combination of warfare, displacement and sanctions politicised and aggravated ethnic divisions in the province, intensified the urban-rural development divide, and increased the share of urban poor – setting the stage for radicalisation in the following period.

Iraq War (2003–2011) and Iraqi insurgency (2003–2013)

The protracted Iraq War began with the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 which toppled the Ba’athist regime. Coalition forces captured Baghdad on 09 April 2003; Kirkuk surrendered to US control on 10 April 2003. In the power vacuum that ensued, Iraq’s internal divisions were exacerbated.

Following the invasion, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces briefly occupied Kirkuk; the coalition forces forcibly withdrew Kurdish forces from the governorate. In Jan 2010, the Coalition forces introduced in Kirkuk “Combined Security Force” units, comprised of Iraqi soldiers and police officers, US soldiers, and Kurdish soldiers from the Peshmerga militia. Still, anger and opposition grew fast in response to the occupation, especially among the Sunni population. Turkmen and Arab populations were particularly angered by visible display of authority by Kurdish authorities and security forces, while many Kurds opposed the presence of Iraqi Government forces.

In the first years of the invasion, Kirkuk remained relatively peaceful. growing insecurity was driven by escalating local tensions, as well as by political leaders and factions amid a growing stalemate between Baghdad and Erbil.


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Kurdish leaders had already made the status of Kirkuk city a high-profile political symbol of Kurdish autonomy -- opposed by Arab and Turkoman politicians aligned to Baghdad. In the new context, political rivalries between Turkomen and Arabs on one hand and Kurds on the other increased. Tensions escalated following the adoption of the new Iraqi constitution in 2005, which includes provision for Kirkuk and other disputed territories to hold referendums for independence.; in the course of the 2005 Provincial Council elections (in which KDP/PUK list collected 59% and absolute majority); and following the Dec 2005 parliamentary elections, following which Nuri al-Maliki (a Shiite) became Prime Minister. In Nov 2006, Arab

13 and Turkomen members of the Provincial Council withdrew, claiming that they were

excluded from decision-making and governance. At the same time, lingering animosities between the KDP and PUK (dominant) in Kirkuk’s governmental institutions led to poor governance and service delivery.

Starting in 2003 – through 2013 – the authorities in Kirkuk embarked on a policy to encourage Arabs (particularly those of recent arrival) to leave the province and to bring back Kurds (in line with the Takrid/Kurdicisation policy of the KRG). This was not always done with peaceful measures,

14 although

there were incentives offered for Arabs to leave. In 2003-2005, an estimated 100 000 Kurds settled in Kirkuk city, and once again, Kirkuk was fast becoming a Kurdish-majority city. While their original homes and villages were largely destroyed (or occupied), many Kurdish returnees squatted in Kirkuk city. These demographic changes brought with them also disputes over the ownership of land which is the second largest economy factor after the oil. Additionally, Kirkuk residents increasingly struggled with inadequate security, poor/unequal services, and other concerns that exacerbate ethnic tensions.

Insurgency groups formed to oppose the occupation, the local government and the new Iraqi government, and armed groups proliferated: the Peshmerga, Al-Qaida in Iraq (Sunni), Sahwa forces (Sunni), Al-Asayesh (Kurdish), groups allied to Muqtada al-Sadr (Shiite), etc. The situation was increasingly exploited by extremists; e.g. in 2005, Al-Qaida started targeting civilians in acts of terrorism, and periodic insurgent attacks targeted oil infrastructure, disrupting the flow of oil along the Kirkuk-Ceyhan export line. Jihadis from east and west of the province (e.g. Ansar al-Islam and Ansar al-Sunnah) were also targeting the city, supported by local Sunni groups.

Across Iraq, fierce Sunni vs. Shiite sectarian violence erupted in 2006–2007 following the bombing (22 Feb 2006) of the Al-Askari Shrine in Samarra (one of the holiest sites in Shia Islam). In Kirkuk, this translated as Arab/Turkoman (Shiite and Sunni) vs. Kurdish conflict and violence; open hostilities broke between Turkomen and Kurds. Between Dec 2005 and July 2006, violent incidents in Kirkuk city increased by 76%, ending the city's status as a relatively safe area. Attacks on KDP and PUK headquarters, sniping, improvised explosive devices, assassination attacks on local police and community leaders, and attacks on politicians proliferated. In Aug-Oct 2006 alone Kirkuk city was hit by 20 suicide bombs and 63 roadside bombs.

Violence, direct threats and generalised fear triggered a spike in internal displacement across Iraq. Military operations and fighting also contributed to displacement (especially as housing was destroyed), as did inter-tribal clashes. Insurgents and militia used religious affiliation as a justification to force hundreds of thousands of people from their homes. Criminals capitalised on an increased lack of security to abduct, loot, and attack individuals, further contributing to an environment of violence and displacement. In general, IDPs moved from religiously and ethnically mixed communities to homogeneous communities – within the same city, as well as across provincial borders. Kirkuk accepted scores of IDPs – mainly from Sunni-majority areas. At the same time, thousands of Arabs and Turkomen fled Kirkuk.

15

After the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq in Dec 2011, sectarian violence escalated again, as Sunni and anti-Kurdish groups stepped up attacks aimed to undermine confidence in the government. In 2012, along with Baghdad and Samarra, Kirkuk saw some of the worst violence in Iraq. At the same time, poverty increased significantly between 2007 and 2012,

16 feeding social unrest and radicalisation. Radicalisation was additionally

galvanised in the context of the Syrian Civil War, with which the insurgency eventually merged in 2014.

By 2014, Kirkuk was a tinderbox of sectarian conflict. The decade of growing violence, extremism and insecurity after 2003 was increasingly seen by parts of the population as counterpoint to ISIL’s promise of peace and order. Thus, it effectively paved the way for the take over of Kirkuk areas by ISIL in 2014.

13 Arab members returned to the council in Dec 2007 after a new power-sharing deal was agreed. 14 There are allegations of murder, kidnapping and physical intimidation used by Kurdish authorities to force minorities to leave the governorate. 15 IOM reports that in 2006, Kirkuk hosted 1002 IDP families (6012 people), and 580 families (2500 people) from Kirkuk displaced to other provinces. Cf. IOM, “Iraq Displacement 2006 Year in Review”: https://bit.ly/2wkINe0. Kirkuk Governorate (2016), Plan to Manage the IDP Crisis suggests that in 2006 Kirkuk province accepted at least 45 000 IDPs (as registered by MoMD), including a vast majority from Diyala. 16 GSDRC (28 Aug 2015), Poverty Eradication in Iraq (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1259): https://bit.ly/2IjekBX.


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Occupation by ISIL 2014–2017

Kirkuk is one the most severely affected provinces of Iraq from the ISIL conflict.

ISIL unleashed a campaign of death and destruction in Iraq in Jan 2014, starting with Anbar governorate. On 10 June ISIL invaded Kirkuk province. On 12 June 2014, the Iraqi Army fled Kirkuk city; Peshmerga fighters moved in and prevented Kirkuk city from being taken by ISIL. The Peshmerga then moved deep into disputed territories, which they defended against the ISIL militants. By July 2014, ISIL controlled ca. 45% of Kirkuk province – mainly Sunni Arab areas – including the entire Hawiga Qadha (see Figure 6).

Thereafter, the Peshmerga increased their influence in Kirkuk province, taking control over the oil installations and supporting the provincial authorities. In March 2015, the Peshmerga started a campaign to take back from ISIL villages south of Kirkuk. Security levels in Kirkuk city and surrounding areas improved. Nevertheless, fighting continued across the province. In ISIL-free areas, ISIL attacks continued, even in the city centre of Kirkuk. E.g. in Dec 2015, Kurdish forces attacked ISIL positions around Kirkuk, backed by heavy air strikes from a US-led coalition; the Peshmerga also advanced on several fronts to the west of Kirkuk. The last large-scale attack on Kirkuk was on 21-24 Oct 2016, when more than 200 ISIL fighters attacked Kirkuk city and a suicide bomb exploded at Dibis power plant – to divert Iraqi military resources during the Battle of Mosul.

On 21 Sept 2017, the Iraqi army with the support from Iran-backed Shiite paramilitary groups (PMFs) and the international coalition launched the final Kirkuk liberation offensive. Following the victory in Hawiga, the governorate was officially declared liberated from ISIL on 10 Oct 2017. Disputed areas in Kirkuk saw additional military activity on 15–20 Oct 2017, linked to the Baghdad-Erbil standoff, whereby Kurdish forces withdrew from Kirkuk and federal authority was reasserted over disputed areas.

Figure 6 ISIL control (2014–2016) and IDP formal settlements (Dec 2017) in Kirkuk province

The context of ISIL had a major effect on economic life in the province. In captured areas, ISIL fighters looted and crushed enterprises; subjected business owners and farmers to excessive taxation; monopolised sales; took control of agricultural production and equipment; forced farmers to sell their products at lower rates; confiscated ready produce; etc. At the same time, food shares allocated for poor families stopped, while the cost of commodities and basic services soared. Across the province, the economy was disrupted. E.g. 2015-2016 saw a prolonged oil disruption, when a quarter of Kurdish oil was reinjected back into the ground for months – costing the region ca. USD 1 billion in lost revenues. Lack of electricity and major fuel stalled activity across sectors. Poverty and unemployment levels soared – exacerbated by food shortage and loss of livelihoods, especially in rural areas.


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Although complete damage of infrastructure is rarely reported, inefficient functioning/condition of roads, sewerage and tap water network affects between one fourth and one third of the population. Many properties (and infrastructures) were damaged by military campaigns and armed group activities. Buildings such as schools and hospitals became focus of attacks and heavy fighting. Additionally, on retreat, ISIL bombed anything supporting the local economy – including economic facilities, bridges, service projects, private shops, etc., as well as housing. Physical damage to the built environment prevents families and communities from recreating livelihoods, and it also impedes effective and inclusive service provision post-ISIL.

Also, ethnic divisions were exacerbated in the context of ISIL. In captured areas, ISIL’s violence systematically targeted religious and ethnic minorities. ISIL also rampaged through numerous historic, archaeological and religious sites, including Islamic mosques and shrines. In secured areas, there were allegations that Kurdish and Shi’a PFM (Turkoman) forces forcibly displaced resident Sunni Arabs in areas under their control. Arab expulsions were allegedly often accompanied by mass property destruction and the demolition of Arab villages. Attacks on Arab communities were also be motivated by revenge for attacks on the Peshmerga: e.g. the 21 Oct 2016 attack in Kirkuk city triggered widespread retaliation by the Kurdish forces against Arabs across the governorate.

17

Additionally, on 25 Sept 2017, a referendum was held to determine whether Kirkuk province would join the KRG or remain tied to Baghdad. The result of referendum (to join the KRG) was not recognised by Baghdad. Prior to the referendum, the ethnic composition of the province increasingly became a top sensitive issue. Among the Kurdish population, the sentiment increased that Arabs settled in the province in the last 50 years should be returned back to their original places and not given the right to vote (although in some cases they are third or fourth generation living in Kirkuk). Also, open hostilities broke between Turkomen (Sunni and Shi’ite) and Kurds – e.g. Tooz Khormato city became violently split between Kurds and Shi’ite Turkomen, with Kurdish Peshmerga forces controlling a Kurdish half, and Shi’ia PMFs controlling the Turkomen neighbourhoods.

Driven by violence and ethnic tensions, across Iraq, internal displacement increased in scale, severity and impact in 2014-2017. In early 2014, Kirkuk (mainly Kirkuk QC) saw an initial wave of ca. 85 000 IDPs (mainly from Anbar).

18 After ISIL captured Mosul and Tikrit on 10-11 June 2014, a new wave of 116 000 IDPs arrived (mainly to

Kirkuk and Hawiga). By end-2014, Kirkuk hosted more than 300 000 IDPs, including 14% from Kirkuk.19

Displacement from Hawiga increased following the beginning of the Mosul military operations in Oct 2016. By the liberation of the province in Oct 2017, IDPs in Kirkuk were ca. 260 000, including 50% from Kirkuk; in total, more than 20% of the population of the province were displaced, almost half of whom to other governorates.

20

Overall, since 2014, Kirkuk has hosted the second highest number of IDPs from other Iraqi provinces after the KRI. By IOM data, IDPs in Kirkuk reached ca. 410 000 IDPs at the height of displacement, and ca. 380 000 on average in 2015 and 2016.

21 By MoMD data, IDPs in Kirkuk reached in early 2016 more than 600 000 (ca.

121 200 families).22

The massive scale of displacement into Kirkuk has driven a major humanitarian crisis, and it has inter alia lead to increased strain on host communities; heightened competition for limited resources; deterioration in the sectors of health, education, water and sanitation; and an increase in vulnerability among women and children.

In the aftermath of its liberation from ISIL, a return process has started. But insecurity in Kirkuk province continues. Following 16 Oct 2017, there have been: reports of flight of Kurds; allegations of violence toward Kurds and forced displacement of Kurds by Shiite PFMs; reports of looting and destruction of property/housing, mainly in Kurdish neighbourhoods (vehemently so in Tooz Khormato); attacks on and assassinations of Turkoman politicians and community leaders (both who supported Kurdish independence and opposed it); etc. In late 2017, Kirkuk has witnessed an increase in acts of violence and armed conflict targeting civilians, security forces and officials. ISIL strikes continue, and there are suspicions of renewed ISIL cells in Hawiga. Distrust of government and officials is high among the Kurdish populations. Fears of retaliation are very high – among the Kurdish as well as the Sunni population. At the same time, guns are sold on the street corner, to whoever wans the, and the incidence of arming is wide-spread.

23

17 New York Times (22 Oct 2016), “ISIS Fighters in Iraq Attack Kirkuk, Diverting Attention from Mosul”: https://nyti.ms/2FSwKnQ. 18 IOM (June 2015), Kirkuk Governorate Profile. 19 http://iraqdtm.iom.int/DtmReports.aspx 20 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix data of 15 Oct 2017: http://iraqdtm.iom.int/IDPsML.aspx. 21 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix: http://iraqdtm.iom.int/IDPsML.aspx. 22 Displaced people registered with MoMD Kirkuk office (121 200 families). Kirkuk Governorate (2016), Plan to Manage the IDP Crisis (ظة خطة محافوك رك ين أزمة ادارةل ك نازح كومه – ال ح ية ال ل مح ي ال ظة ف وك محاف رك عاون ك ت ال شروع مع ب ف م كات .The Plan responds to IDP pressure of 125 000 families .(ت23 In 2014, the fleeing Iraqi Army left behind a stockpile of weapons that are now openly sold to civilians.


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The forced demographic shifts of the past half century, combined with the uncertainty of the status of the province have created a very unstable and volatile situation in Kirkuk province. Kirkuk’s diverse composition, coupled with entrenched presence of Sunni extremist groups, Kurdish-Turkomen violence and inter-Kurdish conflicts, has been a hotbed for ethnic and sectarian conflict. Conflict has escalated in the context of ISIL, while the referendum for independence has exposed divisions in the community that need to be addressed.

Post-ISIL, religious, ethnic and social divisions are exacerbated. Currently there are tensions between Kurds on one side, and Arabs and Turkomen (who govern the province) on the other side. Also, Kurdish–Turkomen and Sunni–Shiite tensions are very much felt: e.g. Hawiga Qadha (Sunni Arab majority) is divided over which tribes supported and which fought ISIL. Tensions could easily ignite retributive acts and further violence.

The situation is additionally complicated by the presence of many armed groups that are not accountable to the provincial or central authorities. Often these armed groups are responsible for kidnappings, blackmailing, revenge killings and sectarian violence. At the same time, the availability of weapons in the province is alarming: it is very easy to buy, without restrictions, various kinds of weapons (including automatic weapons and ammunition) even at the central market in Kirkuk. There are, finally, concerns over the treatment of ISIL family members and (perceived) supporters.

In this context, restoring a state of security, service provision, and return of IDPs to their homes are prerequisites to rebuilding socio-economic life in the governorate – as well as targeted measures to promote inclusion and human rights. Above all, asserting the rule of law over tribal and radical vengeance (with involvement of tribal and community leaders) and transparent governance will be pivotal to facilitate peaceful living together of communities in the course of economic rebuilding.


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II. SOCIAL PROFILE

1. Population

Population structure and trends

Kirkuk is home to 4.2% of Iraq’s population (1 585 463 in 201624

). Of this, 49.8% are women.25

People of working age (15-64y) comprise 57.3% of the population (compared to 56.6% in Iraq). The median age is 20. Two-thirds of the population are under the age of 30 (66.1% –1.05 million people); children under the age of 15 (622 860 in total) comprise 39.2% of the population; and youth (15-29y) comprise 27% of the population (see Figure 7). These shares are only slightly lower than the average for Iraq (see Table 2).

For the period 2012–2016, the average annual growth rate in Kirkuk province is 2.56% (11% increase in the population in 4 years) – a rate comparable to this for Iraq in the same period (2.58%).

26 Annual growth rates

have been unsteady, however, with spikes and lows that appear tied to the security situation. Overall, for the period 1997–2016, the average annual growth rate in Kirkuk province is 4% – which is much higher than the same for Iraq (2.9%). Continued high growth places major developmental challenges to the governorate – even before we factor in de-facto growth from displacement into the province, which is an additional pressure.

The main driver of growth are fertility rates. In the period 1997–2013, fertility rates in Iraq have slowly decreased: from 5.7 live births per woman in 1997 to 4.2 in 2013 – which is still very high compared to the Middle East and global standards. In the same period, in Kirkuk province fertility rates have increased – from 4.2 in 1997 to 5.4 live births per woman in 2013. The adolescent fertility rate is 60‰ (59‰ in Iraq), which inter alia factors in the high maternal mortality rate in the governorate (45‰). High birth rates, and high rates of adolescent marriage and pregnancy are all linked to the low level of socio-economic integration of women – which has been exacerbated in the context of violence and insecurity since 2014.

Fertility rates impact on dependency. The total dependency ratio in the province has decreased since 1997 (from 86.5% in 1997 to 74% in 2013), indicating a gradual shift in the age distribution toward larger share of the working age population. By 2016, the total dependency ratio in Kirkuk province has actually increased (to 74.6%), and the youth dependency ratio is 68.5%. The de-facto dependency rates in province are even higher when we factor in the large share of economic inactivity and unemployment. Economic growth requires lower dependency ratios – i.e. increase in the ratio of net producers to net consumers in the economy – coupled with sufficient jobs and labour absorption. In Kirkuk province, however, birth rates and the share of children remain very high, while jobs creation and economic activity rates are stagnating. The high growth rate and young population continue to place a major pressure on public service provision and social support systems.

Extreme population clustering is a further pressure, which drives strained service provision and urban poverty, in turn feeding social unrest:

Ca. 74% - i.e. ca. every 3 of 4 people live in cities. Kirkuk QC has almost 100% urbanisation rate. Alton Kobry and Al-Rabee nahias (Kirkuk Qadha) are the second most urbanised areas (ca. 75% urbanisation rate). Outside Kirkuk Qadha, the average urbanisation rate is dramatically less – 29% on average;

Almost 1 million live in Kirkuk city alone – over 80% of the entire urban population of the province. The second largest city – Al-Hawiga – is over 20 times smaller (45 488 people, 3.9% of the urban population);

The average density is ca. 189 people/km2 – much higher than the average for Iraq. But in fact, a few

areas of extreme density counterweigh a majority of rural areas. More than 70% of people in Kirkuk province live in Kirkuk QC – on 3.9% of the area of the province. In Kirkuk QC, the average density is 2950 people/km2; this falls as low as below 30 people/km

2 in Shwan, Al-Rabee and Al-Rashad nahias.

Increase in the rate of urbanisation has been rapid – i.e. this is 74% in 2016, up from 72% in 2012. Migration from rural to urban areas is given, which tends to peaks during people’s late 20s and 30s.

24 Data sources for Chapter II.1 (unless specified otherwise): [1] MoP (Central Statistical Commission) estimation for 2016 based on place of birth (hospitals) & registered residency. The 37 158 person increase from 2015 (i.e. 2.3% annual growth: COSIT data) is mostly births. The population number does NOT include refugees or IDPs from outside Kirkuk. The shares of urban/rural and female/male population remain unchanged from 2015 (COSIT) to 2016 (MoP). The last population census in Iraq was in 1997; [2] UNDP (2014), Iraq Human Development Report 2014; [3] WB World Development Indicators database – estimations for 2016 (using UN DESA, Population Division projections, medium-fertility variant). 25 There is trend of increase in the ratio of female to male population with age, above the expected in accordance with national demographics. The female-to-male ratio is 0.93 among children under 15 (4% majority men), but higher than 1.15 for people over 50y (over 5% majority women). This may be due to migration or conflict – this is unclear. But the trend does amplify the need for socio-economic inclusion of women. 26 According to UNDP (2014) Iraq HDR 2014, the population of the governorate was 1 432 747 in 2012 and 753 171 in 1997.


29

Table 2 Population indicators for Kirkuk Governorate compared to the national average, 2016

Population groups (%) Annual growth rate (1997-

2016, %)

Dependency ratio (%)

Fertility rates Density (people/

km2)

Male Female Urban Rural Under 15y

Youth (15-29y)

Total births per woman

Under 18y (per 1000) Total Young

Kirkuk 50.3 49.7 74 26 39.2 27 4 74.6 68.5 5.4 60 18927

Iraq 50.6 49.4 68.7 30.4 40.5 27.5 2.9 77.1 72 4.2 59 85.7

Table 3 Population of Kirkuk Governorate by administrative division, sex and urban/rural, 2016

Qadha Nahia (QC – Qadha Centre)

Urban Rural Total Area28

Average density

(people/ km2)

Total (n)

% of people in

nahia

Total (n)

Male (n)

Female (n)

Total (n)

% of people in province

km2 % of total

Kirkuk Kirkuk QC 967 432 99.7 2531 487 311 482 652 969 963 61.1 328.8 3.9 2950 Yaychi 3909 14.1 23 742 13 982 13 668 27 650 1.7 194.5 2.3 142 Alton Kobry 28 554 68.1 13 377 21 117 20 814 41 930 2.6 289,.5 3.4 145 Al-Multaka (Mula Abdullah)

2694 17.0 13 186 8029 7852 15 880 1.0 156.0 1.9 102

Taza Khormato 18 497 53.7 15 931 17 357 17 070 34 427 2.2 271.6 3.2 127 Laylan 9618 50.2 9557 9670 9505 19 175 1.2 589.7 7.0 33 Shwan 3627 31.4 7907 5825 5709 11 534 0.7 580.0 6.9 20 Qara Hanjeer (Al-Rabee)

8857 72.8 3303 6122 6038 12 160 0.8 452.3 5.4 27

Total 1 043 187 92.1 89 533 569 411 563 309 1 132 720 71.3 2862.4 34.1 396 Al-Hawiga

Al-Hawiga QC 45 488 38.0 74 327 60 478 59 337 119 815 7.5 669.6 8.0 179 Al-Abbasi 10 412 19.2 43 688 27 346 26 754 54 100 3.4 510.2 6.1 106 Al-Riyadh 10 598 17.7 49 425 30 344 29 679 60 023 3.8 847.7 10.1 71 Al-Zab 18 066 31.6 39 095 28 867 28 294 57 161 3.6 552.6 6.6 103 Total 84 564 29.0 206 535 147 035 144 064 291 099 18.3 2580.1 30.7 113

Daquq Daquq QC 22 659 34.4 43 291 33 298 32 652 65 950 4.2 1072.2 12.8 62 Al-Rashad 1617 5.7 26 823 14 390 14 049 28 439 1.8 1012.1 12.0 28 Total 24 275 25.7 70 114 47 688 46 701 94 389 5.9 2084.3 24.8 45

Dibis Dibis QC 21 118 42.3 28 770 25 173 24 715 49 888 3.1 501.5 6.0 99 Sarkran (Al-Qudis)

2083 10.2 18 284 10 302 10 065 20 367 1.3 376.0 4.5 54

Total 23 201 33.0 47 055 35 476 34 780 70 255 4.4 877.5 10.4 80 Kirkuk Governorate total 1 175 227 74.0 413 236 799 610 788 853 1 588 463 100 8404.3 100 189

Figure 7 Population pyramid of Kirkuk Governorate, 2016

27 COSIT reports 160 people/km2 average density for 2015 – based on total governorate area of 9679 km2. See the next footnote. 28 Area data comes from presentation on Kirkuk Governorate (2016), Strategy of Kirkuk Governorate For Re-stabilization, Sheltering Displaced and Rebuilding of Liberated Areas (totaling to province area of 8404.3 km2).The average density per qadha and nahia is calculated based on this data. We note that the total governorate area data provided by COSIT for 2015 differs – this is 9679 km2, which would mean average population density of 164 people/km2 in 2016.

0 20 40 60 80 100 120

0-4

5-9

10-14

15-19

20-24

25-29

30-34

35-39

40-44

45-49

50-54

55-59

60-64

65-69

70-74

75-79

80+

Population number (thousands)

Male/female distribution by age group

Female

Male

66.1% under 30 years

0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175

0-4

5-9

10-14

15-19

20-24

25-29

30-34

35-39

40-44

45-49

50-54

55-59

60-64

65-69

70-74

75-79

80+

Population number (thousands)

Age

gro

up

Urban/rural distribution by age group

Rural

Urban


30

To facilitate economic growth and social stability, the main demographic pressures in Kirkuk province all require targeted measures toward youth.

Young demographic architecture: Urgent job creation is needed for the province to be able to benefit from the increasing working-age population. Absorbing the large number of youth also requires expansion and improvement in education services, and better alignment of education provision with labour market needs. At the same time, the weak private sector and dependency on the oil sector restrict job-creation opportunities. Among youth, 13% express desire to migrate outside the province, citing as top reasons (1) lack of security/stability (28%) and (2) lack of job opportunities (19% total, 22.5% among young women).

Continued high growth of the population: Altogether in Iraq in the last 20 years, fertility rates have declined – but they have increased in Kirkuk province. This is indicative above all of lagging education attainment and economic prospects for women. the absence of other prospects, one out of every four women in reproductive age (15–49y) in Iraq marry before they turn 18. Cultural values and social norms (which influence behaviours and decision making within the family), as well as the heightened insecurity for women in the context of conflict, factor in high rates of adolescent marriage/pregnancy. Measures to keep students in school, to reduce education drop-out rates (especially among girls), to improve the economic inclusion of women, and to increase awareness of the rights and role of women are important in this regard. All they will impact positively family planning attitudes in the province.

Migration from rural areas: The extreme clustering of the population in urban areas is driven above all by 2.5% higher poverty rates in rural than in urban areas. In turn, it drives urban poverty, squatter settlements, strained/uneven service/jobs provision, which feed social unrest. Measures for more balanced spatial development of the governorate, with attention to service provision and jobs creation in rural areas will mitigate the risk of increased migration to cities. This needs to include expansion of relevant education opportunities in rural areas.

Ethno-religious composition

The ethnic and religious variation in Kirkuk is among the highest in Iraq. Arabs, Kurds, and Turkomen make up the majority of the population in Kirkuk; each include the Sunni and Shia sects of Islam. A number of other groups (Assyrians, Chaldeans, Armenians, etc.) form a small minority. We note that accurate recent data on the ethno-religious composition of the province are lacking – linked to the complex interrelation of religious and ethnic identification, and above all, as the issue is highly sensitive for all parties involved and can be used for political and sectarian purposes. There are unofficial estimations that Arabs and Kurds each comprise more than 33% of the population; Turkomen are the third largest group (20–33%); and Assyrians and Armenians form a very small minority (less than 1000 people in total).

In most cities and qadhas the population composition is mixed – with the exception of Hawiga Qadha and Al-Multaka nahia, where Sunni Arabs form the overwhelming majority. Turkomen are concentrated in and around Kirkuk city; Taza Khormato, Alton Kobry, and

Yaychi are among the largest Turkmen-majority cities in Iraq. The towns of Qara Hanjeer and Shwan are Kurdish majority.

The ethno-religious composition of Kirkuk province results from complex and often violent dynamics since the 1970s (see Chapter I.4). Dynamic shifts in ethno-sectarian balance have resulted in persistent sense of disenfranchisement, fears of displacement and discrimination, and distrust of government among communities.

29 The map shows majority presence; it does not reflect group size. Map adapted from Washington Post (23 Nov 2016), “ISIS: A catastrophe for Sunnis: https://wapo.st/2ImrMou.

Figure 8 Distribution of main ethno-religious groups in Kirkuk province

29


31

Tribal structure

Tribal structures are also important in Kirkuk. Arab tribes (mainly Tikriti, Hadidi, Al Ubaid and Jiburi) retain authority in local affairs and tribal divisions have political implications. In the recent conflict, certain tribes – particularly in Al-Hawiga Qadha – were an important ally for insurgents.

There is need to ensure the inclusion of all groups of the community. The ethno-religious diversity of Kirkuk province has been a basis for sectarian and political tensions. In the post-ISIL context, inter-ethnic tensions could easily ignite retributive acts, radicalisation and further violence – especially given the political context of the governorate. Additionally, ISIL has managed to put fellow Sunnis against each other and divide the families and tribes. Post-ISIL, tribal divisions are very much felt, as well as tensions within and among tribes.

There is need for comprehensive measures to achieve the rule of law with regard to tribal and sectarian issues and to reduce the level of radicalisation in society – including measures for peace-building within the Sunni community. In Iraq, actions and support exist at the national level and from international organisations regarding inter-ethnic conflict and reconciliation, including within the Sunni community. However, there is a need to work on the daily communication between tribes in Kirkuk to facilitate peacebuilding and prevent retributive acts for involvement with ISIL.

To promote the peaceful living together of communities in the immediate and long run, it is necessary to (1) assert the rule of law based on a culture of tolerance and human rights protection, (2) ensure transparent governance, (3) facilitate the return of all IDPs, and (4) ensure improved, balanced and inclusive access to public services and livelihoods across all parts of the governorate.

2. Living conditions

Access to basic services

Pre-ISIL, access to basic services in Kirkuk province was comparatively good for Iraq, especially for electricity access (100%).

30 According to data for 2011 (see Figure 9), access to improved water source is over 80% and

deprivation from drinking water is relatively low – 9.7%. Deprivation from shelter is also low (0.3%), although ownership of housing is among the lowest in Iraq (making ca. 20% of the population vulnerable to spikes in rent costs), and the quality of housing is often poor. In 2013, ca. 3% of the population (40 992 people) lived in random housing in 36 informal housing complexes across the governorate

31 typically in urban areas. Public

services cannot be delivered to random settlements. In result, they often lack basic services and infrastructure – although in many cases, inhabitants deliver water and electricity from close-by formal neighbourhoods, which has been adding pressure on the existing public facilities, networks and services.

Access to sanitation service is major problem in the province. Deprivation from sanitation is 12.7% in 2011, which is more than twice higher than the average for Iraq (6%). Only 29% of households have access to public sewerage or septic tank, and only 16% have access to public sewerage. This is particularly worrisome in view of the urban clustering of the population, as well as in the context of insufficient health service. Notably, only 51.8% of youth report that they are satisfied with health services. According to data for 2015, the average time to get to a healthcare centre is 18.5 min – among the lowest in Iraq; and the availability of doctors is low (only 7.6 doctors per 10 000 people), especially in rural areas, which factors in the infant mortality and maternal mortality rates in the province, which are among the highest in Iraq (18.2 and 40 per 1000 respectively). Education access is also limited – e.g. the student-to-teacher ratio (22) is among the highest in Iraq (16 on average).

All these problems have been exacerbated in the context of ISIL – by damage to infrastructure, destruction of buildings and population movements. At the same time, poor service provision has direct bearing on poverty (e.g. adverse health effects erode the income generation capacity of poor families and their ability to support their livelihoods), as well as on social cohesion (poor public services increase the distrust of government, especially among young people, and increase the risk of radicalisation).

30 All data in Chapter II.2 – unless otherwise specified – are from: [1] UNDP (2014), Iraq Human Development Report (HDR) 2014; and [2] UNDP/UN-Habitat (22 Nov 2016), LADP: Strategic Urban Development Framework for Governorates in Iraq – Indicator Technical Brief. 31 COSIT data for 2013.


32

Figure 9 Access to services indicators for Kirkuk province32

Legend: Orange – Kirkuk; Grey – range between top- and lowest- performing governorate

Income, poverty, deprivation

The economic level of people in Kirkuk is better than Iraq on average (see Figure 10). According to UNDP data for 2012, Kirkuk scores 2nd among the 18 Iraqi governorates by GDP per capita (USD 13 171 – compared to USD 5860 Iraq average), and 4th by annual household income (USD 20 256). Per capita on average, the monthly income is 95% of the monthly expenditure (92% in rural areas). Income poverty

33 (9.1%) is the 4th lowest in Iraq,

and more than twice lower than the total in Iraq (18.9%); still ca. 150 000 people qualify as poor. The share of people in multi-dimensional poverty (MDP: 6.2%) is also among the lower in Iraq (compared to 13.3% in Iraq and 4.3 % in Baghdad). Overall, deprivation in Kirkuk province is also among the lowest in Iraq, reflecting relatively improved conditions for health, employment, education and economic opportunities (see Figure 11).

However, poverty figures do not reflect vulnerability rates (people at the threshold of poverty), which are even higher. Also, deprivation and MDP scores are pushed up above all by the relatively higher income of the population. In fact, infrastructure deficiencies, uneven opportunities for education and health, and lack of job opportunities continue to affect larger population groups. It is significant in this regard that by socio-economic development based on GDP the province ranks 6th among the 18 Iraqi provinces, but it ranks only 12th by overall quality of life index. Also, the Human Development Index (HDI) for Kirkuk province is 0.687 – slightly lower than this for Iraq; but the non-income HDI is lower (0.673) and much below this for Iraq (see Figure 11).

Figure 10 Income and poverty indicators for Kirkuk province

Legend: Orange – Kirkuk; Black – Iraq; Grey – range between top- and lowest- performing governorate

Figure 11 Human development scores for Kirkuk province (range 0–1)

Legend: Orange – Kirkuk; Black – Iraq; Grey – range between top- and lowest- performing governorate

32 All tables in chapter – latest UNDP/UN-Habitat data from 2011–2015. 33 At poverty level benchmark = cost of purchasing the maintenance of adult caloric intake of 2200 calories/day. Per IHSES 2012/13, the poverty line for Iraq (excluding Kurdistan and Baghdad) is IQD 101 675.9/person/month, and the national poverty line of IQD 105500.4/person/month. Based on this, the poverty rate in Kirkuk Governorate is 9.1%, and in Iraq – 18.9% in Iraq.

80

38

80,8

100

28,6 16,1

7,6 18,2

40

18,5

80,3

22 15,4

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20

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(%)

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per

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peop

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(‰)

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(6y

+) w

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take

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min

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l (%

) 13,171

42,251

20,256 9,1 6,2 0

204060

GDP per capita(thousand USD)

GNI per capita (thousand$PPP)

Annual HouseholdIncome (thousand USD)

Poverty (%) Multi-dimensionalpoverty (%)

0,687 0,593 0,561

0,622 0,532

0,745

0,608 0,563

0,340

0,673

0,178

0,608

0,1

0,3

0,5

0,7

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33

Current data on poverty in Kirkuk are not available, but it has been estimated that in ISIL-affected governorates, the direct impact of economic, social and security disruptions has doubled poverty rates up to 41.2%.

34 In the

context of poor security situation and displacement, households are struggling inter alia with price inflation, increased unemployment and skyrocketing house rents. According to Governorate data, in 2012, the poverty rate was 14.9%, the poverty gap – 2.8%, and the depth of poverty – 0.8%; but poverty has soared in the context of ISIL – in 2014 already, accounting for the crisis, the poverty rate was estimated to have increased to 17.7%, the poverty gap – to 4.4% and the depth of poverty – to 1.8%. These figures do not account for the overall increase in economic vulnerability in the context of ISIL (people at the threshold of poverty), which is even higher. At the same time, poverty enhances deprivation and it drives up a range of social problems such as begging, child labour, GBV, dropping out from school, drug use, etc. – while it is also a high risk factor for radicalisation.

The province-level figures obscure areas that suffer even worse living environments, poverty and deprivation.

Inequality

The overall level of inequality in Kirkuk province is lower than in Iraq as a whole: the Gini coefficient for Kirkuk is 0.340 (compared to 0.396 Iraq, where 0 is perfect equality). Still, inequality in the province is pronounced and it has been aggravated in the context of ISIL.

While the HDI for the province is 0.687 (“medium human development”), the inequality-adjusted HDI is 0.593 – i.e. in the province there is 9% loss of development due to inequality (see Figure 11). The loss of development due to inequality is particularly pronounced for youth and women. The high Gender Inequality Index (0.561) is driven by low economic inclusion and lower education levels of women, in addition to high adolescent fertility, high maternal mortality and low political representation. Kirkuk province ranks 7th in Iraq by HDI, but only 11th by Youth Development Index (YDI) – which is 0.622 total, and as low as 0.532 for young women (corresponding to “low human development”). I.e., young women suffer the highest exclusion levels in the province.

In terms of spatial inequality, areas with a high share of poverty are areas that have been marginalised historically/politically and left out of the development process; these are usually remote and rural areas. In Kirkuk, poverty rates clearly increase from east to west; the ratio of people in poverty is highest in Al-Rashad, Al-Riyadh and Al-Abbasi nahias on the border with Salah al-Din (see Figure 12). At the same time, the concentration of people in poverty is highest in urban and semi-urban areas; it is by far the highest in Kirkuk QC (which concentrates ca. 48 000 poor people), followed by Hawiga QC. Overall, the poverty levels are almost three times higher in rural than in urban areas (6.1% urban vs. 15.4% rural poverty rate), driving migration to cities. In result, spatial inequality also manifests as urban pockets of poverty, which tend to trigger social tensions and unrest.

Figure 12 Spatial disparity in development in Kirkuk province in 2013 – poverty and illiteracy mapping by nahia

Spatial differences in service provision and job opportunities perpetuate disparity in poverty levels and human development prospects across nahias – as they affect e.g. early marriages, education levels, labour market structure, etc. E.g. with regard to education provision, illiteracy levels across nahias vary from 9% (Al-Zab) to 43% (Al-Rashad); illiteracy in Kirkuk QC is 16% (see Figure 12). With regard to jobs, in some nahias, people are completely dependent on rain-fed agriculture – which means they have no economic security whatsoever.

34 WB, “The World Bank in Iraq: Overview,” updated 01 Apr 2017: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iraq/overview.


34

Youth and women are the biggest victims of systematic shortage of good governance, service provision and violence. Specific measures are needed to facilitate the socio-economic integration of women and youth – including measures to improve education and livelihoods opportunities, to increase rights awareness, and to increasing the involvement of these groups in local development processes and decision making.

Additionally, spatial inequality is a specific threat to social cohesion. While there is a strong correlation between poverty and unemployment, unemployment/underemployment and poor service provision in urban areas contribute to perceptions of deprivation and social exclusion; as such they are a trigger for radicalisation. Deprivation in rural areas triggers migration to big cities, reinforcing the problem. Hence, measures are needed toward more balanced spatial development of the governorate including investments to diversify the local economies and income base, and to ensure inclusive service provision across areas.

Education levels

Prior to ISIL, Kirkuk scored average on education attainment and literacy.

According to UNDP data for 2012, literacy among the population over 12y is 80.3% (compared to 78.2% in Iraq). Illiteracy is 23.2% total (6th highest in Iraq – compared to 13% national average) and 11% among youth according to UN-Habitat data; and 18.5% total and 11.2% among youth according to UNDP data (see Figure 13). I.e. ca. 1 in every 5 people is illiterate.

By mean years of schooling (7.6), the province ranks 12th in Iraq. In the age group 15y+, the school dropout rate is high (55.8%) – slightly lower than the national average; and the studies completion rate is very low (8.7%) – also lower than the national average.

In result, education attainment remains low– especially among women. E.g. among youth (15-29y), only 8.9% have high school education and only 8.7% have diploma (institute) or higher degree. Among young women, there shares are lower – respectively 6.3% and 8.4%. The gender variation in education attainment is very high: illiteracy is 12% among men, but over 27% among women; youth illiteracy is 7% among young men, but 15% among young women; mean years of schooling are 8 for men but 7.1 for women; the dropout rate is 50% for boys but as high as 64% for girls. Overall, in the age group 25y+, people with at least secondary education comprise 25% of men but only 11% of women.

The years of ISIL occupation and associated displacement have compounded the situation. Recent education levels data for the governorate are lacking, however illiteracy in Iraq has increased in the context of ISIL. It is estimated that in Iraq, illiteracy reached 18% in 2014, and 20% among females.

35 Illiteracy tends to be higher in

hot areas of conflict and among displaced families. Illiteracy in Kirkuk province is driven up by the poor security situation, economic destitution, low enrolment and high dropout rates, early marriage, and tribal traditions that e.g. limit school enrolment for girls. At the same time, declining literacy, skills and qualifications translate into uncertain employment prospects, while illiteracy is a key factors for radicalisation and security destabilisation.

Figure 13 Education attainment levels and labour market outcomes, Kirkuk province

Legend: Orange – Kirkuk (values shown); Black – Iraq; Grey – range between top- and lowest- performing governorate

35 Data from the national survey of displaced people by the Central Bureau of statistics carried out in early 2015.

42,8

12,6

37,9

73

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)


35

Employment

Pre-ISIL data show pre-existing structural problems in the labour market of Kirkuk province. In 2011, unemployment in the province was the lowest in Iraq: 2.4% total unemployment in the age group 15y+, 3.4% female unemployment, and 6% youth unemployment (15-29y). However, the low rate of unemployment goes hand-in-hand with low participation in the economy, low share of employment (see Figure 13) and high rate of underemployment and share of working poor (disguised unemployment):

According to data for 2011, Kirkuk ranks 1st in unemployment, but only 7th and 9th in Iraq by rate of male and female employment (respectively 73% and 12.6%). The overall employment figures for the age group 15y+ are low and below the average for Iraq. Youth employment is among the highest in Iraq but still only 39.3% (66.3% among young men, but as low as 14.5% among young women).

Except for men, labour force participation rates (LFPR) in the age group 15y+ are below the average for Iraq (43% total, 13% female and 38% youth LFPR). LFPRs are particularly low among women and youth, and they are even lower in urban areas;

The governorate estimates that in 2008, the share of working poor (i.e. disguised unemployment) was almost 30% of all employment – i.e. people who are formally employed, but receive very low salaries and barely make ends meet, even when they work in several places (including the public administration). Underemployment was 4.3% in 2011.

Women’s access to economic opportunities is disproportionately limited. Women comprise half of the population, but men are almost 6 times more active in the labour market than women. More centrally, in every 100 women looking for work, only 13 get employed – compared to 73 for men. Young women are particularly disadvantaged – with only 15 in 100 active young women getting a job.

Development of the private sector is key. Kirkuk is specific in that only 22.7% youth total and 36.4% young women work/wish to work in the public sector (compared to 45% and 58% in Iraq respectively). The majority of youth in Kirkuk (77%) work/wish to work in the private sector – which is by far the highest rate in Iraq (52.7% national average) – which explains the relatively high employment rate for youth.

In this context, the low unemployment rates indicate a stagnating labour market, predominance of low-quality low-pay jobs, limited jobs generation and decent jobs in the private sector, and failure of the public sector to provide employment opportunities. In turn, all these factors reinforce the low LFPRs – especially among youth and women. Thus, in fact, the employment situation in the province is bleak – which also translates into high share of child labour (6% in 2008) and high begging incidence.

The labour market outcomes of education are poor. Beyond the large inactivity rates, this is linked to: (1) limited employment opportunities in dynamic sectors; (2) mismatch between the output of the education system and skills demand; and (3) hiring practices based on personal and family relations (political and tribal affiliation), rather than qualification and merit. According to 2012 survey data, only 43.5% of youth (15-29y) are satisfied with education quality – the majority feel discouraged from education due to its poor relevance for finding a job. Only 10% of employed youth got their jobs based on educational attainment – 4% of young men and 36% of young women. The highest determinant of job placement was in fact personal and family relations – for 82.7% of youth (compared to 52.5% in Iraq overall), 87% of young men and 64% of young women. In result, vast numbers of mainly poorly educated youth – especially women – face uncertain employment prospects.

Post-ISIL, all these problems in the labour market are aggravated. Current data on the labour market is lacking, however MoP estimates that unemployment has reached as high as 45% in ISIL hotspots.

Post-ISIL, both limited employment options and lack of competences among youth are aggravated problems in Kirkuk province. Education is central for approaching Kirkuk’s immediate challenges. Schools are the best places for providing psycho-emotional support to conflict-affected children and youth, and education can play a pivotal role in promoting resilience among conflict-affected populations and in fostering social cohesion. Reopening of schools, continued education service provision and closing of gaps are a first necessary step – alongside psychological support to students; followed by improving the school environment to raise enrolment rates. For education to benefit the longer-term economic development in Kirkuk, the development is necessary of a dynamic private sector to absorb the youth bulge, better alignment of HR supply and demand (through e.g. vocational training programmes, skills training for women), and job placement programmes based on competency – in addition to higher support for women to join the labour market (e.g. job opportunities for women, women’s rights awareness programmes, improved childcare service, etc.).


36

Corruption

Iraq ranks 166th out of 176 countries total (score 16/100) on the 2016 Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International; it has more or less kept this rank since 2006. Rampant corruption affects socio-economic development on many levels – from discouraging private sector development, to ineffective placement of human resources, jobs availability, unequal distribution of services, effective application of social protection legislation, etc. In the current context of Kirkuk, the interplay of insecurity, corruption, deprivation and inequality feeds populism and exacerbates tensions, as perceptions are heightened of impunity, ambiguity of public spending and favouritism of administration.

Notwithstanding that political instability, war, internal conflicts and terrorism fuel corruption – in particular political corruption – peace and rebuilding in the post-ISIL context are contingent on improving the transparency and accountability of governance in the governorate.

3. IDP and Returnees

3.1. Profile

Kirkuk province has been an arena of internal displacement since the 1970s, with escalation in 2006-07 and especially in the ISIL context since 2014. Since 2014, Kirkuk has hosted the second highest number of IDPs from other Iraqi provinces after the KRI. IOM reports ca. 410 000 IDPs in Kirkuk at the height of displacement, and ca. 380 000 on average in 2015 and 2016.

36 For many IDPs, Kirkuk has been a transit province. There is

continual shift in IDP populations, and continual overlap of displacement and return – with many areas in the province hosting at each time IDP, returnee and host populations.

Table 4 IOM IDP and returnee statistics for Kirkuk as of 31 Oct 2017

IDP families by governorate of displacement

IDPs in Kirkuk province

From Families (n) Persons (n) Kirkuk 29201 175 206 Nineveh 5205 31 230 Anbar 4682 28 092 Salah al-Din 4510 27 060 Baghdad, Babylon, Diyala 274 1644 Total 43 872 263 232

IDPs in Kirkuk by type of shelter

Shelter arrangements of IDPs Persons (n) % of total Rented housing 193 182 73.4 Camp 44 064 16.7 Host family 8868 3.4 Unfinished building 8760 3.3 Informal shelter 8298 3.2 Religious buildings 60 0.02 Total 263 232 100

IDP returnees to home areas in Kirkuk

Qadha Families (n) Persons (n) Kirkuk 25 613 153 678 Al-Hawiga 3955 23 730 Daquq 1166 6996 Dibis 100 600 Total 30 834 185 004

36 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix: http://iraqdtm.iom.int/IDPsML.aspx.


37

As of 31 Oct 201737

(see Table 4):

IDPs in Kirkuk are 263 232 – which amounts to 16.6% of the population of the governorate;

Among IDPs, 66.6% (175 206) are displaced from other areas in Kirkuk – mainly from the western part (e.g. Hawiga);

At the same time, 88 026 people remain displaced to Kirkuk from other governorates (mainly Nineveh, Anbar and Salah al-Din). These IDPs comprise an addition of 5.6% to the population of the governorate;

IDPs from Kirkuk displaced to other governorates are 165 090, including: 64 476 in Erbil, 58 218 in Salah al-Din, 22 056 in Suleimaniah, 11 448 in Nineveh; the remaining 5% are dispersed across all other provinces of Iraq

In total, displaced citizens of Kirkuk (340 296) are 21.5% of Kirkuk’s population;

Ca. 40% of all IDPs in Kirkuk have been in displacement for more than 3 years.

With regard to IDP shelter type:

By far, the majority of IDPs in Kirkuk rent their housing (73.4% - ca. 23 200 families, 193 182 people);

The second largest group are IDPs camp populations (ca. 17% of IDPs – ca. 7350 families, 44 064 people). As of 01 Nov 2017, 9 formal IDP settlements in Kirkuk province remain operational, including 6 camps – (see Table 5 below). In addition, 3 collective centres operate – Bawa (Baidawa), Tuz Khormato 3 and Tuz Khormato 4 – with aggregate population of 3810 individuals.

38

Ca. a third of the remaining 10% of IDPs live with host families, while the remainder (ca. 17 000 people) are housed in precarious housing (informal shelter, unfinished buildings) with little/no public services. Critical shelters also include religious buildings (e.g. the Church of Markorkis and the Evangelical Church);

Overall, the vast majority of IDPs live in cities/villages across the province and share services (including education and healthcare) with the host community. Outside formal settlements, IDPs are located mainly in Kirkuk QC, Yaychi, Laylan and Taza Khormato, and mainly in urban areas. The clustering of IDPs – and therefore pressure on public service systems – is particularly high in Kirkuk city/Kirkuk QC.

Returnees to home areas in Kirkuk are 185 004 (30 834 families), of whom 14% (25 362 people) were displaced in Kirkuk, 132 000 in Suleimaniah and 24 000 in Erbil. Ca. 98% of returnees have returned to their habitual residences; ca. 500 have stayed with host families; shelter conditions are unknown for 3600 returnees (2%).

The number of IDPs in Kirkuk province amounts to 16.6% to the population of the governorate – including 66.6% displaced from Kirkuk province. IDPs from other governorates comprise an addition of 5.6% to the population of the governorate. This is major pressure on public service provision capacities and infrastructure. Therefore, it is important that (1) support for IDPs include all IDPs in the province; (2) the infrastructure in liberated areas be rehabilitated as soon as possible (including housing); while (3) the conditions are provided for people to return to their homes in Kirkuk province – including guarantees for security, rule of law, guarantees against tribal and ethnic revenge, as well as measures for reconciliation not only in the liberated areas but in the entire province. The same efforts will also serve to encourage return from other provinces.

The level of spread of IDPs across the province and among host populations, as well as the constant mobility in the group make it difficult to follow up on the status and needs of IDPs. This is a constraint on the effectiveness of service provision. In this regard, it is important to improve data available on IDPs by area (e.g. database) – to allow effective channelling of support in accordance with IDP group size and types of needs.

3.2. Challenges facing IDPs and returnees

In the context of ISIL and displacement, families have faced huge difficulties with regard to living conditions and livelihoods, and they have had to depend on relief assistance provided by NGOs or government. While relief assistance – including food, water, health, etc. – is mainly directed to IDPs, especially in the camps, it has limited reach for returnees. By far, the top concern for IDPs is access to employment, followed by shelter, health and education. The top three concerns for returnees are health, drinking water and education (see Figure 14 below). Correspondingly, for returnees, the most needed information and support is on health and water, while IDPs are mostly interested in support regarding personal documentation (in 84% of IDP locations) – the highest percentage in Iraq (country average is 20%) – and livelihoods.

37 Data in Chapter II.3 – unless indicated otherwise: IOM TDM as of 31 Oct 2017, IDP Master List Dataset: http://iraqdtm.iom.int/IDPsML.aspx; and IOM Integrated Location Assessment II (completed in March-May 2017) and IOM ILA II Report (Oct 2017). 38 UNHCR–CCCM (Nov 2017), Iraq - CCCM Settlement Status Report (15 Oct–15 Nov 2017): https://data2.unhcr.org/es/documents/download/60901.


38

Means and livelihoods

Even though the majority of IDPs rent their housing, the fact is that IDPs were not pulled to Kirkuk by its security, family/relatives or the possibility to recreate livelihoods. Over half of IDPs were forced to displace to Kirkuk (100% of those settled in Dibis) because they could not afford any other place. Lack of financial means to return (including to repair housing or restart a livelihood) is among the main impediments to return: 33% of IDPs are forced by lack of means to stay in displacement.

In this context, access to employment is the main concern for 92% of IDPs in Kirkuk province, reported by over 39 000 IDP families. Not only are IDPs unable to access jobs because of the insufficient supply (60%), but they are also under-qualified (27%). The IDPs’ main sources of income are informal commerce and daily labour; IDPs also depend on cash grants, while in three out of four locations returnees have gone back to farming/herding.

Most returnees do not have jobs (in 84% of their locations), but they rely on agriculture (100%) and pensions (67%) to support their families. Post-ISIL, on return, some families find their workshops and businesses destroyed or looted; lack/shortage of service (e.g. electricity, legal aid) – in addition to lack of funding – makes it difficult to resume economic activity. In rural areas, arable and grazing land is mostly accessible, but again, disrupted water supply is a big problem in resuming economic activity. Thus, support to resume livelihoods is also a concern for returnees.

39

Living conditions

Although complete damage of infrastructure is not reported in IDP/returnee locations, inefficient functioning/ condition of roads, sewerage and tap water network affects between one fourth and one third of the population. With varying scale, shared living condition problems include: residential damage/poor shelter options; lack of water/low water quality; lack of affordable food/NFI; lack of electricity, wastewater service, etc.

Access to good quality shelter is the second highest concern for IDPs living in Kirkuk. This is a problem for 67% of IDPs (over 24 000 IDP families) and 33% of returnees. The clustering of IDPs in camps drives inter alia overcrowding and health issues; keeping up with rising rents is another problem. Among returnees, housing and shelter problems (mainly in Kirkuk and Daquq qadhas) include a degree of secondary occupancy (in 6% of locations). The apparent lower concern with shelter among returnees (33%) is likely due to (1) still low return movements at the time of assessment and (2) lack of assessment in Hawiga qadha. In assessed locations, houses are intact in 87% of locations, and between 26% and 50% present significant damage. The rate of destroyed residences is overall low, but the rate of residential damage is high; many properties (and infrastructures) have been damaged by military campaigns and armed group activities.

Problems with food and NFIs are mostly associated with high price. But problems with household and drinking water are linked to insufficient supply and poor quality. Access to safe water is the second highest concern for returnees (84%), and a major concern for IDPs (21%). Overall, satisfactory drinking water access is reported in only 33% of IDP/returnee locations. Additionally with regard to basic infrastructure, public electricity service is reported as mostly functioning in 68% of IDP/returnee locations, functional road access to province/qadha centre – in 31% of locations, functional waste removal and sanitation service – in 44% of locations, and functional sewerage service – in only 20% of locations. Limited waste removal, sanitation and access to NFIs is pronounced in camps (see Table 5).

39 In 16% of their locations according to IOM ILA II (survey completed in March 2017), which does NOT include Hawiga qadha.


39

Figure 14 Most important needs of IDPs and returnees in Kirkuk province40

Figure 15 Profile of locations where IDPs and returnees live in Kirkuk province41

Table 5 Operational camps in Kirkuk Governorate as of end-2017 – population and needs

Nahia Camps in Kirkuk province

Population as of 31 Oct 201742

Camp manage

ment

Needs and gap analysis as of Nov-Dec 201743

Persons Families Families from Kirkuk province

Top needs (additional to winter items)

Gap in services vis-à-vis needs

n n n % High/very high Medium Daquq Daquq 9432 1572 1455 93% UNHCR/

IRD Education, documentation, clothing

Health Protection, GBV, education, waste removal

Laylan 2 4662 777 760 98% UNHCR/IRD

Employment, education, clothing

Health Shelter, water

Laylan Laylan IDP 10 062 1677 905 54% IRD Employment, documentation, medical care, clothing

Health Protection, GBV, education, shelter, waste removal, livelihoods

Laylan 3 6282 1047 1037 99% MoMD Employment, documentation, vocational training

GBV Protection, water, sanitation, waste removal, health, food, livelihoods

Nazrawa 9324 1554 1403 90% IRD Employment, education, vocational training, food, water

Health Protection, GBV, education

Yahyawa 4302 717 0 0% AFAD Employment, food, clothing

GBV, sanitation, health

Protection, education, water, waste removal

Total 6 44 064 7344 5560 76%

40IOM (Oct 2017), ILA II Report – based on assessment of 70 of 108 locations – excluding Hawiga (IOM ILA II completed in 20 Mar—31 May 2017). 41 Based on 70 of 108 identified IDP locations. IOM ILA II (20 March—31 May 2017) results: http://iraqdtm.iom.int/ILA2.aspx. 42 IOM DTX (31 Oct 2017), IDP Master List Dataset: http://iraqdtm.iom.int/IDPsML.aspx. 43 CCCM (Nov, Dec 2017), Iraq: Formal Settlement Monitoring Tool: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/61206; https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/61204; https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/61666.


40

Health conditions

The scale and dynamics of displacement have reflected negatively on the health situation of displaced families due to: (1) lack of financial ability to afford health care; (2) permanent mixing in the camps and sheltering methods in these camps; (3) precarious situation of the built environment outside camps, including housing; and (4) limited service provision (heath service but also especially safe water and sanitation).

The clustering of IDPs in camps and overcrowding in critical shelters facilitate the transmission of diseases; in particular water-borne and skin diseases. The shelter conditions in camps do not provide effective protection from summer heats nor winter colds, again leading to deteriorating health conditions of IDPs. Outside camps, limited water, sewerage and waste collection service and damaged/hazardous shelter conditions also increase public health risks for both IDPs and returnees. On the whole, there are a large number of IDPs who were affected by transitional diseases in the provinces and original accommodations from which they fled, since these places were already infected by diseases (e.g. viral hepatitis, Baghdad button, scabies, and rubella, etc.).

Health is the top concern for returnees (100%) – including insufficient supply and too expensive services. Health is also the third highest concern for IDPs – affecting 45% of IDPs. Overall, in March 2017, the health situation was reported to be a concern for ca. 490 returnee families and nearly 20 000 IDP families. Accounting for issues related to quality and quantity of health service (lack/insufficiency of health units, heath staff, medicines, and provided health services, etc.), the health situation is assessed as mostly ‘no problem’ in only 6.5% of IDP/returnee locations. Both inside and outside camps, the situation is exacerbated by weak health guidance and awareness.

Education

Among the serious negative consequences of displacement has been the wide spread of illiteracy, limited education participation, and deterioration of students’ learning/education levels. For families who do not continue their education, the reasons are several, mainly: financial capacity; lack of sufficient school buildings; lack of schooling requirement in the camp; and the poor socio-psychological condition of the displaced families.

Limited access to education is particularly pronounced problem in camps, where child-friendly spaces and organised socialisation and education activities for children and adolescents are very limited. Across IDP/returnee locations, the inadequacy and the limited number of schools cause overcrowding (in 20% of locations) and affect the quality of education. In 25% of locations, returnees reported that schools were too far away. The quantity and quality of education service is seen as ‘no problem’ in only 25% of IDP/returnee locations. On the whole, education is a concern for 67% of returnees and 33% of IDPs (reported by over 14 000 IDP families).

Security and safety

The crime incidence is high, including domestic violence (in 92% of IDP/returnee locations), petty crimes, kidnappings (in 32% of locations) and sexual assaults reported as occurring “sometimes” – “often” in Kirkuk Qadha. In March 2017, the highest countrywide percentage of forced evictions of IDP families was also recorded (78%) and 62% of IDPs were only allowed freedom of movement with a special permit (returnees do not need the permit). Also in March 2017, returnees (excluding Hawiga) reported risk of IED/UXO contamination and landmines in 60% of their locations, making their living conditions unsafe. In locations hosting both IDPs and returnees, limited cooperation between tribes is acknowledged – although the incidence of mutual mistrust and threats is low.

Social problems and protection

IDP families experience difficult living conditions, deterioration of education and psychological status, unknown future, financial loses, loss of family and home/property, and – especially in camps – living conditions characterised with little respect for human dignity. In result, especially given the prolonged conflict, certain social challenges have increased both in and outside IDP camps, including early marriage/adolescent pregnancy, separated/unaccompanied children, widows heads of household, child labour, etc. These issues have been especially evident, given that 40% of all IDPs in Kirkuk have been in displacement for more than 3 years.

Kirkuk hosts 10% of all IDPs in need of protection countrywide –24% of unaccompanied children and 22% of mothers under 18 – a finding that partly explains the high rate of family separations recorded among the IDP population (only 33% of families are united).


41

IDP children are particularly vulnerable, especially in camps. Many had witnessed tragedies and death of family member. All of them are in urgent need of psychosocial support and rights protection. Notably, protection (specifically child protection and protection from GBV) are pronounced needs in all camps (see Table 5). At the same time, mental health care and psycho-social support is given in very few of IDP/returnee locations (see Figure 15).

Despite some NGO efforts, these challenges present a threat to social cohesion. They premise short- and long-term negative consequences, which may include problems related to: radicalisation of young IDP family members; increase of begging incidence; increase in divorce incidence; deterioration of families’ economic level; increase in the administration of painkillers and certain drugs; etc.

In Kirkuk province, albeit at different scale, IDPs and returnees face shared problems – lack of access to livelihoods, lack of access to health and education, damaged infrastructure (resulting especially in lack of water), problems with shelter, need for safety, need for psycho-social support. Accelerated measures to restore water access, health and education opportunities, together with documentation/legal support for IDPs, will have an immediate positive impact in return movements. Overall a similar set of actions will improve the conditions of both IDPs and returnees: i.e. programmes to restore infrastructure/housing, to restore/improve services, and to support livelihoods and peaceful living together. These are also the actions that would encourage return of IDPs from areas outside Kirkuk province.

3.3. Support to IDPs and returnees

In 2014, MoMD Kirkuk Office distributed to IDP families food and health care baskets, blankets, kerosene heaters, air coolers; health institutions in Kirkuk province provided health services; etc. However, the scale of displacement in the context of ISIL and the level of pressure from IDPs on public service provision in the province exceeded expectations. The prolonged conflict and the wider context of financial crisis and insufficient budget allocations by the respective ministries have further constrained the capacity of government institutions to support IDPs and returnees.

In 2016, the Governorate prepared a Plan to Manage the IDP Crisis.44

Based on MoMD data,45

this responds to IDP pressure of more than 600 000 IDPs (125 000 families). The Plan takes into account the very limited resources and capabilities compared to the massive and urgent needs of IDPs. It responds to IDPs as a whole (including in camps, houses and rented apartments), with attention to the most vulnerable groups – children, women, and people with special needs. (The necessary actions identified in the provincial 2016 Plan to Manage the IDP Crisis are still valid; they are incorporated in this PRP under Annex: Proposed projects per sector.)

To-date, the majority of support for IDPs, especially in camps, comes from international organisations and NGOs. A number of local NGOs have been active as well, especially in areas of support for women and children, and inclusion/social involvement of youth; and there are a number of local active volunteering initiatives. Many of the organisations involved also support returnees and vulnerable groups among the host community – women, children, PwDs, elderly people.

According to UN OCHA46, 48 partners have been involved in 2017 in providing various support to populations in Kirkuk province, in 194 locations in camp or off-camp settings (see Table 6). Humanitarian response in 2017 reached 136 000 people in the province – of targeted 592 000 people in need. UN OCHA

47 identifies a total of

1.6 million people in critical need in Kirkuk province – including ca. 0.2 million IDPs and 0.1 million returnees.

44 Kirkuk Governorate (2016), Plan to Manage the IDP Crisis (ظة خطة وك محاف رك ينال أزمة ادارةل ك ازح كومه – ن ح ية ال ل مح ي ال ظة ف وك محاف رك عاون ك ت ال مع بشروع ف م كات prepared in cooperation with Takatof . Takatof is the Emirates Foundation for Youth Development (founded in 2007) with focus – (تon youth engagement, awareness, and youth “volunteering as a way of life”: http://www.takatof.ae/en/default.aspx. 45 Displaced people registered with MoMD Kirkuk office (121 200 families). 46 UN OCHA, Humanitarian Response 2017 Dashboards: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/iraq/2017-dashbords – accessed Dec 2017. 47 UN OCHA(Feb 2018), 2018 Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan: https://bit.ly/2wCWvcq.


42

Table 6 Main organisations active in providing support to populations in Kirkuk

International and national organisations and NGOs active in 2017* Iraqi NGOs active in 2016** Area of support N International National

Camp coordination and camp management (CCCM)

2 IOM International Relief & Development (IRD) AFAD (Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Authority)**

MoMD** Humanitarian Relief Association for Iraqi Turkmen Women

Amal Association Taif Network of CSOs Iraqi Human Rights Institute Waad Youth Development

Organisation Al-Rafedin Organisation Kurdistan Relief Association Al-Murshed Centre (Kirkuk)

for small business development

INMAA for Development Kayan Relief and

Development Organisation Daders Development and

Relief Organisation Al Moaeen Humanitarian

Relief Media Human Rights

Organisation Butterfly Children

Organisation Hasazan Women Rights

Organisation Popular Najdeh Al Rajaa Care for Widows and

Orphans Zayan Women and Children

Development and Education Brotherhood and Peace City

Organisation

Cash working programmes

4 Muslim Aid Terre Des Hommes (TDH) –Lausanne

Tearfund Entrepeneurs Organisation for Relief and Development (EORD)

Education 6 Intersos Mercy Corps Save the Children International (SCI) UNICEF World Vision International (WVI)

Tawa Organisation for Civil Development (TODC)

Emergency livelihoods 10 Relief International (RI) War-Child Canada Mission East

Christian Aid Impact IOM

Oxfam REACH

TOCD Barzani Charity Foundation (BCF)

Food security 8 Secours Islamique France (SIF) REACH

MoMD BCF IHA (health

access NGO)

Al-Khanjar Foundation (KFD) Foundation of United for Relief and

Sustainable Development (FUAD) United Iraqi Medical Society For

Relief and Development (UIMS)

Health and nutrition 11 Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW) Médecins Du Monde (MDM) France

IOM UNICEF

WHO Medair

KFD IHA

UIMS Doctors Aid Medical Activities (DAMA)

Protection (child protection; gender-based violence; housing, land, property; mine action)

15 Danish Refugee Council (DRC) Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) Fondation Suisse de Deminage (FSD) International Rescue Committee (IRC) Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

SCI IRW Intersos TDH-Switzerland Mission East

UNOPS WVI

FUAD Kurdistan Save the Children Organization (KSC) Civil Development Organisation (CDO)

Rapid response (RRM)

48

4 SCI SIF

UIMS Women Empowerment Organization (WEO)

Shelter and non-food items (NFI)

5 Catholic Relief Services (CRS) Tearfund

IOM REACH

SCI

Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH)

20 ACTED Arche noVa Catholic Relief

Services (CRS)

Medair Mission East TDH-Lausanne SIF

Tearfund UNICEF WVI DRC

NRC Oxfam REACH SCI

DoM Kirkuk MoCHPM Al-Rakeezeh Foundation for Relief and Development

(RRD) Total 50 35 15 17

Gap in humanitarian response from target –light grey=40-60% gap, gark grey=major gap (over 60%). Source: UN OCHA, Humanitarian Response 2017 Dashboards (lists 48 organisations); [*] Other international actors involved in 2016 (Governorate data): MSF (Holland), Handicap International (HI), ICRC,FOCSIV, Takatof (UAE); [**]Added (2 – MoMD and AFAD) based on CCCM (Dec 2017), Iraq: Formal Settlement Monitoring Tool; [***] Governorate data.

48 Immediate life-saving assistance – distribution of RRM kits within 72h of a trigger being activated. Each kit is meant to be a week’s supply per family, incl. food rations, a hygiene kit, a dignity kit, potable water and a water container .


43

3.4. Return process

The intentions of Kirkuk’s IDPs do not correspond with trends observed in the country (i.e. mostly wishing to return to their governorate of origin). In Kirkuk 55% of IDPs intend to stay in the short term and over half of IDPs are willing to locally integrate in the long term (over one out of three, voluntarily).

The obstacles to return of IDPs in Kirkuk are also factors that impede the successful integration/reintegration of IDP (see Table 7). In this regard the needs of IDPs and returnees overlap.

49

Table 7 Main IDP return push and pull factors for Kirkuk Governorate (in descending importance)

Reasons to return (push factors) Obstacles to return (pull factors)

Regained security of the location of origin Home location is seen as safe Encouragement from community/religious leaders Lack of means to remain in displacement Family was able to inspect conditions at the area of origin Incentives provided by humanitarian actors Possibility to work/recreate livelihoods in the areas of

origin Opportunity to join returned relatives/friends

Area of return is/is perceived as insecure/unsafe – due to presence of militias, UXO, evictions, etc.

Property is inhabited Absence of services back home Not allowed to return by security actors House destroyed at location of origin Lack of financial means to return (incl. to repair housing

or restart a livelihood) Lack of jobs/access to livelihoods back home Fear due to ethno-religious changes in the area of origin

Some specific problems in the return process include the following:

Property damage is reported by ca. 81% of IDPs and 94% of returnees in Multaka. Arable land is reported “mostly damaged” in 50% of assessed IDP/returnee locations and grazing land in a quarter of them. In 75% of locations, UXOs are preventing agricultural work in at least a few fields; while danger of landmines/UXOs is the main security concern for returnees in 50% of assessed locations;

There is a generalised perception that local authorities would be the most appropriate actor to foster social cohesion (and so facilitate return), followed by tribal leaders.

At the same time, only 44% of IDPs

and 55% of returnees are satisfied with the role of local authorities in fostering return to and cohesion in Al Multaka nahia.

50;

Crisis over the disputed areas has been the main factor driving continued increase in IDP numbers in Kirkuk late into 2017;

Many IDPs have moved in and out of the province; this creates a problem of duplicated registration and denial of rights arising from repeated registration in more than one province;

The need among IDPs regarding information and support on personal documentation is much higher than in Iraq on average; this is reported in 84% of IDP locations (compared to 20% country average);

Over 10% of IDPs need information on documentation/mechanisms for land and property restitution;

Available legal help is reported as ‘too expensive’ in 43% of IDP/returnee locations; often it is available but too far; it is reported to be ‘no problem’ in only 10% of IDP/returnee locations;

Access to law/court programme is reported in only 14% of IDP/returnee locations; access to land restoration programme is none; access to office for replacement of documentation is given in only 9% of locations; and access to reunification programme – in only 10% of all 195 IDP/returnee locations.

Increased help with documentation is a first step in supporting the return to home areas. Thereafter, restoring of physical assets and service provision are key to facilitate the return of IDPs, and targeted measures are necessary to support IDPs and returnees in accessing livelihoods. Efforts in these regards need to also include rural areas, so that IDPs may resume their livelihoods outside cities – which is also important toward restoring food security in the province. In addition, ensured rule of law, transparent governance, and respect for rights are key – to reduce the incidence of and perception of insecurity, and to facilitate the peaceful reintegration of communities. A comprehensive study of the IDP and returnee situation in the province would allow to articulate community-specific support measures for different IDP/returnee groups – as well as to channel available funding for support most effectively.

49 Analysis in Chapter II.3.4 based on IOM TDM ILA II; IOM TDM ILA II Report (Oct 2017); IOM report on obstacles to return (June 2017); and Governorate information. 50 IOM report on obstacles to return (June 2017).


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4. Disadvantaged host community groups

4.1. Profile

Disadvantaged host community groups include orphans, women providers, persons with disability (PwDs), minors and youth (up to 29 years old), and certain groups of economically disadvantaged individuals and families. In Kirkuk, all vulnerable groups and their needs have grown in the context of ISIL. At the same time, accurate data on group size and needs are lacking, which prevents effective planning of programmes and resources to support disadvantaged people to participate fully in social and economic life.

The UN OCHA Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for 2018-1951

has been developed to target populations in critical need throughout Iraq, excluding refugee response. According to the HRP, a total of 1.6 million people are in critical need in Kirkuk province – a fifth of all people in need in Iraq. The number includes ca. 0.2 million IDPs, 0.1 million returnees, and 1.1 million among host communities (69% of the total) . Of all people in critical need, 51% are women, 44% are children and 7% are elderly people.

Only a small part of this is covered by public social support systems (see Chapter II.3.2 below). The majority of support for vulnerable groups comes through international organisations and NGOs and volunteering organisations (see Chapter II.3.3, Table 6; we detail some of this support in Chapter II.4.3 below).

Economically disadvantaged individuals and families

The province has low employment rates, high share of working poor (disguised unemployment), and very low labour market integration of youth and women. It is estimated that in the context of conflict, unemployment has doubled (up to 45% in hot areas), driving up poverty and deprivation; and poverty rates have doubled too (up to 42% in hot areas) (see Chapter II.2).

Women

Women experience structural deprivation and inequality, driven above all by low economic inclusion and lower education levels for women. Both are restricted by cultural values and social norms, which influence behaviours and decision making within the family (including violence against wives, keeping girls from school, forced early marriage, etc.). Awareness of women’s rights is growing, but it remains overall low and the incidence of gender-based violence (GBV) is high.

The years of conflict have exerted additional pressure on women. In ISIL-held areas, women were additionally repressed and prohibited from any meaningful participation in social life. The combination of conflict, displacement, poor economic situation and rights violation has affected women and girls particularly in terms of health, mobility and social composition, making for extremely vulnerable portions of the population. Post-ISIL:

Changes in family structure are observed, with an increased number female-headed households. In 2011, pre-ISIL, the share of women heads of household in the province was 10.8% of all women over 10y

52: 9.9% widows and 0.9% divorced. Recent number of widows is lacking. However, data show that

divorce rates rose sharply in the context of ISIL – almost three-fold from 2013 to 2015 (respectively 2400 and 6945 divorces), while the rate of marriage increase by only 2%.

53 This is indicative of major

deterioration of the quality of social life and familial relationships in the context of economic and security degradation and displacement. At the same time, pre-ISIL female employment was only 14.5%.

Deterioration in the health and psychological situation of women has led to increase in social problems such as begging, prostitution, and early marriage. At the same time, early marriage is one of the main reasons for family disintegration and therefore increase in female-headed households.

54

Conflict has increased economic insecurity as well as the level of threat (real and perceived) to women and girls. Thus, families have increasingly seen marriage as a way to protect women and girls, as well as to increase household resources. Early marriage and forced marriage – a form of gender-based violence –

51 UN OCHA(Feb 2018), 2018 Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan: https://bit.ly/2wCWvcq. 52 According to a 2012 report, female-headed households formed then 1/8th and above of all households in Ryadh (14.2%), Kirkuk QC (13.8%), Daquq QC (13.3%), Alton Kobry and Al Rashad (12.9%), and Laylan (12.8%). 53 Statistics of Personal Status Court of Kirkuk's Presidency. The almost two-fold increase in the number of registered marriages in Kikrkuk in 2016 reflect that fact that marriages were certified also for people from other governorates displaced to Kirkuk. 54 According to the Higher Judicial Council divorce records - see UNDP (2014), Iraq HDR 2014, p.73.


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have increased markedly in Iraq. These trends have been translating in growing rate of early pregnancies and education drop-out among girls – both of which drive deeper the socio-economic exclusion of women (as well as drive high growth rates in the governorate).

The socio-economic inclusion of women is a growing priority. Half of the population of the governorate are women – while the loss of development due to inequality is particularly pronounced for women. Young women especially are the biggest victims of systematic shortage of good governance, service provision and violence. The years of protracted violence have added to the multidimensional problems and vulnerabilities that women suffer. At the same time, women are central to family and community life, and therefore their role in rebuilding of communities post-ISIL, especially, is central.

Targeted measures to promote the role of women are needed – e.g. to increase childcare services, to increase the political representation of women, to expand skills training for women, to secure livelihoods opportunities for women (e.g. though microfinancing for women’s projects), to protect women from GBV, to increase family planning awareness, to increase awareness of the rights of women, etc. – in addition to broad measures to stimulate female participation in education.

Children and orphans

Children under 15y in the province are over a million – 39.2% of the population. Children are the most heavily affected by the protracted conflict. E.g. half of IDPs in Iraq are under the age of 18, while the conflict has reduced the available health and school infrastructure. MoE estimates that 20% of school-age children across Iraq have dropped out of the education system in 2014-16, while ca. 75% of the Iraqi child population under 15y have to work to support the family income. In comparison, by Governorate data, in 2008 child labour in Kirkuk province comprised 6% of the population under 15y. In result, each year, a new wave of children become of school age – but with limited possibilities to receive education; while a new wave of 14–18 year olds enter the labour market with no skills and competences. Additionally, in the context of violence, the number of orphans has increased; grave violations of children’s rights have been widespread; and the psychological impact of the violence on children is likely to have a lifelong impact.

There is need to boost psycho-social support available to children, including in camps, including by increasing the role of schools in the psychological adaptation of children. There is also need for targeted programmes for catching up with education and student placements based on competences instead of just age group. Broad measures to increase education access and quality, to restore safety and the rule of law, and to increase the economic resilience of families are also relevant in this regard.

Youth

Young people (15-29 years old) comprise 27% of the population. Vulnerability of youth in the province – already high pre-ISIL – have been exacerbated since 2014.

55

Poverty and family and social disintegration have been a major pressure on youth – intensified by conflict and displacement (especially to urban areas). Lack of parent, unemployed parent, new environment and difficult circumstances all undermine family and social cohesion. Extreme cases of violence, family violence, abuse and trafficking/organ trade are not unusual in this context – and indeed these are significant concerns among youth in Kirkuk province pre ISIL.

Additionally, some families have

recruited their younger members in illegal/extremist activities in order to make money and supplement the family income. Notably, pre-ISIL, 16% of youth in the province were deprived from food security.

Deterioration of security and economic situation since 2003 and especially since 2014 has resulted in plummeting of school attendance, graduation and career opportunities. At the same time, there has been an erosion of societal structures that used to support youth in school-to-work transition as well as with a sense of purpose. As a result, the group of youth is constantly growing (1) who are illiterate or have only basic literacy, (2) who have no career opportunities, and (3) who are alienated from social and civil life. The sate of youth volunteering in community activities in the province is indicative of the latter; this is only 6.5% - among the lowest in Iraq.

Customs and traditions have been a further pressure – specifically the existing culture of authority, forcefulness, and related practices such as early marriage, choosing husbands for girls, restricted

55 The below analysis is based on and uses data from UNDP (2014), Iraq HDR 2014.


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education access for girls, etc. In this context, early pregnancy, drug use and flight from home have been on the rise, exposing young people to additional psychological, social and health problems.

Enabling youth to shape their own future is key to progress on socio-economic development and stability in the province. Two-thirds of the population of the province are under 30 years old. Clearly, the development of the province depends on the capacity to integrate youth in society, to absorb youth in the labour market, to retain youth who have higher education and to support those with limited access to education. Currently, youth suffer very high levels of exclusion (lack of education, lack of employment, trauma, discrimination, neglect) – while exclusion fosters radicalisation, especially when linked to poor service provision (as poor public services increase the distrust of government among young people). Therefore, youth are particularly vulnerable to radicalisation.

Therefore, youth need to take a central place in the process of restoring peaceful life and rebuilding of the community and economy in the province. The situation requires (1) targeted measures to address the problems of youth – including e.g. projects to increase basic literacy, to keep students in school (through improved quality of infrastructure and teaching, sports, psycho-social support, etc.), to increase vocational training and vocational guidance for students, and to increase the community involvement of students (volunteering, leadership programmes, etc.); and (2) broad measures to restore safety/the rule of law, improve public service provision, and boost economic/private sector development in the province.

Persons with disability

Chemical pollution of the environment and conflict are the two primary causes for the high incidence of disability in Iraq. Persons with disability (PwDs) have been a large and growing group, given Iraq’s history of conflict (see Chapter I.4), prolonged instability and sectarian violence, and most recently, violence in the context of ISIL. Conflict has also exacerbated environmental pollution especially from industry (see Chapter I.2).

The share of the population with disability is even higher in Kirkuk province than in Iraq as a whole. According to data for 2011,

56 PwDs comprise 3.9% of the population of Kirkuk province (3% of the female population, and

4.7% of the male population), and 3.3% of the youth population (15-29y) (4.1% of young men and 2.6% of young women); this is compared respectively to 3.8% (total) and 2.4% (youth) in Iraq as a whole. In absolute numbers, according to this statistic, the IDP population is ca. 60 000.

57 Post-ISIL, the PwD shares are likely higher – while

threats to safety and health associated with military waste/landmines and hazardous chemicals continue in the wake of liberation from ISIL.

In Kirkuk, people with disability comprise a large and growing group of the population, including among youth. Measures to improve work safety and limit pollution from industry are required, in addition to expanding specialised health support, accessibility of public buildings, awareness of the rights and needs of PwDs, etc.

4.2. Social protection and support for vulnerable groups through government bodies

Currently, support for vulnerable groups through the Government is weak. This is due to outflow of staff, lack of financial resources, and some stopped programmes for social support in the context of ISIL – but also due to pre-existing problems: e.g. shortage of specialised facilities and services for persons with disabilities; shortage of facilities and programmes to encourage the social inclusion of youth, women and other vulnerable groups; inefficiencies in allocation of support; low staff capacity; etc. At the same time, the conditions for the vulnerable groups have deteriorated and the number of people needing support has exponentially increased. The lack of current accurate data regarding vulnerable groups and their needs is an additional impediment.

Services under MoLSA

The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA) allocates subsidy salaries to families under the poverty line, as well as to women providers – widows and divorced women who have children (from the social protection network and women’s protection network), in accordance with the number of family members.

56 UNDP (2014), Iraq HDR 2014. 57 The Kirkuk Department of Health indicates a significantly lower figure – 9804.


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Social protection in Kirkuk is administered through the Department of Social Protection in Kirkuk under MoLSA. The Department operates 4 units of social care and has 69 staff (COSIT 2014). The Department reports:

A total of 27 082 beneficiaries of social welfare in 2014, including 42.4% (13 324) female beneficiaries from the widowed, divorced, and disabled women groups, as well as elderly persons, people unable to work due to sickness, minors or unemployed (COSIT);

A total of 41 000 beneficiaries of social welfare in 2016, including 39% (16 000) women – heads of household (widows. divorced, wives of imprisoned/missing persons), elderly, disabled, spinsters; 61% men – elderly, disabled and unemployed; and an additional 6500 persons whose salaries were suspended temporarily in the context of ISIL.

MoLSA also provides educational courses (2-month – in English and Arabic) and vocational courses (1-week to 6-month – in a number of fields) to unemployed, women and IDPs (in the age group 15–50) – to boost their skills and increase their chances for employment and to stimulate small business establishment and self-employment.

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A total of 54 vocational courses are offered by the Vocational Centre in Kirkuk under MoLSA – in computers (working with Word, Excel, etc.), tailoring, hair dressing, Know About Business (KAB), electrical installation, carpentry, etc.

Graduates of vocational courses offered in 2016 were 1206 people, including 63% women, 24.3% IDPs, and 2.1% widows, and an additional 10% (134 people, including 87 women) continued their vocational training and graduated in 2017.

Also, the Department of Employment and Loans under MoLSA registers unemployed certificate holders (except PhDs) and supports them in searching for job opportunities (in the private/public sector, in local/foreign companies). While the “working poor” phenomenon is wide spread, and while workers’ rights are generally not secured in the private sector, the number of registrations with the Department is soaring. Additionally, the Department lends small loans (IQD 5–12 million) to young unemployed persons to open small businesses.

The Department of Pensions and Social Security provides pension to workers and employees after completing 20 years in the private and PPP sectors (this can be combined with service in the public sector). This pension may be allocated for workers in case of work injury, death or disability of not less than 65%.

Persons with disability and persons with special needs are targeted by the Special Needs Care Department under MoLSA in several sections: State shelters; Mental disability; Physical disability; Protected workshops and productive cooperatives for PwD; Fully disabled persons; Nurseries; and Centre for diagnosing disabilities. The Department supervises support and shelters for elderly people; civil nurseries and the issuance of legal licenses to open such nurseries; training for PwDs and the allocation of monthly social salaries for carers for PwDs with 65+% disability rate in accordance with the type of disability that necessitates assistance.

Table 8 Capacity for special needs care (under MoLSA) in Kirkuk province

Institution Capacity Beneficiaries Service/details

Care House for the Elderly

50 people 17 Shelter, food and clothing; monthly payments of IQD 60 000/person

Orphanage 50 orphans n/a Care for orphans in the age group 6–18y, including IDPs – including shelter, food and clothing; education; monthly allocation of IQD 50 000/person

Al Rajaa Mental Disability Institute

n/a n/a Care for mentally disabled children (including with e.g. simple mental retardation, down syndrome, autism). Basic literacy education, self-care skills (e.g. how to use utensils, bathroom, toilet), healthcare.

Al Amal Hearing and Mental Disability Institute

80 students 60 at the start of school year, with significant drop-out rate

Education for disabled students in the age group 6–16y. This is the only such specialised school in Kirkuk province. Given that student housing is far away, the poor financial conditions of students and their families, and the lack of cars allocated for the Institute, most students tend to drop out. An additional problem is the lack of specialised teachers (in English and Arabic),

Ajial Nursery Houses (4)

200 children n/a Subsidised care and early childhood education for children in the age group 40 days–4 years. The social support value of these public nurseries has declined as their cost has increased from IQD 2000 in the past to IQD 15 000/month in 2017. Additionally, they lack adequate number of staff (nannies, social staff and service researchers).

58 In 2013, ca. 72% of all beneficiaries of MoLSA education and vocational courses across Iraq were women.


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Ration card support

The Ministry of Trade (MoT) distributes ration cards trough state and private companies; this allows card-holders to receive certain amount of foodstuffs every month. This support is the backbone on which most families of low and middle income rely.

Pre-ISIL, ration card support included 13 items; in the context of economic crisis and conflict, the items are limited to 4 – flour, sugar, oil, and rice – with a noticeable shortage in the supply of these items. The Kirkuk branch of MoT supplies the ration card items oil and sugar to qadhas in Kirkuk province; to Salah al-Din (Balad and Tooz Khormato qadhas); to IDPs in Anbar, Diyala, Nineveh (Mosul), Salah al-Din, Baghdad and Babil provinces; to IDPs in camps – including Dibaga (Makhmoor) and Khazer (Hamdaniya) in Nineveh.

The main issue here is that ration cards are lacking – as many people who no longer need them still use them. The ration card system was introduced to help cope with exceptional circumstances resulting from the blanket ban imposed by the Security Council in the wake of the invasion of Kuwait in Aug 1990. The system was originally meant to cover all residents of Iraq, and it was designed as a temporary solution to a specific emergency (i.e. the sanctions). However, the system has not been discontinued. In the current context, its indiscriminateness has emerged as a disadvantage, while there is need to target those most in need of assistance.

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The effectiveness of the ration card system is further hampered by bureaucracy in obtaining approvals for processing of ration card items; outdated infrastructure of warehouses for items – which leads to deterioration of items

60; and strained staff and capacities in the context of displacement.

Youth centres

The Department of Youth and Sports in Kirkuk works to (1) enhance the role of youth in the community, including through sports, and (2) enhance the development and prospects of youth – incl. through cultural, sports, arts, science and social activities. The Department oversees 12 youth centres (forums) (see Table 9). In the context of ISIL and economic crisis, these remain operational through USD 1500/month support for each from the Italian organization INTERSOS (affiliated with UNICEF).

Table 9 Youth Centres in Kirkuk Governorate

Qadha Nahia Forums of the Youth and Sports Directorate of Kirkuk (12)

Kirkuk Kirkuk QC Al Salam Forum at military neighborhood First of June Forum at First of June Shorja Stadium in Shorja Rizgary Forum near North Garage

Reheem Owah Forum at Raheem Owah Olympic Pool at Baghdad road Cultural Forum in Tesaeen

Alton Kobry Alton Kobry Forum

Taza Khormato Taza Forum

Al-Hawiga Al-Zab Zab Forum

Daquq Daquq QC Daquq Forum

Dibis Dibis QC Dibis Forum

4.3. Social support through international organisations and CSOs

The majority of support for vulnerable groups comes through international organisations and NGOs and volunteering organisations (see Chapter II.3.3, Table 6). Some of the key support programmes are as follows (Table 10). These are important source of lessons learnt in the formulation of future support.

59 Alzobaidee, H. (WFP/IDS, Dec 2015), Social Protection and Safety Nets in Iraq: https://bit.ly/2jZDCqU. 60 The latter is especially a problem with regard to vegetable oil, which MoT warehouses in Kirkuk store to meet rations in most provinces of Iraq; at the same time financing for rehabilitation is lacking.


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Table 10 Main social support programmes through international organisations

Programme Organisation(s) Target Details

Promoting safe access to livelihood opportunities for women affected by conflict 2016

Al-Amal Association Oxfam UN-Women

Fragile women: widows, divorced, missing husbands, deserted wives, husband or breadwinner is ill or dying, homes containing women only, very destitute families; women in marginalised and ethnically diverse areas

Goals: Raise the economic level of women affected by the conflict in areas of

conflict, and decrease poverty by supporting women economically and morally to provide for their families;

Empower women economically and socially; Increase women’s contribution to solving problems in the community; Highlight the importance of the role of women in conflict zones in

terms of peace-building and reconstruction of schools Help prevent social phenomena such as begging by children and

women, self-murder, underage marriage, out-of-court marriage, polygamy, and GBV – through community outreach.

Provided: Grants to support income-generating projects (e.g. livestock and

poultry ranching, opening of small markets/shops, beauty shops, tailoring, etc.)

Training on how to select projects, how to conduct feasibility study, financial management, and calculation of procurement and profit ratio – to build skills and increase self-employment;

Temporary employment opportunities – to empower women economically and socially.

Training regarding GBV (physical, economic, psychological, legal, communal violence);

Counselling referral; Literacy classes for women; etc.

Community Activation Programme (implemented in 15 governorates)

IOM Widows and divorced women; unemployed youth; families with low income; holders of technical, administrative, professional and industrial certificates and specializations; etc.

Goal: Contribute to achieving stabilisation in Iraq through improving the economic and social conditions of affected persons in the provinces that include a large number of IDPs – including IDPs, returnee and host populations. Types of support: In-kind grants to support income-generating projects/ small business

development; Vocational training for unemployed young people (in the age group

18-35) – in cooperation with MoLSA; successful graduates of the 2-month training receive a package of basic materials to start their craft-based income-generating projects;

On-the-job training for under-skilled youth. Youth are trained in civil workshops, plants and centres by persons experienced in the professional work, chosen by the beneficiary. The trainers are paid a training allowance. The trainees receive transfer allowance and a package of basic materials to help them practice the profession after acquisition of necessary skills;

Job placement within the private sector in various fields for young unemployed graduates of colleges and institutes. Salary for youngsters provided, and training on interview and job-search skills;

Agricultural training for farmers of low income, in coordination with the Department of Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine – to increase their skills and their knowledge regarding the projects chosen by them. Grants provided (e.g. to provide seeds and trees; to develop irrigation methods, sustainability of the soil; or to support animal production).

Social cohesion service provided to various community groups to promote and strengthen social, economic, psychological, cultural ties and ethnic traditions between diverse groups – toward peaceful coexistence through increased sense of belonging in the community. Shared activities include training and qualifying courses, professional courses, artistic and sports activities, dialogue and collective discussion, reforestation and cleaning campaigns.

Child care service for IDP community children in government kindergartens to include them with the children of the host


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communities – to support a culture of tolerance and support breadwinning mothers.

Psycho-social support programme for IDPs, returnees and host populations in 4 neighbourhoods of Kirkuk city and Qadisiya – to help reduce tensions due to social, psychological and economic problems, and thereby strengthen social cohesion and promote peace building.

Community assistant projects to develop infrastructure in the areas of health and education, services, business development and market support.

Mercy Corps programmes (called “Your Right to Education Programme” since 2016)

Mercy Corps – in cooperation with MoE and the Kirkuk Directorate of Education

IDP and host population students and pupils

Main achievements: Courses opened for male and female mentors, educators, and

supervisors in educational mentoring, and a group of negotiators from CSOs – to qualify them for field work in IDP concentration areas of Kirkuk/Daquq;

In the school year 2015/2016, returned to school IDP pupils and students who dropped out /were non-admitted in schools/high schools in Kirkuk/Daquq;

In the school year 2016/2017, teaching staff, mentors and supervisors trained on educational mentoring to return to school students from host and IDP communities (age group 10-20) – including evening education and external exams for sixth, third-intermediate, and sixth-preparatory grades;

Education centres opened in Kirkuk QC (3 – for 307 students) and Daquq Qadha (2 – for 140 students).

Promoting inclusion and social cohesion will require appealing to the most excluded and vulnerable groups. This includes youth and IDPs who suffer disproportionately from lack of access to basic services and jobs. Efforts in this regard need to focus on both (1) inclusive access to services and (2) social support for vulnerable groups:

Effective support to all populations (IDPs, returnees, host communities) needs to be ensured with regard to healthcare, education, psychological health, etc. Ensuring the provision of basic services and the rehabilitation of physical assets (esp. schools and housing) is vital in this regard

61;

The collection of current data on the number and needs of vulnerable groups by location is a necessary first step to allow effective planning, prioritisation and provision of support to vulnerable groups;

It is necessary to develop and expand partnerships with civil society organisations (CSOs) in the governorate that actively support vulnerable groups, and to explore joint collaboration opportunities. It is also necessary to support directly international organisations, local CSOs, community centres, voluntary organisations – and to promote their coordination;

Schools and community centres stand to play a major part in the psychological rebuilding of families and communities and in promoting rights awareness..

5. Community peace-building and reconciliation

Currently, the involvement of Governorate Authorities in reconciliation and peace-building efforts in the province is weak. Centralised reconciliation efforts are under the authority of the Central Government. So far, Kirkuk Governorate has supported one Conference on Peaceful Coexistence Mechanisms – organised with support from Sanad Organisation for peace building, the US Institute of Peace, and the Committee on follow-up and implementation of the national reconciliation programme at the Prime Minister’s office.

The Conference has included a series of meetings and individual conventions conducted in Erbil and Kirkuk to study and discuss ways to guarantee stability and civil peace, and to realise justice in Kirkuk province in the course of liberation and in the post-ISIL context. On closing the Conference, on 15 Jan 2017, tribal sheiks, social elites and representatives of the local government in southwest Kirkuk province – as representatives of the communities and tribes – adopted a set of principles for peaceful coexistence in southwest Kirkuk province and mechanisms to promote peaceful coexistence, as follows.

61 Cf. WB Group (03 Feb 2017), Iraq Systematic Country Diagnostic ( Report No. 112333-IQ): https://bit.ly/2IjsrrX.


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Table 11 Conference on Peaceful Coexistence Mechanisms in southwest Kirkuk province – conclusions (15 Jan 2017)

General principles for peaceful coexistence

1. Peaceful coexistence and community reconciliation are a priority in southwest Kirkuk province; 2. Efforts by local and international organisations, which seek to realise stability and enhance citizenship,

are supported with transparent and comprehensive mechanisms – as are efforts, which seek to rebuild the area;

3. There is commitment to moderation in religious, educational, information, political and tribal discourse; 4. Fighting extremist beliefs and behaviours is a joint responsibility; 5. Comprehensive dialogue accord is adopted to address all problems and challenges in the area,

including condemnation of violence and any other procedures that contradict the law; 6. Justice is supported and there is commitment to human rights principles; 7. Security, judicial and legal institutions are supported to attain fair punishment; other procedures that

aim to settle conflicts outside the framework of the state are prevented; 8. The rule of law is adopted in channelling tolerance and forgiveness; it is the only reference taken into

account in determining who is victim and who is member of ISIL – to avoid cases of tribal revenge; 9. Tribes renounce those persons convicted by law for joining ISIL and its members; 10. ISIL members are divested of tribal, national, ethnic-religious or regional affiliation – i.e. an ISIL

member is not seen to represent any tribe, community group, nationality, or area.

Mechanisms to promote peaceful coexistence

1. The tribes announce their renunciation of ISIL members through public conferences and initiatives; 2. Provide security institutions with lists of names of ISIL members, supported by evidence; prevent

attempts to mislead the security and judicial authorities with malicious or incorrect information; deter attempts to settle disputes outside the frame of the law;

3. Form local committees at the level of administrative units – comprised of representatives of the Governorate, Qadha authorities, local leaders, tribal sheikhs, official security bodies, local councils, the Kirkuk Provincial Council, as well as relevant CSOs – to follow up the security and rights situation in their areas;

4. Adopt and adjust tribal regulations in southwest Kirkuk as appropriate to deal with the current situation challenges without contradicting the law; establish a standard (Tribal Regulations);

5. Ensure the compensation of victims of ISIL crimes and military operations, and speed up the reconstruction of affected areas – by applying pressure on relevant stakeholders;

6. Support programmes to fight extremist beliefs and hate discourse which encourage violence; 7. Enhance educational systems and processes – by establishing an environment that supports

moderation – in coordination with relevant Ministries and Directorates (e.g. the Directorates of Education, Youth, Higher Education and Scientific Research).

A major obstacle in the process of reconciliation and peace building is the wide spread of arming and arms sales in Kirkuk province. These facilitate the outbreak of armed violence, as well as murders and armed robbery. Thus, they factor in increase in the cases of human rights violations. The arming phenomenon is linked to tradition of carrying arms going back to the former Regime, as well as tribal traditions; culture – which includes language of violence and killing; open and wide availability of arms for purchase (including using social media); wide presence of various militias; lack of legal constraints on carrying arms; general insecurity – which e.g. allows arms sales to take place in the name of protection of home and family; lack of awareness programmes that e.g. promote non-violent means of dispute resolution among teenagers.

Local authorities should be more active in promoting peaceful coexistence and the rule of law. There is need to elaborate and support initiatives that work for reconciliation and peace building. The Conference initiative should be followed by other measures, starting with the schools and local communities, and with strong involvement of women, youth and CSOs, in addition to community/religious/tribal leaders. Additionally, effective local governance – based on representation, transparency, accountability, the rule of law and a culture of human rights – is a prerequisite for increased community cohesion in Kirkuk Governorate.

A number of initiatives of CSOs/international organisations provide a successful examples of what can be done at the community and family level to promote peaceful coexistence and community cohesion. E.g.

In 2017, Green Kurdistan Association (funded by Mercy Corps) initiated the plantation of 1100 trees in 10 schools in Kirkuk city neighbourhoods – as a step to teach the students from IDP and host communities the spirit of coexistence and reconciliation;

In 2016/17, Mercy Corps in cooperation with MoE carried out guidance and awareness training for negotiators and mentors – to promote skills in non-violent dispute resolution. Male and female mentors, educators, supervisors in educational mentoring, and negotiators from CSOs were qualified for work in IDP-cluster areas of Kirkuk city.


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In 2016, UNICEF in cooperation with the Kirkuk Directorate of Education, conducted training on “positive education” for teaching cadres. Teaching and administrative staff were trained to better respond to the problems of students and to convey to students the spirit of cooperation, compassion, integration (including with displaced students), tolerance and patience – as a counterpoint to violence and extremism. Outcomes of the training course were concluded with a festival for all participating schools, including participation of Kurdish, Arab and Turkomen students in joint activities (including Kurdish dance and Children's Parliament); etc.

Constraints in restoring community cohesion in Kirkuk province

Lack of community cohesion between members of the Kirkuk community

Ethnic conflicts that erupt from time to time with various negative impacts

Lack of clear local government vision on realising community cohesion

Weak involvement of community leaders and CSOs in the local governance process

Weak coordination of local government planning for social service provision/social inclusion with CSOs involved in community development

Lack of clear vision to address and conclude the problematic issues related to IDPs and returnees

Ineffectiveness of CSO programmes toward the realisation of community cohesion

Wide arming incidence and spread of arms sales

Lack of programmes that raise youth awareness with regard to arming, conflict resolution, tolerance and the rule of law.

Means to promote community cohesion

Adopt a sound local government programme to return all IDPs to their homes;

Reinstate services to liberated areas;

Promote and activate the role of CSOs;

Develop a programme of activities to promote community cohesion – in coordination between the local government and CSOs;

Develop mechanisms for accountability and participation in decision making to empower citizens;

Criminalise sectarian discourse;

Activate the role of schools in promoting peace and tolerance, spreading awareness of the dangers of carrying arms, and mitigating the psycho-social effects of conflict on children and their families;

Articulate and implement programmes aimed to promote tolerance, human rights awareness, and peaceful conflict resolution among youth.


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III. ECONOMIC PROFILE

1. Economic development

By 2011 data, among Iraq’s 18 governorates, Kirkuk scores 2nd on GNI per capita (2012 PPP$) – with USD 42,251; 2nd on GDP per capita – with USD 13 171; and 4th on Annual Household Income – with USD 20 256.

62 In

2011, unemployment in the province was the lowest in Iraq: 2.4% total unemployment in the age group 15y+ and 6% youth unemployment (15-29y). Yet, while Kirkuk ranks 1st in unemployment, it is only 7th and 9th in Iraq by rate of male and female employment respectively. The low total unemployment is driven by low participation in the economy and low employment rates – both of which are lower than the average for Iraq; as well as high share of working poor people (i.e. disguised unemployment).

In this context:

Rather than indicative of prosperity, the apparent low unemployment rates pre-ISIL indicate a stagnating labour market, predominance of low-quality low-pay jobs, and failure of the public sector to provide employment opportunities – all of which reinforce the low labour market participation rates; while

The apparent high economic levels fail to translate adequately into increase in wellbeing and development level. It is significant in this regard that by socio-economic development based on GDP the province ranks 6th among the 18 Iraqi provinces, but it ranks only 12th by overall quality of life index, while both the Human Development and Non-income Human Development indexes for Kirkuk are below the national average.

In sum, pre-ISIL already, Kirkuk had a vulnerable economy. been estimated that in ISIL-controlled governorates, the direct impact of economic, social and security disruptions has doubled poverty rates up to 41.2%.

63 Post-

2014, unemployment has reached an estimated 30%, 45% in ISIL hotspots. The main features of Kirkuk’s economy are also the factors that reduce its economic resilience:

Overdependence on oil and hydrocarbons as a source of wealth; Focus of both institutions and labour market entrants on the public sector/SOEs; Weak private sector; and

Stagnant agricultural development and weak rural development.

Dependency of the economy on oil makes it very exposed and vulnerable to shocks. Post-2014, unemployment has increased due to military activity and human displacements, but also due to decline in oil prices and destruction of oil sector infrastructure.

64 At the same time, the industry and tourism sectors do not make full use of available

resources (see Chapters III.2 and III.5), while the agriculture sector has been stagnating (see Chapter III.3).

Employment in the province mainly relies on the state to provide work – trough the administration and state-owned enterprises, especially in the oil industry; and on agriculture. At the same time, for youth, labour absorption in SOEs is secondary to the private sector (see Chapters II.2 and III.2).

Labour absorption and jobs generation in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is very low (see Chapter II.2). Focus on SOEs reduces economic resilience, as discourages private sector development, entrepreneurship and diversification. SOEs rely on limited financial allocations from the central budget; economic planning capacity in the public sector is weak; and there is limited technological uptake, while most technology used is outdated.

The private sector – dominated by small-scale enterprises – is characterised by low skills intensity, high labour intensity, low productivity, low level of technology adoption, low competitiveness, and very low jobs creation. Inter alia, while it employs the majority of the working poor, the weakness of the private sector undermines poverty reduction efforts.

Overall, the labour market is unable to absorb the youth bulge – which is a problem of low decent jobs availability, as much as a problem of mismatch between demand and supply in the labour market. Historically, the state in Iraq has played a leading role in educating and employing young Iraqis; e.g. in 2012, the public sector provided 40% of all employment. But in the context of population boom and rapid urbanisation, reliance on public sector employment only drives low economic participation and high unemployment rates – with their

62 Detailed analysis of income, employment and poverty is provided in Chapter II.2. 63 WB, “The World Bank in Iraq: Overview,” updated 01 Apr 2017: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iraq/overview. 64 MoP.


54

social consequences. Corruption and patronage, made possible by resource-based state industries, undermine the private sector as they discourage entrepreneurship. Young people are underrepresented in government jobs, while the weakness and stagnation of the private sector prevents it from being an engine of employment for youth.

65

Additionally, significant spatial disparities in the levels of service provision, development and poverty exist between the nahias; and socio-economic development tends to be weaker in rural areas (see Chapter II.2). Also, in most rural areas, the diversification in income opportunities is very low (if any), and therefore income security is low. On the whole, the economic prospects in rural areas are low. This drives up social risks across the province – e.g. poverty, high school dropout rate, adolescent pregnancies, etc. in rural areas, and growth of urban poverty pockets from rural migration to cities; it is also linked to the shortage of (skilled) human resources in rural areas. At the same time, spatial disparities reinforce actual or perceived marginalisation of areas, which factors in social tensions, and which can feed sectarianism.

In this context, the economic development of Kirkuk province would mean:

Diversification of the economy – including development of the agricultural, industrial, oil, tourism and trade 1.sectors – so that Kirkuk may achieve: development and economic status commensurate with its resources; comprehensive economic development; and socio-economic well-being of citizens in the mid- and long term;

Rural development – better quality of social, economic and services conditions for people living in rural 2.areas, ensured through fuller use and sustainable management of agricultural, industrial and human resources, improved service provision, improved physical infrastructure and investment projects.

For both these purposes, it is essential to (1) strengthen the private sector and partnerships between the public and private sectors, and (2) boost investments.

There is plenty of human and resource potentials in Kirkuk's economy where such potentials make it easy to demonstrate the process of economic development and diversification of income sources through all economic sectors (industry, agriculture, services, trade, oil, natural resources). Moreover, there is an experienced technical staff that could be invested in the areas mentioned above, and take advantage of their accumulated experience by virtue of serving in government departments and the private sector for a long time. This process requires organization, coordination, arrangement and rehabilitation of major companies in the province.

Iraq’s current legislation on investment is overcomplicated and not implemented, which creates problems for investors. Corruption and the low availability of qualified and skilled human resources (especially outside cities) deter investors, too. Also, the banking system is not in a position to support the economy in an adequate way.

As a further pressure, in the context of ISIL, most of areas of the economy have suffered setbacks; revenue-generating resources and economic infrastructure (including the oil industry) and supporting infrastructure have sustained major damage; many production facilities have stopped work and staff have left their work places. Post-liberation, as people return, it is often not possible to resume work due to damage to facilities, disrupted infrastructure and services (e.g. lack of electricity or water), and flight of skilled cadres. Finally, much agricultural land is not accessible or it is polluted from destroyed industries. The economy is altogether disrupted; and the economic well-being of residents and living standards have declined. Notably, access to employment is the top shared concern of IDPs and returnees.

Particularly in the post-ISIL context, the limited resources of the governorate require that larger input from the private sector and foreign investors be activated. While strong economic development would provide the means for social programmes and improved service delivery, (1) developing the private sector, (2) improving the competitiveness of enterprises, and (3) increasing investments in the economy of the province are of vital importance both for sustainable economic growth across sectors and for the planning and implementation of actions that target social and human development.

65 Cf. WB Group (03 Feb 2017), Iraq Systematic Country Diagnostic.


55

ISIL-related constraints to Kirkuk’s economic development

Destruction of essential infrastructure of the economy – including loss of industrial facilities and production centres and destruction of transport infrastructure;

Losses in oil production;

Losses in cropland – damage and mining have resulted in many irrigation projects stopped and many fields not accessible. This adds to loss of agricultural land due to transformation of agricultural land into housing land (e.g. random settlements) in the absence of effective government control;

Destruction of strategic SOEs e.g. Beygee Oil Refinery, textile and pharmaceuticals factories, etc.;

Loss of many marketing centres, especially public and private storage facilities;

Burning and destruction of private and public sector archives of data;

Destruction of the sanitation/sewerage system;

Destruction of the water and electricity network – which is the backbone of both industry and life;

Destruction in of infrastructure in the health and education sector – with negative implications for human resource development;

Destruction of cultural heritage – which constrains the tourism sector; Flight of people/loss of human resources; Destruction of housing and basic infrastructure that prevents the return of people to normal life and work.

To facilitate the return of IDPs and economic recovery, it is first necessary to identify all damaged infrastructure in need of rehabilitation, including housing. This is a very important step to allow prioritisation of infrastructure projects and to ensure transparency of the reconstruction process. It is equally important to prioritise actions in the fields of community and economic development, with focus on inclusive service provision across areas and groups and more spatially balanced jobs creation.

Pre-ISIL constraints to Kirkuk’s economic development

Economy dependent on oil as a main source of wealth – including neglect of the agriculture sector and low number of industrial enterprises (large, medium and small)

Management framework for economic activities – including weak role of the private sector Low competitiveness of public and private sector enterprises – which inter alia drives low income of

workers and prevents job creation Legislative environment (e.g. regarding imports control or investments) and weak banking environment Unbalanced rural-urban development/weak rural development – spatial development that has led to a

vast difference between countryside and the city Declining role of the State in investment Lack of investor confidence limits investments – due to the security and political situation in the province

Lack of local production

Weakness of encouraging agricultural industrial projects despite the availability of raw materials.

Goals

Ensure balanced spatial development that supports economic growth as well as social inclusion and social justice;

Eliminate unemployment and reducing poverty rates in the governorate;

Diversify income sources in the governorate.

Means

Prioritise the development of the agriculture sector; activate the role of agricultural initiative;

Facilitate the development of crude oil activity and oil-related industries (including refineries capacity); work on oil products scarcity;

Develop the financial and banking system; activate the role of the banking sector in the process of economic development in the province;

Create legislative environment that facilitates economic development and investment;

Fully use the resources and capacities in the governorate to support economic development;

Ensure cross-sector coordination in decision-making in the formulation of development and investment projects – to identify and foster synergies in development efforts per sector (economic or public service);


56

Improve the coordination between the public sector and the private sector; identify and encourage opportunities for development of PPPs;

Stimulate entrepreneurship;

Facilitate better correspondence between labour market demand and supply – through vocational programmes, skills development programmes, etc. with involvement of businesses and industry;

Secure different types of energy sources;

Much improve the uptake of modern technology in all sectors;

Increase the level of R&D (research and development) in all sectors – to promote best practices and modern management/production processes, and ultimately improve sustainability, productivity and competitiveness across sectors – which will also drive up jobs creation;

Address the treatment of the rights of workers in the private sector (social security);

Address the low income of workers in the public and private sectors;

Address the problem of disguised unemployment in the public sector;

Address the complementary environment of the business – i.e. the complexity of government procedures; activate the role of the single window;

Encourage private sector companies to register in the financial markets and keep abreast of developments in circulation;

Activate the Consumer Protection Law and the competition law between companies;

Limit the continued application of the open import policy;

Activate the role of standardization and quality control for all materials entering the country

Revitalise commercial transport

Allocate a percentage of profits earned to employees in sectors

Encourage and support the private sector, especially in the field of investment.

2. Industry

Developing the industrial sector has multiple impacts on economic development in the province, as it contributes to: labour absorption; revenue generation; per capita and national income; availability of goods and products; activating the role of and developing other related sectors (agriculture, construction, infrastructure and transport, exports/trade), which additionally fuel socio-economic development in the province.

Kirkuk has a wealth in industrial raw materials (detailed in Chapter I.2) that premise significant production and exports of oil and petrochemicals, chemicals and fertilisers, construction materials, asphalt, glass, etc.; as well as conditions available for agriculture that premise significant crop-based industry development.

However, these resources remain largely unexploited and potential industries are underinvested. Local manufacturing industries are almost absent. Mineral and oil-related deposits (such as asphalt and bitumen) are only partially developed. Due to the complicated security situation and the environmental issues caused by the asphalt production, this sector too is still underdeveloped. Investment is also limited due to difficulty in obtaining approvals, linked to rules and bureaucracy.

According to Governorate data for 2016:

A total of 928 industrial enterprises are registered with the Kirkuk Industries Association – including 10 public and 918 private enterprises. Per sub-sector, these include: food (246), wood (49), textiles (51), paper (8), chemicals (87), construction (220), metals (182), services (9), small projects (76);

The 10 operational SOEs (in processing, construction and food industries) employ a total of 4717 workers. I.e. in 2016, operational SOEs absorbed only 0.5% of the entire working-age population, and ca. 1.2% of the economically active population. SOEs are characterised by outdated machinery and technologies used, ineffective use of staff (hiring more people than necessary – also due to nepotism practices), lack of modern management, reliance on state funding. Therefore, production in SOEs tends to be not competitive to cheap foreign imports;

Compared to SOEs, private industrial companies are much smaller and operate with varying success – which signals problems related to (low/lack of) financial, human capital and technological capacity, poor productivity and competitiveness, as well as overall poor business environment. In 2016, labour absorption in the private industry sector was only 0.7% of the working-age population and ca. 1.8% of the economically active population (see Table 13). Of all private industrial enterprises, 93% are concentrated


57

in Kirkuk QC – which limits economic opportunities in other areas of the governorate and perpetuates uneven economic development and urban/rural divide;

There are no operational PPPs;

Large plants operate in the cement, bricks, iron, petrochemicals sub-sectors; small and medium plants include water purification plants, nylon factories, PVC, paper mills, and tissue paper factories;

The main sub-sectors are processing, construction and food:

Oil processing industry includes 3 refineries – two in the private sector (380 workers total) and North Gas Company (2900 workers);

Non-oil processing industry includes asphalt plants, carpentry plants, blacksmith plants and nylon plant (ca. 3750 workers total);

Construction industry is represented by blocks plants, marbles plants, bricks plants, and the Kirkuk Cement Company (SOE) (3640 workers total);

Food industry includes carbonated beverage plants, gypsum plants, ice cream plants, mills, mineral water plants (1800 workers total).

In sum, there is much potential for development in the sector – in terms of capitalising on available resources, spatial diversification, and above all with regard to firm size and relevance for job creation/labour absorption. The data indicates that the majority of enterprises in the industry sector have limited growth and job creation potential in the absence of investment for private sector development.

Post-ISIL, most industries have sustained damage and many workers have been displaced. An estimated 80% of industries have been closed. As yet, no specialized committee has been formed to estimate damages and prepare plans to implement required rebuilding/rehabilitation work to allow industries to resume activity.

Table 12 Large and small industrial plants, Kirkuk province, 2013 (COSIT)

Indicators Large industry Small industry total Public Private Total

Industrial plants (n) 2 27 29 1407 Wages and benefits (IQD million) 64270 6231 70501 17635 Production value (IQD million) 223894 94506 318400 103316 Value of supplies (IQD million) 82130 63262 145393 62365 Value of sales (IQD million) – – 282820 –

Table 13 Private industry indicators, Kirkuk province, 2016

Qadha Nahia Private industrial enterprises (n) Large Medium Small Total

Number Workers Number Workers Number Workers Number Workers Kirkuk Kirkuk QC 30 930 48 730 718 3600 796 5260

Yaychi 1 32 0 0 4 20 5 52 Alton Kobry 1 33 2 33 8 42 11 108 Al-Multaka 1 33 0 0 0 0 1 33 Taza Khormato 0 0 1 15 6 30 7 45 Laylan 0 0 6 95 4 18 10 113 Shwan 0 0 0 17 3 15 3 32 Qara Hanjeer 1 85 1 18 5 22 7 125

Al-Hawiga Al-Hawiga QC* 1 33 0 0 16 80 17 113 Al-Abbasi* 0 0 0 0 6 30 6 30 Al-Riyadh* 0 0 0 0 8 40 8 40 Al-Zab* 0 0 0 0 9 40 9 40

Daquq Daquq QC 0 0 0 0 12 60 12 60 Al-Rashad* 0 0 0 0 5 22 5 22

Dibis Dibis QC 0 0 1 17 14 70 15 87 Sarkran 0 0 0 0 6 30 6 30

Total in Kirkuk province 35 1146 59 925 824 4119 918 6190 % of this in Kirkuk Qadha 97% 97% 98% 98% 91% 91% 92% 93%

[*] Area still occupied by ISIL at the time of data collection.


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Oil and gas industry

Development of the oil and gas sector is responsibility of the central government. The Ministry of Oil manages activity in Iraq’s hydrocarbon sector through SOEs. Overall in Iraq, oil and gas extraction and processing capacities are limited visa-vis the available resources and insufficient/ineffective to meet national demand and support extensive exports.

66 The oil and gas sector is strongly affected by external crises and

internal insecurity/war, resulting in shortages in all energy fronts in country, especially since 2014.

Pre-ISIL, oil and gas extraction and processing used to provide significant revenues for Kirkuk Governorate (through the petrodollar act), although a relatively modest share of employment (ca. 15 000 pre-ISIL).

At the height of their capacity, the Kirkuk oil fields produced more than a million barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil. Pre-ISIL, crude oil production at Kirkuk fields was 410 000 bpd, distributed as follows:

30 000 bpd delivered to and processed at Kirkuk refinery;

20 000 bpd delivered to Al Quds station to produce electricity in Bagdad;

40 000 bpd delivered to Kalk refinery (near Erbil, operated by the Kurdish-owned Kar Group) for the purpose of providing Nineveh province with oil products;

320 000 bpd exported through Kurdistan pipeline to Ceyhan port (Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline – constructed in 1970).

In 2010, Kirkuk oil refinery was the 4th largest among Iraq’s 12 refineries (design capacity of 30 000 bpd of crude oil, available capacity of 28 000 bpd).

67 Since, modification works on the old concentration Unit 105

have been completed (to turn this into a refinery unit) and the unit is now under initial operational phase. When the unit is fully operational, the capacity of Kirkuk refinery will increase up to 43 000 bpd. Oil product production at Kirkuk refinery includes:

Petroleum naphtha – 700 m3/d, and 1180 m

3/d after activation of Unit 105

Kerosene – 100 m3/d, and 355 m


Gas oil – 1000 m3/d, and 1260 m


Fuel oil – 2300 m3/d, and 3350 m

3/d after activation of Unit 105.

North Oil Company (NOC) produces 3.4–4.8 million m3/d of natural gas from South Jambour field used as

industrial fuel in the NOC activities as well as operating electricity production units in Dibis Gas station for Electricity production and to cover the shortfall in the amount of natural gas for the purposes of north gas

North Gas Company (NGC) obtains 5.4–5.7 million m3/d of natural gas. This is associated in the production of

oil production at NOC and processed in the North Gas Complex. Production includes: dry gas (industrial fuel gas) – 4.8 million m³/d used for operating power stations and industrial complexes; liquid gas (kitchen gas) – 600 t/d; natural gasoline – 250 m

3/d; and sulphur – 100 t/d.

Kirkuk’s territory is abundant in hydrocarbon resources. However:

Extraction is limited and local industries for processing of hydrocarbon resources and oil-based industries are limited. At the same time, the production capacity from domestic refineries in Iraq remains insufficient – even though local demand for oil products has rapidly increased since 2003 (in line with economic development and urbanisation trends);

Even though gas is a major resource for the power generation, petrochemical, and fertilizer industries; significant volumes of associated gas remain flared off;

Excluding the modification of Unit 105 at Kirkuk refinery, no positive improvement in crude oil production, oil refining and natural gas processing has taken place in the province;

Development of the sector needs high investment, which is constrained by legal obstacles;

Revenues from the sector and funding for the sector have declined considerably since 2013.68

66 This is recognised by the Ministry of Oil. E.g. the Ministry’s development plan for the oil and gas sector for 2003–2014 had a focus to: improve management systems; rehabilitate existing facilities; improve and increase refinery capacity; improve product specifications; reduce natural gas flaring and increase the utilization of natural gas (e.g. for power/petrochemicals/fertilizers production); reduce heavy petroleum products (fuel oil) from refineries, and replace the dependence on crude oil consumption for power generation; dedicate the oil mainly for export and refineries. IEEJ (June 2010), “Iraqi Ministry of Oil Fossil Fuel Resources (Latest Estimates)” (presentation): http://eneken.ieej.or.jp/data/3196.pdf. 67 EEJ (June 2010), Iraqi Ministry of oil Fossil Fuel Resources (Latest Estimates), presentation: http://eneken.ieej.or.jp/data/3196.pdf. 68 For 2014-2017, except for funding to cover staff salaries in the sector; the Governorate received small-to-none of the due share of the operational 2014–2017 budget. The province does currently receive USD 10 million/month from the KRG as petrodollar benefits for oil exports.


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Constraints to the developing Kirkuk’s industrial sector

Insufficient use of available resources;

Low number of large, medium and small industrial enterprises

Low productivity and competitiveness of enterprises (e.g. brick plants, cement plants, water plants, soft drinks plants, some food plants, Rawlah Agriculture and Industrial plant, Nylon plants) – driving weak decent jobs creation and low income of workers – related to:

Shortage of electricity/services

Outdated facilities – particularly of plants that supply markets with local products

Poor maintenance, shortage of equipment and spare parts

Low uptake of modern technology

Outdated management methods


Underinvestment/underdevelopment of resource-based industries – including the oil sector

Lack of large loans by GoI and banks to support industrial projects – which caused industry actors to abstain from establishing large plants

Weak role of GoI and the local authorities in promoting investment for industry development – e.g. organising large conferences, inviting capital holders to invest in industrial sector – non-provisions of lands for industrial projects pursuant to the industrial investment law

Legislations that impede the advancement of the industrial sector – e.g. exhaustive bureaucracy in getting approvals and allocation of lands for industrial projects – which leads to neglecting the industrial sector and non-completion of many plants (in food industries, textile industries, paper plants, chemical plants, construction and presses);

Management framework for economic activities that prioritises SOEs

Weakness and unattractiveness of the private sector

Weak planning for rural development

Shortage of skilled staff/qualified technical staff for the industrial sector and staff prepared for project management

Damage to industrial and service infrastructure and closed industries in the context of ISIL

Goals

A developed and competitive industrial sector (including SOEs and private enterprises) that is not reliant on state funding contributes to economic growth, jobs creation and poverty reduction.

Means to achieve the goals

Secure approval and investment for, construct and operationalise iron and steel plant, and petrochemicals plant;

Secure required support and investment to develop priority operational plants;

Increase the role of the private sector – including secure good environment to develop the private sector and increase the attractiveness of the private sector;

Improve social benefits and protection for workers in the private sector (e.g. social security, pensions, workers’ rights – incl. guaranteed holidays, childcare, etc.);

Develop an integrated strategy for industry development, which takes into account the available natural, human and financial resources in the governorate and future expectations;

Rehabilitate plants and modernise production processes to improve the productivity of viable SOEs and bring up their capacity;

Develop new and advanced industrial plants and facilities in the governorate;

Involve the private sector in the establishment and funding of small enterprises;

Ensure close coordination of the investment and industry sectors;

Increase the role of universities and research institutions in studying technical problems and developing appropriate solutions;

Restore and extend basic service provision – including energy sources;

Enforce occupational safety laws and promote environmental protection in industrial processes;

Improve product/producer and consumer protection.


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3. Agriculture

Agriculture provides essential sustenance and income for most of the governorate’s residents.

Kirkuk has abundant natural resources and fertile land. The arable land area is 2 051 435 donums69; cultivated land is 62% of the arable land. Vast land areas that are classified as pastures in Kirkuk according to the classification of Kirkuk Agriculture Department. Yet: in plant agriculture, the agricultural output is not as desired – in terms of utilised land or productivity levels; and in livestock production, animal product still incapable for catering to the local market requirements and there is a high dependence on imports from abroad.

Development of the sector is constrained above all by legal constraints; low level of technology adoption (primitive methods are still used in agriculture as well as not using modern technology and fertilizers), and absence of stores for the storage of agricultural output, whether regular or refrigerated warehouses (which reflects negatively on storage of agricultural output and thus conserving the prices of products in times of abundance). Much farmland is not utilized so far due to inability of the agricultural products to compete the prices of imported agricultural products from neighbouring countries.

Marketing capacity is very limited. There is lack of the simplest conditions for storage and marketing. . The lack of refrigerated stores negatively affects the marketers of vegetable and fruit crops and even meat, especially in seasons of abundance of production when prices are cheap due to excessive offer, and it is the farmer's interest to store their products until the prices are improved so that they may have good financial returns.

As for legal constraints, the operative laws on agriculture are outdated and require several changes and new legislation to address these laws for the purpose of development and promotion of the agricultural sector. Also, problems and disputes regarding agricultural land ownership need to be resolved (disputed areas amount to 780 000 donums). Legal matters constrain the willingness of investors to invest in agriculture (livestock/ calve breeding/ fish breeding/ poultry/dairy plants and its derivatives as well as related activities in agricultural and animal industry).

Also, the province is dependent on import of fertilizers. The province has raw materials for the production of fertilizers, but so far plants for the production of organic fertilizers do not exist in the province.

There is also potential to develop plants for producing agricultural sprayers (fixed, axial, dripping systems), which are currently expensive and difficult to purchase. There is a great desire among the farmers to use modern technologies for irrigation of agricultural land; the creation of such projects would help farmers in agriculture and increase agricultural production.

Industry that utilised products from agriculture is weakly developed. E.g. lack of oil mills forces many farmers to avoid cultivation of olive despite having more than 150 existing and productive trees in the province. Also, the existing plant for reception and stripping of yellow corn is old, it uses outdated technologies; in result, it cannot meet the purpose to make the production in the province superior to the rest of the other provinces.

Lack of milk collection centres in the province limits the productivity in the livestock sub-sector – despite the presence of vast livestock resources (cattle, buffalo, sheep, goats).

There are limited large investment projects – especially in the livestock product sub-sector – and limiter financial support as well as knowledge-transfer support to farmers.

There are plenty of cooperative associations in Kirkuk: such as the Federal Government's Farmers Associations, bee farmers association of Kirkuk, Farmer Associations of Kurdistan. There is a direction by the Ministry of Agriculture to create specialized associations (e.g. associations of tomato producers, olive producers, vegetable marketers, etc.).

69 1 donum = 2500 m2.


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Table 14 Arable land, cultivated land and productivity in plant agriculture in Kirkuk province for 201570

Qadha Nahia Arable land Cultivated land Production (tonnes)

Productivity Donum % of total in

province Donum % of arable

land in unit kg/donum of arable land

kg/donum of cultivated land

Kirkuk Kirkuk QC 131 527 3.8 39 923 1.9 22 009 167.3 551 Yaychi 77 781 2.2 74 921 3.5 33 652 432.7 449 Alton Kobry 225 182 6.5 186 034 8.6 56 693 251.8 305 Al-Multaka 62 388 1.8 48 675 2.3 5629 90.2 116 Taza Khormato 108 650 3.1 100 008 4.6 7943 73.1 79 Laylan 235 860 6.8 100 750 4.7 31 775 134.7 315 Shwan 232 193 6.7 180 418 8.4 41 490 178.7 230 Qara Hanjeer 180 900 5.2 35 310 1.6 60 863 336.4 1724

Al-Hawiga

Al-Hawiga QC* 267 825 7.7 258 525 12.0 0 0 0 Al-Abbasi* 204 095 5.9 112 908 5.2 0 0 0 Al-Riyadh* 339 078 9.8 238 819 11.1 0 0 0 Al-Zab* 221 048 6.4 179 035 8.3 0 0 0

Daquq Daquq QC 428 887 12.4 261 346 12.1 55 940 130.4 214 Al-Rashad* 404 824 11.7 152 747 7.1 0 0 0

Dibis Dibis QC 200 598 5.8 113 305 5.3 61 341 305.8 541 Sarkran 150 417 4.3 69 338 3.2 79 328 527.4 1 144

Total in Kirkuk province 3 471 253 100 2 152 062 100 456 663 131.6 212 [*] Area still occupied by ISIL at the time of data collection.

Table 15 Agriculture indicators for selected production, 2014 (COSIT)

Grains Fruit Animal production

Indicator Wheat Barley Indicator Figs Indicator Poultry

Planted area (donum) 830 300 423 96 Palm trees (n) – Chicken meat projects (n) 41

Production (tonnes) 602 147 16 712 Production (tonnes) 125 Chicken meat sold (t) 5233

Productivity (kg/donum) 725.2 394.2 Productivity (kg/tree) 61.2 Value of sold chickens (IDD billion) 14.353

Constraints to developing the agriculture sector

Focus on oil as only source of wealth

Poor management/waste of resources – above all, low and inadequate utilisation of arable land

Loss of agricultural land to housing (random settlements)

Low productivity levels, low competitiveness of products

Weak rural development – lack of services to many rural areas (water supply, education – esp. secondary education, etc.) – which drives families to leave rural areas and conditions shortage of labour in agriculture

Water scarcity, desertification and soil degradation in many plots of lands – linked in large part to human activity (e.g. poor irrigation methods, industrial pollution)

Limited water resources for agriculture, low irrigation capacity

Low adoption of modern technology/methods in agriculture

Low technical level in agriculture – lack of equipment and inputs (e.g. vaccinations, fodder/feed, seeds, pesticides, mechanisation, fuel)

High fuel and transportation costs

Lack of complimentary activities, particularly marketing, and shortage of industries that utilise surplus production (food industries)

Lack of/outdated support infrastructure – market access, storage spaces, veterinary service, etc.

Farmers turn to other jobs (from producers to consumers) – linked to low economic returns in the sector and difficult socio-economic conditions in rural areas – which also drives migration to cities

Lack of financial allocations by the central government to support the sector

Weak protection for farmers’ rights in the course of production (local production law not activated)

Consumers prioritise imported agricultural goods – due to their lower prices and often better quality, better preservation/packing/marketing, and availability across seasons

Abandoned plots of land – linked to tribal customs, tribal revenge, conflict

70 Arable/cultivated land and production data from Kirkuk Governorate (2016), Strategy of Kirkuk Governorate For Re-stabilization, Sheltering Displaced and Rebuilding of Liberated Areas. Productivity (kg/donum) is calculated here based on this data. Thus, in this table, productivity results are correct, but much lower than reported in the Strategy; e.g. the Strategy reports 1745 kg/donum productivity in general for Kirkuk QC, 1353 kg/donum for Yaychi, etc. It remains unclear what the original “productivity” figures in the Strategy represent.


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Extent of destruction in the context of ISIL – also linked to lack of electricity, shortage of fuel, IDP exodus and shortage of labour, inaccessible fields due to mining/explosive devices, etc.;

Lack of comprehensive and current information on the sector to support planning/decision-making.

Goals

Increased share of utilised land;

Increased production, productivity, quality and competitiveness of products in the sector;

Realised food security for all people in the province, including vulnerable groups and IDPs in all their locations.


Establish a database system to provide all the information on the agricultural sector – to support decision-making toward development of the sector;

Increase the share of cultivated land – including improve the use of arable land;

With involvement of Kirkuk University, identify appropriate and sustainable irrigation methods best suited for the conditions in the governorate;

Expand and improve irrigation capacity and promote the use of modern irrigation methods and technologies;

Promote and enforce environmental legislation;

Improve control with regard to environmental/resource protection – e.g. overgrazing, pesticide/fertilizer pollution, quality of drainage systems, etc.;

Secure sufficient specialised staff for the sector – veterinary service, poultry industry, etc.;

Expand secondary/vocational education opportunities in rural areas – in general to retain populations, as well as specifically to develop cadres for the sector;

With involvement of relevant scientific institutions, improve the provision of agricultural training and guidance for farmers –– e.g. through development centres for farmers – to raise their scientific capacity;

Support farmers in rural areas through interest-free loans to develop agriculture;

Ensure the availability of quality agricultural inputs – seeds, fodder, fertilisers, vaccines, medications, pesticides, etc., including fuel at adequate prices and machinery;

Improve the availability of modern markets for agricultural produce – equipped with refrigerated warehouses, logistics facilities and quality control services;

Establish a sophisticated Marketing Center for various fruits and vegetables – with all means of transportation and storage such as refrigerated and frozen stores, hotels for truck drivers in case of overnight lodging, and parking for lodged vehicles, in addition to different stores;

Develop industries that utilise agricultural products – esp. high quality olive oil mills; sophisticated plant for reception and stripping of yellow corn;

Establish milk collection centres;

Establish Urea plant and plants for producing agricultural sprayers;

Encourage the role of the private sector and investments;

Elaborate and implement an investment plan, including egg hatcheries, integrated poultry projects, sophisticated meat and poultry slaughterhouses, fruit and vegetable projects, cattle stations, dairy plants and canneries, etc.

Boost rural development and public service access in rural areas (including electricity, health and education, etc.) – to improve the economic stability of farmers, the resilience of populations in rural areas, and to stimulate agriculture-related industry and commerce in rural areas;

Regulate imports and encourage domestic production through good pricing policy;

Activate local production law to guarantee farmers’ rights and ensure protection from imports..

4. Trade

The trade sector is key to providing basic services and requirements (production and consumption goods) for citizens, within the framework of public, mixed and private entities. External trade includes imports and exports; internal trade includes economic integration at the country level. Thus, the development of the trade sector in Kirkuk is important for long-term economic growth of the province; but it is also immediately important in order to (1) activate the local economies in Kirkuk post ISIL, and to support livelihoods access for IDP and returnee families, and (2) to support rural development in the province.


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Given the geographic location of Kirkuk as a link between Baghdad, the central and southern provinces and Kurdistan, it has been the locus of many active internal and external business activities between the provinces; a number of products must pass Kirkuk province – mainly imports from neighbouring states exported to the southern provinces (such as iron, apparel, food and agricultural products).

The Kirkuk Chamber of Commerce works to organise and develop commercial activity; sponsor and provide the best commercial services to its members; promote the public interest by helping increase economic growth and the competitiveness private enterprises; prepare trade-related studies; and spread commercial awareness, including through newsletters, events, conferences and workshops.

Constraints to developing the trade sector

Non-granting business visa to travel to European countries – even though mutual visits among merchants of various States help activate trade and economic movement between countries. Notably, merchants of Kurdistan's Chamber can obtain visas to EU countries easily but merchants of Kirkuk province cannot.

Double taxation - the difference in tax between Kirkuk and the territory lead to reluctance of merchants to renew their IDs where they have to calculate their tax in the territory's which burdens the merchant

The territory does not recognize the ID of Kirkuk's Chamber of Commerce; the territory's Chambers and relevant departments force merchants of outer Chamber to enrol to the territory's Chamber when they approach them. This has led merchants of Kirkuk to join the territory's Chambers of Commerce

Non-exemption of Kirkuk factories and plants from tax; in the territory, tax exemption allows the owners of plants and factories to restart the plants and increase production besides employment of workforce.

Allocation of plots to create whole-sale stores for merchants of dry food as the case with the warehouses in Baghdad and Sulaymaniyah where allocation of plots for the stores will reduce congestion and violations on sidewalks of the province markets

The owners of shopping malls in the province do not approach the Chamber for the purpose of registration of the trade name and to avoid repetition of names

Difficulty of getting brokerage license (real estate), as brokers (license holders) have to approach several departments including the province noting that the brokerage law gives the power of granting brokerage licenses to trade chambers exclusively.

The Chamber's staff are not included in the civil retirement law

Low revenues of the Chamber as a result of the fall of most qadhas and nahias under ISIL control

Tax duplication where importers have to pay customs when their goods enter into Iraq and they have to pay customs when the goods are moved out of the province

Since Iraq's oil revenues have become a major source of internal and external finance of the State, the agricultural sector moved towards depending on two points: importing the various tools needed for production, and secondly, importing ready foodstuff for domestic consumption. The economic policies followed since long years also contributed actively in transforming the Iraqi economy to consumerism, things grew worse after ISIS control over considerable part of Iraq, making these areas isolated from those State-controlled areas. Due to those factors, the imported agricultural products increased to the extent that nutrition has become almost completely dependent on foreign States

Funding and money transfers where it is difficult to modernize and expand the private sector without funding from the State. Moreover, the State must convert the cost of imported materials to the exporting countries in addition to fluctuating exchange rate of the US dollar against the Iraqi dinar

The State has imposed retroactive taxes (Customs) on all goods entering Iraq, increasing the prices of those materials where the people are paying the taxes thereof.

The imported goods to Iraq are subject to customs for multiple times and to multiple bodies.

The current laws and regulations governing the private sector often introduce obstacles to private sector development and in many cases these laws and regulations have limited the reactivation of the private sector thus obstructed the creation of new jobs

Merchants rely on themselves in the process of importing of all different goods both in terms of funding or money transfer to the exporting countries of these goods.

Al Rafidain Bank had an important and positive role in transferring payments from Iraq to all countries where it has branches (most of the countries in the world). However, the role of the Al Rafidain bank faded after the Gulf War when the Iraqi State decided to print its currency thus affecting greater inflation.


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Proposals for development of the trade sector

Rehabilitate stalled factories and productive companies where direct control over all aspects of the Iraqi economy for decades led to the weakening of the private sector. Many factories and companies were closed and job opportunities offered by the private sector decreased. There is an urgent need to move toward economic diversification that may be achieved and advanced by revitalizing the private sector.

Establish new plants/companies to employ the largest possible number of workers; distribute the products of these factories/companies to the Iraqi market and prohibit import of similar products.

Encourage foreign companies to enter the Iraqi market to invest and build new plants so that their product shall match foreign products and to export the excess to world markets.

Establish mixed sector companies to benefit from government funding.

5. Tourism

The province has foundations for religious, recreational and archaeological tourism, which can be developed further. Pre-ISIL, the tourism sector was underdeveloped and in a state of neglect, linked to the decades instability and insecurity. The ISIL occupation has resulted in significant damage to cultural assets and tourism infrastructure. Investment in development in the sector has been low; in 2016 the Governorate reports increase in hotels/tourist complexes – up to 38 (from 35 in 2013), including 14 tourist resorts – but no increase in the number of guests and overnight stays.

71 A more developed tourism sector in Kirkuk would play a role in

diversifying the economy of the province – with direct benefits for the construction sector (hotels, museums, etc.) and jobs generation, especially in the private sector (e.g. tour guides, travel agencies, hotel managers, etc.).

Table 16 Tourism indicators for Kirkuk, 2013 (COSIT)

Hotels and tourist complexes

Number Staff Guests Overnight stays

Wages and benefits*

Other expenses* Total revenue*

35 128 73 761 384 543 355 502 1991

Restaurants, cafes and casinos

Number total In urban areas Investments* Investor money value on average*

649 93.1% 8763.75 0.014

Money transfer and exchange facilities

Number Money transferred/exchanged* Investments* Value from foreign currency sale/purchase*

11 161.1 4100 315.6

* IQD million

Historical and religious sites are the main asset for the sector (although tourism sites include also e.g. the Eternal Fire in Baba Gurgur for demonstration of oil extraction). According to the Department of Antiquities, Kirkuk province contains 700 archaeological sites, of both historical and religious value (detailed in Chapter I.3).

Overall, historical and religious sites suffer from damage, neglect, and underdevelopment/underinvestment. The historical built environment in the province has sustained significant destruction in the course of conflict. E. g. during WWI, some pre-Islamic Christian monuments were destroyed; in 1997-98 the Citadel sustained serious damage under the Baathist regime; following the 2003 US invasion, by June 2007 alone, 18 ancient shrines had been lost in and around Kirkuk. Conflict in the context of ISIL (2013-17) has resulted in (1) further damage, including outright detonation; and (2) lack of maintenance, due to lack of funding. Additionally, there is loss of assets dues to smuggling (although much attempted smuggling of an ancient antiquity and cultural manuscripts was thwarted).

Regarding the status of the most important archaeological sites:

Qishla of Kirkuk complex occupies ca. 24 500 m2 in the centre of Kirkuk city. Until 1985, the site was used by the Iraqi Army; it passed on to the Iraqi Ministry of Culture after the First Gulf War and thereafter restored. The Qishla includes a Folk Museum. Pre-ISIL, the Institution of Cultural Heritage in Kirkuk had plans to repair the south part of the Qishla to make it a cultural centre and a Museum of Antiquities. In 2016, a significant portion of the Qishla (Western Wing) collapsed due to rain and lack of maintenance;

71 Kirkuk Governorate (2016), Strategy of Kirkuk Governorate for Re-stabilization, Sheltering Displaced and Rebuilding of Liberated Areas.


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Kirkuk Citadel occupies ca. 200 000 m2 in the centre of Kirkuk city. This includes a number of landmarks (heritage homes, church, mosques), but the majority of the area is barren land. Shoddy restoration work has been a problem (e.g. of Gok Kumbet). Neglect and lack of maintenance are a major problem – e.g. the ruins of Chaldean Cathedral collapsed in 2013 due to a broken pipe. Both the Citadel structure and landmarks suffer damage due to poor maintenance. Some reparation of the Citadel complex started in 2009 – although small in scale compared to damage. Geological survey and excavations of 1997 by the Department of Archaeology revealed a large gate leading to a city under the Citadel; work on this has been stopped;

Al-Bawazij Islamic Town (a.k.a. “Abbasid site”, ca. 11 km from Hawiga) which includes the Tomb of Imam Ismail and the Tomb of Shaikh Hamad – both detonated by ISIL in Spring 2015.

Estimated funding needs to rehabilitate archaeological sites: Kirkuk Qishla – IQD 250 million; Kirkuk Citadel – IQD 25 million; Abbasid (Shaikh Hamad and Imam Ismail sites) – IQD 1 billion.

Constraints to developing the tourism sector

Poor maintenance of sites – esp. neglect after the invasion of Iraq in 2003

Lack of funds allocated for maintenance and reconstruction

Extent of destruction by ISIL

Encroaching urban sprawl

Continuing political instability and insecurity

Displacement, including of qualified staff

Insufficient/damaged road infrastructure

Insufficient/damaged tourism infrastructure and tourist/recreational services

Insufficient funding – related to reliance on state funding

Limited involvement of the private sector

Limited investment – linked to cumbersome/unclear investment regulations, and low information and little/ineffective promotion regarding investment opportunities in the sector.

Goals

A developed tourism sector in Kirkuk province capitalises fully on the wealth of religious, historical and nature assets of the governorate, while it contributes to a diversified and resilient economic growth, jobs generation and private sector development, as well as to social inclusion and tolerance in the province;

Restored site-symbols of identity (archaeological, historical, religious) contribute to rebuilding of the social fabric in Kirkuk post-ISIL.


Restore road infrastructure and basic services;

Support the private sector in the process of rehabilitation of physical assets (hotels, etc.);

Map and prioritise needs related to restoration/rehabilitation of sites/collections that were damage/destroyed in the context of ISIL, and provide support in this regard;

Step up the maintenance, safekeeping and preservation of historical/archaeological sites;

Investigate needs in this regard, and provide support to the rehabilitation of damaged/destroyed religious sites of touristic significance;

72 3D model created by Lucie Pospíšilová, "MULINEM" project.

Tomb of Imam Ismail, Abbasit site, Hawiga – 3D model72 and status post-ISIL. The contrast reveals both the opportunities and the constraints in developing the tourism sector.


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Work with Chambers and businesses to identify opportunities and needs related to development of business/events tourism;

Cooperate with vocational schools and HEIs to improve HR capacity in the sector;

Increase awareness of tourism as a legitimate and valuable career path and development/economic activity;

Develop and implement an investment programme for development of the sector, including e.g. PPPs, new tourism services, new tourism infrastructure, integrated tourist facilities around ancient sites, skills development in promotion of tourism and investments in tourism in the province, etc.

In cooperation among relevant actors (universities, cultural institutions, architects, urban panning department, etc.) formulate a vision and strategy for adaptive reuse of historical spaces in the province (above all, the Citadel) – to make a bridge between cultural memory and modern use, to revitalise these spaces, while diversifying economic activities, harnessing the heritage value, ensuring preservation of heritage, and preventing further demolition.

6. Private sector

The private sector in Kirkuk falls within the broader problems of the sector in Iraq. In major economies in the world, the private sector is seen as the cornerstone of development and a prerequisite for economic diversification and sustainable growth. Weak, stagnant and incapable of generating significant employment opportunities, the private sector in Iraq is not yet in a position to play a major role in a non-oil economy. The private sector contribution in the economic development in any country depends highly on the environment available to practice its activities. In Iraq:

While the government prioritises the rapid expansion of oil production and SOEs, private sector development is stunted. SOEs dominate the financial and non-financial sectors and enjoy significant privileges, thus crowding out private firms;

Regulations largely discourage entrepreneurship and investment;

Objective difficulties in acquiring the needed official approvals for establishing different projects that are compatible with provinces environment – whether in terms of land allocation or obtaining the needed approvals to import the required machines and equipment for those businesses;

Certain laws have caused the migration of large capital outside Iraq, compounding neglect in the sector. Notably, the banking sector has been unable to fulfil its role in financing the private sector, given lack of level playing field between public and private banks;

There are no incentives for the private sector to invest in the economy; non-oil infrastructure has suffered neglect. Coupled with poor services, this has further discouraged private investment;

The fact that politically connected firms capture public sector contracts further reduces the opportunities available to other entrepreneurs;

On a broader scale, the globalised market economy has had a weakening effect on private firms in Iraq as well: the trend toward merging of major international companies has placed increasing pressure on small private companies in less developed countries.

Overall, the general framework of policies and legislation must be reformed through the implementation of a government programme that responds to priority needs of the private sector, in the framework of effective dialogue between the government and the private sector. GoI has developed a new strategy for private sector development in consultation with private sector representatives and international development actors in Iraq.

Constraints

The private sector is regarded as a secondary to the state industries

Lack of laws to encourage the activity of the private sector

Lack of adequate controls to protect the private product

Long administrative routines in licensing

Limited coordination between the various directorates on the investment opportunities

One stop service in the administration is still not implemented

Poor banking services

Weak role of existing insurance companies

Security violations that hinder private sector activities; the security situation is very unstable and this limits the opportunities for investment

Corruption limits the will to invest.


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Goals

A competitive and dynamic private sector makes an effective contribution to the economic development of Kirkuk province – in terms of economic returns, labour absorption and jobs generation.


Set standards and controls for the work of the private sector through a specialised consulting entity;

Support the Investment Commission in the governorate, activate the investment law and encourage investment in all fields;

Accelerate the issue of provincial legislation required to protect the product/producer and the consumer;

Provide facilitations to the private sector, to encourage participation in the economic development, by lowering taxes and facilitate acquisition of land for projects and so on;

Facilitate the establishment of private and investment banks;

Support small business establishment and vocational training (including for self-employment) – in cooperation with trade unions and employers to map the development potentials and improve the economic relevance of available training programmes;

Operationalise one-stop-shop;

Increase the attractiveness of private sector employment – including through measures to guarantee the rights of workers in the private sector and increase the share of decent jobs..

7. Investment

The Kirkuk Investment Commission73

(established under the revised Investment Law 13 of 2006) is an independent legal entity responsible for promoting a suitable investment climate, investment planning, investment promotion and awarding investment licenses with aim to accelerate the economic and social development process in the province, mobilise technical and scientific expertise, develop the human resources and create employment opportunities.

Current situation

The Investment Commission has 144 licensed investment opportunities in all sectors.

In order to increase the investment opportunities, all of the state institutions have to encourage investment by offering their properties such as land, real-estates and factories for investors, and to be more cooperative with the Investment Committee according to the provisions of the Investment Law No. (13) of 2016, as amended, which stipulates that all ministries and all state institutions are obliged to offer their properties as investment opportunities, especially that many of the state institutions are unable to exploit their land and factories or invest them properly due to the financial deficit from which most of the ministries suffer, leading to non-sustaining and exploitation of these factories and lands properly and, therefore, non-collection of revenues for the state. There are many local investors inside and outside of Iraq who are willing to invest in these opportunities.

There are some initiatives by the private sector by offering their lands which are burdened with disposal rights for investments as the recent amendment of the investment law stipulates that they can be invested in two fields only (industrial and agricultural)

There have been no recent requests to develop existing projects in accordance with the amended Investment Law No. (13) of 2016

Most of the investors that are working in the province are local companies in Kirkuk province as well as companies that belong to Kurdistan’s region. There are some foreign companies (the UAE Hanzal International Company and other Turkish companies)

Problem and considerations regarding the development of new investment opportunities

Non-identification of the province needs for investments projects

Lack of attractive environment for foreign investments

The difference between central government and provinces trends in concern of investment projects especially in founding the infrastructure projects that leads to blocking of the investment process.

73 www.investkirkuk.com.


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Different basic pillars of infrastructure for the reconstruction development (electricity, water and production services) and non-funding by the central government which considers infrastructure as basic pillar of the investment process for building and construction.

The absence of communication between local and central government, lack of legal legislation and the failure to implement such legislations, laws, regulations and amendments. Where jurisdictions are not clear for the bodies in relation, therefor we suggest to set courses by specialists in such sectors for employees especially those who are related in the investment law number (No. 13 of year 2006 – as amended) that has an active role in economic and social life, and also facilitate funding and developing investment and strategic projects and contribute to addressing the serious deficit in budgets. The 2014 budget and until now had a negative reflection in execution of projects and delaying executing of some infrastructure projects that are considered as fundamental to promote and drive investment and economic development in the province.

Weak supervision and inefficiency of regulatory and financial bodies as (integrity commission, inspection departments in all ministers, office of financial control and lack of transparency). Therefore, the current situation requires the activation of the role of these bodies not to mention the weakness of control in relation to social security.

Non-support of private sector, encourage domestic production and the fragility of private section, therefore we suggest to expand local governmental jurisdictions in order to solve the abovementioned problems. Where small enterprises and individual activities are dominant, and reliance on foreign imports of merchandise, although the central government discourage of such important and vital sector, for example (agriculture, our province is one of the most important provinces in agriculture production and it needs a huge support, in addition to the oil sector that is considered generally an economic tributary in the province and Iraq in general, that will provide employment opportunities and will end the unemployment problem, this is one of the objectives of investment law.

Loss of confidence between investors, private and public banks caused by the inability of investors to withdraw their money when they need to, and problems in governmental and private banking system that can’t support investors with large sums for long terms. Moreover, unwillingness of investors to invest their capital in industrial sector where most currently existing banks in Iraq and our province don’t have the high efficiency and sobriety that qualify them to support the investment process. Therefor we suggest the use of International transparency entities and issuance to issue the law on getting information from all bodies and obligate them to provide information to the applicants.

The un-proper exploitation of natural resources (such as exploitation of natural gas extracted from oil fields). Where studies and International oil companies confirmed that the natural gas in Iraq has very good specifications equivalent to oil that will help in developing a lot of local industries and to export it out Iraq. Therefore, we suggest allowing space to the local government and to expand its jurisdiction to approve and execute such suitable projects.

Lack of oil refineries in Kirkuk. A lot of requests had been received from local and international companies to invest in oil refinery sector, and after calling the related bodies especially (Ministry of Oil), there was no cooperation with investors and the rejection of many applications and non-allocation of land for the above mentioned purpose, where the investment law approves establishing oil refinery through investment.

In addition to the abovementioned points, the security aspect that has an important role in attracting investors, especially foreign companies which negatively affected their willing to invest in the province.

The absence of a standard law for retirement in public and private sectors.

Weak investment culture and lack of knowledge on the investment law by the state institutions and citizens which confuse investment work, and denial by different government departments to conduct investment facilitations that help in executing investment projects out of their intentions to gain profits where the investment law stresses the obligation of ministries to provide facilities and allocations and all measures that help to improve investment, development and economy.

Procrastination, manipulation and non-implementation of law as a result of lack of clear vision of the investment law by the related bodies to obtain approvals and execute projects.

Absence of support to strategic and investment projects by the central government where it is preferable to own these lands (in respect to housing investment law No. 13/2006 as amended to execute excellent housing projects).


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Absence of budget for the investment authority in the province to execute infrastructure projects especially housing projects that are entrusted in the central government and is one of basic obstacles delaying the completion of housing projects.

Non-response of related authorities as owners of land inside and outside city borders by giving investment opportunities to the investment commission despite the existence of legal legislations and amendments on investment law that obligate all ministries to provide investment opportunities, and that if these ministries do not respond, the investment authority will transfer the land ownership in the name of investment authority, but there is no serious will by the government to execute and respond to the investment law No. 13/2006 as amended.

Most state lands are agricultural lands. Changing the land classification is time consuming and causes delay in project awarding because of lack in lands that are included in the basic design, forcing us to seek lands out of the basic design borders due to their large area, particularly as most of these lands are classified as agriculture, pastures and mountains, and it’s required to change the classification of these lands to execute investment projects. Therefore, committees were formed by the province and related departments to change the lands classification. But this committees do not have absolute powers to resolve classifications, and their work is limited to recommendations only.

Non-ratification of the investment map by the province council and related bodies, and non-ratification, execution and/or implementation of this investment map and the opportunities therein by all sectors (housing, commercial, industrial, agriculture and services) which will contribute in reducing bureaucracy and reduce correspondences and approvals among departments and ministries.

Delays in site hand over after issuance investment licenses for projects by the authority where the answers to land owners always stipulate sites should not be handed over without minister's approval despite the preliminary approval by the minister to the investment opportunity proposal for the projects, leading to delay in a lot of the projects.

In short, to solve those obstacles and problems as mentioned above, which need a package of actions to address, we suggest to start with addressing the administration sagging in the province, and to address the administrative corruption, and to execute medium size projects that are under the jurisdiction of the local government, and to impose fees on external roads to increase the province revenues, and to focus on industrial manufacturing projects and to support the industrial and agriculture investment companies and facilitate their transactions with ministries and related bodies, to pay attention to foreign companies and international organizations that have technical expertise in investment sector in order to execute and contribute in investment projects, forming special and engineering committees to select the best investment companies that have the ability to manage investment projects. The steering committee should carefully review the proposals since some of them can contradict the existing legislation or create tensions with the neighbouring provinces.

The importance of implementing the legal legislations and their amendments on investment law No. 13/2006, and to urge the central government to urge the ministers as owners of lands to apply those laws as soon as possible being the main obstacle in front of investment in the province where non-implementation of these amendments is still prevalent among ministries as owners of lands and investment opportunities.

Main constraints

Limited coordination on investment opportunities between the different responsible departments and ministries, which have their own land for investment purposes

Incomplete decentralisation process, which impedes the coordinated development of investment opportunities

Weak government support and financial allocations

Administrative and financial corruption limit the will to invest and stifle business development

Weak banking and insurance services

The private sector is regarded as a secondary to the state industries

Long administrative routines in licensing – including complicated bureaucracy in delivery and allocation of land, especially concerning investment projects, leading to investor’s reluctance

Significant administrative burden associated with operational difficulties for businesses in acquiring land, machinery/equipment, inputs, etc.;

One-stop-shop service in the administration still not implemented

Insufficient/disrupted infrastructure and basic services (particularly electricity)


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Decline of human capital since 2003, and especially since 2013, while weak work force capacity deters investors – many people have been displaced, while education attainment levels are declining, and youth are lacking the education and skills required for the economy

Unstable security situation and security violations, which deter investment and business development activities

Lack of attractive environment for foreign investments.

Goals

Increased investments in all sectors support the optimal use of available resources of the governorate; support the introduction of modern technology and the increased competitiveness of agriculture and enterprises in the province; stimulate jobs creation and help eliminate poverty and unemployment; and attract migrant and highly-skilled human capital to return;

Increased role of the private sector in the economic development of Kirkuk province across sectors.


Activate existing laws on investment; develop and activate legislation that provides suitable environment for business development and investment;

Support the Investment Commission in the governorate;

Develop a comprehensive investment map for Kirkuk Governorate;

Complete feasibility studies for all investment opportunities offered to identify successful investments;

Improve and simplify the investment licencing procedures – to reduce the administrative burden, and thereby improve the investment environment;

Introduce modern and innovative marketing methods to promote investment opportunities;

Strengthen industrial and commercial support structures, business networks and financial arrangements to encourage longer-term investment and engagement in service delivery by the private sector;

Ensure the availability of electricity, transportation and other facilitation;

Facilitate the establishment of insurance and investment banks;

Encourage capital investments in all sectors;

Promote innovative technologies and support the development of new sectors (e.g. renewable energy);

Provide enhanced levels of research and development across all target sectors, while capitalising on assets (e.g. University of Kirkuk);

Strengthen and increase the role of the private sector;

Conduct educational seminars about investment for members of public and private sectors, in all qadhas;

Improve coordination between the public and private sectors – toward development of PPPs, complementarity of projects, and securing the service support base for new projects;

Raise the competitiveness of existing enterprises across sectors;

Stimulate entrepreneurship – through incentives, and particularly through vocational training, to increase project management capacities and to stimulate entrepreneurship;

Expand sector-focused work-based skills development and training programmes – in coordination with trade unions and employers;

Increase transparency with regard to province revenues (especially in regard to tax collection and expenditure) – to improve the level of trust in the government among citizens, as well as to allow taxpayers to invest in projects suggested by the province, instead of paying tax in cash.

Efforts should be aimed at improving the investment environment with attention to foreign investment, PPPs, micro businesses and the skills of the workforce. The public sector in Kirkuk province is not capable of absorbing the available and growing workforce; skills intensity and quality jobs creation are limited in the private sector while it remains dominated by SMEs. The limited economic opportunities for youth and women are a cause for serious concern and training courses and support for micro businesses are needed in this regard.


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IV. PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY

The ISIL invasion coincided almost exactly with oil price collapse. Overnight, GoI lost nearly half its income, just as it had to gear up for a major military campaign. Thus, since 2014, in addition to losses from reduces economic base and activity, Kirkuk governorate has seen considerable reduction in the GoI budget allocation. All this has borne on the capacity of Kirkuk’s authorities to ensure adequate public service delivery – all the more needed in the post-ISIL context. Post-ISIL, funding to rebuild what was destroyed, is severely lacking.

1. Housing

National housing policy. Prior to ISIL, Kirkuk city already suffered from property disputes problems due to resolutions adopted under the Baathist Regime which made it hard to establish a national housing policy that corresponds to the sudden population increase in the city of Kirkuk after the return of the deportees. Nevertheless, there are more than twenty housing projects.

Land ownership. With regard to land ownership structure, most of the land belongs to the state. There are some lands owned by the state with right of disposal held by persons, some lands are state-owned but authorized by title deeds, and there are agricultural contracts for farmers to benefit from such lands but these contracts were terminated by the former regime and granted to others to exploit them, after the fall of the regime these contracts returned to their owners and were exploited for different purposes such as agricultural, tourism and residential. All of these lands are in Kirkuk city.

Property disputes exist in Kirkuk province, particularly on the agricultural land because of the former regime policies embodied by withdrawing and amortizing those lands which belong to the citizens and registering them under the state’s name then granting them to others causing property disputes on these lands.

With regard to the Governorate policy toward land, following the fall of the Regime, the ownership claims commission was formed to resolve the existing disputes and to consider the requests of citizens who suffered from these disputes due to such actions pursuant to laws made for this purpose. Many claims have been resolved and the remaining are ongoing.

Private investment in the housing sector. The Kirkuk Investment Commission has many housing projects; a total of 37 housing projects have been granted investment license. Most are in or near Kirkuk city borders, estimated to provide ca. 7000 housing units; some of these projects are completed or under construction. The problem of ownership transfer of state-owned lands to the investors who have completed their housing investment compounds is acute, causing a confusion in transferring the ownership of residential houses to the citizens due to the bureaucracy within the state institutions arising from the administrative paralysis in the state.

Cooperative housing. Cooperative housing compounds exist in in Al Sayadah and Bunja Ali areas - completed by MoCH before 2014 (prior to ISIL).

Random settlements. Random settlements exist in Kirkuk city and in different other areas; some are located within the residential and non-residential areas as well as the agricultural land outside the border of basic zoning of Kirkuk city and alongside its borders. They are located mainly in Kirkuk, Al-Dibis and Daquq qadhas. The Governorate reports that a total of 268 random settlements exist, which include 61 617 residential units. According to COSIT, in 2013, ca. 3% of the population (40 992 people) lived in random housing in 36 informal housing complexes across the governorate typically in urban areas.

Public services cannot be delivered to random settlements. In result, they often lack basic services and infrastructure – although in many cases, inhabitants deliver water and electricity from close-by formal neighbourhoods, which has been adding pressure on the existing public facilities, networks and services.

Illegal expansion of settlements post 2003 has been driven by: increased demand on housing and lack of vacant land plots available for housing; high prices of housing land for people with limited or low income; failure of the government to fulfil its commitment to provide public housing within reasonable prices; delay in updating the main design of the cities; weak governance and control after 2003, resulting in violations of state-owned land.

Planning. Planning assets exist which can inform housing development and investment – namely: (1) Environment strategy prepared by Atmosphere Company, (2) Basic design of Kirkuk governorate center (in


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progress); (3) Basic design of Dakuk and Al-Dibis governorates (in progress), and (4) Basic design for (Baiji, Shwan, Al-Multaqa, Mulah Abdullah, Kurat Hanjeer) sub-districts.

Secondary occupation. In the context of ISIL, some houses were affected by secondary occupation (e.g. in Al-Hawiga and its nahias.

Destroyed housing. There is not yet accurate data on the number of damaged houses in the context of ISIL.

Goals

Ensure adequate housing conditions for all families in the province in the immediate and long run.


Ensure housing provision for citizens that covers deficits and aligns with expected future needs – while gradually surpassing population and family number growth rates

Attract investments

Provide residential lands at subsidised prices, especially for housing provision for certain types of employees/population groups;

Provide no-interest loans (credit facilitation) in order to implement residential units;

Transfer IDPs residing in non-roofed buildings in cities to the new camp;

Complete shortfalls related to structures that are occupied by displaced families, which will be conducted by the working organizations in the province such as REACH recently;

Facilitate the compensation/restitution to those affected by displacement-induced housing, land and property (HLP) rights violations;

Identify damaged housing, and to plan for and support the rehabilitation of damaged houses.

2. Transport network

The transport sector is vital: it impacts all aspects of social life and economic activity in the province. The location of Kirkuk province is of particular importance for Iraq as a link between the northern mountainous areas and the southern plains; as such, it is strategic for trade. As such, Kirkuk has an important position in the transport network of Iraq. The transport network of Kirkuk includes railway, municipal roads and streets, and primary and secondary roads that provide connectivity within the province as well as with Iraq and neighbouring countries. Roads systems include a number of bridges.

In the context of ISIL, the transport infrastructure of the province has suffered significant damage – particularly roads and bridges. ISIL targeted most of the strategic bridges and main roads. In the security situation, also, the load of road traffic intensified by far, causing deterioration. In the context of economic crisis, reconstruction has been slow, and there is much need for support from the international community.

Rail

Kirkuk’s station was added to the railway network in 1949 after Iraqi Petroleum Company opened a branch in the city. As a public transportation medium, the station was expanded in late 1980s and offered services until 2003 when it was temporarily shut down for renovation. The projects to rehabilitate the railways and expand them towards Erbil have been stalled since 2014 and there are no funds envisaged for their implementation.

Airway

Kirkuk lacks civil aviation airport; the nearest airports are in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. South of Kirkuk city there is a military airport that is proposed to be converted to civil airport for international flights.

Streets in urban areas

Responsibility for the maintenance of streets in urban neighbourhoods rests with the Kirkuk Directorate of Municipalities and the 12 municipal institutions. Post-ISIL, there is damage to the asphalt cover and large amounts of rubble in the street network of cities. These factors inter alia disrupt public transport – making mobility in cities all the more difficult for the poorer among the population – while public transport was already very weak pre-ISIL.


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Roads and bridges

The road system of Kirkuk is part of an integrated network of roads link the southern and middle areas of Iraq with the northern areas and northern neighbouring countries. Specifically, the highways Baghdad–Kirkuk-Erbil-Mosul-Turkey and Kirkuk-Suleimaniah-Tehran provide quick access to all Iraqi territories. Some of these roads have high quality and great capacity (main roads), while others are considered secondary roads.

Pre-ISIL, most existing paved roads (and bridges) were in good condition, albeit old and in need of maintenance. Deterioration of the network is driven by overuse by trucks and vehicles. Certain limitations could reduce the traffic load and wear of roads – e.g. load codes/weight limits, weight stations, enforcement of limits on loads, with pertinent fines to violators, etc. Such limitations, however, are lacking. Also, there have been cases of vandalism, where people dig through the roads to put pipes etc. causing damage and threat to road safety.

Table 17 Road infrastructure indicators, Kirkuk province – main, secondary and rural roads


Main roads Secondary roads Rural roads Number

(n) Length (km)

% of total length

Number (n)

Length (km)

% of total length

Number (n)

Length (km)

% of total length

Kirkuk Kirkuk QC 5 110 3 42 1 1.5 Yaychi 0 0 1 6 2 5.5 Alton Kobry 1 35 2 34 6 25 Al-Multaka 0 0 2 15 2 5.7 Taza Khormato 0 0 2 19 6 14.5 Laylan 0 0 1 40 4 9.7 Shwan 4 115 4 36.3 2 10.5 Qara Hanjeer 0 0 1 4 1 6 Total 10 260 100% 13 196.3 43.9% 24 78.4 33.4%

Al-Hawiga Al-Hawiga QC* 0 0 6 70 6 15.5 Al-Abbasi* 0 0 3 80 6 16.1 Al-Riyadh* 0 0 1 19 1 48.5 Al-Zab* 0 0 1 12 1 6 Total 0 0 0% 11 181 40.5% 14 86.1 36.7%

Daquq Daquq QC 0 0 0 0 3 24 Al-Rashad* 0 0 1 7 2 16 Total 0 0 0% 1 7 1.6% 5 40 17.1%

Dibis Dibis QC 0 0 3 57 6 18 Sarkran 0 0 1 6 2 12 Total 0 0 0% 4 63 14.1% 8 30 12.8%

Kirkuk province 10 260 100% 29 447.3 100% 51 234.5 100% [*] Area still occupied by ISIL at the time of data collection.

In the context of ISIL, the road network has sustained damage.

The main roads connecting the centre and north of Iraq have been disrupted. The main sabotaged roads are: (1) Baghdad–Mosul; (2) Kirkuk–Fat'ha (Beygee); (3) Kirkuk–Tikrit; (4) Mosul–Kirkuk; and (5) Kirkuk–Baghdad. The infrastructures of those roads were destroyed due to the destruction of bridges above them, planting of explosives, and digging of trenches on both sides of them;

The movement of the vehicles and trucks was converted to alternative routes, particularly along Kirkuk–Erbil and Kirkuk- Baghdad roads, which are now the only high roads that link the North and the South of Iraq;

In result, these two roads have sustained fast deterioration. The traffic momentum on them resulted from the passage of loaded vehicles and trucks – in most cases truck loads higher than the capacity of the vehicle or truck. This has led to sliding of the asphalt layer, emergence of deep grooves and waterways, and damage of the asphalt and under-asphalt layers, which has undermined traffic safety.

Maintenance works on the two roads are very limited (if any) due to economic crisis and lack of financial allocations. Projects outside the administration of local government have been stopped.

Bridge on the main road Kirkuk–Erbil in the area of Alton Kobry destroyed in Oct 2017


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Activating the work of weight stations will not only help reduce high loads that harm the roads, but also increase revenues (fees on vehicle weight, fines imposed by law).

Constraints

Overload and lack of weight stations to control road access and overload

Irregular weights of car loads

Violation by citizens

Damaged roads/bridges in the context of ISIL - damaged main/ secondary roads connecting the province

Deterioration of roads from overload and poor maintenance

Damage to streets in cities and war remnants blocking streets

Lack of specialised machinery for maintenance and repair

Lack of financial resources

Weak public transport

Lack of civil (esp. international) airport limits the development of certain sectors (esp. tourism and trade).

Goals

Accelerated rehabilitation and development of the street, road and bridge network.


Prioritise road/bridge rehabilitation and reconstruction work and implement this;

Provide high technical cadres to supervise the progress of work within defined programmes;

Provide subsidies and support to companies to promote development of the road and bridge sector;

Construct weight stations and offer investment opportunities to operate weight stations;

Prepare and operate four asphalt factories to support municipal roads maintenance;

Provide pavement of the main roads and sub-routes within housing areas in municipalities

Improve the public transport capacity – including through private sector/PPPs;

Activate laws to hold accountable violators of roads and public property;

Raise awareness among citizens on issues related to using the transport network – e.g. compliance with regulation, compliance with load assignments, and non-violation of public property.

See Annex A.1 for proposed projects to develop the transport sector.

3. Electricity service

A reliable power supply and inclusive access to electricity are fundamental for the achievement of social and economic development objectives. In Kirkuk province, electricity service is responsibility of the Directorate of Electricity Distribution in Kirkuk. The Directorate oversees 26 stations and 10 transmission networks (high and low voltage) that cover the centres of all qadhas and nahias, as well as 41% of rural areas of the province, and all IDPs camps and compounds.

Already pre-ISIL, the electricity service in Kirkuk suffered from interruptions due to low number of secondary stations and suffocations in the network, outdated infrastructure, low transport capacity of lines, insufficient staff, etc. In the context of ISIL, all pre-existing problems have been exacerbated, as electricity supply systems have been additionally stained – due to damage combined with reduced funding and dramatic increase in electricity demand.

The ISIL occupation of more than 40% of Kirkuk province area affected and led to massive damages in all electricity systems in the province:

As ISIL captured the refinery in Beygee (Salah al-Din), Kirkuk lost its access to fuel for its power plants, which placed an additional strain on electricity generation in the province and leading to power shortage (see Table 18). In this regard, expanding the local refineries in Kirkuk will benefit electricity generation and contribute to uninterrupted electricity supply;

Three key transformers were damaged (2 in Al Sement Station and 1 in Mullah Abdullah New station) and 150 MW were lost;

Some transmission lines and stations were affected by attacks; terrorist acts by ISIL caused instability in the electrical system. Some lines and stations were stopped (see Table 19).


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Most centrally, the high level of displacement into the province caused unprecedented increase in electricity demand, placing excessive pressure on existing distribution and transmission systems. In the context of ISIL, multiplicity of suffocations in the network and low number of secondary stations, with increased loads, coincided with the increased number of consumers from the influx of IDPs.

At the same time, investment projects were stopped. The security situation led contractors and foreign companies to withdraw from working on those projects – including establishment of the University substation (132 kV) and West Kirkuk substation (132 kV); both have been completed with Governorate capacities.

Rehabilitation works (on lines and stations) were also stopped – due to lack of financial allocations and stopped hiring of workers (half the workers of the energy transmission sector are workers under contracts, and they cannot be assumed responsible by the Directorate unless they are established as permanent staff).

Post-ISIL, the massive shortage of machinery prevents necessary maintenance to secure electricity supply.

Table 18 Electricity sector indicators, Kirkuk province, 2016


Power generation stations (n)

Names of of power plants Power distribution

substations (n)

Generated power

(MW/h)

Consumption average (MW/h)

Required power

(MW/h) Kirkuk Kirkuk QC 0 15 0 3 610 893 7 700 000

Yaychi 0 0 0 0 302 000 Alton Kobry 0 2 0 132 483 364 000 Al-Multaka

2

Mullah Abdullah Gas-powered Power Plant; Beygee Gas-powered Power Plant (border with Salah al-Din)

2 1 427 535 0 290 000

Taza Khormato 1 Kirkuk Gas-powered Power Plant 2 2 246 628 270 933 225 000

Laylan 0 1 0 103 935 172 000 Shwan 0 1 0 0 350 000 Qara Hanjeer 0 1 0 0 400 000

Al-Hawiga

Al-Hawiga QC* 0 1 0 0 0 Al-Abbasi* 0 2 0 0 0 Al-Riyadh* 0 1 0 0 0 Al-Zab* 0 2 0 0 0

Daquq Daquq QC 0 2 0 364 962 355 000 Al-Rashad* 0 1 0 0 0

Dibis Dibis QC 1 Dibis Power Plant 2 474 760 214 851 435 000 Sarkran 0 1 0 0 135 000

Kirkuk province 4 36 4 148 923 4 698 057 10 728 000


Table 19 Power transmission infrastructure affected in the context of ISIL

N Electricity substation Transmission voltage (kV)

Short-circuit capacity (MVA)

Stopped in the context of ISIL (electricity substations and transmission lines)

1 Kirkuk 400 kV 400/132/11 4*250 Kirkuk line 400 kV Kirkuk line –Erbil Power Station line 400 kV Kirkuk –Beygee line 400 kV Kirkuk–Mullah Abdullah old line Kirkuk–Mullah Abdullah new line

2 Kirkuk East 132/33 3*63 3 Kirkuk North (Tebbh) 132/33/11 3*63 4 Kirkuk South 132/33/11 3*63 5 University 132/33 3*63 6 Kirkuk West 132/33 3*63 7 Mullah Abdullah New 132/33 2*50 One transformer of the station damaged 8 Mullah Abdullah Old 132/33 3*50 Mullah Abdullah old–Al Hawiga line 132 kV

Dibis–Mullah Abdullah old line Mullah Abdullah old line – North of Samarra 132 kV

9 Al Senaeyyah 132/33/11 3*63 10 Tauz 132/33/11 2*63 11 Al Sement 132/33 3*63 Two key transformers of the station damaged 12 Al Hawiga 132/33/11 3*63 Substation and Al Hawiga–Al Daur line 132kV


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Constraints

Multiplicity of suffocations in the network

Low number of secondary stations

Multiplicity of the operational problems due to the (outdated) status of equipment in secondary stations

Low transport capacity of lines – in most cases this does not exceed 120-140 MW

Violations on the energy transmission lines

Lack of working cadres – half of them are employees under contracts with the Electricity Directorate; all need to be established as permanent cadres and new ones need to be recruited

Shortage of specialised machinery

Stopped investment projects and station rehabilitation works

Lack of financial allocations necessary to carry out maintenance and rehabilitation of damaged stations

Damage to sector capacity in the context of ISIL – including

Damage to three key transformers (2 in Al Sement Station and 1 in Mullah Abdullah New station)

Loss of 150 MW

Loss of fuel for power plants due to destruction of Beygee Refinery (Salah al-Din).

Increased demand – additional pressure of the electricity supply infrastructure from the influx of IDPs; unprecedented increase in the number of consumers

Goal

Urgent response to meet the needs of all citizens, including IDPs (especially in camps), and most importantly the needs of schools, hospitals and specialised support centres (e.g. for PwDs);

Restored and developed power systems in the province support in full the current and future electricity needs of institutions, households and economic enterprises (in industry, agriculture, etc.).


Increase the power transport capacity;

Provide required specialised machinery and equipment for maintenance;

Provide required specialised machinery and equipment for rehabilitation of infrastructure damaged in the context of ISIL (e.g. Al Hawijah station, power transmission lines, the 2 key transformers at Al Sement and Mullah Abdullah New substations)

Ensure urgent rehabilitation of energy transmission capacities damaged in the context of ISIL

Eliminate suffocations in the network - including:

Rehabilitate existing secondary stations;

Build new substations – priority Kirkuk Station 400 kV (we recommend for this station to be located in the North of Kirkuk), and also North Kirkuk new station and Future Daquq station;

Rehabilitate transmission lines and secondary stations – including e.g. upgrade wires in transmission cables and convert aerial lines into ground cables – to increase effectiveness of transmission, increase transmission capacity, and reduce losses and violations.

Secure availability of working cadres.

See Annex A.2 for proposed projects to develop the provision of electricity.

4. Water supply service

Access to safe water supply is one of the main determinants of the standard of living, and premise for the good health status of the population. Sustained quantities of water are required for the development of economic activities. Thus, socio-economic development is unthinkable in the absence of effective water supply service and water resource management.

In Kirkuk province, the sustainability of water resources is at risk – in terms of both water quantity and water quality (see Chapter I.2). Water consumption for Kirkuk is given at 496.2 l/day/capita (COSIT, 2014) including water for domestic, industrial and agriculture use. This consumption rate is (1) much higher than the average for Iraq (403 l/day/capita), and much higher than the capacity of the water supply system (maximum 198 l/capita/day in Kirkuk QC). At the same time precipitation levels and river discharge have been declining, while water pollution levels have greatly deteriorated since the 1990s. In many areas water supply has been increasingly inadequate to meet domestic, agriculture and industry needs.


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Ensuring adequate water supply to meet demand across sectors requires rigorous policy and water management, aligned with the currently available and expected future resources and needs. Best practices and methods should be studied to identify the optimal water usage and water management options.

Water supply service in Kirkuk province is responsibility of the Kirkuk Water Directorate. This has 7 departments, with respective functions to: (1) follow up on citizens’ complaints; (2) address water scarcity; (3) address cases of pollution, including as this results from exposure of water networks to damage by citizens; (4) preparation for implementing water supply projects; (5) cooperation and coordination with other related departments; (5) provision of proposals to be included in plans of the Water Directorate; and (7) administrative department.

Pre-ISIL, Kirkuk province scored 6th among Iraq’s 18 provinces on safe water access – with 80% of households having access to improved water source within 1 h.

74 But access to water is not even across the province. In

some rural areas, less than half of the population have access to safe water supply (see Tables 20 and 21). Overall, the per capita supply (which is maximal in Kirkuk QC – 198 l/capita/day) does not meet the estimated demand. The construction of long-distance distribution networks has been constrained by shortage/lack of electricity, fuel and funding.

As regards water quality, in 2010 there were 16 operational large water treatment plants (WTPs) in Kirkuk province, and 215 small WTPs – with total output of 659 812 m3/d (all operated by the Water Directorate).

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Water treatment plants lack spare parts, equipment, treatment chemicals, proper maintenance, and adequate qualified staff. Loss of electrical power supply is a crucial factor, where extended power cuts limit efficiency. Further, plants often act solely as pumping stations – without any treatment – due to the high demand for water. In some plants, during the summer, treated water is blended with raw water directly from the source to increase water supply. The distribution network, on which most of the population relies, has destroyed, blocked or leaky pipes. Breaks and leaks in the water network result in decreased pressure – while backpressure in the pipelines allows floating sewage to infiltrate the water supply system. Local supplies of liquid chlorine gas and alum (for purification/desalination of surface waters) are minimal, while alum sulphate produced in Iraq is impure, which ruins the water treatment equipment.

Additional to insufficient and outdated facilities and networks, pre-ISIL problems include also e.g. weak monitoring and control capacity, which prevents effective/timely maintenance and effective planning for improvement of the networks – both related to leakage and loss of water resources.

Post-ISIL, complete destruction of infrastructure is not reported, however water supply infrastructure in affected areas is severely damaged and the service has been reduced in quality and quantity. At the same time, pressure on the capacity from the influx of IDPs has been major – while demand for potable water has been unprecedented. Water projects and complexes under the Kirkuk Water Directorate have all exceeded production capacity. Lack of specialised chemicals, equipment and machinery, as well as failures in electricity supply have significantly reduced the operation of WTPs.

Table 20 Water supply indicators for Kirkuk Governorate


Drinking water projects (n)

Design capacity (million l/d)

Actual debit (million l/d)

Population served (n)

Coverage ratio (%)

Shortage ratio (%)

Per capita supply (l/person/day)

Kirkuk Kirkuk QC 1 3.388 2.861 14 450 90 56 198 Yaychi 6 9.458 7.094 39 925 58 49 179 Alton Kobry 25 17.14 9.03 45 987 50 43.9 196.4 Al-Multaka 11 9.6 3.75 0 0 0 0 Taza Khormato 3 12.8 9.6 0 0 0 0 Laylan 20 6.76 3.169 16 872 73 46.3 187.8 Shwan 34 10.1 7.525 57 489 66 62.6 130.8 Qara Hanjeer 27 4.236 1.331 10 144 83 62.5 131.2

Al-Hawiga Al-Hawiga QC* 25 n/a 0 0 0 0 0 Al-Abbasi* 16 n/a 0 0 0 0 0 Al-Riyadh* 23 n/a 0 0 0 0 0 Al-Zab* 18 n/a 0 0 0 0 0

Daquq Daquq QC 16 1.494 7.588 70 000 81 69 108.4 Al-Rashad* 5 n/a 0 0 0 0 0

Dibis Dibis QC 11 9.966 5.989 38 418 65 55 155.8 Sarkran 15 2.1 1.313 55 594 58 93 23.8

Kirkuk province total 256 87.042 59.25 348 879


74 UNDP/UN-Habitat (22 Nov 2016), LADP Strategic Urban Development Framework for Governorates in Iraq: Indicator Technical Brief 75 JCCME/Dunja (Feb 2013), Water and Sewage Sectors in Iraq: Sector Report: http://www.meti.go.jp/meti_lib/report/2013fy/E002792.pdf.


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Table 21 Water supply service coverage in rural areas

Qadha Nahia (QC – Qadha Centre) % villages serviced with water supply - cumulative data for 2013–2016* Kirkuk Kirkuk QC n/a

Yaychi 70 Alton Kobry 92 Al-Multaka (Mula Abdullah) 70 Taza Khormato* 95 Laylan 60 Shwan 74 Qara Hanjeer (Al-Rabee) 78

Al-Hawiga Al-Hawiga QC* 55 Al-Abbasi* 99 Al-Riyadh* 87 Al-Zab* 60

Daquq Daquq QC* 42 Al-Rashad* n/a

Dibis Dibis QC 72.5 Sarkran (Al-Qudis) 71

*For villages that were under ISIL control – service (and data) available through mid-2014

Constraints

Depletion and pollution of water resources – increasing water scarcity, declining quality of available water

Insufficient capacity/coverage of the water systems leading to lack/disruption of drinking water supply

Insufficient number and capacity of water treatment plants, and no wastewater treatment plants

Outdated facilities and networks

Large-scale destruction of water supply systems, stopped operation of assets (e.g. of intake stations, treatment plants), and loss of specialised machinery and equipment in the context of ISIL

Shortage of qualified staff

Weak monitoring and control capacity (electronic maps, pressure monitoring systems) – which prevents effective/timely maintenance and effective planning for improvement of the networks

Lack of specialised chemicals, equipment and machinery

Insufficient electricity supply for the operation of projects

Lack of financial resources – including due to low collection of water use charges (for 2015, the consolidated revenues of water collection fees were IQD 3.9105 billion)

Citizen violations to water distribution networks

Damage to infrastructure/loss of equipment in the context of ISIL

Low awareness among the population regarding water use, water quality and water conservation – which factors in the low charges collection, waste of water resources, and citizen violations to the network

Additional pressure of the water supply infrastructure from the influx of IDPs.

Goals

Eliminate water scarcity and ensure sustained and safe supply of all families in the province (including IDPs), industries and agriculture;

Upgrade the provided service and improve the quality of the drinking water provided to populations in accordance with global standards;

Promote rational and safe water use

Improve sector performance and revenue.


Update previously prepared plans and programmes for developing the sector to meet current and projected requirements;

Increase the production and design capacity of water projects in order to provide the best quantity of water to the citizens in accordance with the standard specifications prepared for this purpose;

Rehabilitate booster pumping stations and ground reservoirs GST 2,3 and 4 to secure continuous water delivery for citizens of Kirkuk;

Install instruments for measuring water use in all residential units and neighbourhoods of Kirkuk;

Address violations to water distribution networks, including ensure regular follow up on subscriber's registrations on a regular basis;


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Replace and perform maintenance on all old networks, including establish electronic database for all networks of Kirkuk city;

Expand water networks to deliver potable water to all neighbourhoods and areas that suffer from lack of regular supply of drinking water;

Investigate/develop alternative sources of raw water to supply the projects in order to eliminate water scarcity in some areas in Kirkuk province;

Promote water conservation awareness among the population and raise public awareness regarding the importance of clean water for health;

Increase the technological uptake in the sector – to improve monitoring and control capacity, and thereby allow effective/timely maintenance and effective planning for improvement of the networks.

See Annex A.3 for proposed projects to improve water supply and secure sustainable water supply in the long run.

5. Wastewater management

Effective wastewater management benefits human health, the quality and quantity of water resources. As such, it is vital for socio-economic development, especially in the context of declining water resources.

Already pre-ISIL, access to wastewater management service was a major problem in the province. The coverage of wastewater collection and processing networks in Kirkuk province is very low. According to UNDP data for 2011, deprivation from sanitation is 12.7%, which is more than twice higher than the average for Iraq (6%); only 29% of households have access to public sewerage or septic tank, and only 16% have access to public sewerage (see Chapter II.2) – ranking the province 17th in Iraq on sewerage service. This is particularly worrisome in view of the urban clustering of the population, as well as in the context of insufficient health service. According to COSIT data for 2014, only 1.8% of the population are served by sewage networks (sewage and rainwater), and 98.3% are served by independent treatment system (septic tank). The aggregate figures hide disparity in access at the level of qadha and nahia – making for even lower levels of service access in most areas; the majority of the public network is concentrated in the city of Kirkuk.

Pollution is a major problem that wastewater management needs to address, and it does not in Salah al-Din. Wastewater from agriculture and industry is a large source of pollution, linked to deficiencies in regulation, inspection and control. WTTPs are limited – with impact on water quality and water availability. In 2010, the amount of wastewater treated in Kirkuk province was 1284 m3/d; there were no large-scale WWTPs; operational small-scale plants were 9 – with design capacity of 8180 m3/d and actual capacity of 46 m3/d.

76 Wastewater generation in the province greatly

surpasses the capacity of WWTPs. The shortage of sewage treatment function results in hundreds of tonnes of raw sewage disposed daily into the major rivers – while the river and groundwaters in the basin are the main source of drinking water in the province. Increased collection and treatment would allow reuse of wastewater and rainwater, esp. for irrigation; rainwater collection/treatment could be optimised for use not only in industry but for household use.

Currently, 5 compact units for the modern residential complexes exist; and transmission pipelines and sub-networks for rainwater collection (box and plastic pipes of different dimensions and diameters) serve ca. 65% of the area of Kirkuk city. Also, integrated studies and designs exist for developing the rainwater and sewage sewer networks for most qadhas, nahias, and the Kirkuk city centre, which are ready for implementation. A number of projects to develop the service have been proposed – e.g. the Al-Multaka integrated wastewater project – including rainwater sewer network, sewage/sanitation sewer network, and WWTP.

76 JCCME/Dunja (Feb 2013), Water and Sewage Sectors in Iraq: Sector Report: http://www.meti.go.jp/meti_lib/report/2013fy/E002792.pdf.

Table 22 Kirkuk city sewer network

Plastic and GRP sewer pipes Trunk sewer lines Pipe diameter

(mm) Length (m) Dimensions

(mm) Length (m)

300 31 526 800 * 800 789 400 146 407 1000 * 1000 785 500 107 319 1200 * 1200. 1130 600 95 394 1500 * 1500 6025 700 12 590 1500 * 2000 1340 800 51 116 1600 * 1600 3689 900 915 1800 * 1800 652

1000 33 577 2000 * 2000 7879 1100 4555 2100 * 2100 2015 1200 12 421 2200 * 2200 421 1300 6111 2000 * 2500 1009 1400 7302 2000 * 2600 3238 1500 2893 2500 * 2500 9011 1600 3988 2500 * 3000 2612 2000 530 3000 * 3000 3876

516 644 m (ca. 517 km) 44 471 m (ca. 44.5 km)


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Table 23 Wastewater management service indicators for Kirkuk province

Qadha Nahia Rainwater sewer network (surface runoff) Sanitary sewer network (domestic/industrial wastewater) Pumping stations

per design (n)

Pumping stations actual (n) Wastewater treatment

facilities (n)

Standard discharge

(litres/ person/day)

Length of pipes (m) Man holes

(n)

Beneficiaries (% of

population)

Length of pipes (m) Man holes

(n)

Beneficiaries (% of

population)

Rainwater

Sewage/ sanitary

Combined

existing designed extra needed

existing designed extra needed

Kirkuk Kirkuk QC 556 609 913 000 356 391 12 186 60 31 781 1 523 000 1 491 219 1115 3 3 1** 1*** 2**** 5* 350–450

Yaychi – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Alton Kobry 4953 26 192 21 239 137 18 – 60,135 60 135 – 0 5 – – – – –

Al-Multaka – 6340 – – – – 15 760 – – – – – – – – –

Taza Khormato

10 256 37 310 27 054 224 27 – 68 670 68 670 – 0 1 – – – – –

Laylan 2407 – – 60 2 – – – – 0 – – – – – –

Shwan – – – – – – – – – 0 – – – – – –

Qara Hanjeer 8888 – 0 216 100 – – – – 0 – – – – – –

Al-Hawiga

Al-Hawiga QC 21 693 46 671 24 978 809 50 – 133 714 133 714 – 0 5 – – – – –

Al-Abbasi – 19 800 – – – – 49 770 – – – 1 – – – – –

Al-Riyadh 250 16 187 15 937 8 1 – 47 900 47 900 – 0 1 – – – – –

Al-Zab 987 – – 32 1 – – – – 0 – – – – – –

Daquq Daquq QC 8175 57 919 49 744 209 14 – 86 986 86 986 – 0 – – – – – –

Al-Rashad – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Dibis Dibis QC 8964 27 367 18 403 265 32 – 67 300 67 300 – 0 2 – – – – –

Sarkran – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

[*] Respective number of processing units: Shoraw (5), Rasheed neighbourhood (10), Nour City (3), Sayada (3), Banja Ali (1). [**] Teachers neighbourhood [***]Rasheed neighbourhood [****] Musalla and Hussein neighbourhoods.


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Post-ISIL, complete destruction of sector infrastructure is not reported, however the infrastructure has sustained damage, and the service has been reduced in quality and in places disrupted – while pressure on the capacity from the influx of IDPs has been major. Importantly, projects to develop the wastewater management service have been stopped or delayed – above all, the Kirkuk unified streams project: Integrated WWTP, rainwater runoff sewer network, sewage/sanitary sewer network, main and sub networks, with lifting plants, Phase I (Kirkuk/Turklan). Delay in the implementation of this project affects the future plans to cover Kirkuk city with sewerage networks.

Constrains

Dire shortage of wastewater lifting stations and sewage treatment capacity in Kirkuk city, the qadhas and nahias

Shortage of rainwater and sewage sewer networks – in Kirkuk city, and especially outside Kirkuk city


Shortage of qualified staff (for maintenance and other labour)

Low collection of charges for use of the wastewater network

Violation by citizens of the rainwater networks – including robbery of lids, grills and manholes

Lack of adequate headquarters for maintenance centres in the qadhas and nahias

Lack of garage for specialised equipment of the Sewerage Directorate

Lack of financial allocations for the Sewerage Directorate from the Ministry – which impedes the implementation of wastewater management projects

Lack of serious response by the municipal institutions in the province with regard to the introduction of a provision on cleaning the manholes into the city cleaning contracts

Non-activation of the collection of rainwater charges by Kirkuk Directorate of Water (to reach 100%)

Delay in the implementation of the first phase of Kirkuk unified streams project

Absence of special laboratories in the province to examine the pipes, lids, manholes and grills


Insufficient electricity supply for the operation of facilities and equipment

Low awareness among the population (parents, butchers, car wash shops, etc.) regarding the importance of water quality, the use of the wastewater collection system and the need to pay for this

Security situation – resulting in destruction of wastewater management assets, stopped operation of facilities/interrupted infrastructure, and loss of specialised machinery and equipment

Stopped projects in the context of ISIL

Additional pressure of the wastewater management system from the influx of IDPs.

Goals

Improve levels of wastewater collection in areas covered by the wastewater network and in areas with concentration of population – including new urban development and IDP cluster areas;

Achieve sufficient and effective wastewater management service that supports human health, water quality and water availability.


Attract investors from residential complexes in the province to build/operate WWTPs to extend the sewerage network in Kirkuk city and the province;

Attract investments for the operation and maintenance of sewerage networks and stations;

Complete stopped projects; ensure the completion of the first phase of Kirkuk unified streams project;

See Annex A.4 for proposed projects the wastewater management sector – including the completion of stopped projects.


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6. Waste management

Poor waste management is a major social and economic risk linked to diseases and pollution (esp. of water resources). Effective waste management can add to the economy (as well as quality of life) by providing inputs to other industries, including energy production.

In urban areas of Kirkuk Governorate, solid waste collection/processing and cleaning services are responsibility of municipal institutions. The Kirkuk Directorate of Municipalities oversees 12 municipal institutions. These are responsible for the implementation of services and projects related to the establishment and maintenance of streets, parks and public spaces within the administrative boundaries of cities. Outside municipal areas, waste management is responsibility of the Governorate service.

Solid waste includes municipal solid waste (from streets, households, etc.), commercial and industrial waste, construction and demolition waste, hazardous waste, hospital/health waste. In the absence of sorting and control mechanisms, all of this ends up in municipal landfills. At the same time, the existing capacity of landfills vis-à-vis generated waste is very low.

According to COSIT data for 2014, 94% of Kirkuk’s urban population are served by waste collection by municipal service, and 67.9% of the rural population – by waste collection by Governorate service;

According to COSIT data for 2014, altogether, there are 5 municipal landfills in Kirkuk province, only 1 of which is approved by environmental authorities;

Waste generation per person is 1.1 kg/day, but waste collection is 395 853 tonnes/year;

The majority of landfills are in fact illegal dump sites. Many of them are near and even in residential areas. There is no mechanism to manage them other than burning – which leads to air pollution and release of toxins into residential areas. In many cases the dumping sites are near water sources and this further contaminates the environment;

There are no recycling plants in Kirkuk – with major implications for the environment, as well as for public health.

Overall, waste management practices need improvement. Waste management is limited to a few formal procedures. Modern operational control procedures are lacking, which inter alia limits the capacity of waste management to add to sourcing and energy needs of the Governorate. No centralised waste recycling plants exist and no effective control procedures are implemented (e.g. for separation of types of waste), and there is lack of facilities for collecting, sorting, separating or storing waste. The methods applied in collection and disposal of solid waste have resulted in the spread of unlicensed/poorly regulated waste dumps. Landfills do not profit from purposeful engineering design and they produce much seepage; given lack of filtration controls, this contaminates soil, surface and groundwater resources. Air pollution is significant as well, with impact on the health of people in the vicinity.

In the context of ISIL, the capacity of the waste management service has been additionally strained by the influx of IDPs, the accumulated quantities of rubble from damaged structures, lack of funding; and loss of specialised machinery and equipment.

In liberated areas, remaining explosives are not an issue (all liberated areas in 2016 have been surveyed and demined by Civil Defence); but liberated areas do need removal of waste and debris accumulated from destroyed houses and institutions.

In 2016, municipal institutions managed to distribute containers and remove the waste from areas of concentration of IDPs (including camps) in in Daquq, Taza Khormato and Qara Hassan. Currently, municipal institutions in Daquq district, and precincts of Taza and Qara Hasan, are distributing containers, removing and disposing waste materials on daily basis in IDP areas and camps, increasing the pressure on these institutions despite their humble capabilities and poor budgets.

Constraints

No recycling plants, insufficient landfills, almost no environmentally approved landfills

Weak regulation and audit/control procedures regarding waste

Lack of financial resources – lack of/insufficient funding allocated for cleaning and waste collection work and maintenance, and low revenues collection


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Lack of/insufficient specialised machinery and equipment (pressers, sweepers, containers) and capacity for maintenance of these – linked to lack of allocated financial resources

Shortage of fuel to operate machinery/perform works

Staff capacity is strained and occupational safety is low – especially given the amounts of accumulated debris in liberated areas

Low public awareness about waste hazards and the importance of waste management

Additional pressure of the waste management system from the influx of IDPs.

Goals

Achieve clean and healthy environment free of accumulated waste in all parts of the province - including in IDP complexes;

Establish an environmentally sound waste collection and disposal system, consistent with best practices – including (1) develop systematic collection, treatment and processing of waste, (2) establish adequate number of landfills with proper design, and (3) improve operational control procedures and effective daily management across the waste life cycle.


Rehabilitate the landfills in municipal district and build new ones to cover all municipal needs;

Build four waste recycling plants in different locations;

Provide specialised cleaning equipment for use by Municipalities;

Provide required specialised equipment (containers, bags) and vehicles (e.g. compactors) to support timely and effective work in waste collection;

Secure continued supply of fuel to operate machinery;

Increase awareness among the population and businesses of the important role of waste management for public health and the environment, and create the necessary incentives to reduce the accumulation of waste;

Diversify funding sources, encourage investments;

Develop training to improve capacities in inspection and control, as well as trainings to improve the occupational safety of workers in the sector;

Increase waste collection in IDP complexes/compounds – particularly in the area of Qara Hassan – including through distribution of containers and waste bags;

Promote environmental awareness among the population (including in IDP camps) to help achieve a clean and healthy environment.

See Annex A.5 for proposed projects the waste management sector.

7. Communications

Modern communications systems are vital for the successful reconstruction and future development of the province. Across the world, access to communications is linked to economic growth, increased incomes, improved services delivery, and the development of enterprises. A dependable communications infrastructure is essential for efficient administration, management, and operation of the public and private sectors. This includes areas such as: internal government operations, citizens’ services, trade, banking and financial services, advertising and tourism.

Currently, the communication sector in the province relies mainly on private telecom operators (Asia Cell, Zain Iraq and Korek Telecom) for provision of mobile phone services, and state investments in internet services, provided by private companies. Public communication services in the province are provided by SOE under MoTC – including landline communication, wireless communication, link to the optical fibre network and transmission service (microwave); telecommunications, internet and intranet services; mail and safety deposit box services.

Pre-ISIL, the public telecommunications, post and internet infrastructures in the province were insufficient. E.g. in 2014, working telephone exchanges across qadhas were only 17, operating a total of 19 fixed telephone lines per 100 people – which is below the standard set by the MoTC (25-35 lines per 100 people). In addition to issues of capacity, quality was also an issue – due to outdated technology and infrastructure.

Following the events of 2014, public communication services in the province were disrupted (see Table 25).


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Table 24 Communications indicators for Kirkuk province, 2014 (COSIT)

Indicator Total (n) Zain (Iraquna & Atheer)

Asiacell Korek Units per 100 citizens* (n)

Citizens served by 1 unit* on average (n)

Telephone exchanges 17 0.001 93 262 Fixed telephone lines 81 600 5.15 19.4 Mobile telephone lines 1 538 258 30% 54% 16% 97 1 Post offices 17 (1478 PO boxes) 0.001 93 262 *Average number based on 2016 population data.

Table 25 Public cummunications service infrastructure (telephone and optical fibre), Kirkuk province, 2017

Optical fibre network and transmission (microwave) infrastructure Telephone exchanges N Station Name Notes 1 Tesaeen optical station 1. Kirkuk Center NGN

2. Tesaeen NGN 3. Wasti 4. Askari 5. Rasheed (Mumez) 6. Alton Kobry 7. Dibis 8. Babakarkar (North Oil) 9. Syria 10. Senaai 11. Taza 12. Daquq 13. Qara Hasan (Laylan) 14. Hawijah * 15. Riyadh * 16. Abbasy * 17. Zab * [*] Each includes 5 stopped switches because of security issues.

2 Kirkuk Center optical station 3 Wasti exchange optical station 4 Dumez exchange optical station 5 Askari exchange optical station 6 Popular Action exchange optical station 7 Laylan exchange optical station 8 Taza exchange optical station 9 Daquq exchange optical station 10 Kobry exchange optical station 11 Dibis exchange optical station 12 Riyadh exchange optical station Suspended due to conflict 13 Hawijah exchange optical station 14 Abbasy exchange optical station 15 Zab exchange optical station 16 Sikanian microwave station Stopped due to looted devices needed

to provide connectivity 17 Kirkuk Center microwave station Operative but out of service due to

stopped Engana microwave station 18 Daquq microwave station 19 Microwave station of the maintenance center

Constraints to developing the sector

Limited financial resources

Limited resources such as machinery, staff, financial

Hard to compete with the new technology of the private operators due to outdated technologies

Security situation.

Goals

Adequate communication services support the effective work of the administration, public service provision, the development of the local economy, economic growth and social development.


Provide communication services for citizens through optical cable service (FTTH);

Provide high-speed internet service and expand the wireless switch through developing investment opportunities by experts in the field;

Upgrade fax and mobile services;

Establish upgraded and efficient switch systems to cover the gaps in telephone lines;

Equip all households, offices and the public sector with phone service.

8. Healthcare

The planning, development, provision of the best level and quality of health service to citizens has significant long-term economic returns – in terms of sustaining and developing the available human resources, and in terms of ensuring supportive environment for businesses and investors – even though the operation of health services facilities as such is not-for-profit, and citizens do not bear the cost of most services. Thus, investment in health services (public, private) and developing public sector capacities in this regard is a major axis of socio-economic development. Health service in Kirkuk province is organised and overseen by the Kirkuk Health Department in coordination with the corresponding departments at MoH.


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Kirkuk Health Department is responsible for providing all means liable to provide health services and various and sophisticated treatment methods to the citizens throughout the province. This requires providing the means by which these services are provided either by establishing hospitals, specialist centers, new health centers or through the modernization and expansion of the existing buildings according to the progress in developing countries, passing the big challenges facing the country, which directly affect the development of the health system such as terrorism, political crises , the worsening economy, and the damage to infrastructure (weakness of electricity, weakness of sanitation, lack of potable water supply).

Pre-ISIL already, the capacity of the system was insufficient. After 2013, healthcare provision in the province deteriorated significantly and was put under additional strain because of the influx of IDPS from within Kirkuk and neighbouring provinces. Currently, the number of hospital beds is insufficient, there is lack of medical supplies and specialist doctors; often even for basic treatment citizens have to go to other provinces or abroad. Nevertheless, the health level in Kirkuk city is relatively good, given the circumstances.

Table 26 Healthcare indicators for Kirkuk province, 2014 (COSIT)

Health sector assets Number Beds (n) Bed occupancy (%) Hospitals Total 9 1201 64.3

Public 7 1145 Private 2 56

Primary Healthcare Centres (public) 119 Doctors 858 Dentists 202 Pharmacists 297

Affected infrastructure in the context of ISIL

Mulla Abdalla Center for primary health care (Dibis)

Secondary health center in Kharab Rot (Dibis)

Al Shaheed Primary Health Care Center (Daquq)

Health center in the village of Albu Mohammed (Daquq)

Health center in Al Samoud village (Daquq)

Health center in Tamour village(Daquq)

Hawija precinct was liberated in Oct 2017 and there is still no complete information on the conditions of the health infrastructure at the time of writing; field visits and inspection should follow up.

Hospitals

The population in the province is 1.59 million and growing, in addition to the displacement of many residents to the province because of the security circumstances. The hospitals in province that currently provide services to citizens do not fulfil the needs, namely:

Azadi general educational hospital, 425-bed capacity

Kirkuk general hospital, 318-bed capacity

Children's hospital, 120-bed capacity

Daquq hospital, 50- bed capacity

Hawija hospital, 126-bed capacity (out of service because of security conditions)

Thus, the actual bed capacity is 913. To achieve global clinical coverage rate, there must be 2.8 beds per 1000 people (i.e. 4200 beds are required). Therefore, there is a deficit of 3287 beds in the province.

Expansion of hospital capacity (with a total of 700 beds) was ongoing but interrupted in the context of ISIL and economic crisis, including: (1) Construction of 400-bed hospital at Baghdad road; (2) Construction of 100-bed hospital Al-Nasser neighbourhood; (3) Construction of 200-bed hospital at Hawiga.

Nevertheless, shortage of services results in: (1) considerable pressure on the hospitals of Kirkuk city center, qadhas and nahias (especially given the huge numbers of IDPs), driving a decline in the quality and level of health service delivery in the province; and (2) citizens having to wait which leads to increased negative impact on emergency and medical conditions that require expedite therapeutic health service delivery and endangering the citizens and may reach to death.


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Specialised medical clinics centres

While the current situation hinders the building and opening of new hospitals, alternative solutions are needed to solve the problem of overcrowding at hospitals. One such solution is the establishment of specialised medical clinics centres in all regions of the province. There, medical services provided are at a level equivalent to the services offered at a consultancy hospital. What is more, citizens with limited income medical services equivalent to the services offered in private clinics and for less cost by 65%.

In 2016, the existing 3 specialised medical clinic centres reduced overcrowding at hospitals by 15% compared to previous years (see Table 27). These centres are not enough to meet needs, especially in heavily populated areas such as Rahim Awah. Also the type of clinics available in centres can be increased to meet needs (with addition of e.g. Ophalmology).

Table 27 Specialised medical clinics in Kirkuk province (2016)

Clinics (21)

Specialised Medical Clinics Center (3)

Gyn

aeco

logy

Inte

rnal

med

icin

e

Rh

eum

ato

logy

/ Im

mu

no

logy

Paed

iatr

ics

Gen

eral

Sur

gery

Oto

lary

ngo

logy

(E

NT)

Der

mat

olog

y

Oph

thal

mo

logy

Den

tal m

edic

ine

X-ra

y an

d so

nar

Visits/day The centre obtains all medical supplies from auxiliary units (laboratory and pharmacy).

Baghdad road 160–250 Ronaki 85–90 Rahim Awah * proposed

* * * 50–85

Specialised medical care

Lack of medical specialties such as (thoracic surgery, blood surgery, cardiac catheterization) in addition to the lack of psychiatric specialties (only two currently) and few number of dentists;

Dialysis unit in terms of dialysis materials and solutions that cost the department on monthly basis ca. IQD 130–140 million, in addition to medicines for kidney transplant and who receive their monthly share from the dialysis unit (e.g. Sandimnm, Cellcept, Immuran) where these medicines are missing since Oct 2016, and their prices are expensive (if found);

In view of the increasing population of the province as a result of the growing number of indigenous or additional influx from districts, precincts and provinces; against such increase there is an increase of cancer cases in different age groups. A specialized cancer centre was opened for those cases. Donation funds were placed in health institutions the revenues of which are allocated to support the center, patients and injured;

Disabled persons in the province amount to 9804 disabled persons (UNDP provides a much higher number – ca.50 000 – see Chapter II.4.1).

Availability of medicines

The scarcity of medicines processed by the State Company for Medicine Marketing in the past six months to meet up to 50 -60% of the actual requirement. In addition to lack of financial resources for the purchase of non-found medicines as it fulfils only 10-15% of shortage.

Responding to the displacement crisis

In the context of ISIL, pressure on the healthcare system from the influx of IDPs has been massive. IDPs form a major additional burden on the province and on provision of services to citizens. To illustrate the scale of pressure of the system:

The number of IDPs in early 2016 was ca. 614 000. This included 12 984 infants under 1 year old, 3709 children under five (1-5y), 103 000 women of child-bearing age, and 12 984 pregnant women (respectively, 3.7%, 13.9%, 27.9% and 3.5% of the IDP population).

77 I.e. from these groups alone – a total

of 45.7% of the IDP population – there was additional pressure on the healthcare system of the province of ca. 830 people/month on average.

77 Kirkuk Governorate (2016), Plan to Manage the IDP Crisis.


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Moreover, of all children under five, 72% were sheltered in formal IDP settlements; while among the rest of these groups, ca. 95% were sheltered outside formal IDP settlements. This data illustrates the demographics of the IDP population (poorer families with many your children tend to be in formal settlements); but it also illustrates the fact that it has been very difficult to plan for and provide for IDP needs specifically – while the majority of IDPs are spread across cities and villages and seek out healthcare alongside host populations. Instead, it has been necessary to expand the capacity for health service in the province as a whole.

In the 16-month period 01 July 2014—31 Oct 2015 alone, health services provided to IDPs by health institutions in Kirkuk province – from vaccinations to complex surgeries – totalled in case number nearly 1 million, or over 60 000 per month on average (see Table 28).

Table 28 Health services provided to IDPs by health institutions in Kirkuk province in 01 July 2014–31 Oct 2015

Health service type Number provided to IDPs in Kirkuk province (01.07. 2014–31.10.2015)

Treatment at primary healthcare centre 338 110 Consultation at hospital 82 241

Outpatient care at hospital 25 882

Emergency care at hospital/health centre 16 104

Inpatient care at hospital 11 189 Consultation at mobile clinic 96 680 Consultation at traditional medicine clinic 1369 Health insurance service 3027 Delivery at hospital/health centre 4274 Paediatric integrated healthcare 39 597 Maternal integrated healthcare 15 582 Surgery 4317 (606 supreme, 1130 major, 1800 medium, 781 minor) Kidney dialysis 204 Laboratory examination 52 522 (hospitals – 14 723, health centres – 37 799) Regular radiology examination 6038 Sonar examination 7479 Magnetic resonance examination 3404 Scanner examination 955 Consultation at clinic for thoracic/respiratory diseases 394 Center of allergy and asthma 168 Chronic disease care 12 769 Health service for elderly people 1413 Diabetes and hypertension early detection 47 215 Vaccination 145 560 (routine sessions/follow up on school drop-outs - 12124;

vaccination campaigns – 24312) Physical therapy 4838 Psychological care 1744 Pre-marital examination 414 Dental treatment at specialised dental centre 15 066 Dental treatment at health centre 41 830 Total (29 broad types of health service) 980 385 cases (61 274.1/month on average over 16 months)

In the post-ISIL context, funding is a major issue. The rehabilitation of damaged hospitals, and provision of necessary medicines, supplies, vehicles, specialised care, establishment of new specialised health clinics centres, etc. all require financial support from donors and humanitarian organisations.

The Governorate has embarked on a plan to return IDPs to their homes – while 66.6% of all IDPs in Kirkuk are from Kirkuk province. At the same time, lack of health service is the top concern for returnees. Thus, urgent steps to extend health access and preventive care are needed that target all community groups: IDPs in/outside camps, returnees and host community.

Constraints

Insufficient bed capacity

Increasing infant mortality rates in all parts of the governorate, especially rural/remote parts and among displaced populations

Limited care, preventive care and prenatal care for children and pregnant women

Limited control of communicable diseases

Limited treatment of non-communicable, chronic and acute diseases


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Limited provision of healthcare to elderly people

Limited provision of essential healthcare to people with disabilities

Limited provision of metal health care/psychological treatment to people (above all IDPs)

Additional pressure of the health service system from the influx of IDPs

Limited provision of ongoing and continuous health and medical services to IDPs in all their locations (including camps)

Limited provision of healthy environment in spaces allocated to IDPs

Lack of/limited access to healthcare in rural areas

Insufficient infrastructure, overcrowding

Suspended work on new health facilities

Shortage of specialist medical doctors and qualified staff in the sector

Insufficient medicines and medical supplies

Increase in water-borne and skin diseases

Increased number of people with disabilities

Acute need of mental heath service provision in the post-ISIL context, especially with regard to children/IDP children.

Constraints specifically regarding IDPs

The majority of IDPs are sheltered outside camps; information on their health status and the health safety of their living conditions is not available, and contacting them for purposes of follow-up is often difficult;

Lack of sufficient/additional budget allocation for Kirkuk Health Department by the Ministry of Health

Lack of adequate supply of medicines and medical supplies to Kirkuk Health Department

There is need to establish additional health institutions in camps – while Kirkuk Health Department lacks the capacity to construct/equip buildings with medical equipment, supplies, medicines, and staff;

Health awareness among most IDPs is low – which leads to easy and rapid spread of communicable diseases;

A large number of IDPs were already affected by communicable diseases in their provinces of origin (viral hepatitis, scabies, measles, etc.)

Goals

Improved health condition of all residents of Kirkuk province in general and for IDPs in particular in the immediate and long run, including specifically:

Ensured control of communicable diseases;

Ensured support to people with chronic diseases, including among IDPs;

Ensured treatment of non-communicable and acute diseases among citizens outside and in IDP camps;

Reduced infant mortality rates in all parts of the governorate, but especially rural/remote parts;

Increased care, preventive care and prenatal care for children and pregnant women;

Provision of metal healthcare, protection, and therapy to citizens outside and in IDP camps;

Provision of healthcare to elderly citizens outside and in IDP camps;

Provision of basic healthcare to people with disabilities outside and in IDP camps;

Provide ongoing health and medical services to IDPs wherever they are present;

Ensured healthy environment in spaces allocated to IDPs;

Provision of ongoing and continuous health and medical services to IDPs in all their locations.


Increase the number of primary healthcare facilities and hospitals, and the availability of specialised healthcare centres, e.g.:

Establish a new Primary Healthcare Center at Kharab Al Rut and supply this with specialised medical instruments and equipment;

Rehabilitate Mullah Abdulla Health Center damaged in the context of ISIL and supplying the center with specialised medical equipment; etc.

Establish additional specialised medical clinic centres/more clinics at specialised medical clinic centres – including to reduce pressure on hospitals through increasing the availability of specialized medical personnel, and to extend access to quality medical services to all citizens, but especially citizens with limited income;


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Specifically, construct an extension to the Medical Clinics Center in Rahim Awah including ophthalmology clinic, ENT clinic, general surgery clinic;

Increase the number of beds in the province – including complete stopped projects;

Operate oxygen plant system and oxygen cylinder filling station to support the work of hospitals;

Ensure supply of medicines and medical supplies.

Ensure sufficient medical warehouses to secure the supply of medicines and medical supplies, and the safety and preservation of vaccines;

Approach donor agencies and humanitarian organisations to support the provision of required medicines

Approach donors and humanitarian agencies to support the reconstruction of damaged medical centres

Approach donors and humanitarian agencies to provide dialysis materials and solutions;

Equip ambulances and provide service/field vehicles for health institutions

Resume training and development programmes for staff in the health field – including specialisations in abroad to keep abreast of developments in medical fields;

Sign a Memorandum of Understanding to provide health institutions in Kikruk with specialist doctors in accordance with a program to be agreed upon with the MoH through the Kirkuk Health Department;

Increase services for PwDs; approach donors and humanitarian agencies for support in this regard;

Increase mental heath service provision

Ensure maintenance of sewers – to decrease the harms arising from environmental pollution.

See Annex A.6 for proposed projects in the health sector.

9. Education

Education is one of the important joints of life in the society, where it constitutes a part of a large social system which includes the entire society politically, economically and socially. Therefore, no reform of education can be isolated from the political orientation.

Prior to ISIL, Kirkuk scored average on education attainment and literacy. According to UN-habitat data for 2012, illiteracy – 23.2% - was the 6th highest in Iraq (compared to 13% in Iraq on average), and 11% among youth. By mean years of schooling (7.6), the province ranked 12th in Iraq. In the age group 15-29y, the school-dropout rate is 55.8% - only slightly lowered than the average for Iraq; while the education completion rate is 8.7% - also lower than this for Iraq. The gender variation in education attainment was very high: e.g. youth illiteracy was 7% among young men, but 15% among young women. In result, education attainment remains low– especially among women.

Pre-ISIL, 68 literacy centres were opened in the province to respond to the growing illiteracy situation, including 17 centres for study of Kurdish, 2 centres for study of Turkmen, and 49 centres for study of Arabic. The centres have remained operational in 2014-17. These cover 3300 female and male students in 4 types of classes (elementary, complementary, special, sixth grade).

Damaged and insufficient provision of schools constrain the ability of governorate to raise educational standards despite the growing need for qualified human resources in the province.

The years of ISIL occupation and associated displacement have compounded the situation. On one hand, the danger of ISIL led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of students, which threatens their scientific future. On the other hand, the economic crisis reduced GoI spending on education, so the crisis became compound and complex at the same time.

Structure

The educational ladder in Iraq includes: preschool (kindergarten, ages 4-5); mandatory primary education from age 6 (grades 1-6); secondary education, including intermediate (grades 7-9) and preparatory school (grades 10-12); and higher education (university, college, technical institute – min. 4 years).

Secondary preparatory schools are two types: (1) general secondary (academic track: sciences or humanities) and (2) vocational secondary (professional track: industry, agriculture or commerce).

Success on the national exam after grade 9 determines whether a student can enter (1) general secondary – which provide a track to higher education, or (2) vocational secondary school.


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Success on the national exam after grade 12 determines whether a student can continue to higher education; of students in vocational tracks, only the top 10% can continue their education in technical colleges.

With regard to responsibility:

Pre-school, primary and secondary education service in Kirkuk (incl. secondary vocational schools) is responsibility of the Kirkuk Directorate of Education (DG Education, under MoE);

The Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MoHESR) directly oversees higher education institutions (HEIs) and allocates their budgets.

Pre-school

The available capacity for early childhood education is insufficient and cannot yet result in quality care and education in habits, self-care and social skills, or effective adaptation to first grade. In total, children in the age group 0-4y in the province are 233 000, excluding IDPs. At the same time:

In 2014, there were 27 operational nurseries in Kirkuk province, with 205 educational staff, 334 total staff, and 1840 enrolled children. Only 4 of these were public (under MoLSA, with capacity of 200 children); and

In 2016, there were 59 operational kindergartens in Kirkuk province, attended by 10 728 children. In densely populated areas (Kirkuk QC) there was one teacher available per 40+ children. In Taza Khormato the situation was particularly dismal - 62 children per teacher, 72 children per classroom on average. On average there were 182 children per kindergarten, but this ration varies between 42 in Yaichi to 432 in Taza Khormato – which is far above the national average

The number of children in nurseries and in kindergartens is very small compared to the child population in the age group 0-4 (233 007 in 2016)..

There is acute need to extend pre-school education:

The tradition in Iraq is that the children are brought up at home by their mothers and grandmothers. However, with the increasing number of children per family, the increasing number of women-led households, and the increasing need to integrate women into the labour force, the kindergarten and nursery infrastructure is insufficient and available staff are inadequate in number and training;

Expansion of early education is above all necessitated by the need for initial adaptation of the child to first grade. Children have to build the necessary habits of being involved in the education process, use of training materials, valuing education, etc. – which should help reduce drop-out rates.

Primary and secondary education

For the education year 2015/16, students enrolment in primary schools is 158 498 – compared to 213 706 in 2013/14 – indicating a substantial decrease, and also indicating that not all school-age children participate in education. Attendance drops even further at the secondary education stage (see Table 29 below). The total number of students in secondary school is 89 859 for 2015/16 (compared to 112 887 in 2013/14) – which makes ca. 26% of the population aged 10-19.

The situation with out-of-school children in the province causes anxiety. High dropout and low enrolment rates are linked constraints specific to education provision – as well as to a range of social and economic reasons

78:

Infrastructure deficiencies include poor quality of school buildings, double shifts, overcrowded classrooms, and lack of school nearby/school located too far from home (especially for girls in rural areas) – coupled with lack of no conditions for studying at home, etc.;

Teaching/education performance deficiencies include inefficiency of teachers and their teaching methods, weakness in the effectiveness of the system for evaluating students, inappropriate school environment, lack of social integration activities (sports, arts, etc.);

Economic factors constitute at least 40%of the reasons for the high rate of dropout (working for the family, and inability of the family to bear education expenses); and poverty remains one of the most important obstacles standing in the way of school enrolment. While the children of wealthier households have better access to education and learning, the exclusion rates of poorer households ranges approximately between 10 times greater in the primary stage and five times greater in the lower secondary stage compared to the wealthy segment;

78 See UNDP (2014), Iraq HDR 2014 – based on youth survey data from 2009 and 2012; and MENA, Iraq Country Report on Out-of-School Children.


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The cultural dimension is also an important factor (related to e.g. keeping girls from school and prioritising marriage). Early marriage is an important obstacle to the continuing education of Iraqi girls, especially at the beginning of the lower secondary stage;

Alarmingly, major factors include the growing lack of awareness about the importance of education, particularly girls’ education. The educational level of the mother is one of the most important factors hindering the enrolment of children (especially girls) in school; as such, more than one quarter of the daughters of illiterate mothers at the primary age and more than half of their daughters at lower secondary level are out of school. The exclusion rates notably decrease with the increase in the mother’s educational level;

An additional major factor is the negative attitudes of the youth towards education (unwillingness to complete education, related to disconnect between education and employment opportunities, low quality of education, low technology uptake in education, etc.).

The situation with out-of-school children is a social problem; it is therefore, very important to take steps to address this issue. There is no single answer to the problem, but multiple approaches are required. Possible actions in this area are:

Review the existing education infrastructure and take actions to expand and improve it;

Implement alternative measures to provide education such as tents, community centres, private houses, in order to use the available teachers, who do not have schools;

Increase the school attendance rates and engage the early school leaving through various projects such as community-based schools, sports projects to encourage school participation. These measures have proven to be very effective in various communities around the world where the school attendance is low.

Education infrastructure damage in the context of ISIL has been extensive. In 2016, the Governorate reports 39 damaged schools (mostly elementary) in liberated areas – including 18 in Kirkuk Qadha (15 in Al-Multaka and 3 in Taza Khormato); 6 in Al- Hawiga Qadha (Al-Riyadh nahia); 11 in Daquq Qadha; and 4 in Dibis Qadha. (The full list is included in Annex A.7 - Rehabilitation of school infrastructure projects in liberated areas).

Urgent implementation is necessary of projects that aim to (1) ensure continued education service provision and closing of gaps, and compensate for lagging behind in school; (2) provide psychological support to students in the school environment; (3) increase school attendance rates through improving the infrastructure; (4) encourage students to stay in school through sports and other extra curricular activities; (5) encourage volunteering and civil education.

Vocational education

While a vocational secondary education track (trade, industrial, and agricultural) is available to those who do not pass the national exam, few students elect this option because of its poor quality and associated stigma. Problems driving low enrolment in and low quality of vocational education include:

Vocational education is seen as a second and dead-end option for students who fail national exams;

Incomplete development of national framework for certificates/qualifications, curricula and methods in TVET;

Uneven geographic availability of vocational specialisations;

Obsolete programmes and curricula, with little connect to technical developments in the job market;

Low quality of teachers, no vocational experience required of teachers;

Little/no practical training – also due to lack of equipment;

Outdated teaching methods and training equipment..

At the same time, in the governorate there is pronounced shortage of qualified technicians, mechanics, machine operators, workers prepared for the tourism sector, business administrators, etc., and there is need to boost entrepreneurship. Expanding vocational education (especially in coordination with trade unions and employers) would serve to (1) stimulate private sector development and investments in the province and (2) improve the relevance of education and returns on education (make it worth the while of students to remain in school). An employer-driven skills development vocational education provision can foster employment generation by strengthening the ability of the province to respond to employer needs, to plan for development of new sectors of the economy and to improve productivity and innovation.


92

Table 29 Education indicators (pre-school, primary, secondary), Kirkuk Directorate of Education, 2015/16

Qadha Nahia (QC=Qadha centre)

Pre-school (kindergarten) Primary education Secondary education

Kin

der

gart

ens

(n)

Ch

ildre

n (n

)

Ch

ildre

n p

er

kin

der

gart

en (n

)

Ch

ildre

n p

er

gro

up

(n)

Ch

ildre

n p

er

teac

her

(n)

Sch

oo

ls (

n)

Stu

den

ts (n

)

Cla

sses

(n

)

Teac

her

s (n

)

Stu

den

ts p

er

sch

oo

l (n

)

Stu

den

ts p

er

clas

s (n

)

Stu

den

ts p

er

teac

her

Sch

oo

ls (

n)

Stu

den

ts (n

)

Cla

sses

(n

)

Teac

her

s (n

)

Stu

den

ts p

er

sch

oo

l (n

)

Stu

den

ts p

er

clas

s (n

)

Stu

den

ts p

er

teac

her

(n)

Kirkuk Kirkuk QC 41 8846 215 48 43 348 119 537 3859 5646 343 30 21 186 71 525 2387 2984 384 29 23 Yaychi 1 42 42 21 7 31 4368 208 300 140 21 14 12 1879 57 136 156 32 13 Alton Kobry 4 369 92 34 23 30 4006 199 347 133 20 11 11 2356 101 191 214 23 12 Al-Multaka 28 1704 92 150 60 18 11 11 577 28 90 52 20 6 Taza Khormato 1 432 432 72 62 34 4604 164 363 135 28 12 11 1794 40 151 163 44 11 Laylan 4 269 67 27 19 31 3567 196 268 115 18 13 11 1749 83 131 159 21 13 Shwan 2 126 63 32 32 31 3019 215 126 97 14 23 10 1595 70 48 159 22 33 Qara Hanjeer 1 86 86 22 12 19 986 106 77 51 9 12 4 569 24 21 142 23 27

Al-Hawiga

Al-Hawiga QC* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Al-Abbasi* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Al-Riyadh* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Al-Zab* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Daquq Daquq QC 2 226 113 38 19 105 7263 436 768 69 16 9 34 4196 153 302 123 27 13 Al-Rashad* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Dibis Dibis QC 3 332 110 30 33 60 8864 383 431 147 23 20 16 3513 127 176 219 27 19 Sarkran 0 0 0 0 0 15 580 69 39 38 8 14 2 107 7 7 53 15 15

Total 2015/16 59 10 728 182 – – 732 158 498 5927 8515 217 27 19 308 89 860 3077 4237 292 29 21

% of population aged 5-9 y (207 368) 76.4% –

% of population aged 10-19 y (343 878) 26.1%


To compare: data for 2013/14 (COSIT)

Total (n) 1121 213 706 9137 12 442 191 23 17 461 112 887 3959 5577 245 29 20

Female (n) 99 99 347 1162 7815 140 43 167 1455 3033

Female (%) 9% 47% 13% 63% 30% 38% 37% 54%


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Higher education

The University of Kirkuk scores high among Iraqi universities especially in the engineering sciences. In addition, a number of technical institutes and colleges operate. Building the capacity of HEIs in terms of quality of teaching staff, laboratory equipment, etc., as well as developing closer ties between HEIs and the Governorate Administration – should support the Governorate in its efforts toward development of economic sectors and effective service provision (e.g. green economy opportunities, waste recycling as industry input, water collection methods, community research to help meet the needs of specific communities in Kirkuk, etc.) – e.g. with studies, development of models, sharing of best practices, an so on. The role of HEIs can also be strengthened with respect to development of qualified cadres in all sectors (in particular teacher training).

Table 30 Students enrolled in initial university studies, 2014/15, Kirkuk Governorate (COSIT)

HE institution type Students Female (n/%) Male (n) Total (n/%)

Public universities 8111 46.3% 9402 17513 60.6% Technical universities 2467 42.3% 3371 5838 19.9% Private colleges 1457 24.2% 4570 6027 20.5% Total 12 035 50% 17 343 29378 100%

Responding to the displacement crisis

Kirkuk Province and the General Directorate of Education played a major role and overcame great challenges in addressing the displacement crisis. The were leaders when it came to dealing with crisis, challenges, and threatens as well as developing successful solutions for them (see Table 31).

Table 31 Achievements under DG Education in Kirkuk in responding to the IDP crisis in 2014/15 academic year

Achievement Scale/details IDP pupils and students received in schools of Kirkuk province ca. 50 000 male and female Total IDP pupils covered 10 198 male, 8241 female – additional to ones

registered in schools of Kirkuk province Total IDP students covered 8167 male, 9664 female – additional to ones

registered in schools of Kirkuk province IDP students received in Syriac schools 81 male and female IDP students registered with the Vocational Education Department 367 male and female as of 05 May 2015 IDP students registered in institutes affiliated to Kirkuk GD Education 409 male and female IDP students received at the teacher training institutes in Kirkuk and Al Hawiga

124 male, 285 female

Books, notebooks, and stationery distributed to IDP students/pupils – Tent schools built in camps 18 classrooms Caravan schools built 36 classrooms Primary schools opened for IDPs (including in camps) 33 Primary schools opened for IDPs wishing to study Turkmen 3 (Yahyawa, Alton Kobry, and Daquq) Secondary schools opened for IDPs (including in camps) 31 Official literacy school for IDPs opened 1 Funding disbursed to support IDPs sheltered in schools IQD 36 million Educational training courses prepared 17 Courses delivered for displaced teachers/education administrators (some with support from CSI, UNICEF)

early childhood development, educational mentoring, math, English, Arabic, calligraphy, science, chemistry, physics, biology

Relevant research completed “Problems suffered by displaced students from the perspective of school administrations and students“

Education is a major concern in Iraq as a whole, but especially so in the provinces invaded by ISIL. Education is plagued by a series of problems – insufficient and outdated school network further damaged by military operations, outdated curriculum and school books, lack of additional activities, traditions restricting the education of girls, the security situation, and finally, sectarian propaganda. All these have created a situation where students receive inadequate education and attendance rates are low. Public education is lagging, while children are being subject to radical teachings. All these problems need special attention. The implementation is necessary of projects that aim to (1) increase school attendance rates through improving the infrastructure; (2) encourage students to stay in school through sports and other extra curricular activities; (3) encourage volunteering and civil education; and (4) compensate for lagging behind in school.


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Constraints

Pressure on the education system capacity from high population growth and urbanisation

Pressure on the education system capacity from displacement – linked to overcrowding in schools in areas of displacement and shortage of staff

High and growing student-to-teacher and student-to-class ratios

High rates of dropout – 56% total and as high as 64% among girls in 2012

Increased rates of repetition, exam failure and dropout

Non-enrolment in schools by all students

Outdated/insufficient school buildings – many are in bad condition, damaged/destroyed

Outdated teaching methods with low adoption of modern technology

Lack of psychological adaptation for pupils/students to the school environment – contributing to drop-out rates and poor academic achievement

Absence of extra-curricular activities in the education system

Low motivation for enrolment in vocational schools

Limited funding

Suspended projects

Reliance on NGOs/CSOs to complete projects/provide services.

Goals

Education service restored to all pupils and students and education gaps closed; displaced students benefit from all tracks of the educational process;

Education service developed to respond adequately to (1) demographic trends and (2) contemporary requirements in teaching methods and modern curricula, as necessary to support the economic development and modernisation of the governorate;

Reduced illiteracy (esp. among youth), increased school attendance, improved capacity of teaching staff.


Cooperate with CSOs/NGOs to promote the role of schools in community rebuilding/fostering social cohesion;

Involve parents more closely - to get parents to send kids to school;

Promote cooperation between the main actors in the sector;

Conduct training courses for sector staff in areas affected by ISIL, together with DG Education staff, in accordance with specialisation, in order to assess the needs of the children and to prepare a program for combating the radicalisation;

Expand and modernise vocational training and work-based skills development;

Expand teacher training and the provide possibility of teachers to participate in training courses according to their specialty;

Open more schools in different areas inside and outside Kirkuk city – including increase caravan schools to accommodate displaced students and convert tent schools in camps to caravan schools;

Provide required educational supplies, books, stationery and furniture;

Support the return of IDPs – through accelerated rehabilitation of school infrastructure;

Rehabilitate health units at schools;

Establish more educational and psychological training courses for education staff;

Review the existing education infrastructure and take actions to expand and improve it;

Implement alternative measures to provide education such as tents, community centres, private houses, in order to use the available teachers where schools are not available;

Increase the school attendance rates and engage the early school leaving through various projects such as community-based schools, sports projects to encourage school participation.

See Annex A.7 for proposed projects in the education sector.


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V. GOVERNANCE

1. Local governance bodies

The Law of Governorates Not Incorporated into a Region (Law No. 21 of 2008, as amended by Law 15 of 2010) calls for decentralisation of the government and the transfer of suitable ministerial functions to the provincial governments. The Second Amendment to Law 21 (2013) affects greater provincial self-determination. In all 14 governorates not incorporated into a region (and not otherwise subject to a constitutional dispute), Law 21 applies to governorate, qadha, and nahia councils. The Law and its amendments govern the rights and powers of local government bodies.

According to Article 1 of Law 21 (as amended by Law 15 of 2010), a governorate is “an administrative unit in its geographic boundaries consisting of qada’as (districts), nahiyas (sub-districts), and villages.”

79

Per Article 2 of the Law, “The governorate council is the highest legislative and oversight authority within the administrative boundaries of the governorate and shall have the right to issue local legislation within the boundaries of the governorate [local laws, instructions, bylaws, and regulations to organise the administrative and financial affairs] so that it can carry out its affairs on the basis of the principle of administrative decentralisation and in a manner that would not contradict the Constitution and federal laws.” The Governorate Council is not under the control or supervision of any Ministry and it has independent finance.

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The governor is the highest executive head in the Governorate: “The governor shall be considered the highest-ranking executive officer in the governorate at the rank of a deputy minister as regards rights and service” (Article 24). The Governor is elected by the Governorate Council and exercises the powers vested in him by the Governorate Council.

On principle, the local councils of qadhas and nahias play the foremost role in determining the development needs and priorities for local development (see Chapter V.4 below).

2. Decentralisation process

The process of decentralisation envisaged in the legislation is not completed – particularly in the area of the delegation of budgets, where MoF still has the main role and which creates a situation of no funds for disbursement in the province.

Table 32 Status of the governance decentralisation process per Law 21

Ministry Decentralisation status Departments

Transferred Not transferred

Former Ministry of Municipalities

The functions have been transferred. Administrative, legal and technical powers are in operation.

Financial powers transfer stage is on-going; Ministry inventories have been sent to MoF.

Municipality Municipalities

Former Ministry of Housing

The functions have been transferred. Administrative, legal and technical powers are in operation.

Financial powers transfer stage is on-going; Ministry inventories have been sent to MoF.

Certain functions/powers remain under discussion (e.g. Housing Fund). MoCHMPW insists to keep them; the Governorate insists on applying Law 21, with the Ministry retaining a role in policy making.

Water Sewage Urban Planning Planning and Follow Up Training Center Buildings Roads and bridges Housing

Housing Fund Cadres of Housing

Companies Construction Lab

Ministry of Agriculture

The functions/powers have been transferred. Financial powers have been transferred. Staff

salaries and operational budget are delivered by the Finance Department in the Governorate.

Agricultural Extension Veterinary Agricultural Bank

79 Official English translation: http://iraq-lg-law.org/ar/webfm_send/765. 80 Supreme Court Advisory Opinion No. 16 recognies the authority of governorate councils to raise local revenues.


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Certain powers remain under discussion with the Coordinating Commission.

Ministry of Youth and Sports

Powers of the Ministry have been transferred to the Governorate under letter of the Coordinating Commission.

Certain powers remain under discussion with the Coordinating Commission.

Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs

Functions/powers have been transferred to Kirkuk Governorate with regard to 4 of MoLSA’s 8 formations.

Special needs section Vocational Training

Centre Works Department Occupational Safety and

Health Department

Workers' Pension Security Fund

Social Protection Network for Men

Social Protection Network for Women

Ministry of Health

Administrative order has been issued to transfer the administrative, legal, financial and technical powers to Kirkuk Governorate.

Currently, staff salaries and operational budget are received by the Province's Financial Department.

Certain powers remain under discussion with regard to inter-provincial transfer of medical personnel, the purchase of medicines, and teaching hospitals

Ministry of Education

Financial, administrative and legal powers have been transferred to Kirkuk Governorate.

Matters of curricula, supervision on exams and literacy programmes remain under the Ministry.

Certain powers remain under discussion.

Ministry of Finance

Financial Department has been formed in the province – responsible for coordination with transferred departments regarding investment and operational budget.

Operational account and an investment account have been opened in the province.

Certain functions/powers remain under discussion between MoF and the Governorate, where MoF insists to keep these departments (e.g. Customs).

State Properties Retirement Taxation Banks Customs

3. Departments of the Governorate Administration

(overleaf)


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Figure 16 Structure of Kirkuk’s Administration

Governor

Governor’s Office

Executive Council and Secretariat Planning and Development Council

According to each governorate

specificity

Administrative Units (qadhas and

nahias)

Department of Contracts

Department of Citizens Affairs

Department of Audit and Internal

Control

Department of Media and Public

Relations

Department of Information Technology

Department of Performance Evaluation

Department of Planning and Follow-up

Advisory Board

Investment Board

Directorate of Financial

Affairs

Directorate of Public Health

Directorate of Public

Education

Governor Technical Assistant

Governor Administra

tive Assistant

Deputy Governor/

Advisor

Deputy Governor/

Advisor

Deputy Governor/

Advisor

Deputy Governor/

Advisor

Deputy Governor/

Advisor

Administrative Departments

in the Governorate

Office

Directorates of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs

Directorates of the Ministry

of Construction, Housing and

Municipalities

Directorate of Agriculture

Directorate of Youth and

Sports

Technical Departments

in the Governorate

Office


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4. Governorate budget

Based on Article 44 of Law No. 21, the financial resources of the Governorate are comprised of the following:

Budget transfers from the federal government in accordance with the constitutional criteria – as sufficient to carry out its missions and responsibilities in accordance with its population and the degree of deprivation, so that balanced development of the different regions of the country is ensured.

Revenues accrued in the governorate – except those from oil and gas – including:

Revenues generated from the governorate services and investment projects;

Proceeds from taxes, fees and fines imposed in accordance with federal and local regulations in force within the governorates – incl. (1) taxes imposed by the Council on companies operating in the governorate in compensation for environmental pollution and damage caused to the infrastructure, and (2) half of the revenues accrued from border crossings;

Proceeds from the sale/lease of public assets – including rent land used by companies;

Donations and gifts that may be received by the governorate in a manner that does not contradict the Constitution and federal regulations

81;

Share of the revenues of local authorities. Local authorities must allocate a fair share of the revenues to their administrative units so that it is sufficient for the latter to carry out their missions and responsibilities in accordance with the governorate population.

The procedure of preparing the annual budget is as follows: (1) the Governor submits a draft budget for development of the province to the Council for approval; (2) the Council approves the draft budget depending on the plans submitted by the local councils to MoP; (3) the Governor has exclusive power to implement the approved budget; the Council is responsible for implementation monitoring; and (4) following audit by the Federal Audit Bureau, if needed, budget adjustments are carried out in the budget of the following year.

Oil and gas revenues are channelled to the provincial government through MoF on an annual basis (a.k.a. general operating funds). Currently, these are the main source of revenue for Kirkuk Governorate. Per Article 43 of the 2010 Federal Budget Law, the Governorate is entitled to (1) transfer of amounts proportional to the barrels of crude oil extracted/refined and the cubic metres of natural gas produced; and (2) MoF allocation proportionate to tourism in the province.

82 For 2017, Kirkuk received IQD 71 billion (14%) of the entire allocation for Iraq.

While Law 21 specifically empowers each province with the authority to “collec[t] taxes, fees, and fines pursuant to the applicable federal laws,” it allows the Governorate to create new sources of revenue and spend in on development in the region – specifically, the governorates can levy taxes and fees on local-level transactions.

83

5. Toward effective local governance

The citizens and administration of Kirkuk agree that there is need to improve public governance in order to better respond to local needs, to provide better services and to reduce corruption. Improved local governance will reduce the burden on businesses thus improving the business and investment environment; it will reduce the waste of resources and help better target available resources; and it will generally help improve the quality of life of citizens and communities.

To be effective, public governance requires better availability of resources (funding) for services and projects, and higher involvement of local communities (citizens, CSOs, youth associations, local businesses, etc.) – in order to facilitate an actually locally-driven development agenda. Correspondingly, it is important to improve taxation and to activate e-governance. Above all, effective local governance requires improved capacity of the Administration to steer inclusive, relevant and sustainable local development processes – in terms of political process, representation, transparency, planning, accountability, etc.

81 According to the Federal Budget Law (44) of 201, donations, grants, assistance and different loans, amounts provided through technical assistance or projects implementation, or amounts provided by the private sectors – whether they came from inside or outside Iraq – need to be registered as final revenues with the Treasury Department (most typically according to MoU). 82 USD 1 per barrel extracted/refined; USD 1 per 150 m3 of gas produced; USD 20 per non-resident visitor to holy sites in the province. 83 Pursuant to positions/ruling of Shura Council, Iraqi Federal Supreme Court and MoF with regard to implementation of Law 21. As long as the action to which the tax is levied does not have implications beyond the province borders, it is unlikely that the tax will be challenged at the federal level.


99

Taxation

The tax objectives vary depending on the economic, political and social circumstances of the state. In general, according to Income Tax Law No. 113/1982 (amended) on managing and developing the tax system, the tax system aims to (1) increase tax revenue collection – by applying best practices, compliance with applicable laws and instructions, and best use of resources – to ensure fair and equal tax management; (2) increase voluntary compliance by providing effective programmes/mechanisms to serve taxpayers; and (3) train and build capacities of tax cadres on tax collection under Law No. 92/1981 (amended).

Per Article 8 of Law No. 92/1981 (amended), the duties of the general tax authority are to (1) manage the requirements of taxes calculation and collection, and to organize their accounts; (2) follow up on sustainability of collection and determine the procedures and grounds for collection; (3) propose developments in tax legislation; (4) recommend new taxes or cancellation of existing taxes.

Weaknesses and constraints regarding tax activities

Wide tax evasion – most registered shop and market owners in Kirkuk do not pay their taxes; many shop and market owners are not registered in the tax departments because of lack of tax awareness and absence of sense of citizenship that leads to lower tax revenues and higher social injustice;

No coordination between state authorities and tax authority, and non-compliance with Law No. 113/1982;. Insufficient staff; Lack of training and development courses for staff (in/outside Iraq) for the branch staff since 2003 that

would build staff capacities (e.g. administrative, technical and financial) and increase learning from tax regulations/practices in other countries;

Lack of financial and administrative powers of the branch; dependency on low financial allocations; Inadequacy of the department buildings for tax work (halls and counters are better suited than rooms); Reliance on manual records which affects work accuracy; computers are limited to income tax collectors

(while all sections – companies, real estate and lands – would benefit);

Low motivation of tax staff – linked to lack of incentives and benefits since 2003 and low salaries.

Recommendations and proposals to improve the effectiveness of tax collection

Raise citizen awareness regarding taxation using different media; Obligate property owners to declare lease contracts of their shops through the notary for the purpose of

registration in tax departments; Obligate shop and market owners to register in tax department through issuance of badges attested by

the tax department to display on their premises; Ensure sufficient number of qualified staff; Provide training and development courses to develop the capacities and skills (management, technical

and financial) of branch staff; Increase cooperation between state departments and the tax department; Improve the technological uptake – to increase the automation of activities of the branch and improve

the accuracy and expedition of work.

Electronic governance

E-Citizen project. The project is aimed to enable the citizens to convey their voice to government agencies – including 56 official bodies, including bodies unrelated to any Ministry. In turn, all public bodies are electronically linked to 450 affiliates (this number can expand). The Citizens' Affairs Department receives requests and complaints from citizens through hotline, social network tools (Facebook) and e-citizen project site. In response, the Department can take action according to its powers, or refer the requests to any of the bodies that are electronically linked to the project.

E-Archiving project. The project started as a pilot in 2012 in two important departments of the Kirkuk province council. Following positive project performance review in 2013, the project has been extended to include all sections. In 2016 it was updated and still operational.

E-Communication project. The project builds on the USAID Taqaddum Project and the Wassit province e-communication pilot. It provides e-account and e-mail connection across all departments with provincial council, removing the need for paper mail – leading to reduced costs and faster performance. The project started working in early 2016, connecting 81 departments through kirkuk.iq.


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Capacity

Constraints to fostering effective local governance in the area of capacity emerge at several levels: (1) Administration; (2) political level; (3) planning; (4) involvement of community leaders and CSOs in local governance; and (5) involvement of citizens.

Constraints at the level of Administration:

Unclear position of Kirkuk in relation to Iraq and the KRI;

Incomplete decentralisation and delegation of powers and budgets;

Lack of efficiency standards and functional analysis of the administration;

Corruption.

Constraints related to political instability:

Growing friction among political blocks especially on ethnic basis;

Political blocs in the province (local level) follow instructions from their political centres (central level);

Continued conflicts and power struggle with the Central Government over delegation of authority and absence of decision on Article 140;

Local councils are still incapable of formulating clear economic policy plan for the province;

The political blocs are still unclear on the issue of representation on the Governorate Council, and their performance on the Council is unclear;

Lack of competencies and qualifications among the political parties;

Political programmes presented as drafts during elections season are not implemented once local governments assume responsibility;

Weak governorate council and local councils (last elections were in 2005);

Lack of appropriate spaces for engaging local government representatives and MPs in dialogue;

Growing trend toward ethnic and regional nominations (i.e. to ensure representation in the Governorate Council, the ethnicities elect their representative on ethnic and not political level). This results in representatives on the Council who favour ethnic and regional interests over priorities of the governorate;

Nominated candidates are selected based on their ability to attract votes to electoral lists, and not on qualifications, efficiency or integrity. This results in ineffective and unexperienced candidates/representatives, and ultimately, weak councils.

Constraints related to planning:

Lack of coordination between the Technical Planning Unit of the Governorate (TPU) and the Planning Directorate of MoP;

Setting priorities for projects does not adequately take into account technical studies:

Most decision makers propose projects base on party directions and interest – and not in view of priorities for development of the governorate;

At the Governorate Council, projects are added/removed based on members’/council interest, without technical studies;

Lack of experience at TPU – specifically weakness in organising Technical Assessments;

Lack of systematic and targeted capacity building for Governorate staff (only some NGO trainings);

Lack of pro-active coordination with international NGOs in planning their upcoming projects to align with governorate priorities.

Constraints related to involvement of community leaders and CSOs:

Community leaders and CSOs are not periodically informed on the functioning of local government in Kirkuk;

Lack of accurate and documented sources of information that enable community leaders and CSOs to keep informed and abreast on the functioning of local government.

Lack of adequate mechanisms for community leaders and CSOs to influence decisions at the local level;

Community leaders and CSOs are more engaged in charitable and humanitarian aid efforts;

Efforts of CSOs are fragmented and unable to improve or promote the living situation of communities;

Some CSOs invest their efforts in lining up with political parties in the preparation for elections.


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Constraints related to involvement of citizens and communities:

Lack of significant involvement of citizens in local government;

Lack of spaces to promote transparent dialogue between local government and citizens to allow their involvement and participation in identifying their priorities;

Lack of sectoral dialogue between departments of local government, specialised committees of the provincial council, and the concerned community segments regarding problems/concerns and ways to address them;

Lack of citizen participation in mobilising the community to work with local councils to identify priorities and vital projects for the regions during the preparation of the regional development budget.

Effective local governance – based on representation, transparency, accountability, the rule of law and a culture of human rights – is a prerequisite for increased community cohesion in Kirkuk Governorate. This will contribute directly to achieving all development goals of the governorate, as well as facilitate social inclusion and the peaceful living together of communities in the course of economic rebuilding and development.


102

VI. SWOT ANALYSIS

The overall SWOT analysis below has been compiled from the SWOTs from the 3 Working Groups: Community Development, Economic Development, and Provision of Public Services.

Inte

rnal

Strengths Weaknesses

Excellent and strategic location Availability of water resources, dams and reservoirs Ethnic diversity History of tolerance and peaceful living together of

the various tribes and ethno-religious communities Availability of basic services Inclusive provision of public services among

communities Existence of NGO centres that support the socio-

economic inclusion of vulnerable groups Overall good education level – especially in cities Good share of higher education graduates Existence of a vocational training centre Availability of specialised staff for public service

provision – including social and health support Availability of high and intermediate cadres for the

oil sector (existence of specialised college for petroleum and oil engineering)

Investors willing to invest in oil who have potential and financial liquidity

Culture of tolerance and community ties weakened in the context of ISIL

Absence of extra-curricular activities in the education system High incidence of child labour Poor living conditions of the majority of families High unemployment, disguised unemployment (working

poor) and begging incidence Lagging education levels and increasing illiteracy rates –

especially in rural areas Weak awareness of the need of education – especially in

rural areas Limited competence areas and weak planning capacity in the

administration Weak government control in various sectors with impacts on

all aspects of daily life (e.g. quality of food, environment, social services, etc.)

High rate of industrial pollution of air, water and soil resources

Conflict of interests as politicians lobby for specific projects Citizen misuse of public services (e.g. violation of rainwater

networks, not paying for electricity/water, etc.) Weak involvement/role of the private sector in service

provision No large-scale WWTP No waste recycling plants Weak public transport Financial and administrative corruption

Exte

rnal

Opportunities Threats

Presence of international organizations and CSOs active on many social issues

Awareness that community peace building is necessary in the society

Local legislation enacted to support and promote coexistence , human rights protection and non -violence

Markets for products of the province exist outside and inside Iraq

Existence and operation of laws and legislation that reduce the administrative burden for businesses and investors

Destruction of Beygee refinery - as opportunity to provide fuel for power plants from refinery within Kirkuk

Diversification of products in the oil-based sector Converting the military airport south of Kirkuk city to

civilian airport Availability of investment opportunities for foreign

companies Construction of crude oil refineries

Non-implementation of Law 21 (2008) amended (administrative decentralisation) – leading to blocked local decisions

Unstable security situation Non-application of constitutional articles/non activation of

articles related to the special status of Kirkuk (esp. Article 140, M 112/II)

Competing intervention from regional political actors (Iran, Erbil, Baghdad) at the local level (due to the oil)

Lack of/weak administrative control and procedures – which allows parties and the central government to interfere at the local level

Parties and factions fight for power instead of working together

Conflict of (political) interest Difficulties in the development of the oil sector/new

refineries Slow reconstruction process in liberated areas Lack of financial allocations Citizen non-compliance with regulation on weight of load

vehicles


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VII. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Based on the analysis made, the strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats identified, five strategic objectives have been elaborated for Kirkuk’s Response Plan for the period 2018–2022, as follows.

Strategic objective 1: Ensured restoration of the social fabric

The objective responds to the identified needs and opportunities for restoring community peace and ensuring the return of people to their homes. Its importance stems from the significant impact that peaceful coexistence has on socio-economic development. In this sense, the achievement of Strategic Objective 1 will have a significant impact on the achievement of the remaining strategic objectives of the Plan.

Strategic objective 2: Supporting environment created for overcoming of social challenges

This objective responds to the identified need to provide opportunities for large parts of the society, who are currently left behind. Specifically, there is need to improve opportunities available to youth, women and vulnerable groups for socio-economic inclusion and full participation in society – including through improved rights awareness and equal access of women and youth to education and career.

Strategic objective 3: Restored and improved infrastructure and public services

The objective matches the identified needs and opportunities for restoration, rehabilitation and further development of public services, including basic services and infrastructure. The availability and quality of infrastructure and public services are a key factor for economic development, social development, human development and quality of life.

Strategic objective 4: Enabling environment secured for economic development

Economic development is a major driver of people's well-being. Increasing investments will facilitate development across the economic, as well as the social service sectors. Increase in the rate of investment requires good infrastructure, effective legislation, adequate promotion of the region and opportunities, as well as the availability of educated and skilled workforce.

Strategic objective 5: Public governance improved

Good governance is a horizontal priority objective: the achievement of all other strategic objectives for development of the governorate depends on the quality of public governance. The quality of governance is reflected in the organisation structure of the Administration; the capacity for effective information management and data analysis, prompt work and effective decision-making; the capacity to train and provide the necessary number of experts in different sectors; the preparation of effective legislation; the provision of the necessary technical equipment and facilities; as well as the provision of the necessary financial resources. Good governance also provides an opportunity to introduce and implement new and modern approaches to managing individual priority sectors. Finally, in the context of democratic decentralisation, good governance is inclusive governance – in that it supports the development of all groups and communities, and it responds to their needs.


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VIII. PROGRAMMES (PRIORITY SECTORS)

The following programmes are outlined on the basis of the SWOT analysis and the identified strategic objectives (above), with attention to interventions in areas where the Governorate has the power to implement specific projects and activities.

1. Programme 1: Ensure reconciliation between communities

Rationale

Since 2014, Kirkuk has been a scene for heavy fighting with the invading ISIL forces; almost half of the province was occupied by the terrorist and the last military operations against them were completed in Oct 2017. This recent violence builds on increasing sectarian violence since 2006, as well as on ca. 50 years of internal displacements and major population shifts driven by ethnic-based policies – starting in the 1970s. All of this has placed much stress on the community in this ethnically diverse province and it has aggravated perceptions of disenfranchisement, fears of displacement and discrimination, and distrust of the central government among societal groups. In the post-ISIL context, inter-ethnic tensions could easily ignite retributive acts, radicalisation and further violence – especially given the political context of the governorate. E.g. the referendum for the independence of Kurdistan has brought forth some of the divisions of the community that need to be addressed.

Critical strategic issues:

Lack of measures for reconciliation and peaceful coexistence;

Lack of measures to condemn violence and radical ideologies and to promote moderation;

Increased incidence of arming among society;

Limited culture of collaboration with the security forces;

Lack of instructions to officials and security force leaders in the governorate to be strict with law violations while protecting human rights and public freedoms;

Lack of involvement of influential people in the reconciliation process (e.g. tribal/religious leaders, academics, community councils) to support and implement reconciliation;

Limited support for youth peace-building activities;

Limited awareness, participation and protection of women in order to enhance their role in building peace and security;

Migration of qualified people due to the security situation.

Vision

Comprehensive measures to achieve rule of law – especially with regard to sectarian issues and radicalisation – support the return of IDPs and the restoration of the community fabric, reduce the level of radicalisation in society, and prevent radicalisation in the long run.

Specific objectives:

Specific objective 1: Activated rule of law with regard to sectarian issues

Specific objective 2: Reconciliation practices supported and promoted.

The attainment of Specific objective 1 will help restore community trust in the authorities, reduce the incidence of tribal vengeance in the province, reduce the spread of sectarian and radical discourses, and overcome the problem of the wide-spread incidence of arming. Specific Objective 2 will support the adoption of reconciliation practices aimed to ensure that the tragedy of the last years does not repeat. Specifically, a Community Reconciliation Committee (CRC) will be established with mandate to coordinate and support all peace-building activities (e.g. conflict resolution, trainings for the administration, awareness-raising campaigns, etc.). It is proposed that the CRC be established under the Governor and the Governorate Council; that it include representatives from the Administration, the Governorate Council, CSOs, and community leaders; and that its work focus on youth, IDP and returnees in order to (1) set the frame for successful restoration of the community fabric and (2) prevent radicalisation and sectarian discourses in the future.


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Programme 1: Ensure reconciliation between communities

Specific objective1: Activated rule of law with regard to sectarian issues

Activity Project type Project name Short description

1 Research and study

Programme for strengthening the rule of law with regard to tribal issues and radicalisation

Prepare a programme for strengthening the rule of law – starting with research and identification of priority areas for training of relevant staff and any further required actions.

2 Research and Study

Programme for involving CSOs and community leaders

Explore and identify options to increase and require the involvement of CSOs and community leaders in the reconciliation process.

3 Capacity Building/ Human Resources

Training on rule of law for the administration, security and judiciary

Plan, develop, secure funding for, and implement training courses for representatives of the governorate administration, security and judiciary.

4 Capacity building

Building the capacity of the governorate administration

Organise and implement capacity building for representatives of the Administration as needed as regards the activation of the rule of law.


Programme to reduce the spread of arming

Identify the relevant legislation to help reduce the incidence of arming, and identify measures to implement it.

6 Awareness Programme for civic education of youth

Articulate and implement a programme for the civic education of youth geared toward preventing sectarianism and radicalisation among youth, as well as reducing the arming incidence.

Specific objective2: Reconciliation practices supported and promoted



Study of the community situation within the governorate

Prepare, organise and conduct a study with support from Kirkuk University on the community situation in the province, including the situation of the families of ISIL fighters.

2 Capacity building / Awareness

Building capacities to promote peace building

Organise and conduct trainings and awareness activities on reconciliation for the general population and among specific communities to promote peace building.

3 Awareness Promoting reconciliation and a culture of tolerance

Plan, organise and conduct an information campaign among the population aimed to increase the culture of tolerance and promote reconciliation.

4 Capacity building

Establishment of Community Reconciliation Committee

Form Community Reconciliation Committee (CRC) with mandate to implement the reconciliation project.

5 Technical/ Investment, Capacity building

Establishment of Reconciliation Centres for youth, IDPs and returnees

Under the auspices of the CRC, establish Reconciliation Centres to build skills and capacities in managing negotiations and dispute/conflict resolution – to equip the current/future leaders of communities with these skills.

6 Technical/ Investment

Provision of equipment and facilities for the CRC

Plan, organise and purchase necessary equipment and rehabilitate premises for use by the CRC.

2. Programme 2: Ensure the return of IDPs

Rationale

In the context of ISIL, Kirkuk has been the theatre of displacement in dramatic scale, driven from fighting across Iraq. Since 2014, Kirkuk has hosted the second highest number of IDPs from other Iraqi provinces after the KRI. As of 31 Oct 2017, in total, displaced citizens of Kirkuk (340 296) are 21.5% of Kirkuk’s population. IDPs in Kirkuk are 263 232. The number of IDPs in Kirkuk province amounts to 16.6% to the population of the governorate – including 66.6% displaced from Kirkuk province. IDPs from other governorates comprise an addition of 5.6% to the population of the governorate This IDP population exerts major pressure on public service provision capacities and infrastructure. Given the complex population movements, most locations in Kirkuk host at the same time IDP, returnee and host populations.


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IDP families experience difficult living conditions, deterioration of psychological status, unknown future, loss, and – especially in camps – living conditions characterised with little respect for human dignity. Deterioration of human capital - in terms of education and health - is rampant. Social challenges have increased, especially in camps - e.g. adolescent pregnancies, drug use, child labour, etc. Children in IDP camps are particularly vulnerable, as they experience separation from family, unattended psychological trauma, and limited organised socialisation and education activities.

In Kirkuk province, albeit at different scale, IDPs and returnees face shared problems – lack of access to livelihoods, lack of access to health and education, damaged infrastructure (resulting especially in lack of water), problems with shelter, need for safety, need for psycho-social support. The obstacles to return of IDPs in Kirkuk are also factors that impede the successful integration/reintegration of IDP: above all, lack of safety in the area of return, inhabited property, absence of services, lack of jobs.

Accelerated measures to restore water access, health and education opportunities, together with documentation/legal support for IDPs, will have an immediate positive impact in return movements. Overall a similar set of actions will improve the conditions of both IDPs and returnees: i.e. programmes to restore infrastructure/housing, to restore/improve services, and to support livelihoods and peaceful living together. These are also the actions that would encourage return of IDPs from areas outside Kirkuk province.


Limited progress in rehabilitating infrastructure in liberated areas (including housing) and restoring basic services;

Slow rate of return of the displaced families to their areas;

Slow compensation of the victims (including for housing);

Limited access to education and limited healthcare support;

Lack/insufficient availability of medical and educational professionals in camps and in liberated areas;

Need for psychological counselling services;

Need for additional income-generating micro projects;

Lack of community-specific programmes: need to coordinate with community centres and organisations in the governorate to prepare workshops and seminars that correspond to the specific needs and condition of communities.

Vision

The return of all IDPs to their homes is ensured through restored provision of basic services, support for rehabilitation of houses and to restoring of people’s livelihoods. Effective support to IDPs still in camps is ensured with regard to healthcare, education, psychological health, etc.


Specific objective 1: Rehabilitated infrastructure, including housing

Specific objective 2: Support provided to IDPs and returnees.

To enable effective support to IDPs and returnees, it is first important to: (1) take steps to resolve their administrative problems – e.g. missing medical records, house ownership documents, etc.; (2) develop an information system that allows effective planning for the rehabilitation of housing, health/education and other infrastructure; and (3) gather information that allows realistic assessment of and therefore effective planning for the actual needs of communities (IDPs and returnees) with regard to basic services, support for their livelihoods, phycho-social support, etc. Specific attention will be given to support to children in overcoming the psychological traumas caused by military action, witnessed violence, loss of family and life in camps.


Programme 2: Ensure the return of IDPs

Specific objective1: Rehabilitated infrastructure, including housing



Identification of damaged infrastructure for rehabilitation

Study and identify priority areas for rehabilitation of existing damaged infrastructure – especially in health and education


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Identification of damaged and destroyed housing for rehabilitation

Study and identify options for support to the rehabilitation of housing.


Rehabilitation and development of existing infrastructure

Plan, secure funding for and carry out rehabilitation and development of infrastructure – especially in health and education.


Expansion of existing infrastructure

Plan, secure funding for and carry out expansion of existing infrastructure/facilities – through additional required projects.


Rehabilitation of housing Plan, secure funding for and carry out rehabilitation of housing.

Specific objective2: Support provided to IDPs and returnees



Identification of IDP and returnee situation in Kirkuk

Organise and conduct study of the IDP and returnee situation in the province.


Identification of the needs of communities

Organise and conduct workshops for IDPs and returnees with task to identify their needs; involve community/civil organisations as appropriate.


Establishment of community and training centres for IDPs and returnees

Establish centres for psychological, health, social and vocational support to IDPs and returnees.

4 Human Resources

Support to medical and educational staff in IDP camps and liberated areas

Support health and education professionals in camps and liberated areas; stimulate their return and participation in support to IDPs and returnees.

5 Awareness Raising awareness of the problems and needs of IDPs and returnees

Plan, organise and carry out an information campaign among the population to increase people’s understanding of the problems and needs of IDPs and returnees – in order to increase support in communities to IDPs and returnees.


Loans/livelihoods support for IDPs and returnees

Plan, organise, secure funding for and implement loans/livelihoods projects for IDPs and returnees to help them improve their economic situation.

3. Programme 3: Provide support to vulnerable groups to help overcome social challenges

Rationale

The population of Kirkuk province is overwhelmingly young – 66% of the population (1.05 million people) are under the age of 30, and 39.2% are under the age of 15.This young population puts a major pressure of service provision and social support systems. Additionally, given the security situation since 2003 and especially since 2014, school attendance and completion levels and career opportunities have worsened. Thus, at present, there is a growing group of young people who have limited career opportunities and who are socially excluded – which places them at risk of radicalisation. Further, many families have been left without their breadwinners and women have had to step up to the position of family providers. At the same time, the position of the women in society is still lagging; women have lower opportunities in education and the labour market, as well as weak role in all areas of the public life. Young women (15-29y) in particular experience the highest level of exclusion from education and the labour market. Finally, in the context of ISIL, unemployment and poverty levels have increased, while the weak social support infrastructure (for orphans, persons with disabilities, women victims of GBV, etc.) has been additionally strained.

It is important to undertake actions to support youth, women and other vulnerable groups to increase their social and economic inclusion and full participation in society. Such strengthening of societal links will help reduce social threats (GBV, begging, adolescent pregnancy, etc.), as well as impact positively on efforts to strengthen the economy and reduce radicalisation in society.


Limited poverty alleviation work/limited activation of social welfare

Gender-based violence


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Low awareness regarding the rights and role of women for social-economic life and development (including building peace and security)

High incidence of begging among women and children; high rate of child labour;

High and increased rates of adolescent marriage (and adolescent pregnancy)

Migration of qualified people due to the security situation

High and growing youth illiteracy; electronic illiteracy

Very low school attendance rates – need to activate the Compulsory Education Law

Lack of spaces and programmes to encourage social initiatives – e.g. sports, youth parliaments, volunteering, educational activities for people with disabilities and other vulnerable groups – including limited/outdated infrastructure of youth centres

Lack of knowledge and training among social services staff, education staff, etc. on how to work with vulnerable groups

Lack of special facilities for integration/skills training/specialised care for persons with disabilities

Need to improve the environmental, psychological and health services to students/youth – with special attention to ones exposed to traumatic experiences;

Low labour-market integration of women and youth – coupled with lack of vocational guidance .

Vision

A supporting environment exists that promotes the inclusion of youth, women and vulnerable groups in the economic and social life of the governorate and thereby helps reduce social challenges.


Specific objective 1: Vulnerable groups included in society

Specific objective 2: Improved socio-economic prospects for youth

Specific objective 3: Enhanced role of women in society and the economy.

The attainment of Specific objective 1 will improve the support and measures for socio-economic inclusion available to vulnerable groups (PwDs, orphans, minors, etc.). Specific objective 2 is focused on various courses and social activities aimed to foster active membership of young people in society. Under Specific objective 3, the position and role women will be supported through programmes to increase social support and reduce gender-based violence, psychological support, and vocational training programmes and livelihood projects for women – to help improve their chances to become active members of society.

Strategic objective 2: Supporting environment created for overcoming of social challenges

Programme 3: Provide support to vulnerable groups to help overcome social challenges

Specific objective 1: Vulnerable groups included in society



Development of criteria for access of vulnerable groups to social services

Develop clear and fair targeting criteria for categories on specific means to access; for identification of priority categories that should receive care and support (e.g. female heads of household, disabled people, poor families); and for continuous updating of targeting mechanisms.


Elaboration of integrated programme for support to vulnerable groups

Prepare an integrated programme for support to vulnerable groups – including by loan and consultancy support to poor families to help them get out of poverty and be economically active.

Develop a consultancy to support borrowers and the successful establishment of small projects.


Improving the quality of child care services

Develop and implement measures to improve the quality of childcare services, particularly in care institutions and rehabilitation centres and home education for children.


Development of financial programme for target actions

Apply conditional cash support system focused on certain target actions, based on identified priority sectors and target strategic economic activities.


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Specific objective 2: Improved socio-economic prospects for youth


1 Awareness Promoting youth skills development

Carry out a number of seminars annually to promote skills development among youth, with focus on their roles in the process of comprehensive development of the community.

2 Awareness Promoting healthy lifestyles among youth

Plan, organise and carry out an information campaign among young people to promote a health-conscious life choices (on e.g. sanitation/microbes, food nutrition, exercise, etc.)

3 Awareness Raising awareness on education, drug prevention, child labour and early marriages

Plan, organise and carry out an information campaign among the population – esp. young people – to raise awareness of the value of education and the prevention of drug abuse, child labour and early marriages/pregnancies (and the role of education in this regard).


Improving the sports and cultural centres network

Build new and rehabilitate existing sports and cultural centres for work with young people.


Improving the vocational training network

Build new and rehabilitate existing vocational training centres for work with young people.

Specific objective 3: Enhanced role of women in society and the economy


1 Legislation Fostering women’s participation in government

Research and draft regulatory measures that promote the representation of women in all bodies and permanent and temporary committees of government.

2 Awareness Promoting the role and rights of women

Plan, organise and carry out an information campaign among the population to raise awareness of the importance of the role of women and of women’s rights.


Promoting women's initiatives

Prepare a programme to encourage women's initiatives in the next three years.


Programme of small financial target actions aimed at women

Increase the amount of loans made to empower women and strengthen their economic role.


Improving the network of women’s centres

Establish new and rehabilitate existing centres for broad support and training for women.

4. Programme 4: Restore and develop the transport network

Rationale

The transport sector is vital: it impacts all aspects of social life and economic activity in the province. The location of Kirkuk province is of particular importance for Iraq as a link between the northern mountainous areas and the southern plains; as such, it is strategic for trade. As such, Kirkuk has an important position in the transport network of Iraq.

In the context of ISIL, the transport infrastructure of the province has suffered significant damage – particularly roads and bridges. ISIL targeted most of the strategic bridges and main roads. All key roads providing external connectivity of the province are disrupted; Kirkuk–Erbil and Kirkuk-Baghdad are now the only main roads that link the north and south of Iraq. the North and the South of Iraq. In the security situation, also, the load of road traffic intensified by far, causing accelerated deterioration of these 2 roads. In the context of economic crisis, reconstruction has been slow.


Damaged main and secondary roads connecting the province, including bridges

Deterioration of roads from overload and poor maintenance

Damaged street infrastructure in cities

Lack of specialised machinery for maintenance and repair

Vision

A restored and improved road infrastructure and improved transport sector performance efficiency fully support economic activities and the mobility of people in Kirkuk province, while minimising traffic accidents.


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Specific objective 1: Rehabilitated and developed road transport network (primary, secondary, rural)

Specific objective 2: Improved transport sector performance efficiency.

The realisation of Specific objective 1 will contribute to the development of transport infrastructure and overcoming the poor state of roads in the governorate. This will help increase the connectivity of rural areas to urban centres, as well as the connectivity between urban centres, facilitating human mobility and economic activities across the territory, while also making economic activities faster and cheaper. Conditions for reducing road accidents will be provided.

The realisation of Specific Objective 2 will contribute to improving the capacity of staff in the sector to manage projects, work with specific information technologies, and ensure better management and archiving of transport network data. Provision of necessary equipment will additionally contribute to improved efficiency and effectiveness of the transport network. Awareness campaigns will contribute to increased road safety.


Programme 4: Restore and develop the road transport network

Specific objective 1: Rehabilitated and developed road transport network (primary, secondary, rural)



Elaboration of transport network development programme

Explore and identify priority areas for new infrastructure development and rehabilitation of existing roads in order to improve transport accessibility in the governorate.


Construction of new roads and bridges

Plan, secure funding for and implement the construction of new roads and bridges in strategic areas to improve connectivity to rural areas and between major urban centres.


Rehabilitation and maintenance of roads and bridges

Plan, secure funding for and implement rehabilitation and maintenance work on existing roads and bridges, including ones damaged in the context of ISIL.


Increasing the capacity of existing roads

Organise and implement the extension of existing roads by adding second corridors for roads whose maximum capacity has been reached.

Specific objective 2: Improved transport sector performance efficiency


1 Human Resources

Building the skills of staff in IT Organise and conduct training courses to enhance the IT capacity of staff in the sector.

2 Human Resources

Building the skills of staff in project management

Organise and conduct training courses to enhance the project management capacity of staff in the sector.

3 Human Resources

Increasing the efficiency of staff in data archiving

Organise and conduct training courses to build the performance efficiency of staff in modern data archiving;

Purchase the necessary software.

4 Human Resources

Promoting the use of GIS Organise and conduct training courses in GIS for staff; Purchase the necessary GIS software.

5 Awareness Promoting road safety Plan, organise and carry out information campaign among the population on the need to comply with traffic regulation/relevant legislation – to increase road safety, as well as to help reduce public property damage.


Purchase of equipment for road maintenance and rehabilitation

Plan, organise and purchase necessary equipment for the maintenance and rehabilitation of roads.

5. Programme 5: Restore and improve the electricity service

Rationale

A reliable power supply and inclusive access to electricity are fundamental for the achievement of social and economic development objectives. Already pre-ISIL, the electricity service in Kirkuk suffered from interruptions due to low number of secondary stations and suffocations in the network, outdated infrastructure, low transport


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capacity of lines, insufficient staff, etc. In the context of ISIL, all pre-existing problems have been exacerbated, as electricity supply systems have been additionally stained – due to damage combined with reduced funding and dramatic increase in electricity demand from the influx of IDPs

Power disruptions affect citizens, enterprises and public institutions – making all the more difficult socio-economic recovery post-ISIL. Urgent work is needed to restore electricity systems to pre-ISIL capacity and to ensure uninterrupted power supply and inclusive access.


Multiplicity of suffocations in the network Violations on the energy transmission lines Lack of working cadres; all working cadres need to be on permanent staff and new ones need to be

employed Shortage of specialised machinery Stopped investment projects and station rehabilitation works Damage to sector infrastructure in the context of ISIL Increased demand – additional pressure of the electricity supply infrastructure from the influx of IDPs.

Vision

Adequate and uninterrupted electricity service meets the current and projected needs of families, public institutions and all sectors of the economy in the province, and it supports prosperity and sustained socio-economic development.


Specific objective 1: Rehabilitated and developed electricity supply network to achieve electricity supply standards

Specific objective 2: Improved performance and revenue of the electricity sector

Specific objective 3: Rationalised electricity consumption.

Attainment of these objectives will contribute to uninterrupted electrical supply to citizens, public institutions and enterprises in Kirkuk province in line with electricity supply standards, and thereby improve the quality of life, support the process of economic recovery, and facilitate the long-term development of productive capacities in the province.


Programme 5: Restore and improve the electricity service

Specific objective 1: Rehabilitated and developed electricity supply network



Mapping of damaged and destroyed electricity supply systems

Map damaged and destroyed electricity supply systems; Research and assess their condition and needs for rehabilitation to

reduce interruptions.


Rehabilitation of electricity supply network

Develop and implement rehabilitation programme for the electricity supply network, focusing on industrial areas, areas in urban centres, and areas with high density of inhabitants – in order to reduce overload cases and achieve the electricity supply standards.


Increasing electricity generation, including renewable energy

Develop and implement a programme to increase electricity generation;

Develop and commission renewable energy systems.

Specific objective 2: Improved performance and revenue of the electricity sector



Development of charging models for electricity service

Develop models to improve the measurement of electricity consumption and the collection of charges for use of the electricity supply network, aligned with the specificities of individual qadhas of the province.


Application of charging models

Apply the developed charging models.


Installation of smart meters

Develop and implement a programme for installation of smart meters and other appliances that allow to measure the actual electricity consumption.


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4 Human Resources

Improving staff capacities Plan and implement a programme to improve staff skills/capacities and to attract new employees.

Specific objective 3: Rationalised electricity consumption


1 Awareness Promoting energy conservation among the population

Plan, organise and carry out information campaign among the population on the need to reduce electricity consumption – including through use of modern electrical equipment with low energy consumption and use renewable energy.

2 Awareness Promoting energy conservation among businesses and industrial enterprises

Plan, organise and carry out information campaign for businesses and industrial enterprises on the need to reduce electricity – including through use of modern electrical equipment with low energy consumption, use of renewable energy, and modern methods in energy load management.

6. Programme 6: Restore and develop the water supply and wastewater management service

Rationale

While generally limited in coverage and capacity, the water sector in Kirkuk province has been additionally weakened in the context of ISIL – while demand on water supply and sewerage systems has risen dramatically from the influx of IDPs. Both the water supply and the wastewater management systems have suffered damage; water treatment and (the already minimal) wastewater treatment capacity are further reduced – with impact on water access, water quality across the province, human health, soils quality, food security, and economic development in the immediate and long run. Both rehabilitation of the water/wastewater network and development of the water purification and wastewater treatment capacities are necessary to ensure inclusive access. Further, measures are required to raise the awareness of the public on the importance of water conservation and the importance of using clean water – and the role of wastewater treatment and water purification in this regard.


Insufficient capacity/coverage of the water systems leading to lack/disruption of drinking water supply

Shortage/lack of rainwater runoff and sewage networks – especially outside Kirkuk city – with negative impact on the environment and public health

Insufficient number and capacity of water treatment plants

No wastewater treatment plants and lack of wastewater lifting stations


Security situation – resulting in destruction of water supply/wastewater management assets, stopped operation of facilities/interrupted infrastructure, and loss of specialised machinery and equipment


Lack of specialised chemicals, equipment and machinery

Insufficient electricity supply for the operation of projects

Shortage of qualified staff

Citizen violations of the networks – e.g. robbery of lids/manholes,

Low collection of charges for use of the water/wastewater networks

Low awareness among the population regarding water use, water quality, and water conservation – which factors in the low charges collection, waste of water, and violations of the networks.

Vision

In both urban and rural areas, all families in Kirkuk enjoy sustainable supply of clean drinking water according to national standards of quality and quantity; while rationalised water use in industry and agriculture both facilitates economic development and secures the availability of water resources in the future.


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Specific objective 1: Reconstructed and developed water supply and wastewater systems

Specific objective 2: Improved water sector performance and revenue.

Attainment of these objectives will contribute to improving the health status of the population of Kirkuk, and support the development of industry, agriculture and other economic activities, while also reducing pressure on water resources and the environment. Specific objective 1 responds to the need to identify and rehabilitate old and damaged water/wastewater systems, as well as to increase the capacity to monitor their status to allow timely response to problems and reduce water losses. Specific objective 2 responds to the need to improve the measurement and collection of charges for use of the water supply/wastewater network, as well as to improve the management capacity and efficiency of cadres in the sectors.


Programme 6: Restore and develop the water supply and wastewater management service

Specific objective 1: Reconstructed and developed water supply and wastewater network s



Mapping of damaged and destroyed water supply and wastewater networks

Complete mapping of the water supply and waste water networks; research and assess their condition and need for rehabilitation to reduce leakage (with impact on water loss or pollution) and improve the water supply and wastewater management service.


Rehabilitation programme for the water supply and wastewater networks

Develop and implement a rehabilitation programme for the water supply and wastewater networks, focusing on areas in urban centres and areas with high density of inhabitants – in order to reduce water losses, achieve water supply standards, support the good quality of water resources and support public health .


Implementation of modern pressure monitoring systems in the water supply network

Implement modern pressure monitoring systems in the water supply network in order to be able to monitor pressure in the pipes and identify areas of seepage and fractures, take measures to reduce the losses, and achieve the water supply standards.


Development of the wastewater collection and processing network

Building on the existing studies and designs for integrated rainwater runoff and sewage/sanitary networks for the province (including most qadhas, nahias, and Kirkuk city) – which are ready for implementation – prioritise, secure funding for and implement a programme to install additional wastewater management infrastructure, including WWTPs.

Specific objective 2: Improved water sector performance and revenue



Development of charging models for water supply service

Develop models to improve the measurement of water use and the collection of charges for the use of the water supply network, aligned with the specificities of individual qadhas of the province.



Apply the developed charging models and achieve 90% collection rate in the areas served.


Installation of water meters Implement a programme for installation of water meters and other appliances for measuring water consumption.

4 Human Resources

Improving the performance efficiency of cadres in the water sector

Organise and deliver training courses to improve the performance of staff in the water supply and wastewater sectors – including purchase the necessary software.

5 Awareness Promoting water conservation and water quality awareness among the population

Plan, organise and carry out information campaign among the population to increase awareness regarding the need to preserve water, why it is important to use good quality water – and therefore, why it is important to pay for use of the water network.


Equipment to support water supply and wastewater management

Plan, organise and complete the purchase of necessary equipment for management and maintenance of the water supply and wastewater management systems.


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7. Programme 7: Expand and develop waste management

Rationale

The waste management sector in Kirkuk province is in dire condition. In number and capacity, landfills are inadequate vis-à-vis needs. Illegal dumping sites proliferate; regulated landfills that meet environmental requirements are almost none. The threats are major for the environment (soils, water/groundwater resources, air quality) and for public health. The absence of sorting, recycling and control mechanisms compounds environmental threats (as e.g. hazardous waste too ends up in landfills), while it also limits the capacity of the sector to add to the economy by providing inputs to other industries, including energy production. The capacity has been additionally strained in the context of ISIL from the influx of IDPs, by quantities of rubble from damaged structures, lack of funding; and loss of specialised machinery and equipment.


No recycling plants, insufficient landfills, almost no environmentally approved landfills Amount of debris in city streets – linked to lack of maintenance and exacerbated in the context of ISIL Lack of financial resources – low revenue collection, lack of allocation for cleaning and waste collection

work (including maintenance) in municipal institutions’ budgets; Lack of/insufficient specialised machinery and equipment (pressers, sweepers, containers) and capacity

for maintenance of these – linked to lack of financial resources; Low public awareness about waste hazards and the importance of waste management.

Vision

An environmentally sound and effective waste collection and disposal system supports the health and quality of life of all people in the province, while it also adds to the economy through protection of resources and recycling.


Specific objective 1: Rehabilitated and developed waste management network

Specific objective 2: Improved waste management sector performance and revenue.

Attainment of these objectives will result in tangible improvement in the quality of life of citizens, counteract air and water/groundwater pollution, and support the resource base for development of the governorate.


Programme 7: Expand and develop waste management

Specific objective 1: Rehabilitated and developed waste management network



Developing an integrated waste management and recycling strategy

Map the existing infrastructure and its status, and research opportunities and needs related to improving waste management through: waste recycling programmes; new facilities for systematic collection, separation, recycling, treatment and processing of waste; improved regulation; and the introduction of modern operational control procedures and effective daily management across the waste life cycle.


Waste collection and recycling programme

Plan, organise and implement a programme to introduce waste recycling and support the removal of debris in streets.

Specific objective 2: Improved waste management sector performance and revenue



Development of charging models for waste management service

Develop models to improve measurement related to waste generation and the collection of charges for waste management service, aligned with the specificities of individual qadhas of the province



Apply the developed charging models and achieve 90% collection rate in the areas served.

3 Human Resources

Improving the performance efficiency of cadres in the waste management sector

Organise and deliver training courses to improve the performance of staff in the waste sector, including in terms of occupational safety, and including the purchase of necessary software.


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Purchase of equipment to support waste management

Plan, organise and complete the purchase of necessary machinery and equipment to support the management and maintenance of the system

5 Awareness Promoting awareness about waste hazards and the importance of waste management

Plan, organise and carry out an information campaign among the population and businesses on the importance of waste management – and therefore, the need to pay for waste management service.

6 Awareness Promoting clean cities Plan, organise and carry out an information campaign among urban population on the importance of keeping cities clean and practical ways to do this in daily lives.

8. Programme 8: Improve health services quality and access

Rationale

Access to healthcare is a key component of measuring human development. Further, healthcare provision has significant and long-term economic returns in terms of sustaining and developing the available human resources, and in terms of ensuring supportive environment for businesses and investors.

Pre-ISIL already, the capacity of the system was insufficient. After 2013, healthcare provision in the province deteriorated significantly and was put under additional strain because of the influx of IDPS from within Kirkuk and neighbouring provinces, damage to infrastructure and facilities, and loss of staff in the context of ISIL. Currently, the hospitals in province that currently provide services to citizens do not fulfil the needs ; he number of hospital beds is insufficient, there is lack of medical supplies and specialist doctors; often even for basic treatment citizens have to go to other provinces or abroad; overcrowding is significant.

The situation is aggravated by the shortage and disruption in water supply and sewerage services, and the clustering of the population in Kirkuk city or in IDP compounds.

A further and massive problem is psychological trauma, especially among children. Services to returnees and host populations are limited; and services offered to IDPs are low and do not meet all needs – acutely so for mental health care. Specialised services – e.g. to people with disability – are also much below current needs.

The Governorate has embarked on a plan to return IDPs to their homes – while 66.6% of all IDPs in Kirkuk are from Kirkuk province. At the same time, lack of health service is the top concern for returnees. Thus, urgent steps to extend health access and preventive care are needed that target all community groups: IDPs in/outside camps, returnees and host community.


Poor health conditions

Increased infant mortality rates in all parts of the governorate, especially rural/remote parts and among displaced populations

Limited care, preventive care and prenatal care for children and pregnant women

Limited control of communicable diseases

Limited treatment of non-communicable, chronic and acute diseases

Limited provision of healthcare to elderly people

Limited provision of essential healthcare to people with disabilities

Limited provision of metal health care/psychological treatment to people (above all IDPs)

Additional pressure of the health service system from the influx of IDPs

Limited provision of ongoing and continuous health and medical services to IDPs in all their locations (including camps)

Limited provision of healthy environment in spaces allocated to IDPs.

Vision

Improved health condition of all people in Kirkuk province in the immediate and long run.


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Specific objective 1: Improved quality and expanded coverage of health services

Specific objective 2: Improved prevention

Specific objective 3: Strengthened research and technological base of health services.

Attainment of these specific objectives will contribute to improved public health, return of the IDPs and reduced cost of health service to the population.


Programme 8: Improve health services quality and access

Specific objective 1: Improved quality and expanded coverage of health services



Elaboration of health infrastructure development programme

Develop an updated map of healthcare infrastructure and identify priority areas for infrastructure investment.


Elaboration of programme for coordinating private sector healthcare

Elaborate a programme to coordinate the provision of healthcare services from the private sector.


Implementation of monitoring system

Build an effective monitoring system to monitor preventive, diagnostic and therapeutic services provision, as well as emergency medicines and medical supplies – with regard to the adoption of professional principles, humanitarian approach, and efficiency of provision.


Investment programme for rehabilitation and new construction of healthcare centres

Develop and implement an investment programme for building of new healthcare centres, in particular in rural areas, and rehabilitation and maintenance of existing centres.


Implementation of health information technology programme

Develop and implement health information technology programme – to communicate information from primary and secondary healthcare centres (on e.g. pharmaceuticals and medical supplies, patient records, records of maternal and child morbidity, mortality data, etc.) – to strengthen the capacity of administrative structures.

6 Human Resources

Enhancing of capabilities in healthcare planning

Develop and implement training courses for healthcare administrators in the field of healthcare planning.

Specific objective 2: Improved prevention



Preventive care programme

Implement a programme for increased vaccine coverage and heath screening to ensure safety from communicable diseases.


Programme to ensure sufficient medicines and equipment

Implementation of a programme for acquiring medicines and equipment

3 Awareness Promoting preventive care Plan, organise and carry out an information campaign among the population on preventive care measures, specifically on the benefits of vaccine programmes.

4 Awareness Promoting health awareness and education

Develop and implement measures to raise public awareness on heath issues and healthy lifestyle practices.

Specific objective 3: Strengthened research and technological base of health services



Identification of the needs of the population

Using socio-economic survey, assess the needs of the population for preventive healthcare, support for cancer, kidney diseases, and other major risks.


Health clinics database Build a health database system to track the coverage of health clinics.

3 Awareness Promoting research in community health

Promote the participation of Kirkuk University in research and studies that promote community health.


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9. Programme 9: Improve education quality and access

Education is a major concern in Kirkuk province. Pre-ISIL, the sector already suffered a series of problems – insufficient and outdated school network, outdated curriculum and school books, lack of additional activities, traditions restricting the education of girls, etc. Prior to ISIL, Kirkuk scored average on education attainment and literacy. According to UN-habitat data for 2012, illiteracy – 23.2% - was the 6th highest in Iraq (compared to 13% in Iraq on average), and 11% among youth, and education attainment remained low– especially among women. Damaged and insufficient provision of schools constrain the ability of governorate to raise educational standards despite the growing need for qualified human resources in the province.

The years of ISIL occupation, further damage to infrastructure and massive influx of IDPs in the province, displacement have compounded the situation. On one hand, the danger of ISIL led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of students, which threatens their scientific future. On the other hand, the economic crisis reduced GoI spending on education, so the crisis became compound and complex at the same time.

All this adds up to a situation where students receive inadequate education, attendance rates are low and decreasing, while drop-out rates are high and increasing. Public education is lagging, while children from occupied areas have been subject to radical teachings. Given the security situation from the last years, many young people have been unable to finish their education and find job. At the same time, data on the labour market outcomes of education indicate a significant disconnect between education provision/quality and labour market needs.


Pressure on the education system capacity from high population growth and urbanisation

Pressure on the education system capacity from displacement

Non-admission of all students in schools

High rates of dropout – 56% total and as high as 64% among girls in 2012

High and growing student-to-teacher and student-to-class ratios

Outdated/insufficient school buildings – many are in bad condition, damaged/destroyed

Outdated teaching methods with low adoption of modern technology

Lack of psychological adaptation of pupils to the school environment

Low motivation for enrolment in vocational schools.

Vision

Adequate and modern education service extended to all – including attractive school environment, quality infrastructure and modern teaching methods and curricula – contributes to reduced illiteracy, increased school attendance, and improved employment prospects, especially among young people, and it effectively supports the economic development of the governorate.


Specific objective 1: Continued provision of educational services and closing of identified gaps

Specific objective 2: Improved school environment, student participation, and human resource capacity in the sector.

The attainment of Specific objective 1 will contribute to increasing the number of good-quality operational school buildings, allowing to resume educational services. Under this objective, standards for primary schools will be developed, and the provision of basic public services in school areas will be planned and coordinated. Attainment of this objective will contribute directly to the inclusion of a larger number of children in the education system and a reduction in the share of illiterates.

The attainment of Specific objective 2 will provide an attractive school environment to help increase enrolment rates and reduce dropout rates. The needs of teachers for specific subjects will be met, and the possibility of applying modern training methods will be provided. Activities will further help attract students to vocational schools and provide teachers in rural areas.


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Programme 9: Improve education quality and access

Specific objective 1: Continued provision of educational services and closing of identified gaps



Elaboration of education infrastructure development programme

Identify priority school buildings for rehabilitation; Elaborate investment programme for completion of building works; Identify possibilities to use other governorate buildings; Study the opportunities to develop PPP for unfinished schools; Identify needs for school equipment – furniture, computers, etc.


Development of standards for primary schools

Develop standards for primary schools, e.g. standard number of children per teacher, standard number of students in a class, standard facilities in schools.


Elaboration of programme for coordinated public service provision in school areas

Elaborate a programme for coordination of the provision of basic public services in school areas (electricity, water, roads, waste and wastewater collection, etc.).


Increasing the role of the private sector in school maintenance

Study possibilities for and develop a programme aimed to increase the involvement of the private sector in the maintenance of schools, including up to 100%.


Investment programme for completion and repair of school buildings

Develop and implement an investment programme to support the completion of unfinished school buildings or the reconstruction/rehabilitation of damaged ones.


Establishment of local centres for school equipment repair

Establish and operationalise workshops for maintenance of school furniture , equipment and supplies;

Provide the required machines, equipment and supplies.

7 Awareness Encouraging community involvement in school reconstruction

Develop and implement a series of initiatives that aim to encourage and increase the involvement of parents and teachers in the process of school reoperation – on volunteering basis, and with support from international humanitarian organisations.

Specific objective 2: Improved school environment, student participation, and human resource capacity in the sector



Programme for increased extracurricular activities at schools

Develop and implement a programme to increase extracurricular activities at schools – e.g. school trips, volunteer works, sports, exhibitions , school garden, etc.


Introducing modern teaching methods with help of ICT

Prepare schools – in terms of planning and equipment – for the implementation of modern teaching methods with help of information technologies.

3 Human Resources

Programme of courses for teacher

Develop and implement courses for teachers – to increase their capacity in e.g. modern teaching methods, use of ICT, etc.

4 Human Resources

Programme for teacher training

In collaboration with universities, develop and implement a joint programme for teacher training.

5 Human Resources

Support to education in rural areas

Develop and implement a programme to support teachers in rural areas and to promote continuing secondary education.

6 Awareness Promoting the benefits of education

Plan, organise and carry out an information campaign among the population on the benefits of education.

7 Awareness Increasing the attractiveness of vocational schools

Develop and implement – with support from businesses – an awareness campaign aimed to attract young people to vocational schools.

10. Programme 10: Encourage investment and economic development

The main features of Kirkuk’s economy are also the factors that reduce the economic resilience of the province: overdependence on oil and hydrocarbons as a source of wealth; focus of both institutions and labour market entrants on the public sector/SOEs; weak private sector; and stagnant agricultural development and weak rural development.

Kirkuk’s potential to develop diversified economy remains unfulfilled as the available mineral, natural and cultural resources are not fully utilised. Agriculture has been in decline – linked to loss of land/water, rural


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migration to cities, and the effects of warfare. Production and revenue-generating resources are concentrated in a few hubs (above all, the urban area of Kirkuk and the oil fields). In result, Kirkuk’s economy is slow, exposed to shocks, unable to absorb the youth bulge, and unable to support a more balanced socio-economic development across the territory of the province. Pre-existing economic problems have been exacerbated following destruction in the context of ISIL.

In this context, the economic development of Kirkuk would mean: (1) diversification of the economy – including development of the agricultural, industrial, oil, tourism and trade sectors – so that Kirkuk may achieve: development and economic status commensurate with its resources; comprehensive economic development; and socio-economic well-being of citizens in the mid- and long term; and (2) rural development – better quality of social, economic and services conditions for people living in rural areas, ensured through fuller use and sustainable management of agricultural, industrial and human resources, improved service provision, improved physical infrastructure and investment projects.

For both these purposes, it is essential to (1) strengthen the private sector and partnerships between the public and private sectors, and (2) boost investments. Investment is a driving force for development, driving up competitiveness, trade, productivity and diversification, as well as the capacity of the institutions to implement social and service projects. Particularly in the post-ISIL context, given the limited resources of the governorate, it is critical that larger input from the private sector and foreign investors be activated.

Promoting investment opportunities is bound with creating an active business environment in the governorate. The challenges that stand in the way of attracting investments in Kirkuk pertain to the complicated regulatory environment, weak banking environment, corruption, decline in education/human capital, displacement, insecurity, and infrastructure shortage/damage.


Growing poverty rates; wide disparities in development within/across nahias; strong urban-rural divide

Growing unemployment in the context of population growth and youth bulge

Underinvestment/underdevelopment of resource-based industries – including the oil sector

Outdated/neglected agriculture sector that is not aligned with resource limitations

Low productivity and competitiveness of enterprises/products – driving weak decent jobs creation and low income of workers/farmers

Poor security situation prevents investments

High administrative burdens impede investments

Weak work force capacity deters investors – many people have been displaced, while youth are lacking the education and skills required for the economy

Shortage of skilled staff/qualified technical staff for the industrial sector and staff prepared for project management

Few enterprises – small, medium or large


Weakness and unattractiveness of the private sector.

Vision

A vibrant private sector, improved investment climate and diversified economy commensurate with available resources make an effective contribution to the economic recovery and sustainable socio-economic development of the province.


Specific objective 1: Stimulating and attractive investment environment for domestic and foreign capital

Specific objective 2: Improved marketing and promotion of investment opportunities

Specific objective 3: Existing investments expanded

Specific objective 4: The oil sector and related industries modernised and expanded

Specific objective 5: The agriculture sector developed.

Attainment of these specific objectives will contribute to (1) decreased poverty levels, increased employment, improved socio-economic conditions and inclusion of young people in socio-economic life – with positive impact


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on social and community resilience and reduced radicalisation; (2) diversification of Kirkuk’s economy – with positive impact on its economic resilience; and (3) development of the agriculture sector, including improved productivity, planning, and resource/input efficiency in the sector.

Strategic objective 4: Enabling environment secured for economic development

Programme 10: Encourage investment and economic development

Specific objective1: Stimulating and attractive investment environment for domestic and foreign capital


1 Legislation Development of model to improve the licencing system

Review and evaluate the existing licensing system; Develop a model to simplify the licencing process, reduce

administrative routines and burden, and thereby improve the investment environment (including for the purpose of developing the agriculture sector).


Establishment of joint ventures with local or foreign capital

Motivate chambers, unions and associations to participate in the implementation of investment opportunities through the establishment of joint ventures with local or foreign capital.


Consultancy to develop investment opportunities

With involvement of Kirkuk University and consulting offices, identify and complete preliminary feasibility studies for all investment opportunities offered.

Specific objective 2: Improved marketing and promotion of investment opportunities



Investment map Create a comprehensive investment map for all sectors (including agriculture) in cooperation with the relevant authorities – based on integrated cross-sector analysis and identification of possible synergies.

2 Capacity building

Effective marketing of investment opportunities

Develop a programme for adopting modern and innovative marketing methods to promote investment opportunities.

3 Awareness Investment promotion Realise a programme of measures to promote investment opportunities domestically/abroad in cooperation with local /national institutions.

Specific objective 3: Existing investments expanded


1 Capacity building

Improving structures and capacities for investment and industry development

Establish a special coordination council for the investment and industrial sectors;

Encourage existing investors to expand their successful investments and replicate them in other locations in the governorate ;

Encourage partnerships between domestic and foreign investors; Develop the industrial sector through the implementation of plans

prepared for this purpose and coordination between the efforts of relevant authorities.


Support to vocational training

Develop and implement a programme to support vocational training centres in the training of qualified skilled technicians – especially in the area of industrial projects management.


Grants for local entrepreneurship initiatives

Develop and implement a programme to support the establishment of small industrial projects and entrepreneurship projects through the provision of financial and administrative support, facilities and local services.


Rehabilitation of damaged industries

Develop and implement a programme to support the rehabilitation of industrial projects damaged by ISIL.

Specific objective 4: The oil sector and related industries modernised and expanded



Investment map for the oil sector

Develop an investment map for all oil related sub-sectors in cooperation with the relevant authorities.


Support the development of oil -related industries


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Specific objective 5: The agriculture sector developed



Elaboration of programme for development of the irrigation network

In coordination with Kirkuk University, conduct research on the use of irrigation methods and techniques appropriate to the nature and quantities of water resources in Kirkuk Governorate and analysis of best practices for their management.

Elaborate a programme for development of the irrigation system through optimal methods


Implementation of pilot projects for the use of sustainable irrigation methods

Plan and implement pilot projects for the use of proposed irrigation methods (see 1 above) – to support farmers.


Establishment of modern markets for fruits and vegetables

Establish modern markets for fruits and vegetables, equipped with refrigerated stores, logistics facilities and quality control services – in coordination with municipal institutions , the private sector and the Investment Authority.


Elaboration of models for cooperatives establishment to improve production and marketing

Identify best practices in the region with regard to cooperatives establishment;

Analyse the potential of existing structures to improve production and marketing;

Elaborate models for cooperatives among farmers.


Database system for the agriculture sector

Establish a database system for provision of all information on the agricultural sector – to support decision-making regarding agriculture sector development.

11. Programme 11: Improve public governance

Rationale

Kirkuk Governorate is undergoing the decentralisation process envisaged in legislation, with some issues related to its specific region. Effective public governance has emerged as a distinct horizontal priority area – integral to the realisation of objectives in all other priority areas. Improved public governance will result in better service provision, reduced corruption, and reduced burden on citizens and businesses, and reduced waste of financial resources. Thus, it will contribute to improved investment environment, private sector development, jobs creation, social inclusion, and overall improved quality of life and human development in the governorate, including reduced poverty levels.

In the post-ISIL context, the rule of law and transparent and accountable governance based on a culture of human rights are pivotal in order to facilitate the peaceful living together of communities in the course of economic rebuilding.


Incomplete decentralisation

Lack of performance efficiency standards and functional analysis of the administration

Corruption.

Vision

Strong, efficient and transparent government institutions contribute directly to achieving all the development goals of the governorate.


Specific objective 1: Effective local government organisation and professional and expert management Specific objective 2: Integrity, transparency and accountability promoted Specific objective 3: State of law established and a culture of human rights protection promoted.


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Attainment of these specific objectives will result in better administrative services, reduced corruption, improved business and investment climate, and an environment of transparency, accountability and order that supports the return to peaceful living together of communities.

Strategic objective 5: Public governance improved

Programme 11: Improve public governance

Specific objective 1: Effective local government organisation and professional and expert management



Functional review of the administrative structures of the provincial government

Perform a functional review of the administrative structures of the local government to identify the needs for changes in the organisational structure to better allocate their functions and provide them with the necessary resources;

Establish an expanded committee – comprised of representatives of Kirkuk Governorate, the Directorates of Financial and Administrative Affairs, and representatives of Kirkuk University, and qualified staff – to carry out systematic monitoring of the state of the administrative structures and the need for changes in the Administration’s organisational structure..

2 Legislation Draft legislative changes to facilitate decentralisation

Prepare changes in the legislation related to making the necessary changes in the organisational structure of the provincial government.


Implementation of Performance Measurement System (PMS)

Develop and implement PMS by creating links between the goals set and their achievement by administrations and employees at individual level;

Develop job descriptions for employees to reflect the functions of the administration;

Develop annual plans for employees to reflect the goals of the administration;

Develop a system of criteria for objective evaluation of the work of the employees.

4 Human Resources

Increasing staff motivation

Build a system for stimulating employee motivation based on employee performance – through e.g. bonuses, opportunities for additional training, position rotation, etc.

5 Human Resources

Building the human resource capacity of government departments

Elaborate annual employee training plans reflecting the needs of the administration and the individual needs of employees;

Prepare a Memorandums of Understanding with Kirkuk University to implement required workshops , training courses and specialised continuing education for employees of government departments;

Organise and conduct training courses and seminars on the basis of the annual training plans for employees.


Establishment of governorate e- government

Carry out a study and analysis of the opportunities and steps needed to build an electronic government in the governorate. Determine the services to be made available electronically at the initial stage;

Build information registers for the needs of e-Government.

Specific objective 2: Integrity, transparency and accountability promoted


1 Legislation Access to public information

Draft local legislation that regulates the disclosure by the local government of information and data of interest to citizens – to raise the level of transparency in government work – provided that legislation requires government departments to make available various information and data related to the management of public funds and to the decision-making mechanisms from different decision centres.

2 Legislation Citizen participation in decision making

Elaborate local legislation to regulate the CSO (NGOs, trade unions and professional federations) participation in the decision-making process and the formulation of visions for public policies for the governorate.

3 Awareness Promoting a culture of integrity and transparency

Develop and implement information campaign to promote a culture of integrity and transparency of governance.


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Specific objective 3: State of law established and a culture of human rights protection promoted


1 Awareness Promoting human rights and public property preservation

Develop and implement information campaign aimed to disseminate among society a culture and practices that promote human rights and help preserve public property.

2 Awareness Promoting human rights in the work of security agencies

Develop and organise seminars and information campaigns for security agency representatives to promote respect for human rights in the implementation of their duties.

3 Awareness Promoting the rule of law among tribal and religious communities

In cooperation with tribal and religious community leaders, develop and implement seminars and information campaigns to promote respect for the rule of law.


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IX. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRP

1. Implementing structures

This Plan is going to be implemented through Kirkuk Provincial Government departments led by the Planning Department of the Governorate. The Steering Committee responsible for the planning process will be dissolved, and an Implementing Board will be established with the purpose to take responsibility for implementation, monitoring and updating of the PRP. Along the way, some specific activities (such as monitoring) will be designated to Committees with specific responsibilities (e.g. Monitoring Committee).

In case Kirkuk Governorate decide to use an implementation structure as suggested in the “Guidelines for Strategic Planning for Local Authorities in Iraq,” the Governor and respective departments will take action regarding the establishment of an economic development entity (e.g. “Strategic Development Organisation”).

2. Monitoring and evaluation

There are three levels of monitoring and evaluation. At levels 1 and 2, the focus is on the recommended interventions and the results of their implementation; at level 3, the focus is on updating the PRP.

Level-1 monitoring asks “Is the intervention being implemented as recommended in the PRP?” A 3.comparison of what has occurred with what was set forth in the Summary Action Plan (SAP) for the respective intervention answers this question. Level-1 monitoring considers the details of implementation, the actions taken – or not taken – to implement the recommended intervention.

Level-2 monitoring asks “Is the intervention producing the outcomes that lead to achieving the expected 4.results, project purpose and goal?” The performance indicators listed in the second column of the Log Frame Planning Matrix answer this question. Level-2 monitoring assesses the achievement of the expected results, project purpose and goal (i.e. the intended outputs, outcomes and impact of the intervention), as they link the intervention to the PRP vision.

Level-3 monitoring asks “Has the environment changed in ways that affect the choice of critical issues, 5.interventions, and implementing entities in the PRP?” The answer uses information generated by the first two levels of monitoring, an update of the economic scan, and an organisational review of the implementing entities. Level-3 monitoring updates the PRP and indicates when the situation has changed so significantly, that it is time either to refresh the PRP or to repeat the full planning process.

Responsibility for monitoring and updating of the PRP will rest with the Provincial Government, part or all of the PRP Task Force, but it could also be designated to another entity (e.g. the local economic development entity). The term “monitoring group” is used here to encompass any of the possible configurations. Ideally, the monitoring group will include representatives from the local government, the business community, the non-governmental sector, other actors relevant to the PRP implementation, and certainly, leadership from local economic development actors. The monitoring group may act as a whole or establish subcommittee(s) to deal with specific issues.

Monitoring and evaluation/updating are essential components of strategic planning. However, these processes cannot be as tightly specified as the PRP preparation process, because the monitoring process will vary depending on the PRP recommendations for each locality and on the progress made in their implementation. Monitoring occurs over time and it has to respond to an ever-changing situation.

3. Financial resources

Financial resources for implementation of the PRP will be diversified and sought at the national, local and international level. Nationally, the Governorate will present capital investment projects to the respective ministries and negotiate the implementation of programmes. Locally, the implementation of PPPs (Public Private Partnerships) requires to ensure that local-level legislation encourages and remove obstacles to private initiative. Internationally, the Governorate will seek both foreign investment and the assistance of foreign governments in development and humanitarian areas.


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SOURCES

Statistical sources:

Kirkuk Agricultural Department data

Kirkuk Department of Education data

Kirkuk Governorate Statistic Department data

Kirkuk Governorate Planning Department data

COSIT

Ministry of Planning annual statistics

World Bank, World Development Indicators database

Cited and consulted analyses/studies:

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GSDRC (28 Aug 2015), Poverty Eradication in Iraq (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1259): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08967ed915d622c0001d9/HDQ1259.pdf.

IOM (2015), Kirkuk Governorate Profile: http://iomiraq.net/file/1926/download.

IOM Integrated Location Assessment II (ILA II, completed in March-May 2017); http://iraqdtm.iom.int/ILA2.aspx, http://iraqdtm.iom.int/Downloads/DTM%20Special%20Reports/DTM%20Integrated%20Location%20Assessment/DTM%20Integrated%20Location%20Assessment_Part%20II_Governorate%20Profiles_March%202017.pdf.

IOM (June 2017), Obstacles to Return in Retaken Areas of Iraq: Final Report: http://iraqdtm.iom.int/LastDTMRound/DTM%20Obstacles%20to%20Return%20in%20Retaken%20Areas%20of%20Iraq_June%202017.pdf.

IOM (Oct 2017), ILA II Report: http://iraqdtm.iom.int/Downloads/DTM%20Special%20Reports/DTM%20Integrated%20Location%20Assessment%20II/ILA%20II_PART2%20Governorate%20Profiles.pdf.

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Kirkuk Governorate (2016), Plan to Manage the IDP Crisis (ظة خطة وك محاف رك ين أزمة ادارةل ك نازح كومه – ال ح ية ال ل مح الي ظة ف وك محاف رك عاون ك ت ال شروع مع ب ف م كات .in cooperation with Takatof – (ت

Kirkuk Governorate (2016), Strategy of Kirkuk Governorate for Re-stabilization, Sheltering Displaced and Rebuilding of Liberated Areas – presentation on this made available by the Governorate.

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Siddiqui, N. et al (IOM, Feb 2017), Reframing Social Fragility in Areas of Protracted Displacement and Emerging Return in Iraq: http://iomiraq.net/file/29038/download.

UN OCHA (Feb 2018), 2018 Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/iraq_2018_hrp.pdf.

UNDP (2014), Iraq Human Development Report 2014: http://www.iq.undp.org/content/dam/iraq/img/Publications/UNDP-IQ_IraqNHDR2014-English.pdf.

UNDP/UN-Habitat (22 Nov 2016), LADP Strategic Urban Development Framework for Governorates in Iraq: Indicator Technical Brief.

UNHCR, Iraq Situation: UNHCR Flash Updates of July–Nov 2017: https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq.

Vishwanath, T. et al. (World Bank Group, June 2015), Where Are Iraq’s Poor?: Mapping Poverty in Iraq: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/889801468189231974/Where-are-Iraq-s-poor-mapping-poverty-in-Iraq.

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http://iraqdtm.iom.int/Downloads/DTM%20Special%20Reports/DTM%20Integrated%20Location%20Assessment/DTM%20Integrated%20Location%20Assessment_Part%20II_Governorate%20Profiles_March%202017.pdf

http://iraqdtm.iom.int/Downloads/DTM%20Special%20Reports/DTM%20Integrated%20Location%20Assessment/DTM%20Integrated%20Location%20Assessment_Part%20II_Governorate%20Profiles_March%202017.pdf

http://iraqdtm.iom.int/LastDTMRound/DTM%20Obstacles%20to%20Return%20in%20Retaken%20Areas%20of%20Iraq_June%202017.pdf

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127

ANNEX: PROPOSED PROJECTS PER SECTOR

A.1 Transport sector projects

N Priority projects to rehabilitate road and bridge infrastructure damaged in the context of ISIL Location

1 Maintenance of the concrete bridge of Maktab Khaled Kirkuk–Al-Riyadh (Al-Hawiga)–Beygee main road

2 Rehabilitation of the concrete bridge in Mariam Baig and the road leading to it Kirkuk–Al-Rashad–Tikrit road; villages and centre of Al-Rashad nahia (Daquq)

3 Construction of a concrete bridge on the road Kirkuk –Tikrit Kirkuk–Al-Rashad–Tikrit road; villages and centre of Al-Rashad nahia (Daquq)

4 Rehabilitation of the concrete bridge in Mula Abdullah (Kirkuk Qadha) Kirkuk city –Al-Multaka–Al- Hawiga–Al-Abassi road

5 Maintenance of the concrete bridge on the road Kirkuk –Mosul (First bridge) Kirkuk –Al-Multaka–Mosul road

6 Maintenance of the concrete bridge on the road of Kirkuk –Mosul (Second bridge) Kirkuk –Al-Multaka–Mosul road

7 Maintenance of the concrete bridge on the road of Kirkuk –Mosul (Third and Forth bridge and first and second bridge of Bay Hassan)

Kirkuk –Al-Multaka–Mosul road

8 Maintenance and rehabilitation of the old road Taza Khormato –Basheer and Basheer checkpoint Taza Khormato Nahia, village of Basheer

9 Maintenance of the road Kirkuk –Baghdad (road to Kirkuk) – length 24.5 km Kirkuk –Baghdad road

10 Improvement of the road Taza Khormato –Sulaiman Baig –Kifri (alternative of Kirkuk-Baghdad road) – length 28.5 km Kirkuk–Taza Khormato–Tooz Kormato–Sulaiman Baig (Kirkuk –Baghdad road)

11 Maintenance of the road Kirkuk –Baghdad (return way) – length 22 km Kirkuk –Baghdad road

12 Improvement of the road to Amerly nahia – length 6.8 km Amerly nahia (Salah al-Din)

13 Reconstruction of Shanashil Bridge (Sarha) (both ways) Kirkuk –Baghdad road


128

A.2 Electricity sector projects

Qadha Nahia N Priority projects to restore electricity supply in areas affected by ISIL Affected populations Kirkuk Al-Multaka 1 Rehabilitation of Electricity Network at the centre of Al-Multaka Nahia and its villages Sub-district centre and all its villages damaged from the

terrorist actions Al-Multaka/ Yaychi

2 Supply and installation of secondary station 11/33 kV (2*16 MVA) (building + equipment) in Beygee Power Plant Yaychi and Al-Multaka nahias

Taza Khormato

3 Rehabilitation of electricity networks for villages of Taza sub-district Villages of Taza Nahia damaged from terrorist actions 4 Rehabilitation of electricity network for Basheer area Basheer village 5 Supply and installation of secondary station 11/33 kV (2*16 MVA) (building + equipment) in Basheer area Basheer village

Daquq 6 Rehabilitation of electricity network at the villages of Daquq Qadha Villages of Daquq Qadha damaged from terrorist actions Dibis 7 Rehabilitation of electricity networks for the villages of Dibis Qadha Villages of Dibis Qadha damaged from terrorist actions

N Proposed projects to improve and develop electricity distribution capacities in Kirkuk province Cost (IQD million) 1 Rehabilitation of East Kirkuk–North Kirkuk lines 132 kV –incl. conversion of the lines from TWIN TEAL/aerial to ground cables with 2 circuits and capacity of over 140 MW 12 000

2 Rehabilitation of Kirkuk–Mullah Abdullah old lines 132 kV - including switching the towers and LARK wires to TWIN TEAL wires (length 21 km) - to increase transport capacity from less than 120 MW to more than 450 МВ

4291.5

3 Purchasing of machinery to be used in the rehabilitation and maintenance of substations (esp. Al Hawijah station) and energy transmission lines – including: Haiyab 10 t (2), Tadano crane 30 t (1), Loader with head of a lorry (1), Six-wheel Iskania lorry (1), Double-cabin pick up (4), Water tanker (1), Shovel lorry (1)

1033

4 Rehabilitation of Dibis–West Kirkuk and West Kirkuk-North Kirkuk lines – including switching TWIN TEAL wires with thermal wire type TWAACSS to increase transport capacity from less than 200 MW to more than 480 MW

7948.25

5 Procurement of necessary backup equipment for secondary stations - to be used in stations rehabilitation works – including: Three-phase auxiliary earthing transformers (4); Voltage transformers type 4MU.46 XD SIMENS (9); Three-phase winding oil immersed power transformers for outdoor installation with ONAN/ONAF cooling rated voltage (2); One-pole earthing switches 2.5 KA 1 sec for neutral high voltage bushing (3 per transformer); Complete control panels with mimic diagram, voltage regulator and parallel operation (2 per transformer); HV neutral lighting arresters type XAF 75 B (2 per transformer)

2529.5

6 Rehabilitation of Dibis—Erbil lines 132 kV – including switching TEAL wires to a thermal wire type TWAACSS (length 60 km) to increase transport capacity from less than 200 MW to more than 480 MW

10 314.25

7 Rehabilitation of Dibis—Mullah Abdullah old lines 132 kV – incl. switching LARK to TEAL wires (length 35 km) to increase transport capacity from less than 120 MW to more than 450 МВ

10 732.4

8 Purchasing of 2 compressors for the Central Conditioning Unit of the old building of the administration (Compressor RLA 345 model number 06E299600) 40

9 Establishment of Kirkuk Station 400 kV to alleviate suffocations in the network (recommended location North of Kirkuk) –

10 Rehabilitation of Kirkuk 400 kV– Tauz lines 132 kV – incl. switching the towers and LARK wires to TWIN TEAL wires (length 57 km) to increase transport capacity from less than 120 MW to more than 450 МВ

16 379

11 Establishment of Future Daquq Station to alleviate suffocations in the network –

12 Establishment of new Electricity Directorate building –

N Projects required specifically to meet the electricity needs of IDPs

Per Kirkuk Governorate (2016), Plan to Manage the IDP Crisis Quantity Unit cost (IQD

thousand) Total cost (IQD million)

1 Transformer 400 kV 50 units 10 632 531.6 2 Circuit breaker, 250 A with box 100 units 525 52.5 3 Round column (11 m) with casting 100 units 492 49.2 4 Braced column (11 m) 50 units 600 30 5 Round column (11 m) with casting 150 units 323 48.5 6 Braced column (11 m) 75 units 500 37.5 7 Bracket channel with nut and bolt 200 units 30 6


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8 Disk insulator 11 kV with accessories 600 units 27 16.2 9 Cup insulator 11 kV with spindle 600 units 27 4.13 10 Cut-out set (link fuse with fuse wire) 50 sets 330 16.5 11 Transformer base with bolts 50 sets 200 10 12 Aluminium wire (120 mm2) 10 000 m 2.5 25 13 Suspended cable 3*120+70+16 mm2 25 000 m 9.25 23.13 14 Pull clamp 250 units 11 2.75 15 Suspension clamp 125 units 7.5 0.94 16 Column hood 375 units 6.75 2.53 17 Steel band with buckles 375 units 7 2.63 18 Suspension cable accessories (connector) 250 units 3.5 0.875 19 Cable 1*95 mm2, Cupper 4800 m 15 72 20 Cable 1*50 mm2 1750 m 8 14


130

A.3 Water supply sector projects

Qadha Nahia N Priority projects to restore water supply infrastructure affected in the context of ISIL Affected populations Kirkuk Al-Multaka 1 Rehabilitation of Al-Multaka Center Water Project (capacity 240 m3/h) Center of Al-Multaka nahia

2 Rehabilitation of Al-Multaka Center Water Project (capacity 50 m3/h) Center of Al-Multaka nahia 3 Rehabilitation of Mullah Abdullah residential water supply project (capacity 100 m3/h) Center of Al-Multaka nahia 4 Rehabilitation of Khalid and Tal Al-Ward Water Project (capacity 400 m3/h) Khaled’s office –Daur Al Ray- Tal Al Ward- Al

Khabbazah- Al Abeeter 5 Rehabilitation of Al Sakhra Water Complex (capacity 50 m3/h) Al Sakhra village

Taza Khormato 6 Rehabilitation of the water complexes affiliated to Taza nahia, and water networks affiliated to Al Basheer town in addition to establishment of high reservoir

Basheer village

Al-Hawiga Al-Riyadh 7 Rehabilitation of Riyadh villages modern Water Project (capacity 66 m3/h) 40 villages from Riyadh nahia 8 Supply of water pumps, generators, pipes, and supplements for Al-Riyadh water project Riyadh nahia and villages 9 Rehabilitation of Al Hahrawan Water Complex (capacity 50 m3/h) Al Nahrawan compound

Daquq Al-Rashad 10 Rehabilitation of the water projects Al Rashad 1 (capacity 200 m3/h), Al Rashad 2 (capacity 200 m3/h), and Al Humairat (capacity 100 m3/h)

Center of Al Rashad nahia and 20 of its villages

Al-Hawiga/ Daquq/ Kirkuk

Al-Riyadh, Al-Rashad, Al-Multaka, Al-Zab, Al-Abbasi

11 Maintenance of Kirkuk Water Directorate vehicles damaged due to terrorists acts and military operations All areas affected by terrorism in Kirkuk province

Type N Proposed projects to extend the capacity for water supply service – including to meet the needs of IDPs

Per Kirkuk Governorate (2016), Plan to Manage the IDP Crisis Units Cost

(IQD million) Emergency 1 Preparation and installation of combined water unit in Yarolli Water Project (capacity 400 m3/h) 1 620

2 Provision of mobile water tanks (capacity 18 000 l) 12 210 3 Provision of mobile water tanks (capacity 16 000 l) 10 190 4 Provision of mobile water tanks (capacity 10 000 l) 8 160 5 Provision of mobile water tanks (capacity 8 000 l) 6 120 6 Preparation of water pipes (UPVC) with different diameters 80 2400 7 Drilling of artesian wells with depth no less than 100 m, and installation of plungers 4 200 000 8 Preparation and installation of water desalination units (capacity 40 m3/h) 4 720

9 Preparation of plungers for artesian wells in Kirkuk 50 300

10 Installation of water desalination units (capacity 20 m3/h) 3 420

11 Transfer of the installed water desalination unit in Al Zawra’a neighborhood to Al Rujaibat village in Laylan 1 100

12 Preparation of horizontal pumps of different capacities for projects 40 240 Strategic [*] Additional to the 2016 Plan to Manage the IDP Crisis.

1 Complete the construction of Kirkuk Water Project Phase II (awarded to FAW Group Corporation) – –

2 Implement Alton Kobry Water Project (capacity of 12 000 m3/h) to cover the drinking water needs of Kirkuk and Alton Kobry nahia – including to ensure potable water supply to IDPs and refugees residing in Kirkuk province, Alton Kobry nahia, and the areas of Sikanyan, Korka Jal, and Shoraw 1/2

– –

3 Complete Laylan Water Project (Qara Hasan, capacity 1000 m3/h) to distribute potable water to populations in Laylan nahia and its adjacent areas, including IDPs/IDPs in camps

– –

4 Implement the proposed transmission line (1200 mm diameter) from Reservoir No.1 to Reservoir No.4 in order to increase water quantity in the central and western areas of the province

– –

5 Expand Dibis Central Water Project (capacity 8000 m3/h) to support water demand (including drinking water for IDP families) –

6* Rehabilitate booster pumping stations and ground reservoirs GST 2,3 and 4 to secure continuous water delivery for citizens of Kirkuk – –


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A.4 Wastewater management sector projects

Qadha Nahia N Proposed projects to develop the wastewater management capacity in Kirkuk province Duration of work (days) Cost (IQD billion) Kirkuk Kirkuk QC 1 Rehabilitation and maintenance of networks to reduce bottlenecks within Kirkuk city 360 2

2 Purchase of pipes of different diameters and manhole lids and grills for maintenance purposes 70 1.5 3 Implementation of rainwater sewer line in Banja Ali 140 2 4 Implementation of rainwater line in the Aviation square 210 20 5 Implementation of sewer line project for rainwater in Askari area 150 1.5 6 Implementation of sewer line project for rainwater in Wasti area 150 1.5 7 Implementation of sewer line project for rainwater in Hojjaj area 140 1.5 8 Implementation of sewer line project for rainwater in Kurdistan area 180 3 9 Construction of compact unit for Nour City Complex Ongoing project – commenced 03 Mar 2015, contract value IQD 0.7933

billion, estimated cost IQD 1.254 billion Planned completion – 28 June 2016

Yaychi/ Kirkuk QC

10 Preparation, study, design of integrated WWTP, rainwater runoff sewer network, sewage/sanitary sewer network, main and sub networks, with lifting stations, Phase I (Kirkuk/Turklan) – a.k.a. Kirkuk unified streams project Phase I

Stopped project – commenced 19 June 2012, contracting value: IQD 136.0645 billion (Investment Allocations of the Ministry) Completion rate – 3.7%

Alton Kobry 11 Construction of Alton Kobry maintenance centre building 140 0.5 Al-Multaka 12 Completion of Al-Multaka integrated wastewater project – including rainwater sewer network,

sewage/sanitation sewer network, and WWTP 400 7.11

Taza Khormato

13 Construction of Taza Khormato maintenance centre building 140 0.5 14 Implementation of rainwater sewer line at Bashir town and maintenance of the old sewer lines 120 0.75

Daquq Daquq QC 15 Construction of Daquq maintenance centre building 140 0.5

N Projects required specifically to meet the needs of IDPs with regard to wastewater management

Per Kirkuk Governorate (2016), Plan to Manage the IDP Crisis Quantity Unit cost (IQD) Total cost (IQD thousand)

1 Pulling vehicle (يارة س سحب ) 4 units 30 000 120 2 Canal jetting vehicle (يارة س ية صاروخ ) 2 units 40 000 80 3 Sanitary sewer network, Laylan Camp Complete 21 4 Rainwater sewer/storm drain network, Laylan Camp Complete 100 5 Sanitary sewage removal station 1 units 250 000 250 6 Compact unit 3 units 490 000 1960

A.5 Waste management sector projects

N Projects required specifically to meet the needs of IDPs with regard to waste management Per Kirkuk Governorate (2016), Plan to Manage the IDP Crisis

Quantity Unit cost (IQD) Total cost (IQD million)

1 Provision of environmentally-friendly plastic bags for waste collection (size 70*90 cm) 500 000 units 100 50 2 Provision of plastic containers (size 120 l) 5000 units 25 000 125 3 Provision of plastic containers (size 660 l) 1000 units 170 000 170 4 Provision of waste compactor (6 m3) type ISUZU 4 units 55 000 000 220 5 Provision of small-sized tipper (2.25–2.50 m3) 4 units 40 000 000 160 6 Provision of cleaning supplies/equipment for Municipal institutions – including Manual sweepers (500), shovels (500), work

suits (500), work shoes (500 pairs), wheelbarrows (100), gloves (500 pairs), hats (500) 1.25


132

A.6 Health sector projects

N Projects to restore and extend health services available to all residents of Kirkuk province, including IDPs Cost (IQD million)

1 Extension of the Medical Clinics Center in Rahim Awah including building extension, ophthalmology clinic, ENT clinic, general surgery clinic – to increase visitation rate from 50-85 to 90-160 visitors per day Note: the Center already has equipment and medical supplies that will be needed after completion of the expansion (e.g. X-ray and sonar, laboratory and pharmacy).

66.275

2 Supply, erection and operation of containerised PSA oxygen manufacturing, oxygen plant system and oxygen cylinder filling station (capacity 20 m3\h) for 4 hospitals (Azadi Teaching Hospital, Kirkuk General Hospital, Al Nasser Neighbourhood Hospital, and Children's Hospital) Note: Not executed due to lack of financial resources.

1224 (306 per hospital)

3 Rehabilitation of Mullah Abdulla Primary Health Center (Dibis Qadha) damaged in the context of ISIL – including: Civil works (rehabilitation and modernisation of structure/facilities, including lab); Electrical/mechanical works and equipment; Supply of furniture and medical supplies; Supply of medical instruments – including: Microscope (1), Nebuliser (1), Suckers (capacity 30-45 l/min) (2), Bilirubinometre (1), Centrifuge (min. 32 tubes) (1), Micro

centrifuge (type 24/75 mm capillary) (1), Hemoglobinometre (1), Blood Glucose System + 4 Kits (4), Mercurial blood pressure apparatus (7) , Stethoscope (6) , Hot air oven (50-300°C) (1), ECG (1) – where all devices must be of EU, USA or Japanese origin

187.1 (including 21.25 for medical instruments; 162.633 excluding reserve and supervising/ monitoring)

4 Construction of Primary Health Center at Kharab Al Rut (Dibis Qadha) – including: Civil works; water, sanitary and electrical foundation works; Supply of furniture and medical supplies; Supply of medical instruments – including: Microscope (1), Nebuliser (3), Sucker (capacity 30-45 l/min) (1), Centrifuge (min. 32 tubes) (1), Micro centrifuge (type 24/75 mm

capillary) (1), Hemoglobinometre (1), Blood Glucose System + 4 Kits (2), Mercurial blood pressure apparatus (6) , Stethoscope (6) , Hot air oven (50-300°C) (1), ECG (1)

ca. 270 (including 17 for medical instruments; 237.8 excluding reserve and supervising/monitoring)

5 Rehabilitation of Secondary Health Center at Kharab Al Rut (Dibis Qadha) damaged in the context of ISIL 254

6 Rehabilitation of Al Shaheed Primary Health Care Center (Daquq Qadha) damaged in the context of ISIL 34.7

7 Rehabilitation of Health Centre in Albu Mohammed village (Daquq Qadha) damaged in the context of ISIL n/a

8 Rehabilitation of Health Centre in Al Samoud village (Daquq Qadha) damaged in the context of ISIL n/a

9 Rehabilitation of Health Centre in Tamour village (Daquq Qadha) damaged in the context of ISIL n/a

10 Rehabilitation of health infrastructure in Al-Hawiga Qadha (incl. 126-bed Hawiga Hospital) damaged in the context of ISIL n/a

11 Supplementary works for extension of delivery rooms in Azadi Hospital 1001.432

12 Construction of 100-bed hospital in Al-Nasser neighbourhood, including provision of supplies and furniture/equipment Note: Not executed due to lack of financial resources.

10 202.45

13 Construction of 400-bed hospital at Baghdad road Note: Not executed due to lack of financial resources.

n/a

14 Construction of 200-bed hospital at Hawija Note: Not executed due to lack of financial resources.

n/a

15 Repair and maintenance of sewage services 516

16 Rehabilitation of buildings and maintenance of service and medical bodies for three years – including: Rehabilitation and maintenance of buildings (IQD 400 million) Rehabilitation and maintenance of service bodies (IQD 150 million) Rehabilitation and maintenance of Medical Bodies (IQD 500 million)

1050


133

Target area N Projects required specifically to meet the needs of IDPs with regard to healthcare Per Kirkuk Governorate (2016), Plan to Manage the IDP Crisis

Cost (USD thousand)

Yahyawa Camp 1 Expand, furnish, and provide the necessary medical equipment to the health centres inside Yahyawa Camp 250 Laylan Camp 2 Expand the emergency unit in Laylan Center for health care in order to receive emergency cases that do not need surgeries, and the same

goes to the delivery room to keep mothers who gave birth recently for 24 hours 250

Nazrawa Camp 3 Establish caravan-type primary health centre in Nazrawa Camp including 16 caravans (size 8*4 m), electrical generator, furniture/equipment and medical supplies

450

IDP camps 4 Provide water filtration and disinfection for camps 100 IDPs control points and camps 5 Supply 10 generators 50 KW (4 for the control points, 6 for the IDP camps) 275 Outskirts of province 6 Install 8 caravans at the control points located in outskirts of the province (2 caravans for each point in Baghdad, Tikrit, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah)

equipped with the necessary furniture equipment, and medicines to be able to receive the new IDPs, examine and treat them, and provide preventive services

400

IDP cluster areas 7 Secure medicines and medical supplies 1000 8 Secure a mobile health centre including 16 caravans (6*4) and necessary furniture and equipment, to provide medical and preventive services

(vaccines, mother and child care, health education, etc.) 800

9 Secure a special share for general and life-saving medicines, anaesthetics, medicines of chronic diseases, and medical supplies, to be deducted for the Kirkuk Directorate from the share of provinces from which IDPs fled

n/a

10 Secure general and life-saving medicines, anaesthetics, medicines for chronic diseases, and medical supplements as needed, to arrange IDPs within lists by Department of Pharmacy

n/a

11 Secure financial support for workers (incentives and overtime pay) who provide field medical services for IDPs (incl. mobile centres and clinics, vaccination mobile teams, chlorine distribution teams, pesticides spray teams, evening guarding teams)

n/a

12 Secure amounts to buy fuel (gas oil and gasoline) for generators for spray teams, and evening spraying and fuming 20 13 Secure financial support to print and distribute information materials with regard to health subjects 15

Kirkuk city* 14 Supply new health centres with furniture, equipment and medical supplies to reduce IDP load on other health centres 500 * Neighbourhoods of Kirkuk city: Uruba, March First, housing clusters on Laylan–Azadi road, Runaki, Tisin, Shahidan


134

A.7 Education sector projects

Qadha Nahia Projects required to restore school infrastructure damaged in the context of ISIL The list is not exhaustive – it only covers school in areas liberated in 2016.

N School Location N School Location

Kirkuk (18)

Al-Multaka (Mula Abdullah) (15)

1 Mulla Abdulla Preparatory Mula Abdullah Centre 9 Al Bahr Elementary Al Bahr village (Diwan)

2 Al Abitar Elementary Old Al Abitar village 10 Tul Al Ward Elementary Tul Al Ward village

3 Rumaythah Elementary Dor Al Kahraba village 11 Neel Elementary Village

4 Koas Kurd Elementary Koas Kurd village 12 Al Hinyiah Elementary Al Hindiayh village

5 Khandaq Elementary Sakhra village 13 Istabraq Elementary Village

6 Zahara Elementary Nasiriyah village 14 Al Adalah Elementary Idris Khabaz village

7 Shalalat Elementary Nassif Jassem village 15 Miqdadiyah Elementary Village

8 Adalah Elementary Edris Khazal village

Taza Khormato (3)

16 Imam Hassan Elementary Bashir village 18 Shamsiya Primary Shamsiyah village

17 Maryam Bek Elementary Maryam Beck village

Al-Hawiga (6)

Al-Riyadh (6)

19 Abtal Elementary Shahid complex 22 Morra Elementary Morra village

20 Halim Elementary Yarmouk compound 23 Marbad Elementary Nawafel village

21 Baba Gurgur Elementary Sayed Khalaf vllage 24 Nahrawan Elementary Nahrawan complex

Daquq (11)

Daquq (11)

25 Adhwaa Elementary Big Banshakh village 31 Zamzam Elementary Toilah village

26 Bo Nijm Elementary Bo Nijm village 32 Tul Maghar Elementary Tul Maghar village

27 Qadous Elementary New village 33 Baiyat Saqifa Elementary At'shanah village

28 Tamor Elementary Aziziyah village 34 Karama Elementary Morra village

29 Samaka Alia Samaka Alia village 35 Hemren Elementary Koman village

30 Tul Basal Elementary Tul Basal village

Dibis (4)

Dibis (4)

36 Ismail Awa Elementary Old Ismail Awa village 38 New Ismail Awa Elementary New Ismail Awa village

37 Kbaiba Elementary Kbaiba village 39 Zaiton Elementary Kharab Al Rout village

N Proposed projects to support and extend the education service to populations in Kirkuk, including IDPs

Per Kirkuk Governorate (2016), Plan to Manage the IDP Crisis Quantity Unit cost (IQD) Total cost (IQD thousand)

1 Comprehensive renovation of health units in schools 400 units 150 60 2 Comprehensive renovation of classrooms in schools 1000 classrooms 900 900 3 Building of caravan schools including 12 classrooms each, administration suite and all supplies 6 schools 600 000 3600 4 Conversion of tent schools at Laylan and Yahyawa camps 33 tents 10 000 330 5 Completion of Al Shumos school in Beriadi to receive displaced students 1 school 10 6 Addition of caravan classrooms to Al Razi school to receive more displaced students 100 7 Addition of caravan classrooms to Asteera kindergarten to receive more displaced children 120 8 Supply of Turkish two-seats desks according to iron and wood specifications, incl. 1-year warranty from supply date 50 000 units 40 200 9 Supply of Turkish blackboard size (1*2 m) 500 units 30 15 10 Supply of Turkish administration desks size (1*1.5 m) 300 units 25 7.5 11 Swivel chairs for the administration 300 units 100 30 12 Turkish metal semi-glazed cupboard with two doors 250 units 100 25 13 Photocopy machine with touch screen type CANON 162 100 units 300 30 14 A4 Paper 12 500 units 4 50 15 Laser printer cartridge type CANON lbp 2900 and 6000 500 units 40 20

PROVINCIAL RESPONSE PLAN KIRKUK GOVERNORATE · 2019-03-23 · Table 10 Main social support...

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