Protective Countermeasures

8/13/2019 Protective Countermeasures

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PROTECTIVE

COUNTERMEASURES

VIPPSC 10-13


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TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE

Although the goals of surveillance remainconstant, the means by which surveillance isconducted differ depending on who is interested

in you or your protectee. The terrorist organization is interested in daily

routine.

Establishing an individuals schedule can provide

terrorists with valuable information, such as thetime the target leaves for work, what route istaken and the kind of vehicle driven.


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The Terrorist always needs to be one

step ahead of security If the agent has an armored vehicle the terrorist should

have an armor-defeating weapon, such as a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) or a light, anti-tank weapon(LAW).

The terrorist surveillance group looks for predictablepatterns which determine a logical place to stage an attack.

The terrorist understands choke points.

The protective detail is presented with greater challengesnear the protecteesresidence and work place since thepotential attacker knows that the target must be at eitherone of these two locations at some point during the day.


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To confuse surveillance team, change:

Routes;

Times of departure and arrival

Vehicles (stealth or dummy convoy);

Number of vehicles in convoy; and

Configuration of convoy.


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All protective detail must vary as much inaccurateinformation as possible, while continuing toprovide comprehensive surveillance/counter-surveillance.

All surveillance/counter-surveillance should be

immediately reported to the detail leader todetermine its threat level.

Terrorists usually employ newer members to

conduct initial surveillance as part of their testmission.


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These individuals often are not trained in

surveillance tactics and, as a result, are easilydetected.

Also, if one of these new operatives arecaptured by police they will have little, if any,

information about the inner cells of the

terrorist structure.


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PRO-ACTIVE VS REACTIVE SECURITY

MEASURES

Certainly marksmanship proficiency andspecialized driving skills are necessary, however, ifan attack gets to where one needs to use these

skills, when a series of opportunities were missedin predicting and thus preventing the attack fromoccurring it means you already failed to protectyour protectee.

Pro-active measures uncover an attack plan whilein its preparation stage.


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These measures include detecting

surveillance, piecing together intelligence

reports and identifying pre-incident indicators.

Pre-incident occurences may be unrelated but

sometimes, when examined together, they

provide clues that terrorist activity is in the

works.


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Types of Pre-incident indicators

An increase in criminal activity, i.e., car thefts,passport fraud, stolen weapons.

Uniforms from public utility companies, militaryfacilities and police departments are reportedmissing.

There is new construction along the protecteesprimary route.


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What indicators would differentiate between

suspected and actual surveillance?

Correlated movement

Inappropriate or crude disguises.

Communications equipment

Physical gestures which coordinate with the

protecteesmovement.

Note taking.


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If surveillance is verified, do not apprehend thesurveillant.

Rather, keep in mind that initial surveillance isconducted by newer terrorist members. If theymake mistakes, the detail/intelligence units canprobably identify and neutralize them.

Employ counter-surveillance methods to uncoverinformation or a safe house which may lead tothe core of the organization.


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One method is an inconspicuous tail or sweepcar/motorcycle.

The terrorists surveillance vehicle will trail the

convoy, taking an inappropriate interest in thedetail.

The sweep car will be effective in this manner

because the terrorists attention will be focused onthe detail in front of him and they will not beaware of whats behind them.


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TYPES OF SURVEILLANCE

Fixed surveillance

The surveillant remains in the same position over time toobserve the activities of a particular subject or location.

Examples:

(1) phone booths,

(2) bus stops,

(3) garages,

(4) parked vehicles,

(5) rented apartments,

(6) vendors, only limited to the terrorist imagination.

They attempt to blend in with the dress, mannerisms, andtime schedules of the local populace.


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Moving/Mobile Surveillance

The subject is followed on foot or by vehicle. The terrorist may use any number of surveillants

and various types of vehicles in doing this.

Technical Surveillance

Equipment used to record conversations in rooms,

automobiles, or from telephones.


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Combination Surveillance

Any combination of fixed, moving, or technicalsurveillance.

Progressive Surveillance Time intensive, involving surveilling a subject

along a route, in successive segments, over an

extended period of time.


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COMMON TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE

MISTAKES

Vehicles parked in prohibited zones.

Vehicles parked in the same spot for an extendedtime, with possible surveillants sitting in the frontseat.

Vehicles that stop or start as the protectee ordetail moves, especially motorcycles.

Vehicles that pass the target and park.

Vehicle that goes through an intersection slowly,rounds a corner slowly or pokes its nose arounda corner and then withdraws.


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Vehicles moving on parallel streets at roughly

the same speed as the protectee.

Vehicles apparently hiding behind traffic,

pulling out as if to pass, then dropping back.

Vehicles passing in a traffic circle until thedetail has taken an exit.

Vehicles stopping nearby when the protectee

or detail stops.


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Persons dismounting vehicles when the

protectee or detail stops. Persons turning away when observed by the

protective detail or SD team.

Persons hesitating or looking around whenentering a building that the protectee has just

entered.

Persons leaving or entering a store, restaurant,etc, immediately before or after the protectee.


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Persons who begin to move as the protecteeor detail does, or stop as they do.

Persons standing on the street or in lobbies,

reading newspapers or magazines. Broken down vehicles.

Sloppy suveillant shift changes near the

residence. One vehicle arriving, anotherdeparting. Possible communication betweendrivers.


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Any vehicle with an altered or obliterated

license plate in or near a choke point.

Work crews in or near chokepoints. Check

vehicles, equipment, and clothing, especially

the footwear. Inquire with appropriate agency

to verify the legitimacy of the work order.

Persons inappropriately dressed for the area

or season.


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ROUTE SURVEY

A route survey is simply an area street mapindicating where the detail and protectee willbe travelling.

It is the responsibility of the protective detail(both the protective drivers and advance

detail) to plot out the routes that will be takenor could be used to get from point A to pointB.


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The ideal route will have minimal choke points

and many strong points.

Remember, it is likely the attack will occur in

or around the area where surveillance is

taking place.


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SURVEILLANCE DETECTION ROUTE

(SDR or pag-pag)

One method of detecting or confirming

surveillance is through the use of a

surveillance detection route (SDR). The SDR

forces correlation between the surveillanceand the targeted individual.

The SDR uses a logical detour in which the

target doubles back on their route.


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This natural reverse should allow the target

to observe anyone following them into and

out of the SDR.

It would be very likely that anyone would

make the same combination of turns.


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OBSERVATION

Observation is the complete awareness by an

individual of his surroundings achieved

through maximum employment of the senses.

Expert observation enables on to recognize

and recall any object or situation accurately

and completely.


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When Observing vehicles, the following

sequence should be followed:

First its plate number, general type, size, condition

and color

any distinguishing characteristics

Its make, model and year.

Identifying information on name plates and bodyparts. i.e. commemorative plate.


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When observing People, notice their:

Sex

Race(i.e.): Caucasian, American Indian. Black,

Mongolian, or Malayan. Other terms, such asmestizo or Hispanic, may be more descriptive of

the local populace and should be learned.

Color of Skin. Height


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Unaware of the surroundings

An attack on an individual in condition white will probably be successful.

General awareness of surroundings.

You perceive events and changing in condition yellow 24 hours a day.

Heightened state of awareness.

A person can only stay in this condition for about 3 to 4 hours.

State of Action - FIGHT or FLIGHT

DURING this state a person will exhibit the symptoms of physical reaction tohigh stress.

A person in this state is so overwhelmed by the situation they are shocked intoan inability to react.

An attack on a person in this state will probably be successful.


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Unaware of the surroundings

An attack on an individual in condition white will probably be successful.

General awareness of surroundings.

You perceive events and changing in condition yellow 24 hours a day.

Heightened state of awareness.

A person can only stay in this condition for about 3 to 4 hours.

State of Action - FIGHT or FLIGHT

DURING this state a person will exhibit the symptoms of physical reaction tohigh stress.

A person in this state is so overwhelmed by the situation they are shocked intoan inability to react.

An attack on a person in this state will probably be successful.


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TYPES OF ATTACK

Looking at the route, could the terrorists

succeed in kidnapping the protectee or

staging a bomb attack?

Is there an escape route, cover or

concealment for the terrorists?


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Weapons at close range - sub-machine gun,

small caliber weapons. EXAMPLE: assassination attempt on President

Reagan.

Stand-off attack - RAG rocket, hand grenade.


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Kidnapping / Selective violence.

Hostage must remain unharmed to be used as abargaining chip for the terrorists.

EXAMPLE: Hans Martin Schleyer kidnapping,Cologne, Germany 2977 by R.A.F.

Explosives / Random violence.

EXAMPLE: Secretary of State Schultz, bombing. La

Paz, Bolivia 1986.

Escape.


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SUMMARY

The protective detail is responsible for

familiarizing itself with all possible routes.

Strong points and escape routes should be

identified on a street map and visually verified.

Establish what is normal in an area to be able to

identify suspicious activity.

Know what type of attack could be used againstyour Protectee in the area you will be working.

Protective Countermeasures

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