Proprietry Estoppel

8/13/2019 Proprietry Estoppel

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Informally Created Property Rights

It follows that provided the person at whom the representation is directed reasonably believed that the

representation is trueand intended to be acted upon by him, though it is not necessary to prove that the

promisor intended that his words or conduct would have that effect or was even subjectively aware that they

did so.

It is now well established that the promise need not be made irrevocably

What later makes them binding, and therefore irrevocable, is the promisee's detrimental reliance on

them. Once that occurs, there is simply no question of the promisor changing his or her mind.

Again, however, it seems that CONTEXT IS EVERYTHING. It may be that the promise in was so

unambiguous and had been made on numerous occasions at family gatherings, that it was thus more than

more than a mere statement of present [revocable] intention, and is tantamount to a promise . Gillet v Holt

On the other hand the representation might only be reasonably interpreted as conveying no more than a

statement of A's current intention, which can be subject to change with the passage of time, with or without a

change of circumstancesIt might even be a conditional promise as in Uglow v Uglow

Finally, the expectations of the claimant must, it now seems, focus on some specific, identified piece

of property, or some part of the property the extent of which need not be identified, but which is objectively

ascertainable: Thorner v Major.

ii) Reliance

There is no need to show a mutual understanding or agreement that the Claimant would incur the

relevant expenditure or suffer the relevant detriment Instead:

There must be a sufficient link between the promises relied upon and the conduct which constitutes

the detriment;

The promises relied upon do not have to be the sole inducement for the conduct: it is sufficient if

they are an inducement;

Once it has been established that promises were made, and that there has been conduct by the

plaintiff of such a nature that inducement may be inferred then the burden of proof shifts to the

defendants to establish that he did not rely on the promises

It is not necessary, however, for the Claimant to show that he would have acted differently if the promise hadnever been made but only if the representation had been withdrawn: Ottey v Grundy

Subject to that, to the list may be added that the reliance must be reasonable in all the circumstances:

Thorner v Major. However when evidence is available that the property owner intended the Claimant to rely

on his promise as he did, the question of the reasonableness of the reliance is likely to be indisputable:

Lester v Woodgate.


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iii) Detriment

Although taken separately here, reliance and detriment are intertwined. In Henry v HenrySir Jonathan

Parkersaid:

Notwithstanding that reliance and detriment may, in the abstract, be regarded as different concepts,

in applying the principles of proprietary estoppel they are often intertwined.

Detriment was defined in Gillett v Holtas follows:

Detriment is not a narrow or technical concept: it need not consist of the expenditure of money or

other quantifiable financial detriment, so long as it is something substantial;

The detriment which the promisee must be shown to have suffered falls to be judged at the moment

when the promisor proposes to go back on his representation. Whether the detriment is sufficiently

substantial is to be tested by whether it would be unjust or inequitable to allow the assurance to be

disregarded; and

Detriment is the detriment or harm which a claimant would suffer if the promisor were not compelled

to adhere to the representation in reliance upon which the claimant had altered his position.

iv) Unconscionability

Lord Walkerin Cobbe:

That argument raises the question whether "unconscionability" is a separate element in making out a case

of estoppel, or whether to regard it as a separate element Here it is being used (as in my opinion it should

always be used) as an objective value judgment on behaviour (regardless of the state of mind of the

individual in question). As such it does in my opinion play a very important part in the doctrine of equitable

estoppel, in unifying and confirming, as it were, the other elements. If the other elements appear to be

present but the result does not shock the conscience of the court, the analysis needs to be looked at again.

v) Satisfying the Equity

Once an estoppel has been established, the Court must go on to consider how to satisfy the Claimants

equity. It is perhaps at this stage that the flexibility of the doctrine is at its most apparent. The Courts

approach can be summarised as follows

The court takes a principled approach, and does not exercise a completely unfettered discretion

according to the individual judge's notion of what is fair in any particular case;

The approach to be taken is to ascertain the maximum extent of the claimants equity, and then to

determine what the minimum required is to satisfy it and do justice between the parties;

The most essential requirement is that there must be proportionality between the expectation and

the detriment;

It is a question of satisfying the equity rather than satisfying, or vindicating, the claimant's

expectations.


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In certain cases however either expectation or detriment alone might be fulfilled:

The court might vindicate an expectation:

Where the representation was on the basis of mutual understanding or agreement in reasonablyclear terms that the claimant would have an identifiable interest in an identifiable property (such as

being the sole heir of a house); or

Where there are difficulties or uncertainties in quantifying the detriment, for example where it

consisted of the provision of care or services, or of pandering to the moods or caprices of an elderly

person.

By contrast detriment may be the relevant yardstick:

Where the claimants expectations were uncertain, extravagant or out of all proportion to the

detriment suffered; or

Where the detriment can be quantified with reasonable precision, for example if it consists solely of

expenditure on improvements to another person's house, and in some cases of that sort an

equitable charge for the expenditure may be sufficient to satisfy the equity

.

In any case, the key rule is that the remedy must be proportionate to the detriment suffered

Proprietry Estoppel

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