Property Research

7/31/2019 Property Research

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G.R. Nos. 154391-92 September 30, 2004

Spouses ISMAEL and TERESITA MACASAET, petitioners,

vs.

Spouses VICENTE and ROSARIO MACASAET, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN,J.:

The present case involves a dispute between parents and children. The children were invited by

the parents to occupy the latters two lots, out of parental love and a desire to foster family

solidarity. Unfortunately, an unresolved conflict terminated this situation. Out of pique, theparents asked them to vacate the premises. Thus, the children lost their right to remain on the

property. They have the right, however, to be indemnified for the useful improvements that they

constructed thereon in good faith and with the consent of the parents. In short, Article 448 of the

Civil Code applies.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review1

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 22,

2002 Decision2

and the June 26, 2002 Resolution3

of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SPNos. 56205 & 56467. The challenged Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with the followingMODIFICATIONS:

1. Vicente and Rosario should reimburse Ismael and Teresita one-half of thevalue of the useful improvements introduced in the premises prior to demand,

which is equivalent to P475,000.00. In case the former refuse to reimburse the

said amount, the latter may remove the improvements, even though the land maysuffer damage thereby. They shall not, however, cause any more impairment upon

the property leased than is necessary.

2. The award of attorneys fees is DELETED.

3. The records of these consolidated cases are REMANDED to the Court oforigin for further proceedings to determine the option to be taken by Vicente and

Rosario and to implement the same with dispatch."

4

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

Petitioners Ismael and Teresita5

Macasaet and Respondents Vicente and Rosario Macasaet arefirst-degree relatives. Ismael is the son of respondents, and Teresita is his wife.6

On December 10, 1997, the parents filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) ofLipa City an ejectment suit against the children.7 Respondents alleged that they were the owners

of two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-78521 and T-103141, situated at Banay-banay, Lipa City; that by way of a verbal lease agreement, Ismael and

Teresita occupied these lots in March 1992 and used them as their residence and the situs of theirconstruction business; and that despite repeated demands, petitioners failed to pay the agreed

rental of P500 per week.8

Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of any verbal lease agreement. They claimed that

respondents had invited them to construct their residence and business on the subject lots in


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order that they could all live near one other, employ Marivic (the sister of Ismael), and help in

resolving the problems of the family.9

They added that it was the policy of respondents to allotthe land they owned as an advance grant of inheritance in favor of their children. Thus, they

contended that the lot covered by TCT No. T-103141 had been allotted to Ismael as advance

inheritance. On the other hand, the lot covered by TCT No. T-78521 was allegedly given to

petitioners as payment for construction materials used in the renovation of respondents house.

10

The MTCC11

ruled in favor of respondents and ordered petitioners to vacate the premises. Itopined that Ismael and Teresita had occupied the lots, not by virtue of a verbal lease agreement,

but by tolerance of Vicente and Rosario.12

As their stay was by mere tolerance, petitioners were

necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate the lots upon demand.13

The MTCCdismissed their contention that one lot had been allotted as an advance inheritance, on the ground

that successional rights were inchoate. Moreover, it disbelieved petitioners allegation that theother parcel had been given as payment for construction materials.

14

On appeal, the regional trial court15 (RTC) upheld the findings of the MTCC. However, the RTC

allowed respondents to appropriate the building and other improvements introduced bypetitioners, after payment of the indemnity provided for by Article 448 in relation to Articles 546and 548 of the Civil Code.16 It added that respondents could oblige petitioners to purchase the

land, unless its value was considerably more than the building. In the latter situation, petitioners

should pay rent if respondents would not choose to appropriate the building.17

Upon denial of their individual Motions for Reconsideration, the parties filed with the CA

separate Petitions for Review, which were later consolidated.18

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA sustained the finding of the two lower courts that Ismael and Teresita had beenoccupying the subject lots only by the tolerance of Vicente and Rosario.19

Thus, possession of

the subject lots by petitioners became illegal upon their receipt of respondents letter to vacateit.20

Citing Calubayan v. Pascual,21 the CA further ruled that petitioners status was analogous to thatof a lessee or a tenant whose term of lease had expired, but whose occupancy continued by

tolerance of the owner.22

Consequently, in ascertaining the right of petitioners to be reimbursed

for the improvements they had introduced on respondents properties,23

the appellate court

applied the Civil Codes provisions on lease. The CA modified the RTC Decision by declaringthat Article 448 of the Civil Code was inapplicable. The CA opined that under Article 1678 of

the same Code, Ismael and Teresita had the right to be reimbursed for one half of the value of the

improvements made.24

Not satisfied with the CAs ruling, petitioners brought this recourse to this Court.25

The Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:

"1. a) Whether or not Section 17[,] Rule 70 of the Rules of Court on Judgment should

apply in the rendition of the decision in this case;

b) Whether or not the Complaint should have been dismissed;

c) Whether or not damages including attorneys fees should have been awarded toherein petitioners;

"2. a) Whether or not the rule on appearance of parties during the Pretrial should apply onappearance of parties during Preliminary Conference in an unlawful detainer suit;


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b) Whether or not the case of Philippine Pryce Assurance Corporation vs. Court

of Appeals (230 SCRA 164) is applicable to appearance of parties in an unlawfuldetainer suit;

"3. Whether or not Article 1678 of the Civil Code should apply to the case on the matters

of improvements, or is it Article 447 of the Civil Code in relation to the Article 453 and454 thereof that should apply, if ever to apply the Civil Code;

"4. Whether or not the [D]ecision of the Court of Appeals is supported by evidence,

appropriate laws, rules and jurisprudence;

"5. Whether or not Assisting Judge Norberto Mercado of the MTCC Lipa City should be

held accountable in rendering the MTCC [D]ecision;

"6. Whether or not Atty. Glenn Mendoza and Atty. Andrew Linatoc of the same [l]aw

office should be held accountable for pursuing the [e]jectment case[.]"26

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:

Ejectment

Who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises? At the outset, we stress

that this is the main issue in ejectment proceedings.27

In the present case, petitioners failed to

justify their right to retain possession of the subject lots, which respondents own. Sincepossession is one of the attributes of ownership,28 respondents clearly are entitled to physical or

material possession.

Allegations of the Complaint

Petitioners allege that they cannot be ejected from the lots, because respondents based their

Complaint regarding the nonpayment of rentals on a verbal lease agreement, which the latter

failed to prove.29

Petitioners contend that the lower courts erred in using another ground(tolerance of possession) to eject them.

In actions for unlawful detainer, possession that was originally lawful becomes unlawful uponthe expiration or termination of the defendants right to possess, arising from an express orimplied contract.30In other words, the plaintiffs cause of action comes from the expiration or

termination of the defendants right to continue possession.31

The case resulting therefrom mustbe filed within one year from the date of the last demand.

To show a cause of action in an unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is illegallywithholding possession from the plaintiff is sufficient. The complaint may lie even if it does not

employ the terminology of the law, provided the said pleading is couched in a language

adequately stating that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate has become

unlawful.32

It is equally settled that the jurisdiction of the court, as well as the nature of the

action, is determined from the averments of the complaint.

33

In the present case, the Complaint alleged that despite demands, petitioners "refused to pay theaccrued rentals and [to] vacate the leased premises."34 It prayed that judgment be rendered

"[o]rdering [petitioners] and all those claiming rights under them to vacate the properties x x x

and remove the structures x x x constructed thereon."35

Effectively then, respondents averred that

petitioners original lawful occupation of the subject lots had become unlawful.


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The MTCC found sufficient cause to eject petitioners. While it disbelieved the existence of a

verbal lease agreement, it nevertheless concluded that petitioners occupation of the subject lotswas by mere tolerance of respondents. Basing its conclusion on the fact that the parties were

close relatives, the MTCC ruled thus:

"x x x [T]he parties herein are first degree relatives. Because of this relationship, thisCourt takes judicial notice of the love, care, concern and protection imbued upon the

parents towards their [children], i.e., in the instant case, the love, care, concern andprotection of the [respondents] to the [petitioners]. With this in mind, this Court is

inclined to believe the position of the [petitioners] that there was no such verbal lease

agreement between the parties herein that took place in 1992. x x x.

"From the allegations of the [petitioners], this Court is convinced that their stay and

occupancy of the subject premises was by mere tolerance of the [respondents], and not by

virtue of a verbal lease agreement between them."36

Having found a cause of action for unlawful detainer, the MTCC (as well as the RTC and theCA) did not err in ordering the ejectment of petitioners as prayed for by respondents. There was

no violation of Section 17 of Rule 7037 of the Rules of Court. As earlier explained, unlawful

detainer was sufficiently alleged in the Complaint and duly proven during the trial. Significantly,

the issue of whether there was enough ground to eject petitioners was raised during thepreliminary conference.38

Not Merely Tolerated

Possession

Petitioners dispute the lower courts finding that they occupied the subject lots on the basis ofmere tolerance. They argue that their occupation was not under such condition, since respondentshad invited, offered and persuaded them to use those properties.39

This Court has consistently held that those who occupy the land of another at the latterstolerance or permission, without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied

promise that the occupants will vacate the property upon demand.40

A summary action for

ejectment is the proper remedy to enforce this implied obligation.41

The unlawful deprivation orwithholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.42

Toleration is defined as "the act or practice of permitting or enduring something not wholly

approved of."

43

Sarona v. Villegas

44

described what tolerated acts means, in this language:

"Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely tolerated are those which byreason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or

another person to do on the property; they are generally those particular services or

benefits which ones property can give to another without material injury or prejudice to

the owner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy. x x x. And, Tolentino

continues, even though this is continued for a long time, no right will be acquired by

prescription." x x x. Further expounding on the concept, Tolentino writes: There is tacit

consent of the possessor to the acts which are merely tolerated. Thus, not every case ofknowledge and silence on the part of the possessor can be considered mere tolerance. By

virtue of tolerance that is considered as an authorization, permission or license, acts of

possession are realized or performed. The question reduces itself to the existence or non-existence of the permission."45

We hold that the facts of the present case rule out the finding of possession by mere tolerance.Petitioners were able to establish that respondents had invited them to occupy the subject lots in

order that they could all live near one other and help in resolving family problems. 46 By

occupying those lots, petitioners demonstrated their acceptance of the invitation. Hence, there


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was a meeting of minds, and an agreement regarding possession of the lots impliedly arose

between the parties.

The occupancy of the subject lots by petitioners was not merely "something not wholly approved

of" by respondents. Neither did it arise from what Tolentino refers to as "neighborliness or

familiarity." In point of fact, their possession was upon the invitation of and with the completeapproval of respondents, who desired that their children would occupy the premises. It arose

from familial love and a desire for family solidarity, which are basic Filipino traits.

Right to Use the Lots Terminated

That Ismael and Teresita had a right to occupy the lots is therefore clear. The issue is the

duration of possession. In the absence of a stipulation on this point, Article 1197 of the Civil

Code allows the courts to fix the duration or the period.

"Article 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the

circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix theduration thereof.

"The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon the will of thedebtor.

"In every case the courts shall determine such period as may under the circumstances

have been probably contemplated by the parties. Once fixed by the courts, the period

cannot be changed by them."

Article 1197, however, applies to a situation in which the parties intended a period. Such

qualification cannot be inferred from the facts of the present case.

To repeat, when Vicente and Rosario invited their children to use the lots, they did so out of

parental love and a desire for solidarity expected from Filipino parents. No period was intendedby the parties. Their mere failure to fix the duration of their agreement does not necessarily

justify or authorize the courts to do so.47

Based on respondents reasons for gratuitously allowing petitioners to use the lots, it can be

safely concluded that the agreement subsisted as long as the parents and the children mutually

benefited from the arrangement. Effectively, there is a resolutory condition in such anagreement.48 Thus, when a change in the condition existing between the parties occurs -- like a

change of ownership, necessity, death of either party or unresolved conflict or animosity -- theagreement may be deemed terminated. Having been based on parental love, the agreement would

end upon the dissipation of the affection.

When persistent conflict and animosity overtook the love and solidarity between the parents and

the children, the purpose of the agreement ceased.49

Thus, petitioners no longer had any cause forcontinued possession of the lots. Their right to use the properties became untenable. It ceased

upon their receipt of the notice to vacate. And because they refused to heed the demand,

ejectment was the proper remedy against them. Their possession, which was originally lawful,became unlawful when the reason therefor -- love and solidarity -- ceased to exist between them.

No Right to Retain

Possession

Petitioners have not given this Court adequate reasons to reverse the lower courts dismissal oftheir contention that Lots T-78521 and T-103141, respectively, were allegedly allotted to them as

part of their inheritance and given in consideration for past debts.


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The right of petitioners to inherit from their parents is merely inchoate and is vested only upon

the latters demise. Indisputably, rights of succession are transmitted only from the moment ofdeath of the decedent.50 Assuming that there was an "allotment" of inheritance, ownership

nonetheless remained with respondents. Moreover, an intention to confer title to certain persons

in the future is not inconsistent with the owners taking back possession in the meantime for any

reason deemed sufficient.

51

Other than their self-serving testimonies and their affidavits,petitioners offered no credible evidence to support their outlandish claim of inheritance

"allocation."

We also agree with the lower courts that petitioners failed to prove the allegation that, through a

dation in payment, Lot T-78521 had been transferred to the latter as payment for respondentsdebts.52 The evidence presented by petitioners related only to the alleged indebtedness of the

parents arising from the latters purported purchases and advances.53 There was no sufficient

proof that respondents had entered into a contract of dation to settle the alleged debt. Petitioners

even stated that there was a disagreement in the accounting of the purported debt,54

a fact thatdisproves a meeting of the minds with the parents.

Petitioners also admitted that a portion of the alleged debt is the subject matter of a collectioncase against respondents (Civil Case No. 0594-96).55Thus, the formers allegation that theindebtedness has been paid through a dation cannot be given credence, inconsistent as it is with

their action to recover the same debt.

Despite their protestations, petitioners recognized the right of the parents to recover the premises

when they admitted in their Position Paper filed with the MTCC that respondents had a title tothe lots.

"The [respondents] want to get their property because the title is theirs, the [petitioners]

do not object but what is due the [petitioners] including the reparation for the tarnish oftheir dignity and honor must be given the [petitioners] for the benefits of their children

before the premises will be turned over."56

As a rule, the right of ownership carries with it the right of possession.

Second Issue:

Appearance at the Preliminary Conference

Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court requires the appearance of the plaintiff and the

defendant during the preliminary conference. On the basis of this provision, petitioners claimthat the MTCC should have dismissed the case upon the failure of respondents to attend the

conference. However, petitioners do not dispute that an attorney-in-fact with a written

authorization from respondents appeared during the preliminary conference.57

The issue then is

whether the rules on ejectment allow a representative to substitute for a partys personalappearance.

Unless inconsistent with Rule 70, the provisions of Rule 18 on pretrial applies to the preliminary

conference.58

Under Section 4 of this Rule, the nonappearance of a party may be excused by the

showing of a valid cause; or by the appearance of a representative, who has been fully authorizedin writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute

resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.59

Section 4 of Rule 18 may supplement Section 8 of Rule 70. Thus, the spirit behind the exception

to personal appearance under the rules on pretrial is applicable to the preliminary conference. If

there are valid reasons or if a representative has a "special authority," a partys appearance maybe waived. As petitioners are challenging only the applicability of the rules on pretrial to the rule

on preliminary conference, the written authorization from respondents can indeed be readily

considered as a "special authorization."


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Third Issue:

Rights of a Builder in Good Faith

As applied to the present case, accession refers to the right of the owner to everything that is

incorporated or attached to the property.

60

Accession industrial -- building, planting and sowingon an immovable -- is governed by Articles 445 to 456 of the Civil Code.

Articles 447 and 1678 of the

Civil Code Inapplicable

To buttress their claim of reimbursement for the improvements introduced on the property,

petitioners cite Article 447.61 They allege that the CA erred in applying Article 1678, since they

had no lease agreement with respondents.

We clarify. Article 447 is not applicable, because it relates to the rules that apply when the ownerof the property uses the materials of another. It does not refer to the instance when a possessor

builds on the property of another, which is the factual milieu here.

In view of the unique factual setting of the instant case, the contention of petitioners regardingthe inapplicability of Article 1678 deserves attention. The CA applied the provisions on lease,

because it found their possession by mere tolerance comparable with that of a lessee, per the

pronouncement in Calubayan v. Pascual,62

from which we quote:

"x x x. It has been held that a person who occupies the land of another at the latterstolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an

implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action forejectment is the proper remedy against them. The status of defendant is analogous to that

of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by

tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the unlawful deprivation or withholding ofpossession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate."63 (Emphasis in the

original.)

As explained earlier, Ismael and Teresitas possession of the two lots was not by mere tolerance,

a circumstance that negates the applicability of Calubayan.

Article 448 Applicable

On the other hand, when a person builds in good faith on the land of another, the applicableprovision is Article 448, which reads:64

"Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in

good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting,

after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one

who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is

considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable

rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after

proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case ofdisagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof."

This Court has ruled that this provision covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or

planters believe themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto. 65

It does not apply when the interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or

usufructuary.66

From these pronouncements, good faith is identified by the belief that the land isowned; or that -- by some title -- one has the right to build, plant, or sow thereon.67


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However, in some special cases, this Court has used Article 448 by recognizing good faith

beyond this limited definition. Thus, in Del Campo v. Abesia,68

this provision was applied to onewhose house -- despite having been built at the time he was still co-owner -- overlapped with the

land of another.69

This article was also applied to cases wherein a builder had constructed

improvements with the consent of the owner. The Court ruled that the law deemed the builder to

be in good faith.

70

In Sarmiento v. Agana,

71

the builders were found to be in good faith despitetheir reliance on the consent of another, whom they had mistakenly believed to be the owner of

the land.72

Based on the aforecited special cases, Article 448 applies to the present factual milieu. The

established facts of this case show that respondents fully consented to the improvementsintroduced by petitioners. In fact, because the children occupied the lots upon their invitation, the

parents certainly knew and approved of the construction of the improvements introduced

thereon.73

Thus, petitioners may be deemed to have been in good faith when they built the

structures on those lots.

The instant case is factually similar to Javier v. Javier.

74

In that case, this Court deemed the sonto be in good faith for building the improvement (the house) with the knowledge and consent ofhis father, to whom belonged the land upon which it was built. Thus, Article 448 75 was applied.

Rule on Useful Expenses

The structures built by petitioners were "useful" improvements, because they augmented the

value or income of the bare lots.76

Thus, the indemnity to be paid by respondents under Article448 is provided for by Article 546, which we quote:

"Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the

possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.

"Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right

of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of

refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thingmay have acquired by reason thereof."

Consequently, respondents have the right to appropriate -- as their own -- the building and otherimprovements on the subject lots, but only after (1) refunding the expenses of petitioners or (2)

paying the increase in value acquired by the properties by reason thereof. They have the option

to oblige petitioners to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than that of

the structures -- in which case, petitioners shall pay reasonable rent.

In accordance with Depra v. Dumlao,77

this case must be remanded to the trial court to determine

matters necessary for the proper application of Article 448 in relation to Article 546. Suchmatters include the option that respondents would take and the amount of indemnity that they

would pay, should they decide to appropriate the improvements on the lots. We disagree with the

CAs computation of useful expenses, which were based only on petitioners bare allegations intheir Answer.78

Ruling on Improvement Justified

While, ordinarily, the jurisdiction of the MTCC on ejectment proceedings is limited to the issue

of physical or material possession of the property in question, this Court finds it necessary toabbreviate the issue on the improvements in relation to Article 448. First, the determination of

the parties right to those improvements is intimately connected with the MTCC proceedings in

the light of the ejectment of petitioners. Second, there is no dispute that while they constructedthe improvements, respondents owned the land. Third, both parties raised no objection when the

RTC and the CA ruled accordingly on this matter.


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Equitable considerations compel us to settle this point immediately, pro hoc vice, to avoid

needless delay. Both parties have already been heard on this issue; to dillydally or equivocatewould not serve the cause of substantial justice.

Other Issues Raised

Given the foregoing rulings, it is no longer necessary to address petitioners allegation that the

MTCC judge and respondents lawyers should be respectively held personally accountable forthe Decision and for filing the case.79 The insinuation of petitioners that the lawyers manipulated

the issuance of a false barangay certification is unavailing.80

Their contention that respondents

did not attend the barangay conciliation proceedings was based solely on hearsay, which haslittle or no probative value.81

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMEDwith the following MODIFICATIONS:

1. The portion requiring Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaet to reimburse one half ofthe value of the useful improvements, amounting to P475,000, and the right of Spouses

Ismael and Rosita Macasaet to remove those improvements (if the former refuses to

reimburse) is DELETED.

2. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings to determine

the facts essential to the proper application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code,specifically to the following matters:

a. Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaets option to appropriate -- as their own --

the improvements on the lots, after paying the indemnity, as provided under

Article 546 in relation to Article 448 of the Civil Code; or in requiring SpousesIsmael and Rosita Macasaet to pay for the value of the lots, unless it isconsiderably more than that of the improvements, in which case petitioners shall

pay reasonable rent based upon the terms provided under the Civil Code

b. The value of the useful expenses incurred by Spouses Ismael and Rosita

Macasaet in the construction of the improvements on the lots

c. The increase in value acquired by the lots by reason of the useful improvements

d. Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaets choice of type of indemnity to be paid

(whether b or c)

e. Whether the value of the lots is considerably more than that of theimprovements built thereon

No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.


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G.R. No. 178908 February 4, 2010SPOUSES EULOGIO N. ANTAZO and NELIA C. ANTAZO, Petitioners,vs.

LEONIDES DOBLADA, DIOSDADO CELESTRA, LEOPOLDO CELESTRA,

FERDINAND CELESTRA, and ROBERTO DOBLADA, Respondents.

D E C I S I O NNACHURA,J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision

1dated February

28, 2007 and Resolution2dated July 18, 2007, which affirmed the order directing petitioners to

vacate the subject property.

The case arose from the following antecedents:

Respondents, Leonides Doblada, Diosdado Celestra, Leopoldo Celestra, Ferdinand Celestra, andRoberto Doblada, filed a complaint for forcible entry against petitioners, spouses Eulogio N.

Antazo and Nelia C. Antazo. The complaint alleged that respondents have been in open and

peaceful possession of a parcel of land, identified as Assessors Lot Nos. 112 and 113, located in

Barangay Pila-Pila, Binangonan, Rizal, with an area of, approximately, 551.87 square meters.3

Respondents narrated that, in May 2003, they received a letter from petitioners, through thePanganiban Law Office, informing them that the latter had bought the property. It was made to

appear in the said letter that respondents forcibly took possession of the property frompetitioners. Respondents replied that they could not have wrested possession of the property from

petitioners, as they were in possession thereof and that, in fact, on June 11, 2003, petitioners

evicted them therefrom, destroyed respondents bamboo fence, and constructed a concrete

perimeter fence thereon.4

In their Answer, petitioners admitted that they sent a letter to respondents through the

Panganiban Law Office, but they denied that respondents had been in possession of the property

since time immemorial. They averred that respondents failed to show their right to recoverpossession of the property. On the contrary, petitioners claimed that they are the ones entitled to

possess the property considering that they purchased it from a certain Carmencita S. Anciano,

registered it for taxation purposes in their names, and paid the real property tax thereon.

The records reveal that the subject property is part of the parcel of land owned by EduardoParalejas, respondents great grandfather, who died in 1939. Paralejas had three daughters:Matea, Eufemia and Leoncia. On April 12, 1983, Eufemia and Atanacio Buesa, Mateas son,

purportedly executed an Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale,5adjudicating to themselves the entire

parcel of land and, at the same time, selling it to Guadalupe Morales Sevillano. The document

bears the thumbprints of Eufemia and Atanacio, which, respondents claim, are not genuine. After

Sevillano died on November 24, 1995, her sole heir, Carmencita S. Anciano, petitionerspredecessor-in-interest, executed a document, denominated as Sinumpaang Salaysay ng

Paglilipat sa Sarili ng Mga Lupang Naiwan ng Namatay,6adjudicating to herself the properties

that Sevillano left, which included the subject property. On April 21, 2003, Anciano sold the

subject property to petitioners.7On July 2, 2004, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) dismissed the complaint because respondents

failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that they had prior possession of the subject

property. The court a quo found that ownership and possession of the subject property was

transferred to petitioners when they purchased the same from Anciano.8

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially affirmed the MTC Decision.9 Upon

respondents motion for reconsideration, the RTC, in an Order dated May 29, 2006, reversed its

previous decision and ruled in favor of respondents, thus:Wherefore, this Court reconsiders the Decision of Judge Bernelito R. Fernandez, dated August

18, 2005, and the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Binangonan dated July 2, 2004 is

hereby reversed as follows:A. That the complaint which was dismissed by the Lower Court is hereby reinstated.

B. That this Court finds that the plaintiffs-appellants were in prior possession of lot 112and 113, subject of this case, before defendants-appellees Eulogio Antazo and Nelia

Antazo forcibly seized possession of the aforementioned property from the plaintiffs-appellants.
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C. That defendants-appellees, Eulogio Antazo, and Nelia Antazo are hereby ordered to

vacate lots 112, 113 situated at Barrio Pila-Pila, Binangonan, Rizal, covered by TaxDeclaration No. 17-0765 consisting of 787.87 square meters.

D. That there was a substantial compliance of the Katarungan Pambarangay Law.

E. That the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to pay 1,000.00 a month as

reasonable compensation for the occupancy of the lots from the time they purchased theproperty on April 21, 2003 up to the present.

F. The defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to pay attorneys fees in the amount of

20,000.00 pesos.G. To pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.10

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the RTC on August 1,2006.11

Unrelenting, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA. On February 28, 2007, the CA

affirmed the RTC decision with modification, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Orders are hereby

AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION deleting the award of P1,000.00 as reasonablecompensation for the use and occupation of the land from April 21, 2003 up to the present.

SO ORDERED.12

According to the CA, petitioners may not eject respondents from the subject property since it

appears that, as between them, the latter had prior possession thereof. Assuming that petitioners

have the legal title to the property and that respondents are mere usurpers thereof, the latter are

nonetheless entitled to stay until they are lawfully ejected therefrom.13

The CA also deleted theamount of reasonable compensation awarded to respondents for the use and occupation of the

property, ratiocinating that the latter can recover only the damages they have sustained as mere

possessors.14

Both petitioners and respondents moved for the partial reconsideration of the decision. In a

Resolution dated July 18, 2007, the CA denied both motions.15

Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari, ascribing the following errors to the CA:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIALCOURT ERRED IN REVERSING ITS EARLIER DECISION DATED AUGUST 18, 2005

AND IN ORDERING THE EJECTMENT OF PETITIONERS FROM LOTS 112 AND 113;

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONERS HAVEPRIORITY IN POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.

Petitioners contend that respondents claim is not supported by competent evidence. They aver

that when they bought the property from Anciano, the latter transferred to them possession andownership of the subject property. They point out that, after they purchased the property from

Anciano, they declared it in their names for taxation purposes and paid real property tax thereon.

The petition is without merit.

Petitioners argument is misplaced, considering that this is a forcible entry case. They areapparently referring to "possession" flowing from ownership of the property, as opposed to

actual possession. In ejectment cases, possession means nothing more than actual physical

possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law.17

Prior physical possession is the primary consideration in a forcible entry case. A party who canprove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever

may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the

security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfullyejects him.18The party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand,

violence or terror.19

We are convinced that respondents were in prior possession of the property and that petitionersdeprived them of such possession by means of force.

In the Letter dated May 26, 2003, Atty. Jimmy R. Panganiban of Panganiban Law Office, onbehalf of petitioners, wrote to respondents:

According to my clients, they bought the above-mentioned property from the true and absoluteowner sometime in April 2003. Immediately upon the sale of said land in their favor, they took

possession thereof in the concept of an owner. They reported to me that they are now fencing

said property. They were surprise[d] that through force, violence, threat, strategy, and stealth you
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deprived them of possession. The saddest part of it is that you timed the deprivation after they

have already paid a worker for one week fencing activity. They have already bought fencingconstruction materials such as gravel[,] sand, steel, wires, and others. They could not understand

why you are doing this thing to them because they know that you have no legal basis [for]

putting up a bamboo fence at the frontage portion of the said property.

Accordingly, FINAL DEMAND is hereby made upon all of you to remove the bamboo fenceand to restore my clients possession within five (5) days from receipt of this letter. If you [fail]

to comply with this demand, I shall take it that I am at liberty to file an ejectment case against all

of you in order to protect the rights and interests of my clients.The RTC correctly concluded that it would have been unnecessary to write the letter if

petitioners were already in possession of the property. The contents of the letter are clear

petitioners are demanding that respondents restore possession of the property to them.We also note that petitioners did not deny in their Answer respondents allegation that theyconstructed a concrete fence on the subject property. Failure to specifically deny the allegation

amounts to a judicial admission. Unlawfully entering the subject property, erecting a structure

thereon and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would necessarily imply the use of force. In

order to constitute force, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war.

21

No other proofis necessary.

While the Letter intimates that petitioners were in possession of the property prior to respondentsand that the latter were the ones who forcibly evicted them therefrom, such statement is clearly

self-serving and unsupported by other evidence. Verily, this information, assuming that it is true,

is not relevant to the resolution of this case. This case involves respondents cause of action

against petitioners for evicting them from the subject property which was in their possession. It isimmaterial how respondents came into such possession or by what right they did so. Even

usurpers of land owned by another are entitled to remain on it until they are lawfully ejected

therefrom.22

Granting that petitioners had earlier possession and respondents were the ones who first forcibly

dispossessed them of the property, this circumstance would not have given petitioners license to

recover possession in the same way. Such course of action is precisely what is sought to be

avoided by the rule on ejectment. The underlying philosophy behind ejectment suits is to preventbreach of the peace and criminal disorder and to compel the party out of possession to respect

and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his. The party deprived of possession must

not take the law into his own hands.23

Petitioners would have had a right of action againstrespondents to file an ejectment suit, but they evidently let the chance pass and chose the easier

and faster way. Unfortunately for them, this time, their opponents chose to resort to appropriate

judicial measures.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The CA Decision dated February 28,

2007 and Resolution dated July 18, 2007 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
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JULIANA SUDARIA, G.R. No. 164305

Petitioner,

Present:

QUISUMBING,J.,

- versus - Chairperson,

CARPIO,CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA, and

MAXIMILLIANO QUIAMBAO, VELASCO, JR., JJ.

Respondent.

Promulgated:

November 20, 2007

x--------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O NTinga,J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,

petitioner Juliana Sudaria (petitioner) assails the Decision dated 8 March 2004 of the NinthDivision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75560 and its Resolution dated 10 June

2004 denying her Motion for Reconsideration.The antecedents follow.

On 11 October 2001, respondent Maximilliano Quiambao filed a Complaint[5] for unlawful

detainer against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Miguel, Bulacan

docketed as Civil Case No. 2557. Respondent stated that he was the owner of a parcel of landwith an area of 354 sq m situated in Barrio Sta. Rita, Bata, San Miguel, Bulacan and covered by

Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-113925. He also averred that in 1965, by virtue of aKasunduan, his predecessor-in-interest, Alfonsa C. Vda. de Viola, leased the said piece of land

to petitioners late husband, Atanacio Sudaria, for a monthly rental of P2.00 which was later

increased to P873.00 per annum in 1985. According to respondent, in the same year, petitioner,

who took over the lease after her husbands death, stopped paying the rentals on the property. In

April 2001, respondent made a demand[7] for petitioner to pay the overdue rentals and vacate thepremises. However, petitioner refused to leave the premises despite the lapse of the fifteen (15)

day period given by respondent. Because no settlement was reached at the conciliation

proceedings before the barangay captain, respondent was constrained to file the ejectment case.In her Answer with Motion to Dismiss,[9] petitioner averred that the subject property was

previously owned by Alfonsa C. Vda. de Viola and later inherited by Leticia and Asuncion Viola

as evidenced by an agricultural leasehold contract. She claimed that she had not been remiss inpaying the lease rentals, as the payment for the years between 1980 and 1999 were evidenced by

receipts except that the receipts for 1998 and 1999 were withheld by respondent. Petitioner also

maintained that she refused to pay the lease rentals to respondent because he was not the

registered lessor, and that as bona fide tenant-successor of her deceased husband, she wasentitled to security of tenure, as well as to the homelot which formed part of the leasehold under

agrarian laws. She further contended that the MTC could not have taken cognizance of the case

as there had been no prior recourse to the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council as provided for in

Section 53 of Republic Act No. 6657. Finally, petitioner asserted that the MTC had nojurisdiction over the case as it involved an agrarian dispute.

In a Decision dated 10 May 2002, the MTC held that there existed a tenancy relationship

between the parties and that since the subject lot was petitioners homelot, the instantcontroversy is an agrarian dispute over which the courts have no jurisdiction.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 9 reversed the decision

of the MTC. The key portions of said decision read as follows:To begin with, it bears stressing that the 354-square meter residential lot covered by the

KASUNDUAN riceland covered by both the Agricultural Leasehold Contract (Exh. 1) and theKasunduan Buwisan Sa Sakahan (Exh. 3) are separate and distinct from one another; they are

parcels of realty differently located. (Exh. B) and the 1.076-hectare parcel ofHaving been originally established in December 1979 (Exh. 1), the agricultural leasehold relation

between herein contending parties, specifically with respect to a home lot, is governed bypertinent provisions of Rep. Act No. 3844 (Agricultural Land Reform Code) which took effect


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upon its approval on August 8, 1968, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6389 (Code of Agrarian

Reforms of the Philippines) which took effect upon its approval on September 10, 1971. Havingtaken effect upon its approval on August 30, 1954, Rep. Act No. 1199 is not applicable to herein

parties leasehold relation (Bunye v. Aquino, 342 SCRA 360, 369).

x x x

With the aforecited provisions of prevailing agrarian laws to go by, it becomes all too clear thatthe 354-square meter residential lot aforementioned, located as it is outside the 1.076-hectare

landholding, cannot be considered a home lot inasmuch as the same has not yet been

expropriated by the Department of Agrarian Reform for resale at cost to herein defendant -appellee. By such token, the instant controversy falls under the jurisdiction of civil courts to the

exclusion of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board.[14]

Consequently, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals in a petition for review underRule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The denial of the

petition was based on petitioners failure to attach clearly legible copies of the judgments of the

lower courts and of the pleadings and documents material to the judicious consideration of the

case, in violation of Section 2, Rule 42[15] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Even on themerits, the appellate court held that the petition must be denied as petitioners occupation of the

subject property was in the concept of civil law lease and had no reference at all to agriculturallease.[17]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but the same was

denied. She insists that since the subject property is her homelot, she is entitled to continue in the

exclusive possession and enjoyment thereof. Hence, this appeal by certiorari, whereby sheasserts that the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the decision of the RTC and ruled that

the civil courts did have jurisdiction over the instant case.

For his part, respondent maintains that petitioner occupied the subject property by virtue of alease agreement and not by virtue of any tenancy relationship with its previous owner.

The petition must fail.

First, the procedural aspects. The Court of Appeals correctly denied the petition for failure to

attach clearly legible duplicate originals or photocopies of the MTC judgment and copies of thematerial portions of the record, specifically the Kasunduan dated 21 March 1965 which is

integral to the complaint (Annex B thereof).The case ofAtillo v. Bombay[22] reiterates the

mandatory tenor of Section 2 (d), Rule 42 with respect to the requirement of attaching clearlylegible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of the lower courts. As

for the phrase of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the

allegations of the petition in the same provision of law, the Atillo case likewise tells us thatwhile this contemplates the exercise of discretion on the part of the petitioner, such discretion in

choosing the documents to be attached to the petition is not unbridled, to wit:

The [Court of Appeals] has the duty to check the exercise of this discretion to see to it that the

submission of supporting documents is not merely perfunctory. The practical aspect of this dutyis to enable the CA to determine at the earliest possible time the existence ofprima facie merit in

the petition. Moreover, Section 3 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides that if petitioner fails

to comply with the submission of documents which should accompany the petition, it shall be

sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.[23]

In any event, petitioners contentions on the substantive aspect of the case fail to invite judgment

in her favor.

It is settled that jurisdiction of the court in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations of thecomplaint and the character of the relief sought.[24]

The Complaint[25] filed by petitioner alleged these material facts:

Cause of Action3. Plaintiff is the owner of that certain parcel of land situated in Bo. Sta Rita, Bata, San Miguel,

Bulacan, with a total area of 354 square meters, more or less, and covered by TCT No. T-113925of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan. A copy of the said title hereto attached is

made on (sic) integral part hereof as Annex A.

4. On 21 May 1965, the said piece of land was leased to the defendants predecessor-in-interest,

her late husband Atanacio Sudaria, for a monthly rental of P2.00 which was later increased to


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P873/year in 1985. A copy of the lease contract is hereto attached and is made an integral part

hereof as Annex B.5. Defendant took over the lease of the said property after her husbands death.

6. In 1985, defendant stopped paying the rentals for the said property which, as of 4 April 2001,

amounted to P13,095.00.

7. On 4 April 2001, plaintiff sent [to] defendant a notice to vacate and demand to pay but thedefendant refused, and still refuses, to vacate the leased property despite the lapse of the fifteen

(15) day period given [to] her. A copy of the said notice is hereto attached and is made an

integral part hereof as Annex C.[26]It was clearly alleged that petitioner unlawfully withheld possession of the land despite

respondents demand to vacate the premises, which demand respondent made after petitioner had

failed to pay the rent. Based on the averment in the complaint, the MTC properly acquiredjurisdiction over the ejectment case.

Petitioners naked claim in her answer that the subject property is her homelot is not sufficient todivest the MTC of jurisdiction over the ejectment case. The court could not be deprived of

jurisdiction over an ejectment case based merely on defendants assertion of ownership over the

litigated property. The underlying reason for this rule is to prevent the defendant from triflingwith the summary nature of an ejectment suit by the simple expedient of asserting ownership

over the disputed property.[27]Ejectment proceedings are summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of

protecting actual possession or right to possession of property. Title is not involved. The sole

issue to be resolved is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or

possession de facto.[28] On this point, the pronouncements in Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals[29] areenlightening, thus:

The only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings is whois entitled to

the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to thepossession de jure. It does not even matter if a partys title to the property is questionable, orwhen both parties intruded into public land and their applications to own the land have yet to be

approved by the proper government agency. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the

property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand,violence or terror. Neither is the unlawful withholding of property allowed. Courts will always

uphold respect for prior possession.

Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against theowner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior

possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a

person with a better right lawfully ejects him. To repeat, the only issue that the court has tosettle in an ejectment suit is the right to physical possession.

Anent the issue of rightful possession, it is clear that it belongs to respondent. Petitioner failed to

show that the Department of Agrarian Reform had awarded the property in her favor as her

homelot. Instead, the clear preponderance of evidence is on the side of respondent. He presentedthe Torrens title covering the lot in his name.

It must be stressed, however, that the Court has engaged in this initial determination of

ownership over the lot in dispute only for the purpose of settling the issue of possession.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 8 March 2004 of the Court ofAppeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75560 and its Resolution dated 10 June 2004 are AFFIRMED. Costs

against petitioner. SO ORDERED.


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G.R. No. 154415. July 28, 2005

GASPAR CALACALA, BALTAZAR CALACALA, MELCHOR CALACALA,

SOLOMON CALACALA, FELICIDAD CALACALA, PETRONILA CALACALA and

SALOME CALACALA, Petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, representedby the Solicitor General, and SHERIFF JUAN C. MARQUEZ,Respondents.

D E C I S I O NGARCIA,J.:In this appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, petitioners urge us to annul and set aside the resolution dated 31 October 2001 and theorder dated 2 July 2002 of the Regional Trial Court at Rosales, Pangasinan which respectively

dismissed petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. 1239-R and denied their motion for

reconsideration.The material facts are not at all disputed:

The spouses Camilo Calacala and Conchita Calacala, predecessors-in-interest of the herein

petitioners, are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Balincanaway,

Rosales, Pangasinan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21204 of the Registry of

Deeds of Pangasinan.To secure the provisional release of an accused in a criminal case then pending before the then

Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pangasinan, the spouses offered their aforementioned parcel ofland as a property bond in said case. For failure of the accused to appear at his scheduled

arraignment on 4 November 1981, the CFI ordered the bond forfeited in favor of the

government, and, following the bondman's failure to produce in court the body of the accused,

rendered judgment against the bond in the amount of P3,500.00. Thereafter, the court issued aWrit of Execution[1] directing the provincial sheriff to effect a levy on the subject parcel of land

and to sell the same at a public auction to satisfy the amount of the bond. In compliance with the

writ, the deputy provincial sheriff issued on 26 July 1982 a Notice of Levy [2] addressed to theRegister of Deeds of Pangasinan who, on 19 August 1982, caused the annotation thereof on TCT

No. T-21204 as Entry No. 83188.

Not long thereafter, a public auction of the subject parcel of land was held on 24 September

1982, at which respondent Republic submitted its bid for P3,500, which is the amount of thejudgment on the bond. Hence, on that same day, a Sheriff's Certificate of Sale[3] was issued in

favor of the Republic as the winning bidder.

On 5 October 1982, the same Certificate of Sale was registered and annotated on TCT No. T-21204 as Entry No. 83793, thereby giving the spouses Calacala a period of one (1) year

therefrom within which to redeem their property. Unfortunately, they never did up to the time of

their respective deaths on 13 January 1988 and 8 January 1994.Claiming ownership of the same land as legal heirs of the deceased spouses, petitioners filed

with the Regional Trial Court at Rosales, Pangasinan a complaint[4] for Quieting of Title andCancellation of Encumbrance on TCT No. T-21204 against respondents Republic and Sheriff

Juan C. Marquez. In their complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 1239-R and raffled to Branch 53of the court, petitioners prayed, inter alia, for the cancellation of Entries No. 83188 and 83793

on TCT No. T-21204 or the declaration of said entries as null and void.

To the complaint, respondent Republic interposed a Motion to Dismiss [5] grounded on the (1)

complaint's failure to state a cause of action and (2) prescription of petitioners' right to redeem.In their Opposition,[6] petitioners contend that when respondent Republic moved to dismiss the

complaint for failure to state a cause of action, it thereby hypothetically admitted all the

allegations therein, specifically the averment that despite the lapse of nineteen (19) years,respondent did not secure the necessary Certificate of Final Sale and Writ of Possession and

failed to execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership. Petitioners thus submit that the

Republic's rights over the land in question had either prescribed, been abandoned or waived.They add that by filing a motion to dismiss, respondent Republic likewise admitted the allegation

in the same complaint that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have been in continuouspossession of the subject land and paying the realty taxes thereon.

In the herein assailed resolution[7] dated 31 October 2001, the trial court granted the Republic'smotion to dismiss and accordingly dismissed petitioners' complaint. Petitioners moved for a

reconsideration but their motion was denied by the same court in its equally challenged order[8]

of 2 July 2002.
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Hence, petitioners' present recourse, it being their contentions that -

I.THE INSTANT COMPLAINT FOR QUIETING OF TITLE AND CANCELLATION OF

ENCUMBRANCE ON TCT NO. T-21204, FILED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT, RGIONAL

[sic] TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 53, ROSALES, PANGASINAN WAS THE PROPER

REMEDY.II.

THE COMPLAINT STATES SUFFICIENT CAUSE OF ACTION.

III.THE CASE FOR QUIETING OF TITLE HAS NOT PRESCRIBED.

IV.

AND THE RESPONDENT REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES HAS NOT PERFECTED ITSTITLE TO THE LAND IN QUESTION.

In the main, it is petitioners' submission that their complaint a quo sufficiently states a cause of

action because they are still the owners of the subject parcel of land despite their failure to

redeem it within the 1-year redemption period. They premise their argument on the Republic's

failure to secure the Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation ofOwnership and obtain a writ of possession over the same property within ten (10) years from the

registration of the Certificate of Sale on 5 October 1982. Prescinding therefrom, they thus arguethat the Republic's right over the property in question has already prescribed or has been

abandoned and waived, citing, in support thereof, Article 1142 of the Civil Code. In short, it is

petitioners' thesis that respondent Republic failed to perfect its title.

On the other hand, it is respondent's posture that its rights and title as owner of the same propertyare already perfected by the mere failure of petitioners and/or their predecessors-in-interest to

redeem the same within one (1) year from the registration/annotation of the Sheriff's Certificate

of Sale on TCT No. T-21204, in accordance with Section 33, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of CivilProcedure.

As we see it, the only question which commends itself for our resolution is whether the trial

court's dismissal of petitioners' complaint for Quieting of Title was proper. It thus behooves us to

determine if, in the first place, petitioners have a cause of action in their complaint.We rule for respondent Republic.

To begin with, it bears emphasis that an action for quieting of title is essentially a common law

remedy grounded on equity. As we held inBaricuatro, Jr. vs. CA:[9]Regarding the nature of the action filed before the trial court, quieting of title is a common law

remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real

property. Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure 'x x x an adjudication that aclaim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that

the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of

hostile claim. In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to determine the

respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, 'x x x not only to place things in their

proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the

other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubtoverthe property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he

may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best xxx (Italics supplied).Under Article 476 of the New Civil Code, the remedy may be availed of only when, by reason of

any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but is, in fact,

invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby casts on the complainant's titleto real property or any interest therein. The codal provision reads:

Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason

of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid oreffective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be

prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or

any interest therein.In turn, Article 477 of the same Code identifies the party who may bring an action to quiet title,

thus:
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Article 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property

which is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.It can thus be seen that for an action for quieting of title to prosper, the plaintiff must first have a

legal, or, at least, an equitable title on the real property subject of the action and that the alleged

cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid. So it is that in Robles, et al. vs. CA, [10] we

ruled:It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal title or an equitable title to or

interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. Also, the deed, claim,

encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiff's title must be shown tobe in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Verily, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2) indispensable requisites must concur,

namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the realproperty subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be

casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie

appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Unfortunately, the foregoing requisites are wanting in this case.

To start with, petitioners base their claim of legal title not on the strength of any independentwriting in their favor but simply and solely on respondent Republic's failure to secure the

Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ ofpossession over the property in dispute within ten (10) years from the registration of the

Certificate of Sale.

Petitioners' reliance on the foregoing shortcomings or inactions of respondent Republic cannot

stand.For one, it bears stressing that petitioners' predecessors-in-interest lost whatever right they had

over land in question from the very moment they failed to redeem it during the 1-year period of

redemption. Certainly, the Republic's failure to execute the acts referred to by the petitionerswithin ten (10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale cannot, in any way, operate

to restore whatever rights petitioners' predecessors-in-interest had over the same. For sure,

petitioners have yet to cite any provision of law or rule of jurisprudence, and we are not aware of

any, to the effect that the failure of a buyer in a foreclosure sale to secure a Certificate of FinalSale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ of possession over

the property thus acquired, within ten (10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale

will operate to bring ownership back to him whose property has been previously foreclosed andsold. As correctly observed by the trial court, the Republic's failure to do anything within ten

(10) years or more following the registration of the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale cannot give rise

to a presumption that it has thereby waived or abandoned its right of ownership or that it hasprescribed, 'for prescription does not lie against the government', nor could it 'be bound or

estopped by the negligence or mistakes of its officials and employees' .

Quite the contrary, Section 33,[11] Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly

provides that '[u]pon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptionershall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor

to the property as of the time of the levy.

Concededly, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was yet inexistent when the facts of this case

transpired. Even then, the application thereof to this case is justified by our pronouncement inLascano vs. Universal Steel Smelting Co., Inc., et al., [12] to wit:

Procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time

of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a general rule, theretroactive application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any personal rights

because no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom.

Moreover, with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year redemption period forecloses theobligor's right to redeem and that the sale thereby becomes absolute, the issuance thereafter of a

final deed of sale is at best a mere formality and mere confirmation of the title that is alreadyvested in the purchaser. As this Court has said in Manuel vs. Philippine National Bank, et

al.:[13]Note must be taken of the fact that under the Rules of Court the expiration of that one-year

period forecloses the owner's right to redeem, thus making the sheriff's sale absolute. The

issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale becomes a mere formality, an act merely
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confirmatory of the title that is already in the purchaser and constituting official evidence

of that fact. (Emphasis supplied)With the reality that petitioners are not holders of any legal title over the property subject of this

case and are bereft of any equitable claim thereon, the very first requisite of an action to quiet

title, i.e., that the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real

property subject matter of the action, is miserably wanting in this case.For another, and worse, petitioners never put in issue, as in fact they admit in their pleadings, the

validity of the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale duly registered on 5 October 1982. On this score, the

second requisite of an action to quiet title, namely, that the deed, claim, encumbrance orproceeding alleged to cast cloud on a plaintiff's title is in fact invalid or inoperative despite itsprima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy, is likewise absent herein.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed resolution and order of the trialcourt AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.


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G.R. No. 152115. January 26, 2005NIMFA USERO, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. HERMINIGILDO &

CECILIA POLINAR,Respondents.

G.R. No. 155055. January 26, 2005LUTGARDA R. SAMELA, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS.

HERMINIGILDO & CECILIA POLINAR,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CORONA,J.:

Before this Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court. The first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 152115, filed by Nimfa Usero,assails the September 19, 2001 decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 64718.

The second petition, docketed as G.R. No. 155055, filed by Lutgarda R. Samela, assails the

January 11, 2002 decision [2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP NO. 64181.

The undisputed facts follow.

Petitioners Lutgarda R. Samela and Nimfa Usero are the owners respectively of lots 1 and 2,Block 5, Golden Acres Subdivision, Barrio Almanza, Las Pias City.

Private respondent spouses Polinar are the registered owners of a parcel of land at no. 18Anahaw St., Pilar Village, Las Pias City, behind the lots of petitioners Samela and Usero.

Situated between the lots of the parties is a low-level strip of land, with a stagnant body of water

filled with floating water lilies; abutting and perpendicular to the lot of petitioner Samela, the lot

of the Polinars and the low-level strip of land is the perimeter wall of Pilar Village Subdivision.Apparently, every time a storm or heavy rains occur, the water in said strip of land rises and the

strong current passing through it causes considerable damage to the house of respondent

Polinars. Frustrated by their predicament, private respondent spouses, on July 30, 1998, erected aconcrete wall on the bank of the low-level strip of land about three meters from their house and

rip-rapped the soil on that portion of the strip of land.

Claiming ownership of the subject strip of land, petitioners Samela and Usero demanded that the

spouses Polinar stop their construction but the spouses paid no heed, believing the strip to be partof a creek. Nevertheless, for the sake of peace, the Polinars offered to pay for the land being

claimed by petitioners Samela and Usero. However, the parties failed to settle their differences.

On November 9, 1998, petitioners filed separate complaints for forcible entry against thePolinars at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Pias City. The case filed by petitioner Samela

was docketed as Civil Case No. 5242, while that of petitioner Usero was docketed as Civil Case

No. 5243.In Civil Case No. 5242, petitioner Samela adduced in evidence a copy of her Transfer Certificate

of Title, plan of consolidation, subdivision survey, the tax declaration in her name, and affidavits

of petitioner Usero and a certain Justino Gamela whose property was located beside the

perimeter wall of Pilar Village.The spouses Polinar, on the other hand, presented in evidence their own TCT; a barangay

certification as to the existence of the creek; a certification from the district engineer that the

western portion of Pilar Village is bound by a tributary of Talon Creek throughout its entire

length; boundary and index map of Pilar Village showing that the village is surrounded by acreek and that the Polinar property is situated at the edge of said creek; and pictures of the

subject strip of land filled with water lilies.

On March 22, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner Samela:WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment ordering the defendants to vacate and

remove at their expense the improvements made on the subject lot; ordering the defendants to

pay the plaintiff P1,000.00 a month as reasonable compensation for the use of the portionencroached from the filing of the complaint until the same is finally vacated; and to pay plaintiff

P10,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees plus costs of suit. [3]In a parallel development, the Metropolitan Trial Court, in Civil Case No. 5243, issued an order

on February 29, 2000, directing petitioner Usero and the Polinar spouses to commission aprofessional geodetic engineer to conduct a relocation survey and to submit the report to the trial

court.
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On April 24, 2000, Mariano Flotilde, a licensed geodetic engineer, conducted a relocation survey

of Usero's property covered by TCT No. T- 29545. The result of the said relocation survey, asstated in his affidavit, was as follows:

1. That I executed a relocation survey of Lot 2, Block 5, (LRC) PCS-4463 covered by TCT No.

T-29545 registered in the name of Nimfa O. Usero;

2. That according to my survey, I found out that there is no existing creek on the boundary of thesaid lot;

3. That based on the relocation plan surveyed by the undersigned, attached herewith, appearing is

the encroachment on the above-mentioned lot by Spouses Herminigildo and Cecilia Polinar withan area of FORTY THREE (43) SQUARE METERS;

4. That this affidavit was made in compliance with Court Order dated February 23, 2000 of

Metropolitan Trial Court, Las Pias City, Branch LXXIX. [4]On August 25, 2000, the Metropolitan Trial Court decided in favor of petitioner Usero:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants

ordering them:

a) To vacate and remove at their expense the improvement made on the subject lot;

b) To pay the plaintiff P1,000.00 a month as reasonable compensation for the portion encroachedfrom the time of the filing of the complaint until the same is finally vacated;

c) To pay plaintiff P10,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees plus costs of suit.SO ORDERED. [5]

The Polinar spouses appealed the decisions of the two Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional

Trial Court of Las Pias, Branch 253 which heard the appeals separately.

On December 20, 2000, the Regional Trial Court, deciding Civil Case No. 5242, reversed thedecision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the complaint. It confirmed the existence

of the creek between the northwestern portion of the lot of petitioner Samela and the

southwestern portion of the lot of the spouses Polinar:Finding the existence of a creek between the respective properties of the parties, plaintiff-

appellee cannot therefore lay claim of lawful ownership of that portion because the same forms

part of public dominion. Consequently, she cannot legally stop the defendants-appellants from

rip-rapping the bank of the creek to protect the latter's property from soil erosion therebyavoiding danger to their lives and damage to property.

Absent a lawful claim by the plaintiff-appellee over the subject portion of that lot, defendants-

appellants are not duty bound to pay the former compensation for the use of the same. As aresult, the

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