Property Case Digests Compendium Done (1) (1) (1)

8/11/2019 Property Case Digests Compendium Done (1) (1) (1)

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Table Contents

Leung Yee V. Strong Machinery, 37 Phil. 644. .............................................................................. 1

Antonio Punsalan, Jr., Petitioner, Vs. Remedios Vda. De Lacsamana And The Honorable Judge Rodolfo

A. Ortiz, Respondents. .............................................................................................................. 1

The Standard Oil Company Of New York V. Joaquin Jaramillo, Gr No. L-20329, 16 March 1923, EnBanc, Street ............................................................................................................................ 2

Davao Sawmill Co. V. Castillo, 61 Phil. 709 ................................................................................. 3

Board Of Assessment V. Manila Electric, 10 Scra 68 [1964] ........................................................... 3

Makati Leasing V. Wearever Textile Mills, Inc, 122 Scra 296. ......................................................... 4

Mindanao Bus V. City Assessor, 116 Phil. 501. ............................................................................. 5

Caltex V. Central Board Of Assessment Appeals And The City Assessor Of Pasay, Gr No. L-50466, 31May 1982. ............................................................................................................................... 5

Serg Products V. Pci Leasing And Finance, Inc., Gr No. 137705, 22 August 2000. ............................ 6Tumalad Vs. Vicencio, Gr No. L-30173, 30 September 1971. ......................................................... 6

Star Two V Paper City Corp. Gr No. 192088. October 9, 2012. 2ndDiv. Perez .................................. 7

Pastor D. Ago V. Ca, Cfi Agusan Judge Ortiz, Provincial Sheriff Of Surigao And Grace Park Engineering,Gr No. L 17898, 31 October 1962, En Banc, Labrador. ............................................................... 8

Us V. Ignacio Carlos, Gr No. 6295, 1 September 1911, Per Curiam ................................................ 9

Luis Marcos P. Laurel V. Hon. Zeus Abrogar, Makati Rtc 50, And Pldt, Gr No. 155076, 27 February2006, First Division, Callejo. ...................................................................................................... 9

Municipality Of Cavite V. Hilario Rojas, G.R. No. L-9069, 31 March 1915, En Banc, Torres ................ 11

Maneclang V. Iac, G.R. No. L-66575, 30 September 1986, Second Division, Fernan. ....................... 11Republic Of The Philippines V. Democrito T. Mendoza, Gr No. 153726, 28 March 2007, Third Division,Chico-Nazario ......................................................................................................................... 12

Faustino Ignacio V. The Director Of Lands And Valeriano, G.R. No. L-12958 30 May 1960, En Banc,Montemayor ........................................................................................................................... 13

Levy Macasiano V. Hon. Roberto Diokno, G.R. No. 97764, 10 August 1992, En Banc, Medialdea ....... 13

Cebu Oxygen And Acetylene, Gr No. L40474, 39 August 1975, Second Division, Concepcion. ........... 14

Laurel V. Garcia, Gr No. 92013, 25 July 1995, En Banc, Gutierrez ................................................. 15

Manila International Airport Authority V. Ca, City Of Paraaque, Et.Al., Gr No. 155650, 20 July 2006,En Banc, Carpio. ..................................................................................................................... 16

Philippine Ports Authority V. City Of Iloilo, Gr No 109791, 14 July 2003, First Division, Azcuna. ........ 16

Philippine Fisheries Development Authority Vs.Ca, Office Of The President, Et. Al., Gr No. 169863, 31July 2007, Third Division, Ynares-Santiago. ................................................................................ 17

Republic (Philippine Reclamation Authority) Vs. City Of Paranaque, Gr No. 191109, 18 July 2012, ThirdDivision, Mendoza. .................................................................................................................. 18

Jean Tan Vs. Republic, Gr No. 193443, 16 April 2012, Second Division, Reyes. ............................... 19

Ideals, Inc. V Psalm Gr No. 192088. October 9, 2012. 2ndDiv. Villarama, Jr. .................................. 21

Woodridge School Inc Vs. Arb Construction ................................................................................ 21

Francisco Chavez V. Public Estates Authority And Amari Coastal Bay Dev. Co., Gr No 133250, 9 July2002. En Banc, Carpio. ............................................................................................................ 23

Francisco Chavez V. Nha, Gr No. 164527, 15 August 2007, En Banc, Velasco. ................................ 25

Estate Of The Late Yujuico V. Republic And Ca, Gr No. 168661, 26 October 2007, Second Division,Velasco .................................................................................................................................. 27

Land Bank Of The Philippines V. Republic Of The Philippines, Gr No. 150824, 4 February 2008, ThirdDivision, Reyes. ...................................................................................................................... 28

Heirs Of Malabanan V. Republic, Gr No. 179987, 29 April 2009, En Banc, Tinga .............................. 29


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Secretary Of Denr V. Mayor Jose Yap, G.R. No. 167707, October 8, 2008. En Banc, Reyes. .............. 31

Vda De Tan Toco Vs. Municipal Council Of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52. ........................................................ 32

Espiritu Vs. Municipal Council Of Pozorrubio, 102 Phil 867. ........................................................... 33

The Province Of Zamboanga Del Norte Vs. City Of Zamboanga, Gr No. L-24440, 28 March 1968....... 34

Rafael Salas Vs. Jarencio, 46 Scra 734. ..................................................................................... 36Manila Lodge 761 V. Ca, Gr No. L-41001, 30 September 1976, First Division, Castro. ...................... 37

Commissioner Of Public Highways V. San Diego, Gr No. L-30098, 18 February 1970. ...................... 42

Philippine National Bank V. Judge Javier Pabalan, Gr No. L-3312, 15 June 1978. ............................. 43

Professional Video, Inc. v TESDA GR No. 155504. June 26, 2009. Brion. ........................................ 44

Dr. Lorna Villa V. Heirs Of Altavas, Gr No 162028, 14 July 2008, Third Division, Austria-Martinez. ... 44

Estate Of Soledad Manantan V. Aniceto Somera, Gr No. 145867, 7 April 2009, Third Division, Chico-Nazario. ................................................................................................................................. 45

Casilang V. Casilang-Dizon, Gr No. 180269, 20 February 2013, First Division, Reyes. ...................... 46

City Government Of Quezon Vs. Ericta, 122 Scra 759 .................................................................. 46City Of Manila V. Judge Laguio And Malate Tourist Development Co., Gr No. 118127, 12 April 2005, EnBanc, Tinga. ........................................................................................................................... 48

Office Of The Solicitor General V. Ayala Land, Robinsons, Shangrila And Sm Prime Holdings, Gr No.177056, 18 September 2009, Third Division, Chico-Nazario. ........................................................ 48

Mmda V. Trackworks G.R. No. 179554 December 16, 2009 .......................................................... 49

Air Transportation Office And Mciaa V. Gopuco G.R. No. 158563. June 30, 2005. ........................... 50

Heirs Of Moreno V. Mciaa G.R. No. 156273. October 15, 2003. ..................................................... 51

Mciaa V. Lozada G.R. No. 176625. February 25, 2010 ................................................................. 53

Lunod V. Meneses G.R. No. 4223. August 19, 1908. .................................................................... 54

Roman Catholic Archbishop Of Manila Et. Al. V. Court Of Appeals G.R. No. 77425. June 19, 1991. .... 55

German Management And Services V. Ca And Villeza .................................................................. 56

Napocor V. Maruhom, Et. Al., Gr No. 168732, 29 June 2007, First Division, Azcuna. ........................ 57

Republic (Director Of Forest Development) V. Ca And Jose De La Rosa, Gr No. L-43938, 15 April 1988,First Division, Cruz .................................................................................................................. 58


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Leung Yee V. Strong Machinery, 37 Phil. 644.1

Principles Of Law:The Mere Fact That The Parties Seem To Have Dealt With It Separate And Apart

From The Land On Which It Stood In No Wise Changed Its Character As Real Property; One Who

Purchases Real Estate With Knowledge Of A Defect Or Lack Of Title In His Vendor Cannot Claim That

He Has Acquired Title Thereto In Good Faith As Against The True Owner Of The Land Or Of An Interest

Therein; And The Same Rule Must Be Applied To One Who Has Knowledge Of Facts Which Should HavePut Him Upon Such Inquiry And Investigation As Might Be Necessary To Acquaint Him With The

Defects In The Title Of His Vendor

Facts:

Compania Agricola Bought Rice-Cleaning Machinery From Respondent And Executed A Chattel

Mortgage Of Such Machinery And The Building Where The Machinery Was Found In Favor OfRespondent; There Was No Reference As To The Land Where The Building Was Found;

Due To Failure To Pay Of Agricola, The Property Was Sold Through Public Auction By SheriffWherein Respondent Was Able To Buy Said Property;

Few Weeks After, Agricola Executed A Deed Of Sale Which Was Not Registered Over The Land

Of The Building But Made No Reference As To Building Itself; As A Result, Respondent Took

Possession Of The Building; Incidentally, The Same Building Was Apparently Subject Of Chattel Mortgage In Favor Of

Petitioner Executed By Agricola; For Failure To Pay The Debt, Sheriff Foreclosed The PropertyWhich Was Won By Plaintiff Through Public Auction After The Latter Has Secured IndemnityBond Of P 12,000.00; This Was Due To The Fact That During The Levy, Agricola Has Set Up ItsClaim Over The Building And Demanded That It Be Release From Levy;

Court A Quo Rendered Judgment In Favor Of Strong On The Basis That Respondent Was AbleTo Register The Building First;

Issues

1. Was There A Proper Mortgage?

2.

Who Is The Proper Owner Of The Building? Incidentally, Is Good Faith A Requirement In TheInscription Of A Mortgage?

Held

1. No, There Was Not. The Building Of Strong Materials In Which The Rice-Cleaning MachineryWas Installed By The "Compaia Agricola Filipina" Was Real Property, And The Mere Fact ThatThe Parties Seem To Have Dealt With It Separate And Apart From The Land On Which It StoodIn No Wise Changed Its Character As Real Property.

2. Respondent. We Are Of Opinion, However, That The Judgment Must Be Sustained On TheGround That The Agreed Statement Of Facts In The Court Below Discloses That Neither ThePurchase Of The Building By The Plaintiff Nor His Inscription Of The Sheriff's Certificate Of SaleIn His Favor Was Made In Good Faith And Further, That The Building And The Land Were Sold

To The Machinery Company Long Prior To The Date Of The Sheriff's Sale To The Plaintiff. TheAgreed Statement Of Facts Clearly Discloses That The Plaintiff, When He Bought The BuildingAt The Sheriff's Sale And Inscribed His Title In The Land Registry, Was Duly Notified That TheMachinery Company Had Bought The Building From Plaintiff's Judgment Debtor; That It HadGone Into Possession Long Prior To The Sheriff's Sale; And That It Was In Possession At TheTime When The Sheriff Executed His Levy.

Miscellaneous:

1. One Who Purchases Real Estate With Knowledge Of A Defect Or Lack Of Title In His VendorCannot Claim That He Has Acquired Title Thereto In Good Faith As Against The True Owner OfThe Land Or Of An Interest Therein; And The Same Rule Must Be Applied To One Who Has

Knowledge Of Facts Which Should Have Put Him Upon Such Inquiry And Investigation As MightBe Necessary To Acquaint Him With The Defects In The Title Of His Vendor

Antonio Punsalan, Jr., Petitioner,Vs.

Remedios Vda. De Lacsamana And The Honorable Judge Rodolfo A. Ortiz, Respondents.2

1Cesista. 21 June 2014.


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Principles Of Law:The Prevalent Doctrine Is That An Action For The Annulment Or Rescission Of A

Sale Of Real Property Does Not Operate To Efface The Fundamental And Prime Objective And Nature

Of The Case, Which Is To Recover Said Real Property. It Is A Real Action.; A Building Always

Considered Immovable Notwithstanding That Parties To A Contract Treat It Apart From The Land It

Stands;

Facts:

Punsalan Was The Registered Owner Of A Property Situated In Tarlac; Such Property Was

Mortgaged In Favor Of Pnb Which Foreclosed The Same After Petitioner Failed To Pay HisDebts

Petitioner, Allegedly With The Consent Of Pnb Continued Occupying The Land And In FactConstructed A Warehouse Thereat Which Was Leased To One Sibal For A Period Of 10 Years;

In 1978, The Property (Land) Was Sold By Pnb To Lacsamana And A Separate Title Of The

Land As Well As Tax Declaration Over The Building Was Acquired By Lacsamana; Obviously, Punsalan Sued To Impugn The Validity Of The Sale In Quezon City; Lacsama Used

The Defense Of Accessory Follows ThePrincipal; Further, Lacsamana Claims That There WasNo Cause Of Action As The Case Was Impugning Real Property And Hence, Should Have BeenFiled In A Different Venue

As A Response, Punsalan Claimed That The Action For Annulment Of Deed Of Sale WithDamages Is In The Nature Of A Personal Action, Which Seeks To Recover Not The Title NorPossession Of The Property But To Compel Payment Of Damages, Which Is Not An ActionAffecting Title To Real Property

Issue:

1. Whether The Impugned Action Concerns Real Property And Hence The Action Should HaveBeen Filed In The Court Where The Property Is Found

2. Whether There Is Merit In Petitioners Claim That What He Seeks Does Not In Any Way InvolveThe Possession Or Title To Real Property

Held

1.

Punsalan Is Clearly Confused. The Warehouse Claimed To Be Owned By Petitioner Is AnImmovable Or Real Property As Provided In Article 415(L) Of The Civil Code. Buildings AreAlways Immovable Under The Code. 7A Building Treated Separately From The Land On WhichIt Stood Is Immovable Property And The Mere Fact That The Parties To A Contract Seem ToHave Dealt With It Separate And Apart From The Land On Which It Stood In No Wise ChangedIts Character As Immovable Property.

2. The Stance Is Bereft Of Merit. While It Is True That Petitioner Does Not Directly Seek TheRecovery Of Title Or Possession Of The Property In Question, His Action For Annulment Of SaleAnd His Claim For Damages Are Closely Intertwined With The Issue Of Ownership Of TheBuilding Which, Under The Law, Is Considered Immovable Property, The Recovery Of Which IsPetitioner's Primary Objective. The Prevalent Doctrine Is That An Action For The Annulment Or

Rescission Of A Sale Of Real Property Does Not Operate To Efface The Fundamental And PrimeObjective And Nature Of The Case, Which Is To Recover Said Real Property. It Is A RealAction.

The Standard Oil Company Of New York V. Joaquin Jaramillo,

Gr No. L-20329, 16 March 1923, En Banc, Street3

Principles Of Law:Register Of Deeds Performs A Purely Ministerial Function; The Efficacy Of The ActOf Recording A Chattel Mortgage Consists In The Fact That It Operates As Constructive Notice Of TheExistence Of The Contract, And The Legal Effects Of The Contract Must Be Discovered In TheInstrument Itself In Relation With The Fact Of Notice; Registration Adds Nothing To The Instrument,

Considered As A Source Of Title, And Affects Nobody's Rights Except As Specifies Of Notice.

Facts




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A Chattel Mortgage Was Executed By One Gervasia In Favor Of Standard Oil Company Of New

York; The Case Stems From The Refusal Of The Register Of Deeds Of Manila To Record TheSame;

Gervasia Is A Lessee Of A Land On Which She Built A House Of Strong Material; Such House

Was The Subject Of The Chattel Mortgage; Apparently, The Chattel Mortgage WhichIndubitably Talked Of Personal Property Included Therein The Building Situated On The Lot In

Question;

Issue

1. May The Register Of Deeds Refuse To Record The Registration Of The Building As ChattelMortgage?

2. What Is The Effect Of Registration To The Contract?

Held:

1. No, The Register Of Deeds Performs A Purely Ministerial Function. It Is His Duty To Accept TheProper Fee And Place The Instrument On Record. The Duties Of A Register Of Deeds InRespect To The Registration Of Chattel Mortgage Are Of A Purely Ministerial Character; And No

Provision Of Law Can Be Cited Which Confers Upon Him Any Judicial Or Quasi-Judicial PowerTo Determine The Nature Of Any Document Of Which Registration Is Sought As A ChattelMortgage.

2. Registration Adds Nothing To The Instrument, Considered As A Source Of Title, And AffectsNobody's Rights Except As Specifies Of Notice. The Efficacy Of The Act Of Recording A ChattelMortgage Consists In The Fact That It Operates As Constructive Notice Of The Existence OfThe Contract, And The Legal Effects Of The Contract Must Be Discovered In The InstrumentItself In Relation With The Fact Of Notice.

Davao Sawmill Co. V. Castillo, 61 Phil. 7094

Principles Of Law:When Machinery Is Not Owned By The Lessee Occupying A Property Belonging To

Another, The Rule Is That When Such Machinery Will Revert Back To The Owner Of The Land, The

Same Will Be Charged Realty, Otherwise, The Machinery Will Not Be Charged With Real Property Tax;Otherwise Stated Machinery Which Is Movable In Its Nature Only Becomes Immobilized When Placed

In A Plant By The Owner Of The Property Or Plant, But Not When So Placed By A Tenant, A

Usufructuary, Or Any Person Having Only A Temporary Right, Unless Such Person Acted As The Agent

Of The Owner.

Facts:

Davao Sawmill Erected A Building And Had Machinery In It With Cement Foundation, Upon TheLand Which Does Not Belong To It;

In A Provision Of Such Lease, Davao Sawmill Is To Concede The Building In Favor Of The

Lessor Upon The Expiration Of The Contract; It Should Be Noted That In A Number Of Occasions, Davao Sawmill Has Treated The

Machinery Therein As A Personal Property Such As When It Executed A Chattel Mortgage OverThem; This Notwithstanding, In A Separate Case, Davao Sawmills Machinery Were Levied In

Favor Of Davao Light As The Court Took The Machinery To Be Real Rather Than Personal;

Issue

1. Were The Machinery Introduced In The Building Personal Or Real?

Held

1. They Were Personal Property For Two Reasons: A) . It Must Further Be Pointed Out That WhileNot Conclusive, The Characterization Of The Property As Chattels By The Appellant IsIndicative Of Intention And Impresses Upon The Property The Character Determined By The

Parties; And B) It Is Machinery Which Is Involved; Moreover, Machinery Not Intended By TheOwner Of Any Building Or Land For Use In Connection Therewith, But Intended By A LesseeFor Use In A Building Erected On The Land By The Latter To Be Returned To The Lessee OnThe Expiration Or Abandonment Of The Lease.

Board Of Assessment V. Manila Electric, 10 Scra 68 [1964]5



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Principles Of Law:The Case Emphasizes That Steel Towers, By Their Nature And Destination Are

Movables, For They Can Be Removed At The Will Of The One Who Put Them There And The Land

Wherein They Stood Are Not Necessarily The Primary Industry With Which Such Steel Towers Are Built

For;

Facts

Mr. Swift Won The Bid Providing For The Construction Of Street Lights, Lamps And Heats And

The Maintenance And Management Of The Same; Such Was Granted By Municipal Board OfManila Pursuant To Ca 484 Executed In 1902;

On November 15, 1955, Petitioner City Assessor Of Quezon City Declared The Aforesaid Steel

Towers For Real Property Tax Under Tax Declaration Nos. 31992 And 15549 After Denying Respondent's Petition To Cancel These Declarations, An Appeal Was Taken By

Respondent To The Board Of Assessment Appeals Of Quezon City, Which Required RespondentTo Pay The Amount Of P11,651.86 As Real Property Tax On The Said Steel Towers For TheYears 1952 To 1956.

Issue

1. Whether The Steel Towers Are Realty And Hence, Respondent Is Liable To Pay For Realty Tax

Held

1. They Are Movables. The Steel Towers Or Supports In Question, Do Not Come Within TheObjects Mentioned In Paragraph 1, Because They Do Not Constitute Buildings Or ConstructionsAdhered To The Soil. They Are Not Construction Analogous To Buildings Nor Adhering To TheSoil. As Per Description, Given By The Lower Court, They Are Removable And Merely AttachedTo A Square Metal Frame By Means Of Bolts, Which When Unscrewed Could Easily BeDismantled And Moved From Place To Place. They Can Not Be Included Under Paragraph 3, AsThey Are Not Attached To An Immovable In A Fixed Manner, And They Can Be SeparatedWithout Breaking The Material Or Causing Deterioration Upon The Object To Which They AreAttached. Each Of These Steel Towers Or Supports Consists Of Steel Bars Or Metal Strips,

Joined Together By Means Of Bolts, Which Can Be Disassembled By Unscrewing The Bolts AndReassembled By Screwing The Same. These Steel Towers Or Supports Do Not Also Fall UnderParagraph 5, For They Are Not Machineries, Receptacles, Instruments Or Implements, AndEven If They Were, They Are Not Intended For Industry Or Works On The Land. Petitioner Is

Not Engaged In An Industry Or Works In The Land In Which The Steel Supports Or Towers AreConstructed.

Makati Leasing V. Wearever Textile Mills, Inc, 122 Scra 296.6

Principles Of Law:Reiterates That Doctrine That An Object, Even If It Is Immovable By Nature, May

Be Subject Of Chattel Mortgage7; A Party Suffers From Estoppel When Upon Declaration That The

Property In Question Is Personal Subsequently Changes The Declaration In Order To Avoid Contractual

Obligations;

Facts

In Order To Secure Financial Accommodation From Makati Leasing, Respondent Executed A

Receivable Purchase Agreement With Petitioner Which Likewise Included Executing A ChattelMortgage Over Certain Raw Materials And Machinery In Favor Of Makati Leasing;

Due To Failure Of Respondent To Pay The Debt, An Extrajudicial Foreclosure Was Instituted,But The Same Failed; Hence, A Judicial Foreclosure Was Sought By Respondent;

Ca Reversed The Decision Of Lower Court Claiming That The Property Cannot Be Subject OfReplevin And Chattel Mortgage For The Same Was A Real Property It Being Attached To TheFloor Of The Building And Taking It Out Would Mean Drilling Out Or Destroying The Concrete

Floor;

Issue



7NOTE: the discussion here involved machinery, the digest should not be misinterpreted to mean that all

machinery are construed to be immovables


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1. May Such Machinery Be Considered As Personal Property?

Held

1. Yes, It May. There Is Absolutely No Reason Why A Machinery, Which Is Movable In Its NatureAnd Becomes Immobilized Only By Destination Or Purpose, May Not Be Likewise Treated As

Such. This Is Really Because One Who Has So Agreed Is Estopped From Denying TheExistence Of The Chattel Mortgage.

It Must Be Pointed Out That The Characterization Of The Subject Machinery As Chattel By ThePrivate Respondent Is Indicative Of Intention And Impresses Upon The Property The CharacterDetermined By The Parties. As Stated Instandard Oil Co. Of New York V. Jaramillo, 44 Phil.630, It Is Undeniable That The Parties To A Contract May By Agreement Treat As Personal

Property That Which By Nature Would Be Real Property, As Long As No Interest Of Third

Parties Would Be Prejudiced Thereby.

Mindanao Bus V. City Assessor, 116 Phil. 501.8

Principles Of Law:So That Movable Equipments To Be Immobilized In Contemplation Of The Law

Must First Be "Essential And Principal Elements" Of An Industry Or Works Without Which Such

Industry Or Works Would Be "Unable To Function Or Carry On The Industrial Purpose For Which It Was

Established."

Facts

Several Machinery Of Mindanao Bus Was Charged With Realty Tax Of The City Assessor Of Cdo

For As The Latter Claims, They Are Sitting On Cement Or Wooden Platforms; These Machinery Mostly Include Those Which Are Aimed To Maintain Buses And Other Vehicles

Of Mindanao Bus; Cta Rejected Petitioners Contention That They Are Personal Property;Hence, This Case;

Issue

1. What Should Be The Characterization Of A Movable For It To Be Considered Realty?2.

Are The Machinery In This Case Considered Real Property?

Held

1. So That Movable Equipments To Be Immobilized In Contemplation Of The Law Must First Be"Essential And Principal Elements" Of An Industry Or Works Without Which Such Industry OrWorks Would Be "Unable To Function Or Carry On The Industrial Purpose For Which It WasEstablished."

2. In The Case At Bar The Equipments In Question Are Destined Only To Repair Or Service TheTransportation Business,Which Is Not Carried On In A Building Or Permanently On A Piece OfLand, As Demanded By The Law. Said Equipments May Not, Therefore, Be Deemed RealProperty.

Caltex V. Central Board Of Assessment Appeals And The City Assessor Of Pasay,

Gr No. L-50466, 31 May 1982.9

Principles Of Law:The Nature Of Machinery Whether As Movable Or Immovable Does Not Change

Even When Leased To A Third Person; The Onus Should Be Whether The Machinery Is To Be Returned

To The Owner Of The Land Or Not; In The Prior Case, It Is Chargeable With Real Property Tax

Facts

Caltex Installed Tanks, Underwater And Otherwise On A Leased Land;

The Said Machines And Equipment Are Loaned By Caltex To Gas Station Operators Under AnAppropriate Lease Agreement Or Receipt. It Is Stipulated In The Lease Contract That The




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Operators, Upon Demand, Shall Return To Caltex The Machines And Equipment In GoodCondition As When Received, Ordinary Wear And Tear Excepted.

Issue

1. The Issue Is Whether The Pieces Of Gas Station Equipment And Machinery Already

Enumerated Are Subject To Realty Tax.2. Whether The Nature Of Machinery As Immovables Change When Used By Tenants

Held

1. We Hold That The Said Equipment And Machinery, As Appurtenances To The Gas StationBuilding Or Shed Owned By Caltex (As To Which It Is Subject To Realty Tax) And WhichFixtures Are Necessary To The Operation Of The Gas Station, For Without Them The GasStation Would Be Useless, And Which Have Been Attached Or Affixed Permanently To The GasStation Site Or Embedded Therein, Are Taxable Improvements And Machinery Within TheMeaning Of The Assessment Law And The Real Property Tax Code.

2. No.

Serg Products V. Pci Leasing And Finance, Inc., Gr No. 137705, 22 August 2000. 10

Principles Of Law:After Agreeing To A Contract Stipulating That A Real Or Immovable PropertyBe Considered As Personal Or Movable, A Party Is Estopped From Subsequently ClaimingOtherwise. Hence, Such Property Is A Proper Subject Of A Writ Of Replevin Obtained By TheOther Contracting Party.

Facts

Pci Filed A Case Of Replevin Against Serg And Resulted To The Sheriff Seizing One Of TheMachinery Of Serg;

Serg Avers That The Machinery Were Not Subject Of Replevin For They Are Not Personal

Property; Serg Likewise Claims That The Machinery Were Real Property As Under The Civil Code And

Hence, Parties Cannot Designate Them To Be Personalty As It May Prejudice Third Persons;

Issue

1. Whether The Machinery May Be Under The Writ Of Replevin

Held

1. Yes, They May Be. The Writ Of Replevin Will Lie Since Parties Themselves Designated A RealProperty As A Subject Of Chattel Mortgage. Provided That Such Does Not Prejudice ThirdPersons, The Designation By The Parties Bind Them.

Tumalad Vs. Vicencio, Gr No. L-30173, 30 September 1971.11

Facts:

In This Case, Vicencio And Simeon Executed A Chattel Mortgage In Favor Of Tumalad Over

Their House Of Strong Materials Built On A Lot Rented From Madrigal & Company, Inc. WhenVicencio And Simeon Defaulted In The Payment Of Their Obligation, The Mortgage WasExtrajudicially Foreclosed And The House Was Sold At Public Auction. Tumalad Emerged AsThe Highest Bidder During The Auction.

Subsequently, Tumalad Filed An Action For Ejectment Against Vicencio And Simeon. In TheirAnswer, The Defendants Impugned The Legality Of The Chattel Mortgage And Its SubsequentForeclosure On The Ground That The House, Being An Immovable, Could Only Be The SubjectOf A Real Estate Mortgage And Not A Chattel Mortgage.

Issue:

1. May The Tumalad Now Claim That The Chattel Mortgage They Entered Into WasUnenforceable?

Held:


11Degamo


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1. No. This Case Was Likewise Compared With Associated Ins. & Surety Co., Inc. V. Iya, Lopez V.Orosa, Jr. And Plaza Theatre, Inc. And Leung Yee V. Strong Machinery Co. Unlike In TheseThree Cases, Wherein Third Persons Assailed The Validity Of The Chattel Mortgage, It Is TheDebtors-Mortgagors Who Are Attacking The Validity Of The Chattel Mortgage In This Case.Hence, The Doctrine Of Estoppel Applies. When The Case finally Reached The Supreme

Court, The Said Court Again Applied The Principle Of Estoppel Since The Parties Treated The

Subject House As Personalty. The Court Explained That Although There Is No SpecificStatement Referring To The Subject House As Personal Property, Yet By Ceding, Selling OrTransferring A Property By Way Of Chattel Mortgage (Vicencio And Simeon) Could Only HaveMeant To Convey The House As Chattel, Or At Least, Intended To Treat The Same As Such, SoThat They Should Not Now Be Allowed To Make An Inconsistent Stand By Claiming Otherwise.

Star Two V Paper City Corp.12Gr No. 192088. October 9, 2012. 2ndDiv. Perez

Facts: Paper City Was Granted Several Loans By Rcbc, Metrobank And Union Bank. These Loans Were

Secured By Four Deeds Of Continuing Chattel Mortgages On Its Machineries And Equipment FoundInside The Paper Plants.

However, Rcbc Eventually Executed A Unilateral Cancellation Of Deed Of Continuing ChattelMortgage.

In 1992, Rcbc, As The Trustee Bank, Together With Metrobank And Union Bank, Entered Into A

Mortgage Trust Indenture (Mti), With Paper City. In The Said Mti, Paper City Acquired AdditionalLoans Secured By Five (5) Deed Of Real Estate Mortgage, Plus Real And Personal Properties In AnAnnex To The Mti, Which Covered The Machineries And Equipment Of Paper City. The Mti WasLater On Amended And Supplemented Three (3) Times, Wherein The Loan Was Increased AndIncluded The Same Mortgages With An Additional Building And Other Improvements In The PlantSite.

Paper City Was Able To Comply With The Loans But Only Until 1997 Due To An Economic Crisis. Rcbc Filed A Petition For Extra-Judicial Foreclosure Against The Real Estate Executed By Paper City

Including All The Improvements Because Of Payment Default. The Property Was Foreclosed And

Subjected To Public Auction. The Three Banks As The Highest Bidders Were Issued A Certificate OfSale.

Paper City Filed A Complaint Alleging That The Sale Was Null And Void Due To Lack Of Prior

Notice. During The Pendency Of The Complaint, Paper City Filed A Motion To Remove MachineryOut Of The Foreclosed Land And Building, That The Same Were Not Included In The Foreclosure OfThe Real Estate Mortgage. The Trial Court Denied The Motion, Ruling That The Machineries AndEquipment Were Included. Thereafter, Paper City's Motion For Reconsideration, The Trial CourtGranted The Same And Justified The Reversal By Finding That The Machineries And Equipment AreChattels By Agreement Thru The Four Deeds Of Continuing Chattel Mortgages; And That The DeedOf Cancellation Executed By Rcbc Of Said Mortgage Was Not Valid Because It Was OneUnilaterally.

Rcbc's Motion For Reconsideration Was Denied. The Case Was Petitioned At Ca That

1. That Paper City Gave Its Consent To Consider The Disputed Machineries And Equipment

As Real Properties When They Signed The Mti's And All Its Amendments; 2. That The Machineries And Equipment Are The Same As In The Mti's, Hence Treated By

Agreement Of The Parties As Real Properties. The Ca Affirmed The Orders Of The Trial Court Because It Relied On The Plain Language Of The

Mti's Stating That Nowhere From Any Of The Mtis Executed By The Parties Can We Find TheAlleged "Express" Agreement Adverted To By Petitioner. There Is No Provision In Any Of TheParties Mti, Which Expressly States To The Effect That The Parties Shall Treat The EquipmentsAnd Machineries As Real Property. On The Contrary, The Plain And Unambiguous Language OfThe Aforecited Mtis, Which Described The Same As Personal Properties, Contradicts PetitionersClaims.

Issues:1. Whether The Subsequent Contracts Of The Parties Such As Mortgage Trust Indenture As Well

As The Subsequent Supplementary Amendments Included In Its Coverage Of Mortgaged

Properties The Subject Machineries And Equipment;2. Whether Or Not The Subject Machineries And Equipment Were Considered Real Properties And

Should Therefore Be Included In The Extra-Judicial Foreclosure Which In Turn Were Sold ToThe Banks.

Held:Petition Was Granted.

12Avila.


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1. 1.Repeatedly, The Parties Stipulated That The Properties Mortgaged By Paper City To Rcbc AreVarious Parcels Of Land Including The Buildings And Existing Improvements Thereon As Well As TheMachineries And Equipments, Which As Stated In The Granting Clause Of The Original Mortgage, Are"More Particularly Described And Listed That Is To Say, The Real And Personal Properties Listed InAnnexes A And B X X X Of Which ThePaper City Is The Lawful And Registered Owner." Significantly,Annexes "A" And "B" Are Itemized Listings Of The Buildings, Machineries And Equipments Typed Single

Spaced In Twenty-Seven Pages Of The Document Made Part Of The Records. As Held In GatewayElectronics Corp. V. Land Bank Of The Philippines,49 The Rule In This Jurisdiction Is That TheContracting Parties May Establish Any Agreement, Term, And Condition They May Deem Advisable,Provided They Are Not Contrary To Law, Morals Or Public Policy. The Right To Enter Into LawfulContracts Constitutes One Of The Liberties Guaranteed By The Constitution.

2. Contrary To The Finding Of The Ca, The Extra-Judicial Foreclosure Of Mortgage Includes TheMachineries And Equipment Of Respondent. Considering That The Indenture Which Is The InstrumentOf The Mortgage That Was Foreclosed Exactly States Through The Deed Of Amendment That TheMachineries And Equipment Listed In Annexes "A" And "B" Form Part Of The Improvements Listed AndLocated On The Parcels Of Land Subject Of The Mortgage, Such Machineries And Equipment Are SurelyPart Of The Foreclosure Of The "Real Estate Properties, Including All Improvements Thereon" AsPrayed For In The Petition. The Real Estate Mortgages Which Specifically Included The MachineriesAnd Equipments Were Subsequent To The Chattel Mortgages. Without Doubt, The Real Estate

Mortgages Superseded The Earlier Chattel Mortgages.The Real Estate Mortgage Over The Machineries And Equipments Is Even In Full Accord With The

Classification Of Such Properties By The Civil Code Of The Philippines As Immovable Property UnderArt. 415 (3). The Machineries And Equipment Were Integral Parts Of Said Plant Hence Included AsReal Properties.

Pastor D. Ago V. Ca, Cfi Agusan Judge Ortiz, Provincial Sheriff Of Surigao And Grace Park

Engineering, Gr No. L 17898, 31 October 1962, En Banc, Labrador.13

Principles Of Law: A Machinery Once Under 415 (Real Property) Is Subsequently Auctioned,

Publication And Personal Notice Are Essential Requisites. Publication Of The Advertisement Of Sale InA Newspaper Is And Indispensable Requirement On The Execution Sale Of A Real Property

Facts

Ago Bought Sawmill Machinery And Equipment From Grace Park Engineering, Over Which AChattel Mortgage Was Had To Secure The Balance Of P32, 000.00;

Upon Default, An Extrajudicial Foreclosure Was Instituted By Grace Park But A Compromise

Agreement Was Reached; A Year Later, Ago Again Defaulted And So Foreclosure Was Had Once Again; This Time, The Trial Court Ordered The Writ Of Execution And The Sheriff Levied The Property

Without Publication; The Machinery In Question Was Sawmill Machinery In Building Of Gold Pacific Sawmill For The

Use Of Sawing Logs;

Issue

1. The Primary Question Is Whether The Machineries Were Real Or Personal2. Incidentally, Whether Publication And Personal Notice Are Required

Held

1. Yes, Under Art. 415, The Machineries In Question Are Real Property. Art. 415 (5) Machinery,Receptacles, Instruments Or Implements Intended By The Owner Of The Tenement For AnIndustry Or Works Which May Be Carried On In A Building Or On A Piece Of Land, And WhichTend Directly To Meet The Needs Of The Said Industry Or Works. Hence, The Machinery

Forming As Essential Parts Of The Industry/Business Of Such Establishment Makes SuchMachineries Real Property.

2. Being So, Publication Is A Necessary Requirement Before The Same Can Be Disposed In APublic Auction. Further, Personal Notice Is Not Sufficed By The Fact That The Judgment WasRead In Open Court.



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Us V. Ignacio Carlos, Gr No. 6295, 1 September 1911, Per Curiam14

Principles Of Law:The True Test Of Whether A Thing Is A Personal Property And Therefore May Be

Subject Of Larceny Is Whether The Same May Be Appropriated By Another Other Than The Owner

Facts

13 Feb 1909 3 March 1910, Carlos Is Charged With Stealing 2273 Kilowatts Of Electric

Current Of Manila Electric Railroad And Light Company, Then Valued At P909.20; One Of The Defences Given By Counsel Of Carlos Was That The Charge Did Not Constitute A

Public Offense; However, He Was Still Given 1 Year 8 Months And Twenty Days PresidioCorreccional;

The Electricians Installed A Separate Meter Outside The House Of The Accused; Electricity

Passed By The Two Meters But The First One Showed 218 2718 And The Other 745 968;

Issue

1. Is There Merit In Defendants Contention That Electricity Cannot Be Stolen?2. What Is The Test To Determine Whether Something Can Be Regarded As A Personal Property?

Held

1.

No, Electricity May Be Subject Of The Crime Of Larceny. Counsel For The Appellant InsistsThat The Only Corporeal Property Can Be The Subject Of The Crime Of Larceny, And In TheSupport Of This Proposition Cites Several Authorities For The Purpose Of Showing That TheOnly Subjects Of Larceny Are Tangible, Movable, Chattels, Something Which Could Be TakenIn Possession And Carried Away, And Which Had Some, Although Trifling, Intrinsic Value, AndAlso To Show That Electricity Is An Unknown Force And Cannot Be A Subject Of Larceny.

2. It Is True That Electricity Is No Longer, As Formerly, Regarded By Electricians As A Fluid, ButIts Manifestation And Effects, Like Those Of Gas, May Be Seen And Felt. The True Test OfWhat Is A Proper Subject Of Larceny Seems To Be Not Whether The Subject Is Corporeal, ButWhether It Is Capable Of Appropriation By Another Than The Owner. Electricity, The Same As

Gas, Is A Valuable Article Of Merchandise, Bought And Sold Like Other Personal Property AndIs Capable Of Appropriation By Another. So No Error Was Committed By The Trial Court InHolding That Electricity Is A Subject Of Larceny.

Luis Marcos P. Laurel V. Hon. Zeus Abrogar, Makati Rtc 50, And Pldt, Gr No. 155076, 27

February 2006, First Division, Callejo.15

Principles Of Law: Brilliantly Argued That Voice Passing By Transmission Lines Cannot Be Made

Subject Of Appropriation Being Taken From A Whole, Hence, The Same Cannot Be Personal Property

Subject Of Larceny; Telephone Calls Are Not Personal Properties. However, Use Of These

Communications Facilities Without The Consent Of Service Provider Constitutes The Crime Of Theft,

Which Is The Unlawful Taking Of The Telephone Services And Business

Facts

Pldt Alleges That One Of The Means Of Committing Fraud Regarding Phone Lines Is By The

Use Of International Simple Resale; Isr Is A Method Of Routing And Completing InternationalLong Distance Calls Using International Private Leased Lines (Ipl) And Bypassing InternationalGateway Facility, Which In This Case, Is Maintained By Pldt;

Baynet With Laurel As Its Secretary Was Charged For Using Isr To Transmit Long DistanceCalls From Japan To The Philippines And Make It Appear As Though The Calls Are From Manila;Baynet Was Proven To Have A Total Of 123 Telephone Lines/Numbers;

Laurel Argued That The Caller Merely Uses The Facilities Of Pldt, And What The Latter Owns

Are The Telecommunication Infrastructures Or Facilities Through Which The Call Is Made. He

Also Asserted That Pldt Is Compensated For The Callers Use Of Its Facilities By Way OfRental;For An Outgoing Overseas Call, Pldt Charges The Caller Per Minute, Based On The Duration OfThe Call. Thus, No Personal Property Was Stolen From Pldt. According To Laurel, TheP20,370,651.92 Stated In The Information, If Anything, Represents The Rental For The Use OfPldt Facilities, And Not The Value Of Anything Owned By It;

14Cesista. 29 June 2014



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The Prosecution Asserted That The Use Of Pldts Intangible Telephone Services/Facilities

Allows Electronic Voice Signals To Pass Through The Same, And Ultimately To The CalledPartys Number. It Averred That Such Service/Facility Is Akin To Electricity Which, Although An

Intangible Property, May, Nevertheless, Be Appropriated And Be The Subject Of Theft. He Insisted That Telephone Calls Are Considered Privileged Communications Under The

Constitution And Cannot Be Considered As "The Property Of Pldt." He Further Argued That

There Is No Kinship Between Telephone Calls And Electricity Or Gas, As The Latter Are FormsOf Energy Which Are Generated And Consumable, And May Be Considered As PersonalProperty Because Of Such Characteristic. On The Other Hand, The Movant Argued, TheTelephone Business Is Not A Form Of Energy But Is An Activity.

Thus, In Prosecutions For Theft Of Certain Forms Of Energy, It Is The Electricity Or Gas Which

Is Alleged To Be Stolen And Not The "Business" Of Providing Electricity Or Gas. However,Since A Telephone Company Does Not Produce Any Energy, Goods Or Merchandise And MerelyRenders A Service Or, In The Words Of Pldt, "The Connection And Interconnection To TheirTelephone Lines/Facilities," Such Service Cannot Be The Subject Of Theft As Defined In Article308 Of The Revised Penal Code.

For Its Part, Respondent Pldt Asserts That Personal Property Under Article 308 Of The Revised

Penal Code Comprehends Intangible Property Such As Electricity And Gas Which Are Valuable

Articles For Merchandise, Brought And Sold Like Other Personal Property, And Are Capable OfAppropriation.

Issue

1. Are International Telephone Calls Placed By Baynet Personal Properties Of Pldt?2. Why Are Voices Or Waves Passing Through Telephone Lines Are Not The Same As Gas Or

Electricity?3.

Do Voices That Pass By Pldt Lines Covered By The Crime Of Theft?

Held

1. Apparently Not. On The Second Issue, We Find And So Hold That The International Telephone

Calls Placed By Bay Super Orient Card Holders, The Telecommunication Services Provided ByPldt And Its Business Of Providing Said Services Are Not Personal Properties Under Article 308Of The Revised Penal Code. The Construction By The Respondents Of Article 308 Of The SaidCode To Include, Within Its Coverage, The Aforesaid International Telephone Calls,Telecommunication Services And Business Is Contrary To The Letter And Intent Of The Law.

One Is Apt To Conclude That "Personal Property" Standing Alone, Covers Both Tangible AndIntangible Properties And Are Subject Of Theft Under The Revised Penal Code. But The Words"Personal Property" Under The Revised Penal Code Must Be Considered In Tandem With TheWord "Take" In The Law. The Statutory Definition Of "Taking" And Movable Property IndicatesThat, Clearly, Not All Personal Properties May Be The Proper Subjects Of Theft. The GeneralRule Is That, Only Movable Properties Which Have Physical Or Material Existence And

Susceptible Of Occupation By Another Are Proper Objects Of Theft.

According To Cuello Callon, In The Context Of The Penal Code, Only Those Movable PropertiesWhich Can Be Taken And Carried From The Place They Are Found Are Proper Subjects OfTheft. Intangible Properties Such As Rights And Ideas Are Not Subject Of Theft Because TheSame Cannot Be "Taken" From The Place It Is Found And Is Occupied Or Appropriated.

2. Gas And Electrical Energy May Be Taken, Carried Away And Appropriated. In People V.Menagas, The Illinois State Supreme Court Declared That Electricity, Like Gas, May Be SeenAnd Felt. Electricity, The Same As Gas, Is A Valuable Article Of Merchandise, Bought And SoldLike Other Personal Property And Is Capable Of Appropriation By Another. It Is A ValuableArticle Of Merchandise, Bought And Sold Like Other Personal Property, Susceptible Of Being

Severed From A Mass Or Larger Quantity And Of Being Transported From Place To Place.Electrical Energy May, Likewise, Be Taken And Carried Away.

In Defining Theft, Under Article 308 Of The Revised Penal Code, As The Taking Of PersonalProperty Without The Consent Of The Owner Thereof, The Philippine Legislature Could NotHave Contemplated The Human Voice Which Is Converted Into Electronic Impulses OrElectrical Current Which Are Transmitted To The Party Called Through The Pstn Of RespondentPldt And The Isr Of Baynet Card Ltd. Within Its Coverage.


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3. No, They Are Not. The Legislature, In Making Rpc 38, Did Not Have Any Idea Of Voices PassingThrough Electric Transmission Lines For They Are Not Yet Existing At The Time.

Municipality Of Cavite V. Hilario Rojas, G.R. No. L-9069, 31 March 1915, En Banc, Torres

16

Principles Of Law: Things Which Are Outside The Commerce Of Men And Subjected To Contract

Produce No Effect; The Remedy Is Restitution Of Things On Both Parties; A Municipal Council Cannot

Sell Or Lease Communal Or Public Property, Such As Plazas, Streets, Common Lands, Rivers, Bridges,

Etc., Because They Are Outside The Commerce Of Man; And If It Has Done So By Leasing Part Of A

Plazas The Lease Is Null And Void, For It Is Contrary To The Law, And The Thing Leased Cannot Be

The Object Of A Contract. The Lessee Must Restore Possession Of The Land By Vacating It And The

Municipality Must Thereupon Restore To Him Any Sums It May Have Collected As Rent.

Facts

Rojas Leased A Parcel Of Land In The Municipality Plaza With The Understanding That His

Family Is To Vacate The Place Within Sixty Days Upon Notice To Vacate By The Municipality OfCavite If And When The Municipality Needs The Land For Decoration Purposes; Rojas Argues That If They Refused To Vacate, It Is Because They Have Acquired The Right Of

Possession Thereof;

Supreme Court Cited A Previous Case Of Nicolas V. Jose 17Ruling That The Plaza Should BeKept Open For Public Transit; Hence, The Defendant In The Cited Case Has No Right ToOccupy The Plaza For It For Public Use And Common Benefit;

According To Article 344 Of The Civil Code: "Property For Public Use In Provinces And In

Towns Comprises The Provincial And Town Roads, The Squares, Streets, Fountains, And PublicWaters, The Promenades, And Public Works Of General Service Supported By Said Towns OrProvinces";

Issue

1. Whether The Municipality Of Cavite Has The Authority To Lease The Land Which Is Part Of ThePlaza

2. May The Defendant Claim Damages For The House That Was Built?

Held

1. No, It Does Not. In Deciding The Case, The Supreme Court Cited A Decision By The SupremeCourt Of Spain Ruling In This Wise - "Communal Things That Cannot Be Sold Because TheyAre By Their Very Nature Outside Of Commerce Are Those For Public Use, Such As The Plazas,Streets, Common Lands, Rivers, Fountains, Etc."

2. No, The Defendant Cannot. The Clear Import Of The Law Is That Since The Subject Of The

Contract Is Outside The Commerce Of Men, Such Contract Is Null And Void And Produces NoEffect. For This Reason, The Municipality Of Cavite Must Restore To The Defendant What ItHas Received By Virtue Of Lease And The Defendant To Return The Improperly Leased LandTo The Municipality.

Maneclang V. Iac, G.R. No. L-66575, 30 September 1986, Second Division, Fernan.18

Principles Of Law: A Body Of Water Is Part Of The Public Domain And Cannot Be Subject Of A

Contract Or A Compromise Agreement Between Private Individuals; In Fact, It Cannot Be Made

Subject Of Torrens In Favor Of A Private Individual; A Creek, Defined As A Recess Of Arm Extending

From A River And Participating In The Ebb And Flow Of The Sea, Is A Property Belonging To The Public

Domain Which Is Not Susceptible To Private Appropriation And Acquisitive Prescription, And As Public

Water, It Cannot Be Registered Under The Torrens System In The Name Of Any Individual.

Facts


17Cesista. 6 Phil Rep 589



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1975 - A Case Of Quieting Of Title Over A Certain Fishpond Filed By Maneclangs With Further

Prayer To Annul Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan Municipal Resolution Nos 38 And 95; Resolutions 38 And 95 Order For An Ocular Inspection On The Creek That Traverses Within

The Property Land Of The Maneclangs, And Allows For Public Bidding Of The Same; SuchCreek Being An Extension Of The Agno River; The Creek In Question Was Turned Into AFishpond By The Winner Of The Bidding Alfredo Maza;

Prior To The Case Being Settled, The Petitioners Manifested That An Amicable Settlement Has

Been Reached By Them And The Winners In The Bidding; And That For This Reason, It Is MoreBeneficial If The Court Will Recognize The Maneclangs To Be The Owner Of The Creek InQuestion;

Issue

1. May The Creek Be Subject Of Compromise Agreement Between Two Parties Partaking TheNature Of An Award Of The Same?

2. Does It Matter That The National Irrigation Administration Constructed A Dike Preventing TheWater From Flowing Out Of The Property Of Maneclangs?

Held

1. No. The Compromise Agreement Cannot Subject The Creek To The Effect Of Transferring ItsOwnership In Favor Of A Private Individual. A Creek, Defined As A Recess Or Arm ExtendingFrom A River And Participating In The Ebb And Flow Of The Sea, Is A Property Belonging ToThe Public Domain Which Is Not Susceptible To Private Appropriation And AcquisitivePrescription, And As A Public Water, It Cannot Be Registered Under The Torrens System In TheName Of Any Individual.

2. No, It Matters Not. Considering Further That Neither The Mere Construction Of Irrigation DikesBy The National Irrigation Administration Which Prevented The Water From Flowing In And OutOf The Subject Fishpond, Nor Its Conversion Into A Fishpond, Alter Or Change The Nature OfThe Creek As A Property Of The Public Domain, The Court Finds The Compromise AgreementNull And Void And Of No Legal Effect, The Same Being Contrary To Law And Public Policy.

Republic Of The Philippines V. Democrito T. Mendoza, Gr No. 153726, 28 March 2007, Third

Division, Chico-Nazario19

Facts:

Present Controversy Involves A Considerable Spread Of Silot Bay Situated In Liloan Cebu. On 13 Jan. 1954, Mendoza Was Accorded An Ordinary Fishpond Permit Within Silot Bay, Which

Was Previously Leased By His Father Who Waived The Leasehold Rights In His Favor. He WasAlso Issue The Nipa- Bacauan Permit Also In Silot Bay. 7 May 1969, Mendoza Was Then AgainIssued An Ordinary Fishpond Permit Which Consisted Of Both Permits.

Marcos Then Issued A Memo Giving The Bureau Of Forestry The Power To Release Such

Fishpond Areas As Alienable And Disposable. Mendoza Then Applied For Sales Patent ToPurchase Said Area Covered By The Ordinary Fishpond Permit.

Thereafter, The Acting Director Of Forestry Also Issued A Letter Certification Certifying The

Alienability Of Said Land In Pursuant To Marcos Memo. Afterwards, Mendoza Followed All The

Procedures. Day Before The Scheduled Action Sale, Mayor Bugtai Opposed The Sale Of Such Property

Claiming That Such Was Intended For Development By The Local Government As A TouristAttraction. District Land Office Of Cebu Still Proceeded With The Auction And Mendoza Won.

Issue:

1.

Whether There Was Fraud In The Application Of Sales Patent By Mendoza2. Whether Estoppel Lies On The Government

Ruling:

1. No, It Was Not. There Was Positive Act By The Government Declaring The Land Alienable AndDisposable. Even The President, Through A Presidential Decree, Testified On Its Veracity.

19Degamo.


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Hence, This Is A Plain And Simple Case Wherein The Government Allowed A Fishpond PermitTo Ripe Into Actual Ownership. Note That Though The Decree Of Registration Is ConclusiveUpon All Persons, Including The Government As Well As All Its Branches; However, Facts ShowThat The Mendozas Has Already Appropriated Such Land For P.

2. Estoppel Lies. In Mendoza, No Mistakes Because The Issuance Of The Sales Patent SprungFrom Declaration Of Marcos That Was Why They Were Able To Issue Sales Patent. Theres No

Mistake. So You Can Validly Claim Estoppel. Sc, In This Case, Justified That It Was About FairPlay And Justice. Estopped. **We Have To Respect The Prerogative Of The ExecutiveReclassifying The Public Domain -> Alienable

Faustino Ignacio V. The Director Of Lands And Valeriano, G.R. No. L-12958 30 May 1960, En

Banc, Montemayor20

Principles Of Law: The Article (457) Cited Is Clearly Inapplicable Because It Refers To Accretion Or

Deposits On The Banks Of Rivers, While The Accretion In The Present Case Was Caused By Action Of

The Manila Bay. A Bay Is A Part Of The Sea. Thus It Is Part Of The Public Domain, Not Susceptible To

Private Appropriation And Acquisitive Prescription

Facts

1950 Ignacio Filed For Application Of Registration Over A Parcel Of Mangrove Lands; HeClaims That He Applies The Same By Right Of Accretion;

The Director Of Lands Argued That Ignacio Or His Predecessors-In-Interest Had Not Acquired

Sufficient Title Thereto And That The Land In Question Is A Foreshore Which Is Public Domain; On The Other Hand, Ignacio Argues That His Possession Thereof Was Continuous, Adverse And

Public For A Period Of Twenty Years Until Possession Was Distributed By Oppositor Veleriano; The Petitioner Likewise Wants The Court To Declare That Granting The Land Be Part Of Public

Domain, That It Is Not Anymore Necessary For Public Use And Should Therefore Be DeclaredAs Part Of Public Domain;

Issue

1.

Whether The Rules On Accretion Apply In This Case2. Whether Ignacio Can Indeed Have The Parcel Of Land Registered3. Whether Acquisitive Prescription Applies To Land Of Public Domain

Held

1. No, The Article Cited Is Clearly Inapplicable Because It Refers To Accretion Or Deposits On TheBanks Of Rivers, While The Accretion In The Present Case Was Caused By Action Of The ManilaBay.

2. No, He Cannot. It Forms Part Of The Public Domain And Even If It Were Not AnymoreNecessary, Only The Executive Or Legislative Can Declare The Same To Be So.

3. No. In Answer, Suffice It To Say That Land Of The Public Domain Is Not Subject To OrdinaryPrescription. In The Case Of Insular Government Vs. Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil., 505. TheOccupation Or Material Possession Of Any Land Formed Upon The Shore By Accretion, WithoutPrevious Permission From The Proper Authorities, Although The Occupant May Have Held TheSame As Owner For Seventeen Years And Constructed A Wharf On The Land, Is Illegal And IsA Mere Detainer, Inasmuch As Such Land Is Outside Of The Sphere Of Commerce; It PertainsTo The National Domain; It Is Intended For Public Uses And For The Benefit Of Those Who LiveNearby.

Levy Macasiano V. Hon. Roberto Diokno, G.R. No. 97764, 10 August 1992, En Banc,

Medialdea21

Principles Of Law:Discussion On Two Different Properties Of Lgu; When May Public Property Be

Used By Lgu For Lease Purpose; Properties Of Public Dominion Devoted To Public Use And Made

Available To The Public In General Are Outside The Commerce Of Man And Cannot Be Disposed Of Or

Leased By The Lgu To Private Persons




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Facts

1990 Municipal Ordinance 86 Ordered The Closure Of Certain Streets In Paraaque, MetroManila And The Establishment Of A Flea Market Thereon;

On June 1990 Then Mayor Ferrer Was Authorized Through A Municipal Resolution To Enter

Into A Contract With A Private Entity In The Establishment, Management And Operation Of

Flea Market, Respondent Palanyag Kilusang Bayan Was The Private Entity That Engaged WithThe Municipality; On Sept. 1990 Brig. Gen. Macasiano Ordered The Destruction And Confiscation Of Stalls In

The Flea Market; He Likewise Gave Palanyag 10 Days To Cease And Desist From The MarketOperation;

Palanyag And Municipality Of Paraaque Filed Before The Trial Court Mandamus To Enjoin The

Petitioner From Executing His Order-Letter Destroying And Confiscating The Stalls In TheMarket; The Trial Court Ruled In Favor Of The Respondent; Petitioner Filed The Case ThroughThe Solicitor Generals Office Alleging Grave Abuse Of Discretion; Hence, This Petition Before

The Supreme Court; In Sc, Petitioner And Sol Gen Claims That The Road Is Public Property And As Such, It Is

Already Devoted For A Public Purpose; Petitioner Claims That A Property Already Devoted For

Public Purpose Cannot Be Subject To Another Public Purpose Without Express Grant From TheLegislature;

Issue

1. Whether The Ordinance Allowing The Lease Of The Public Streets And Thoroughfares As FleaMarket Is Valid

2. Whether The Lease Was Valid3. When May A Public Property Be Subject To A Contract Of Lease?

Held

1. In Resolving The Issue, The Supreme Court Looked Into The Law At The Time The OrdinanceWas Made Which Was Bp 337 Distinguishing Municipal Properties To Public Use AndPatrimonial Property. Based On The Foregoing, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. GarciaExtension And Opena Streets Are Local Roads Used For Public Service And Are ThereforeConsidered Public Properties Of Respondent Municipality. Properties Of The Local GovernmentWhich Are Devoted To Public Service Are Deemed Public And Are Under The Absolute ControlOf Congress

2. No. The Land Being A Public Property, It Cannot Be Subject Of Lease Contract.3. When It Is Already Withdrawn From Public Use, The Property Then Becomes Patrimonial

Property Of The Local Government Unit Concerned (Article 422, Civil Code; Cebu Oxygen, Etc.Et Al. V. Bercilles, Et Al., G.R. No. L-40474, August 29, 1975, 66 Scra 481). It Is Only ThenThat The Respondent Municipality Can "Use Or Convey Them For Any Purpose For Which Other

Real Property Belonging To The Local Unit Concerned Might Be Lawfully Used Or Conveyed" InAccordance With The Last Sentence Of Section 10, Chapter Ii Of Blg. 337, Known As LocalGovernment Code.

Cebu Oxygen And Acetylene, Gr No. L40474, 39 August 1975, Second Division,

Concepcion.22

Principles Of Law:In Determining Whether Land Of Public Domain May Be Patrimonial Will Have To

Depend On The Law Governing The Lgu;

Facts

1968 The Terminal Portion Of M. Borces And Mabolo Streets Was Declared By The City

Government Of Cebu As Abandoned Lot; Hence, A Resolution Was Passed By The City CouncilAllowing The Mayor To Sell The Same; The Lot In Question Was Sold To Petitioner For A TotalConsideration Of P10,800.00; An Application For Land Registration Was Filed By PetitionerBefore Cebu Cfi



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1974 The Assistant Provincial Fiscal Of Cebu Filed A Case In Court To Dismiss The

Application For Registration The Subject Lot Being Part Of The Public Domain And Hence,Cannot Be Subject To Registration Of Any Private Individual. The Property, As Argued ByFiscal, Is Beyond The Commerce Of Men;

Cfi Favoured The Fiscal, Hence, A Petition Before Sc Was Filed;

Issue

1. Does The Declaration Of The Road, As Abandoned, Make It The Patrimonial Property Of TheCity Of Cebu Which May Be The Object Of A Common Contract?

Held

1. In Order To Answer The Same, The Supreme Court Resorted To The Revised Charter Of CebuCity. Legislative Powers. Any Provision Of Law And Executive Order To The ContraryNotwithstanding, The City Council Shall Have The Following Legislative Powers: ...; To CloseAny City Road, Street Or Alley, Boulevard, Avenue, Park Or Square. Property Thus WithdrawnFrom Public Servitude May Be Used Or Conveyed For Any Purpose For Which Other RealProperty Belonging To The City May Be Lawfully Used Or Conveyed.

Hence, It Appears That The Power To Declare A Land Withdrawn From Public Domain AndAvailable For Disposal Is Within The City Government Of Cebu.

Laurel V. Garcia, Gr No. 92013, 25 July 1995, En Banc, Gutierrez 23

Principles Of Law:Eo Is Not A Sufficient Ground To Conclude That Property Is Not Anymore For

Public Purpose; A Clear And Definite Act Of The Government Is Required; Mere Non-Usage Of A

Property Does Not Ipso Facto Make It Patrimonial; A Property Continues To Be Part Of The Public

Domain, Not Available For Private Appropriation Or Ownership Until There Is A Formal Declaration On

The Part Of The Government To Withdraw It From Being Such

Facts

1956 Under The Reparations Agreement Between Japan And The Republic Of ThePhilippines, The Latter Has Acquired Four (4) Properties, One Of Them, The RoponggiProperty, All In Japan;

The Roponggi Property Used To Be Where The Philippine Embassy In Japan Was Located But It

Was Later Moved To Nempeidai Property; By Then, Eo 296 Was Already Issued By President Cory Aquino, Showing Much Intention To

Sell The Property Even To Non-Filipinos; By This Time Likewise, The Property Has Not Been Used For A Very Long Time (Has Been Idle

For A Long Time); Several Individuals Filed A Case Against Government Representatives With Some Connections

With Properties In Japan;

Note That The Respondents In This Case Argued That Lex Situs (Which Will Be Japan) Should

Be Applied In The Present Case In Determining Which Law Is Applicable; Hence, PhilippineLaws Are Not Applicable;

Issue

1. Whether The Public Purpose Of The Property Was Altered By The Fact That The Property WasIdle For Some Time?

2. What Is The Effect Of The Eo Issued By The President?

Held

1.

No. The Character Of The Property Being For Public Purpose Does Not Suddenly Become

Patrimonial Just Because The Property Has Not Been Used For A Long Time. There Must Be APositive Declaration And A Positive Act From The Government Withdrawing Such From PublicPurpose And Making It Patrimonial.

2. Executive Order No. 296, Though Its Title Declares An "Authority To Sell", Does Not Have AProvision In This Text Expressly Authorizing The Sale Of The Four Properties Procured FromJapan For The Government Sector. The Executive Order Does Not Declare That The Properties



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Lost Their Public Character. It Merely Intends To Make The PropertiesAvailableTo ForeignersAnd Not To Filipinos Alone In Case Of A Sale,Lease Or Other Disposition.

Manila International Airport Authority V. Ca, City Of Paraaque, Et.Al., Gr No. 155650, 20

July 2006, En Banc, Carpio.24

Principles Of Law:A Government Instrumentality May Also Perform Commercial Functions, In ThatSense, It Is Exempt From Tax; Provided That Such Instrumentality: (A) Has A Personality Not

Separate And Distinct From Government And (B) It Must Neither Be A Non-Stock, Nor A Stock

Instrumentality; Miaa Is Not A Government-Owned Or Controlled Corporation But An Instrumentality

Of The National Government And Thus Exempt From Local Taxation.The Real Properties Of Miaa Are

Owned By The Republic Of The Philippines And Thus Exempt From Real Estate Tax. The Airport Lands

And Buildings Of Miaa Are Property Of Public Dominion And Therefore Owned By The State Or The

Republic Of The Philippines. The Airport Lands And Buildings Are Devoted To Public Use Because They

Are Used By The Public For International And Domestic Travel And Transportation. The Fact That The

Miaa Collects Terminal Fees And Other Charges From The Public Does Not Remove The Character Of

The Airport Lands And Buildings As Properties For Public Use. The Operation By The Government Of A

Tollway Does Not Change The Character Of The Road As One For Public Use.

Facts

Miaa Is A Government Instrumentality Which Has Been Adjudged By Paraaque To HaveRemised Of Its Obligation To Pay Realty Tax;

As A Defense, Miaa Claims That Its Lands Belong To The Government, And In Fact, It Is A

Government Instrumentality, Hence, It Is Exempt From Taxation; Paraaque Claims That Miaa Is A Gocc And According To Lgc, Goccs Are Not Exempt From

Realty Tax;

Issues

1. May Miaa Be Charged Realty Tax?2. Are Its Properties Parts Of Public Dominion?3. What Is The Effect Of Charging Terminal Fee?4.

Is It A Gocc Or A Government Instrumentality?5. Characterize Miaa Being Neither A Stock, Nor A Non-Stock Corporation?

Held

1. No, Miaa May Not Be Charged Realty Tax For It Is A Government Instrumentality Which IsNeither Stock, Nor Non-Stock.

2. Yes, The Properties Of Miaa Form Part Of Public Dominion. The Term Ports In Art. 420 Of NccContemplate Airports As Well. Further, The Lands And Buildings Are Used For PublicInternational And Domestic Travel.

3. It Does Not Change The Nature Of Miaa As A Public Corporation. Be It Noted That The

Terminal Fees Are Called Users Tax Which Means That Only A Part Of The Public (The OneWho Uses) Are The Only Ones Charged By Such Tax Measure (Terminal Fees). It Is In EssenceA Particular And Specific Kind Of Tax.

4. It Is A Government Instrumentality But Vested With Corporate Powers. Note That It Does NotHave A Separate Personality Than The Government.

5. Miaa Is Not A Stock Corporation Because It Has No Capital Stock Divided Into Shares. MiaaHas No Stockholders Or Voting Shares. Miaa Is Also Not A Non-Stock Corporation Because ItHas No Members. A Non-Stock Corporation Must Have Members.

Philippine Ports Authority V. City Of Iloilo, Gr No 109791, 14 July 2003, First Division,

Azcuna.25

Principles Of Law: Strange Decision. But It Says Warehouse Is Distinct From Port, Hence, Not

Exempt From Tax; Real Property Tax Code Provides That Real Properties Of The Government, Or Any

Of Its Political Subdivision Or Government-Owned Corporation Are Not Exempt From Tax When It

Grants Beneficial Use Of Its Property To A Taxable Person

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Facts

Philippine Ports Authority Was Created Under Pd 857 As A Government Corporation; It IsArguably A Property Of Public Dominion;

The City Of Iloilo Filed A Case Against Ppa For Realty Tax Allegedly Because Of The

Stevedoring And Arrastre Services It Does Through The Warehouse In Its Iloilo Port;

Ppa Argues First That It Is A Gocc Then It Claimed To Be A Gov Instrumentality

Issue

1. Whether The Warehouse Built On Iloilo Port Is Exempt From Realty Tax

Held

1.

No, It Is Not. The Warehouse Being Taxed In The Present Case Is Absolutely Distinct From ThePort. Hence, It Is Not Exempt From Realty Tax.

Comment

This Forms Part Of A Line Of Strange Decisions Including Lrta V. Central Board. Consider This,

The Port Is Obviously Where Ships Will Dock And Inevitably, It Will Require Some Forms OfStorage Place Or Warehouse. In Fact, Sc Argues That The Warehouse Is Not Accessible ToAnyone. Two Responses: (1) Just Because It Is Not Accessible To Anyone Does Not Make ItNot Public (Iglesia Case) And (2) Its Primary And Only Purpose Is To Be An Appendage Of ThePort, Which Without It, The Port Wouldnt Be Able To Efficiently Function.

Philippine Fisheries Development Authority Vs.Ca, Office Of The President, Et. Al.,

Gr No. 169863, 31 July 2007, Third Division, Ynares-Santiago.26

Principle Of Law:There Are Some Properties Which Are Under The Institutions Name Which Are

Subject To Commercial Ventures Are They Liable For Property Tax?? Yes. When They Are Used By

Taxable Entities (Engaged In Proprietary Functions); Can The Tax Liabilities Be In Form Of Seizure Of

The Properties Owned By The Authority? Sc Claimed That In Using Miaa - Pfda Is Not Organized As AGocc In Accordance With Corp Code, It Is Just A Mere Govt Instrumentality. Even If The Properties Are

Registered Under Its Name The True Owner Is The Government. Liable But Not Enforceable.

Facts:

August 11, 1976 - Pd 977, As Amended Created The Authority And Placed It Under The

Supervision Of The Secretary Of Natural Sources Attaching It To The Ministry Of NaturalResources

October 31, 1981 The Ministry Of Public Works And Highways Reclaimed From The Sea A

21-Hectare Parcel Of Land In Barangay Tanz Upon Its Completion The Ministry Turned OverThe Ifpc (Iloilo Fishing Port Complex) To The Authority. Title Of The Land And All Others,Remained With The Republic.

The Authority Thereafter Leased Portions Of Ifpc To Private Firms And Individuals Engaged In

Fishing Related Businesses. The Assessment Remained Unpaid Until The Alleged Total Tax Delinquency Of The Authority

For The Fiscal Years 1988 And 1989 Amounted To P5,057,349.67, Inclusive Of Penalties AndInterests. To Satisfy The Tax Delinquency, The City Of Iloilo Scheduled On August 30, 1990,The Sale At Public Auction Of The Ifpc.

Authority Claimed For Tax Exemption. However, Department Of Finance Ruled That Authority

Is Liable To Pay Real Property Taxed. There Were Subsequent Denials. Hence, Instant Petition.

Issues:

1. Is The Authority Liable To Pay Real Property Taxes To The City Of Iloilo? Whether The

Authority Is A Government Owned Or Controlled Corporation (Gocc) Or An Instrumentality OfThe National Government2. If In The Affirmative, May The Ifpc Be Sold At Public Auction To Satisfy The Tax Delinquency?

Whether The Ifpc Is A Property Of Public Domain.

Ruling:

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1. The Court Rules That The Authority Is Not A Gocc But An Instrumentality Of The NationalGovernment Which Is Generally Exempt From Payment Of Real Property Tax. However, SaidExemption Does Not Apply To The Portions Of The Ifpc Which The Authority Leased To PrivateEntities. With Respect To These Properties, The Authority Is Liable To Pay Real Property Tax.

Nonetheless, Being A Property Of Public Dominion Cannot Be Sold At Public Auction To SatisfyThe Tax Delinquency.

2. Cannot Sell To Pay For Tax Delinquency: The Salient Provisions Of Ca No. 141 - Since ThenAnd Until Now, The Only Way The Government Can Sell To Private Parties GovernmentReclaimed And Marshy Disposable Lands Of The Public Domain Is For The Legislature To PassA Law Authorizing Such Sale. Ca No. 141 Does Not Authorize The President To ReclassifyGovernment Reclaimed And Marshy Lands Into Other Non-Agricultural Lands Under Section 59(D). Lands Classified Under Section 59 (D) Are The Only Alienable Or Disposable Lands ForNon-Agricultural Purposes That The Government Could Sell To Private Parties.

Petition Granted. Assessment Void Except Those Pertaining To The Portions Leased To Private

Parties. The City Of Iloilo Is Directed To Refrain From Levying On The Iloilo Fishing PortComplex To Satisfy The Payment Of The Real Property Tax Delinquency.

Miscellaneous:

1. This Case Cited Mmia Case

The Miaa Case Held17 That Unlike Goccs, Instrumentalities Of The National Government, LikeMiaa, Are Exempt From Local Taxes Pursuant To Section 133(O) Of The Local GovernmentCode.

2. Exception: Applying Section 234(A) Of The Local Government Code,The Court Ruled ThatWhen An Instrumentality Of The National Government Grants To A Taxable Person TheBeneficial Use Of A Real Property Owned By The Republic, Said Instrumentality Becomes

Liable To Pay Real Property Tax.3. In Light Of The Foregoing, The Authority Should Be Classified As An Instrumentality Of TheNational Government Which Is Liable To Pay Taxes Only With Respect To The Portions Of TheProperty, The Beneficial Use Of Which Were Vested In Private Entities.

4. When Local Governments Invoke The Power To Tax On National GovernmentInstrumentalities, Such Power Is Construed Strictly Against Local Governments. The Rule IsThat A Tax Is Never Presumed And There Must Be Clear Language In The Law Imposing TheTax. Any Doubt Whether A Person, Article Or Activity Is Taxable Is Resolved Against Taxation.This Rule Applies With Greater Force When Local Governments Seek To Tax NationalGovernment Instrumentalities.20

5. Thus, The Real Property Tax Assessments Issued By The City Of Iloilo Should Be Upheld OnlyWith Respect To The Portions Leased To Private Persons. In Case The Authority Fails To PayThe Real Property Taxes Due Thereon, Said Portions Cannot Be Sold At Public Auction ToSatisfy The Tax Delinquency.

Republic (Philippine Reclamation Authority) Vs. City Of Paranaque, Gr No. 191109, 18 July

2012, Third Division, Mendoza.27

Facts

Pea Is A Gocc By Virtue Of Prd 1084 (Creating Public Estates Authority) Which Took Effect OnFeb 4, 1977. By Virtue Of A Decree By Marcos, It Was Responsible For Integrating, DirectingAnd Coordinating All Reclamation Projects For And On Behalf Of The National Government.

Eo 380 Pea Into Pta Same Functions Relating To Reclamation. By Virtue Of Its Mandate, Pra Reclaimed Several Portions Of The Foreshore And Offshore Areas

Of Manila Bay, Including Those Located In Paraaque Over The Reclaimed Lands. On February 19, 2003, Then Paraaque City Treasurer Liberato M. Carabeo (Carabeo) Issued

Warrants Of Levy On Pras Reclaimed Properties (Central Business Park And Barangay San

Dionisio) Located In Paraaque City Based On The Assessment For Delinquent Real PropertyTaxes Made By Then Paraaque City Assessor Soledad Medina Cue For Tax Years 2001 And2002.

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Pra Filed For Tro At Trc. Rtc Denied And Dismissed Pras Petition Ruling That I t Was Not

Exempt From Payment Of Real Property Taxed, The Rtc Reasoned Out That It Was A GoccUnder Se 3 Of Pf 1084. It Was Organized As A Stock Corporation Because It Had AnAuthorized Capital Stock Divided Into No Par Value Shares. And That Being A Gocc, Local TaxExemption Has Been Withdrawn By Lgc.

Pra: Insists That, As An Incorporated Instrumentality Of The National Government, It Is

Exempt From Payment Of Real Property Tax Except When The Beneficial Use Of The RealProperty Is Granted To A Taxable Person. Pra Claims That Based On Section 133(O) Of TheLgc, Local Governments Cannot Tax The National Government Which Delegate To LocalGovernments The Power To Tax.

City Of Paranaque: Argues That Pra Is A Stock Corporation With Capital Stock. Hence, Not

Exempt From Real Property Tax.

Issue:

1. Whether The Petitioner Is An Incorporated Instrumentality Of The National Government AndIs, Therefore, Exempt From Payment Of Real Property Tax Under Sections 234(A) And 133(O)Of Republic Act 7160 Or The Local Government Code Vis--Vis Manila International Airport

Authority V. Court Of Appeals

Held:

1. Yes, Petitioner Is An Incorporated Instrumentality Of The Government And Thus, The PetitionTo Levy Is Void. In The Case At Bench, Pra Is Not A Gocc Because It Is Neither A Stock Nor ANon-Stock Corporation.

Pra Cannot Be Considered A Non-Stock Corporation Either Because It Does Not HaveMembers. A Non-Stock Corporation Must Have Members.8 Moreover, It Was Not Organized ForAny Of The Purposes Mentioned In Section 88 Of The Corporation Code. Specifically, It WasCreated To Manage All Government Reclamation Projects.

In This Case, Pra May Have Passed The First Condition Of Common Good But Failed TheSecond One - Economic Viability. Undoubtedly, The Purpose Behind The Creation Of Pra WasNot For Economic Or Commercial Activities

It Is Clear From Section 234 Of Lgc That Real Property Owned By The Republic Of ThePhilippines (The Republic) Is Exempt From Real Property Tax Unless The Beneficial UseThereof Has Been Granted To A Taxable Person. In This Case, There Is No Proof That PraGranted The Beneficial Use Of The Subject Reclaimed Lands To A Taxable Entity. There Is NoShowing On Record Either That Pra Leased The Subject Reclaimed Properties To A PrivateTaxable Entity.

Miscellaneous:

1. When The Law Vests In A Government Instrumentality Corporate Powers, The InstrumentalityDoes Not Necessarily Become A Corporation. Many Government Instrumentalities Are VestedWith Corporate Powers But They Do Not Become Stock Or Non-Stock Corporations, Which Is ANecessary Condition Before An Agency Or Instrumentality Is Deemed A Gocc.

2. The Fundamental Provision Above Authorizes Congress To Create Goccs Through SpecialCharters On Two Conditions: 1) The Gocc Must Be Established For The Common Good; And 2)The Gocc Must Meet The Test Of Economic Viability.

3. Reclaimed Lands Such As The Subject Lands In Issue Are Reserved Lands For Public Use. TheyAre Properties Of Public Dominion. The Ownership Of Such Lands Remains With The StateUnless They Are Withdrawn By Law Or Presidential Proclamation From Public Use.

Jean Tan Vs. Republic, Gr No. 193443, 16 April 2012, Second Division, Reyes. 28

Facts:

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On June 14, 2001, The Petitioners Filed With The Regional Trial Court (Rtc) Of Naic, Cavite,

An Application For Land Registration Covering A Parcel Of Land Identified As Lot 9972, Cad-459-D Of Indang Cadastre, Situated In Barangay Bancod, Indang, Cavite And With An Area Of6,920 Square Meters.

Acquired The Property From Gregorio Gatdula To A Deed Of Absolute Sale And Have Been In

Ocenp Since For More Than 30 Years Rtc Granted Petitioners Application On July 29 2006 Ca Gave Due Course To Appeal Filed By Republic Since Petitioners Failed To Prove That Their

Predecessors-In Interest Have Been In Ocenp For 30 Years If Appellees Have The Right To Register Their Title On Such Land Despite The Fact That Their

Possession Commenced Only After 12 June 1945.

Records Show That The Appellees Possession Over The Subject Property Can Be ReckonedOnly From 21 June 1983, The Date When According To Evidence, The Subject PropertyBecame Alienable And Disposable. From Said Date Up To The Filing Of The Application ForRegistration Of Title Over The Subject Property On 14 June 2001, Only Eighteen (18) YearsHad Lapsed. Thus, Appellees Possession Of The Subject Property Fell Short Of The

Requirement Of Open, Continuous And Exclusive Possession Of At Least 30 Years Ca Granted And Reversed Rtc

Issue:1.

Whether The Petitioners Have Proven Themselves Qualified To The Benefits Under TheRelevant Laws On The Confirmation Of Imperfect Or Incomplete Titles.

Held:

1. No, Petitioners Have Not Proven Themselves To Be Qualified. Commonwealth Act No. 141,Otherwise Known As The Public Land Act Governs The Classification And Disposition Of Lands

Forming Part Of The Public Domain. Section 11 Thereof Provides That One Of The Modes OfDisposing Public Lands Suitable For Agricultural Purposes Is By Confirmation Of Imperfect OrIncomplete Titles. Section 48 Thereof Enumerates Those Who Are Considered To Have

Acquired An Imperfect Or Incomplete Title Over An Alienable And Disposable Public Land. The

Petitioners Application Is Obviously AnchoredOn Section 14(2) Of P.D. No. 1529 As They DoNot Claim To Have Possessed, By Themselves Or Their Predecessors-In-Interest, The SubjectProperty Since June 12, 1945 Or Earlier. That It Was Thru Prescription That They HadAcquired An Imperfect Title Over The Subject Property Is The Foundation Upon Which ThePetitioners Rest Their Application. Unfortunately, This Court Finds The Evidence Presented ByThe Petitioners To Be Wanting. The Petitioners Failed To Demonstrate That They And TheirPredecessors-In-Interest Possessed The Property In The Requisite Manner

On This Basis, Respondent Would Have Been Eligible For Application For Registration BecauseHis Claim Of Ownership And Possession Over The Subject Property Even Exceeds Thirty (30)Years. However, It Is Jurisprudentially Clear That The Thirty (30)-Year Period Of PrescriptionFor Purposes Of Acquiring Ownership And Registration Of Public Land Under Section 14 (2) OfP.D. No. 1529 Only Begins From The Moment The State Expressly Declares That The PublicDominion Property Is No Longer Intended For Public Service Or The Development Of TheNational Wealth Or That The Property Has Been Converted Into Patrimonial.

Miscellaneous:

1. In Heirs Of Malabanan, This Court Ruled That Possession And Occupation Of An Alienable AndDisposable Public Land For The Periods Provided Under The Civil Code Do Not AutomaticallyConvert Said Property Into Private Property Or Release It From The Public Domain. There MustBe An Express Declaration That The Property Is No Longer Intended For Public Service OrDevelopment Of National Wealth. Without Such Express Declaration, The Property, EvenIf Classified As Alienable Or Disposable, Remains Property Of The State, And Thus,

May Not Be Acquired By Prescription.2. Presidential Decree No. 1529 (P.D. No. 1529), Otherwise Known As The Property Registration

Decree, Is A Codification Of All The Laws Relative To The Registration Of Property And Section

14 Thereof Specifies Those Who Are Qualified To Register Their Incomplete Title Over AnAlienable And Disposable Public Land Under The Torrens System.

3. Article 420 (2) Makes Clear That Those Property Which Belong To The State, Without BeingFor Public Use, And Are Intended For Some Public Service Or For The Development Of TheNational Wealth Are Public Dominion Property


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4. PossessionIs Open When It Is Patent, Visible, Apparent, Notorious And Not Clandestine. It IsContinuous When Uninterrupted, Unbroken And Not Intermittent Or Occasional; ExclusiveWhen The Adverse Possessor Can Show Exclusive Dominion Over The Land And AnAppropriation Of It To His Own Use And Benefit; And Notorious When It Is So ConspicuousThat It Is Generally Known And Talked Of By The Public Or The People In The Neighborhood.The Party Who Asserts Ownership By Adverse Possession Must Prove The Presence Of The

Essential Elements Of Acquisitive Prescription5. Tax Declarations Per Se Do Not Qualify As Competent Evidence Of Actual Possession For

Purposes Of Prescription.

Ideals, Inc. V Psalm29

Gr No. 192088. October 9, 2012. 2ndDiv. Villarama, Jr.

Facts:Power Sector Assets And Liabilities Management Corporation (Psalm) Is A Gocc Created Under The

Electric Power Industry Reform Act (Epira). Under Epira, Psalm Is Mandated To The Management AndSale Of The Assets Of Npc.

Sometime In August 2005, Psalm Commenced The Privatization Of The 246 Mw Angat Hydro-ElectricPower Plant (Ahepp). Ahepp Became The Subject Of Bidding Where Korea-Waters Emerged As TheHighest Bidder After The Post-Bid Evaluation On May 5, 2010.

On May 19, 2010, Initiative For Dialogue And Empowerment Through Alternative Legal Services,Inc. (Ideals), Et. Al., Filed A Petition With Prayer For Tro. Ideals Argued, Among Others That K-WaterIs A Foreign Corporation; Thus, The Award Of Sale By Psalm To The Former Is A Violation Of TheConstitutional Provision On The Appropriation And Utilization Of Water As A Natural Resource LimitingWater Rights To Filipino Citizens And Corporations Which Are At Least 60% Filipino-Owned.

Issue: Whether The Sale Of Ahepp To K-Water Is A Valid

Held: No.Sale Of The Ahepp To A Foreign Corporation Is Not ProhibitedBut Only Filipino Citizens And

Corporations 60% Of Whose Capital Is Owned By Filipinos May Be Granted Water Rights.

The State Policy Under Sec. 2, Art. Xii Of The Constitution About The Exploration, Development AndUtilization Of Natural Resources Is Implemented Through The Regulation Of Water Rights. Pd 1067,The Water Code Of The Philippines, Is The Governing Law Regulating Water Resources And Rights.This Law Is Clear That The Grant Of Water Rights Is Limited Only To Filipino Citizens And JuridicalEntities Duly Qualified By Law To Exploit And Develop Water Resources, Including Private CorporationsWith Sixty Percent Of Their Capital Owned By Filipinos. However, What Was Sold To K-Water Was NotThe Water Rights But The Physical Plant Only.

What Is Water Right? Water Right Is The Privilege Granted By The Government To AppropriateAnd Use Water. It Is The Right To Have The Water Flow So That Some Portion Of It May Be ReducedTo Possession And Be Made Private Property Of Individual, And It Is Therefore The Right To DivertWater From Natural Stream By Artificial Means And Apply The Same To Beneficial Use.

The Process Of Generating Electric Power Using The Water From The Angat Dam Does Not

Constitute Water Appropriation; Hence Is Not The Acquisition Of Water Rights. K-Water WillBe A Mere Operator Of The Angat Dam. In The Power Generation Activity, K-Water Will Have To Utilize

The Waters

Property Case Digests Compendium Done (1) (1) (1)

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Transcript of Property Case Digests Compendium Done (1) (1) (1)