Proliferation and Terrorist Risks

Presentation for The Role of Nuclear Power Workshop

Washington and Lee UniversityJune 23, 2007

Charles D. FergusonFellow for Science and Technology

Council on Foreign Relations

Can We Change Our Thinking and Behavior to Make the World Safer for Nuclear

Energy?

“The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.”

--Albert Einstein

Dual-Use Dilemma: Atoms for Peace and Atoms for War are Intertwined

Operating Nuclear Power Plants

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* = Country that has expressed interest in nuclear power plants

Types of ReactorsGeneral classes:

Power reactors (generate electricity for commercial/civilian use) ≈ 200 to 1,600 MWe

Propulsion reactors (generate energy and electricity to move ships – both military and civilian)

Research reactors (scientific and engineering studies)

Production reactors (radioisotopes, tritium, and plutonium)

Reactors and Proliferation Potential

Reactor types that pose the biggest proliferation potential:

Heavy water “research” reactor of 25 MW(th) or greater power rating (e.g., India, Israel, and Iran (yet to be built))

Graphite reactor of 25 MW(th) or greater power rating (e.g. North Korea)

Light water “research” reactor of 25 MW(th) or greater power rating

Assessing the Proliferation Potential of a Reactor

• 1 Megawatt-day (thermal energy, not electricity output) of operation produces 1 gram of plutonium using 20% or lower enriched uranium.

• So, a 100 MW(th) reactor produces 100 grams of Pu per day and could produce roughly enough plutonium for one weapon every 2 to 3 months depending on reactor operation.

• A 25 MW(th) reactor produces approximately 1 bomb’s worth of Pu per year. [e.g. the North Korean 5MW(e) reactor]

Demonstrated nuclear capability on

October 9, 2006

NF, FW

NF, FWNF, FW

NF

NF: enrichment orreprocessing

FW: former weaponsprogram

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

• Entered into force in 1970• Created an international norm against proliferation of

nuclear weapons• All but four countries (India, Israel, North Korea, and

Pakistan) are members• Five countries (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the

United States) are defined as nuclear-weapon-states (NWS)

• Other NPT members are non-nuclear-weapon-states (NNWS)

• Iran joined in 1970

NPT: Rights and Responsibilities

• NNWS have right to peaceful nuclear technologies contingent on forsaking nuclear weapons and maintaining safeguards on nuclear programs (articles II, III, and IV)

• NWS have pledged to pursue nuclear disarmament and a treaty on general and complete disarmament (article VI)

How Manageable are the Security Risks under a Major Expansion of Nuclear Energy Use?

• Depends on where the growth happens• Already face daunting proliferation challenges• Politically unstable regions are more prone to

misusing nuclear fuel making in weapons programs

Some argue that we need to keep the “bad guys” from getting these technologies and that we can trust the “good guys”

Current Proliferation Seems Manageable

Courtesy of Nonproliferation Policy Education Center

With More Nuclear-Ready States: Ramp Up to a Nuclear 1914?

Courtesy of Nonproliferation Policy Education Center

Safeguards and Timely Detection

• Nuclear fuel suppliers can more than meet current global demand

• Under many ambitious growth scenarios, global nuclear fuel capacity would have to increase 2 to 6 times from the present level

• But only 1% of these projected capacities could fuel 100s of bombs annually

• The IAEA has not applied inspections thoroughly enough to detect diversion of this small fraction of nuclear explosive material

IAEA conversion times to make a nuclear bomb

• Uranium/Plutonium metal (7-10 Days)

• Uranium/Plutonium mixed oxides/non-irradiated pure mixtures (1-3 weeks)

• Uranium/Plutonium irradiated fuel (1-3 months)

• But inspection frequency has not been frequent enough

Honey, Where did I Put the Plutonium? • Problem of Material

Unaccounted for (MUF) – even “good guys” have problemsBritain: about 30 kg Pu as MUF

at SellafieldJapan: more than 200 kg Pu as

MUF at Tokai-mura

Strengthened Safeguards and Monitoring• Near-real-time monitoring

could raise barrier to diversion, but not foolproof

• Ban on enrichment of uranium to highly enriched uranium (HEU) could also help; NPT has loophole for research reactor and naval propulsion use of HEU

• Could implement continuous monitoring of enrichment level in individual centrifuges

IAEA’s Shortage of Funds• IAEA is strapped for funds to pay

for inspectors and near-real-time surveillance

• Current safeguards budget of about $100 million ≈ Washington Redskins’ payroll

• Voluntary contributions have filled some funding shortfalls, but need for more secure financial footing

Those countries that benefit the most from nuclear energy should pay the most for safeguards

Double Standard and Fuel Assurances• Much of developing world is fed

up with nuclear double standard as embodied in many recent fuel assurance proposals

• These proposals have merit in helping to expose underlying intentions of certain countries

• But these proposals might unintentionally spur demand for fuel making technologies

Can the World Implement Country Neutral Rules?

• Properly interpret NPT “right” to peaceful nuclear technologies [Sokolski and Zarate, NPEC]

• Any country in noncompliance with safeguards must suspend the suspect activity until compliance problem is resolved [Goldschmidt, CEIP]

Country Neutral Rules (continued)• Any country must demonstrate

economic soundness of proposed nuclear power and fuel making programs [Sokolski]

• Countries should have wide portfolio of energy options and should weigh all costs and benefits of each energy source

Safety and Terrorism Concerns• “An accident anywhere is an accident

everywhere.”

• Assumption: Future accident would likely have chilling effect on potential growth or continued use of nuclear energy

• Similarly, a terrorist attack might stifle the nuclear industry

• Regardless of nuclear expansion in U.S., the United States has a vested interest in working bilaterally and multilaterally to improve safety and security standards and practices

• Who should play for these safety and security costs?

Terrorist Motivations

• Those who study terrorist motivations are “underwhelmed by the probability of such an event for most – but not all – terrorist groups.” – Jerrold Post (IAEA presentation, Nov. 2001)

• Psychological and political constraints are great for most groups

Terrorist Motivations (continued)• Traditional thinking: “Terrorists want a lot of people

watching, not a lot of people dead.”

-- Brian Jenkins, RAND

• New Breed of Terrorist Group: Al Qaeda – politico-religiousAum Shinrikyo – Apocalyptic

Want to kill many and have even more watching in dread

Nuclear Weapons Types

• Simple:Gun-typeImplosion type

• SophisticatedBoosted (fission-fusion)Thermonuclear

Gun-Type Nuclear Weapon

Subcritical piece fired rapidly into another subcritical piece Subcritical piece fired rapidly into another subcritical piece Rate of assembly – 100s of meters/sec Assembly time of about 1 millisecond.

Requires HEU – spontaneous fission rate of Pu is too great.

Implosion Bomb

Nuclear Reactors

Spent Fuel Pool Vulnerabilities? Most plants store spent fuel in pools near reactor site• An attack that caused the fuel to ignite could cause widespread radioactive dispersal• Spent fuel pools for BWRs usually housed in reactor buildings, situated above ground• Spent fuel pools for PWRs, outside the reactor building and containment and generally buried• Very little of the world’s spent fuel has been put in dry-cask storage; many pools in ‘dense-pack’

Spent Fuel Pool

Dry Cask Storage

Spent Fuel Pool and Reactor Schematic

Vulnerability of Spent Fuel Pools• If attack causes a propagating zirconium cladding fire,

large amounts of radioactivity could be released

• “successful terrorist attacks on spent fuel pools, though difficult, are possible,” National Academy of Sciences report, 2005

• Need to make sure: Pools are properly secured Effective means of cooling are available under emergency

conditions As soon as possible, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) should be stored in

dry storage casks Reconfigure remaining SNF in pool to minimize risk of

propagating fire

Containment Structures: How Vulnerable to Attack?

Not Very Extremely

Containment structures built to withstand “extreme events”

9/11- style attack never envisaged

Applying maximum force would be difficult because of

rounded structure of containments

Perhaps a misplaced focus on containments, other targets i.e.

auxiliary buildings more vulnerable

Aircraft would have to completely penetrate the

containment

Even small penetrations could allow fuel leakage which would

probably lead to fire and assist in dispersal of radioactive materials

Industry studies say safety mechanisms would most likely

prevent radioactivity release

Outside the Industry, studies indicate that a large-scale attack

could overwhelm response capabilities

Radioactive Waste Disposal• Legacy of tens of thousands of

tons of highly radioactive waste that will last for tens of thousands of years

• No country has established a permanent repository

• In the U.S., even if Yucca Mountain’s license is approved in next few years, DOE will not move waste there until about 2020

• Spent fuel continues to accumulate in pools at reactor sites

Radioactive Waste Disposal is Manageable

Dual-track approach:• U.S. should commit to

developing consensus on permanent repository and then opening it up as soon as possible, but there is no need to rush

• Use hardened at-reactor-site storage of dry spent fuel casks

Any Questions?