Professional Journal of the US Army mL*:~

~ j

~Military Review Professional Journal of the US Army

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SeniorArmy Officersand DevelopingAreas . . COL Arne H. Eliasson,USA 3

An NM Sf.wial Fsatrw

TheArmy’s Mi~atu~ AT&T . . . . . ,. COL John B. McKirrney,USA ’69

Armored Warfare in Europe . . . . CAPT F;tz von Wyszecki,Fed Rep of GermanyArmy 76 “

Memoirs of Marshal Konev . . . . . . . . . Peter 1.Gosztony 81i

Armored Forces in the Middle East . . . . . . . . Leo Heiman 11

East of the Andes . . . . . . . COL John G. Waggener,USA 20

Vieiamese Marines in Joint Operations . . LTC Douglas T. Kane, USMC 26

Korea: Our Next Vietnam? . . , . . . LTC James M. Wroth, USA 34

FrenchStrategy After Oe Gaulle . . . . . . . . . R. J. Hill 41

Flexible Response in Perspective . . . . COL Walter Beinke, USA 41

SovietOfficer Courts of Honor . . . . . . VyacheslavP. Artemiev 53

Sino40viet Attitudes . . . . . . COL Bryce F. Denno, USA, Ret 59

Strategy ofa War . . . . . . . . . . B. H. Liddell Hart 80

Thinking About Military Thinking . . MAJ J. L. Hillard, British Army, Ret 91

Military Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

MilitaryBooks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

t-

The VIEWS expressed in this megazine ARE THE AUTHORS’ and not necessarily those of the US Army or the Commend and General Staff College.

Editorin Chief COLDonaldJ. Delaney

AssociateEditor COLJohn B. B. Trussell,Jr. ArmyWar College

AssistantEdit$r LTCA. LeroyCovey

Features Editor LTCRobertlG. Main

ProductionEditor HelenM. Hall

Spanish.AmericanEditor MAJJuan Hortafvlerly

BrazilianEditors LTC SamuelT. T. Primo LTCRomeroLepesqueur

PublicationOfficer LTCEdwardA, Purcell

Art and Oesign CharlesA. Moore

MILITARY REVIEW=Publkhed monthly by the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leav. enworth, Kansaa, m En&!lish,Spanish, and Portuguese. Use of funds for printing of Uris publication has been approved by Headquarters, Dearfment of the Army, 25 JuIY 1968.

Second-class postage paid at /’ort Leavenworth, Kansaa. Subscription rates $4.00 (US currency)a yaar in the Unitad States, llnited, StatSsmilitary post offices, andthose countries which are members of the Pan-American Postal ~IIIIJII (mcludmg Spaml; $5.00 a year in all other countrie~ single copy price 50 cents. Address subscwption mail to the Qook Department, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.

. SEIIIIOR‘ ARMYOFFICERS

A@gnmenf

to DevelopingAreas

Colonel Arne H. Eliasson, Uw”tedStates Armg

T HE United States is currently involved in an extensive program to make her technological knowledge and finan

cial resources available to the developing areas of the world. The hungry nations are eagerly grasping the opportunities afforded by this multiple assistance and are attempting to pull themselves into the 20th century, to ‘make their standard \, of living comparable to more developed nations, and to attain a position of independence in the community of nations.

This surge of development, which hae no parallel in history, has not been an entirely peaceful process. During times of turbulence, the modernizing nations are extr&mely vulnerable to subversion by dissident internal elements, exploitation by

NaremberlW8 “ 3

DEVELOPINGAREAS

selfish external powers, and deadly influence through Communist infiltration and insurgency.

To help the nonindustrial countries carry out the revolution of modernization and acquire the capability to solve their own problems remains a fundamental objective of the US foreign assistance program.

A long period of security and relative atahility is required in order for technological and financial aid to be successf u] in promoting progress. Stability operations to promote security and progress in the modernization of less-favored nations have become the US Army’s third principal mission. They include the whole spectrum of internal defense and development operations.

CountryTeams In each country receiving assistance

from the United States, a Country Team is organized informally to coordinate the Military Assistance Program (MAP) with other assistance activities. The Country Team ie usually headed by the Ambassador or Chief of Diplomatic Mission. It normally includes Embassy officers and attach6e, including military attach6e,

Colonel Arne H. Eliaeseni8 the US Army Attachi in Pakistan. He received his Bachelor’s degree from the University of Omaha, in Nebraska, and is a graduate of the US Army Communal and General Staff College, and of the US Army War College, Carlisle Barrasks, Penne@ania. He served in Europe dum”ng World War II with the 16th ZnfantW;” with the 8d Helicopter Detachment, Far East Command, Korea; with the 7’th Army in Europe; with the Militam Assistarwe Command, Vietnam; and with the Ofice of the Director of Personnel, US Army Infantrg C” ,ter, Fort Benntng, Georgia.

4

., the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) or Military Mission Chief, and the US Information Service Director.

Military assistance acts to strengthen a nation’s internal security in three ways: I

e In training of the$nilitary forces, both by providing US instructors and advisors, and by training individuals in US-operated schools.

e By providing weapons, equipment, ammunition, and other materiel.

e By financing civic action projects in conjunction with the Agency for International Development.

Within a country receiving military aid, MAAG’s administer the assistance program. In come countries, the military aeaistance organization may be designated as Service Training Missions, Defense Liaison Groups, Military Groups, or Military Missions. In others, the US military attach6 is charged with responsibility for MAP administration.

It ie in the best interest of the United States that US Army personnel who are involved in fighting insurgency, establishing security, and promoting development of the emerging nations be carefully selected and thoroughly trained.

FASTProgram A program dezigned to provide

selected Army officers with academic knowledge and practical experience of certain countries of the world is the Foreign Area Specialist Training Program (FASTP). Participants are fluent lingnists-able to read, write, and speak the major language of the area specialty. They study the total culture within the framework of the area’s history, geography, sociology, economy, and politics.

MilitaryReview

DEVELOPINGAREAS

tBecause of the relatively high cost and are sought by senior officers in

of training, both in terms of training advisory positions. Because a FAS1’P time (shout four years) and money graduate ie a volunteer, and he and (approximately $21,000), theoreti- hip family have had prior expoeure cally, officers are required to remain to the “cultural sheek” which often in tbe program for the rest of their comes when firet introduced to a de-careers unless they are dropped for veloping foreign country, he posseeses

.,.’. -. . . . . . ,..,

#-i* ‘m’.w:imm:~iw;%;~i’ 1. Your current duty position(e) and a description of your duties and

responaibllities te include length of time served.

2. Name(s) and a brief description of the country or countries in whwh you perform ,your duties.

3. To the best of your knowledge, what were the reasons for your selection for this assignment ? Did you volunteer?

4. What training did you receive prior to and specifically for this assignment and, if applicable, what is your evaluation of this training?

5. What additional training do you believe would have benefited you prior to reporting to your present job?

6. What previous experience and training have gou had which you have found useful in this type of assignment?

7. Do you have a counterpart in the hoet country’s military establishment? If so, please indicate nature and frequency of your contacts with him.

8. What are your communications problems, if any, due to different cultural background and language barriei ?

9. What functions are not currently performed by US military representatives which you believe ehould be considered?

10. Please give any additional conclusions and recommendations that you have formed regarding the selection criteria; training content, procedures, and facilities; and other procedures and policies for preparing eenior otficcrs for developing area assignments. \

Figure 1.

failure to remain qualified. At least excellent potential for a successful every other assignment should be a advisory tour. tour of duty which utilizes their Officers presently aseigned to specialist training. In practice, this MAAG’s and missions are in a unique has not always been poeeible because position to evaluate selection and as-of conflicting assignment require- signment procedures and training pol‘menta, even though these officers rep- iciee for stability operations. There-resent those most highly qualified for fore, their opinions were sought as an overseae duties. aid in etudying these problems. Ques-

Graduatee of FASTP are some of tionnaires were mailed to approxithe most effective stability operators mately one-third of the colonels and

Nswmber 1966 5

DEVELOPINGAREIU

lieutenant colonels eerving in MAAG and mission assignments. However, officers in Vietnam were not queried.

Replies were received from 98 officers-a. 64-percent response.

MAAG assignments have traditionally heen considered unrewarding within a career pattern. However,

w“. “

‘ , .?? ‘* -&i&r*, ---

missions, or occupying positions in a headquarter responsible for supervising advieory and assistance efforts, should have prior experience as a member of a MAAG or mission. They feel also that recurring advisory assignments should be made whenever possible and feasible. Oficers are

US Ann”

Most advisors stressed the importanceof knowingthe languageof the host country

advisory and assistance duties now are considered by the Department of the Army as key roles in executing the Army’s mission of restoring or establishing stability and insuring continuing progress in modernizing developing areas. These assignments require professional officers who are aware of the military relationship to the political, economic, social, and cultural structure.

A number of M A8G officers feel that officers commanding MAAG’s or

usually more efficient and successful as advisors on their second and subsequent tours. Although military necessity must govern, repetitive tours should not unduly handicap an officer by denying him essential career schools and other assignments necessary to develop his potential value to the Army.

There are some reservations, however. Assignment to some developing areas requires unusual initial expenditures for household goods, canned

M6itaryReview 6

DEVELOPINGAREAS

food, and specialized items such as transformers, space heaters, and various electrical appliances. Education of children is often markedly dis

‘ rupted. There is often a lack of proper medical, dental, and other personal welfare support activities. Therefore, recurring assignments, even though normally desirable from a j ob-effectivenesa point of view, must be evaluated carefully.

SelectionQualifications, The stated qualifications for selec

tion for MAAG duty are high. Professional experience, knowledge of tbe appropriate language, adaptability, and ability to instruct are considered. In addition, the officer must have an exemplary record of personal conduct, be physically qualified, and be graduated from the school courses appropriate fpr his grade and length of service. He muet not be on hla last tour prior to retirement nor have been passed over for promotion.

The records of the officer and in. formation concerning his dependents are screened thoroughly prior to final determination. The chiefs, deputy chiefs, chiefs of the Army sections, and other selected officers of MAAG’a and missions are nominated for approval through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense.

Approximately two-thirde of the respondents to the questionnaires stated what they thought were the reasons they had been selected for their present jobs. The largest number thought that they were chosen because of professional qualifications, specialized backgrounds, language proficiency, or previous experience in advisory-type assignments. Some felt they were selected because they were available or due an overseas tour.

Nowmber 1968

There were 17 percent who reported t~at they had volunteered for the current or a eimilar assignment compared to 39 percent who stated that they had not volunteered. In between t~e two groups, ,but leaning toward thoee who did r+ volunteer, wae an additional 34 perFent who said they had “accepted” when offered the assignment.

Current selection procedures have provided many enthusiastic, dedicated officers, competent in their particular fields and ready to do a good job. Incompetence is eeldom a complaint of overeeaa commander nor a reaeon for premature return of officers from a MAAG or mission assignment. When relief is requested, it is usually based on pereonal problems.

OverseasRequisitions Requisitions-from overseas com

mande continue to ask for highly qualified officers and for upgrading of qualification requirements. Thie may be a sign that some commanders are not satiefied. Several replies noted that reviews of promotion selection liets from lieutenant colonel to colonel reveal a disproportionately large number of “not eelected” among those aeeigned to MAAG’s and missions. Respondents emphasized that it ie in the best interest of the United States to send highly capable people to ~eveloping area assignments. This will be difficult, if not impossible, unlese senior officers feel that adviaory assignments contribute toward career development and enhance promotion possibilities.

The total percentage of senior officers in advisory positione is relatively small. Therefore, some respondente suggested that eelection procedures for advieory assignments be made comparable to those for military

7

DEVELOPINGAREAS

attach6s—nameIY, that criteria he established and announced, vacancies be advertised, and the most highly qualified applicants be selected.

Technical competence and personal qualities of the officer were named as the most important factors contributing to a successfd MAAG tour. Technical competence is a product of all training and experience. Except for certain refresher courses conducted by branch schools, military

:1. ~ . .. . sPECW

Courses Attended

Military Assist.ante Institute

Special Warfare Orientation or Counterinsurgency Courses, Special Warfare School

Civic Action or Civil Affairs Coursee, Civil Affairs School

National Interdepartmental Seminar, Foreign Service Institute

Figure

schools are generally programed as part of normal career development and not specifically for MAAG duty. However, the FASTP and certain other courses and schools contribute directly to adequate preparation for stability operations assignments:

e Military Assistance Training Advisor Course and the Senior Officer Counterinsurgency and Special Warfare Orientation Course conducted at the John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

e Civil Affairs Functions Course, Civic Action Course, and Special Civic Action Advisor Course at the Civil Affairs School Fort Gordon, Georgia.

..

e Military Assistance Institute in Arlington, Virginia.

e Defense Language Institute conrses at the Presidio of Monterey, California, and in Washington, D. C,

e National Interdepartmental Seminar, Country Team Seminars on Development and Internal Defense, and other area and country seminars held at the Foreign Service Institute, Arlington, Virginia.

Professional competence, area

GOURSES Euafuafion

Limited ExceUent U8efui value

16 18 “18

4 5 1

1 3 0

6 3 1

2.

knowledge, language facility, and communications and interpersonal skills are four necessary requirements for military assistance personnel to be successful in overseas operations. Most respondents felt that senior officers are handicapped if they are not technically qualified, lack linguistic capability to communicate their professional advice, or if they cannot understand the people and the total culture of the area of assignment.

Learning the area and the language of its people is important, but this knowledge does not, by itself, provide an adequate background. The most difficult category-communications and interpersonal skills—has received far less attention.

WitaryReview 8

DEVELOPINGAREAS

Influencing }ocal officials to adopt dpty with a newly organized MAAG ideas and techniques that may be new or mission. The replies of other re-to them is one of the chief functions spondents indicate the type of special-of MAAG and miseion pereonnel. Ac- ized training received and the officer’s cording to the Human Resources Re- evaluation of it, The results are tabu-search Office of George Washington lated in Figure 2. University, the failure of the advisor A number of officers who had at-to: tended the Military Assistance Ineti

. . . recognize the cultural differences tute felt that the instruction was too @Zected in the behavior, attitudes, broadly directed and that insufficient and inetitutio& of the recipients. has information was presented about the T,. ...-’ -,. ,., ,,$ -.!. ,-:*.lw” -,

.fi,., , .,*’~r-*:,:2:::~:,..? ~~ >y,. * .. . . ~:< ~ .,,”.. ...., .c...,..- ,., .- . ! ,:. . AL;.,.,..):.,,. ., , ..- .. . . .,,,-,

Duration of Trm”ning

Lnnguage Lea8 than 3 months More than 3 months

Arabic 1

Farsi (Persian) 2

French 2

Greek 1 1

Portuguese 3 1

Spanish 9 18 — —

Total 15 23

Figure 3.

beena major factor in the lack of suc- specific countries to which the officers cess of many of our efforts overseas. were aseigned. Some officers suggested

An officer may know a language, that tbe area and cultural subjects but etill not know what to say or presented at the Military Assistance when to say it. In order to impart Institute could be covered better in his technical knowledge and to get it conjunction with language training. accepted, the advisor must know the With regard to language trainin& necessary cross-cultural interaction respondents stationed in Libya, Inskille so that he can communicate in dia, Pakistan, and the Philippine rea manner that will not be misunder- ported that their counterparts and stood. other personnel with whom they deal

Twenty-four officers who answered officially speak English. Others re-the queetionnaire stated that they had ported that many indigenous officer received no specific schooling in prep- personnel speak English in the Repubaration for their MAAG assignment. lic of China, Ethiopia, Iran, and These were primarily individuals who Thailand. In all other countriee, it ie were ordered overseae on short notice normally necessary to speak tbe host to fill a vacancy caused by an unex: language or use an interpreter. Figpeeteddeparture of an advisor or for ure 3 indicates the language training

November1968 9

IIEVELtlPINCAREAS

completed by the respondents and the length of time in training.

The officers who received instruction in Arabic and French, and eight of the nine who received less than three months’ instruction in Spanish, reported that the time allotted was not long enough to enable them to communicate adequately in the host language. A number of officers recommended that language training be given after completion of the other training for advisory assignments.

In response to a question concerning additional training that would have been beneficial, the respondents mentioned a variety of subjects and areas. Included were organization of tbe host military forces and culture and history of the host country. Refresher training in branch subjects and counterinsurgency training also were mentioned. But by far the greatest number of officers (55 percent) recommended language training—even those stationed in countries where many officials speak English. It also was proposed that the best way to teach cultural aspects, essential history of the country, and the governmental structure was in conjunction with language training.

On accompanied tours, the effectiveness of an officer’s work is often affected by his wife’s adjustment to the strange environment. The importance of instruction for wives in linguistic skills, cultural background of the country, and on our foreign policies was stressed. Many respond

ents concluded that it is essential for wives accompanying advisory personnel to speak the host language. Most cultural problems are encountered off the job-not on it.

A short period of temporary duty to visit the country prior to assignment and, preferably, prior to the specific area training, was recommended as an inexpensive way thoroughly to orient the individual concerning living conditions, job requirements, and necessary cultural adjustments. Most respondents felt that, in any event, the officer must make a detailed study of the country to which he is, assigned. Particular attention must be paid to economic and political conditions in addition to military aspects. Personal consultations with appropriate desk officers in the Departments of State, Defense, and the Army might be included.

It is apparent from the survey that experienced officers now serving in MAAG-type assignments feel that greater attention should be given to the selection and preparation of officers for MAAG duty. They are of the opinion that more of the Army’s “best” officers should be selected, and that officers of proved effectiveness in MAAG assignments should receive repeated tours.

They also stress the importance of knowing the local language and point out that the wives of at least the senior officers should also receive some instruction in the language, customs, and politics of the country.

Military Review 10

.

ARMOREDFORCES

intheMiddleEast Leo Heiman

T HE rapid collapse of Soviet-trained Egyptian armored

forces in the Middle East war in June 1967 remains a puzzle. In less than 60 hours, the numerically inferior Israeli forces routed two enemy armored divisions, five tank brigades, and Up to a dozen armored artillery regiments. Aetual losses suffered by the Israelis were insignificant compsred to the de. cisive damage inflicted upon the en. emy, of the 1,1OOtanks and self-pro-

Title photo courtesy of Jac Weller.

November1966

pelled armored assault guns committdd by the Egyptians in the Sinai and Gaza sectors, almost 800 were either destroyed or captured intact.

Nearly 2,500 armored vehicles— tanks, armored cars, self-propelled guns, and armored personnel carriers (APC’s)-were committed by both sides in what was one of history’s decisive armored battles.

It Cwasthe third encounter between Israeli and Egyptian armored forces in 19 years, after the 1948 Palestine

11

ARMOREDFORCES

War and the 1956 Sinai campaign. Instead of improving over the years from experience and practical applica. tion of tactical lessons learned at great cost, the Egyptian armored forces deteriorated at a rate that paralleled their equipment improvement.

Composition of Forces In 1948, the Egyptians had no ar

mored brigades. Their mechanized brigades were equipped with surplus Britieh Locust, Valentine, and Sherman tanks, a motley collection of armored cars, and hundreds of Bren carriers which were substitutes for APC’S, but which were, in fact, inferior to jeeps. Yet they performed better than in either 1956 or 1967.

In 1956, the Egyptians had a number of tank brigades and division-size armored formations equipped with Soviet T3L/85’s, SU1OO’S, BTR1 62’s, British Centurions and Archers, and French Super Shermans with AMX turrets. Performance in 1956 was still above that of 1967, when they had Soviet-type armored and mechanized divisions, with T5.4 and T55 tanks, JS3 heavies, and armadas of supporting, auxiliary, and engineering vehicles supplied by the USSR.

In 1956, one year after the first military agreement with the Soviet Union, tbe old order etill predominated in tbe officer corps, but the rahk-andfde soldiers ‘and noncommissioned offi-

Leo Heiman, an Israeli foreign press correspondent, was born in Poland, studied in the Soviet Union, and fought with Soviet partisan forces againet the German Army for two years. He attended Munich Universit~, and went to Ierael in 1948 where he served in the army and uavsi for seven yearn. A freguent contributor to the MILITARYREVS.,+, he hcw writtsn several books: on military subjects.

cers had been trained by Soviet and Czechoslovak instructors. This apparently contributed little to their political awarenese and sociopatriotic motivation.

In 1967, fifteen years after the Egyptian revolution and 12 yeare after the Cairo-Moscow agreement, the results stunned both friend and foe. Nearly 3,500 Egyptian officers and specialists had graduated from military, naval, and aviation schools, specialized training courses, and etaff academies in the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. This wae followed and supplemented by tactical and technical instruction by hundreds of Soviet experts and advieors in the United Arab Republic (UAR).

Reasons for Failure Since the results were worse than

before, one might conclude that something is wrong with Soviet operational doctrine, tactical training methods, and the equipment itself. Israeli commanders say that Soviet doctrine is good for Soviets but bad for Arabs. Obviously, the lack of success goes much deeper than that. It illuminate tbe fact that doctrine, methods, and even weapons must be tailormade and adapted to each nation’e character, terrain, climate, resources, socioeconomic factors, and scientific-technological potential.

The Israelis learned this in 1948 when their attempt to utilize British doctrine and methods cost them thousands of casualties and several disastrous setbacks. It is no coincidence that the Israeli Army chiefs, all of whom had served as officers in the British Army in World War H, were subaequently replaced by veterane of Palmacb commando squads. The last Britiah-trained Israeli Chief of the

!#iIitaryReview

ARMOREO FORCES

General Staff was replaced in the 1950’s by Palmach ve~eran General MosheDayan who scored the 1956 victory in Sinai. The 1967 triumph was achieved by Palmach veteran General Itzhak Rabin. Rabin’s successor as Chief of the General Staff, General Haim Bar-Lev, is another veteran of the Palmach commandos.

Soviets’TOE The two Egyptian armored divisions

and five tank brigades which were crushedin the Sinai last year followed the Soviet ArmY’s table of organization and equipment (TOE) from tanks to shoelaces. This resulted in such illogical contradictions as an amphibiouscapability in a desert, snow-clearing equipment in a hot climate, mechanical saws in a wide-open terrain without trees, and tank-mounted bridges and pontone for rivers which did not exist. Meanwhile, basic equipment for desert warfare was lacking. The#ewere no bulldozers, no bulldozer. tanks, and no tank transporters without which armored campaigns are unthinkable in the Middle East.

The TOE of a Soviet-trained Egyptian armored division included one battalion of PT76 amphibious tanks and one battalion of BTR50P amphibious APC’S. The Soviet planners must have assumed that amphibious tanks can be ueed everywhere, with or without rivers to cross. But Egyptian crews in the sealed, watertight vehicles with inadequate ventilation were roasted in the desert sun.

The JS.9heavy tanks which are now being replaced by the newer TIO’S are an extremely effective weapon—in eastern Europe. There, they can rumble over peasant cottages, ftatten bunkers, cut a swath through forests, and absorb punishment. The Egyptians

Noremberlee8

t’ used them to support their antitank artillery in action and were trained by their Soviet instructors to fight with turret hatchea closed.

Tbe JS.9 heavies, and one must assume tbe TIO’S as well, are not equipped with airconditioning equipment which is not needed in the cooler climate of eastern Europe. On the contrary, they are tightly sealed against radioactivity for combat missione under conditions of nuclear warfare. There were no bombs in Sinai, but the sun was suffocatingly hot for the ,7.%9 crews. Their responees were so sluggieh and their rate of fire so slow that come JS.9 tanks were actually destroyed or captured by unarmored jeep commandos using bazookas and grenades,

Bulldozers The Israeli armored forces could

not have scored their remarkable successes on the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian battlefronts without bull-’ dozers and tank transporters. The Israelis utilize bulldozers for almost any kind of mission, from clearing minefield and removing obstacles, to filling in ditches and deep gorges and blazing a trail up rugged mountain cIiffe for the tank columns to follow. Three types of bulldozers are used ip a campaign:

� Tankdozere of organic engineering companiee—Sherman tanke with bulldozer blades.

� Armored bulldozers of engineering battalions—heavy Caterpillar models with armored cabins.

� Commercial bulldozers of reserve units-civilian contractors and construction syndicates.

Trazzaporters are just as important ae bulldozers. Tanks moving on their own tracks damage the roads, wear

13

maintained tank is good for about 100 hours of actual combat driving before it needs minor rspairs or a major overhaul.

Israeli tanks fought for 60 hours in Sinai, 50 hours in Jordan, and 40 hours in Syria. Had they moved up front under their -,-n power, rather than on transporters, they would have deprived themselves of valuable com

tractor-pulled 50-ton flatcars on rubber wheels. No Israeli tank was left without a transporter to move it to the actual frontline deployment area.

The situation was vastly different on the Egyptian side where not a single transporter was available. Soviet tanks unloaded from ships at Alexandria or Port Said harbors proceeded by train to El Arish and El

Militafy Review 14

Kantara East stations in Sinai and moved on their own tracks to deployment areas. Tank brigades stationed weat of the Suez Canal crossed hundreds of miles of desert under their own power. They suffered so many mechanical breakdowns en route that some battalions arrived on the battlefieldat one-half to two-thirds of their authorized strength before a eingle shot had been fired. When bulldozer were needed, Egyptian tanks waited until engineering unite arrived.

Easy Targeta But since engineering units seldom

appeared where they were needed, Egyptian tanke operated along the roads-easy targets for Israeli fighter bombers. Lack of wheeled tank transporters also precluded rapid movement of forcee from one sector to another. The overnight switchoverof Israeli tank brigades from Jordan to Syria was made possible by columns of wheeled transporters which moved rapidly along the roads with priority over all other traffic.

One probable reaeon for Soviet failure to provide bulldozers and transporters for the Egyptian armored formations is that the Soviets seldom use them. Soviet tanks are ueually moved by rail to deployment areas. Tbe east European rail network is much more developed than the road network so that nothing would be gained by switching over from railway flatcars to wheeled transporter. From Poland to Siberia, and from tbe Baltic to the Baikal, farms, villages, and even small towns are built of wood. The only buildinge of brick and stone are to be found in the cities.

Heavy tanks, like the JS3 or 2’10, can eaeily flatten peasant cottages, smashtrees, and break through hedge

November1968

ARMORED FORCES

rodfs and fences witbout resorting to bulldozers. There are no rugged canyone, deep gorgee, rocky wadi riverbeds, escarpment, and mountain cliffs that must be cleared or negotiated with the aid of bulldozer blades. Lakes and rivers provide the main natural obstacles—hence the emphasie on amphibious tanks and APC’S.

BasicDifferences ~~ Soviet armored tactics, as applied

by the Egyptians, aleo left much to be desired. The rigid divisional forms depended on efficient communication. But even when these were available, many Egyptians apparently lacked training in how to uee them. Moreover, it appears that there was a lack of understanding and appreciation concerning tbe basic difference between an armored column, an armored convoy, and a task force advancing in column formation in a desert campaign.

To the uninitiated eye, all three may look the came. An armored column is an operational formation advancing along ite tactical axis in an organized pattern. It ie capable of giving battle on the move, straight ahead, or to either flank.

An armored convoy is a logistic formation a’dvancing along a road. It can bean extra tank battalion moving up to reinforce a column, or trucks with petroleum, oils, and lubricants and ammunition escorted by armored vehicles, engineering, auxiliary, or supporting units moving to the battle area. It is protected on the move against aerial and commando attacks, but is not organized for regular battle against a major enemy force.

A task force does not have to be armored, but it must be mechanized and Flghly mobile. It can advance along one axis or more. It can move

15

ARMORED FORCES

in parallel columns, overlapping cOlumns, or interlocking columns, or it can move in one large single column. It is a fighting organization geared to the specific conditions of terrain, enemy presence, natural obstacles, and assigned mission.

The Egyptian armored divisions, mechanized divisions, and tank brigades moved in convoys only. Thus, it was often possible for one Israeli tank company, with 10 to 15 tanks, to ambush an enemy column many times its size. The Egyptian tanks often rammed one another, crushed jeepa and trucks, and contributed to the general chaos and disorder in an effort to deploy for action. They fought as single tanks without company-level coordination or guidance of a higher headquarters.

Flaw in Ooctrkses Part of this inherent weakness must

be ascribed to a flaw in the Soviet armored doctrines. Documents and training manuals found by the Israelis in Syria and Sinai indicate that the Soviets prefer to deploy for action in their favorite linear formation before meeting the enemy. Their instructions teach commanders of armored forces to engage the enemy with the leading column alone, in case of a head-on clash, and deploy the remaining forces in the standard pattern. They have no column organization ready for 360degree battle such as had been developed by the Israelis.

From the Soviet point of view, there is no need for euch in the terrain of eastern Europe where derise forests, marshes, and rivers protect the flanks of mechanized forces. However, columne not ready to rive battle under all circumstances m the deserts and open spaces of the Middle East are

vulnerable to smaller, but better organized, enemy formations.

The Egyptian practice of digging in tanks, or confining them to reinforced revetments behind fortified positions or on reverse slopes of hills, may or may not have been influenced by Soviet doctrines. By so doing, their armor was deprivsd of its main asset —mobility. In most cases, the well. camouflaged tanks were not epotted by the Israelis who suffered losses when the first enemy salvo hit them. However, when the Egyptian tanks disclosed their positions by flashee from their firing, they were outflanked and bypassed, or destroyed, by the lighter and more mobile Ieraeli columne, and fighter bombers struck the revetments and dugouts, with napalm, rockets, bombs, and cannon fire.

Even when the Egyptians had ultramodern equipment, good positions, solid Ieadersbip, and many hours of preparation for battle, they often lacked adaptability, initiative, and tat. tical skill as demonstrated in the battle for a key road junction west of the Bir Gafgaffa airbase in Sinai. The Israeli tank battalion which overran the base was counterattacked by an Egyptian tank brigade.

A small Israeli column of one company of Centurion tanke with 105millimeter guns, two companies of armored .infantry, and smaller units of jeep commandos and combat engineers moved out to secure the road junction and was ambushed by a battalionof Egyptian 2’55 night-figbtiug tanks with infrared equipment, The Egyptians fired from both forks of secondary roads converging into the junction.

Appraising the tactical situation in

MilitaryReview 16

ARMOREO FORCES

conditions of total darkness, the Is. raeli commander ordered two of his tank platoons to deploy in a single line and stop, sending the third pla. -, toon ahead. Lackhg infrared equipment, he wanted the enemy tanks to expose themselves first. As calculated, themoving tanks drew enemy fire, and the stationary Israeli tanks fired hack

at the flashes, scoring some hits. The Israelis then sent APC’S into the gap, again drawing fire, and again scoring hits after firing back at the flashes.

At dawn, over 30 T55 tanks were found destroyed, damaged, or abandonedintact at the cost of five Israeli tanks and some APC’S. More important, the vital road junction was controlledand secured despite enemy superiority,and preparedness. Egyptian

Nmnbsr 1968

p+cmers taken by jeep commandos disclosed they had been trained to fire at moving vehicles at night. Their infrared equipment could not distinguish between tanks and APC’S. As a result, they thought new tanks were moving in all the time, and they failed to use visual observation.

Artillery support for armored and

mechanized forces illustrated another deficiency in Soviet doctrine. Soviet doctrine is based on centralized artillery control with forward observere reporting to regiment and brigade. Fire miesions are assigned from higher headquarters. Standard pat-terne of fixed barrage, rolling barrage, or time on target concentrations are often used. This works well with hundreds or thousands of artillery pieces

17

ARMORED FORCES

massed along a sector of the battlefront for tbe decisive breakthrough which must be preceded by prolonged artillery softening-up.

This is neither possible nor applicable in t e Middle East where no fixed

?frontlines need be breached, where mo-

Israeli Centurion

bile forces do not remain in one place long enough to be hit, and where the war is one of rapid movement, flexibility, and furious assaults.

Israeli artillery was organized in units of self-propelled guns, or 120millimeter mortars on APC’S. It followed armored columns and task forces in battalion-sized formations, splitting up into batteries to support smaller tank formations down to the company

level. There was no centralized control over artillery, and each battery and battalion commander accompanied the task force chief in the command tank or halftrack, ready to provide supporting, protective, or tlanking fire on his own initiative without requir

C.urtew of author tanks in Sinai

ing the permission of higher headquarters. Egyptian battery and battalion commanders lacked such authority.

Another flaw in the Soviet armored doctrine as applied in the Middle East appears to be the division of tanks into breakthrough, supporting, and exploitation roles. The Egyptians did not have the time or opportunity to test the Soviet tactical concepts. Training manuals and headquarters documents

Militafy Review 18

collected by the Israelis indicate the Soviets believe enemy lines must be assaulted by medium tanks supported by heavy tanks and self-propelled artillery from stationary positions. After .a gap is punched with artillery and fighter-bomber support, armored divisions pour through it to advance to their next assigned objective.

The Israelis do not believe in such division or any type of divieion which affects the integrity, unity, and collective push of their armored forces. The Israeli doctrine in the 1967 war was based on the HRSH principle. These letters represent Hebrew words for breakthrough, pursuit, tanks against’ tanks, and destruction. The HRSH doctrine foresees using the same formations for all four taske rather than assigning different units for each intermediate stage. This is achieved by nonstop operation of available armored forces and conversion of nonarmored units to mobile, mechanized units by adding armored halftracks, self-propelled artillery, and jeep commandos.

The HRSH principle depende on the smooth work of supporting echelons which must move with the operational formations into direct combat. Tanks wererepaired and casualties evacuated under enemy fire; fuel and ammunition supplied on the move; and the reshufflingof formation and their reassignment to other tacks were made without losing time.

The Israelis do not believe in any division into light, medium, and heavy tanks and are looking forward to a‘ universal’‘battle tank of the 1970’s. They are not impressed with the giant strides made by antitank technique, including guided miseiles and TOW system+ They believe that the beet

November1968

ARMOREO FORCES

atiitank weapon ie a tank, and the best protection against antitank fire is rapid movem”entand surprise.

It is difficult to form accurate estim~tea of future prospects. The Soviets are reporte’d to have replenished the UAR Army’s armored equipment.

However, as was amply demonstrated by the 1967 war, equipment alone is not enough to fight a campaign or even win a battle. Much more is needed, and it is doubtful whether the Soviet instructors, doctrine, and aid can bring about the desired changes in administration, indoctrination, morale, discipline, initiative, and flexibility-especially if they lack certain of these key factors. In the Israeli forces, barring unexpected developments, there will be no drastic changes of the HRSH doctrine. The emphasis will be on training, planning, and efficient adminietration.

The T55 emergas as the best Soviet tank provided the crews are trained to rely on their eyes from time to time, and not only on the infrared instruments. Lack of self-propelled artillery, mobile mortars, and proper artillery aseault columns cannot be al-

Army doctrines. Thi~ se~ms unlikely. The Soviete claim there is nothing wrong with their doctrine or equi ment and blame the reactionary cha! acter of certain Egyptian officers for defeats in tbe 1967 war.

For the West, and especially for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries, the lessons of the 1967 armored campaigns muet be evident—to seek out the chinks and weaknesses. in the rigid Soviet doctrine and oppose them with a radically different set of conc~pts, tactics, military thought, and actual execution.

19

Aaw:s#edd%atbze

Colonel John G. Waggener,United States Arnw

NE-HALF of the 12 million Peruvians are not participating in their country’s social, economic, and cultural advances.

These Peruvians, principally Indians living in the Andean Highlands, endure a marginal existence more harsh than the life enjoyed by their ancestors during the age of the Inca Empire. The Indians of the highlands form a society which is distinct and separate from the Peruvian national society.

The complex solutions to this principal problem of Peru, the peaceful revolution

O required if the violent revolution is to be avoided, demand the well-directed applica. tion of all available resources of the Peru. vian nation. Increasingly since 1961, the government of Peru has turned to the armed forces to expand their participation in internal development operations. The highest priority is given to operations east of the Andes Mountains which bisect Peru from north to south, resulting in the forma. tion of three distinct Peruvian worldathe coast, the highlands, and the jungle.

I

PERUVIAN CIVIC ACTION

The world of the long, arid coastal plain is moving forward in the 20th century with a prosperous economy and a relatively progressive society. The highlands, or sierra, cradle a 17th-century agricultural society plagued with the population problems of the 20th century. The jungle remains a primitive, underpopulated world awaiting develop ment by those who have the courage and the capability.

The core of Paru’s profilams is centered with the social conditions of the five million Indians who live in the sierra and with the inefficient agricultural aconomy to which they are bound. These people are largely illiterate, unskilled peasants who ratain the social customs and the agricultural methods of their ancestors. Their monetary income is so low, avaraging less than $50 per year, that they are effectively outside of the monetary economy, thereby drastically reducing the Peruvian internal market for industrial production and commerce.

Peru’s population has doubled since 1940, and, if the present trend continues, it will double again by 1991. There is neither food nor work available in the sierra to sustain any large increase in population.

Fortunately, Peru possesses a large and untapped reserve east of the Andes. Eastern Peru, the Oriante, is naturally divided into two parts, the high jungle and the low jungle. The eastern slopes of the Andes and the interlying valleys form the high jungk% the remaining and larger area comprises the low jungla or the jungle proper. The high jungle offers the most immadiate economic promise,

The overriding prerequisite for successful economic development of the jungle regions is access. Demandable and relatively low-cost transportation must connact the production r~gions in eastern Peru with the

Novnmbsr 19e8

m rkets in western Preu. The development oI eastern Peru requires, as a first step, a combination of highway, river, and air transportation systems.

+Peru’s armed forces are major a icipants in the development of thP e transportation systems, and in a broad range of other civic action operations.

Starting in the 1920’s, the military air service extended air transportation over the Andes Mountains into the jungle areas. They were the firat to extend ragular air tranaport service to many settlements in the Oriente which had no other means of modern transport.

As commercial aviation has expanded to serve the requirements of the high jungla settlements, the Peruvian Air Force has moved farther east to concentrate its development effort in the low jungle. In cooperation with local communities, the air force is engaged in a program of constructing 17 airstrips capable of supporting C47type aircraft.

Colonel John G. Waggener is Commanding O@eer of the b5th Engineer Group in Vietnam. He hohfe a B.S. from the US MilitaW Aco&mg, West Point, New York, and an M.S.E. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambn.dge, Maesochueette. He gradmzted from the Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force B e, Alabama, in 1961 and f~om the%S ArrnsI War CoUege, Carlisle Barracks, Penns@ania, in 1968. Hie aesig~ ments inclwde duty with the let I* fantm Division in Germany, with the 8th US Army in Korew, and with the 82d Airbosw Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and in the Dominican Republic. For more than three years, he was in Lima, Peru, ae Engitwer Advisor with the US ArrnrJ Mission an& as Civic Action O@cer with the US Militurar Group.

21

In 1%4, the air force ksurrciled its targest and most important civic action program. It urrdertr?ok to provide hrtraregionalair service to the entire Amazon Basin of Peru, a region as large as the state of Texas. Using C47 aircraft, the air force pilots fly three scheduled routes serving 20 jungle towns stretched out along 1,500 air route miles. Utilizing Catalina hydroplanes and amphibian aircraft; scheduled service is provided along

November1966

tm Mlw fwttsto severai river krwrrs which have no airfields. In addition to the scheduled service, the air force provides nonscheduled or charter flight service, and emergency and medical suPPort flights.

Highway construction is the Peruvian Army’s largest civic action program. .Sirrce 1947, the Peruvian Army has been engaged in cfinstructhrg penetration highways to provide access to several million acres of

23


cultivable land in the high jungle regions. Six engineer battalions and one separate company, backed by logistic and training organizations and supported with Department of Nighways civilian engineers and civilian workers, constitute the major construction forces working in the high jungle.

These units are committed to the con

struction of six major roads two in the north, one in central Peru, and three in the southeast totaling 735 miles in length. Three of the roads will provide links to Amazon ports. Two roads were initiated to promote the stabilization of areas which were the centers of insurgency in 1962 and 1965.

Fluvial Civic Service is the major military civic action program of the Peruvian Navy. Under this program, the navy provides a wide range of technical and public service support to the people who inhabit the Amazon Basin. Using four gunboats which regularly patrol the Amazon River and its major tributaries, navy technicians and the other

ministries provide medical, dental, sanit~ tion, educational, and agricultural support to the people living along these rivers.

Army engineer units employed in the high jungle and army garrisons stationed along the frontiers support community develop ment and provide limited public service sup port in their respective areas. Each army unit treats civilian patients and advises in preventive medicine. Schools operated at each battalion camp are attended by children living nearby. Engineer units construct feeder roads linking villages and towns with the main penetration highways.

In 1966, the army initiated a new Colonization Program for the resettlement of colonists from the sierra into selected frontier areas. The pilot. project, New Nazareth, is operating in northern Peru in a region recently opened by a major civic action highway. Based on the experience gained in this project, the army plans to extend colonization projects into other areas.


Ph,?tm courtau d nuth.,

Peruvian Army conscripts learn a trade

These support programs provide to the scattered residents of tha Amazon Basin their bast contact with end their most significant form of support from the Peruvian Government,

The armed forces provide a major social benefit to the nation by taking into the military service large numbers of Indian. and mestizo youths, providing them an intensive social and civic education, and training many of them in military skills which will qualify them for employment after discharge. In addition, the army conducts literacy training.

The largest civic action training program is the Peruvian Army’s Vocational Training Program Established in 1962, this program now includes five industrial training centers which conduct” training in 17 carefully se

lected vocational skills, one construction equipment training center, and one agricul-

Nwember1968

tural training center. These seven centers train approximately 4,500 men a year to fill a portion of Peru’s huge demand for skilled workers. Approximately two-thirds of the men are Indians from the sierra or the jwv gle, and many of the graduates are employed in the development operations proceeding east of the Andes.

Major services which directly su port development operations east of tha L des include aerial photography by the air forcq and mapping by the army. The navy and the air forte provide limited coverage of eastern Peru in hydrography and meteorology.

The Peruvian armed forces are contributing not only to social and economic develop rnent, but also to the political unity of the P~ruvian nation. These internal developmers,t operations of the armed forces represent a major force for the stability and security of the cewntry.

25

Vietnamese Marines

in Joint O~erations

LieutenantColonelDouglasT. Kane,United Stafes Marine Corps

F EATURED on a national news network one! night in late 1967 was a report of an opera

tion in the Mekong Delta area of South Vietnam involving elemente of a US Army division and a battalion of Vietnamese Marines. The operation resulted in a number of Viet Cong killed and the restoration to government control of the immediate area in which the operation had been conducted.

The news reporter praised the combat efficiency of the Vietnamese Marines—a force which he said had heretofore been employed only ae “palace guards” in Saigon. The success of the operation

MilitaryReview 26

wee such, the ‘reporter stated, that both United States and Vietnamese officials were hopeful that similar joint operations could be conducted. He implied that both the combat capabilities of the “palace guards” and the success of the operation had been wholly unexpected and completely surprising.

MilitaryMaturity On the contrary,’ Vietnamese bat

talions have been involved in large-scale combat operations for the last five yeare. Since 1965, Vietnamese forces have conducted many succeesfrd operations with forcee from US Marine and Army divisions. But meet of the reporting of the war has involved US units, The result is that the American public, despite the fact that the Vietnamese conflict is the most chronicled and photographed war in history, remains lees informed about Vietnamese units in action.

The Vietnamese forces are becoming increasingly effective in cOmbat operations, and there are many

Lieutenant Colonel Dougkw T. Kane, United St@tee Marine Corpe, is with the Poli%yj Am@sis Branch, Mara”neCorps Headquarters, Washington, D. C. Other assignments include duty foith the Ist Marine Division in Korea: with the Historical Branch, Marine Corps Headquarters; and with the Militm~ Assistance Command in Vietnam. He holds a B.S. from South DakotaState College in Brookings and is a graduate of the US Man-ne Corps Commandand Staff College, Quantico, Virginti; the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia; and the US Armv War College, Carlisle Barracks, F%mt@vania. He ia coauthor of the Ieolation of Rabaul, History of U. S. Marine, Corps Operations in World War II, Volume 11.

Nweinber1968

VIETNAMESE MARINES

edcouraging signs that they are at last reaching military maturity. Assignment of Array Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) units to strategic defe~sive positions formerly held by US forces and improved efforts by the Vietnamese “forces in area pacification programs are increasing evidence of the changing nature of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). The marked progress achieved by the Vietnamese Marines ie typical of that which can be accomplished by other RVNAF units in combat operations in the future.

“Palace Guards” The Vietnamese Marine Corps (VN

MC) of today, 15 years after its organization, is a poised, profession.al, and combat-tested unit with numeroue battle honors. From its original organization of a collection of French-trained riverine or “commando” companiee, tbe corps has moved steadily and efficiently into its preeent US Marine-type configuration of six battalion with appropriate headquarters and staff elements, artillery (both 105-millimeter and 75-millimeter), and combat support and combat service support unite. M was during its formative years that ~ the VNMC earned the title of “palace guarde” which is still applied—u~fairly or not—today.

During the tumultuous and, confused regime of President Ngo-dinh-Diem, VNMC battalions were rushed during crisis periods to guard key installations such as Diem’s palace, the police and radio stations, and the rail terminal against possible coup attempts. In 1963, however, Vietnamese Marines ewitched sides to play a majo~ role in Diem’s overthrow.

The Marines later were the first government forces deployed to Hue

27

VIETNAMESE MARINES

and Da Nang during the” Buddhist crisis of April-June 1966. These troops—whose ranks contain ample representation of every religious, political, and ethnic group in Vietnam -exercised considerable restraint in quelling the so-called “struggle forces” with a minimum of loss of life to either side.

An effective counterinsurgency

force in the delta area since their organization in 1954, the Marines have been committed increasingly to field operations in other areas in the last few years. Deployment time has increased also.

In 1962, each of the then four battalions of the Marine Brigade was committed to field combat operations or security missions in actively hostile areas about ~“ percent of the time. ln succeeding years, the average percentage of combat operational

time for all battalions has risen to 59 percent in 1963, 83 percent in 1964, 88 percent in 1965, and over 90 percent in 1966. The Marines have maintained a steady kill ratio of nearly six Viet Cong and North Vietnamese for each Marine lost in battle.

During this period, the Marines, as part of the strategic reserve of

the RVNAF, usually were committed as a reaction force in response to various critical military situations. Of late, however, the Vietnamese Marines have been assigned more and more to continue operations in conjunction with US forces. By comparing their former combat efficiency in counterinsurgency operations with their present proficiency in joint operational efforts, their marked improvement becomes apparent.

There is no question that two years

MilitaryRevlnw 28 I

.

VIETNAMESEMARINES

.! ago, ILLSobservers who watched a Vietnamese search-and-destroy 0Peration for the first time were appalledat the apparent lack of direction or purpose in the tactical scheme. In most instances, a Vietnamese battalion traversed its tactical area of responsibility in two straggling columns with virtually no flank protection-a type of formation referred to by advisors as a “tactical front one man wide.”

“A Walk in the Sun” Search operation proceeded about

as fast as the rate of march, with few stops for systematic, thorough searches.of the villages. Because this formation was easily avoided by any enemy forces who did ot choose to makea stand, most Vle tl amese operations were described ae “a walk in the sun.”

These cautious search-and-destroy operations—which lasted a maximum of three days, or as long as the pack-carried rice held out—were a direct inheritance from the French training which still influenced the Vietnamese, despite efforts by US advisors. Theee tentative ventures into the field, followed by a return to defended compounds, had little tactical effect. The Viet Cong drifted out of the area as the ARVN soldiere approached and drifted back in as the ARVN troops departed. Control of the area remained with the Viet Cong.

Vietnamese Marines from Saigon, committedto such operations to assist the ARVN, were assigned to an ARVN division or regiment for control, The assignment of Saigonbesed troops under the direction of another commander was hardly conducive t? more than minimal cooperation. Hastily drawn plans given

Mmber 1S68

to {he Marines usually called for a three-day sweep into Viet Cong territory in a move calculated to catch Viet Cong forces between the Marines and‘a blocking force of ARVN troops. Results seldom matched the operation’s expectations.

Cooperation between United States and Vietnamese forces in early combat operations was equally difficult to achieve except on a low level involving mutual agreement between adjacent commanders without ref-, erence to higher headquarters. The Vietnamese, fierce defenders of their sovereignty and still smarting from years of subordination to the French, resisted any suggestion for a comb]ned command. Vietnamese forces operated in adjoining tactical areas of responsibility, sometimes with mutual fire support. The maneuver schemes, however, were barely supporting and there was usually confusion on both sides about the location of flank]ng units.

Coordination Established The action which established a new

concept of cooperation was Operation Deckhouse V, an amphibious assault by United States and Vietnamese Marines against Kien ~oa Province in the Mekong Delta in January 1967. When a joint am-\ phibious operation was first proposed, the sticky question of shifting command of Vietnamese forces to the US amphibious task force commander loomed as an insurmountable obstacle. Furthermore, notification of the attachment of VNMC units, once ashore, to an ARVN command in the delta area might have compromised the @ntire operation becauee of POS-” sible security leaks.

The Vietnamese Marines, eager to operate with the US Marines in

2a

VIETNAMESE MARINES

suclr an assault, solved the problem by superimposing another echelon of command and staff over the VNMC units which were to make the land]ng. . This ad he headquarters, ostensibly on a level with that of the US Marine landing force commander, satisfied the requirement that Vietnamese units must be under the command and control of Vietnamese.

Joint Commanq When visitors from the RVNAF

High Command flew to the amphibious task force command sh~p for briefings, the command relationship was explained as a joint command, one of “close cooperation and coordination.” This was true, except that the tactical plan for both forces ashore was determined by the US commander, helicopter support for both forces was directed by the tactical operations center afloat, and fire missions of VNMC artillery ashore were approved by the supporting arme coordination center afloat.

The Navy’s logistic system supported both forces, and all casualties incurred by both Vietnamese and United States forces were returned to naval facilities afloat for treatment. Approval of some deeisions involving the Vietnamese Marines was obtained in advance from the VNMC landing force commander. The VNMC, once the ice had been broken, went all the way.

Later, in February, the same organization directed Vietnamese Marines in Operation JrwzctionCitV with the US 25th Division in War Zone C (Tay Ninh Province). Instead of being controlled by the nearest ARVN division commander, the VNMC battalions T’-we retained under the command of a VNMC colonel as brigade commander. The brigade corn.

mand post was adjacent to the command post of the 25th Division, and the VNMC staff shared many facilities of the division staff.

Tactical employment and objectives of the Marine units were determined in a joint conference of the division commander and the VNMC brigade commander. Division orders were written with only an information paragraph pertaining to VNMC actions; the brigade commander simultaneously wrote lds own orders for the Vietnamese force. Daily operational smnmaries included the results of actions by both forces.

?&dual Benefit The Vietnamese knew that their

fighting capabilities would be under direct and close scrutiny from US observers in these operations. In order to insure maximum results, the bri. gade commander held preoperation briefings in which all battalion, company, and platoon commanders were enjoined to do as well as US forces or lose command.

The amount of professional polish which the Vietnamese acquired during these operations was reflected directly in improved execution of tactical assignments, a better under. standing of staff procedures, and new ideas about Iogistilc support methods. These changes, which resulted from c~ose observation of US forces in action, were improvements which no amount of advisor influence would have been able to effect in a comparable period of time. As the 25th Division commander had noted earlier, mutual benefit resulted:

At first, both the US awd ARVN soldiers felt uneasy fighting side by ~ide. But mutual admiratwz and camaraderie developed, awd tn two weeke of conztant operatioue, the

MilitavReview 30

combhted f orcei had grown into a highly efficient team using successful methods.

The neceseity for RVNAF units to engage in joint operations as a means of increasing their combat capabilities and improving their military image may be questioned by

t

VIETNAMESE MARINES

h mid-1966, after Premier Nguyen Cao Ky’e regime had weathered a twin threat of cou~ d’etd and civil war in the Buddhist uprieings in Hue and Da! Nang, South Vietnam’s political stability wae believed strong enough to assume a greater share of the pacification program. Up to this point,

US Ann.’!

VietnameseMarinestake time out during an operation

those who see the role of local militarY forces ae a pacification force only. Suchforces, it has been stated, should only be engaged in operations to return vital areas to government control and provide a military screen behind which governmental procedures may be reestablished. It is in this area—revolutionary development.) that RVNAF critics claim it has flunkedits major test.

November1968

US forces had combined effective combat operations with equally effective civic action programs while the Vietnamese had done little. US eecurity operation, it was reasoned, did not establish Vietnamese Government control. Ae a result, more RVNAF units were programed for greater participation in the pacification plan.

Th~” RVNAF’S reluctance to as. sume these new tacks with any en

31

VIETNAMESE MARINES

thusiasm brought new disappointment and increased US criticism of RVNAF apathy w~lch seemed to stem from military arrogance and indifference toward the peasants. The hard fact is that deployment of Vietnamese Marines and other RVNAF units to operations in remote prOvinces had contributed materially to this criticism and negated any progress made by ARVN units in pacification programs. The Saigon-based Marines, descending upon a refugee-choked province or district capital, markedly reduced the fresh food stocks of the already depleted area and created numerous small but ugly incidents over the allegedly iniiated price of beer and produce.

Improvements Noted Such charges were a matter of

distinct concern to tbe advisors, and the criticism was discussed openly and candidly with senior VNMC officers. Marked improvements were noted: foraging for food on operations was halted by quick action of platoon and company commanders, and a roving band of VNMC military police settled all price disputes— usually in favor of the vendor—before large arguments developed.

In later joint operations with US Marine units, ample stores of rice and Vietnamese C rations were stockpiled before an operation. Timely resupply of field troops eliminated the necessity to forage for food. More importantly, the Viet Cong rice caches which were uncovered by” VNMC oPerations—and usual]y destroyed for lack of other means of disposal—were returned by US helicopters to the nearest village for distribution to refugees, thereby effective y reversing the ,flow of food supplies.

The difference in the attitude of

i

the Vietnamese Marines and the rural populace toward each other can best be illustrated by two incidents. In Operation Deckhouse V, a large pig which was inadvertently killed by US naval gunfire was bought on the spot by the Vietnamese Marines as a supplement to their rations. This purchase provided a cash outlay that brightened the unhappy owner, surprised VNMC officers, and delighted the advisors. In Operation Junction City, the villagers who had received tons of Viet Cong rice discovered by Marines in War Zone C held a small party with a band concert and refreshments for Marines after the operation.

Measures Taken Whether large-scale joint opera

tions detract from the real role of indigenous military forces as pacification agents of the government, and tend to escalate stability operations in major conflicts, is a question for debate. The experiences of such a force indicate that measures which will improve military and combat pro- . ficiency will also improve pacification efforts. The conclusions indicated are:

e Joint operations which combine Vietnamese and United States forces in major operations to restore stability within South Vietnam are feasible and desirable. The problem of command relationships, which was

“ worked out on a tentative basis at lower levels and found acceptance on higher echelons, can be continued and improved by the mutual desire of both forces to achieve military supremacy over the enemy.

e Joint operations conducted in Vietnam in the past succeeded because the US forces overcame their early reservations about Vietnamese

MilitaryReview 32

VIETNAMESE MARINES

combat capabilities and possible w;]] convince the hamlet and village security leaks to ehare wholeheartedly populace that the government troops the tactical reeources which helped not, only have the authority to ad-assure victories. The Vietnamese, m@ister government policies and pro-challenged by the Americans to programs, but that they also have the reduce significant contributions, resources and strength to do so without sponded with a dedication and zeal interference from Viet Cong- forces. unmatched in previoue operations Military victories in which RVNAF against the enemy. units play a major role will be the

� Joint operations may eventually primary manner in which government lead to a combined command etruc- control can be projected both inwardly ture. A VNMC battalion ie assigned and outwardly. permanently to work with a brigade The jessons to be learned by the of the US 9th Division in 4th Corps, Vietnamese in observing and particiand the 25th ARVN Division is also pating with the professional US involved in riverine operations with forces in action against either major US forces. An even closer method of enemy units or insurgent forces will joint cooperation is employed in the have lasting effects. Joint operations 199th US Brigade which integrates have already exhibited the increased companies of Vietnamese Rangers RVNAF professionalism and growing and US soldiers into “supercom- confidence. Leadership in tbe officer panics.” and noncommissioned officer ranks

. As combat proficiency of the has improved from the trairiing and RVNAF improves, the revolutionary examples provided by their US developmentprogram will be speeded. counterparts. The benefits to be re-The pacification program must be ac- ceived from further joint operations complished by Vietnamese forces if can only result in a greater degree of government influence over former proficiency throughout the RVNAF Viet Cong areas is to be established. and an eventual end to charges of Military success by Vietnamese forces ineptitude and incompetence.

I

\

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November 1968 33

LieutenantColonel James M. Wroth, UnitedStates Arm#

l!?OR more than a year now, the tempo of North Korean incidents

acrose the demilitarized zone (DMZ) has increased markedly. From the armistice in 1953 through October 1966, eight Americana were killed in Korean clashes. During the 12 months beginning in November 1966, more than two dozen Americane were killed

ualty increases have been experienced by the South Koreans who man all but 18 miles of the DMZ.

Casualties, however, are but one indication of the increased tempo of violence. In April 1967, Republic of Korea troops used artillery fire for the first time gince the truce to repel a Communist incursion. This battle involved more than 100 men. In June, a US 2d Infantry Division barracks was dynamited near Korea’s famed Freedom Bridge. September saw two South Korean trains blasted, one of which car

34 Militaq Review

KOREA

ried American ,military supplies. In October, NOrth Korean ar+dlery fire sounded for the firet time since 1953 when more than 50 rounds were fired at a South Korean army barracks.

In January 1968, there were 31 North Korean military personnel discovered by police in the outskirts of Seoul. They had infiltrated to assassinate South Korean President Chung Hee Park. In the ensuing battle, more than 10 people were killed. Two days later,North Korean patrol boats seized the USS Pueblo. The vessel and its crew have been held ever since. Security Tightened

New violence on the part of North Korea hae caused new preparedness by United Nations Command personnel who guard South Korea. In the area to the south of the military demarcation line, US and ROK troops have increased their vigil. Movement immediately couth of the DMZ is closely controlled, even during daylight. Troops continuaKy patrol infiltration routes in mountainous areae.

An anti-infiltration barrier has been constructed along the southern edge of the DMZ to help catch line-crossers.

Lieutenant Colonel James M,, Wroth is with the Ofice of the Aseistant Secretary of the ArmsI (FinarwiaZ Management), Washington, D. C. He received his B.S. from the University of Nebrasku, Lincoln, and an M.B.A. from Syracuse University, New York. His assignments include dutg with the .lOth and 7th Infantry Divisions in Korea; the 9d Infantrgr Division Artillery in Germany; and with the Offics of the Chief of S’taf, .!7S ArmzI, Washington. He is a graduate of the USArmg Command and G neral Stuf College; the Armed Force 1 Staff CoZlege, Norfolk, Virginia; a~d the US ArmIIWar College, Carlisle Barra&e, %m.q.dv,ania.

T~ *barrier includee heavy fencing, mmes, radar, and sophisticated detection gear. Guard poste are spotted along the barrier to catch infiltrators detected or delayed by its devices.

Although no one can state conclusively how effective the UN Command vigil has heen, eeveral hundred Communist agents have been killed or captured since October 1966. No estimate can be made of the number evading capture. North Korean Intentions

The ones who escape are important because they present the biggeet threat to Korean national security. This is not because they can sabotage another train or bomb another US barracks, but because of North Korea’s announced intention to foment a Vietnam-style insurgency in South Korea. Many infiltrators are dispatched specifically for this purpose.

Along the DMZ, the usual intiltration pattern is for a group of apecially trained guidee to lead two or three agents through the UN defenses. These groupa will fight if discovered. Once safely inside South Korea, the agents attempt to blend with the population while the guides return north. Similar tactics are used to land ag nts along South Korea’a extensive c1astline. Agents captured or killed hav$been equipped with weapons, money, cameras, explosives, and propaganda materiel. Their missions have been terroriem, sabotage, and insurgency.

Premier Kim Ii-sung made North Korean intentions abundantly clear in his report to the Central Committee of the Korean Workere’ (Communiet) Party on 5 October 1966. In tbe usual Commnnist jargon, Premier Klm called~for actions, not worde, in the battle against US imperialism, pointed

Nwember 1533 35

KOREA

to the example of North Vietnam’s struggle to liberate South Vietnam, and called for more active assistance to the South Korean struggle.

Increased infiltration and violence aPPear aimed at supporting the following goals to:

o Foment insurgency in South Korea, using Viet Cong success as the example.

e Reduce South Korean participation in the Vietnam war by creating trouble at home.

o Support the Vietnamese Communists by diverting US attention and strength.

e Divert attention of the North Korean people from their present economic problems.

Although unification under her rule is one of North Korea’s long-range ob. jectives, it does not appear that current violence is an attempt to resume open hostilities.

Guerrilla Warfare Prospects North Korean Communists appar

ently believe that the most likely way to unify Korea under their terms is by guerrilla warfare. In their view, now ie the time to build the base for insurgency. In 1962, Premier Kim called for peaceful reunification of Korea. His 1966 call omits the modifier “peaceful.” Kim indicates that the Vietnamese example should be followed. No longer are the North Korean Communists content to wait for revolution in the south to achieve reunification.

This change reflects recognition of the political and economic progress achieved by South Korea during the past five years. Before 1963, Communist propaganda played heavily on poor economic conditiou. and dictatorial government in South Korea. North Ko

rean “prosperity and freedom” were contrasted with “starvation and brutality” in the couth.

During the past five years, however, South Korea has achieved a breakthrough into true economic progress. New prosperity is most evident to the city dweller, but even the peasant farmer in his mud-walled home is seeing the benefits of chemical fertilizer and farm-to-market roads. The South Korean citizen has seen his economic well-being improve and expects to see further improvement from a continuation of his present government.

By Weetern standarde, personal freedom in South Korea ‘continues to be limited. Anti-Communist laws grant the government powers which can be, and perhape are, used to suppress some legitimate dissent. However, this situation must be viewed in the context of a people accustomed to a thousand years of authoritarian rule, and it may be said that the climate for dissent continues to improve.

Popular Support Popular eupport for the current gov.

ernment was demonstrated in May 1967 when President Park was reelected for a second term. His 1.3 million-vote edge over former President Yun Po-sun was much wider than predicted. In 1963, when Park first defeated Yun, this margin was 150,000 votes. The extent of Park’s 1967 victory has been attributed to political and economic progress during his first term, including actions to help the farmers. The election saw a turnout of 85 percent of South Korea’s 14 million registered voters and was reported by UN observers to have been honestly conducted.

Response to North Korean infiltrators has been another measure of poP-

Military ReVkW 36

KOREA

uk+r Support , for the government. Many infiltrators have been captured or killed as a direct result of cooperation by local citizens. As long as suspicious strangers are reported to authorities, infiltrators will find it difficnlt to establieh guerrilla base areas in the Korean countryside. Thus, the

t e ‘late 1950’s. However, several dift“’ferences exist between the two situations, including the absence of sparsely populated jungle areas in Korea that cyn swallow the infdtrators. The cruc]al difference is popular support for the South Korean Government. As long as the government can retain the

Anti-infiltrationbarriers snd continuous patrolling aesist in the capture of North Korean Iirre-croesers

lack of popular dissatisfaction within South Korea, which led North Korea toward guerrilla tivity, also militates against succe s of this activity.

The current lack Tf continuing guerrilla warfare in S&th Korea should not be interpreted as complete failure of the Communiet effort. Pyongyang sees the present as a time for building its forces in South Korea and saving large-scale guerrilla fighting for the time when these forces are stronger. In some ways, this plan is similar to the Viet amese situation in

Y

November1968

support of its people, the guerrilla threat will be minimized.

South Korea preeently has 45,0b0 troops fighting in South Vietnam. Thie number makes her contribution the largest of any nation except the United States or Vietnam. Additionally, Korea is providing civilian workers and aid teame. Korean troops in Vietnam have gained the reputation of being highly effective fighting men. By creating trouble at home, the North Kor&ans hope to limit South Korean participation in the Vietnam war.

3

KOREA

tions have increased, US force levels in Korea have been rebuilt.

However, expectation by the North Korean Communists that the United States might find difficulty meeting simultaneous pressures on more than one front holds potential future consequences. The Nc ~b Koreans might conclude that the US resolve to defend

economic problems at home may be one purpose of North Korea’s increased violence. North Korea is suffering the typical woes of a Communist economic system. While Premier Kim was calling for more aggressive action toward the United States and South Korea, First Vice Premier Kim 11was telling North Koreans that their

MilitaryReview 38

tiORE#

seven-year ecqnomic plan would be three years late in achievement.

When the country was divided, North Korea inherited most of the industrial facilities. South Korea, on tbe other hand, inherited most of the population. Thus, the north. started with a rudimentary industrial base and no population pressures, while the south began with h dense population and no industry. These factors caused many observers to predict that South Korea could not survive as an independent nation. Indeed, she probably would not have s rvived without US aid. P

Economic Goals North Korea now has lost her eco

nomic advantage. During the period following the Korean War, and with considerable aid from both the USSR and Communist China, North Korea’s economy developed reasonably well. In 1962, North Korea reported achieving self-sufficiency in foodstuffs, considerable progrees in housing, and fulfillmentof industrial goals. In 1966, however, pleas were made to the North Korean people to cut back on food consumption, to be patient on housing, and to produce more in mining and industry.

An increase in resources devoted to national defense was the major cause for delayed achievement of economic goals cited in North Korea’s 1966 economic report. A more likely reason was reduction in economic and military assistance from the Soviet Union and Communist China, both of whom shifted their major attention and aid to Vietnam.

In addition, the 1966 economic report gives strong indications that the economy is suffering from poor planning and management—problems

November19e8

~hich have haunted all Communist economies. Whatever the cauaes, this economic report admits major shortfalls throughout the economy. With t$eir economic situation worsening

“ while South Korea’a improves, the North Korean leadere may be using the proved tactic of renewing border tensions to justify belt tightening at

,.home.

Otker Goals North Korea has two other goals

concerning the United States and South Korea which do not appear directly involved in the current trend to increased violence. These are to sever UN ties with South Korea and to remove US troops from South Korea. The United Nations has two major ties with South Korea:

� UN efforts to establish a representative government for a unified Ko- ~ rea, which have continued periodically, since before the Korean War.

� The UN label which has been worn by forces defending South Korea since the beginning of the Korean War.

North Korea always has insisted that unification and the form of government in Korea are internal questions and, therefore, not withi the

rscope of the UN Ch+rter. Supp rt of this position by other Commun” t

Ycountries has precluded UN action on unification. Similarly, other Communist nations have called for the United Nations to withdraw its sanction from the forces defending South Korea. Poland included this demand in her general debate speech to the UN General Assembly in October 1967.

Knowing that North Korea has announced a policy of increased violence, and chaving seen the corresponding multiplication of border incidents, the

,!

39

KOREA

question now ie: What does this mean for the United St@es ?

A mutual defense treaty binds the United States and the Republic of Korea. Additionally, the United States has invested several billion dollars in military and economic aid to the Republic of Korea.

Deterring another Communist attack on South Korea is the obvious US intereet. Under present conditions, the need to deter insurgency, or guerrilla warfare, is as great as the need to deter overt invasion. As illustrated by Vietnam, the US defense commitment extends to defense against outside-eponsored Communist insurgency. For thie reason, the possibility of North Korea succeeding in her attempts to start guerrilla warfare holds the potential of involving the US in another Vietnam-st y]e conflict.

The United States hae her world prestige on the line in Korea because of the legacy of the Korean War, the investment of military and economic aid, and a mutual defense treaty with the Republic of Korea. Should the United States fail to see that Korea remains free and independent, US commitments around the world would lose their meaning.

The Republic of Korea is becoming an example for other developing nations of the benefits accruing from alignment with the United States. It is obvious that US assistance played a major role in making Korea what she is today. Thus, as Korea progresses economically and politically, other emerging nations are more likely to choose the way of democracy.

Korea provides the United States with ueeful military bases in Aeia. Although these base: .~e primarily for the defense of South Korea, their util

ity, in the event of war between the United Statee and Communist China, cannot be denied. The proximity of Korea to the Chinese mainland and her strategic location between China and Japan make desirable the retention of US base rights in the Republic of Korea.

Korea is emerging as a leader among the developing nations of Asia. The best example of this is the role played by Korea in the founding and development of the Asian and Pacific Council. It is in the US interest to see this Asian leadership role filled by a nation sympathetic to US views.

Continued Korean participation in the Vietnam war is one of the more important short-range US interests. This participation not only eases the military burden on the United States, but also demonstrates the concern of Asian nations with containing Communist expansion.

Disruption of South Korea’s current political and ecofiomic progress would be a major victory for the Communists, and would seriously damage US interests in Asia. Active insurgency in Korea would interfere with economic development since a climate of law and order is essential to commerce. Also, increased military expenditures to combat insurgency would divert government resources from development projects.

North Korea has launched a campaign of increased violence and infdtration. With continued political and economic progress in South Korea, Communist efforts are likely to result in little more than harassment. However, the United States, as well as South Korea, must keep watch to preclude the serious implications inherent in North Korean actions.

Military Review 40

At mm From Znter tioncd Journal (C@ada)

. F ,

Strategy After De Gaulle

R. J. HIR

The views expresssd in this arti- TTEMPTS to estimate the nacle are those of the author and do ture of French strategy in the not constitute the opiniows of the future suffer from difficulties common Defense. Research Board, Govern- to all analyses of French policy at the ment of Canaifu, Ottawa.—The Ed- present time. They turn on asseesitor. men@ of the nature of Gaullism and

A

- depend on evaluation of GeneralT,tlepbc.tomutiegy L,Arm&.

November1968 41

FRENCH STRATEGY

Charles A. de Gaulle’s success in establishing his system of government in France. No one can say with absolute certainty that he fully understands Gaullist plans, or that he is able to set out all the priorities in French Government policy, but each commentator must make some estimate of the situation if his argument is to have any claim to sophistication.

Twofold POtiCy General de Gaulle’s policy appears

to be twofold. In the short run, it seems to be concerned as much with the reconstruction of national unity as with foreign affairs; in the long run, with developing French power in the international community.

The primary task is to create a state of equilibrium or balance within France by 1972, or as soon as possible thereafter, so that France may advance into the last quarter of the century in unified service to her new legitimacy, the Fifth Republic. The political forces of the nation, the administrative and military organs of the state, an~.even national doctrines must be coordinated to create the state of equilibriu~ without which Francf

This article was condensed from the original, published in the INTERNATIONALJOURNAL(Canada) Spring 1968. Cop@ghted @ 1968 by the Cawadian Iwstitute of Iwternatiomzl Affairs.

Mr. Hill holds a B.S. from the London School of Economics awd an M.A. from the University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. He has worked in journalism and business in Montreal and, since 1964, has besn a Defense Service Scientific Officer engaged in strategic stt!dies fov the Deferwe Research tioard, Government of Canada, in Ottawa.

will return to the divisiveness of the past when De Gaulle departs the scene.

French strategic doctrines in the next 10 years are likely to reflect not only the nation’s position within West. ern Europe and the Atlantic alliance, but also the Gaullist hope of creating national equilibrium in France. The provision of nuclear equipment to the armed forces, designed, in part, to reconcile the military establishment to the Fifth Republic, makes French adoption of some kind of nuclear strat. egy imperative. At the same time, General de Gaulle’s withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to an autonomous role within the alliance involves, of necessity, reliance on a strategy of “immediate nuclear response” to threats against vital French interests in Western Europe.

“Massive Retaliation” France argues that her nuclear

strategy is derived from the doctrine of “massive retaliation” upheld by NATO in the days of John Foster Dulles. France refuses to coordinate her policies with the “flexible response” doctrine she ascribee to the United States, but lacks the second-strike capability required to make her nuclear forces truly credible as an independent deterrent. French nuclear forces can retaliate at present only against attacks mounted with conventional weapons and are more likely to provoke enemies into preemptive strikes than to deter them from action.

The French Government’e task, in the next few years, is to create the weapons required to support a truly credible “massive retaliation” strategy. The first generation of her nuclear weapons, consisting of 62 Mirage IV bombers, must be replaced by more sophisticated equipment.

MilitsryReview

Government.plans call for the creation of a second-generation force of land-based, medium-range ballistic missiles; a third-generation force of nuclear submarines, with a second-strike capability; and several batteries of tactical nuclear weapons. But tbe costs and technical problems to be overcomeremain formidable wh]le ma-

Interavi. Mirage IV aircraft constitute France’s first-generationnuclear weapons system

jor quantities of new conventional equipment must also be issued if the armed forces are not to become dispirited and dissatisfied. The weapons program must not be allowed to jeopardize government plans in tbe social and educational fields and, preferably, should be carried out without incurring excessive inflation.

The most spectacular part of tbe government’s military reequipment program lies in the field of nuclear weaponry,

France has registered some remarkable achievements in the field of ballistics, but still must prove that she can successfully fire Pokzm”s-typemissiles from her nuclear submarines. A Pohzris-type missile is an extremely difficultweapon to develop. The French Government indicates that its technicians have fired two-stage rockets successfully from underwater caissons andthe experimental submarine Gym

Novemberla6a

FRENCH STRATEGY

rjote, but a fi nal verdict on its missile program must await installation and regular firings from The Rerfoutabte and her sisters. , Thermonuclear warheads must also

be built for the nuclear submarines as rapidly as possible although the government may be satisfied with improved nuclear devices for an interim period. There is little doubt that French technicians will, in time, successfully produce enough warheads to fit the 16 missiles to be placed in each nuclear submarine. The complete equipment of two nuclear submarine, however, is probably the most th@ the government can hope for by 1972.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons In addition to stIategic nuclear

weapons, the French Government has committed itself to a major program of tactical nuclear weapons construction whose implementation holds considerable importance for the prestige of the army. The air force will have medium-range ballistic missiles by 19’72; the navy will have nuclear submarines; and the army will control batteries of tactical nuclear weapons as a key weapon in the armament of its new mechanized divisions.

There is little doubt that Ff’ench technicians will succeed in budding the missiles for the tactical nucleqr weapons, but the miniaturized warheads present greater technical problems and may not be issued in any great quantities by 1972.

The conventional weapons part of the government’s military reequipment program is no less important than the nuclear, owing to the obsolescent nature of much of the present materiel and the constantly increasing costs of replacement. The army, in particular, needs considerable quantities of

43

FRENCH STRATEGY

new materiel. It is now divided into the Forces for Operational Defense of the Territory (DOT) of about 25 bat. talions whose duty is to defend the national territory against subversion or enemy paratroop drops, and a Force

of Maneuver of 150,000 men for participation in nuclear and mobile conventional wars.

The DOT is fairly satisfactorily equipped with the light weapons brought back from Algeria after 1962, but tbe Force of Maneuver still requires large quantities of suitable weapons. Government plans call for the complete reequipment of the force by 1973. However, it is doubtful whether the program will be fulfilled by that time.

The air force is scheduled to receive 110 J&age III fighter bombers and 40 Trqmsall transport aircraft be

fore 1972 while the navy acquires nine minesweepers and five corvettes. The low priority accorded to the construction of conventional naval vessels at the present time is being offset by the navy’s advancement to a leading position among the national nuclear deter. rent forces.

Tbe Long Term The Gaullist search for equilibrium

and national unity is not an end in itself, but only the first step in a process designed to elevate France in tbe international community. General de Gaulle doubtless bepes that the effects of his establishment of national unity, if it is established, will be felt, long after he has retired from power, in the military aqd strategic fields as much as in any other.

France will need time to consolidate her power in the 1970’s by completing the present armaments program and, perhaps, by building a small number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, but may be ready to install new weapons and fnrther military power in the 1980’s and 1990’s. She will probably have a population of about 75 million by the end of the century and may possess enough industrial and financisl power to construct some of the rockets, antimissile systems, and reconnais. sance satellites now under development.

While ballistic systems remain as expensive as the Polaris submarine or the Nike X antimissile project, France is unlikely to be able to compete in a truly effective way with the United States and the Soviet Union. But technology is changing rapidly, costs of development change with the passage of time, and no one can be sure of the state of the military art a quarter of a century from now.

MilitaryReview 44

FRENCH STRATEGY

The success of Gaullist military poli. ties will be assured in the long term only if the French nation adopts a pragmatic approach as the basis for strategy. France must abjure the neo. Cartesian search for absolute principles in warfare which has so often afflicted her policies in the past. The kind of thinking which characterized national strategies at the outset of World War I, in the interwar years, and in the colonial campaigns in Indochina and Algeria must give way to doctrines based on the realities of tech. nology and the international environment.

There must be no repetition of Plan XVII which caused 300,000 French casualties in August 1914 by its insistence on the superiority of offensive spirit in warfare, even when pitting lightly armed troops against strongly fortified positione. There must be no renaissance of the Maginot Line men. tality with its complete commitment to the defensive. There must be no reversion to tbe attitudes of the counterrevolutionary psychological warfare school which ignored basic demands for national independence in Algeria as it sought for the technical sources of victory in battle.

The strategic theories of General Pierre M. Gallois, French Air Force, Retired, must be treated with reserve and employed only as a tool to justify some particular piece of Gaullist policy. General Gallois contends that any French nuclear force is valuable because nuclear weapons are the arbiter of the modern battlefield and can threaten an aggressor with losses always outweighing his potential gain. However,he finds his logic merely used by the, Gaullists to further their strictly political ends.

November1968

+ General de Gaulle has already given evidence of his pragmatic approach to strategy. His early theories of mechanized warfare are now famous fhr their realism while his policies since 1958 show a marked inclination

.to bend doctrines to the diplomatic situation. In the last nine years, the government of the Fifth Republic has

I“tanwi Trsa8all C-160 medium militarytransport

totally eliminated the Algerian war and its attendant counterrevolutionary strategy as a factor in national politics, and thrice altered its stand on questions of military doctrine when it suited it to do so.

The end of the Algerian war in 1962 coincided with a speech by US Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara at Ann Arbor, Michigan, in which he set out the fundamentals of the Kennedy administration’s stratdgy of “flexible response;’ and called on the United States European allies to &ordinate their military policies with the United States. General de Gaulle then gave some indication of his willingness to coordinate policy, provided bis goal of establishing French hegemony in Western Europe was recognized, by assisting in the creation of the France-German Treaty of Friendship.

The military clauses of the treaty called for a close harmonization of doctrines between the two nations

4s

FRENCH STRATEGY

which implied that France would accept the basic tenets of US strategy, at least in the short term, since German military forces depended almost completely on support from the United States.

When Dr. Ludwig Erhard came to power in October 1963, however, and the France-German Treaty seemed unlikely to provide France with the leadership she desired in Western Enrope, General de Gaulle authorized the late General of the Army Charles Ailleret to state French support for a doctrine of “immediate nuclear response.” Since then, the French Government has twice shown its willingness to change its policies to suit its diplomatic goals.

An anonymous article in Politigue fltrang~re in 1965, clearly written with government backing, proposed a new syetem for NATO in which the European members would be grouped under French leadership. Further, doctrines of deterrence were to be coordinated by France and the United States, meaning that France would adhere to US doctrine since the United States could hardly be expedted to change her policies just to suit the Europeans.

Then, in 1966, fihdy disillusioned with the prospects for a reform of NATO along lines satisfactory to his own policies, General de Gaulle withdrew France from NATO’s integrated military structure and once again authorized his Ministers to proclaim the virtues of a strategy of “immediate nuclear response.”

Time alone will tell whether General de Gaulle’s analysis of French requirements is correct, and whether the French nation wili, in fact, adopt a

pragmatic approach as the basis for its strategy. France may find opportunities to adjust her doctrines to advantage as the century proceeds, and it will be interesting to see whether she uses them. Doctrines of “immediate nuclear response” or “massive re. taliation” will probably need to be maintained throughout the 1976’s, but afterward new strategies may prove more fruitful.

The present French position is based on the belief that the Americans are obliged to defend Western Europe whether they like to or not in order to defend their own national interests, but recognizes that US commitments may change with alterations in weapons and the international environment.

The construction of expensive antimissile systems cmdd alter the international situation to France’s disadvantage while a cheapening in the costs of either missiles or antimissile might enable France to adopt a more independent stance. If the United States and the Soviet Union build heavy and costly antimissile systems, France may be forced to coordinate her strategy more closely with the United States because her nuclear deterrent forces can no longer maintain any claim to credibility.

If, on the other hand, nuclear weapons and antimissile systems become much cheaper and more effective, France might poseess enough industrial power, either alone or in concert with other Western European powers, to establish quite credible deterrent forces. Whatever the exact outcome, strategy will need constant readjustment to fit the political and technical environment if France wishes to pursne a Gaullist destiny.

&

M6itsi Review

Colonel Walter Beinke,United States Arm~

W E LIVE in a rapidly changing world, a world character

ized by political upheaval, social turmoil, and economic revolution. In a world such as this,” it is not difficult to perceive the necessity for frequent changes in our national policy objectives. Likewise, the military strategy supporting our national policy objectives must be revised frequently if it is to stay attuned with reality.

During the years immediately following World War II, the United States enjoyed a position of unchallengedmilitary supremacy. Early recognition of the expansionist goals of worldcommunism prompted a countervailing strategy of “contilnment.”

November1968

However, public reaction to the Korean War, reductions in tbe defense budget, and a US nuclear monppoly influenced a change to the strategy of “massive retaliation.” Whereas CO+ tainment had been oriented toward resisting aggression, massive retaliation emphasized tbe deterrence of aggression by the threat of overwhelming military force.

In 1961, the Secretary of Defense conducted a complete reappraisal of our military strategy. Intelligence estimates at that time indicated that the military power differential between the United States and the S,oviet Union, particularly with respect to nuclear weapons and delivery

47

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

means, had decreased considerably. In the event that deterrence failed, the damage that might be sustained by the United States was judged unacceptably severe. Furthermore, our defense posture to engage successfully in conventional nonnuclear warfare was questionable.

It was in view of these considerations that the single, all-out-response concept which highlighted the strategy of “massive retaliation” was replaced by a strategic doctrine which provided a wider range of options to our national leaders—the strategy of “flexible response.”

. What Is Flexible Response? Whenever a change in strategy is

being contemplated, planners are faced with the remnants of ,the old strategy —programs, forces, weapons, and alliances—and it is neither politically expedient nor economically advantageous to discard them. Thus, at any given time, a mixture of strategies exists. Flexible response is no exception. It retains the nuclear deterrent concept of its predecessor strategy while, at the same time, increasing the role envisioned for general purpose forces in the conduct of conventional nonnuclear conflicts.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have de-

Colonel Walter Beinke is with the 2d Field Force in Vietnam. He is a graduate of the US Military Academy, West Point, New York; the US Army Command and General Staff College; and the US Armg War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. He has served with the 25th Infantry Division in Japan, Korea, and Hawaii; with the 5th Region, US Army Air Defense Commamf. F’.rtSher’idan, IUinois; and with the Ojice, Chief of Research and Development, in Washington, D. C.

As

fined flexible response as the capability of military forces for effective reaction to any enemy threat or attack with actions appropriate and adaptable to the circumstances existing. It represents a balanced posture with capabilities for selective use of force at all levels of conflict, from stability operations through large-scale conventional warfare to general thermonuclear war.

While deterrence of aggression re. mains fundamental to flexible response strategy, due recognition is given to the possibility that deterrence might not work nor be appropriate ina given situation. Accordingly, emphasis is placed on the controlled use of force —freedom for the President to select and apply the amount and kind of force appropriate to the threat at hand.

National Security Flexible response strategy is not

based on a fixed concept of war. Its primary purpose is to deter war, but it recognizes the possibility of general nuclear war and assures an adequate defense posture if it should occur. At the same time, it recognizes the need for a capability to cope with situations short of general nuclear war and undertakes to maintain aforwardposture designed to keep such situations as far from the United States as possible. It permits our natilonal leaders a wide range of choices in determining the appropriate military reaction required to support our national interests.

The keynote of flexible response strategy is that, in the event deterrence fails, it provides the maximum number of options for subsequent actions. History is replete with examples of strategies which were so rigid that they could not be reconciled with the

Military Review

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE ~

actual situation. The disastrous effects of an inflexible strategy were demonstrated by the Germans in World War I with the Schlieffen plan and by the French in World War H when they depended on the Maginot Line.

At the opposite end of the doctrinal spectrum, however, a strategy can be

ah ez post facto strategy. If flexible response strategy has an Achilles’ heel, it is likely to be its reliance on crisis management.

~When pursuing a strategy which is not sufficiently definitive, abnormal expenditures of effort are required in times of crisis to establish a starting

ArmvNews~t”,e. The82dAkborne DNieiondemonstratedthe merits of flexibleresponeein their deploy

ment ta the DominicanRepublic \ so vague as to be no etrategy at all, and each event muet be treated as a separatecrisis. The purpose of a strategy is to provide a plan of action for a number of circumstances which are likely to occur. Its merits can best be judgsd in relation to whether or ~ot tbe predicted events do, in fact, take place and whether or not tbe forces developedin their anticipation are ade. quate to cope with the situation. It is difficult; if not impossible, to evaluate

November 19S8

point for consideration of the particular problem at hand. From a practical viewpoint, there is a finite limit on the number of crises our natilonalleaders are capable of handling simultane-OUSIy. Additionally, there is the ever-present danger that compartmentalized thinkhg wiR engender what are essentially episodic solutions inconsistent with our over-all national objectl%es.

On the other hand, the lack of a

49

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

definitive strategy may have some deterrent value which is our primary aim. If the target of our deterrence is aware of our capabilities, but is left in doubt as to our intentions, he may be equally as deterred as if he had received a direct threat.

However, there is evidence to sup-

that of control. Inherent in the concept of flexible response strategy is the controlled use of force, not only as a peacetime deterrent, but also during all levels of conflict, including a strategic nuclear exchange. While the United States has incorporated the necessary control measures into

us Arm” Failure of strategy to providean early solution may lead to entrapmenton the escala

tion ladder

port a supposition that even we are not completely sure of our intentions. The strategic debate which bas eurfaced such variations as counter-force, countervalue, damage-limiting, assured destruction, and escalation— all of which fall within the purview of a flexible response strategy—lends credence to the argument that our present strategy i mbiguous.

Another area open to question is

her military structure, there is no real assurance that our potential adversaries have the capability or the desire to do the same.

During the Cuban missile crisis— a peacetime situation—precise control was exercised by both sides, essentially at the diplomatic level. In Vietnam—a limited war situation—the United States has demonstrated her ability to maintain a high degree of

Military Review 50

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

control over - conventional military forces.

But what about a strategic nuclear exchange? Is it realistic to assume that the vast destruction sustained by both sides would not seriously impede their capabilities for command and control, as well as their ability to communicate with each other ? And what about our allies and the allies of our adversary? How does one nation exercise a high degree of control over the military forces of another friendly nation?

impact on Allies It must be recognized that it is not

possible for the United States to change her strategy to any large degree without such changes having some impact upon her allies. This was the dilemma in which tbe United States found herself when she decided to dkcard the concept of massive retaliation and adopt the doctrine of flexible response.

On the one hand, our allies in newly emerging countries could look forward to increased assistance, even to the extent of US participation in low levels of conflict. On the other hand, onr Western European allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were somewhat reluctant to provide adequate local forces. Not only were they strongly influenced by economic considerations, but they believed that a conventionalbuildup might weaken the credibility of the nuclear deterrent. Furthermore, they argued that a conventional war in Europe would offer little hope for success in view of the overwhelming superiority of the Soviet forces.

Basically, tbe flexible response strategy prOvidedfor retention of the formidable nuclear strike forces inherent

November 1968

tp the massive retaliation strategy while, at the same time, increasing the capabilities to wage lower levels of warfare. Although this posture enables t~e United States to respond discreetly to a wide range of situations, the European member nations of NATO have yet to give their full support to the flexible response concept.

Consider Options NATO unity has been founded on

the belief that the United States possesses tbe capability and the will to react to a Soviet attack on Europe. Conventional forces have been viewed alternatively as a “tripwire,” “shield,” or “firebreak,” but never as the main thrust of NATO strategy. The mere fact that our flexible response strategy permits consideration of options other than nuclear is viewed by many Europeans, and even som~ Americans, as an invitation to the Soviets to engage in lower levels of aggression.

This concern probably is overstated. The record indicates that in recent years the Soviet attitude has been one of cautilon. The United States still maintains forces in Europe prepared to fight a nuclear or nonnuclear war. Furthermore, the United K]ngdom and France have developed nuclear capabilities, so it is doubtful that &e nuclear deterrent has been downgra~d from the Soviet viewpoint.

The fact remains, however, that NATO lacks a unified strategy. What it does have, in effect, is two strategies—an official strategy of massive retaliation and a de facto strategy of flexible response.

As a peace-keeping strategy, flexible response has demonstrated its merits in such diverse situations as BerJin, Laos, Thailand, and the Dominican Republic. Its most notable

51

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

success was the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis. Although many factors may have influenced the Soviet decision to back down in Cuba, the fact remains that the United States possessed the appropriate means and the will to react, and the Soviets knew it.

In retrospect, it is evident that we adopted the strategy of flexible response without a full realization of its implications. Admittedly, there was a need for something other than nuclear strikes in answer to limited aggression, but our present strategy turns out to have some unique problems of its own. Unseen and largely unexamined, they may well plague us in the future. These problems are:

e Flexible response is an extremely sophisticated strategy. It outlines a broad framework within which actions may be taken. In times of crisis, the lack of a more definitive strategy will no doubt place great strain on our national leaders. It is interesting to spec. ulate about how well a second crisis could have been managed during the Cuban missile situation.

e The matter of control is always preeent. Conceptually, the controlled use of force represents an ideal solution. It is difficult to argue for the use of a sledge hammer when a flyswatter is appropriate. However, the controlled use of force in the real world is a complex matter, and, while recognized as being difficult at the lower levels of conflict, it may be completely infeasible at the higher levels of conflict.

e There has been a deterioration of relations with our European allies, particularly France. As long as we pursue a flexible response strategy, this trend probably will continue.

e The criteria for response at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict is too open ended at the present time. Our increased capability permits involvement in a wide variety of situations in newly emerging nations throughout the world. Unless these situations are approached from a position of military restraint, we soon can become overextended.

Equally significant in our democratic eystem is the requirement for public support of our Government’s actions. It may become increasingly difficult to convince the public that we should become involved militarily in some remote geographical area against an enemy we barely know. A floor needs to he constructed in our military etrategy—a realistic minimum threshold for the commitment of US forces.

e The opposition may not always quit at the first display of counter-force. If, aa in Vietnam, our flexible response fails to provide an early solution, increased military pressure may be required, and then we are trapped on the escalation ladder. As our force commitments are increased in one area, our ability to respond elsewhere is degraded. Thus, options are decreaaed and the credibility of our deterrent is lowered. Once our forces are committed, it is imperative that operations be conducted at the level of intensity required to assure rapid victory and early disengagement.

It is clear that once again we must conduct a reappraisal of our strategy. Obviously, massive retaliation was not a panacea, nor is flexible response. In view of our experience in Vietnam, we may become just as reluctant to invoke flexible response as we were earlier to employ massive retaliation.

Military Re?iew 52

~OFFICER COURTSOF HONOR . .

in the Souiet Armed Forces

VyacheslavP. Artemiev

T HE Soviet Officer Courts of Honor are separate from the regular judicial system, and are associated in no

way with the organs of military justice. They are organizations of the officer corps, created by order of regiment, division, and higher commanders.

Each court is organized and acts in accordance with the Regulations on Oficw Courts of Honor, approved by the Ministry of Defense. The mission of a Court of Honor [ is to investigate the offenses of officers which discredit their

!rank, violate military honor, and which are inconsistent with the concept of morality. Courts of Honor investigate the discreditable actions of officers, not only in official circumstances, but in their private and family lives as well.

Courts of Honor are established at headquarters of independent units, divisions, armies, training institutions, military districts, and in the directorates of the Ministry of Defense. There are separate Courts of Honor for junior officers, from the rank of junior lieutenant through captain, and for senior officers, from major through colonel. Special courts of honor are established a~,military district level for commanding officers of independent battalions, regimente,

November 1968 53

COURTS OF HONOR

and brigades regardless of rank. Gen. era] officers are not brought before these courts.

Tbe members of each court are selected by secret ballot. For junior officers, this is done at meetings of all junior and senior officers of the particular unit or staff. For senior officers, the selection occurs at meetings of senior officers only. A corn. manding officer may not sit on a Court of Honor in bis own command. The selection of members usually takes place in the fall, at the beginning of the training year. Selected officers serve for a period of one year.

Composition of Court Five active members and two alter

nate members comprise a Court of Honor. The membership of a court which examines the cases of junior officers must contain one or two senior officers. The members choose a permanent chairntan and a deputy chairman from among their number. The election and subsequent composition of the court are announced in an order of the appropriate commander.

Standing Courts of Honor do not exist for commanders of independent battalions, regiments, and brigades. They are created whenever needed for each individual case. The members of such a court are selected by brigade, division, and higher commanders and

Vyaeheslav P. Artemiev is the author of “Soviet Military Penal Units” which appeared in the April 1968 issue of the MILITARYREVIEW..4 fmner oficer in the Soviet Army and a graduate of the Soviet War Col?ege (Fr-unze Military Academy), he is occwpied in researcli’ of the Soviet system and has written eztewsively on the Soviet armed forces. This article was translated from the Russzan by Jerome S. Mass.

‘wminted b the military district. The immediate superiors of the accused officers may not select members of a court.

Courts of Honor investigate the conduct of an officer only upon the request of the commander under whom the court is established, and only with the sanction of the offender’s immediate commander, The immediate supe. rior of the offending officer and the court can propose to the senior commander that the case be brought be. fore the court for investigation. The regiment or division commander, or the chief of an establishment, has the right to decide whether to turn over the case of an offending officer to the military courts, to handle the matter himself as a disciplinary measure, or to lay the case before the Court of Honor.

limitations The Courts of Honor are limited in

their competence to moral offenses which are not in violation of criminal codes or service regulations. As a social force, the Court of Honor is not intended to replace either disciplinary action or tbe punishment meted out by the military tribunal. A moral code which classifies offenses in violation of the honor of an officer does not exist.

In the event that an offense is committed jointly by a junior and a senior officer, it is investigated by a Court of Honor for senior officers. Courts of Honor hear the offenders’ cases in the presence of as many officers as pOssible, but an officer may not attend a Court of Honor if he is of lower rank than the accused.

Officers brought before a Court of Honor have the right to challenge for cause, and a member of tbe court also

Military Review

COURTS OF HONOR

Ihas the right to disqualify himself rnents at some point during the hear-from the court. In the latter case, the fng. Particular zeal in mercilessly de-court must rule on the validity of this structive criticis~ and implacability self-disqualification. In the event that toward the offender are displayed by the officer on trial fails to appear at officers of the political service. Coma session without a valid excuse, the manders make such critical statements court examines the case by default and as well. passes sentence in his absence. After the remarks of those in at

tendance, the accused makes a finalOpen Hearing statement. He is supposed to be ruth. The investigation of a case hy a Iessly self-critical, to repent his mis-Court of Honor usually is carried out deeds ardently, and, after scourgingin an open hearing. During the trial himself thoroughly, to promise neverof an offending officer, it is common to commit such an act again. Occapractice for attending fellow officers sionally, the officer is stubborn—heto make sharply critical statements.

These attending officers must -eh.---+efuses to admit his guilt. or he cOn—. s“ders that the Officer-Court of Honorcondemnthe conduct of their omrade. d s not have the authority to inter-They must ignore their pride nd for ‘kfere with his private life, especially in get common tact ii {even the m st intbe case of family problems. The retimate matters associated with the ofsult of an accused officer taking such fense of the officer on trial. As a rule, a poeition is a higher degree of pun-these statements are carried to abishment invoked by the court, party surdity, connecting the offender’s miscoercion, and appropriate entriee in hk “ deeds: efficiency report. It is far more prudent . . . with the international and iwto how to the established ritual. ternal position of the USSR under the

conditions of hostile capitalistic encir. No Formal Documentation clement and threats Ori the part of the During tbe preliminary investiga. :99ve.SsiWe forces of toorld impevial. tion of the circumstances surrounding aem; with the required mode of con. the offense, as well as during the trial duct and moral make-up of a man in itself, there is no formal documentaa socialist society; with the tasks fac- tion of the proceedings. Only a brief ing every Soviet person, and especially statement of the court session dnd the of7tcers, in realizing the creation of detailed verdict of the court are drawn a communist societ~ under the leader- up. During the investigation at! a ship of the Party. . . . Court of Honor, a delicate matter is

Such declarations are similar to the the summoning and questioning of highly political indictment of a Soviet witnesses from among the accused’s prosecutor. The critical activeness of superior or subordinate officers. those officere in attendance is guar- Enlisted men and civilians are not anteed in advance by the political and called before the court in session, but party organs of the military unit at they may be examined in advance, if which the court sessions take place. their evidence is important. Such evi-Individual officers secretly receive as-, dence, entered into the court record signments from the political organs or ~rnerelyjotted down hy the investiand party organizations to make state- gating officer, is taken into account

November 1968 55

As many officers as possible attend

sion. The verdict of a Court of Honor is decided by a simple majority through a show of hands.

The court may decide to: @ Acquit. e Reprimand. e Announce a public censure. e Announce a severe public cen

sure. o Petition the authorities to post

pone normal promotion. o Draw up a petition requesting

that the individual be reduced either in position or rank.

te Petition that h- ~]e transferred to another military district.

- “ a COUIt or ktOIIOr Dpen hearings ot

mentation to the commander who had ordered the court proceedings initially.

In a Court of Honor, no appeals are permitted against the verdict or the severity of the sentence. It is permissible to appeal irregularities in the court proceedings. Appeals are personally directed to the commander, under whose authority the court is established, within three daye after the verdict has been announced. If the commander considers the appeal justified, or if he uncovers an irregularity, he has the right to set the verdict aside and order the chairman of the court to rehear the case.

Military Review 56

If the sentence is to reduce an officer in rank or position, to transfer him to another military district, or to transfer him to the reserves, the corn. mander must refer the matter to higher echelons under established procedures.

Although the sentence of a Court of Honor against a junior officer is announced to all officer personnel, a senior officer’s sentence is announced only to senior officers. But this decision rests with the commander of the regiment or division. If he does not consider it necessary, then the sentence is not announced at all outside the formal court proceedings.

Organ of Sociaty The Officer Court of Honor is sup

posed to be an organ of society. Therefore, the court’s decision on each offense is to reflect the independent opinion of the entire officer cadre and be a social evaluation of the offense. Those in command may not coerce the court or influence the verdict or the severity of the sentence in any way. Administrative machinations with regard to Courts of Honor are intolerable. However, this is on]y the formal situation and is never observed in even the most insignificant cases.

In practice, the unit commander, the deputy for political affairs, and the secretary of the party bureau jointly decide both the question of submitting the case to a Court of Honor and the sentence which the court is supposed to mete out. The court proceedings and the verdict are merelyformalities which carry out the will of those in command under the guise of social action.

Although appeal of the court’s verdict is forhidden, the convicted officer retains the right to lodge a complaint

Novemberleee

COURTS OF HONOR

ag inst the measures taken by hisP

commanding officer, even if these actions are based on the verdict of a Cou$t of Honor. These complaints are pe~missible only if the commander has exceeded his authority in the severity of the punishment.

Even after the verdict and the sentencing of the guilty officer by the Court of Honor, the case is not concluded. An officer who is a member of the Communist Party or the Communist Youth League is inevitably faced with the pressures of the appropriate party organizations. If the officer is a regular party member, his offense is examined by the party bureau and at the general party meeting. The party reaches a verdict after taking into consideration the individual’s prior service record, as well as his private life.

Active Criticism Those in attendance at a party meet

ing during the examination of an officer’s personal case include officers, noncommissioned officers, and privates —all the party members. Party democracy does not recognize officer etiquette, military subordination, human self-respect, or personai pride. Active criticism is held as evidence that the party member is a faithful befiever in party ideals.

The accused officer is subjected Jo unceremonious questioning hy the full membership. Again there is the necessity for mortifying self-chastisement, repentance, and promises. The party demands from its members compIete servility and obsequious submissiveness, regardless of the individual and his merits. Only such conduct can reduce the degree of party punishment. Not @y the offense, but the conduct of the offender at the party meeting,

57

COURTS OF HONOR

determines the degree of party punishment.

Party penalties can include varioue measures ranging from a simple warning and censure to expulsion from the party.

The sentence imposed by an Officer Court of Honor or the disciplinary measures of a commanding officer do

not free the offending officer from examining the case and meting out punishment along party lines. Party punishment is always a parallel and additional sentence.

Every party penalty can he appealed through higher party echelons up to the Central Committee of the Commu. nist Party of the Soviet Union.

HAVINGTROUBLESELECTINGCHRISTMASGIFTS? How about the friend in the service? The retired officer? The Allied

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M5itaryReview 58

From Orbis

*

* Sine-SovietAttitudes * s*

* TowardRevolutionary

Colonel Bryce F. Denno,United States Armu Retired

[

THE Soviets and the Chinese nractice. The Chinese Communists and ~ Communists have stressed time the Soviets often disagree on whe~e

andagain their endorsement of “just” and when revolutionary war should be civil wars, especially in developing fought, the way it should be fought, countries. To Communists of all per- and especially the risk of escalation suasions, most civil wars of the type to be tolerated. These disagreements described variously as revolutionary stem from differences in national ob-war, “people’s war,“ internal war, na- jectives, attitudes toward war, experitional “wars of liberation,” insur- ence with revolutionary war, and ingency, or counterinsurgency are as terpretations of its nature.

. justified as the Crusades were to the The objectives of the USSR and Knights Templar. Communist China reflect the differ

Sino,Soviet agreement on doctrine, ence in their status as world powers, however, finds erratic reflection in their positions within the Communist

November 1968 59

REVOLUTIONARY WAR

community, and their views of the world. The Soviet Union has been recognized as a great power for at least four decades; until recently, she was the unchallenged leader of world communism. Communist China has yet to attain recognized great power status in modern times. Further, China’s failure to achieve even the semblance of a boycott of the 23d Congress of tbe Communist Party of the Soviet Union revealed, with humiliating clarity, the gap between her ambitions for leadership in the Communist world and her ability to fulfill them.

Tbe Soviet view of the world ia much more sanguine than that of Communist China. The USSR’s 4,000 miles of border with China mark her sole physical contact with a “hostile” major state.

Enemy Bastions By contrast, Communist China pic

tures herself surrounded by formidable enemies. The East and South China Seae appear not as obstacles, but as highways for foreign access to mainland China. On China’s northeastern and southern flanks are the Republic of Korea and parts of Southeast Asia which provide uncomfortably close “imperialist beachheads” on the Asian landmass. In Chinese Communist eyes,

This articls was condensed from the original tohich appeared in OrtBm,No. 4 Winter 1968, published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Psnns@ania. Copyrighted Q 1968 by the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania.

Colonel Denno, formerly Senior Advisor, Ist Vietnamese Corps, is Associate Director for Instruction, The Militarv Assistance Institute, ArlingtwL, Virginia.

the Pacific isles of Okinawa, Taiwan. and the Philippines are enemy bastions.

A reeurgent Japan poses a growing potential threat. Overflights by Chinese Nationalist aircraft and occasional artillery fire from Quemoy and Matsu remind the Communists that Chiang Kai-shek awaits a propitious time for return to the mainland. British military facilities at Singapore provide a base for additional hostile forces, as do Australia and New Zealand. Behind the Himalayas lies a rearmed India, smarting under the memory of recent Chinese aggressions along her borders. Above all 100methe threat of the Soviet Union.

Regain Territory The realization that China once held,

or at least dominated, much of the adjacent territory now occupied by enemies puts an edge of frustration on Chinese apprehension. The recapture of “lost territory,” especially Taiwan, stands high on the list of Peking’s objectives. Expulsion of the Western (particularly American) military and political presence from the Far East is a desirable prelude to eeizure of territory, as well as an end in itself.

The probable ultimate aim is to regain China’s status as the Middle Kingdom which she held hefore the disasters of the 19th century. Attainment of a further objective—leadership of the worldwide Communist movement—will contribute to this effort.

Soviet goals appear much more modest and less belligerent. This does not mean that the Soviets have abandoned action to assist and hasten the “historically inevitable” transformation of the world to socialism and communism.

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REVOLUTIONARY WAR

They have not’ outgrown their penchantfor overt and covert political machination. They can etill succumb to the temptation to play dangerously for high stakes ae in Cuba. They support revolutionwhen it suits their interests as in Vietnam. Even when their interests are marginal, they continue under obligation to give at least nom

~oclaim publicly. The second, economic development of the Soviet Union, has political as well ae economic potentialities in the struggle fdr Communist hegemony on a worldwide scale. These two objectives are intimately interrelated, according to

,,the Soviets.

The conflicting requirements of

Onegoal of the Soviet Union,economicdevelopment,has politicalas well as economic potentialities in the struggle for Communisthegemonyon a worldwidescale !

inal encouragement to COmmunist

apprOved revolt, if only to forestall Chineee accusations that they are shirking their Socialist responsibilities.

Two other goale, however, demand Soviet attention. One is overriding: avoidance of a thermonuclear world war III, the disastrous consequences of which the Soviets have probably always” recognized privately, and now

November1968

avoiding situations which could lead to world war III, while encouraging -or at least appearing not to discourage”ju st” wars of revolution, prompted Nikita S. Khrushchev in January 1961 to draw a distinction among three categories of wars: world ware, local wars, and “liberation wars an% popular uprieinge.” World wars are anathema. Local wars, involving the confrontation of Communist and

61

REVOLUTIONARY WAR

Western states, he warned, could easily lead to world wars; hence, they should be shunned. “Wars of national liberation,” bowever, are usually justified and would be assisted, as well as encouraged, by the USSR.

“People’s Wars” The Chinese Communists, on the

other band, have made it clear that they consider war with the “imperialists and their lackeys” not only unavoidable but desirable. With sanctimonious certitude, they reaffirm the orthodox Communist dogma that “people’s wars” are an inevitable consequence of equally inevitable imperialist aggression and oppression.

Sneering at “cowardly” Soviet fears of thermonuclear world war III, the Chinese Communists point out that such a war has not yet developed from the many wars of “national liberation” that have occurred since World War H. They deem the use of nuclear weapons by the United States—who is now vulnerable to nuclear retaliation-extremely unlikely in light of United States as well as world opinion.

Even if thermonuclear world war III did break out, they say, the ultimate result would be victory for socialism; after all, World War I saw the birth of the Soviet Union, and World War 11 provided the opportunity for additional Socialist nations to emerge. Meanwhile, in the Chinese Communist view, undue preoccupation with avoiding nuclear war can provoke increased “imperialistic aggression.”

How serious are the Chinese Communists in their professed disdain for the threat of nuclear war? To think that they underestimate tbe potency of thermonuclear weapons defies credulity. Before the Sine-f *iet split, Chinese scientists and military specialists

undoubtedly gained enough access to results of Soviet nuclear testing to acquaint them with nuclear capability for devastation. Their own experimentation now affords them firsthand knowledge.

A much more likely explanation of Communist China’s belittling of rmclear weapons is her conviction that they will not be used against China. Meanwhile, the nuclear standoff between the Soviet Union and the United States offers China a certain freedom of maneuver denied the great nuclear powers. These powers must weigh every military action or threat of action with scrupulous care lest it instigate escalation.

Stringent limitations Although the Chinese Communists

can thue operate with a certain latitude in threatening war and even in making provocative military moves, there are stringent limitations, which they unquestionably recognize, on their actual use of military force. Their resumption of hostilities in Korea, a serious invasion of Vietnam or India, or an attack on Quemoy and Matsu could provoke a war under ground rules quite different from those during the Korean War.

Then, the Chinese fought with copiously supplied Soviet weapons and equipment. Reassured by a freshly signed Sine-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, they swarmed across the Yalu not only with their rear secured, but with at least an implied promise of Soviet assistance in the event of threatened defeat. This promise was sufficient to deter the United States from bombing north of the Yalu.

But 1968 is not 1950. If the Chinese were to initiate aggressive war—

Military Review 62

which the USS’R has expressly declared not only to be contrary to her interests hut even a potential threat to ber survival—they would do so at great hazard. Particularly would this be the case if the United States were involved as in Vietnam. The United States has made it pointedly clear that

The Chinese Communists must have some weapons could

we would not again respect sanctuaries in mainland China as-we did during the Korean War.

In the face of enemy retaliation which they had brought solely on themselves, it is doubtful whether the ChineseCommunists could expect help, or even sympathy, from the Soviets (unless,perhape, China’s continued existence as a Communist state were threatened). This is tr~e despite the Sine-Soviet Treaty of 1950. The fact

November1966

++

REVOLUTIONARY WAR

th~ the Soviets virtually enddd, in 1960, the military and economic aid . they had provided China under the treaty casts doubt on their willingness to honor other mutual assistance programs agreed upon.

Since 1960, the Soviets have been signaling, in unmistakable terms~their

,.

US Air For..

appreciation for the havoc US convent!onsl infllct on China

\ unwillingness to assist the Chinese Communist pursuit of “special aims and interests” which go beyond the legitimate interests of the Communist world and “which cannot be supported by the military power of the socialist camp.” One of many such signals was Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovsky’s blunt assertion in January 1962 that Soviet military power would be used to defencd only “those socialist states friendly to us.”

63

REVOLUTIONARY WAR

These considerations limit severely the use of military force by the Chinese Communists to attain their goals. Unlike the Soviet Union, Communist China lacks the option of seeking political power through economic leverage. The debacle precipitated by the Great Leap Forward must have convinced even the most fanatical that China’s traditional answer to economic problems—massed and regimented manpower+annot substitute for experience and time in building a modern economy. China has troqble making ends meet domestically without finding funds for significant amounts of foreign aid.

Revolutionary War In this dilemma, it seems reasonable

to assume that Communist China views the promotion and support of revolutionary war in other countries as a promising, cheap, and relatively safe means of attaining some of her ambitious goals. Success in Vietnam, for instance, could result in elimination of the “imperialist beachhead” in Southeast Asia. Internal wars, even those receiving heavy clandestine suPport from China, would normally not involve a significant threat of reprisal against China herself.

Further, the Communist takeover in China epitomizes successful revolution against great odds. The formula for revolutionary war which the Chinese Communists developed during that struggle is, in their eyes, one of the most attractive exports they can offer to the developing world.

The Soviets portray Chinese promotion of revolutionary war purely as a stratagem to attain nationalistic objectives. The Chinese Communists’ championing of revohltionary war, insist the Soviets, is:

a4

. . . not based on conceru for world revolution, or concern for the further upsrwge of the national liberation movement. . . . This {s nothing but an attempt at acquiring, b~ means of flatteT~, a cheap popalaTitg among the Asian, AfTican, and Latin American peoples, at establishing one’s hegemony over them, and exploiting them for one’s egotistic great-power purposes.

Interestingly enough, the Chinese accuse the USSR of playing precisely tbe same game-that is, acting in her national, rather than the international, interest. They have long since passed the stage of complaining that the Soviets are failing to support wars of “national liberation,” or attempting to avoid becoming involved in them. Now, say the Chineee Communists, the Soviets are actively collaborating with the Americans and other imperialists to defeat people conducting legitimate revolutionary war. The Chinese and Soviet charges that each state is acting purely in its national interest have a ring of plausibility. Both could be right.

Contrast in Experience The experience of the Chinese Com

munists, who waged a protracted war for most of 22 years, differs diametrically from that of Soviet Russia where, under V. 1. Lenin’s bold leadership, the provisional government wae toppled in only two days.

The Bolsheviks seized control initially in the cities. The urban worker provided the backbone of revolution. In the two-decade fight of the Chineee Communists, they had, of necessity, to depend primarily on the peasantry.

The Soviets and Chinese also differ in their experience with guerrilla or partisan warfare. The major and most

Military Review

recent Soviet experience with this type of warfare occurred during World War II. Soviet propaganda notwithstanding, guerrilla operations in that war do not constitute one of the prouder chapters of Russian martial history. This was true despite many factors favoring guerrilla war. For example, fast-moving German columns early in the war often bypassed Soviet units. Prevented from rejoining Soviet main forces, these units were available to fight behind the lines and to provide a nucleusaround which partisan forces could rally.

Additional Advantage AnotIier advantage stemmed from

the vast areas which the Germans seized, but could not begin to control adequately. Much of this expanse, especially in the central and northern sectors of the eastern theater of operations, contained wooded marshes, lakes, and virgin forests—ideal guerrilla country.

But most of the 50 million people in enemy-occupiedareas at the apogee of Germany’s military effort were apathetjc to Soviet attempts to arouse themagainst the invader. Some-especially in the Baltic States, Belorussia, and the Ukraine—displayed, at least initially, sympathy for the Germans. In any event, no appreciable guerrilla resistance developed until almost a year after the Germans invaded the USSR.

Eventually, as the war progressed, partisan operations. expanded. The partisans received massive external support in the way of ammunition, weapons, medical items, and even tobacco, liquor, and mail by air. Soviet aircraft often evacuated guerrilla wounded. They transported key individuals, such as guerrilla command-

November1968

REVOLUTIONARY WAR

ers,+ and sometimes even moved entire units.

Despite the encouragement of this sort of support and the Soviet manpower available in German-occupied territory, partisans never exceeded 4.5 percent of the Soviet armed f6rces opposing the Germans. Their contributions to the war effort were modest, and the Soviets never considered their guerrillas to play more than an ancillary and supporting role to their conventional military forces.

Thus, in their domestic experience with revolutionary war, the Soviets attained a relatively quick victory, depending on the nrban worker as their mainstay. Subsequently, in World Wai II, they stressed conventional military forces; guerrillas provided an ancillary and not especially notewort~ contribution.

Prolonged War By contrast, the Chinese Commu

nists fought a prolonged and successful war made possible by the peasant. Their guerrilla effort played a predominant role in attaining ‘victory. Guerrilla forces insured the Communists’ survival, gave birth to conventional forces, and supported subsequent conventional campaigns to a significant degree.

These obviously differing experi~ ences should not be exaggerated when appraising current SinO-SOvietviews of revolutionary war. Certainly, the Soviets recognize that successful revolution may be protracted. Conversely, the Chinese would not disparage a revolution which displayed promise for quick success.

The Soviets emphasized convention~ forces during World War H because they had them. The Chinese Communists stressed the importance

as

REVOLUTIONARY WAR

of guerrillas because they began with nothing else. Mao Tse-tung himself has emphasized the indispensability of conventional forces in attaining fi. nal victory. Again, neither Soviets nor Chinese would spurn the support of either peasant or urban worker, deem. ing both to be important contributors to their popular base.

Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to

of victory in the “great war of resistance against Japan.” The article, entitled “Long Live the Victory of the People’s War,” provided an authoritative and current Chinese Communist statement concerning revolutionary war.

After reviewing the strategy conceived and employed against the Japanese by Mao Tse-tung, Lin analyzed

. .....

/ -------.-..-;.’.’.~~;;;....., ‘1,<::-,”:..-.

assume that their differing experiences with revolutionary war have influenced Chinese and Soviet attitudes toward this type of war to some degree, in conjunction with other factors discussed: national objectives, views of the world, and attitudes toward war iti general.

In September 1965, the New China News Agency released the text of an article by Defense Ihmter Lin Piao commemorating the 20th anniversary

the strategy’s applicability to the current world situation. In so doing, he seemed alternately cautious and bellicose. For instance, he stressed the indispensability of self-reliance among a people staging internal war in these words:

Revolution or people’s war in any cmmtry is the business of the massee in that cowntrti and should be carried owt primarily by their own efforts; there is no other way.

Military Revisw 66

REVOLUTIONARY WAR

At the same’ time, Lin Piao disparaged the nuclear weapons’ of the United States, declaring the “spiritual atom bomb which the revolutionary peoplepossess” to be a “far more powerful and useful weapon than the physical atom bomb.” Meanwhile, he insisted, “History has proved and will goon proving that people’s war is the most effective weapon against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys.” In combating this type of war, the United States has the support of the “Khrushchev revisionists” who are:

. . . doing thsir utmost to spread all kinds of arguments agaiwst people’s war, and, wherever they can, they arssckeming to undermine it by overt or.covert means.

Global Stage Appealing to the developing coun

tries, Lin stressed the importance of the peasant who had played such an indispensable role in China’s revolution. After asserting that “The countryside, and the countryside alone, can provide the revolutionary bases from which the revolutionaries can go forward to final victory,” he projected this principle to a global stage:

Taking the entire globe, if North Amer;ca and Western Europe can be catted ‘the cities of the toortd: then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute ‘the rural areas of the world.’ . . . In a sense, the contemporary world revolution also presents a picture of the encirclement of cities by the rural areas.

This latter statement drew sharp retort from the Soviets in a “secret” letter which they sent to Communist Parties around the world shortly be. fore the 23d Congress of the Communiet Party of the Soviet Union and aPrrarently“leaked” deliberately. The

Nwsrnber1968

So~iet letter, published by the Hamburg newspaper, Die Welt, appears anthentic; at least the Chinese Communists have so regarded it. It reads:

*he concept of revolution as the struggle of the world village against the world cit~ is tantamount to the rejection of the leading role of the working class and constitutes a complete revision of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the world historical mission of the working claes.

Vietnam Testing Ground If Lin Piao’s article expounds Chi

nese Communiet doctrine on revolutionary war, Vietnam provides current expression of tbe doctrine in application. The outcome of the struggle in Vietnam is of grave and major concern to the Chinese. A US defeat would mean not only removal of an uncomfortably close Western military presence, but a dramatic vindication of the Mao Tse-tung formula for revolutionary war.

The need for such a vindication be~omes especially clear when one considers the long and dreary succession of failures suffered by the Chinese in their attempts to “export” revolution. Their setbacks in Africa+specially in the Congo (Kinshasa) and Ghana —were as complete as they were unexpected. Africa had been considereil ripe for revolution of their brand.

China badly needs a victory stemming from a Mao Tse-tung type of revolutionary war in Vietnam. Her prestige in Asia and in the world Communist community is at stake. This is why Maoists in China recognize Vietnam, aa does the United States (and probably the Soviet Union also)& as a “testing ground” for revolutionary war.

Communiet China hae displayed her

67

REVOLUTIONARY WAR

anxiety concerning the course of the war on several occasions and in many ways. She has, for instance, urged the North Vietnamese to return to phase II (the purely guerrilla phase) in roil. itary operations and deliberately prolong the war.

China has also discouraged attempts to initiate negotiation of the war, and her threat that she might enter North Vietnam in the event that country was confronted with a “dictated peace” could be interpreted as a warning to North Vietnam against suing for peace. Meanwhile, evidence continues to mount that a dispute over policy toward North Vietnam is at least one factor influencing the current “general election” within China.

The Soviet Union’s stakes in Vietnam are both smaller than those of the Chinese Communists and more am. biguous. Although the Soviet Union, like the United States, is a global power, her interests in Southeast Asia cannot be compared with her interests elsewher%in Eastern Europe or the Middle East, for instance. She would probably oppose US attempts to maintain a presence in Southeast Asia although a case might he made that a continued and inconclusive contest there between the United States and China could work to Soviet advantage.

The Soviets are, of course, committed to assist North Vietnam regardless of their interests in Southeast Asia since to do otherwise would lend credence to Chinese propaganda that the Soviets and the United States are attempting to stifle the war effort of North Vietnam and the Viet Cong. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has at least gone through the motions of attempting to promote ,,~gotiations for a peace settlement. There are several

possible explanations for such actions. One is that the risks and costs of the Vietnam war outweigh, in Soviet eyes, any possible returns.

This examination of Chinese Communist and Soviet pronouncements on, and actions toward, revolutionary war, especially in Vietnam, leads to three major conclusions. First, the Chinese are much more dependent on revolutionary war as an instrument of for. eign policy than are the Soviets. Tbe latter possess a greater range and variety of such instruments, among them the modern Soviet economy and the Soviet thermonuclear arsenal.

Second, although both the Chinese and the Soviets support revolutionary war, their support differs in degree. The Soviets appear much more concerned than the Chinese that revolutionary war may escalate into nuclear war. This does not mean that the Chinese do not also have reservations concerning the applicability of revolutionary war in certain situations. Lin Piao’s warning that the people of a country mus t be able to prosecute a 5revolutionary war through their own efforts is an indication that they do. It is probable that Communist China’s failures to export revolution account, at least in part, for this reservation.

A final conclusion pertains to Vietnam, the most crucial example and test of revolutionary war extant. Of the major powers involved in Vietnam—the United States, Communist China, and the Soviet Union—china has most at stake for the reasons outlined above while Soviet stakes are ambiguous. As long as the current leadership continues in China, China’s stake in Vietnam should have an important bearing on the future of negotiations and on the further course of the war.

MilitaryReviaw 68

,. , ..

The Army’s Miniature AT&T

ColonelJohn B. McKinney,United States Armu

THE cmmn.nicrdions buildup in I Vietnam over the past three

years has seen the A my’s combat support signal streng h mushroom from a single signal attalion to a 20,000-man signal brig / de. The most significant communica ‘ion achievement of this period as been the installation and oper tion of the Southeast Asia Wide and System (SEA WBS), an operat on conducted by the Army under th direction of the Defense Communic tiona Agency.

1

Most of tbe combat support co~munication capability that was installed during the early days of the communications buildup in Vietnam was provided through the use of transportable equipment—shelter-mounted switchboards and multichannel troposcatter, microwave, and very high frequency radios. This equipment is still in use in the Army Area Communications System. As troop strength grew and dispersion increased the distances over which military leaders

November 1966 I 69

ARMY’S MINIATURE AT&T

needed to communicate, it became evident that tactical equipment could not provide the number Of high-quality channels required to support a theater communication .system.

CommunicationsMilestone To meet expanding communication

needs, both for quantity and quality, a decision was made by the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and the US Army, Vietnam, to employ fixed-plant equipment, normally not employed in a combat theater, and to install commercial multichannel radio systems. Responsibility to install, operate, and maintain these facilities was assigned to the US Army Strategic Communications Command (USASTRATCOM).

This decision was a major communications milestone in military 0perations because the extent to which these systems have been installed in Vietnam and Thailand is without

Colonel John B. MeKinney is Director of the Communications Department at the US Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College and the US Army War College, and holds an LL.B. from Southern Law School in Memphis, Tennessee; an M.B.A. from Harvard Business School, Cambridge, Massachusetts; and an M.S. from George Washington University, Washington, D. C. Colonel MeKinney’s assignments include serving as a member of the faculty of the US Army War College, and as Associate Editor of the MILITARYREVIEW;with the 1st Signal Brigade in Vietnam; and with the Weapons Syetems Evaluation Group, Ojice of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D. C. He is the author of “Red Paper Tiger” which appeared in the October 1967 issti. of the MILITARY REVIEW.

precedent. During no previous period in the history of the Armed Forces has so much commercial equipment been part of the ground commander’s command and control network.

To install, operate, and maintain the rapidly expanding SEA WBS—as the combination of fixed-plant and transportable system is designated of-ficially-and to operate and maintain the Army Area Communications System that extends the SEA WBS to the Army’s combat forces, USASTRATCOM activated the 1st Signal Brigade on 1 April 1966. The dollar value of the SEA WBS and its supporting fixed-plant facilities that have been installed by the 1st Signal Brigade ‘since the brigade’s activation, or were being constructed by it near the end of Fiscal Year 1968, is approximately 500 million dollars.

‘IWBCS’ Facilities The backbone of the SEA WBS is the

Integrated Wideband Communication System (IWBCS). The IWBCS— which provides multichannel voice, teletypewriter, and data communications—has been designed especially for optimum performance in the Southeast Asia environment, It also has been provided with the flexibility neededto respond to ever-changing military command and control requirements.

The IWBCS employs the most advanced techniques and equipment available on the communications equipment market today. Included among the IWBCS facilities are high-quality, commercial microwave systems that function in line of sight, diffraction, or tropospheric scatter propagation modes. At key nodal points in the system, the IWBCS connects with the Army Area Communications System thus extending SEA WBS circuits to

Military Re~ieW 70

United States and Free’World tactical subscribers down to infantry brigade level.

The IWBCS is being constructed in three phaeee. Phases I and II, presently being installed by Page Communication Engineers in Vietnam and by Philco-Ford in Thailand, were completed during Fiscal Year 1968. The eystems included in phases I and II, which provide the minor communications trunking capability in Southeast Asia, already are in operation. Additional radio systems to extend the IWEWS to lower echelons are planned for phase HI which is scheduled for completion in mid-Fiecal Year 1969.

The ZWBCS had 76 systems in operation at 58 sites in Southeast Asia upon completion of phase II. Within the ZWBCS, as many as 240 voice frequency channels are provided on a single troposcatter system. In fact, the IWBCS system between Saigon and Nha Trang is believed to be the world’s first operational 240-channel tropospheric scatter system.

Unique Feature One of the unique features of the

IWBCS in Vietnam has been a requirement, for technical reasons, to locate many IWBCS sites in territory in which the Viet Cong are active. Consequently,the brigade not only bas had to concern itself with the installation and operation of remote mountaintop sites—a difficult logistic problem in iteelf—but the brigade also has been forced to provide physical security for these sites. Highly skilled military technical controllers have learned to become expert mortarmen, and site commanders have learned to operate tactical operation centers and build formidable defense perimeters.

Site commanders alao have learned


to $epend on the nearby Army Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) combat unit commanders for infantry and firepower support if they are attacked. Co~versely, on several occasions, the mortars from the I WBCS sites atop Lang Bian and Pr’Line Mountains near Dalat and Vung Chua Mountain near Qui Nhon have come to the rescue of ARVN units under Viet Cong attack.

Tandem Switcbhrg Centers The ZWBCS primarly is a long-lines

system. Dial central offices”are used to serve local customers within a restricted geographic area. An interface between the two funct~ons, therefore, is essential. Presently, this interface is provided by manual long-distance switchboards, operated either by soldiers and airmen, or by female civilian operators. By October 1968, however, most of the manual long-distance switchboards in Vietnam and Thailand will be replaced by the Southeast Asia Tandem Switching Network, the most sophisticated telephone communication system ever to be introduced into a combat theater.

The Southeast Asia Tandem Switching Network will include nine tandem switching centers (TSC’S). Six TSC’S will be located in Vietnam and three in Thailand. Each of the dial centrtd offices in Southeast Asia will be interconnected with the nearest tandem switching center, and each TSC will be connected by high-quality circuits to tbe other eight TSC’S. When this system becomes operaticmal, any class A telephone subscriber will have direct dial accesa to any other class A subscriber in Southeast Asia.

TQe system will provide basically the same type of service to the military customers in Vietnam that the Ameri-

November 1968


can Telephone and Telegraph Company’s Direct Distance Dialing System provides to civilian customers in the United States. Tandem switching will be unique in combat theater communications.

In addition to providing a traditional long-distance telephone system,

The Integrated Wideband Communication

the IWBCS also furnishes trunks for a Southeast Asia secure telephone system. This permits commanders and key staff officers of the principal headquarters in Southeast Asia to discuss classified matters with each other on a real-time basis. A 1imitedsecure telephone system has existed in Vietnam and Thailand for the past two years, hut the present system wae expanded and improved greatly during the past year.

For message and data handling in Southeast Asia, the 1st Signal Brigade has installed three Automatic Digital Network (A UTODZN) switching centers located at Saigon and Nha Trang in Vietnam and at Korat in Thailand. The A UZ’ODIN system is a worldwide interservice system de.

US Ann”

System site at Nha Trang, Vietnam

signed to transmit digital data and normal message traffic of all priorities and security classifications.

The new A UTODZN switches will replace three semiautomatic data relay switches presently in operation in Southeast Asia. The A UTODLV switches also transmit most of the out-of-country message traffic previously handled by conventional tape relay centers. Two of the principal advantages that will accrue to the

MilitaryReview 72

customers of A UTODIN in Vietnam and Thailand are greatly improved speed of transmission and a decreased number of transmission errors.

The installation of the three A UTODIN switches was completed by the spring of 1968. The A fJTOD2N switching center at Korat is operated and maintained by the US Air Force’s 1974th Communications Group. The two A UTODIN switchee in Vietnam are operated by the 1st Signal Brigade.

SatelliteCommunications To connect the SEA WBS into the

worldwide defense communications system, the 1st Signal Brigade relies heavily on satellite communications. The brigade operates and maintains two satellite ground stations in Vietnam as part of the Defense Communications Satellite System (DCSS). The DC.SS employs equatorial, near-synchronous, low-power satellites to provide worldwide coverage. The brigade’s ground terminal at Tan Son Nhut Airbase, on the outskirts of Saigon, provides 11 telephone circuits to Hawaii, and the satellite terminal at Nha Trang provides 11 circuits to Okinawa.

In addition to operating DCSS satellite terminals, the brigade also operates satellite circuits between Thailand and Hawaii. These are leased by the Def..se Communications System from the ‘3MSAT Corporation. Vietnam extensions of the circuits, which terminate in Thailand, are pro. vialed over military microwave and cable facilities.

The vakre of satellite communication to the war effort in Southeast Asia was proved conclusively during the last week in August and the first week in September 1967. During that

November 196e


~riod, the transpacific cable was cut between the Philippines and Guam. Satellite circuits carried the heavy operational traffic load with such ease that most of the military subscribers in Vietnam and Thailand were unaware that the cable had been cut.

Personnel Problems The introduction of commercial,

state-of -the-art, multichannel radio systems and theaterwide tandem switching into Southeast Asia has caused the 1st Signal Brigade many personnel probleme. Foremost has been the dificult task of operating a highly sophisticated commercial telephone system with junior officers and enlisted men who have been in the Army less than a year when they arrive in the theater. These soldiers come to Southeast Asia from th< US Army Signal School at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and have had little or no opportunity to obtain prior practical experience in systems operation.

School-trained radio repairmen have learned how to maintain and repair the UVBCS radio, channeling, and power equipment, but have not been equally adept at mastering the more

difficult techniques of circuit restoration. Because circuits frequently pass through technical control facilities at several nodal points in the 2WBI.?S system, circuit restoration must be a coordinated effort. Each technical controller must work closely with several other technical controllers and have intimate knowledge of the capabilities and shortcomings of the many types of ancillary equipment used in circuit engineering. Such knowledge comes only with experience.

Ae, an interim solution to the problem=of operating and maintaining the .SEAWBS with inexperienced military

73


personnel, the US Army Communications Systems Agency has negotiated operation and maintenance contracts with the two IwBCS prime contractors. These contracts task the companies to provide a limited number of skilled civilian technicians at each IWBCS site to assist military personnel in circuit restoration and to provide on-the-job training for the soldier technicians.

As a long-range solution to the personnel skill problem, the US Army Signal School at Fort Monmouth has developed a comprehensive technical controllers course. It also has installed a sophisticated training aid for student use during the course. This train. ing aid includes all items of equipment to be found in the SEAWBS system. In addition, the Signal School has developed a circuit simulator that duplicates the sometimes chaotic conditions that exist during periods of circuit restoration. It is anticipated that soon most of the contractor operations and fiainten~nce personnel no longer will be needed.

Logistics Support Another major problem in the opera

tion of the IWBCS has been the limited responsiveness of the logistic sYstem to provide unique IWBCS repair parts and to meet test equipment maintenance and calibration requirements of the ZWBCS. The Army’s logistic system in Southeast Asia works well for the distribution of hulk supplies and for maintenance parts co”mmonto tactical communication equipment.

The system has not had time, however, to establish the procedures required to supply the IWBCS with the parts and test equipmpnt needed to keep it operating reliably. Consequently, as an interim measure, spare

parts and facilities for the repair and calibration of test equipment have been provided by the IWBCS prime contractors. “

A long-range solution to the logis. tics problem is now in sight. A list of the system’s peculiar spare parts has been compiled. The list is based on experience factors determined by the 1st Signal Brigade from its operation of the IWBCS in Southeast Asia over the past year, plus recommendations from the prime contractors. In addition, Federal stock numbers are being assigned to each of the commercial parts so that they can be identified for procurement purposes.

Special Handling Distribution of these parts will re

quire the Army to establish streamlined procedures. The IWBCS parts are to be used primarily by a single customer, the 1st Signal Brigade. Tbe parts consist primarily of replaceable modules and subassemblies that contain hundreds of transistors, micro-modules, and other components. These high-cost modules are fragile and have not been designed for rugged field use nor for normal depot processing. Consequently, they require special handling.

To provide this special handling, the US Army is considering establishing three Army maintenance support facilities (AMSF’S) in Southeast Asia. TWO AMSF’S will be located in Vietnam and one in Thailand. Tbe AMSF’e will forward requisitions for unique IWBCS parts directly to tbe communications-electronics national inventory control point in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In many instances, the manufacturer will ship the parts directly to one or more of the AMSF’S. When the AMSF’S become operational,

MilitaryReview 74

. ARMY’S MINIATURE AT&T

most of the ZWBCS logistic probleme era reasons. In Vietnam, the commu).should be solved. nications zone and the field army’e

The SEAWBS and its associated se. area of operations are merged. Additionally, the SEA WBS supports the lon@ines requirements of the Air

cure voice, tandem switching, AUTODIN, and satellite networks provide

Force, the Navy, the US Agency for a high-quality, high-capacity, long-” International Development, the Malines system for Southeast Asia. Over rinee, Civil Operations and Revoluthese networks are carried a volume tionary Development Support, and the of voice, meseage, and data traffic that Free World Military Forces. The coun

far exceeds the maximum capabilities trywide Army advisory effort alsoof tbe US Army’s transportable tec places great demands on the system. tical systems. Without the SEA WBS, Thus, the SEAWBS is a theater comeffective command and control from munication system rather than a theathe Commander, US Millitary As ter army syetem. sistance Command, Vietnam, down The magnitude of the military long-through the chain of command to in- lines communication requirements far fantry brigades, fighter squadrons, de- exceeds the limited capabilities of the pots, ports, and provincial advisors, commercial communication systems to would be limited and, in many in. be found in much of Southeast Asia. stances, would be almost nonexistent. The 1st Signal Brigade, to satisfy

The commercial facilities that” the these requirements, therefore, has had 1st Signal Brigade is installing in to install, operate, and maintain a com-Vietnam might appear, at first glance, mercial quality long-lines eyetem. to be far greater than needed to meet When the program is completed in the Army’s normal requirements in October 1968, it will be the most so-a combat theater. This observation, phisticated military communications however, would be inaccurate for sev- system the world has ever seen.

COMMENTS INVITED \

The Military Review welcomes your comments on any material published. An opposite viewpoint or a new line of thought

will assist us and may lead to publication of your ideas. If you

are an authority on a certain subject, why not write an article

for our consideration? If you have only an idea, query us; per

haps we can assist you in developing an acceptable article.

November 1966 75

Trends in central Europe

Captain Fritz von Wyszecki, Federal Republic of Germanu Armg

T HE six-day war in the Middle East proved once more that tanks are still the commander’s arm of decision. Of course,

the tank and its tactics and techniques are changing continuously, and it is worthwhile to compare trends in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Warsaw Pact countries. First, however, we need to consider the materiel available to each side.

Tanks and armored vehicles in NATO are largely dominated by US designs. The medium battle tanks, M47 and M48, still form the backhme of armored troops in most NATO countries, but replacement by M60 and other types is underway.

MilitaryRwisw 76

ARMORED WARFARE

These tanks are distinguished by high tirepower and fairly good mobility. Their armor protection is relatively light, but firepower and mobility are considered to be more important on today’s battlefield. Two serious disadvantages of the MM and M48 tanks, however, are their enormous fuel consumption and high technical standards which make maintenance and repair expensive.

NATO TypeS Neither the M.47 nor the M48 is

equippedwith chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR ) protective ventila. tioq and they are incapable of deep fording, submerging, or floating. The M60, on the other hand, is equipped with a diesel engine with a lower fuel consumption and is capable of deep fording and submerging. It also bas an efficient CBR protective ventilation system and is outfitted with infrared and white searchlights and optics. Its horsepower-to-weight ratio, however, is only 16.2 horsepower per ton which is less than that required for a modern battle tank.

The British Centuribn and Chief-tai?t have remarkably great firepower and their armor is thicker than that of other NATO tanks, but they’ are rather heavy and slow. Both tanks are equipped with infrared and white searchlights and optics. The Chieftain is currently found in British units

Captain Fritz von Wyezecki, FederaZ Republic of Germany Army, is on the staff of Kampftruppenschule II where he haa aleo served as an in8tTUCt0r for cadets. A member of the army 8ince 1956, he luz8 been a pbtoon leader and company commami?er in a tank battalion and has attended the ~~u~ae Grade O@ers’ PreparatoW

,.

only, but the Centurion is now used &.o by Denmark and the Netherlands.

The most modern tank in NATO units is the German Leopard. It combines great firepower with high me-: bility and adequate armor protection. It has a high power-to-weight ratio of 21 horsepower per ton. In addition to use in the Buwde8wehr, it will be used also by Belgium, and negotiations with other countries are pending.

All NATO countries have dropped the concept of a heavy surveillance tank, and they have made great efforts to improve the water mobility of their armored forces and their capability for night operations. Engine design and development is concentrated on the multifuel engine.

Warsaw Pact Characteristics In the Warsaw Pact countries, there

is, in contrast to NATO, an apparent purity of types of armored vehicles. Only Soviet tanks are found in the Warsaw Pact armiee. They include the T9.4, T54, T55, T62, JS2, JSS, and TIO. While the T34, JS2, and JS3 are no longer found in first echelon units, they are still used in great numbers in second echelon formations.

Only the T54, T55, and T62 answer the requirements for a modern battle tank. They are equipped with infrared and white searchlights and stabilizing systems and are capable of deep fo*ding and submerging. The range of their searchlights and the quality of their stabilizing systems are considered inferior to the corresponding Western models, however. At present, the Warsaw Pact countries can deploy approximately 55,000 tanks, many of which are 10 to 15 years old.

A modern mechanized army needs not only tanks, but also other armored veh~cleeto move infantry on the battle

Nnvemher1968 77

ARMOREO WARFARE

field and for self-propelled artillery. Here, NATO is far in front in quality, but, unfortunately, also in variety.

The most common type of armored personnel carrier (APC) in the NATO forces is the US MII.3. Similar to the Mll$ is the Britieh AFV4%?. Completely different from theee are the French AMX-VTP and the German

HS30. But even the old halftrack M2 is still in use, as well as a few Outdated, armor-protected, wheeled vehicles.

The Warsaw Pact countries retain wheeled vehicles for infantry carriers in all but the highest priority units. Tbe old BTR152 developed in 1944-46 is still the transport vehicle in most of the motorized rifle regimente, although it is being replaced by the f3TR60P in rifle divisions of the 1st Strategic Echelon. The motorized rifle battalions of Soviet ai .,im-ed divisions and certain other high-priority units

are equipped with tbe tracked APC BTR50P. The Warsaw Pact forces also lag well behind NATO in equip. ping their artillery with armor-pro. tected, self-propelled weapons.

In reconnaissance vehicles, the Warsaw Pact enjoys a slight equipment advantage over NATO. The PT76 and the BTR40P are both excellent, fully

amphibious vehicles to which NATO has nothing in the field comparable at the present time.

Both sides continue research and development in tanks and other armored vehicles, but no revolutionary breakthrough appears in view. Marginal gains may be made in multifuel engines, navigational and fire control systems, and in the use of missiles instead of conventional ammunition. But since all nations still possess a great number of tanks of conventional design, we shall probably see the familiar types for quite a long time. Tbe

MilitaryReview 78

progressive mechanization of other arms, as well as the current movement of antitank weapons, have lessened most of the advantage which the tank enjoyed during World War II. Therefore, it is the task of the tactician to determine the best way to employ the existing weapon systems to reestablish this advantage.

On both sides of the Iron Curtain, great stress is being given to allowing the subordinate commander the greatest flexibilityy in tactical procedures. The higher commande~ assigns the objective only, leaving all details of implementation to the subordinate’s discretion.

Tactical doctrine of the Warsaw Pact forces is based, of course, on Soviet concepts. This is still similar to that of the German Army of 1941, but modified by considerations of nuclear warfare. Marshal Vasili D. Soko-Iovsky, as the leading spokesman on Soviet strategy, prescribes a two-phase attack. Massive nuclear strikes on pre-planned objective are followed in phase II by airborne strikes in the enemy’s rear together with massed armor attacks to mop up combat formations remaining in contact.

All Warsaw Pact armies are drilled in this mode of warfare. The depth for a day of attack is given as ahout 62 miles. Of course, defense also is taught, but it is called only a phase of transition between two attacks. The tactical concept of the Warsaw Pact armies is dictated by strategic planning. This planning is based on attack with exploitation of heavy nuclear fires. Consequently, equipment, organization, and training of all Warsaw Pact armies is designed accordingly.

November 1966

ARMOREO WARFARE

#here appears to be no perceptible change for the future.

The Soviets are working hard to increase the mobility of their forces. This applies not only to the area of command and control, but to improvement of signal equipment, to training —where cooperation between air force, armor, and paratroopers is practiced again and again—and to equipment, where everything possible is done to improve the day-and-night mobility of all mechanized units.

It is difficult to make a valid statement on the trend of tactical doctrine in the West. We know that it is difficult for NATO to reach a joint strategic concept, and member nations are far away from unification of tactical concepts. However, certain trends are evident.

Within their financial limits, all NATO countries are striving for better mobility of their ground forces. Training cooperation between army and air force is continuously improving. This also applies to air mobility of army units. Water mobility, which ia well developed in the Warsaw Pact armies, is rapidly improving in NATO.

The fighting of armored infantry, while remaining within the pro ection of their APC’S, which was ~lways practiced in the German Army, fi~ds more and more friends in the allied nations. This means that combat power and mobility of our mixed armored units are better than those of comparable Soviet ones. Soviet infantry must still dismount for combat and, therefore, the speed of attack becomes considerably slower. The key to success is increased mobility. The hope now is that tbe financial obstacles are not~too high.

79

--

da iml:vw From An Cosantc5ir (Ireland)

Strategy of a .. .. .. . .

A * ~.,,; .....

B. H. Liddell Hart

T HE most critical stroke in the six-day war of 1967 was the

first, the air stroke-or, in modern parlance, the “airstrike.” The details were revealed soon after the event, presumably with the permission of Israeli censors who had been extremely, and in some respects absurdly, secretive in 1956.

W~P --.,,. , :-“.:”- . . . . . . . . . .

& *

da

. ..

.. . a ,+,- ... . - ... ..

,., .

- . . -

.sk” t,.. .

Besides the combined calculation and subtlety of a plan that paralyzed the whole of the numerically superior Egyptian Air Force at the outset, the staggering ground turnaround time of the Israelis, barely seven and a half minutes, was itself a great contribution ‘to surprise. It enabled many of the Israeli pilots to start on a second

M6itaryReviet 80

,-,7--- -.

“y

STRATEGY OF A WAR

sortie within an hour, and make eight sorties in the day compared with the Egyptian reckoning that they might manage to do two. It is no wonder that Gamal Abdel Nasser sought to disguise his debacle by asserting that United States and British aircraft had reinforced the Israelis.

Numerous reports have emphasized the effect of the way that the Israeli air attack came in from unexpected directions, and how upsetting that proved.

Operational Analysis A general point of more significance

was brought out in an operational analysis of the campaign in a Voice of Israel broadcast on 15 July 1967 by Colonel J. L. Wallach (Professor of War Studies at the University of Tel Aviv who was reactivated in May for duty with the general staff ) :

The first point I would like to make is the prime importance of the Israeli Air Force’s [IAF’s] actions in destrogtng the hostile air forces and gahzing air superiority ovev the battlefiekle. There wae nothing new in the method itself of attacking the erremy airfields in order to deetroy a maximal numbev of airplanes on the

Thie arttile was condeueed from the origiual, publiehed in AN COSANT61R(Repnblic of Irslaud) April 1968.

B. H. Liddell Hart served in France during Wortd War I and retired from odive duty in 1927. He has been military correspondent of the London Daily Telegraph and the London Times, and military editor of the Encyclopedia Britannica. He is the author of numerous books, including two volumes of Memoirs and Strategy —The Indirect Approach.

November1968

$ in order to render theg ouwd and runwags useless for a certain pem”od of time. . . . But what waz really outstanding on 5th June, 1967, was the fa~t that IAF had &ccomplished the main partof its mieskm in lese than three hours. . . . The key to this phenomenon maII be found in the high technical level of the fome, tehich enables the mazimat utilization of its planse, inthehigh standard of its ~”lots and in their courage, but also in the fact that in the IAF there ie no gulf, so characten”etic in most air forces throughout the wortd, between ground staff on the one hand and jlying personnel on the other. IAF hae succeeded in welding together both branches of the service into ow familg, in which one respects the fu?wtlons of the other. . . .

Armored Forces Colonel Wallach then went on to dis-

cues and emphasize the no less important part played by the armored forces in reaping the effect of theairetroke:

Among the ground forces the w“ority belongs without any doubt to the Armored Corps. . . . The IDF [Israeli defeuse forces] grasped the impo7tatwe of armor . . . in the Siuai campaign of 1956. Since theh this corpe htw been etrengthsned aud improved. Its excellent technical level &zabled it to cawy out a diversified range of combat missiom: break-through through f ortijied enemy localities; encircling movements over terrain normally considered ae uniwoeeable by armor; combat of armor againet armor, while utilizing to tk? titmost the elemente of movement and fire and pursuit of a withdrawing enemy in order to @lock his route of retTeat. . . .

However, not less important ‘than the tschnical expertness was the

et

STRATEGY OF A WAR

method of deploging armor. This was mostlg done in the largest concentra. tions and thus ~s—shock power was brought to the best advantage. Simultaneously the mobility of the Armored Corps was used to the utmost. In accordance with the best tradition

Air Form md .9P... Digest

Brigadier General Mordecai Hod, Chief of the Israeli Air Force

of armor opm-atiows . . . the Armored Corps dashed forward without paying much attention to ite flanks and rear, knowing that sooner or later the fate of flanks and rear will be decided by the deep penetration into the rear of the enemy dispoeitiows, leading to the collapse of the enemy’s resieting power. There wos an incessant dashing forward . . . which prevented the enemy’e proper evaluation of the eituation and his reaching balanced decisions. . . .

Long ago, before the Sinai campaign of 1956, the IDF had ~.dided upon the principle of troop leadership which ie

expressed in the phrase ‘Follow me!’ The execution of thie principle ie not easg at all. Its realization has cost in the past, as well as in the present camnaign, the lives of some of the best commanders. But on the other hand this phenomenon presente the key to the secret of IDF’s 61an. There is no surpriee that it prevaile over armies in which commander lead their troops from the rear and in which the ofi. cers are the first to despair and give up battle and abandon their subordinates. . . .

Composition of Groupings Colonel Wallach then emphasized

how much the Israelis had profited by organizing their formation in combat teame of a variable pattern, termed an Ugdah, instead of in a fixed size and rigid pattern divisions.

The composition of these combat groupinge varied in accordance with the particular tack allotted to them, and alao the way that the battle developed. Extra strength—in armor, infantry, or artillery—was added or subtracted “without destroying any organic framework and without imposing a stop for re-grouping.” This organizational flexibility had produced the maximal operational flexibility.

The whole course of the Israeli campaign, a perfect blitzkrieg, was of particular interest to me becauae it was the best demonstration yet of the theory of the strategy of indirect approach, and in its eubtler sense of seeking and exploiting “the line of least expectation”-a theory evolved nearly 40 years ago.

The Germans, to my chagrin, applied it in 1940 under General Heinz Guderian’s inspiration and influence. But even Guderian or Field Marehal Erwin Rommel, generoue as they were

Military Review 82

STRATEGY OF A WAR

in acknowledgment, did not grasp the subtler side of it as well as the Israeli leadera have done since 1948. With each test, the Israelis have improved -contradicting the experience of history that armies learn only from defeat not victory.

What struck me moat in their latest campaign, compared with the second ,.

.,

in 1956, was the significant develonment of the Israeli plan and operations in combining the strategic offensive with the tactical defensivein getting around the back of the Egyptians in Sinai after the opening pene. tratione and, by blocklng their lines of retreat, forcing them to attack in trying to escape.

It was also significant that the center “division” under Brigadier General Avrabam Yoffe, which estahlisbed the main blocking position at the Mitla Pass, gained its initial penetration of the frontier line by taking a route through sand dunes that the Egyp-

Novmrber 1968

t tians evidently believed to he impassable.* It came as more of a surprise to the Egyptians because thk, route had not been used or attempted in 1956.

It was found that only a company with a few antitank guns was covering this route-and was soon overrun. That was fortunate since the main

armored force on the coastal route under Brigadier General Isra61 Tal met much tougher resistance than in 1956-until Yoffe’s armored fokce brought its flank and rear leverage to bear.

General Yoffe’s “division” was equipped with modernized Centurion tanks armed with the 105-millimeter gun, and he reported that these proved more effective than the T54 (and even

� It fulSlledm axiom1 had deduced in my earliest .bwk o“ the histmy of atrate%y, and often

‘%X%%”% however formidable. are in. h.,.ntb km dmto.vaw .md km .nc.rtcim thm $h:b~ticka W= ~mm.tibz., than th-e Ofittn hazards. All cmditicmm an more calculable,

hum.m resist.mam.

83

STRATEGY OF A WAR

the latest 2’55 Soviet tank) used by the Egyptians.

Brigadier General Ariel (Arik) Sharon’s “division” on the left was also deployed and employed in a dual-pronged way. With the deceptive use of dummy tanks, it conveyed the im-

A damaged Soviet-built

pression that it was aiming at a dash through Quntilla to the Gulf of ‘Aqaba and the capture of Sharm cl-Sheik, as in 1956, whereas it was actually thrusting westward to Suez. Although it dld not achieve as spectacular a bag of prisoners as the other two divisions, its distracting effect made an invaluable contribution to the success and rapidity of their westward drive to the Suez Canal.

The three Israeli ~li~~isionson the Sinai front, which had to face seven

Egyptian divisions, were under the control of Brigadier General Yeshayahou Gavieh who was in charge of the Southern Command. In sum, the plan wae a superb application of the strategy of indirect approach, and its corollary of choosing “the line of least

I?ttenl”ia

T55 tank in the Sinai

expectations,” to throw the opponent off balance.

On the Jordanian f rent, rugged and more constricted, there was less scope for maneuver, and the handicaps were greater because of the Israeli’s desire to occupy the whole city of Jerusalem as soon as possible. Moreover, they had not expected that King Hussein would actually take the offensive in aid of Nasser in view of the way that Nasser had cowed dissension in Jordan.

MilitaryReview 84

The cramping conditions around Jerusalem, and the unexpectedness of King Huseein’s active intervention in the war, hindered any such wide and subtle maneuvering as that carried on the southern front in Sinai. Moreover, when this Jordanian offensive intervention became clear, the Israeli’s intense emotional urge to seize the opportunity of regaining possession of Jerusalem as a whole was a handicap on any subtle strategy. Even so, the operation was carried out hy a series of local flanking moves with an armored brigade, a paratroop brigade, and an infantry brigade.

Despite stiff resistance from the Jordaniantroops, the Israelia achieved their prime objective by nightfall on the thh-d day while exploiting their success by the speedy capture of Jericho on the west bank of the Jordan and Hebron, south of Jerusalem.

MeanwhiIe,the four brigades of the Northern Command overran the northern part of .Jordan west of the river by two pincer moves, each of an indirect type and culminating in a rear attack. Their swift s~ccess was greatly helped by the way they unhalanced their opponent’s dispositions, as well as by the air force’s help in disrupting the opponent’s efforts to regroup his forces.

In the next and final stage of the war—starting on 9 Jnne-the Israelis switched their northern effort againet the Syrian forces whose artillery had

STRATEGY OF A WAR

he& battering the Israeli settlements around and north of the Sea of Galilee. Time was short because of the “ceasefir~” for which the United Nations Assembly was calling. So, here again, the time factor was a handicap on effective use of the indirect approach and maneuver.

Thus, the Israeli moves were narrower and more direct than they need otherwise have been, and their losses consequently heavier. Nevertheless, they succeeded in clearing the heights by the second evening. They could easily have driven on into Damascus by the third day but for the “cease-fire.”

If they had driven on eastward far enough to reach the area inhabited by the Druzes, they might have helped to establish an independentstate there that could have been a buffer between Syria and Jordan—to the benefit of the latter and the future of the Middle East.

As to the postwar situation and the question of a peace settlement, the experience of the past 20 years—and, indeed, the last half century’s history of the Middle East—shows all too clearly that little can be expected from negotiations, but only from tim and stability. IAny settlement is lik ly to take a long time, and it is foolish f r

‘/the Western Powers to indulge m hopes of hastening the process-either from altruism or shortsighted concern for their own short-term interests.

November 1968 85

I

Peter I. Gosztony

Over the pact three years, Sov<et marshals of World War 11 fame have broken into print with their memoirs, frequently contradicting earlier histories of the “Great Patriotic War.” The latest of these memoirs to appea~ are those of Marshal Konev, originally published in installments in Moscow awd now avaifable in a French tran.slation.-Editor.

NE of the outstanding World o War II commanders of the Red ArmY was Marshal G~~keSoviet Union Ivan Stepanovich Konev. Trained in

the artillery in the army of the czar, he took part, at the age of 20, in the Bolshevik Revolution. He fought in Siberia as a police commissar against Alekeandr V. Kokhak and the Czech legion and, under the leadership of Mikhail N. Tukhacheveky, aided in putting down the revolt of the Kronehtadt sailors of 1921.

Following this victory over the Kronshtadt rebels, Konev returned to Moscow feeling he had done his share of fighting and had thereby gained the right to aspire to come peaceful civil employment. However, the polit-

MilitaryReview 86

KONEV’S MEMOIRS

ical high command of the Red Army decidedhe should continue ae a soldier.

In hie memoirs which were recently published in Moscow, the ‘71-year-old veteran renders a clear and enlightening account of the fateful year of 1945 as eeen through the eyes of an army group commander.

Konev Commands Konev had been raised to the rank

of marshal in the spring of 1944 after proving his ability in numerous battlee on the German-Soviet frout. In May, he took command over the 1st Ukrainian Front (army group) and with it wae the first to tread on German soil.

In January 1945, the 1st Ukrainian Front formed the left wing of the groupmentof three army groups which constituted the Red Army and which bad the task of liberating Poland, of occupying the eastern part of Germany, and of taking Berlin. Of the three marshals—Konev, Georgi K. Zhukov, and Konetantin Rokossovsky —it was Konev who commanded these operations the most actively.

At the end of November 19.4.4, I was ordered to come to Moscow with my plan of operations. In the presenze of the members of the National Defense Commission, I had to submit it there to Stalin. I still remember well how Stalin attentively studied this

Peter I. Gos.stony is Director of the Swis8 East Europe Library Fonmfation, Bern, Switzerland. A graduate of the University of Buh%pest, Hungarg, he took part in the 1956 revolution as an o@er of the Hungarian People’e A~y, He eecaped to the West, aud studied at the University of Zurich, Switzerland, where he gradnated in 1962. This article was translated from the German by MT. La-Vergne Dale, Leavenworth, Kansas.

p~n. He devoted partkxdar attention to a etudy of the mape which showed the Silesian induetm”alarea. Here, the various enterprises with their fo.ctorief, mines, ware-houees and other i% dustrial establishment were indicated close upon one another. They coedd constitute an obstacle in the impending maneuvere of our attacking forces. This industrial area with its tremeqdoue size and etrength was even ver~ impressive on the map. This was recognized o.leo. by Stalin who ran his finger arowid the induetrc”al area on the map and epoke only a single word: ‘Gold!’

Konev understood immediately. The Sileeian industrial area was to fal] unharmed into the hands of the Red Army. As he stated: I Be~au~ethis area, an old Polish territor~, would by righte accrue to Poland, we worked out our plan of operations in such a wag that our forces would not directly attack the indetstrial area, but ~oould go around it on the north and south respectively.

Red Army Attack On 12 January 1945, the Red Army

stdrted its great attack from the Vistula. Konev’s 1st Ukrainian Front of eight field armiee had more than”3,660 ‘ tanks and aseault guns and morelthan 17,000 other gune of various calibers at ite dispoeal, and was supported b% 2,580 planes. It spread its attack over a front of 160 milee and by 17 January had succeeded in breaking through the German defense and in pushing ahead to a depth of from 75 to 90 miles. The marshal notes with respect, in connection with this, that the moral strength of his opponents was far from broken at this time.

According to the etatemente of German prisoners, the view gensrdlg pre

November1968

KONEV’S MEMOIRS

vailed among both soldiers and oficers that the Allies would be defeated in the Ardennes and forced to make a separate peace. After this, the Wehrmacht would turn its entire strength eastward. These reports were still widely prevalent even in January when the German attack in the Ardennes had already been halted for a long time.

Industrial Area Occupied By 29 January, Konev had suc

ceeded in occupying the Silesian industrial area. In order to obtain possession of the industrial facilities intact, the Soviets even permitted strong German forces to pull out to the west. Many of the plants were still operating when Soviet troops reached them. Their production was then continued under Soviet protection.

In February, the 1st Ukrainian Front continued its operation. In hard fighting, Konev succeeded in getting the greater part of Silesia into the hands of the Red Army. However, the situation did not shape up as they had hoped it would. The Germans, although suffering heavy losses, were able quick]y to establish the defense on the Oder, redispose their forces, and organize an active defense. Nevertheless, the 1st Ukrainian Front together with the let Belorussian Front, under Zhukov, fought their way ahead to the Neisse line and were within 65 to 95 miles of Berlin.

Although the marshal would not mention names, he does, in his memoirs, assume a position with regard to the question raised by Marshal Vasili I. Chuikov of why the Red Army, at the end of February 1945, suddenly halted its operations.

This pause lasted from 2.4FebruaW to 16 AP”l. Duri,.U this time, the

USSR filled out divisions, brought about order in the rear area of the Red Army, finished or improved railway lines and airfields, and took care of the supply of the troops on the front. But the main reason for the pause in the operations lay elsewhere. We were troubled by the reports that the Germans were not going to accept the loss of the SWesian industrial area and were massing strong fo7ces on our southern wing. By all appearances, they wished to win back ‘the second Rukr district!

Plan la Oroppad As a matter of fact, the Wehrmacht

did have this intention. General Heinz Guderian and the German Army High Command urged this plan. It was even more important since, with the Ruhr district in ruins, the loss of the Silesian industrial area had come as a deathblow to the German war economy. Adolf Hitler, however, decided differently. The 6th SS Panzer Army, one of the best equipped German armies, was to be employed not for Silesia, but for Hungary for the retaking of Budapest. All of Guderian’s arguments were in vain. Hitler would not alIow his mind to be changed, and the plan for retaking Silesia was dropped.

The Soviets knew nothing of this. Konev says:

Stalin wae constantly worried abcxd our south wing. He called several times bg telephone and directed my attew tion to the threat by the Germans. ‘Believe me; he implored, during one of hie conversations, ‘the Germans will not remain satisfied with the loss of Silesia and it can happen that it will be taken away from you!’ Thereupon, I considerably strengthened our sonthern front and began an operation in

Military Review 88

KONEV’S MEMOIRS

the Racib6rz area the aim of which wee the deetnwtion of the German de. feuse in, the Opole-Rac{b6rz dietrict.

The Berlin operation of the Red Army assumes a primary place in the memoirs of Marshal Konev. On 1 April 1945, Stalin received Konev and Zhukov in the Kremlin. He informed the two marshals that the Western Powers had already made preparation to take Ber/in. Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery wae to lead the operation. Stalin wanted this prize for the Red Army and wae aesured by both marshalethat they could reach Berlin sooner than the Anglo-Americans.

Zhukov 6iien Task They then received the order to

work out, on the spot, the operation plan for taking Berlin. Zhukov, Stalin’s favorite, was given the task. Konev, to his great regret, was to pnsh south of Berlin, cut through the Germandefenses, and meet the Americane at the Elbe. He could, however, picture that, if the right wing of the front made good progress, the situation would permit him to attack Berlin from the south and thus take a direct part in the fighting for this city.

Stalin spurred both marshals on to taking Berlin as quickly as possible. The occupation of Hitler’s capital city was for him a matter of prestige. He let the juncture point of the two fronte be eo indicated on the map that, on the third day after the great attack on Berlin, either Zhukov or’ Konev, depending on the circumstances, could completethe seizure of Berlin.

However, at this time in MOSCOW, it was not the matter of prestige alone that dictated what was to be done. The Soviete, according to Konev, seriously feared that a separate peace would be establie~ed between Hit]er and the

November 1968

W~atern Powers which would, then, make it possible for the Germans to direct their efforts against the Red Army alone.

Todav, it ie a histort”cd fait that Hitler aud his entourage did not succeed in making a separate peace with the Anglo-Americans. We did not, at that time, want to believe that our Alliee would take such a step. But at that time, when not OZIY numerous facts with regard to this nwtter were in our possession, but our heads also were full of rumors, we had no right to give any thought to the possibility of a sepaTate peace. These circumstances contributed to the significance of the Bertin operations.

Offensive Operation Early in the morning of 16 April

1945, Zhukov’s offeneive operation against Berlin began. On the same day, Konev also began the attack with his 1st Ukrainian Front. According to his directives, be had between 10 and 12 days to gain possession of the Beelitz-Wittenberg region, reach the Elbe, and take Dreeden. Konev writes that:

I, for my part, also added to this directive: ‘Care & to be taken that the possibility eholl exist to take part jointly wtth our right wing in the operatiom of the Ist Belorussian hront against Berlin.’

The marshal did not wish to lea~e Berlin solely to his rival Zhukov. Consequently, he gronped his armies in euch a way that he could direct them at any time to the north, in the direction of the German capital city.

As a matter of fact, Zhukov’s operation did not go forward as rapidly as Stalin had hoped. The Germans defended tbemselvea bitterly. Konev was more~eucceesful.His forces crossed the Neiese and on the third day of the

89

KONEV’S MEMOIRS

attack had already plunged more than 30 miles westward. On the evening of this day, Konev spoke again with Stalin and announced his successes. Stalin replied that Zhukov was still occupied with the breakthrough of the German defense. Stalin then asked if Zhukov’s mobile forces could not be regrouped over onto Konev’s front in order to go on from there against Berlin. Konev replied:

Comrade Stalin, that would take a great deal of time. . . . It is not nscessary for the troops of the Ist Belorussian Front to be engaged in our iweakthrough sector. Our position is favorable. We have enough forces and are in a position to lead both of our armored armies against Berlin.

Stalin, after some silence, gave Konev hie consent. From the south, Konev sent his armored and infantry armies toward Berlin. Zossen, the nerve center of the German Wehrmacht, was taken and Cottbus was reached. The Germans put up bitter resistance and few prisoners were brought in. Konev tried to reach Berlin ahead of Zhukov. On 25 April, Konev’s armies did reach Berlin.

The marshal calculated the number of the defenders at more than 200,000 soldiers and possibly higher. In reality, they numbered 92,000. However, Zhukov’s troops had also reached the city from the east and the north, and the field had to be turned over to Stalinfe “favorite general.” Konev wae bitter but, since an “order wae an order,” he reluctantly turned over ‘taking the center of Berlin to Zhukov.

Konev says that the greateet difficulty in the Battle of Berlin came from the antiaircraft bunkers which were invulnerable to artillevy fire. The antiaircraft batteries on their roofs were

used against the tanke and infantry, and protecting troops were equipped with panzer fauats-an antitank rocket launcher. The People’s Assault Battalions, consisting largely of very old or very young men, were plentifully provided with these weapons, and they fought bitterly. Konev statee:

Even during the last hours of the fighting, they showed more courage and endurance than many well-trained soldiers. There existed a state of mind u%hichI can only describe us hysterical, sacrificial rage. These people, many of whom were mere children, had somehow the hope that they. still, at the last minute, could bring about a miracle,

On 2 May, Berlin surrendered and Konev was aseigned the task of seizing Prague. US forces were making preparations to assist the city in the liberation. To do so, however, Stalin’s consent was needed eince Czechoslovakia, by agreement, lay in the Soviet zone of operation. Although Soviet troops were much farther from the Czech capital than General George S. Patton’s 3d Army, and their route led through the Erz Gebirge Mountains and more than one million men of the German Central Army Group, the Soviet dictator was determined that the Soviets would liberate Prague.

With the crumbling of general resistance, Konev reached Prague in four days. Here, he was not obliged to share victory with Zhukov. Konev describes in detail the meeting with US forcee, tbe taking of Dresden, and the capture of General Andrei A. Vlaseov. He refrains from any criticism of Stalin and confines himself solely to relating his combat experiences. His memoirs add to the growing amount of credible Soviet history of World War II.

MilitaryReview 90

bout

Military Thinking \

Major J. L. HWrd, British Arm% Ret;red

T HINKING may be described as an art whkh is based on phi

losophy, psychology, and logic. Aristotle further classified thinking into speculative and practical. The end of speculative thinkhg is science or knowledge; the end of practical thinking is results. Military thinking is concernedwith both types, but this article will be limited to practical thhkhrg.

Practical thinking is exemplified in

November1968

$

the British Army by what is called the appreciation of the situation and, in the US Army, the estimate of the situation. There are minor differences in each procedure, but these are not relevant when considering these appreciations as processes of thinking.

Everybody thinks, but it is generally agreed that those who have conscious knowledge and control over the thinking process are more likely to

91

MILITARY THINKING

be successful than those who have not. Conscious knowledge enables con. trol. Without it th&e can be no conscious method, and method is usually regarded as desirable.

Two Factors Tbe form of the “appreciation of

tbe situation” ie ueualIy as shown on the chart. All practical thinking is limited or conditioned by two factore. One of these is tbe desire for a result or end. This corresponds to the “object” or “mieeitm.” The other factor ie tbe actual circumstances in which the end is to be achieved.

The circumstances correspond to information about own troops and the enemy. It is hard to substantiate the order of the British type of appreciation in its consideration of information about own troops and the enemy prior to the object. Such pieces of information are really factors, just as much as are ground and space. Tbe prior importance of the object is that it should control the whole thinking process and direct the mind to search for only those factors which are relevant to the problem or, in this case, “object.”

It is generally agreed that part of the natural mechanism of the mind is

Major J. L, Hillard, British Awny, Rstirsd, is Commissioner of ths Essential Services Corps for the Hong Kong Government. He served with the Indian Army in Burma during World War II, and subsequently saw service in Frenzh Indochina with the British forcee, and in India during the partition in 1947. He transferred to the British Armu in 1948, and served in Malaya {n 1949-50 during the emergency. His art{cle, “Countersubvereion in Urban Areas,” appeared in the September 1967 issne of the MILITARY REVIEW.

association, by which the idea tends to recall either an analogous idea or an idea with which it was previously associated in tilme and place. Therefore, if the “object” is a withdrawal, the mind will tend to recall those factors about withdrawal which are associated with it. In the case of information about own troops, it should lead to consideration of the availability of long-range artillery and tanks. The “object:’ therefore, forms the frame of reference against which every factor is to be evaluated.

Any situation, when it first presents itself, may be described as a mass of confusion. Initially, in looking at a landscape, we are aware merely of sensory impressions. These impressions have to be intellectualized. They have to be verbalized or brought under concepts which are instruments for dealing with a situation. The total situation has to be broken up and analyzed into its component parts.

Deductions Great stress in the British Army

is laid, however, not only on this analysis of tbe factors, but also on the drawing of deduction from them. The term “deduction” often puzzles many people. A practical illustration involving a forested area may clarify its meaning. In analyzing a situation, a green area on a map may be conceptualized as a forest. The “object” is a withdrawal. Knowledge supplies a theory and principles to he observed in a withdrawal among which is included the availabilityy of covered lines of retreat. The pro&ss of thought and deduction is:

e From observation of the situstion, a wooded area is recognized.

e Woods make good covered lines of retreat. This is knowledge or theory

1 Military Review 92

MILITARY THINKING

aDDliedto the facts . . of the situation. � The green area on the map is

a possible line of retreat. This is deduction.

The point requiring stress here is the importance of knowledge. Without knowledge of the principles or theory of withdrawal tactics, the value of the forest for what it is. in this situation.

add not have been discovered. Al~ ..

1. Information a. Own troops b. Enemy

2. Object

3. Factors a. Ground b. Time and Space c. Other d. Courses Open e. Consideration of Courses

deduction, therefore, presupposes a theory against which the fact-is evaluated.

The consideration of all the factors should continue in this manner. This consideration will, in turn, initiate and guide the search for other factors which may not have come to mind initially. The relative strength of the enemy tanks in comparison with our own tank strength will enhance the search for natural antitank obstacles. A common mistake in the consideration of factors is to overlook the fact that euch examinations must be as comprehensive as possible and that no important factors should be omitted.

In the illustration, the failure to notice that the forest was heavily mined or fronted by a lake or river would be to neglect an important and relevant factor which might thereby lead to failure to achieve the object.

November1968

~ plan might have been made which did not conform to reality or which did not fit the facts of the situation; hence, it would fail.

Analysis Emphasized The “courses open” part Of an ap.

preciation is often given the least attention although it is the most important part. Up to this point, the emphasis is on analyais. The emphasis is correct because it is impossible for the mind to think about more than one item at a time. We should, as far as possible, divide problems into parts. However, such divieion necessarily introduces a certain falsification. In real life, most things are interconnected, and certain philosophers would say that everything is interconnected and that the whole truth lies only in the absolute.

For practical purposes, it is not necessary for military thinkers to go to this extreme, but it is important to see items in relation to each other. We see only individual things. We see the red of a rose. A few days later, we see the brown of a rose after it has died. But we do not see the relation between the red of the rose and the brown of the rose unless we mentally connect both these facts. I

Items are often related as antecedent and consequent or a cause and bffect, but we must discover thk+ relation for ourselves. In our example of withdrawal, if the enemy has a much stronger tank force than ours, this factor takes on an entirely different significance according to whether there is or is not suitable ground for tank operations. If there is such ground, our ability to withdraw will be ~uch impeded. The importance of lines of defense providing natural antitank obstacles will be enhanced, as

03

9

MILITARY THINKING

will be the need for antitank weapons.. The significance of the factors, therefore, cannot be seen in isolation, but only in relation to each other.

Usually, it is thought that most animals have no power of imagination and can work only by habit learned from trial and error. Man, however, has the power of forward mental construction of events—imagination. He can represent to himself ideally what would happen if he took certain steps. He is not therehy tied to his present situation, but can mentally construct the future by symbolic imagination using either words or images.

It is this mental projection which a military thinker must do in the “courses open” phase of appreciation. He has to combine or make a synthesis of the various factors in different ways until he finds a combination of means which leads to the desired end. In practical thinking, the end is the desired object, but this end is limited in accordance with the facts of the situation.

A Syllogism In the working out and elaboration

of the consequences of the various proposed courses, much use is made of deduction. Deduction may be in the form of the syllogism as in the example about the use of a woods for a covered line of retreat. In simple lan

guage, a syllogism consists of three statements, of which two statements are known as the premises and the third statement is the conclusion. The two premises each consist of two terms, with one term, known as the middle, being common to each premise. The conclusion consists of the other two terms which have been joined by the third common t- ,,1 which acts as the mediating link.

In the example ahout the use of a woods as a covered line of retreat, the term “woods” was the mediating or middle term which connected “the green area on a map” and the term “good covered line of retreat.” The actual syllogism, however, is only the form of exposition and not that of discovery. The art of discovering the conclusion of the syllogism consists in thinking, on the one hand, of all the

Ipossible types of good covered lines of retreat and trying to find in the factual situation presented something of this type. In this case, it was woods.

Dialectical Procedure Here again, in this phase, the im

portance of knowledge is manifest. In making appreciations, it is a common mistake of beginners to think that their pattern of thought should follow the pattern of exposition. This is not the case at all. In discovery, the mind darts forward and backward in an irregular manner, seizing upon some suggestion, trying it out, discarding it, and seizing upon an. other until it finds one which fits the situation.

The procedure is dialectical. Certain tentative proposals are made and their consequences worked out. If the proposals bridge the gap between what is given, on the one hand, and the end, on the other hand, they are accepted. The matter viewed in this light is rather like the solving of a geometrical problem,

,Deduction also, however, may be of a systematic nature which means it is based either upon the way elements are in nature or the way they have been made artificially. If water is poured from a glass, it is a well-known fact that it will fall downward because that is the way of nature. If it

Military Review

MILITARY THINKING

is desired for guns to get into action, a military man knows that, in certain circumstances, the process +11 take half an hour because they have to move to a certain area, survey in, and complete other necessary details. Time and space calculations are of the same type. Therefore, given the syetem and certain initial data, we can make certain other deductions.

Pros and Cons The next item in the process of

appreciation is the consideration of the proe and cone of the varioue coursee. This consideration involves subjecting them to criticism. This criticism may be carried out by the planner himself ae an internal dialogue or by another party. If it appears probable that none of tbe proposed courses will achieve the object, then the trouble may be due to the lack of skill of the planners. Alternatively, such a failure may indicate that the object is too ambitious and should be changed.

The courses also, however, must be examined for their own intrinsic merit. First, it should be seen if the proposed cmrse agrees with the facts, that they contain no error, and that no important facts have been omitted. Second, it should be seen if the proposed course is consistent with other statements.

Criticism may be made against the course either directly by attacking the reasons for it, or indirectly by attacking the results of the proposed course and showing that these are unacceptable. In the direct attack, it may be shownthat either the reasons are false or that the course does not follow logicaljy from them. Three types of argument are possible along these lines:

Nwember1966

~ Faulty reasoning. This results in invalid deduction of conclusions from facts or purely logical errors such as “in this battle, the tanks preceded infankry in attack and were successful; therefore, in every battle, the tanks should precede infantry in attack.”

� Faulty theory. This fault is especially likely to occur in military theory because soldiers are not continually engaged in wars. The accepted theory may be that, in close country, the tanke should, follow infantry in attack. This theory has been inductively drawn out of the experience of many battles, but may, nevertheless, not he applicable in the special circumstances or without qualification.

� Faulty application of theory. Principles necessarily have to he stated in general terme, otherwise they would not be applicable to other cases. Their very generality, however, can be the cause of error. For instance, it may be true that a major advance cannot be carried out through thick jungle because of administrative difficulties. However, the question is how thick must the jungle be to be too thick for such an advance. If the jungle is not sufficiently thick, the case does not fall under the principle. Here, there Iis a failure to make distinctions where distinctions are required. \

In the formation of such argumente, we may accept our opponents’ reasons as true and then show that unacceptable consequences follow from them when we bring these reasons into connection with some other. principle acknowledged by both parties to be true.

However, disagreement as to the courses to be adopted will often remainweven after this procedure has been followed. Thie disagreement will arise when one party places emphasis

95

MILITARY THINKING

on some principles as the starting point for its reasons and another party stresses other principles, with both principle or sets of principles conflicting. Both parties may then try to justify their position by deriving their position from even higher level principles. One party may succeed in persuading the other party that its course is right by carrying the argument backward to a principle on which they both agree.

In the example of withdrawal, one party may reason that, because of our inferior tank strength, the lines of withdrawal must be acroes tank obstacles such as rivers. Another party may claim that, because of our own inferiority in the air, and, therefore, the danger of tbe destruction of tbe bridges over which such a withdrawal must be made, the lines of withdrawal should avoid crossing rivers. Again, during the withdrawal, one party may advocate the blowing of bridges because it is important that they do not fall undamaged into enemy hands. Another party might argue that the blowing of bridges should be delayed since much of tbe withdrawing force is still on the enemy’s side.

In this stage of the argument, we

have Dassed out of the realm of scientific facts with their objectivity into the realm of values which, in the final analysis, are not susceptible of proof, but are a matter of choice although not arbitrary choice. All principles condition each other.

The great planner is the one who can assess the right value to be put on each principle. Each party will make its own assessment, but neither party can prove by logic alone that ite course is right. The process of appreciating cannot, therefore, be reduced entirely to a logical procedure. Valuation, and hence opinion, will also be present.

It is important to remember the findings of modern ethical philosophers who believe that the good exists when the good consequences outweigh the bad consequences. There will usually be no course of action which is completely good. Every course will have its disadvantages as well as its advantages. The good course will be that which achieves the aim with the greatest balance of good consequences over bad consequences.

The ultimate test of the soundness of the reasoning will be whether the plan works in practice.

Military Review 96

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t MBLHARY .-.

UNITEDSTATES >.,.Parawing Glider Prisoner-of-War Identification Kits

This parawing glider, which was The Army is looking at ideas for dropped from a plane, is steered by a prisoner-of-war (PW) identification ground-based radio beacon and can kits that will prevent captured troops carry high-priority cargo to troops or suspected partisans from switching

names to confuse interrogation and confinement.

Tropic tests are being performed for the US Army Combat Developments Command (USACDC) to determine which concept meets its essential and desirable characteristics for wristbands and the device for tamper-proof attachment. Most sought after is a band that will clearly show when it has been removed or altered in any way. It must also be waterproof and must resist normal wear, tear, and discoloration for about one year.

In addition to preventing prisoners from concealing or falsifying their true identities, the bands and banding devices may have secondary ubes in aseuring identification of casualties,

A$-Iw Naus Features stragglers, internees, and, in some Jp. erations, the entire populations of vii.

with pinpoint accuracy. The delivery Iages or cities. system can be released from altitudes The equipment will be issued to the as high as 30,000 feet at distances up military police PW processing comto 12 miles from its target.—Army panies, PW enclosures sectione, and News Features. PW camp units. b With Vietnam and similar wars in

mind, USACDC specifies that an acceptable band be one that cannot be us~ by a prisoner as a weapon, signaling device, or be hidden.—US Army release.

November 1968 97

MILITARY NOTES

Designations of Airmolsile Oivisions The Army has announced the desig

nation for ite two airmobile divisione, each currently serving in Vietnam.

The 10lst Air Cavalry Division is designated the 10lst Airborne Division (Airmobile) and the 1st Air Cavalry Division is the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Elements of divisions—for example, maneuver battalions—will add the suffix “ (Airmobile)” to their current designation. —DOD releaee.

Microfilming of Computer Output The Army has completed a year of

testing a new project designed to improve the flow of computer information by recording computer output on high-speed microfilm instead of paper. Called the Nonimpact Printing Project, the new system is being tested at three prototype sitee.

The use of microfilm resulted in major improvements at the three sites during the first year of operation. Tbe system freed more than 11,000 hours of computer time; eliminated more than 50 million pages of printed paper, and has proved to be a sound medium for the worldwide distribution of supPly management data.

The direct microfilming of computer output in support of the broad epectrum of automated information systeme offers a means of curbing and controlling paper costs.

One of the potential Army microfilm applications is the conversion of cataloge, regulations, and manuals to microfilm. Also, Army commands overseas may use microfilm techniques in communications zones, inventory control centers, and mai:,r depots for a wide variety of supply problems.— Army News Features.

Metal “V!’ Fence Stops Erosion The Air Force Syetems Command

is inv@igating the best way to keep coil around landing pads for vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft from eroding. One solution, which successfully diffuses engine blast, is an inverted “V” fence of porous metal.

Measuring less than 16 inches high, the fence is placed between the aircraft and edge of a VTOL landing pad. The fence uermits some of the engine

US Air Fomx

Engineer inspects porous metal fence

blast to. flow through and deflects some upward at a 45-degree angle.

In this way, tbe force of an engine downblast is diffused before it reaches the edge of the landing pad, preventing erosion of the surrounding soil. Without a fence, the landing pad would have to be 100 feet wide or more to keep soil at the edge”of the pad from eroding and creating hazards.

The prime advantage of using the fence is that landing pad areas for VTOL aircraft can be reduced from 100 to 50 feet in diameter, in addition to eliminating adjacent soil erosion.— US Air Force release.

9B MilitaryIlevtew

..

MILITARY NOTES

Driverless J~eps

Artist’s concept of operation of remote-controlled, mine.detecting jesp shows “drivqr” at safe dktance from vehicle as it sweeps road for mines

A $370,000 contract for prototype remote radio control systems to be installed in vehicles has been awarded by the Army.

The manufacturer’e system will enable a single operator at a remote location to start the vehicle, disengage and engage the clutch, shift forward and reverse, advance and retard the throttle, eteer the vehicle, and apply the brakee.

Novemberleee

The system will consist of two independently powered units—the operator’s, control pack and a truck-mounted transceiver. It will allow operation of the jeep-mounted mine detector by an operator from any distance up to 300 yards away. The operator will control the mine detector with his~backpack transmitter and chest-mounted, remote-control unit.—News release.

99

MILITARY NOTES

‘Nike X’ Development Office A Nike X Development Office headquartered in Washington, D. C.

(NXDO) has been created by the The new reeearch agency will be Army with the mission of insuring organized into five divisions, each sup-that the .Senti?zelballistic-missile de- porting separate technology areas: rafense system can adapt to changing dar development, systems requirement threats. Located at Redstone Arsenal, and threat studies, missile develop-Alabama, the NXDO is a field agency ment, reentry physics and range measof the US Army Advanced Ballistic urement research, and optical systems Missile Defense Agency, which is development.—DOD release.

‘Maverick’ klksile

The Air Force’s Maverick missile heads for its target in this artist’s concept showing how the weapon would he used operationally. The new miseile is a highly accurate, television-guided, air-to-surface weapon designed to knock out enemy tanks, armored vehicles, and field fortifications.

In operation, the pilot selects a target on a television screen in his cockpit, locks the missile’s guidance system on it, and launches the missile. The pilot can then leave the area while the missile continues on its way to the target, guided by an electro-optical television homing device in its nose.

The Maverick is designed for use by tactical aircraft, including the A-7, F-J, and F-III series. The Air Force recently awarded a contract to develop, teet; and produce the Maverick (MR, Apr 1967, p 98) .—News release.

MilitaryReview 100

MILITARY NOTES , -,

‘Starlight’SCOpeAids Ship Navigation An image-intensification device de

veloped by the Army for land use may also prove a boon in ship navigation, as well as reduce the rescue time for survivors from a shipwreck. In two tests conducted by the US ArmY Mobility Equipment Research and Development Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, results have indicated that the Starlight scope would be of great value in the nighttime navigation of ships (MR, Aug 1968, pp 102-103).

The Stmliglzt scope is an image-intensification device developed by the Army. It utilizes a special electron tube to intensify the natural low level of starlight, moonlight, or skyglow to produce a visible image. It cannot be readily detected by the enemy eince it requires no artificial radiation.

Tests were conducted as part of a program to improve navigation of the Army’s marine fleet, particularly beach discharge lighters. A standard Starlight scope was mounted on a standard pelorus ring and dropped over the gyrocompass in the pilot room of a ship operating at night in Chesapeake Bay. In one test, the Starlight scope was able to pick up light from a lighthouse which waa well below the horizon and enabled the pilot to keep on iourse. This was much beyond the coverage of the ship’s radar.

In a second test, at more than twice the distance, it also picked up light from a lighthouse. Identification was possible from the coded flashee. The pelorus contributed bearing readings for direct helmsman use and also a second reading for triangulation.

Although not tested in this reepect, tbe Starlight scope ie a “tool” that offers possibilities in nighttime sea rescues.’ A flashlight is part of the

November1968

strthdard equipment for lifeboata, and, in the event of a shipwreck, the light could be flashed skyward in SOS coded signals. Shipa equipped with the Starlight scope, even though great distances away, would be able to pick up the light and, therehy, be guided directly to the lifeboat.—US Army release.

HelicopterNiglr.Speed lifting System A new high-speed system for lifting

troops from jungles and swamps to hovering helicopters has been demonstrated in Massachusetts at the Army

-= = .— —= —— z

—— US’ Amu

A CE-47 Chinook helicopter Sifts a man zbozrd with a new high-speed liftin k

system

Natick Laboratories. In the demonstration, cargo, litters, and personnel were lifted and lowered from a CH-.47 Chinook helicopter 100 feet above the ground.

Twenty infantrymen can be hauled aboard in four minutes versus up to 40 minutes for the same number to climb the presently used !t%oopem’ Ladder.-Newa release.

101

MILITARY NOTES

‘C-5A Galaxy’ Air-Orop System A contract to engineer and develop

the largest air-drop energy transfer mechanism ever built for use aboard the C-5A GalaxV transport has been awarded by the Army. Tbe system will he used to pull 25-ton loads from the aircraft for parachute air drop.

The concept calls for a coupling mechanism which will sustain 75,000pound loads (maximum of 50,000 pounds multiplied by 1.5-G force) to pull the load along the cargo bay and clear of the aft ramp under the force of extraction parachutes. When the load is clear, the coupling must respond to only a 100-pound-force actuation to deploy the eight 100-foot-diameter drop parachute cluster by removing its packing shroud.

Utilizing new low-friction bearing technology, the mechanism also will embody manual and automatic controls to release the extraction parachutes in case of cargo jamming.—News release.

‘Nike Hercules’ Sites to Be Closed Twenty-three Nike Hercules firing

sites and seven headquarters installations will be closed. In addition, two double battery sites will be reduced to a single battery each.

After careful study, these sites, in 12 states, were found to contribute least to the effectiveness of the defense of the continental United States. It was originally planned to close some of these sites by the summer of 1970.

The closing was speeded to help meet the Defense Department’s share of the limitations imposed by the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968. It is expected that 18.8 million dollars will be saved by tbew closings in Fiscal Year 1969 and 54 million dollars in each succeeding year.—DOD release.

Air-Transportable Trailer Workshop An air-transportable aluminum

trailer workshop for aircraft repair in the field will soon be placed in service by the Marine Corps.

The airborne armament maintenance trailer is a four-wheel flatbed, 12 feet 10 inches long and six feet

R.u.o[da M,t& CmIm,W

wide. The trailer can be air transported to forward SATS (Short Airfield for Tactical Support) fields. From these fields, it can be towed by most Marine vehicles over rough terrain to areas where it is needed.—News re. lease.

900 ‘UH-lHHueys’ Ordered The Army recently awarded a crm

tract for an additional 900 UH-IH Huey helicopters. The latest order calls for delivery of the helicopter in 1970. The UH-lH is an improved vereion of the UH-1 D helicopter.—News item.

Twin-Engine‘Iroquois’ Ordered A twin-engine version of the UIf-1

Iroquois helicopter bas been ordered by the Air Force. The twin-engine helicopter, designated UH-IN, will be a configuration of the VH-lH model which is being produced for the Army.

Seventy-six UH-lN helicopters have been ordered; deliveries will begin in November 1969.—News release.

102 MilitaryRe!iew

MILITARY NOTES

Promotions to Grade? E-8 and E-9

The Army will centralize promotions requisite for promotion, and will in-of noncommissioned officers to grades sure that the best qualified noncomE-8 and E-9 in 1969. Tbe new pro. missioned officers are advanced to cedure will roughly parallel the eys- grades E-8 and E-9. terncurrently used to promote officers The new syetem will insure that to field grades, and will insure an the individual is considered for Army-equitable and uniform procedure for wide vacancies in the grades of E-8 promotion to E-8 and E-9 on an Army- and E-9 rather than for the limited wide baeis. ones occurring under the old eystem

The system will eliminate the re- , of local promoting authority. Each quirement for a position vacancy to soldier will be competing with others exist in the noncommissioned officer’s in the same skills and knowledge.— current unit of assignment, as a pre- US Army release.

Aluminum ‘Unhreraal Enginaer Tractors’

Reu.olda Metda ConaPamI

Two Universal Engineer Tractors ( UET’S) undergo service test at Fort Belvoir,Virginia. The aluminum combat construction machine, weighing 31,500 pounds,eerves as a bulldozer, grader, scraper, dump truck, and cargo and troop carrier. Air droppable and amphibious, the vehicle ii 20 feet long and nine feet wide.

On land, the UET can move along at 30 miles an hour under the power of its 285-horsepower diesel engine. The single engine also provides power for the other operations of the vehicle.—News release.

November196S 10s 1

MILITARY NOTES

‘FkebeeN’AchievesSupersonicSpeed The advanced F%-ebee II jet aerial

target reached a speed in excess of 695 knots in its first supersonic flight recently.

Air launched at an altitude of 14,000 feet, the I%ebee IT climbed to a 36,000-foot altitude, leveled off, and was flown supersonically until parachute recovery was commanded. A Navy helicopter retrieved the target and returned it to base.

The new jet target made its first flight in January when it was flown

Rum A.rmm.timd Comp.nv

Firebee 11 aerial rocket

at subsonic speeds up to 478 knots. Flight testing of the highly sophisticated aerial target is scheduled for completion in December.

FVrebee II is designed to iiy at a maximum speed of Mach 1.5 (868 knots). It can perform target missions at altitudes of 50 feet to 60,000 feet.

The advanced target is currently scheduled to he phased into fleet operations in 1970 for use as a target for fleet surface an ‘ .Iir units.—News release.

‘Bushmaster’AutematicCannon Development of a new automatic

cannon, nicknamed Bushmaster, to be employed on a new family of Army combat vehicles, has been announced by the US Army Weapons Command. This new weapon will be the successor to some caliber .50 machheguns and the M139 20-millimeter gun.

It is anticipated that initial contracts will be awarded in early 1969, and production is scheduled for the mid-1970’s.

The Bushmaster system will include the new automatic cannon, ammunition, and feed system. It is expected that the new weapon will be 20 millimeters or larger. The new system will permit the gunner to select the type of ammunition which will be the most eftective against the target being engaged. The ammunition will have increased range and lethality.

In addition to its use on the Army’s new family of combat vehicles, the Bushmaster may also be used by other services.—US Army release.

Rotor Blade PropellerReseareb A contract to investigate rotor blade

propellers for advanced vertical and short takeoff and landing aircraft has been awarded to a US manufacturer by the Army and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

The project is part of a cooperative research program being conducted by NASA and the French National Office of Aerospace Research. Scale model wind-tunnel testing, to be supported by the manufacturer’s representatives, will take place in France and the United States. The objeet is to determine perf orrnance of rotor blade propeller in speeds ranging from zero to 520 miles an hour.—News release.

le4

MILITARYNOTES

Panama Canal amounts to 105 million long tons.

average of about 40 a day—paesed Some 14,800 oceangoing chips—an

Much of the sharp traffic rise W8S due to movements to and from Asia,throughthe Panama Canal during Fisincluding the Vietnam area. Cloeingcal Year 1968, a. lo-percent jump over

Fiscal Year 1967 and a record high of the Suez Canal was responsible for in canal traffic. For the first time, the some rerouting of Aeia-hound traffic

canal handled more than 100 million through the Panama Canal.-State De-

tons of cargo in a eingle year wh]ch partment release.

Heavylift Helicopter

A heavy lift helicopter (HLH) capable of transporting 20 tO 30-tOn payloads is one of eeveral advanced helicopter configurations being developed by a US manufacturer. The three-engine, tandem-rotor HLH would be able to cruise at 130 knots with an external payload and meet all current operational requirements of the US military services. These requirements include aircraft recovery, offehore unloadlng, transport of medical units, command poets, engineering and communications equipment, and eupplies.

Maximum gross weights of the manufacturer’e HLH designs range from 72,500to 117,000 pounds. By comparison, the ~aximum design gross weight of today’s largest heavy lift helicopter, the CH-.47C f%rzook, is 45,700 pounds.— News release.

Nwmrbor 1051S89

MILITARYNOTES

AUSTRALIA New WeaponSight

A revolutionary system of sighting direct-fire weapons, known as the Auxarmes-Chivem Universal Day-Night weapon sight, has been developed in Australia.

The system is undergoing military field trials, and unofficial reports indicate good performance, especially in hitting targets under adverse light conditions. Results are said to be seven times better than by other systems; the sight provides speed and accuracy of fire even by untrained recruits.— News release.

BRAZIL New Aircraft

The prototype of a new two-engine aircraft, called Bandeirante, designed and built in Brazil, will be tested this year. The aircraft’s main feature is its versatility.

The Bandeirante, a turboprop, can be used to carry passenger and cargo and for training, aerial photography,

Re.ista Awondutic.

Bandeironte aircraft

and medical evacuation. It will have a range of 1,000 miles, a speed of about 225 knots, and will he capable of oPerating with a variety of aviation fuel. The aircraft will % able to operate from semiprepared fields.-News item.

FRANCE New Structureof Army Divisions

The structure of the current French Army division is to undergo a change. The new division will have a strength of 14,000 men compared to 20,000 in the current structure.

The French field forces will be corn. posed of 15 identical mechanized brigades organized in five divisions of three brigades each. Each brigade will include:

e One mechanized regiment of two armored squadrons equipped with AMX19 90-millimeter gun light tanks and two battalions of mechanized infantry.

e One medium armored regiment of three squadrons equipped with AMX90 tanks and one squadron of mechanized infantry.

e One regiment of self-propelled, 155-millimeter guns.

@ Headquarters and support unite. In addition to the three brigades,

each division will include: e One air defense regiment with

twin, 30-millimeter automatic guns and Rollanrt missiles.

o One mechanized combat engineer regiment.

e One signal regiment. e One light aircraft unit. Later, Pluton missiles with nuclear

warheads and a range of about 70 miles will be added to each division.

e Logistic and maintenance units. The five 1970 divisions will be or

ganized in two corps. Activation of the new division is scheduled prior to the end of 1969. However, owing to delays in the production of new armaments and equipment, one brigade in each division will he equipped with wheeled vehicles for a few yeare.Revue Militaire Ginirate.

militaryRevi!W 106

“~

MILITARY NOTES

DENMARK? Swedish‘Draken’FightersOrdered

SwsiWsh Air Force J-35 Draksn

The Royal Dani&h Air Force will additional 23 Druken aircraft to reprocure23 J-s5XD Draken fighter air- place RF-84F photoreconnaissance aircraft under a contract signed between craft. A decieion on this purchase is the Danieh Ministry of Defense and expected in late 1968. the Swedish manufacturer. Of the aircraft now purchaeed, 20

The aircraft, delivery of which will are eingle-seat fighter bombere, and start in 1970, are to supplement the three are two-seat trainers. DaniehAir Force’s F-IO@ Super Subre The Swedieh Air Force has ordered fighterbombers. Denmark also consid- more than 500 Drrzken aircraft of ered French and United States offere various configuration. Service life of before selecting the J-.95XD. the Dnzken is eetimated at abou 15

fDenmark has an option to buy an years.—Armed Forces Management.

\JAPAN Shipbuilding Industry

The Japanese shipbuilding industry The 14 leaders account for 90 percent hae led the world in the tonnage of of the nation’e chip completions. At ships Iauncbed for the past 12 years. the beginning of 1968, Japan had a In ‘1967, Japan launched 7,497,000 two-year backlog. grosstons, or 48 percent of thez.world’s As a result of a new welding method total, followed by Sweden, the United that serves to cut a ship’s weight and Kingdom,West Germany, France, and construction time, a 200,000-dead-Norway. weight-ton tanker, for example, can

Thereare more than 1,000 shipyards be co~pleted in a period of two or in Japan, of which 27 are major ones three months in a building dock.— ownedand operated by 14 shipbuilders. Japan Report.

Mwshw 1336 la7

MILITARY “. , =---- .- : ,

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BOOKS

TOTALITARIAN RULE. its Nature and Characteristics. By Hans Buchheim. Translated From the German by Ruth Hein. With Annotations by Kurt P. Tauber and the Translator. 112 Pages. Wesleyan University Press, Mid. dletown, Cmsn., 1968.$4.50. BY MAJ HARRYG. SUMMERS,JR., USA

In terms especially relevant to the Marcusian new left movement so pop-u@ with today’s students, Dr. Buchhelm has written a useful primer on totalitarianism. , Stripping away the camouflage of $olemics which surrounds fascism and communism, he finds their inner realities similar. The insidious formulas devised to insure the support of the uncommitted masses are laid bare.

Dr. Buchheim laye most of the blame for the rise of totalitarianiem, which he isolates as a more dangerous 20thcentury variant of authoritarianism, on the sociotechnological society of the 19th and 20th centuries with their idealistic, “scientific” formulas to explain every aspect of human life. This “scientific” truth is the hallmark of the totalitarian who must impose this immutable truth on others through control of every aspect of human life. The end is not the authoritarian goal of absolute rule, but that of creating a new superior man and a new society.

The author believes that man is not as malleable as the totalitarians believe, and that by going against the grain of human nature, totalitarianism carries within it tit- seeds of its own ultimate destruction.

WESTMORELANO: The inevitable General. By Ernest B. Furgurson. 342 Pages. little, Brown & Co., Boston, Mass., and Toronto, Can., 1966.$6.95.

13Y LTC JACKG. CALLAWAY,USA

A “Biography of any man in mid. career is a quicksilverish thing. When he is a general in midwar, the problem is compounded.” This biography was undertaken without the initiative or encouragement on the part of General William C. Weetmoreland. It is not a ghostwritten autobiography, and it is not an “authorized” biography.

Mr. Furgurson is White House correspondent for the Baltimore Sun and has been on several reportorial assignments in South Vietnam.

It does not purport to be the ineide story of his [ Westmoreland’s] leadership in Vietnam, but rather is a reporter’s account of where he came from, how he got there, what equip. m ent he acquired along the way, and how it has applied to the unprecedented task he faced on arrival in Saigon.

This is not a definitive work. It lists but does not discuss the major decisions that have been made or significantly influenced by General Westmoreland. The narrative does, however, contain enough detail to reveal the major leadership characteristics, and the industrious, energetic will to succeed, excel, and contribute that are hallmarks of the US Army’s Chief of Staff, and it does provide an ineight into how he thinks and works.

Military Review 108

.,

THE REFERENCE NANDBOOK OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE WORLO. Second Edition. Edtiedby Robert C. Sellers. 215 Pages. RobertC. Sellers& Associates,Garden City, N. Y.,1968.$14.95.

A handy reference on the armed forces in more than 118 countries. Includedis information on defenee budgets, strength figure:, equipment in each service, military assistance, and defenseagreements

HE6R0 TROOPSOFANTEBEUUMLOUISIANA. A Historyof tire Battalionof Free Men of Color.BY Roland C. McConnell. 143 Pages. Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge,La,,1968.$5.00. ,. BY MAJ JAhiEeE. 3XNHWMOND,USA

This scholarly and extensively documentedvolume covers the history of Louisiana’efiret Negro unit which had its historical precedents in the companies initially organized under the French during the Indian rebellion of 1729and which later fought under the Spanish.

During the first decade following the US acquisition of the Louieiana Territory, the continued existence of this unit was the subject of political controversy. In 1812, at the insistence of Governor William C. Claiborne, the unit was officially created by the Louisiana Legislature ae the Battalion of Free Men of Color.

In 1814, this volunteer militia battalion was enrolled into Federal service“alongwith a second, like battalion by General Andrew Jackson at the Battle of New Orleane. Their service was exemplary; both battalions occupied key positions in the frontline of defense where they “fought like desperadoes and deserved distinguished praisej”

Nwamhar 1SS8

I MILITARY BOOKS

BA@BARY OENERAL: The life of William H. Eaton. By Samual Edwards.277 Pages.Prentires-Hall,Inc., Englawood Cliffs, N.J., 1968. $6.95.

BY MAJ DENNISS. FARLEY,USA

This is a biography of one of America’s early and forgotten heroes who distinguished himself while serving in the Barbary nations of North Africa during the late 1700’s and early 1800’e.

Written by the author of such books as, The Naked Maja, and 55 DaIIs to Peking, Barbarg General provides the reader with an interesting look into the life of the man who many have termed as America]e “Lawrence of Arabia.”

This book is recommended for military readers with an interest in American history between the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812.

THE VAA6S0 RAIO: The Commando Attack That Changed the Course of World War Il. ,By Joseph N. Oevhrs, Jr. 222 Pages. Chilton Co.,Philadelphia,Pa.,New York,and London, Eng., 1967.$4.50.

BY ROBINHIGHAM

The Vaageo Raid was one of those minor actions during World Wdr II which helped change the course of history. An attack by a small forc~ upon the Germane in Norway, it had international political repercussions which convinced the Norwegians and the Britieh that such pinpricks caueed more harm than good.

The author has assiduously interviewed or contacted many of the survivors and has pieced together an exciting story of a minor action in all ita d~t+ls. Whether such amphibious operations will ever again take place is a matter of epeculation.

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MILITARY BOOKS

YEAR OF THE HORSE—VIETNAM. Ist Air Cavalry in the Highlands. By lieutenant Colonel Kenneth D. Mertel, United States Army. 380 Pages. Exposition Press, Inc., New York, 1968.$10.00. BY MAJ JOHN W. CRANCER, USA

This is the odyssey of the 1st Battalion Airborne, 8th Cavalry. Germinating from the concept of airmobile warfare, the unit was formed, equipped, trained, and sent to Vietnam in less than two and a half months. This period of preparation and the battalion’s first nine months in Vietnam are related by its commander.

Many fascinating details about the employment of airmobile units are presented. The reader gains insight into the introduction of US troop units into Vietnam while they try to build a secure, livable base and, at the same time, find and dest~.oy the elusive Viet Cong. The mobile operations of this battalion and their pace and frequency give the reader an excellent feel forthe type warfare being conducted in Vietnam’s Central Highlands.

NEGOTIATING WITH THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS: The United Ststes Experience, 1953-1967. By Kenneth T. Young. 461 Pages. Mcfiraw-HiN Booir Co., New York, Toronto, London, and Sydney, Aus., 1968.$10.95. BY MAJ RICHARD O. BoesGsTaoM,USA

“United States Only Free World Government Able to Immediately Begin Negotiations With Red China.” An impossible headline? No. Since August 1955, Ambassadors of the United States and Communist China have held more than 130 secret meetings at Geneva and Warsaw which have come to be known as the “Ambassadorial Talk,. Mr. Young’s book is the story of these talks and his

110 ‘

appraisal of the future which such meetings might bring.

Even though the actual substance of the meetings is classified, the author has compiledan amazing array of detail from unclassified sources. Substantive data on issues over Tai. wan, the repatriation of Americans held in Chinese prisons, and nuclear disarmament and Vietnam, to name but a few, are covered in this highly interesting and informative work.

Many will bedisappointed with the story of the ambassadorial talks because of their meager direct results— yet they may play a more critical role in our future.

INTEGRATION OF THE NEGRO IN THE U.S. ARMEO FORCES. By Richard J. Stillman N. 167 Pages. Frederick. Praeger, krc.,New York, Washington, and London, Eng.,1988, $10.00. BY MAJ RONALD B. STEVENS, USA

As the son of a US Army colonel, the author has lived at numerous military bases in the United States and in Europe and has observed tirsthand the integration of the Negro in the US Armed Forces.

The book begins with a consideration of the political influences affecting integration of the Armed Forces and how these influences became military policy onthe use of the Negro in theeervices. Their successes and failures as both service and combat troops are discussed. Of particular interest are the personal evaluations of Negro soldiers by senior commanders of segregated and integrated units.

The gradual movement from segregation to integration from 1940 through 1953 and the influencing fsctors are presented in some detail. Not overlooked is the problem of segregation “just outside the post gate.”

Military Review

TKE ESSENCE OF SECURITY.Reflectionsin ,- Office.BY Robert S. McNamara. 176 Paces. , Harper i Row, Inc.,New York, Evanston,;nd

London,Eng., 1968.$4.95. BYMAJ THOMASJ. KERVER,USA

Subtitled “Reflections in Office: this volumetouchee on what Mr. McNamara believes were the most importantdecisione he had to face. He covers the spectrum of what he calls the “principles and philosophy by which I have directed the activities of the DefenseEstablishment.”

Those expecting to find qccounts of in-fightingwhich preceded I controversial decision will be disappointed, for they do not appear here. Instead, the authorassesses the value of programs for which he was responsible, and attemptsto defend them.

Of particular interest is Mr. McNamara’sevaluation of the Soviet and Chinese threats. Concerning Europe andthe Soviet threat, he contends that an increasing strategic mobility capability. coupled with the growing strength- of other North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations make it necessary for the United States to maintainin Europe “only those forces for which there is a clear military requirement.” He maintains that China is “cautious to avoid any action that might end in a nuclear clash with the UnitedStates, however wild her words.

,,. . . Not surprisingly, Mr. McNamara

viewsthe present US defense posture as basically sound and arguee that US security can best he preserved by:

. Aid~ng developing nations which are willing to help themselves.

. Enckmraging more activity by countries capable of sharing international peacekeeping responsibilities.

� Mak]ng a concerted effort to re-

MILITARY BOOKS

ducp the risk of conflict with nations such as the USSR and China.

In spite of its brevity, the book goes beyond a discussion of US defense policies and presents arguments for such varied causes as a better edu. cational system in Europe, the need for open housing, the responsibilities of the Defense Department to educate servicemen, and the importance of preparing noncareer’ military- personnel for a productive life as civilians after diecharge.

THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. American Society of International Law. EdNedby Richard A. Falk. B33 Pages. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N~J., 1968.$15.00.

BY COL THOMASH. REESE,USA

This is an unusual collection of published articles, background essays, and timely legal appraisals of the current world order. It is distinguished by the high quality of its writing, the prominence of its contributors, and the magnitude of its discussion of the American presence in Vietnam.

In this book, reasonable men possessing professional competence give serious and balanced consideration to the legal issues arising out of [the US involvement in Vietnam to arrive at contrary conclusions. Most of the! disagreement converge on one underlying question: Is it legally justifiable to treat the Vietnam war aa a civil war or as a peculiar modern species of international war?

Presented are articles and essays by contributors such as Walt W. Rostow, Quincy Wright, John Norton Moore, Dean Rusk, and U Thant in three categories which are entitled: “A Framework for Legal Inquiry,” “Legal Perspectives,” and “World Perspectives.”

Nawmbw 111lge8

MILITARY BOOKS

THE SPANISN ARMADA. By Michael Lewis. 216 Pages. Thomas Y. CroweN Co- New York, 1900. Published in the United States 1968.$6.95.

BY LTC FSANCISA. IANNI, USA

The author, for years a Professor of History at the Royal Naval College in England, presente a thorough analysis of the defeat of the Spanish Fleet in 1588. Personalities, equipment, training, and doctrine of the two contending forces are examined and combined in a scholarly fashion to show their impact on the battle’s eventual outcome.

SUERILLAS: A History and Analysis from Napoleon’s Time to the 1960’s. By Arthur CampbaN. 344 Pages. Tha John Oay Co., Inc., New York, 1967. $B.95.

BY LTC JAMESM. NEIL, USA

Arthur Campbell, a lieutenant colonel in the British Army, gained firsthand experience with guerrilla warfare in Burma, Malaya, and Cyprns. This book traces guerrilla warfare from its use against Napoleon Bona-parte in Spain, from 1807 to 1813, to its use in Algeria through 1961. The author covers many guerrilla actions during the period and devotes separate sectione to the most significant.

The concluding chapters summarize successful revolution and counterrevolution. They outline key points from the guerrilla campaigns of the 19th and 20th centuriee and provide recommended approaches for both the revolutionary and the defending nation-

This work is especially valuable for the individual with a small library who wants, in one volume, a brief history of significant guerrilla actions and a well-presented summary of techniques for both revolution and counterrevolution.

CNURCNILL ANO THE MONTGOMERY MYTH. By R. w. Thompson. 276 PageS.M. Evans& Co., Inc., New York, 1967.$5,95. BY COL TIMOTHYF. CLIFFOSU,USAR

Thla case history of the “Montgom. ery Myth” analyzes how Prime Min. ister Winston S. ChurWill developed the legend of Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery. To satisfy Britain’s need of a conquering hero in the dark days of August 1942, the author claims the Prime Minister deliberately ma. nipulated public relations and developed an image of “Monty” as an invincible hero.

The author tells how leaders were shutlled and, partly by accident, Montgomery was chosen to become Britain’a champion. General officers’ mem. oirs and oslicial records are cited to show the substantial performance of General Claude Auchinleck, the prior leader opposing Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. From the same sources, Montgomery’s less impressive record, although based on enormously increased British strength, is compiled for comparison. The result is a judgment of Montgomery not found in standard reference books.

A century ago, Thomas Carlyle wrote that a hero is the fortunate coincidence of the “right man at the right moment.” Thompson would have the reader believe that Monty the Hero is a coincidence of the wrong manand deliberate manipulation of public & lations.

The book ends ae Montgomery lCSVW

the Sth ArmY to accept command of British forces for Operation’ Over. tord. World War H buffs will find this a zarefully documented account, completely at odds with most prior WI’Ning and with public opinion.

MiliirY R8* 112

Professional Journal of the US Army mL*:~

Documents

Transcript of Professional Journal of the US Army mL*:~