Produced by: Performing an Advanced Shutdown: Taking it to the Next Level Dan Sawyer Outage Manager...
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Transcript of Produced by: Performing an Advanced Shutdown: Taking it to the Next Level Dan Sawyer Outage Manager...
Produced by:
Performing an “Advanced” Shutdown:Taking it to the Next Level
Dan SawyerOutage Manager – Ontario Power Generation
• 881 Mw (Net) 2650 Mw(th)• 15% of Ontario’s Supply• 2700 Full-time Staff• Common Structure• 3 Year Outage Cycles• 55-60 Day Duration• $80 M Budget• 1% FLR •>10 M Man-hrs since last LTA
D1 1992
D2 1990
D3 1993
D4 1993
D1 1992
D3 1993
D4 1993
D2 1990
D1 1992
D3 1993
D4 1993
On Complexity……
Dealing with complexity is an inefficient and unnecessary waste of time, attention and mental energy. There is never any justification for things being complex when they could be simple.
Edward de Bono
Overlap Makes it Even More Complex……….
TIME COST
SCOPESTAFF
COMMUNICATIONS
RISK
MATERIALS
QUALITY
Project Management Components
Project Management 101
‘What Isn’t Measured Isn’t Controlled’
‘Just Because You’re Measuring Something Doesn’t Mean You’re Managing It’
10 TRUTHS FOR CRITICAL PATH MANAGEMENT
1. Time is our enemy and he never rests or goes on vacation2. Bad things happen ……….. so better be prepared3. Time travel machines do not exist4. Never take a hit now if you can defer it to later5. Hide the fat6. It’s riskier to bring a project ahead than have it run late7. Don’t believe everything you’re told 8. Control the bow wave before it washes out your outage9. If you haven’t got time to do it right, when will you find time to do it over? 10. The die is cast by Day 6
When Bad Things Happen
Risk Management Process
Minimize impact of discovery work on: safety and outage schedule
Basic Principles
• Anticipate problems:o Unfavourable results from:
1st time projects Inspections & tests Infrequently performed work Critical system components Known problem areas
• Plan for “what if” scenarios
11
DOES DELAY EXTEND REFUEL TCD?
RESOLVE ISSUE AND CONTINUE
INSPECTION
NO
AUTHORIZATION RECEIVED TO REDUCE
SCOPE?
CUMULATIVE FC INSPECTION DELAY TO REFUEL TCD GREATER THAN 36 HOURS: INITIATE CIGAR SCOPE
REDUCTION VIA REQUEST TO STATION C&E
UP TO 36 HOURS OF FEEDER INSPECTION SCOPE IS AVAILABLE AS “POTENTIAL SCOPE REDUCTION” TO OFFSET CIGAR SCOPE. DETERMINATION OF SCOPE REDUCTION TO BE PERFORMED AT COMPLETION OF CIGAR CAMPAIGN AND
TO FACTOR IN PROGRESS OF FEEDER INSPECTION CAMPAIGN.
THIS INCLUDES 12 HOURS “CRAWLER” INSPECTION AND 24 HOURS VISUAL FACE CLEARANCE INSPECTION.
NO
YES
REFUEL DATE EXTENDED DUE TO FC INSPECTION DELAYS
YES
REVISE SCOPE AND CONTINUE
INSPECTION
Advance Decision Making Matrix
Strategies for Managing Risk
Avoidance• De-scope• Modifying the activity• Additional resources • Adding time to the schedule
Reduction• Add redundancy• Order spare parts• Outsourcing• Additional oversight
12
Acceptance
Risk AssessmentRisk = Probability x Consequences
Assess each “what if” scenario against a risk matrix
Determine the level of contingency planning required
Risk Response Development
Use Challenge Reviews
Purpose: Challenge and test readiness of each department to execute outage within targets
Objective: Awareness of scope, schedule and targets Confirm parts and equipment adequate Understand what could go wrong and
contingencies in-place to handle them
Schedule Contingency
• Management Reserve concept
• Have contingency for crushing the bow wave
• Front end load risky activities
IPTEIPTE
1) W. Feeder Inspections/Set-up2) LLDS activities3) PV8 Iceplug
VAULT PRIORITIES (In Order):
4) Mod Drain activites5) E. Vault Crane Mtce6) UDM Work
12 14 16 18 20 22 00 02 04 06 0810 12 14 16 18 20 22 00 02 04 06 0810 12 14 16 18 20 22 00 02 04 06 0810 12 14 16 1810
Operator Permitry
UNIT 4OVERVIEW
APPLY
REMOVE
APPLY
REMOVE
APPLY APPLY APPLY
FLOW DEFUELLING
CONTROL/COOL/CONTAIN - TODAY #2 SHIFT RRS/LZC: SSM ECI: BLOCKED SDS1: POISED NPC: POISED SDS2: UNAVAILABLE GSS: IN EFFECT
Sat. April 19 #2
APPLY
72100-NV2709 REMOVE
Sun. April 20 #1 Sun. April 20 #2
C14 P14
GENERAL VAULTACCESS
Installmini
W. Feeder Cracking Inspections
To LLDS PV8
iceplug Refillto GFS
C/D &De-press
Mod Drain pre-req's
53340-MCC20963432-PV5753330-HTR333110-BO163310-PV3333130-PM134320-MV26933310-MV25
Mon. April 21 #1 Mon. April 21 #2
O02
Tighten C/P's(as req'd)
Jigsaws
Moderator Drain (Calandria)PHT Drain pre-req's
E. Vault Crane Mtce Access Gate ModsInstallmini
Jigsaws
TightenC/P's
TRFPump up LT's
S&I
35000-RAB&C63331-CV12NPICG56311-RE13/2355720-42RF1
RSG 3 & 533810-RV7243110-HX5A75120-V35463310-PV3433130-PM3
74950-SG1153340-MCC20933110-BO233320-PV853340-MCC20972100-P175120-NV35543310-P172200-RV64182-LC2
55720-42RF148100-MV2247100-TK1
HFD Mtce
AA in-core
APPLY
Lower Pzrlevel
Tues. April 22 #1 Tues. April 22 #2
W. Feeder Thickness Inspections
Moderator Drain (Pipework)
Swap RV72 Permit Iceplug PV8 Drain 33320-PV8 Overhaul
STOP D.O.M. approvalreq'd for Mod drain.
LPSW flowmeas.
LPSW oninter-tie
Rapid Trending
Goal: Early identification & addressing adverse safety conditions or trends
• 22 areas monitored (ex. Ergonomics, Falling Objects, Hand Safety & Hearing Protection)
• Daily field observations rate areas as ‘safe’ or ‘at risk’
• During outage, analyzed for emerging adverse trends
• As areas fall below targets ‘adverse’ conditions are reported to Management and corrective actions taken.
Rapid Trending
Outage Control Center
OutageManager
OCC Manager
(7821)
Maintenance
(7818)
Operations
(7814)
Engineering
(7824)
Materials
(7809)
ContractMonitor
(7808)
Radiation
(7806)
Outage Control Center (OCC)
Communication Center Facilitate
Decision Making
Status Progress
Optimize Coordination & Handoffs
Monitor Critical Path
& 6 Shift Overview
Look Ahead Resolve Emergent Issues /
BarriersProvide Direction & Priority
30 Minute Rule• Employees are to elevate work delays• Every employee should resolve problems themselves but when unable within 30 minutes their line supervisor is contacted• Supervisor immediately resolves problem or contacts the Outage Control Center
For critical path work, OCC representative is contacted immediately
1 Hour Rule• Employees must know who has the next activity in the work sequence. • FLM of the work group to be contacted at least one hour before task will be finished
For critical path work, the OCC and the work group with the next activity "must" be contacted one hour before task is finished.
Outage Control Center
Getting Better
Corrective Action Programo Ensures deficiencies that adversely impact plant operations,
personnel safety, environment or equipment reliability, are promptly identified and corrected
Includes non-conformances, weaknesses with a process, document, or service
Captures information at all levels Record cannot be deleted
Slide 25
Corrective Action Plans
o Allows learning from mistakeso Prevents repeat occurrences by
Evaluating the problem to determine root cause Identifying the solution and actions required Evaluating the effectiveness of corrective action taken
Trending
2 48 792
4357
10788
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
A B CO C D
Darlington CAP's by Resolution Catagory
Trending for Outages
Task Scoping / Planning
28%
15%
17%25%
8%
7%
Inappropriate Scheduling
Late Scoping
Miscellaneous
Delay to Critical Path
Lack of Resources
Materials
Best Practices
• Information Sharingo Independent Nuclear Power Operators (INPO)
est. 1979
o World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) est. 1989
o CANDU Owners Group (COG) est. 1984
Best Practices
• Technical Information Exchange
• Professional and Technical Development
• Audits
• Operating Experience
31
March 11, 2011March 11, 2011• The Fukushima nuclear facilities were
damaged in a magnitude 8.9 earthquake centered offshore of the Sendai region, which contains the capital Tokyo.o Plant designed for magnitude 8.2 earthquake.
An 8.9 magnitude quake is 7 times in greater in magnitude.
• Serious secondary effects followed including a significant tsunami, significant aftershocks and a major fire at a fossil fuel installation.
• The Fukushima nuclear facilities were damaged in a magnitude 8.9 earthquake centered offshore of the Sendai region, which contains the capital Tokyo.o Plant designed for magnitude 8.2 earthquake.
An 8.9 magnitude quake is 7 times in greater in magnitude.
• Serious secondary effects followed including a significant tsunami, significant aftershocks and a major fire at a fossil fuel installation.
Slide 32
Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1
33
Hydrogen Detonation at Unit 1 Hydrogen Detonation at Unit 1
Reactor Building
Refuel Floor
• Safety • Human Performance • Reliability • Value for Money
Fukushima Event: O.P.G. Response Synopsis
OPG Nuclear Powering our future with operational and project excellence
“SAMG”