Proclus~ Commentary on Plato's Timaeus~ Volume 1, Book I~ Proclus on the Socratic State and Atlantis

http://www.cambridge.org/9780521846592

This page intentionally left blank

PROCLUS

Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus

Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s dialogue Timaeus is arguably the mostimportant commentary on a text of Plato, offering unparalleled insightsinto eight centuries of Platonic interpretation. This edition offers thefirst new English translation of the work for nearly two centuries, build-ing on significant recent advances in scholarship on Neoplatonic com-mentators. It provides an invaluable record of early interpretations ofPlato’s dialogue, while also presenting Proclus’ own views on the mean-ing and significance of Platonic philosophy. The present volume, thefirst in the edition, deals with what may be seen as the prefatory ma-terial of the Timaeus, in which Socrates gives a summary of the politicalarrangements favoured in the Republic, and Critias tells the story of hownews of the defeat of Atlantis by ancient Athens had been brought backto Greece from Egypt by the poet and politician Solon.

Harold Tarrant is Head of the School of Liberal Arts, University ofNewcastle, Australia. He has published widely on Plato and ancientPlatonism including Scepticism or Platonism? (1985) in the CambridgeClassical Studies series.

PROCLUS

Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus

VOLUME I

Book 1: Proclus on theSocratic State and Atlantis

translated with anintroduction and notes by

HAROLD TARRANTUniversity of Newcastle, New South Wales

With a general introduction byDirk Baltzly and Harold Tarrant

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo

Cambridge University PressThe Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK

First published in print format

ISBN-13 978-0-521-84659-2

ISBN-13 978-0-511-27517-3

© Harold Tarrant 2006

2007

Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521846592

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision ofrelevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take placewithout the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

ISBN-10 0-511-27517-X

ISBN-10 0-521-84659-5

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urlsfor external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does notguarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

www.cambridge.org

hardback

eBook (NetLibrary)

eBook (NetLibrary)

hardback

http://www.cambridge.org

http://www.cambridge.org/9780521846592

Contents

Acknowledgements page viiNote on the translation viii

General introduction to the Commentary 1dirk baltzly and harold tarrantThe importance of the Timaeus and its commentary tradition 1Proclus’ life and writings: some essential facts 2Cultural context: Proclus and pagan practice in Athens 3Proclus’ writings 7Intertextuality and interpretation in the Neoplatonic commentary

tradition 10Formal features of Proclus’ commentary 13The skopos of the Timaeus: theology and physiology 16

Introduction to Book 1 21The structure of Book 1 of Proclus’ commentary 21Interpreting the Timaeus in antiquity 23Proclus on general questions concerning the Timaeus 49Proclus on the summary of the constitution in the Timaeus 53Proclus and his predecessors on Atlantis 60

On the Timaeus of Plato: Book 1 85Analytical table of contents 87Translation 91

References 305English–Greek glossary 312Greek word index 318General index 342

v

Acknowledgements

The project of which this is part was a cooperative one from the start,emerging from a mutual conviction that Proclus’ great Commentary onthe Timaeus is a work for which a modern English translation was par-ticularly needed, and helped along by the shared belief that input fromboth classicists and philosophers was needed. The team of translatorsoriginally consisted of Dirk Baltzly of Monash University, David Runia(then working in the Netherlands), and myself, and was later expandedto include Michael Share. The input of my colleagues was very muchappreciated. The project has been kindly supported by a three-year grantfrom the Australian Research Council, notionally for 2000–2002. TheUniversity of Newcastle (Australia) afforded me study leave for the sec-ond semester of 2001, and has also supported me with conference grantsto attend various conferences crucial to my interests in the history ofPlatonism in antiquity. Furthermore, it supported a conference held inNewcastle in July 2002 on ‘Plato’s Ancient Readers’, where many of thepapers were related to Proclus.

The support of our research assistants, Dr Tim Buckley (on a widerange of matters) and Fiona Leigh (on the indexing), has been very muchappreciated. So also has been input from the wider scholarly world,and particularly from my widely spread colleagues in the InternationalPlato Society, the membership of which I have found invaluable. I mayconfidently predict that none of them will have saved me as many errorsas I should have wished to avoid, but these are due to no fault but myown. Constant pressures as Head of School in a University trying tograpple with an ever-deepening deficit might have been an easier targetto blame, but my admirable colleagues have been commendably happyto put up with inferior administration and welcomed the idea of a Headwith active interests in research and publication. Their tolerance hasbeen critically important, but is of course superseded by that of my wife,Judith, who has long been used to the perils of a husband obsessed withhis latest publishing projects. I can confidently assert that I do not intendto desert her for Proclus!

Creative life is not an island, whether in the universe or the partialspace of one’s study. There are a great many others, both past and present,who have contributed in their own ways to this single reversion to thetext of Proclus. To all that plurality I send my thanks.

vii

Note on the translation

In this translation we have sought to render Proclus’ text in a formthat pays attention to contemporary ways of discussing and translatingancient philosophy, while trying to present the content as clearly as pos-sible, and without misrepresenting what has been said or importing toomuch interpretation directly into the translation. We have not sought toreproduce Proclus’ sentence structure where this seemed to us to createa barrier to smooth reading, for which reason line and page numbers willinvolve a degree of imprecision. We have found the French translationby A. J. Festugiere an invaluable starting-point, and it is still a usefuland largely faithful rendition of Proclus’ Greek.1 However, we considerit worthwhile to try to make the philosophical content and argumentsof Proclus’ text as plain as possible. Something of our intentions can bededuced from the translation and commentary that Tarrant producedcooperatively with Robin Jackson and Kim Lycos on Olympiodorus’Commentary on the Gorgias.2

We believe that the philosophy of late antiquity now stands whereHellenistic philosophy did in the early 1970s. It is, at least for the anglo-analytic tradition in the history of philosophy, the new unexplored terri-tory.3 The most impressive contribution to studies in this area in the pastfifteen years has been the massive effort, coordinated by Richard Sorabji,to translate large portions of the Greek Commentators on Aristotle.4R. M. van den Berg has provided us with Proclus’ Hymns, while John

1 Festugiere, (1966–8). We are enormously indebted to Festugiere’s fine work, even if wehave somewhat different aims and emphases. Our notes on the text are not intended toengage so regularly with the text of the Chaldean Oracles, or the Orphic fragments, orthe history of religion. We have preferred to comment on those features of Proclus’ textthat place it in the commentary tradition.

2 Jackson et al. (1998).3 To be sure, some of the seminal texts for the study of Neoplatonism have been available

for some time. These include: Dillon (1973), Dodds (1963), Morrow (1970), Morrowand Dillon (1987), O’Neill (1965). There are also the translations by Thomas Taylor(1758–1835). While these constitute a considerable achievement, given the manuscriptsfrom which Taylor was working and the rate at which he completed them, they cannotcompare well with modern scholarly editions.

4 The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle (Duckworth and Cornell University Press). Thefirst volume in the series, Christian Wildberg’s translation of Philoponus’ Against Aristotleon the Eternity of the World, appeared in 1987. There are a projected 60 volumes including

viii


Finamore and John Dillon have made Iamblichus’ De Anima available inEnglish.5 Sorabji’s Commentators series now includes an English trans-lation of Proclus’ essay on the existence of evil.6 There is also a newedition of Proclus’ eighteen arguments for the eternity of the world.7We hope that our efforts will add something to this foundation for thestudy of late antiquity. If we have resolved ambiguities in Proclus’ textwithout consideration of all the possibilities, or failed to note the con-nections between a particular passage in the Timaeus commentary andanother elsewhere, then we can only plead that our team is working tobegin the conversation, not to provide the final word.

In all five volumes in this series, the text used is that of Diehl. Hispage numbers and line numbers are reproduced in the margins; thepage numbers are in bold. Deviations from that text are recorded inthe footnotes. On the whole, where there are not philological mattersat issue, we have used transliterated forms of Greek words in order tomake philosophical points available to an audience with limited or noknowledge of Greek.

Neoplatonism has a rich technical vocabulary that draws somewhatscholastic distinctions between, say, intelligible (noetos) and intellectual(noeros) entities. To understand Neoplatonic philosophy it is necessaryto have some grasp of these terms and their semantic associations, andthere is no other way to do this than to observe how they are used. Wemark some of the uses of these technical terms in the translation itselfby giving the transliterated forms in parantheses. On the whole, we dothis by giving the most common form of the word – that is, the nom-inative singular for nouns and the infinitive for verbs – even where inthe corresponding Greek text the noun is in the dative, or the verb afinite form. This allows the Greekless reader to recognize occurrencesof the same term, regardless of the form used in the specific context athand. We have deviated from this practice where it is a specific form ofthe word that constitutes the technical term – for example, the passiveparticiple of metechein for ‘the participated’ (to metechomenon) or com-parative forms such as ‘most complete’ (teleotaton). We have also madeexceptions for technical terms using prepositions (e.g. kat’ aitian, kath’

works from Alexander Aphrodisias, Themistius, Porphyry, Ammonius, Philoponus andSimplicius.

5 Van den Berg (2001), Finamore and Dillon (2002). Other important, but somewhatless recent, additions to editions and modern language translations of key Neoplatonictexts include: Segonds (1985–6) and the completion of the Platonic Theology, Saffrey andWesterink (1968–97).

6 Opsomer and Steel (2005).7 Lang and Macro (2001). Cf. the first translation of the reply to Proclus by the Christian

Neoplatonist, Philoponus, Share (2005).

ix


hyparxin) and for adverbs that are terms of art for the Neoplatonists (e.g.protos, physikos). This policy is sure to leave everyone a little unhappy.Readers of Greek will find it jarring to read ‘the soul’s vehicles (ochema)’where the plural ‘vehicles’ is followed by the singular form of the Greeknoun. Equally, Greekless readers are liable to be puzzled by the differ-ences between metechein and metechomenon or between protos and protos.But policies that leave all parties a bit unhappy are often the best compro-mises. In any event, all students of the Timaeus will remember that a gen-erated object such as a book is always a compromise between Reason andNecessity.

We use a similar system of transliteration to that adopted by theAncient Commentators on Aristotle series. The salient points may be sum-marized as follows. We use the diaeresis for internal breathing, so that‘immaterial’ is rendered aylos, not ahylos. We also use the diaeresis toindicate where a second vowel represents a new vowel sound, e.g. aıdios.Letters of the alphabet are much as one would expect. We use ‘y’ for �alone as in physis or hypostasis, but ‘u’ for � when it appears in diphthongs,e.g. ousia and entautha. We use ‘ch’ for �, as in psyche. We use ‘rh’ forinitial � as in rhetor; ‘nk’ for ��, as in ananke; and ‘ng’ for ��, as in angelos.The long vowels � and � are, of course, represented by e and o, whileiota subscripts are printed on the line immediately after the vowel as inoiogenes for ��. There is a Greek word index with each volume inthe series. In order to enable readers with little or no Greek to use thisword index, we have included an English–Greek glossary that matchesour standard English translation for important terms, with its Greekcorrelate given both in transliterated form and in Greek. For example,‘procession: proodos, ��’.

The following abbreviations to other works of Proclus are used:

in Tim. = Procli in Platonis Timaeum commentaria, ed. E. Diehl, 3 vols.(Leipzig: Teubner, 1903–6)

in Remp. = Procli in Platonis Rem publicam commentarii, ed. W. Kroll,2 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1899–1901)

in Parm. = Procli commentarius in Platonis Parmenidem (Procli philosophiPlatonici opera inedita pt. III), ed. V. Cousin (Paris: Durand, 1864;repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1961)

in Alc. = Proclus Diadochus: Commentary on the first Alcibiades of Plato,ed. L. G. Westerink (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1954). Also usedis A. Segonds (ed.), Proclus: Sur le premier Alcibiade de Platon, vols. Iet II (Paris, 1985–6).

in Crat. = Procli Diadochi in Platonis Cratylum commentaria, ed.G. Pasquali (Leipzig: Teubner, 1908)

x


ET = The Elements of Theology, ed. E. R. Dodds, 2nd edition (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1963)

Plat. Theol. = Proclus: Theologie Platonicienne, ed. H. D. Saffrey and L.G. Westerink, 6 vols. (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1968–97)

de Aet. = Proclus: on the Eternity of the World, ed. H. Lang and A. D.Macro (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001)

Proclus frequently mentions previous commentaries on the Timaeus,those of Porphyry and Iamblichus, for which the abbreviation in Tim. isagain used. Relevant fragments are found in

R. Sodano, Porphyrii in Platonis Timaeum Fragmenta, (Naples: Istitutodella Stampa, 1964) and

John Dillon, Iamblichi Chalcidensis in Platonis Dialogos CommentariorumFragmenta, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973).

Proclus also frequently confirms his understanding of Plato’s text byreference to two theological sources: the ‘writings of Orpheus’ and theChaldean Oracles. For these texts, the following abbreviations are used:

Or. Chald. = Ruth Majercik, The Chaldean Oracles: Text, Translation andCommentary (Leiden: Brill, 1989)

Orph. fr. = Orphicorum fragmenta, ed. O. Kern. (Berlin: Weidmann,1922)

Majercik uses the same numeration of the fragments as E. des Places inhis Bude edition of the text.

References to the text of Proclus’ in Timaeum (as also of in Remp. andin Crat.) are given by Teubner volume number, followed by page andline numbers, e.g. in Tim. II. 2.19. References to the Platonic Theology aregiven by Book, chapter, then page and line number in the Bude edition.References to the Elements of Theology are given by proposition number.

Proclus’ commentary is punctuated only by the quotations fromPlato’s text upon which he comments: the lemmata. These quotations ofPlato’s text and subsequent repetitions of them in the discussion thatimmediately follows that lemma are in bold. We have also followedFestugiere’s practice of inserting section headings so as to reveal whatwe take to be the skeleton of Proclus’ commentary. These headings aregiven in centred text, in italics. Within the body of the translation itself,we have used square brackets to indicate words that need perhaps tobe supplied in order to make the sense of the Greek clear. Where wesuppose that Greek words ought to be added to the text received in themanuscripts, the supplements are marked by angle brackets.

xi

General introduction to the Commentary

dirk baltzly and harold tarrant

the importance of the timaeus and itscommentary tradit ion

Proclus’ Commentary on the Timaeus is arguably the most importanttext of ancient Neoplatonism. The Timaeus itself has proved to be themost important of all Plato’s works from a historical perspective, for itremained a key text from the death of Plato, through Hellenistic philos-ophy, Philo of Alexandria, Middle Platonism, and the Christian fathers,down to the Neoplatonists, and well beyond. The fact that in the pastcentury or so it has been effectively challenged by the Republic for thetitle of ‘Plato’s greatest work’ means little in the 2500-year history ofPlatonism. The Timaeus was acknowledged as one of the two supremetexts of the Neoplatonist curriculum. The other was the Parmenides,which was of similar importance to many Neoplatonists, but less widelyacknowledged as central to a Platonic education.

The commentary itself was usually the major vehicle of Neoplatonistteaching, even though much of what survives on Plato, unlike Aristo-tle, is not in this form. Interpretation of authoritative texts, includingmany of those of Plato, was a central part of a Neoplatonist’s work. Thecommentary arose directly out of the reading of texts in the schools ofphilosophy, though some commentaries went on being used by subse-quent generations, for which reason Proclus would have been consciousthat he was not writing an ephemeral work, but one that could be usedin other contexts.

The Commentary on the Timaeus is the culmination of centuries ofinterpretative work, with much earlier material embedded within it.From it we can see the kinds of debates about interpretation that flour-ished in a previous age, as well as the particular stance taken by theAthenian School under Proclus and Syrianus. From the historical pointof view, this commentary is the richest that Proclus has left us. It alsogives insights into the interpretation of other Platonic works, in particu-lar the Republic and Critias, which Proclus believes to be part of the samePlatonic sequence. It will often seem alien to us, employing unfamiliarexegetical and metaphysical assumptions. Yet in following his reason-ing, and seeing how he argues for his views, we shall have new cause toquestion our own interpretative assumptions.

1


proclus ’ l i fe and writ ings : someessential facts

We are reasonably well acquainted with the facts of Proclus’ life througha surviving biography by his successor, Marinus.1 The biography aimsnot merely to record the events of Proclus’ life, but to show how hisascent through Neoplatonism’s various grades of virtue enabled him tolive a happy and blessed life. So it is partly a moral treatise and partly apagan hagiography, like Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus. Nonetheless, we maydraw some relatively secure conclusions about Proclus’ life.

He was very likely born in 411 and died in 485.2 His father, Patricius,was a lawyer at court in Byzantium, but shortly after Proclus’ birth took apost in Xanthus. This might well have been agreeable to his parents, sincethey were themselves Lycians. Siorvanes suggests that this choice mightalso have been related to a law of 415 that excluded pagans from imperialservice and the army. While this is possible, there is no easy pathway fromour knowledge that the law at a certain date forbade something to theconclusion that the prohibition was uniformly enforced.

Proclus was intended to follow his father into the law. He studiedrhetoric and law both at Xanthus and then at Alexandria. It is an indica-tion of his father’s wealth and reputation that he was tutored by importantmen, such as Leonas of Isauria. At the behest of the governor of Alexan-dria, Theodorus, the young Proclus accompanied Leonas to Byzantium.There Marinus’ hagiography records that Proclus had a vision of thegoddess Athena who instructed him to leave rhetoric and law and pursuethe study of philosophy (VProc. 9). It is possible that the climate hadchanged in Byzantium and that Proclus encountered Athenian Neopla-tonism within the circle of the Empress Eudocia and her father, thepagan sophist Leontius. In any event, Proclus did not move immediatelyto Athens, but rather returned to Alexandria where he studied logic andmathematics with distinction. At the age of 19 he moved to Athens tostudy at the ‘Academy’.

Proclus’ talent was quickly recognized in Athens. Syrianus was at thistime the acting head of the school, and with him Proclus embarked onthe first part of the Neoplatonic curriculum – the works of Aristotle.Indeed, Proclus became such an intimate of Syrianus that he lived inhis house, calling him ‘father’. Syrianus persuaded the aging Plutarch ofAthens, who had retired as head of the Academy, to instruct his star pupil

1 For the Greek text see Boissonade (1966), and for an English translation, Edwards (2000).2 There is some uncertainty about the date of his birth. What Marinus tells us about

the date of his death and the length of his life is incompatible with the horoscope thatMarinus provides for Proclus. The issue is well discussed in Siorvanes (1996).

2

Proclus and pagan practice in Athens

in Aristotle’s psychology and Plato’s Phaedo (VProc. 12). Such was Pro-clus’ progress that at least some version of the work before us was writtenin his twenty-eighth year (VProc. 13). The date of Syrianus’ death is notclear. Proclus became Diadochos or ‘Platonic successor’ either immedi-ately afterwards or perhaps after a brief interlude in which Domninusassumed leadership.3 Thus Proclus was head of the Academy for aroundfifty years.

Proclus lived a life of strict asceticism. He abstained entirely from sex,and ate meat only in the context of sacrifice where necessary for the sakeof piety. His religious devotion apparently imposed considerable strainson his somewhat delicate constitution. His habits included ritual bathingin the sea year-round, all night vigils, and fasts. He died at seventy-fiveyears of age, though for the last five years of his life he endured ill-health(VProc. 26). At his death Marinus tells us that he was ‘judged worthyof the rites according to the ancestral custom of the Athenians’ (VProc.36, trans. Edwards). He was buried in a common tomb with his teacher,Syrianus, on the hill of Lycabettus.

cultural context : proclus and paganpract ice in athens

One of the things that must strike any reader of Marinus’ biography isthe extent of Proclus’ devotion to the gods. When contemporary readersimagine the office of ‘Head of the Academy’ it is easy to think of a pro-fessional academic – a slightly eccentric but harmless chap who spendsa lot of time in the library and rather less lecturing. Certainly Procluslectured, and wrote commentaries and essays – what university admin-istrators might now characterize as ‘research’. But we cannot get a clearpicture either of the man or of Athenian Neoplatonism without someappreciation of the centrality of pagan religious practice in the life andperception of both.

It is a familiar point that ‘pagan religion’ was even less of a unitarything than the religion of the Christians who adopted this single word todescribe so much. This ‘other’ of Christianity was in fact a fairly disparatecollection of localized cults. Central to the various cults was not a body ofdoctrine that one believed in, but rather a set of practices that one engagedin. Participation in one set of rites in no way prohibited participation inothers. Moreover, people could participate in various rituals with variousattitudes and degrees of understanding. It would be a mistake to supposethat, even in the fifth century, we can distinguish completely distinctgroups of people – the Christian and pagan communities. Christians

3 Cf. Diller (1957), 188 and Siorvanes (1996), 6.

3


sought to incorporate traditional celebrations into the new religion.4Doubtless there were many hard-working men and women who didn’treally care whether a particular feast was part of a pagan sacrifice ora saint’s day. Who today would refuse a day off on religious or politi-cal grounds? The self-understanding among those who did not think ofthemselves as Christians differed too. The word ‘Hellenes’ is tradition-ally used of intellectuals who see the tradition of Greek language, poetry,drama, and philosophy (paideia) as the core of civilization. The traditionsof pagan religious rituals were commonly integrated within this paideia.Radical ‘Hellenists’, like Julian the Apostate, were Hellenes who sup-posed not only that this integration should be pursued thoroughly andsystematically, but that the empty, superficial, populist tide of Christian-ity ought to be vigorously resisted. Perhaps it is not too far wrong to seethe Hellenes as like conservatives in the ‘culture wars’ in America in the1980s and 90s. They supposed that empty, superficial post-modernismand deconstruction were assailing the eternal values of ‘Western cul-ture’. Attention lavished on the simple koine Greek of New Testamentwriters might have been regarded by the Hellenes much as conserva-tives regard cultural studies PhD theses on Madonna or Mills and Boonnovels. An important disanalogy with the culture wars of America wasthat the Christians had the law notionally on their side.

The Theodosian Code of 438 sought to codify laws in the easternRoman Empire issued since 312. Among these were various proscrip-tions of pagan religious practices. An imperial decree in 391 notionallyprohibited all pagan cults and closed their temples. But it is one thingto pass a law, and another to have it enforced with due diligence every-where, as we still see in states with laws against sodomy or the possessionof marijuana. Pagan religious practices in the fifth century were in a simi-lar situation. Different cities took different attitudes and much dependedon the degree of animosity to paganism, the energy and the influence ofthe local Christian population.5 One of Marinus’ anecdotes about Pro-clus’ arrival in Athens is perhaps revealing about the extent to whichAthenian pagans were closeted and the extent to which Proclus was not.

Marinus tells us that Proclus was met upon his arrival in Athens by afellow Lycian, Nicolaus. On the way back up to the city, Proclus finds

4 Trombley (1995), chapter 2.5 Marinus’ biography of Proclus is one of the documents that historians appeal to in order to

understand the progress toward the closure of the Academy in 529. We discuss below oneepisode from Marinus’ biography that indicates some sort of dispute between Proclusand the Christians. Two other points seem salient. First, Marinus notes rather sadlythat – at the time at which he is writing – the city no longer has the use of the temple ofAsclepius (29). Second, he makes oblique reference to the removal of the great statue ofAthena from the Parthenon (30). It is unclear whether this took place in Proclus’ lifetime.

4

Proclus and pagan practice in Athens

that he is tired and they stop to rest. Nicolaus has a slave fetch water froma nearby spring where stood a statue of Socrates. Nicolaus, Marinus tellsus, was struck by the fact that the newly arrived Proclus first drank theAttic water (a metaphor for eloquence) in a place sacred to Socrates. Aftermaking obeisance (proskunesas), presumably worshipping the statue ofSocrates, he continued on. Proclus’ readiness to engage in this behaviourcontrasts sharply with his initial introduction to the circle of Syrianus.As Proclus talked with Syrianus and Lachares, the sun set and the moonappeared for the first time in her new cycle.6 The older men wantedto send their new acquaintance away in order that they might worshipthe goddess (proskunein) by themselves. But when Proclus saw the moonhe took off his sandals7 in front of these strangers and greeted the god.Both were struck by Proclus’ parrhesia – his paradigmatically Athenianfrankness of speech and action – in doing so. Proclus’ willingness todisplay his pagan piety openly contrasts with their initial desire to ridthemselves of the stranger so that they might worship in private.

Proclus clearly did things that were forbidden by the law. He sac-rificed, not merely cakes or wheat, but animals. Marinus tells us that,on the whole, Proclus abstained from eating meat except where it wasnecessary as part of the ritual for the sake of holiness (19). He performedceremonies in which he invoked the aid of the gods for the healing ofthe sick. Marinus says that he interceded on behalf of ill friends by worksand hymns (ergois te kai hymnois, 17). He is particularly associated withthe cult of Asclepius, whose temple was near where Proclus lived. WhenAsclepigeneia, who was the wife of the archon Theagenes, fell sick, he‘worshipped Asclepius in the ancient manner’ and successfully cured her.But apparently even Proclus knew his limits. Marinus says of this episode:

Such was the act he performed, yet in this as in every other case he evaded thenotice of the mob, and offered no pretext to those who wished to plot againsthim. (VProc. 29, trans. Edwards)

But there must, nonetheless, have been limits. It appears that Proclus’devotion to the cults of the Greeks, Egyptians and Chaldeans caused

6 Trombley supposes that the goddess that Proclus worships in this episode is Athena.Edwards supposes that the goddess in question is Artemis and/or Hecate, both of whomare associated with the moon. If the latter is correct, then the action is doubly bold. Hecateis associated with theurgy and magic. Magic was particularly likely to be suppressed andthe penalty was death.

7 As Edward’s note ad loc. informs us, the removal of one’s footware was not a featureof Greek ritual, though it is associated with Pythagorean sacrifice by Iamblichus. If theanecdote is true, perhaps Proclus thereby related his foreign and wonderful learningfrom Lycia. Cf. Iamblichus, VPyth. 85, 105.

5


trouble for him at least once. Marinus gives a cryptic reference to a yearin which he left Athens for Lydia.

[He] entered into the billowing tempest of affairs at a time when monstrouswinds were blowing against the lawful way of life, yet he carried on a soberand undaunted existence even amid the perils; and once when he was criticallyharassed by certain giant birds of prey, he left Athens, just as he was, entrustinghimself to the course of the world . . . (VProc. 15, trans. Edwards)

Saffrey has speculated that the ‘tempest of affairs’ might have beenthe closure of the temple of Asclepius and its conversion to a place ofChristian worship.8

It would have been necessary for Proclus to be particularly circum-spect about theurgy. For the Neoplatonists of the Athenian school, thetheurgical virtues were the highest level of intellectual and moral per-fection. The accomplished theurgist understands enough about the wayin which various gods are manifested and symbolized through differentphysical substances in order to open himself to the ubiquitous presenceof the divine in all things. It is a form of ritual magic in which the aim isto become united with the gods. However, theurgy was associated withother, less noble forms of magic. The laws forbidding sorcery were morestringently enforced, having had their origins in the reign of Constan-tine when there was a positive terror of the black arts.9 The executionof the magician Maximus of Ephesus, associate of Julian the Apostate,in 371–2 set a bad precedent for Hellenes with Platonic leanings and anassociation with theurgy. Yet in the chapter on Proclus’ theurgic exper-tise Marinus reports that he used his skills to end a drought in Attica,that he protected the city from earthquakes, and that he made use of theprophetic tripod.

One conclusion to draw from the evidence of pagan religious prac-tice in Marinus’ biography of Proclus is that Athenian Christians were

8 Saffrey (1975), 555–7. It seems that Proclus was particularly devoted to the cult of Ascle-pius, as the episode with Theagenes’ wife shows. Marinus even notes that Proclus’ housewas conveniently located in close proximity to the temple. So it is certainly possible thatthis is what Marinus alludes to. However, if Trombley is correct to place the closure ofthe temple in the period 481–5, this would mean that Proclus left Athens ‘just as he was’in the last five years of his life during the period of his illness (Trombley (1995), 342–4).If the events related in §32 involving a visit to the temple of the sons of Asclepius nearAdratta are supposed to take place during Proclus’ year in Lydia then this seems odd.Marinus notes that he was deeply affected by the memories of what took place there,and perhaps this implies that the events were significantly in the past. Second, Marinusseems to imply that he put to good use what he learned of the gods of Lydia in the courseof his career. But if the trip to Lydia happened in his twilight years, this seems hard tounderstand.

9 Trombley (1995), 65.

6

Proclus’ writings

relatively tolerant. This may be true, but we should also not overlookthe rather special position that Proclus occupied. As the Platonic succes-sor, he would have been a relatively important person in Athens. First,he would have been afforded slightly more latitude than the ordinarynon-citizen for speaking his mind in public. The Athenians were aptto tolerate a certain amount of blunt speaking from the inheritors ofSocrates’ role.10 Second, Proclus would have had the financial resourcesto back his favoured causes and Marinus tells us that he did much ofthis through his friend Archiadas, the grandson of Syrianus who wasentrusted to Proclus’ care after his teacher’s death (VProc. 12, 14). In hiscapacity as Diadochus, Proclus would have had an income of 1,000 goldsolidi a year–a sum that Siorvanes estimates as equivalent to over US$500,000 per annum.11 The intellectual, cultural-historical and financialpower of the Platonic successor is physically manifested in the dimen-sions of the ‘Proclus house’. Near the temple of Asclepius on the southernside of the Acropolis is a large structure that some archaeologists believeto be the house used by Syrianus, Proclus and their Neoplatonic school(VProc. 29).12

So Proclus was no closeted academic happily writing books that fewwill read. He was a powerful man in a delicate political position. Neithershould we think of Proclus’ religiosity as an extraneous aspect of hisPlatonist role – as someone like Isaac Newton, who held a position atCambridge because of his brilliance in mathematics and physics, but whohappened to be interested in alchemy as well. Proclus’ religious devotionand his practice of theurgy were not an incidental hobby, irrelevant tohis role as a Platonist. Rather, it was partly because of his piety that hewas deemed worthy of the job. For the Athenian Neoplatonists, theactivity of teaching Plato and writing works of Platonic philosophy wasitself a spiritual exercise. This has implications for the understanding ofProclus’ Timaeus commentary. Shortly we examine the contrast betweenmodern commentaries and those of the Neoplatonists, but we shouldfirst examine the breadth of Proclus’ writings.

proclus ’ wr it ingsMarinus tells us that Proclus was a workhorse who wrote and lec-tured relentlessly. His surviving works alone bear this out. They divideinto roughly four genres: commentaries; large systematic works; shorter

10 See Edwards (2000), 78 for the tradition of ‘parrhesia’ or ‘philosophic frankness’ thatcomes with the role of the philosopher.

11 Cf. Damascius Phil. Hist. 102, in Athanassiadi (1999), and Siorvanes (1996), 22.12 Karivieri (1994).

7


monographs; and religious hymns and works dedicated to the exegesisof sacred texts other than Plato’s.

Commentaries on Plato’s dialogues dominate the first group. We haveonly a portion of Proclus’ commentary on the Timaeus – it breaks off after44c where the condition of the newly embodied soul is discussed. Buteven this portion runs to over one thousand pages in the Teubner editionof the Greek text.13 Both his massive commentary on the Parmenides andhis Alcibiades I commentary are also cut short.14 A partial summary of hiscommentary on the Cratylus too has been preserved.15 Proclus’ Republiccommentary is actually a collection of essays on topics relating to thatdialogue.16 The other surviving work in commentary form is on Book 1of Euclid’s Elements.17 Among the Plato commentaries that are lost to usare works on Gorgias, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Theaetetus and Philebus. Probablythere was also a Sophist commentary,18 a Theaetetus commentary,19 anda commentary on Plotinus.20 There may also have been a commentary,or perhaps just an essay, on Symposium.21

Three of Proclus’ systematic treatises survive. The best known is hisElements of Theology.22 The least well known is his systematization ofAristotelian physics, the Elements of Physics.23 The third is the massivePlatonic Theology which attempts to chart the hierarchy of divinities fromthe highest to the lowest gods.24

We also possess three monographs from Proclus: Ten Problems concern-ing Providence, On Evil, and On Fate.25 The contents of his work, EighteenArguments on the Eternity of the World can be reconstructed from Philo-ponus’ criticisms in the latter’s Against Proclus on the Eternity of the World.26

There are also two astronomical works. The first, Outline of the Astronom-ical Hypotheses, is a critical examination of Ptolemy’s astronomy.27 The

13 For the Greek text see Diehl (1965). For a French translation see Festugiere (1966–8).14 In the introduction to his Morrow/Dillon translation of Proclus’ in Parm., Dillon sug-

gests that this might be the consequence of an exhausted scribe!15 Duvick (forthcoming), Pasquali (1908).16 Greek text: Kroll (1899–1901). French translation: Festugiere (1970).17 Morrow (1970). 18 Annick (1991), Guerard (1991).19 Cf. Marinus, VProc. 39 and in Tim. i. 255.25. 20 Diller (1957), 198.21 A scholion to Proclus’ Republic commentary at II. 371.14 gives the title ‘On the speech

of Diotima’.22 Greek text with English translation is provided in Dodds (1963).23 Ritzenfeld (1912), Boese (1958).24 Greek text with French translation is provided in Saffrey and Westerink (1968–97).

With a certain amount of caution, one can also make use of the reprint of Taylor’s 1816translation of Platonic Theology, Taylor (1995). On the question of the completeness ofthe work as we have it, see Saffrey and Westerink vol. 6, xxxv–xliv.

25 Isaac (1977), (1979), (1982). 26 Lang and Macro (2001).27 Manitius (1909).

8

Proclus’ writings

other is a paraphrase of some difficult passages in Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos.There are a couple of lost works mentioned in the Timaeus commentarywhich we may assume would form similar short essays. One is an ‘exam-ination of the objections made by Aristotle to the Timaeus’ (ii. 278.27).At least part of this work is preserved in Simplicius’ commentary onAristotle’s On the heavens (in Cael. 640–71). The other is a ‘collection ofmathematical theorems in the Timaeus’ (ii. 76.22).

We possess fragments of a variety of works that demonstrate Proclus’interest in the canon of pagan Neoplatonic religious texts, as well as intheurgic practices. Among these are the fragments of his commentaryon the Chaldean Oracles.28 The Oracles were a collection of hexameterverses composed by Julian the Chaldean – or perhaps his son, Julian theTheurgist – during the late second century ad. Previous Neoplatonistshad accorded these a great importance. Proclus’ chance to study theOracles in depth with Syrianus was lost. The master set his two star pupils,Proclus and Domninus, the choice of reading either the Oracles or theOrphic poems with him.29 They disagreed. While Proclus preferredthe Oracles, Domninus opted for the works of Orpheus. Alas, Syrianusdied shortly thereafter. Proclus, however, seems to have worked up hiscommentary on the Oracles from his study of Porphyry and Iamblichus(VProc. 26). Marinus also tells us that Proclus was further instructed in thetheurgic rituals associated with the Oracles by Asclepigeneia, who was thedaughter of Plutarch (VProc. 28). A portion of Proclus’ work On Sacrificeand Magic survives.30 In spite of his preference to study the Oracles ratherthan the Orphic writings, it appears that Proclus did not neglect theseinspired texts either. The Suda attributes to him a commentary on theOrphic Theology, as well as a work entitled On the agreement of Orpheus,Pythagoras and Plato with the books of the Chaldeans.31 Finally, we have anumber of hymns to various gods from Proclus.32

In light of his pagan piety and the cultural context, we may regretthat we have no record of any work on Christianity. Porphyry, of course,

28 Text and French translation included in des Places (1971). English translation in Johnson(1988).

29 The ‘Orphic writings’ that Proclus and the Neoplatonists quote most frequently, how-ever, is the Rhapsodic Theogony which is mostly the product of the post-Hellenistic period.Comparisons with the Derveni papyrus suggest that they also encompass earlier mate-rial too. On the Orphic poems generally, see West (1983). We cite the fragments ofOrphic writings that Proclus quotes by their numbers in Kern (1963).

30 Greek text, Bidez (1928); French translation in Festugiere and Massignon (1944).31 It is possible that Proclus’ role here was to edit Syrianus’ notes and perhaps to add some

scholia. A work of the same title is attributed to both authors. Cf. Dodds (1963), xiv. Onthe question of originality in Proclus’ works, see pp. 13–16 below.

32 Cf. Vogt (1957), van den Berg (2001).

9


wrote an infamous Against the Christians – in no fewer than fifteen books.Saffrey argued that we can discern coded references to Christians in Pro-clus’ works.33 But these are very subtle. Proclus’ work On the Eternity ofthe World is often given the sub-title ‘Against the Christians’, but Langand Marco argue convincingly that this is a later addition.34 The moreobvious targets of Proclus’ arguments in this work are other Platonistphilosophers, such as Plutarch, who supposed that the Timaeus impliesa creation of the world in time. Of course, it may simply have been toodangerous by the mid-fifth century to write anything that was openlycritical of Christian theology. This would perhaps explain the absenceof any such work by Proclus, even though he was not much inclinedtoward compromise. It seems equally likely that Proclus cultivatedthe same frosty indifference to Christians that Plato displayed towardDemocritus.

To conclude, just as we should not think of Proclus’ religious devotionas distinct from his role as Platonic successor, so too we should notimagine that his works divide into two distinct kinds: sober exegesis ofPlatonic texts and enthusiastic writings on obscure, mystery religions.Proclus’ version of the content of Platonic philosophy weaves what mayseem to the modern reader to be quite disparate elements into a singlesynthesis which is pagan religious Platonism.

intertextual ity and interpretat ion in theneoplatonic commentary tradit ion

The Neoplatonic commentaries on Plato differ in quite significant waysfrom the modern commentaries like that of Cornford or Taylor on Plato’sTimaeus. One potentially misleading way to characterize the differenceis to claim that for modern commentators the purpose of the commen-tary is simply to interpret Plato’s text, while for the Neoplatonists, thecommentary form serves as a vehicle for the elaboration of the com-mentator’s own philosophical views. This may, in fact, be the correctway to contrast the content of, say, Cornford’s commentary with that ofProclus, depending on what you take to be the distance between Neopla-tonism and Plato’s intended meaning. But it is exactly the wrong way tocharacterize the Neoplatonic commentators’ own self-conception. TheNeoplatonists would be shocked by such an imputation, not only becausethey would regard it as false, but because the idea of philosophical the-orizing independently of a tradition of interpretation would be hubris.Thus, Damascius writes in On first principles (Peri archon):

33 Saffrey (1975). 34 Lang and Macro (2001).

10

The Neoplatonic commentary tradition

And if I should have introduced any innovation (kainotomoien) concerning thesethings, I would have dishonoured the divine Iamblichus, this man who was thefinest interpreter of divine as well as intelligible matters. Therefore, followingin the intellectual footsteps of the one who had thought about so many things, itseems right to me to at least propose that . . . (I. 291.23–5, translated by MossmanRoueche in Sorabji (2004), II 45)

The activity of philosophy is the same as the act of interpreting Platobecause the truth is to be found in Plato.35 Proclus thinks that Plato wasthe one man to whom the entire truth about all matters of importancewas entrusted by the gods (Plat. Theol. I. 6.2). Of course, Plato needsto be properly interpreted in order to yield this knowledge and Proclusbelongs to a select band of Bacchic celebrants who have been initiatedinto divine vision (epopteia) of Plato (Plat. Theol. I. 6.16). These includePlotinus, Porphyry and Amelius, Iamblichus, Theodorus of Asine andSyrianus. Hence the commentary tradition makes frequent reference toprevious interpreters of Plato.

What about philosophers other than Plato, particularly those whocannot be regarded – as Aristotle was36 – as a follower of Plato? Whenwe find agreement between Presocratic philosophers and Plato, this isnot because Plato is influenced by them or takes on board any of theirideas, but because Plato philosophizes in such a way as to agree with anyancient intimation of the truth (Plat. Theol. I. 6.30.23). The exception to

35 It is important to note that there may be a slight difference of opinion here betweenIamblichus and Proclus on the one hand, and the Neoplatonists of the Alexandrianschool on the other. Olympiodorus acknowledges the possibility that sometimes Platomight actually be wrong! Cf. Olymp. in Gorg. 41.9 and Tarrant (2000), 97.

36 For Porphyry’s role in establishing the place of Aristotle in the Neoplatonist tradition,see Hadot (1990). For Aristotle and Proclus’ teacher, Syrianus, see Saffrey (1990).TheNeoplatonists held slightly different views among themselves about the extent of thisagreement or symphonia between Plato and Aristotle. Proclus and his teacher Syrianusbelong to the end of the spectrum that is willing to acknowledge some pretty importantsources of disagreement, for example on the theory of Forms. Iamblichus stands at theother end and is accused by later Neoplatonists of going too far and not recognizingany disagreement between Plato and Aristotle (Elias, in Cat. 123.1–3). Where Proclusdoes acknowledge that Plato and Aristotle differ on a substantive matter, Plato mustbe defended. This defence, if sufficiently sustained and thorough might make up a sup-plementary work. Proclus gave an extensive answer to Aristotle’s criticisms of Plato’stheory of the elements. His reply is preserved in Simplicius’ commentary on De Caelo III(643.13 ff.). Diller (in RE [1893] q.v. Proklos) assigns this fragment to Proclus’ ‘Exam-ination of Aristotle’s refutations of the Timaeus’ (cf. in Tim. I. 279.2). In his defenceof Plato’s views within the context of the Timaeus commentary itself, Proclus will fre-quently offer Aristotle a fig leaf. So, in the case of the fifth element, Proclus notes thatif Aristotle means no more than that the kind of fire in the heavenly bodies is quitedifferent from sublunary fire, and that he indicates this by calling it a fifth substance,then there is no real disagreement with Plato; cf. Baltzly (2002).

11


this generalization is Pythagoras. Iamblichus had sought to portray Platoas a link in the chain running back to Pythagoras,37 while Pythagoras, inturn, was initiated into the divine mysteries by Orpheus38 (Plat. Theol.I.5.25.24–26.4). Thus we find several places in the Timaeus commentarywhere Proclus establishes the correctness of (his reading of) Plato’s claimsby showing how this agrees with something in the Orphic poems. Thereare two other sources unfamiliar to the modern student of Plato thatProclus draws upon for confirmation of what Plato means. The first isHomer. Proclus argued, particularly in his Fifth and Sixth Essays onPlato’s Republic, that when Homer is read ‘symbolically’ what is meant isin agreement with Plato’s divine philosophy.39 Plato’s criticisms of poetryin the Republic are actually directed only at ‘mimetic’ poetry, but Homer’sworks are the product of divine possession. The other, frequent source ofa confirmatio for Proclus’ reading of Plato will be the Chaldean Oracles.40

Throughout the Timaeus commentary, Proclus is anxious to show howthe truths symbolically encapsulated in these inspired works agree withPlato.

Two further points of comparison between Proclus’ Timaeus com-mentary and that of apparently similar modern commentaries are worthnoting. First, some, but not all, modern Plato scholars work with vari-ous hypotheses about Plato’s philosophical development. Neither Pro-clus, nor any other ancient Platonist, considers genetic explanations ofapparent differences in doctrine between dialogues. Thus Proclus feelsperfectly free to cite other Platonic texts as confirmation of his readingof Timaeus. Second, few modern scholars of Plato work with as stronga view about the unity of each Platonic dialogue as Proclus and his fel-low Neoplatonists. Iamblichus was perhaps the first to insist that eachdialogue has a specific target or skopos toward which it is directed. Everyaspect of the dialogue directs the reader toward this end when it is cor-rectly interpreted. Thus there is no feature of a Platonic dialogue that is,in principle, too trivial or tangential to comment upon. Where it appearsthat there is no strong thematic unity between one part of a dialogue andlater parts, such a unity must be discovered in analogical or allegoricalreadings.

Finally, it is important to keep in mind the different purposes forthe composition of these commentaries. People study the texts ofPlato and Aristotle for many reasons. The Neoplatonists studied themwith the ultimate goal of union with God, the unitary source of all

37 O’ Meara (1989) 38 Iamblichus, VPyth. 28.146, cf. Brisson (1987).39 Lamberton (1986), Sheppard (1980). 40 Brisson (2000), Brisson (2003).

12

Formal features of Proclus’ commentary

existing things.41 They approached this goal systematically, readingphilosophical works in a set order under the direction of a qualifiedteacher.42 Students begin with the works of Aristotle, as Proclus himselfdid when he read them with his teacher, Plutarch of Athens.43 Iamblichuslikely introduced the order of the dialogues that Proclus supposes is theright one.44 There are some doubts here because the text is corrupt,but it is clear that students began the study of Plato with Alcibiades I,Gorgias, Phaedo, Cratylus, Theaetetus, [probably Sophist and Statesman],then Phaedrus, Symposium, and Philebus. The final or crowning dialogueswere Timaeus and Parmenides. The extant commentaries by Proclus onAlcibiades I, and then on Parmenides and Timaeus, thus represent verynearly the alpha and omega of Neoplatonic studies of the ‘greater mys-teries’ of Plato.

This also means that the content of the Timaeus commentary is pitchedto a very advanced audience in terms of the Neoplatonist curriculum.Proclus assumes that the audience for these lectures will be sufficientlyfamiliar with the texts of Plato that they will immediately recognizeallusions to them – or indeed to the Oracles or anything else in the Neo-platonic canon. Proclus also assumes that his audience is both familiarwith, and convinced of, the fundamental correctness of the basic prin-ciples of Neoplatonic metaphysics. His Timaeus commentary thereforeoffers not so much an articulation and defence of these principles, butan application of them.

formal features of proclus ’ commentaryThe origin of Proclus’ Timaeus commentary as a series of lectures alsodeserves some comment. The first implication to consider is that ofauthorship. Some Neoplatonic commentaries are explicitly said to beapo phones. This means that the content of the commentary is derived

41 Cf. Ammonius, in Cat. 6.9–16 and Sedley (1999b) for the Platonic antecedents of thisspecification of the goal or purpose of life and philosophy.

42 Cf. Elias in Cat. 107.24 where he discusses Proclus’ work ‘Being led by one who knows’on the texts of Aristotle.

43 Marinus, VProc. 28. The justification for beginning with Aristotle can be found in theintroductions to the Categories commentaries beginning with Ammonius. Prior even tothe logical works of Aristotle, a student could read Porphyry’s Introduction or Isagoge tothe Categories. It is also possible that they might hear a course of lectures on an ethicallyuplifting work. Simplicius’ commentary on Epictetus’ Handbook or Enchiridion providesan example.

44 Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy, 26

13


from a lecture given by someone other than the compiler.45 Such com-mentaries sometimes record the name of the compiler and note that hehas included some observations of his own.46 Proclus’ commentaries aregenerally not of this sort.47 However, there is good reason to believethat his Timaeus commentary in particular is significantly indebted tothe lectures of his teacher, Syrianus, on the dialogue. First, there is arevealing remark in Proclus’ biography by Marinus. Recall that Proclusfirst studied with the aging Plutarch of Athens. Marinus tells us thatPlutarch ‘exhorted him to write down what was said’ in order that ‘whenthese notes were filled out by him (symplerothenton autoi scholion), therewould be a commentary (hypomnemata) on the Phaedo in Proclus’ name’(Marinus, VProc. 12). The Timaeus commentary is not perhaps tied quiteso closely to the content of someone else’s teaching. Having read Aris-totle and the Phaedo with Plutarch, Proclus was initiated into the greatermysteries (mystagogia) of Plato by Syrianus. Here too he made rapidprogress.

Working day and night with tireless discipline and care, and writing down whatwas said (ta legomena . . . apographomenos) in a comprehensive yet discriminatingmanner, Proclus made such progress in a short time that, when he was still inhis twenty-eighth year, he wrote a great many treatises, which were elegant andteeming with knowledge, especially the one on the Timaeus. (Marinus, VProc.13,trans. Edwards)

Consistent with this description of the circumstances of its composi-tion, Proclus’ Timaeus commentary frequently reports and endorses theopinion of ‘our teacher’ on some disputed point. Should we concludethat such ideas as are endorsed in the commentary, but not explicitlyattributed to anyone, therefore belong to Syrianus, not Proclus? Thereare cases where the content in Proclus’ works is not attributed, but where

45 Praechter (1990), Richard (1950).46 For example, the works of Ammonius – son of Proclus’ fellow pupil, Hermias, and even-

tually Proclus’ own student as well – are particularly likely to be apo phones. Only hiscommentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione was written out by him. His commentarieson Porphyry’s Isagoge, Aristotle’s Categories and Prior Analytics were transcribed by some-one else but listed under Ammonius’ name. Ammonius’ lectures on Metaphysics appearas a commentary by Asclepius. His commentaries on Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics,On Generation and Corruption, and De Anima appear under the name of Philoponus. Inthe case of the last three, Philoponus notes that the commentary includes some of hisown additions.

47 The exception here is the very incomplete Cratylus commentary. This comes down tous described as ‘extracts from the scholia of Proclus on the Cratylus’. We have no ideawho the extractor might have been.

14

Formal features of Proclus’ commentary

we can find exactly the same views in some of Syrianus’ surviving works.48

On the other hand, Sorabji has argued persuasively that Proclus oftenmodifies and extends some ideas found in Syrianus in important andinteresting ways.49 One possibility is that we should see a distinctionbetween scholia and a commentary or hypomnemata.50 The notes fromsomeone’s lecture get ‘filled out’ to a greater or lesser extent. Once filledout, they constitute a commentary that can – but need not – be regardedas the work of the person who thus filled out the scholia. The filling outmight be accomplished by incorporating material from other commen-taries or by adding thoughts of one’s own. The Neoplatonists’ generalattitude toward innovation, considered above, would militate against anytendency to highlight one’s own contribution.51

Finally, the fact that Proclus’ Timaeus commentary derives from lec-tures accounts for some of its structural features.52 As the genre of Neo-platonic commentary evolves, it becomes increasingly rigid in its struc-ture. This structure is clearly displayed in Olympiodorus’ commentarieson Gorgias and Alcibiades. After the all important preliminary remarks inwhich the lecturer isolates the skopos or target of the dialogue, discussescharacters and their symbolism and so on, there is a division of the textinto sections (tmemata). Each section is then further divided into a les-son (praxis) which may include a title. Each lesson begins with a textto be interpreted – the lemma. The general interpretation (theoria) fol-lows. After this, various points in the theoria are often recapitulated in anexamination of particular words or phrases from the text under discus-sion. This portion of the lesson is called the lexis. Proclus’ commentary

48 The commentary on the Phaedrus by Proclus’ fellow pupil, Hermias, is increasinglytreated as evidence for the views of Syrianus. In addition, there are portions of a com-mentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Books 3, 4, 13 and 14). Dodds’ introduction to ET(p. xxiv) gives some examples of parallels between the Metaphysics commentary andProclus. See also Sheppard (1980), 42.

49 Sorabji (1988), 111–19. 50 Lamberz (1987).51 David Blank considers the commentary of Ammonius on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione.

Ammonius’ introductory remarks suggest that the commentary reflects the content ofthe notes he took from his reading of this text with Proclus. Comparison with the DeInt. commentary of Boethius suggests that he has filled out the scholia from Proclus withmaterial largely drawn from Porphyry’s massive (and no longer extant) commentary onthe same work. Ammonius acknowledges his indebtedness to Proclus at the beginning(1.6–12) and humbly comments that, if he has added anything to the clarification ofAristotle’s very challenging text it will be ‘thanks to the god of eloquence.’ Cf. Blank(1996), 2–4.

52 On the form of Proclus’ commentary in contrast with that of later Neoplatonists, seeFestugiere (1971). For the theoria-lexis division in this commentary see now Martijn(2006), 152–5.

15


on the Timaeus does not conform rigidly to this structure, though theoutlines of it are certainly visible. Although there is no formal divisioninto lessons the commentary does present the lemma to be commentedon. The number of pages devoted to the discussion on different lem-mata varies greatly. Frequently something like a general interpretationcomes immediately after the lemma, followed by lexis. Sometimes, how-ever, Proclus will examine key phrases within the lemma first. Moreover,the lexis seldom merely recapitulates the theoria. Proclus often takes upproblems that are traditionally asked about particular phrases or themeaning of the whole passage under discussion. His general interpreta-tion is often reinforced in sections where he invites the audience to con-sider the facts themselves (ta pragmata) independent of any connectionwith Plato’s text. As one might expect, Proclus finds that such indepen-dent considerations confirm the truth of what he supposes Plato’s text tomean.

the skopos of the timaeus : theologyand phys iology

The extant portion of Proclus’ in Timaeum is divided into five books.These divisions mark more or less significant breaks in the text.

� Book 1 contains an introduction and exposition of the recapitulationof the Republic53 and the myth of Atlantis.

� Book 2 covers Timaeus 27c–31b: from Timaeus’ invocation to thegods to his conclusion that the generated cosmos is unique.

� Book 3 covers Timaeus 31b–37c. This content may be roughlydivided between an account of the body of the world and an accountof the generation of the soul from Being, Sameness and Difference;its form or shape, which mirrors the heavens; and its activities.

� Book 4 covers Timaeus 37c–40e and is the shortest of the five books.It opens with a discussion of time and the heavenly bodies. It con-cludes with a discussion of the traditional gods.

� Book 5 covers 40e–44d where the commentary breaks off. It takesup with the genealogy of the traditional gods, spends considerabletime on the address of the Demiurge to the junior gods, and theirdistribution of souls into bodies. It concludes with a discussion ofthe difficulties faced by embodied souls and the structure of thehuman body.

53 Proclus supposes that it recapitulates the Republic (I. 4.12). Against this, see Cornford(1957), 4–5.

16

The skopos of the Timaeus: theology and physiology

What, apart from the order of Plato’s text, gives Proclus’ commen-tary a structure of its own? As noted above, one thing that sets the tra-dition of Neoplatonic commentary apart from the modern commen-tary tradition is a strong presumption about the unity of every Platonicdialogue. Among the first tasks of any commentary is to articulate theskopos or thing at which the work to be examined aims. This strongunity assumption justifies a meticulous examination of every word inthe text. There can be no purely extraneous elements in the dialogue,nor any unit of meaning so small that it plays no role in the overallplan of the work. Morever, the assumption of the single skopos for eachwork was also a way of placing limits on attempts to find significancein various aspects of Plato’s texts. Attempts to find some unity in everyPlatonic dialogue often took the form of allegorical readings of the text.An illustration of how a specification of the skopos can legitimate oneamong a variety of possible allegories is provided in Proclus’ Parmenidescommentary.

The skopos of the Parmenides (in Parm. 641) is ‘all things insofar asthey are the offspring of one cause and are dependent upon this uni-versal cause’ (Syrianus) and ‘insofar as they are thereby deified’ (Pro-clus). This reading of the skopos bears out Proclus’ allegorical interpre-tation of the introduction of the dialogue. Recall that the conversationis related fourth-hand. There is the conversation (i) that first took placebetween Parmenides, Zeno and Socrates; (ii) Pythodorus, a friend ofZeno, related it to Antiphon; (iii) Antiphon relates it to the Cephalus andthe philosophers from Clazomenae; (iv) Cephalus relates this episode tosome unknown person – it is this conversation that the reader ‘overhears’.Proclus claims that (iv) symbolizes the enforming of sense objects, sincethe indefinite auditor is like the indefinite receptacle. (iii) symbolizesthe procession of Forms into genera and species. (ii) corresponds to theprocession of Forms into Soul – a correspondence that is confirmed byAntiphon’s involvement with horses and the image of the soul as a char-iot with two horses in Phaedrus. Finally, (i) corresponds to the structureof Nous: Parmenides, Zeno and Socrates standing for Being, Life andIntellect respectively (in Parm. 625.37–630.14). Doubtless there are anyof a number of correspondences between the conversations and personsof this dialogue and various elements in Neoplatonic ontology. How-ever, Proclus’ insistence that the dialogue has as its goal or skopos tospeak about all things insofar as they are products of the One is used tovindicate an allegorical reading which includes all the levels from Nousto the sensible realm (644.3 ff.).

So what is the skopos of the Timaeus? It is among the first things thatProclus tells us about the dialogue:

17


This whole dialogue, throughout its entire length, has physical inquiry (physiolo-gia) as its target, examining the same matters simultaneously in images (en eikosi),and in originals (en paradeigmasin), in wholes (en tois holois) and in parts (en toismeresi). (in Tim. I. 1.17–20, trans. Tarrant)

Let us first consider what Proclus alleges the dialogue aims at and thendiscuss how it carries out this examination.

The claim that the skopos of the dialogue is physiologia might lead us toexpect that it is not also a work replete with theological content. After all,for the Neoplatonists physis or Nature is either the lowest manifestationof Soul which is incapable of reverting upon its cause and so not separatefrom the matter that it informs (Plotinus III.8), or some principle ofmotion that inheres in body but which is distinct from soul (Simplicius,in Phys. 286.20 ff.). In either case, it is nearly at the bottom of the levelsof being in Neoplatonic metaphysics. But Proclus divides the study ofNature into three parts. One part does investigate matter and materialcauses. A second part studies form as well, since this is more properly acause. But Plato’s study of Nature is of the highest kind since it postulatesthe true causes of these things: the productive, paradigmatic, and finalcauses (I. 2.1–9). So the proper investigation of Nature requires that weascend back up the onto-causal ladder to the Demiurge, then the All-Perfect Living Thing upon which the Demiurge models the cosmos, andfinally the Good for the sake of which it comes to be (I. 2.29–4.6). Thus,while the skopos of the Timaeus appears to be merely physiology, it is infact a work of theology.

Let us now turn to the themes through which the dialogue investigatesthe skopos. These oppositions – images versus paradigms; universals orwholes versus parts or particulars – figure repeatedly in Proclus’ attemptto impose an orderly architectonic upon the dialogue. The integrationof the recapitulation of the Republic and the myth of Atlantis makes use ofthe first opposition. They are an investigation into the order (taxis) of thecosmos through images (I. 4.7). This understanding of the role of theseepisodes in Plato’s dialogue is summarized again at the beginning of Book2 of the commentary where Proclus begins the transition to the speech ofTimaeus. The architecture of this book is harder to characterize in termsof the oppositions invoked in the statement of the skopos. In general wemay say that it carries the investigation of the cosmos further throughexamining its paradigms: the Demiurge and the All-Perfect Living Beingupon which the Demiurge models the realm of generation.

At the opening of Book 3, Proclus explicitly attempts to reimposethese oppositions on the text. He now describes the contents of Book 2 asproviding an initial foundation (hypostasis) of the universe with reference

18

The skopos of the Timaeus: theology and physiology

to wholeness (kath’ holou) that it has from its creation (II. 2.9). In virtueof this, it is made divine, possessed of intellect and ensouled throughresembling the All-Perfect Living Being. But, Proclus tells us, Platothen goes on to provide us with a second foundation of the universe thatcreates a division of the universe into universal parts and intact wholes.By this, he says he means the psychic being and the corporeal beingjust considered in themselves. Thus, while Books 1–2 tend to pursue theskopos of the entire work through the theme of paradigms and images,Book 3 picks up the theme of wholes and parts that was introduced inthe initial statement of the skopos. While Proclus returns to this themetime and again, the framework within which he organizes Plato’s textfrom Book 3 onward consists in the idea that the Demiurge gives to hiscreation ten gifts. Recall that according to Plato’s text, the Demiurge doesnot merely make a cosmos: he makes a visible god (34ab; 62e; 92c). Book3 breaks Plato’s account of the creation of the cosmos into ten stagescorresponding to ten gifts that the Demiurge bestows on his creationwhich make it a god. These ten gifts organize Proclus’ exposition ofPlato’s text not only in Book 3, but right through Book 4, where thelast gift is bestowed (III. 98.12 ff.). They also hark back to the originalstatement and explication of the skopos in Book 1. As noted above, theTimaeus’ investigation of physiology really entails an investigation oftheology. Tracing the productive, paradigmatic and final causes of theuniverse takes us back to the Demiurge, the Form of Living Being itselfand the Good. The organizing theme of the ten gifts of the Demiurgemakes clear another way in which the Timaeus is a theological work. Theten gifts are properties that make the cosmos itself a god.54 So the studyof divine matters is implicated with physiology (properly understood),not merely because the real causes of the universe are transcendent divineones, but because the product taken as a whole is itself a divinity.

In general, then, Proclus’ commitment to the fundamentallyphysiological-cum-theological skopos of the Timaeus yields a commen-tary that moves at several levels. If the surviving fragments of Iamblichus’commentary on this portion of Plato’s text are representative, then wemay say that Iamblichus engaged with the dialogue primarily at a sym-bolic and allegorical level. To be sure, Proclus thinks that the Timaeuscommunicates many truths about the various ranks of hyper-cosmicgods, as well as those within the cosmos. It is, in this sense, a theologicalwork. But it is also a work of physiology or natural science and at manypoints Proclus is keen to show that (what he takes to be) Plato’s view isdefensible as a contribution to Greek natural science and mathematics.

54 Note that this additional factor in boosting the Timaeus into the realm of theology isnoted in Proclus’ introductory discussion of the skopos of the dialogue (I. 3.33–4.5).

19


This tendency explains the dense, encyclopaedic character of Proclus’commentary. It surely moves at the level of high-flown Neoplatonictheology in some parts. But it also seeks to vindicate Platonic doctrineby means of arguments constructed from materials that are not solelythe province of Neoplatonists. The mature Platonic philosopher shouldknow these things as well because those who practise dialectic can defendtheir views against all objections (Rep. 534bc).55 This is part of what isrequired in mastering dialectic. It is also characteristic of the dialecticianthat his view be synoptic: he must see the interconnections between thingsand be able to engage every subject at every level (Rep. 537c).56 Proclus’commentary perhaps takes the form that it does – an exhaustive pursuitof physical matters back up to their divine causes – because he wishes tomake sure that his Platonic pupils become genuine masters of dialectic.The character of Proclus’ commentary would thus correspond to theplace that it has in the Neoplatonic curriculum.

55 See Proclus’ account of the three forms of dialectic at in Parm. 989.13. As a master ofthe second form – that which involves recollection of true being – Socrates is able toengage in the other two forms which involve the refutation of false opinions.

56 For the superiority of the synoptic mode of apprehension, see in Parm. 1026.18 and inTim. I. 148.27.

20

Introduction to Book 1

the structure of book 1 of proclus ’commentary

Book one covers the first 204 pages of the first volume of the Greekedition by E. Diehl. In the course of these two hundred pages Proclusintroduces his treatment of the work as a whole in about thirteen pages.He then discusses just under fourteen pages of Burnet’s Greek text ofPlato, from 17a to 27b of the Stephanus edition that supplies the universalmethod of referring to Plato’s text in modern times. That means that itis entirely given over to matters that precede Timaeus’ treatment of thephysical world, the part that has been so influential over two millennia,and the only part of interest to many scholars. In the course of these pagesSocrates had provided a summary of some of the most prominent featuresof the state that had been proposed at length in the Republic, explainingthat he would like to be able to picture that state in operation. And thenCritias had explained the feast of words that others then present plannedto offer Socrates in return, including a preliminary treatment of a storysupposed to have been passed down to him by his grandfather, who hadheard it from Solon, who had in turn heard it from an Egyptian priest.That story had been about a conflict between prehistoric Athens, thecity of Athena, and Atlantis, once sacred to Poseidon.

There are many reasons for the length of Proclus’ treatment of thesepages, though the fact that he devoted a book to them seems fromthe closing statement to have been due to the fact that Porphyry andIamblichus had also done so. The commentary tradition tended to absorbearlier material, reusing it and building upon it, so that while some issuesreceded in importance they tended not to be forgotten. Furthermore,Porphyry had been keen to promote the idea that Plato’s prologues werealways philosophically important, opposing here the view of Severus inparticular. He returned to a version of a view that surfaces at one pointin the anonymous Theaetetus commentary (IV. 23–6) where prologuesare said to be useful for the guidance they can offer about appropri-ate ways to behave, both in pursuing one’s studies and in a variety ofother ways. However, Porphyry’s idea of the prologues’ moral relevanceseems to have been fuller, more closely related to his psychology, and soleading on more naturally to much of the later material in a work such

21


as the Timaeus. Iamblichus, however, insisted on treating any dialogueas having a unity of purpose, and all material within it as contributingtowards this, so that a dialogue with the natural world as a focus musthave preliminary materials that enabled one to reflect upon the natu-ral world, whether directly or indirectly. Proclus, following his masterSyrianus, broadly accepted Iamblichus’ position, but required that pre-liminary material be found to have a bearing not just on physics but alsoon the lower levels of theology. By this I mean those gods who by virtueof the creative, life-giving, or protective roles were somehow involved inprocesses affecting the natural world. Such lines of interpretation wouldinevitably take many pages to explain and defend.

This accounts for the length of the treatment, but what structuredid Proclus afford to it? This may be best considered by looking at theopening of Book 2 (I. 205.4–12):

The prelude of the Timaeus offers two principal themes, a summary of Socrates’constitution, and a brief narration of the battle of the Athenians against theAtlantines and the ensuing victory over them. Each of these accounts makes avery important contribution to the overall study of the cosmos. The structure ofthe constitution, though object of knowledge in its own right, fitted in primarilywith the organization of the heaven, while the narration of the war and thevictory offered us a symbol of cosmic rivalry.

So there are only two main parts of the book, divisible no doubt intomultiple further parts, but seen by Proclus as reflections of the universe,in the former case of its structural unity, and in the latter case of thepolar oppositions that pervade it. The role of each will be considered ingreater detail in due course. Here, however, we shall consider the spacethat Proclus allots to them.

The absolute preliminaries begin at 14.4, and, while gradually leadinginto matters pertinent to the constitution, might be said to conclude at28.14, while texts treating the individual aspects of this constitution arediscussed from 33.1 until 55.26. Next Socrates’ reasons for wanting toproceed further and the reactions of the others are discussed in detailfrom 55.27 to 74.25. The story of Athens and Atlantis is now introduced,and some aspect of it remains in central focus until 192.27, taking upwell over half the book, before discussion of some further concludinglemmata occupies the last twelve pages.

In the course of this introduction we shall first examine the history ofcommentary on the Timaeus and related matters, since the importanceof this commentary for the history of Platonic hermeneutics is unri-valled. Not only does it contain a great wealth of earlier interpretations,but it usually names the figures whom Proclus associates with them, insharp contrast with his practice in the Commentary on the Parmenides. The

22

Interpreting the Timaeus in antiquity

interpreters’ names that he offers range from Crantor, perhaps alreadywriting at the end of the fourth century bc, to Proclus’ own fifth-centuryad companion, Domninus (110.1). Many scholars first encounter Pro-clus as a source for fragmentary material on the history of Platonism orof Platonic interpretation, and it seems appropriate to offer this historyin the first volume of our translation. Following this study we shall turnour attention first to Proclus’ general remarks about the Timaeus, thecorrect approach to it, and its relation to its sister-dialogues the Republicand Critias (in Tim. I. 1.4–14.3; 198.21–204.29). Then we shall devote asection each to his treatment of the summary of the Republic and of themyth of Atlantis. There will once again be considerable historical mate-rial in our discussion of Atlantis, as the evidence of Proclus has oftenbeen quite wrongly interpreted here. I shall argue that Proclus actuallyknew of no Platonist authorities who maintained that the account ofAtlantis was historically true.

interpret ing the timaeus in antiqu itySome observations on Plato

It is well known that Plato did little to make the interpreter’s task easy.We have come to think of the history of philosophy as something akin toa history of well-reasoned belief concerning philosophic issues. Many inlate antiquity seemed to agree, insofar as the history of philosophy wasoften seen in terms of doxography – of lists of successively held doctrineson key issues. However, this was not a major activity of Neoplatonists,who seem to have thought it more profitable to record the history ofphilosophy in terms of lives. In the lives of major philosophers, such asthose of Pythagoras, Plato, Plotinus, and Proclus (written by Iamblichus,somebody close to Olympiodorus, Porphyry, and Marinus respectively),philosophy could be seen to be acting itself out, giving evidence of theconsequences of doctrine for life, particularly moral and religious life.The lives of Diogenes Laertius had done something similar, thoughincluding summaries of the doctrine of some major figures.

Hence, not everybody thought that the object of studying a philoso-pher was the unearthing of that philosopher’s views. More typically thegoal was to uncover the truth, utilizing past writings in whatever waywas conducive to intellectual progress. Some even acknowledged thatthe truth was dearer than Plato.1 They were able to point to the wordsof Plato’s own Phaedo (91c), where Socrates tells his followers not to

1 This is the attitude of the School of Ammonius and Olympiodorus: Olymp. in Gorg.41.9; Elias in Cat. 122–3; Tarrant (2000), 97–8.

23


bother about himself, but rather about the truth, and of Alcibiades I 114e,where Alcibiades is told not to trust something from another unless hecan hear himself agreeing. While Proclus believed that Plato, as a sourceof inspired writings, was in inspired contact with the truth, this was notquite the same as making Plato’s beliefs the goal. Nor did it mean thatthe discovery of Plato’s conscious intentions as a writer was the key tothe set of truths that his writings concealed.

The discovery of his own doctrines was never what Plato was encour-aging. Recent work on the embedded poetics of early texts has shownthat authors were encouraging a certain type of reading long beforePlato, and laying claim to the truth in a variety of ways.2 Plato, by con-trast, was deliberately trying to undermine any suggestion that access tothe poet’s mind was access to the truth. This may be seen in the Pro-tagoras, where for Socrates ‘the poet’s intentions have no existence if heis an inspired poet’.3 Accordingly the task of the true interpreter is toestablish the deeper inspired meaning of a poem, just as Socrates’ ownattempt to fathom the meaning of the Delphic Oracle is not concernedwith the Pythian priestess’ views (Apology 21a–b). Further legitimizationof in-depth interpretation occurs at Apology 22b–c, which acknowledgesthe quality (and by implication the truth-value) of much poetry, whiledenying that the poets have knowledge themselves. The Ion also offerssupport for any interpreter who is more interested in the truth arisingfrom a chain of inspiration than from the understanding of the mind ofeither a poet or his interpreter.

Examination of Plato’s treatment of the poets immediately raises thepossibility that he envisages a similar response to his own writings. Doeshe play a poet-like role himself, or is he to be distinguished from themas an author who has reasoned knowledge? Should we look for inspiredmeaning, or for his own reasoned opinions? The latter view would bewidely preferred today, but the former has more support in the key texton composition, which also happened to be an important text of Neo-platonic theology. In stunning us with the idea that a sensible person’sprincipal work will not be entrusted to writing (Phaedrus 276c–d), Platomakes a claim that applies to himself as well as to the poets. Insofar as itis his work, and he has nous, writing can achieve little. But consider thepalinode from this very dialogue (256a–b), the most poetic passage inPlato that was enormously influential in generating in-depth interpre-tation among later Platonists. This very passage is not even representedas Socrates’ own (244a); it commences by explaining the crazed inspira-tion of oracles, rites, and the poetic Muse; its content throughout invites

2 See particularly Ledbetter (2003). 3 Ledbetter (2003), 113.

24


in-depth interpretation; and it ends with an injunction to philosophy.The reader is transported to the truth, not told it.

The sceptical reader will perhaps feel that we are using the evidenceonly of Plato’s most poetic text, but even if we turn to the most prosaic ofall, the Laws, we find the Athenian Stranger casting himself in the role of aserious dramatic poet (817b), and seeing the discussion that has precededas being somehow inspired (811c). It may seem that in prescribing thesetexts to be learned and praised, like Homer, by Magnesia’s teachers,and to be taught to their pupils, Plato’s mouthpiece (if the Atheniancan be legitimately so described) is asking that his views be adoptedby successive generations. Yet on close inspection, the Athenian is notreferring to views of his own, but to the discussion as a whole, and it isnot doctrines but a paradigm of political discourse that is to be learned.Indeed the writing of dialogues within which he takes no overt part wouldnot seem to be a natural activity for a writer who thought it importantto communicate his own views to the public rather than approved waysfor them to discover truths for themselves. If we approach Plato in thebelief that our goal must be the discovery of his own doctrines thenwe approach him with an attitude that is ultimately inimical to his ownpurposes.

If this is true elsewhere in the corpus it must surely be true of thesequence, possibly unfinished, that constitutes the Timaeus and Critias.We are given some reasons for taking ‘Timaeus’ seriously (20a), butnone for trusting ‘Critias’ or ‘Hermocrates’. The truth-value of almosteverything said is kept in doubt by remarks that make us think, and thinkinconclusively, about what is said. The character from whom the readerwho seeks Plato’s own views expects to find them, ‘Socrates’, remainslargely a background figure, and never actually gets the opportunityto say what he thinks of Timaeus’ cosmology. Surface meanings mayregularly be found unsatisfying because ‘Timaeus’ is often economicalin giving reasons for his statements, while enormous challenges awaitthe reader who demands deeper answers and pursues further reasonshimself.

Early responses

Plato’s rivals, the tragedians, attempted to say something importantabout the human condition by retelling in their own manner storiesthat illuminate it. Their theatrical compositions in no way affirm thehistoric truth of what is depicted, and are frequently based on a newlyinvented version of the myth. That did not cause them to be calledliars, even by a Plato who was happy to criticize them in Republic 2 forpromoting a different kind of falsehood. Tragedians were still teachers.

25


Plato’s immediate successors, Speusippus and Xenocrates, thought thatthe creation-story of the Timaeus was similarly unfettered by historicaltruth, in that it did not portray any actual creation.4 It was designedto illustrate the workings of the world, and the narrative itself was aconvenience. The figure of the creator-god was just a deus ex machinadesigned to advance the action. He was the intelligent designer withoutwhom it would have been far more difficult to convey the message thatthe world is organized in accordance with an intelligent design. Whilesimilar figures might be detected in the myth of the Statesman (272e) orin the mixing cause of the Philebus (27b1), neither has the same paternalcharacter and neither creates so much as organizes.

The voice of Aristotle alone suggested that Plato was seriously propos-ing an entity with a beginning in time, but no corresponding end.5Though at times not a friendly witness, Aristotle is nevertheless notto be dismissed, since he, if anybody, seriously engaged with many of theviews that we have come to associate with Plato. Yet Aristotle’s chargeof inconsistency6 would have some point even if Plato had not intendedthe creation-process literally, and Dillon notes in this context that heaccused Plato of failing to employ a motive cause,7 which would in a wayimply a recognition that the creator-god is not to be taken at face value.

When discussing issues such as this, and in particular the creation ofthe soul at 35a–b, the early pupils of Plato seem not to have been pre-occupied with what Plato believed, but rather with why he wrote what hedid. Even Aristotle is not so much criticizing what Plato believed, butwhat he saw Plato promoting, whether by written or oral means. Plato’simmediate successors, Speusippus and Xenocrates, may have discussedPythagorean or other ancient belief when dealing with Plato’s writings,8but that does not lead to a preoccupation with Plato’s beliefs – beliefs thatthey may have had no commitment to themselves. In general it seemsthat their challenge was to present their founder Plato in the best possiblelight, and hence to find meaning that others could respond to in the text.They had to make Plato defensible in the light of challenges from hostile

4 Tarrant (2000), 44–5; Speusippus fr. 95 I-P = fr. 61b T; Xenocrates frs. 153–8 I-P;evidence suggests that not only Crantor (below) but also Heraclides Ponticus and Polemo(Dillon (2003), 172–3) understood the Timaeus similarly.

5 Tim. 32c, 41b etc.; De Caelo 1.12, 2.2.6 The inconsistency of postulating an entity that has been brought into being, yet is not

subject to destruction.7 Met. 1.6, 988a7–14; Dillon (2003), 25 n.49.8 See for instance Speusippus in Proc. in Parm. 7.38–40; Xenocrates’ definition of soul (in

the Timaeus?) as ‘self-moving number’ is also foisted on Pythagoras (Stob. Ecl. 1.49.1),and Xenocrates seems generally to have tried to place his version of Platonism in thePythagorean tradition, on which see Dillon (2003), 153–4.

26


schools. Certainly the refusal to accept the words of a principal Platonicspeaker such as ‘Timaeus’ at face value led directly to an acknowledge-ment that Plato’s text required interpretation.

Interpretation first comes formally from Crantor, a senior figure of theAcademy under Polemo, and a strong early influence on Arcesilaus who isheld responsible for moving the Academy in a sceptical direction. Polemohimself, while something of a mystery who has left us few fragments withany philosophical meat in them, has recently been the focus of interest, asSedley and Dillon have accepted that the picture of Old Academic beliefsfound in Cicero Academica 1.24–32 reflects the official line of Polemo’sAcademy,9 rather than being the result of Antiochus’ stoicizing distortionof the evidence. The physics reduces the forces of the Platonic universeto a fundamental dualism: an active intelligent power and a passive, quasi-material one. The former is also known as the cosmic soul, providence,and necessity. If this was supposed to underlie Plato’s own Timaeus, andit surely needed to be reconciled with it somehow if it was an officialAcademic position,10 then it is clear that the basic active power of theuniverse was thought of as being none other than the world-soul itself,identical (perhaps in different circumstances) with both intelligence andthe contrasting force of necessity (47e).

Whatever we make of the evidence for Polemo, Crantor worked withhim, and is seen as the first commentator by Proclus in the present com-mentary (I. 76.1–2). It seems that a number of early exegetes did tendto follow his position, to judge from the way that both Plutarch (Mor.1012d) and Proclus (I. 277.8–10) refer to ‘those with Crantor’. Crantor(ibid.) explained the ‘generation’ of the universe in terms of its depen-dence on a cause other than itself. Plutarch (Mor. 1012f–1013a) confirmsthat he followed the standard Old Academic view that the Timaeus shouldnot be read as postulating a creation in time, and offers his account of themixing of the world-soul, which assumes (on the principle of cognitionof like by like) that the soul must be mixed of the principal ingredientsof the universe in order that it should be able to grasp all that consti-tutes the universe. As it needs to apprehend both intelligible and sensibleelements in the universe, along with their similarities and differences, itrequires these four ingredients within it. So the two primary ingredientsin soul would seem to reflect a fundamental dualism in the universe.

A non-literal interpretation of the creation-process was accompaniedby some observations on the status of the Atlantis story, some of whichseem to support the view that it was historically true, while the rest

9 Sedley (2002), cf. (1999a); Dillon (2003), 168–76.10 That would apply even if it were Antiochus’ own work, for his own claim to Plato, and

to the best known of Plato’s works, was more open to challenge.

27


support a different view. Proclus puts Crantor at the head of the traditionthat treats the story as historia psile. If this meant ‘unadulterated history’then Crantor would be a literalist on this issue, but the ‘psile’ is beingused primarily to suggest the absence of any deep allegorical meaningsuch as Amelius, Origenes, Numenius, and Porphyry demand.11

Our information also assures us that Crantor did not dismiss the wholeprologue as irrelevant to the main subject of the work. Sedley has recentlyargued that complaints about the non-integration of the prologues ofHeraclides Ponticus and Theophrastus, found in Proclus In Parmenidem659.20–3, go back to Crantor himself.12 Of three basic attitudes to theinterpretation of prologues discussed in that context – that they are irrel-evant, that they relate to morally correct behaviour, and that they havea deep symbolic link with the principal theme – it seems clear that thefirst and last are not those of Crantor. It therefore seems logical to sup-pose that he was linking the prologue with Platonic ethics, includingthe ethics concerning the plagiarism charges. That view is also closelyassociated with Porphyry, and is still reflected in some of the content ofthe Proclus commentary.

The path to ‘Middle Platonism’

There is then a considerable gap in our knowledge of Platonic commen-tary for quite some time. It may be that partial exegetical discussions ofthe Timaeus were preferred to any attempt to replace the work of Cran-tor. In his discussion of 24c5–7, Proclus has cause to mention ‘Panaetiusand certain others of the Platonics’ (162.12–13), implying (presumably)that the Plato-loving Stoic from Rhodes had been involved in the inter-pretation of Plato, but the absence of any other reference to him in thiscommentary suggests that Panaetius had not contributed more generallyto the exegesis of the dialogue. Posidonius, the Stoic who practised inRhodes, is mentioned by Proclus at 3.125.14 in relation to the world-soul’s movements at 40a7–b4. This reference, involving Rhodes, could bedisregarded as evidence of any Timaeus-specific activities, but for someexegetical fragments in Plutarch, Sextus, and Theon of Smyrna.13 Allthese have a bearing on Plato’s discussion of the world-soul, involvingits basic construction (35a–b), the seven numbers (35b–c), and like by

11 The term historia psile would most naturally be derived from Porphyry, the champion ofthe allegorical interpretation of Atlantis. Hence we should perhaps be considering whatthis term might have signified for him rather than for Proclus, and the likely answer isthat it was meant to cover any non-allegorical interpretation that took into account thestory’s claim to be true (20d7). I deal with this matter in my introduction to Atlantis.

12 Sedley (1999a), 141. 13 F141a, F85, and F291 EK.

28


like cognition (37a–c) respectively. This last involved the close associ-ation of the world-soul with Pythagorean theory if one judges from itscontext in Sextus (Math. 7.93). Whereas a straightforward commentaryon the Timaeus would have strongly suggested that the work was beingstudied within the unlikely context of a Stoic school, a treatise on theworld-soul, emphasizing its Pythagorean background,14 might suggestnothing more than an antiquarian inquisitiveness about the history ofphilosophy.

Whatever Posidonius had contributed to discussion of the Timaeus,it had been widely respected, and made him one of the philosopherswhom Plutarch found it natural to refer to when writing his own workon the Platonic soul. Others were Xenocrates, Crantor, and Eudorus ofAlexandria.15 Eudorus remains a shadowy figure, with much of what wethink we know about him little better than speculation. Given a late first-century bc date, this is not particularly surprising. He has left no markin Proclus, and this perhaps reflects Porphyry’s failure to take note of hisviews on the Timaeus beforehand. Even in Plutarch we find him drawnto the views of both Crantor and Xenocrates on the composition of theworld-soul, but no view of his own is attributed to him on that issue. Ingeneral the period from around 50 bc to ad 50 is an age when importantdevelopments seem to have taken place: Cicero composes a translation ofthe Timaeus; a de-platonized version of the cosmology, intended to reflectearly Pythagorism, arises under the name of Timaeus Locrus; Philo ofAlexandria makes extensive use of the Timaeus in his own essay on thecreation of the world in Genesis, and elsewhere;16 Potamo of Alexandriarevives the Plato-commentary under the banner of Eclecticism;17 andThrasyllus organizes the Platonic corpus. While none of these events canbe linked straightforwardly to provide a broader picture, I think it shouldbe noted that Philo uses the Timaeus in the context of what are, in effect,scriptural commentaries, in much the same way as Proclus will later usethe religious texts of different traditions to elucidate those of Platonism.And just as Philo utilizes allegorical interpretation of his target texts, soPlatonists will soon be using it in the service of understanding Plato.

In Plutarch of Chaeronea, the essayist and biographer who needs tobe distinguished from Proclus’ early teacher Plutarch of Athens, thereis no evidence, I submit, that the Platonic commentary is taking over.Lively oral discussion takes place throughout his life, and is reflected

14 A link that was probably already played up by Xenocrates; see Dillon (2003), 152–3.15 I leave aside those who were perhaps more mathematically inclined, such as Theodorus

of Soli.16 On Philo see particularly the extensive treatment of Runia (1986).17 On Potamo, who wrote a Commentary on the Republic, see Tarrant (2000), 177–80.

29


in his dialogues. But this discussion seems usually to have been ratherloosely focused, quite the opposite of a commentary on a key text. Weget the feeling, both from Plutarch and from his mathematically-mindedcontemporary Theon of Smyrna, that more effort had been expended inrecent times on Plato’s mathematical passages than on straight philoso-phy. Plutarch himself was happy to tackle individual exegetical problems,but had no appetite for tackling whole dialogues.

A little reflection can help explain why this is so. Plutarch, while happyto engage in allegorical interpretation of Egyptian religion in the De Iside,tends to be a literalist in relation to Platonic texts. Thus at those pointswhere a dialogue can be taken relatively straightforwardly, and still yielda meaning that agrees with the rest of the corpus, he probably sees noneed for the exegete to intervene at all. Though he finds key passages in anumber of dialogues that do require deeper interpretation, he still prefersto anchor his interpretations in the literal meaning of other passages.It is not simply that he stood out against the Old Academic trend, andaccepted that Plato meant the creation process in the Timaeus to be takenseriously. It is rather that he admires Plato more when he is prepared tospeak his mind, as he thinks is the case in the passage on the two soulsin Laws 10.18 Non-literal interpretation, at least where a literal one is anoption, is for him a struggle for a way out, as we see from his response toXenocrates and Crantor (especially Mor. 1013e). Consequently he willbecome in Proclus one of the most often used of the Middle Platonistsfor illustrating the pitfalls of literalism, outshone only by the pedanticAtticus.

The forerunners of Plotinus and Porphyry

The age of Plutarch probably coincides with the rise of the Platonic com-mentary among professional teachers of Platonism. He may have beenfairly close in date to the anonymous Theaetetus commentator,19 whobesides his partly extant work on the Theaetetus seems to have writtencommentaries on the Timaeus (XXXV.12), the Symposium (LXX.12), andthe Phaedo (XLVIII.10).20 By his time it is clear that commentary wasa natural activity for the Platonist teacher of philosophy, and the genrewas already developing many of its enduring features. These include

18 Mor. 370f; Laws 896e.19 Uncertainties persist, and I am not entirely persuaded to date this figure as early as I

suggested in Tarrant (1983), even though my case received some support in the CFPedition of Bastianini and Sedley (1995).

20 This is either a reference to a planned work, or to a work that will follow later in theworks designed to be read by his readers.

30


both the topics that are to be included in the introductory pages (some-what curtailed in the papyrus), and the division of the text into lemmata,which attract about one or two columns of commentary. The lemmatathemselves cover most of the text, though there are some omissions. Alsoworth mentioning is the commentator’s shyness of naming rival inter-preters, something that applies to the anonymous commentator on theParmenides, to other Proclus commentaries and to Olympiodorus, butnot really to On the Timaeus.

Also of importance are some basic attitudes to the text itself. It isassumed that Plato has something consistently worthwhile to offer, sothat there will always be something to be said that can enhance his repu-tation. Consequently Plato cannot be seen as one whose views developedin such a way that anything would be completely superseded. Certainlyhe cannot come to see the error of his early ways, and a unitarian assump-tion will always control the discussion. Equally vital to the commentatoris that the text should require exegesis, being in need of its defender andexpounder. It is observed that in his investigations Plato does not simplystate his views on the topic being investigated, but allows them to emergein such a way that they become clear enough to the experienced reader(LIX.12–34). The author here distinguishes sharply between a Socrates(not Plato’s) who would completely undermine the truth, and one whowould conceal or omit it. Such concealment or omission, though com-patible with Theaetetus 151d, would be the kind of complication thatrequires the skilled interpreter. Another feature is the development ofkey snippets of Platonic text that are thought vital for the interpretationof the work in hand: in this case mostly passages from the Meno andPhaedo as far as one can tell from the surviving pages. Similar develop-ments clearly take place in relation to the Timaeus, though the key textsfor comparison will be different.

The number of commentators in this period seems to have grown.Besides the papyrus fragments unrelated to the Theaetetus commenta-tor,21 for which only the date of the copy can generally be guessed, thereare several persons referred to by Proclus and others. The Athens-basedPlatonists L. Calvenus Taurus (fl. c. ad 140) and Atticus (fl. c. ad 175)composed commentaries on the Timaeus,22 as did Severus and eitherNumenius of Apamea or his close follower Cronius. Some of their workis reflected faithfully in the partially extant Commentary on the Timaeusof Calcidius, though it may it have been composed as late as the fourth

21 Fragments exist of what seem to be commentaries on the Alcibiades I, Phaedo, and States-man (nos. 5, 7, and 8 in Corpus dei papiri filosofici III).

22 We also have a passing reference, from Proclus (in Tim. III. 247, 15), to a commentaryby Atticus on the Phaedrus.

31


century. It seems more or less untouched by Neoplatonic influences, andemploys other sources from the Middle Platonic period including thePeripatetic Adrastus. Evidence of commentaries on other dialogues ismuch thinner, though we know various views on some of them.23

On the whole, one would suppose that most of those who wrote com-mentaries on other dialogues also tackled the more popular Timaeus,though one cannot be sure. Such commentaries may have omitted theprologue (like Severus, in Tim. I. 204.17–18), or the later pages that arefull of the details of what we might see as early anatomy. The failure ofothers to deal properly with this caused the great physician (and part-time Platonist) Galen to write his own commentary on this part, andsome of the third book has survived in reasonable shape.24 What oneimagines would have concerned all philosophical commentators on thework is the account of the first principles of Timaeus’ cosmology, includ-ing the nature of the demiurge and his model, and the soul, both cosmicand human.

In spite of a growing amount of evidence during this period for bothcommentaries and the interpretation of the Timaeus, we should alwaysremember that this evidence does not cohere in such a way as to offerthe unified picture that we should like. In particular one should perhapsbear the following difficulties in mind. First, while we have the names ofseveral of those whose commentaries were employed by Plotinus (Porph.VPlot. 14), the relevant authors (Severus, Cronius, Numenius, Atticus,and Gaius)25 have not left us any substantial example of their commen-tary. Consequently it is difficult to say what type of commentary had beenavailable to Plotinus. Second, we have no substantial piece of commen-tary on the Timaeus from anybody before Porphyry whose main incomewas derived from Platonic teaching. So whereas we can say what at leastone commentary on the Theaetetus looked like, we cannot simply assumethat the same author’s Timaeus commentary was similar in either scopeor format. We could make substantial mistakes by assuming that Proclus’Timaeus commentary was going to be similar in scope to his Alcibiades

23 A certain Democritus may have written commentaries on the Alcibiades and Phaedo (ondetails of which he is found offering views), while Eubulus (also mentioned at Porph.VPlot. 20) was said by Longinus to have written on the Philebus and Gorgias. Harpocration(Suda, s.v.) is supposed to have written a 24-book Commentary on Plato, on which seeDillon (1971).

24 See Schroder (1934). There are other fragments also.25 There is at least a possibility here that Gaius’ commentary was being read through

Albinus’ record; likewise, though Numenius may have written a commentary on theRepublic or on the Timaeus rather than mere exegetic works, he may have been beingread through the work of Cronius. It is otherwise hard to understand why Croniusshould have been mentioned first.

32


commentary or in format to his Republic commentary, or in assumingthat Olympiodorus’ Phaedo commentary would be similar to his Gorgiascommentary. Third, though we have examples of commentary fromGalen and Calcidius, they cannot suffice to give us a clear idea of what aprofessional Platonist of the time would have written. Fourth, while wehave some reason to suspect that the genre involved much updating ofthe works of predecessors,26 and this is even detectable in Proclus, wecannot assume too much similarity between commentaries on any singledialogue between, say, ad 50 and ad 250.

The two main matters that concern us concerning the commentariesand other exegetical works of the period are which commentators Proclushimself uses, and how he knows them. The short answer is that, of MiddlePlatonists, he refers mainly to Albinus, Atticus, Numenius, Plutarch,and Severus. Comparison with Porphyry’s list of those read at Plotinus’gatherings (VPlot. 14) shows that Plutarch is the only addition, and thisis not surprising if he did not write ordinary commentaries. Besides,Proclus’ understanding of Plutarch is perhaps not profound,27 and in thepresent commentary Plutarch’s name mainly occurs in relation to that ofAtticus,28 who may well have been using Plutarch himself. The thesis thatPlutarch is important because Atticus had thought he was important isat least arguable. The only omission is Cronius, whose importance theremay have been more as a reporter of Numenius’ views, and who doesfind a place in the Commentary on the Republic.

The significant references to Middle Platonists in Book I of the Com-mentary on the Timaeus are as follows:

Platonist Others in the context

20.21 Atticus Others of that age77.6/23 Numenius Amelius, Origenes, Porphyry83.26 Numenius Origenes, Longinus97.30 Atticus Theopompus204.17 Severus Longinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus

26 See Longinus on the work of Euclides, Democritus, and Proclinus at Porph. VPlot.20; in later times compare the commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories from Ammonius’school (under the names of Ammonius himself, Olympiodorus, Philoponus, Elias, andSimplicius), and also Arethas’ scholia on the Categories (Share 1994).

27 See on this matter Opsomer (2001a). The evidence suggests to me an incautious assump-tion on Proclus’ part that Plutarch tends to agree with Atticus, rather than any lack offamiliarity with Plutarch’s writings.

28 I. 326.1, 381.26–7, 384.4, II. 153.29, III. 212.8.

33


While I have no confidence that Proclus’ knowledge of these authorsis uniform, the vast majority of references can be explained in termsof their importance in the age of Porphyry. Certainly it should not beassumed that Proclus has their works open in front of him, and it is plau-sible that they had become routinely associated with certain positions byNeoplatonist commentators from Porphyry on. It is worth noting herethat at 77.6–8 Porphyry will be found to be consciously making partuse of the view of Numenius, while at 204.16–20 it is highly likely thatLonginus had already remarked on Severus’ refusal to tackle any of theprologue.

Whatever we may suppose to be Proclus’ means of knowing the Mid-dle Platonists, his level of respect for them was not great.29 To anybodytrained in the more elaborate speculations of post-Iamblichan interpre-tation, with its extensive literary and religious background, the MiddlePlatonists would generally have seemed remarkably unsophisticated (asthey have sometimes seemed today),30 and Proclus’ attraction to sym-bolic meanings entails that the more literal interpretations of straight-forward Middle Platonists would have seemed to him to imply a lack ofdepth. Atticus in particular is viewed with little respect, since, like Philoand Plutarch before him, he seems to have reverted with something of afundamentalist fervour to a literal reading of creation and creator.

However, Middle Platonism was by no means united either in itsbeliefs or in its approaches to Platonic exegesis. What we refer to by asingle convenient label actually embraced many shades of opinion. Iron-ically, it seems that the second-century interpreter in whom the Neopla-tonists found most to interest them was the Neopythagorean Numenius,in part because Numenius analysed texts in such a way as to find a plu-rality of metaphysical entities where some might not have suspected anycomplications, and in part because of the imaginative nature of his inter-pretation of myths and stories. The Atlantis-interpretation found in thepresent volume is a case in point. Though Proclus himself failed to seethe attraction of Numenius, it is clear that Porphyry had done so.

The diversity of Middle Platonism should warn us against trying tosee any homogeneous approach to commentary during this period. Inparticular I feel that I have been too hasty in the past in assuming thatthere ought to be a close correlation between the different productsof the time. Besides commentaries, known to us mainly via small frag-ments and occasionally as something bigger but still incomplete, the

29 Whittaker (1987) refers in relation to the reference to Albinus and Gaius at in Tim. I.340.23ff. to ‘Proclus’ lack of interest in the Middle Platonists’.

30 Part of the function of Tarrant (1983) was to try and see Anon. Tht. in a way that betterappreciated its merits, against Dillon (1977), 270.

34


period produced doxographical handbooks (such as Alcinous’ Handbookand Apuleius’ On Plato’s Doctrines), introductory works designed to assistreaders of Plato (such as Albinus’ Introduction and Theon’s MathematicsUseful for Reading Plato), and a great variety of treatises. Plutarch andothers (including Numenius) also produced dialogues of a kind.

It would be rash to suppose that the writers of handbooks, who neces-sarily sought to present a philosophical system in a concise form, adoptedthe same approach to the Platonic corpus as those who wrote commen-taries, while treatises show a great variety in the ways of demonstratingallegiance to Plato. An author such as Apuleius, who has left us differentkinds of works, seems to approach him more as the skilled unfolder oftruths in the treatise On the God of Socrates and more as an expounderof doctrines in the handbook On Plato’s Doctrines. The balance betweenthe attention paid to literary and dramatic elements in the dialogues canshift as an author switches to a different genre. While I can offer no clearexample of an author who wants now to communicate his own Platonistsystem (fathering it all on Plato), and now to help Plato to speak forhimself, it would not be surprising if this were the case. In any case com-mentaries were most naturally a vehicle for the latter, helping the readerto get maximum benefit from the reading of Plato by explaining all thatneeded to be understood in order to appreciate him. The anonymousTheaetetus commentator seems to be doing something like this, as doesOlympiodorus in a later age. The commentary of Calcidius, however, ismore didactic in style, and we get the impression that Atticus for instancemust have been similarly didactic. The gaps in our record offer us littlehope of understanding the scope of Middle Platonic commentary, andfortunately this is probably not necessary in the case of Proclus, who iswidely assumed to be responding only to such material as had alreadybeen reported by Porphyry.

The world of Plotinus and Porphyry

From the point of view of the present commentary the next stage comeswith certain individuals who appear in Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus. Sincethese had at least been identified by a respected Neoplatonist as mak-ing a contribution to debate, their treatment seems more even-handed.Among them were the early teacher of Porphyry, Longinus, repeat-edly seen as suspect because of his excessively philological approach(VPlot. 14), the pagan Origenes (not to be confused with the Christianwriter from the same era), and Amelius Gentilianus. Though almost a fullmember of the Neoplatonic fraternity, and numbered by Proclus amongthe Bacchic fraternity of Neoplatonism (Plat. Theol. 1.5–6), Ameliusis peripheral to book 1 of this commentary. Longinus is mentioned

35


frequently in book 2, but thereafter only once in book 2 (I.322.24 =fr. 19). Origenes is mentioned several times in book 1 only.

Longinus is from the beginning painted as an individual with a facil-ity for commenting on the language of the dialogue’s prologue. This isall the more surprising when one considers the evidence of 204.18–24(= fr. 37). Longinus apparently thought that a little of the prologue wasworth attention, but this did not extend to the Atlantis story, which hethought superfluous. Therefore his practice was to move from Socrates’long speech ending at 20c directly to 27a, where Critias asks Socrateswhether the planned programme of intellectual entertainment will suf-fice. That presumably reflects his preferred practice in class, though fivefragments refer to his views between 20e and 24c (= frs. 32–6). Clearlysomebody, and presumably his one-time pupil Porphyry, had at sometime induced him to offer views on matters outside his standard cur-riculum. These views had passed into the commentary tradition becausethey filled something of a gap, since up to this point few commentatorsseem to have included this material. The second hundred Teubner pagesmake no reference to Middle Platonist exegesis. A mention of Plutarchat I. 112. is in fact a reference to the treatise De Facie in Orbe Lunaerather than to anything to do with commentary. Platonist sources arelargely confined to Porphyry and Iamblichus, though Panaetius (withother ‘Platonists’), Longinus, and Origines are all brought into a discus-sion of material on the climate of ancient Athens (24c: 162.11–33), andit seems that Panaetius and others were mentioned there because Long-inus had found their view incredible, while Longinus and Origenes owetheir place to the fact that they in turn had been replied to by Porphyry.

Longinus (c. ad 213–72/3) owes his place in the commentary to hisblindness to what Porphyry and Proclus would see as the philosophicissues. He finds stylistic devices instead of doctrine. Perhaps his influencediminishes later in the commentary because, when forced to commentupon doctrine and finding nothing of his own to contribute, he lackedanything distinctive enough to ensure the preservation of his name. Thesingle mention of him outside book 1 is about his view that the Ideas areoutside the demiurge and after him in contrast to Porphyry’s early viewthat they had been outside and before him. Porphyry and Longinus arehere merely representatives of a debate that had presumably flourishedin Middle Platonist times, and they have been chosen as such becauseof the well-known references to the debate on the issues in Porphyry’sLife of Plotinus (17–20). In a sense, Longinus in Proclus stands for cer-tain types of error, much as Plato does among certain modern analyticphilosophers.

His contemporary Origenes was from the opposite spectrum of phi-losophy. He had studied, perhaps, in the esoteric classes of Ammonius

36


Saccas alongside Plotinus, eventually being less meticulous than Plotinusin keeping these teachings secret (Porph. VPlot. 3), though not commit-ting them to writing. Longinus is happy to acknowledge that he hadattended Origenes’ lectures at Athens, and he includes him among thosephilosophers who wrote very little, mentioning specifically a treatise ondaemones (ibid. 20), which agrees well with the material that we havein Proclus. Porphyry himself is able to add a work That the King is theOnly Demiurge, which in all probability argued that the demiurgic powerin the Timaeus does not, as Numenius had clearly thought (in Tim. I.303.27–9 = fr. 21), conceal more than one Platonic divinity, and that thisdivinity is to be identified with the ‘King’ of the Second Epistle (312e–313a), something that appears to be equally opposed to the thrust ofNumenius.31 Such views, and a little else that we know of Origenes,would fit a period when the most talked-of exegetical influence wasNumenius; and they also suggest that he was somewhat less radical thaneither Numenius or Plotinus. While there is nothing to say that he didnot lecture on Platonic texts such as the Timaeus, it would appear thathe wrote no commentary, and so we should assume that any material ofwritten origin in Proclus is responding to exegetical elements in the twoknown treatises. This exegesis involved the hypotheses of the Parmenides,where he denied the presence in hypothesis 1 of a transcendent principleabove Being.32 This would make him fit the ‘Middle Platonist’ mouldbetter than the Neoplatonist one.

This is not the case with Gentilianus Amelius.33 From the Life of Plot-inus we learn that he took up the Plotinian cause against a charge (ofAthenian origin) that he was dependent on Numenius (17),34 againstcertain Gnostics and their texts (16), and against Porphyry’s early views

31 The real demiurgic power in Numenius is the second god, while he refers to his first godas ‘King’, distinguishing this figure from the demiurge at fr. 12.12–14. Here too the mostplausible origin of the term ‘King’ is Ep. 2, 312e1 and 313a1. It may be that Numeniussupported his attribution to Socrates of a triad of gods (fr. 24.51–3) with reference tothe same passage of the Second Epistle considered in relation to the remark that ‘whatis now being spoken of belongs to a young and handsome Socrates’ (see Dillon (1977),367). However that may be, it is clear that the thesis that the King is the only demiurgewould run directly counter to Numenian theology.

32 See Proc. in Parm. 635–8; Morrow and Dillon (1987), xxvii.33 On him see in particular Brisson (1987); Corrigan (1987).34 I prefer not to use the loaded term ‘plagiarism’, which was not considered seriously

reprehensible in itself. What the detractors were trying to say was that Plotinus wasmore dependent than his reputation suggested on the Neopythagorean. What Longinuswill later (20) be acknowledging is that Plotinus was more detailed in his treatment offirst principles than Neopythagorean predecessors, but with the sting that they werereally Pythagorean principles rather than Platonic ones. See on this Menn (2001),especially 115–18.

37


(17). Longinus regarded him as being far too keen to write (20), an opin-ion that was clearly shared by Porphyry (21). Associated with Amelius isan interpretation of the final part of the Parmenides, which divided it intoeight parts (as opposed to the more usual Neoplatonist nine).35 I haverashly, but unrepentantly, associated this view with Moderatus beforehim.36

The link between Amelius and the Neopythagorean tradition is clear.Indeed the tendency to associate Plotinus with Numenius and otherNeopythagoreans may well have something to do with the proclivities ofAmelius, since he wrote much more freely, and people may have assumedthat he was Plotinus’ mouthpiece. Unsurprisingly the best-attested linkwith the Neopythagoreans is with Numenius.37 We are told by Porphyry(VPlot. 3.43–8) of his enormous energy in collecting together ‘all thatbelonged to Numenius’ (whether writings or doctrines), and committingmost of it to memory. He was clearly influenced by Numenius’ exegeticaltactics. Hence he too can find a plurality of powers behind the much-discussed text at Timaeus 39e7–9 (in Tim. III. 103.18–32). In his case itis a triad of divine intellects that is discovered there. He is found againin the company of Numenius on the question of whether intelligiblescan participate in the Ideas as well as sensibles (III. 33.33–34.3), and inthis case Syrianus adds the additional information that Numenius’ friendCronius held this view.38 One may also mention that they have closelyrelated allegorical views on the interpretation of Atlantis at I. 76.17–77.6. On theology Amelius goes one better than Numenius in that heanalyses the Platonic demiurge into three rather than two (i. 303.27–29;306.1–3). Most tellingly of all, Iamblichus linked the two. He saw fit tocriticize Amelius and Numenius together in a single work for a certaintype of speculation about the numbers in the world-soul.39 He attackstheir interpretations of 39e jointly at III. 104.8–16.40 In his work On Soulhe links the two philosophers (along with Plotinus and Porphyry) in theview that, even in separable soul, the whole intelligible cosmos and the

35 Proc. in Parm. 1052–3. The question of whether this interpretation has to come froma commentary (rather than Porphyrian reports) is discussed by Brisson (1987); note,however, that Amelius’ love of writing makes it probable that he would have committedhis views to some form of detailed exposition.

36 (1993), 150–61.37 See now Bechtle (1999), 257; cf. Brisson (1987), particularly 801–3.38 in Met. 109.12–14 = Numenius fr. 46b.39 Tim. 36d; Iambl. at in Tim. 2.277.26–31; strangely, this telling passage is not found in

des Places’ edition of Numenius. It is fr. 57 in Dillon’s collection of the fragments ofIamblichus’ commentaries. On the relationship between the two see Dillon’s commen-tary, 337–8.

40 = Iambl. in Tim. fr. 72; see Dillon (1973), 359–60.

38


whole divine hierarchy is to be found, with Amelius holding this viewtentatively.41

I think that it is plain from this that Numenius was the single mostimportant interpreter of the second century ad, somebody to whom Ori-genes responded conservatively, while Amelius tried to outdo him. Hisinfluence in the second century itself is more difficult to assess, for whileHarpocration and Cronius are clearly deeply influenced by him, otherswho were probably late enough to show his influence do not obviously doso. While Proclus must have appreciated Numenius’ importance, thereis little sign that he knew him first hand or that he understood the rea-sons for his influence. One reason for this may be the reverent silencethat generally surrounded the teaching of Ammonius Saccas, thoughNemesius at one point expressedly links Numenius with ‘Ammonius theteacher of Plotinus’.42 It may be that Origenes engages with Nume-nius because of his importance in Ammonius’ background. Suspicionsof Plotinus’ dependence on Numenius may arise from an awareness ofthe deep influence of some Numenian background assumptions. Suchassumptions do not have to be such as to make Plotinus in any sense aNumenian philosopher. They might rather involve ways in which Pla-tonic texts might be interpreted. They share deep interpretation, thebelief that Plato can speak in riddles, the notion that x in Plato can standfor y.43 And I strongly suspect that they share the confidence that cer-tain texts are crucial for the reconstruction of a Platonic or, perhaps, aPythagorean system. Besides the Timaeus, the Index Auctorum a NumenioLaudatorum of des Places refers to Laws 10 on cosmic souls, the principalmyth of the Phaedrus, the Philebus on peras and apeiron, and the Idea of theGood from Republic 6. In my view the myth of the Statesman, the esotericpassage in the Second Epistle and the second part of the Parmenides arealready among texts that need to cohere with these others.44 Luc Brissonhas recently argued in detail for Numenius’ dependence on Epistle 2,and the Epistle’s connection with the metaphysical interpretation ofthe Parmenides.45 It is noteworthy that Iamblichus seeks to counter the

41 Iambl. in Stob. Ecl. 1.49.40 = Numenius fr. 48.42 De Nat. Hom. 2.8 = Numenius fr. 4b.43 The soul’s prison of the Phaedo (62b) stands for pleasure (fr. 38), Hermes stands for

the expression of reason (fr. 57), and Hephaestus for generative fire, i.e. the life-givingwarmth of the sun (fr. 58).

44 Statesman at fr. 12.20 (which recalls 272e5; cf. also aperioptos at 11.18); Epistle 2 at fr.12.12–14, on which see above n.87; Parmenides at fr. 11.11–15.

45 See Brisson (1999). The article is important for showing their relevance to the GnosticApocalypse of Zostrianos, a pre-Plotinian text important for its links with Marius Victori-nus, and hence with the kind of philosophy that we had been previously unable to traceback beyond Porphyry. The Apocalypse of Zostrianos is itself traced to the environmentof Numenius, following M. Tardieu (1996).

39


tendency of Numenius and Amelius to see multiple divinities behind themask of the demiurge by appealing to the way Plato establishes differentranks in the Sophist, Philebus, and Parmenides, and does not roll them allinto one obscure reference:

Plato has not made distinctions between divinities of the kind that they suggestin the Sophist, Philebus, and Parmenides, but he offered distinct accounts of eachrank there, and distinguished the hypotheses from one another, keeping separatethe one about the One and the one about the Whole, and outlining each in turnin the same manner with its appropriate determinants. (III. 104.10–16)

Iamblichus implies, I think, that they too were used to appealing to theseworks as the basis of their distinctions, and there is no doubt that theParmenides was foremost in his mind. He may of course have Ameliusprimarily in mind, but he thinks the argument can work against Nume-nius as well. While steps towards a collection of key texts were alreadyvisible in Plutarch and Taurus,46 it did not yet seem to include any partof the Parmenides or any of the Epistles.

Numenius, then, is likely to have played a major part in the develop-ment of an in-depth interpretation that sees Plato’s philosophy, which isfor him a fundamentally Pythagorean philosophy, as embedded in sucha way in the dialogues that it requires a riddle-solver to extract it. Itinterprets Plato’s words as standing symbolically for something otherthan their normal referent, so that the soul’s prison of the Phaedo (62b),for instance, stands for pleasure (fr. 38) or the war between Athens andAtlantis stands for the struggle between good and evil soul-forces (fr. 37:in Tim. I.76).

The first phase of Neoplatonism: Plotinus and Porphyry

It may be objected here that I am speaking as if it were not agreedthat Plotinus is the founder of Neoplatonism. That is not quite cor-rect. Numenius’ doctrine, his avowed Pythagorism, and in particular hisdualism, prevents him from being regarded as anything like a founder-figure of Neoplatonism. What we have been talking of is Numenius’exegetical legacy. It is no easy matter to speak of Plotinus’ approach toexegesis, because what he wrote was a series of meditative treatises. Thecommentaries that we know were read in his classes were not those ofPlotinus himself, but those of respected predecessors (VPlot. 14). Ploti-nus enjoyed thinking things through in minute detail, and, while severalof his treatises are closely linked with exegetical problems, a sustainedexegetical treatment of a text was not for him. Sentences could be taken

46 Tarrant (2000), 36–7.

40


out of their context, aligned with other sentences upon which he hadcome to rely, so that Plato begins to become a miscellaneous collectionof key passages. They are of course the passages that had been vital tothe intellectual world in which Plotinus and Origenes had been raised.Iamblichus’ later emphasis upon the integrity and unity of purpose ofeach mature Platonic dialogue had been timely, for it was precisely theunity of the dialogue that we miss in Plotinian exegesis.

A treatise of the Enneads may grow out of consideration of a singlekey Platonic passage. A good example here is I. 2, which is a meditationupon the single most popular passage of the Theaetetus in Plotinus andlate antiquity (176a),47 the passage generally thought to offer Plato’s telos,and a source of great controversy in respect of the identity of the godto which humans should assimilate themselves. Much else in Plato getsbrought into discussion, including the virtue-theory of the Republic, thepurification of the Phaedo, the theory of the disembodied soul from thePhaedrus. But there is no place for anything else from the Theaetetus.

A good example of Plotinus treating a much-debated exegetical issueof his own day is the first chapter (in fact a small, self-contained treatise)of III. 9. The debate is over the alleged necessity for separating divinities,along Numenian or similar lines, at Timaeus 39e. Plotinus feels that thestress on the unity or diversity of Plato’s autozoon (the What-is-Life),his Intellect and his Discursive Power may differ in accordance with thepurposes one has in view (26–8). He is attracted to the idea that discursivethought, with the division that this implies, belongs to something otherthan intellect, at the next level down, something which he would callsoul (29–37). However, he has particular difficulty with the idea thatlife’s paradigm should be outside the intellect that contemplates it, forhe is committed to the idea that the intelligibles are not outside intellect,and he suspects that the contemplation of an outside paradigm and anoutside truth will mean that it is mere images, and not the truth, thatexist within that intellect (8–10). This is a contribution to a debate fuelledby Numenius and continued by Amelius (above), but again it has littleconnection with the rest of the Timaeus.

Well-known treatises dealing with his Platonic exegesis are V. 1 andV. 8. The latter treats a comparatively large passage of the Phaedrus(246d–7e). While it brings in the Symposium (2) and the Timaeus (7) itseldom loses its focus. V. 1, on the other hand, expounds Plotinus’ the-ory of the three hypostases, Soul, Intellect, and One. But in chapters8 and 9 we have what Brehier (1956), 7, called ‘une sorte d’ excursushistorique et critique’ in which the Parmenides of Plato, specifically the

47 Atkinson (1983), 185, reports that in Plotinus this passage accounts for 76% of referencesto the Theaetetus!

41


first three hypostases of the final part (counting according to the Neo-platonic method), are famously employed to suggest that Plato himselfhad an account of the same hypostases (V. 1.8.23–7). Earlier in V. 1.8Epistle 2, 312e had also been used to suggest a triad of hypostases inPlato, and then a combination of Epistle 6, 323d (the Father of theCause), Philebus 26e–30c (demiurgic intellect as cause), and Timaeus 41d(demiurge manufactures soul) is used to construct a similar argumentfor Plato’s recognition of the triad One, Intellect, Soul (V. 1.8.1–6). Hethen recalls how the Republic places the Idea of the Good at a higher levelthan intellect. What follows is worth quoting:

So Plato knew that Intellect is from the Good, and Soul is from Intellect. Andthese doctrines are not new, and it is not now but long ago that they have beenstated, though not fully unfolded (me anapeptamenos).48 Our present argumentshave been interpretations of them, proving on the basis of Plato’s own writingsthat these views are ancient. (V. 1.8.9–14)

There is no doubt that Plotinus thought that the basis of his own systemwas already present in Plato, needing to be teased out. But the teasing outinvolves no sustained exegesis of any one passage, but long meditationover brief and seemingly esoteric passages, either alone, as in the case ofthe Second Epistle, or in company with other such passages. Though thepassage containing the first three hypostases is lengthy (137c–157b), it isclearly not separable from the rest of the final part of the Parmenides. Ourevidence suggests that Plotinus’ associates Amelius and Porphyry wereable to give meaning to all eight or nine hypotheses they respectivelycounted there.49 One who finds metaphysical levels behind three of thenine hypotheses ought surely either to find nine or to show why ninecannot be expected. Did Plotinus only care about the first three levels?Did he only care about engineering Plato’s support for pre-determinedNeoplatonic doctrine?

It is well known that, of Plotinus’ essays On the Kinds of Being (VI.1–3), the second has a special place for the so-called Greatest Kinds(megista gene) of Plato’s Sophist. But VI. 2.22 considers the findings sofar in the context of a variety of texts, Timaeus 39e (the same as isinvolved in III. 9), the second hypothesis of the Parmenides (144b), and

48 Atkinson (1983), lxiii, translates this hapax legomenon (see 192) ‘not explicitly’, but I thinkthis fails to capture the somewhat religious tone of a word suggesting that mysteries werenot to be wholly revealed. At 191, Atkinson puts it nicely when he says that, for Plotinus,‘Plato did not make everything clear,’ and that Plato’s remarks (at V. 8.4.51 ff.) ‘needinterpretation’, and he goes on to talk of the religious associations of the vocabulary ofriddles, which, as he points out, can be directly linked with Epistle 2 312d7–8 (cf. 314a).

49 Proc. in Parm. 1052–4. For the identity of the champions of these interpretations weare reliant on the scholia.

42


Philebus 16e.50 But Plotinus isn’t getting what he wants directly fromPlato, so the first two of these texts involve Plato’s speaking in riddles!51

This will no doubt be controversial, but Plotinus speaks as one who hascome to think in terms of a particular metaphysical system, seeing Platoas the vehicle by which he came there. He therefore assumes that Plato,above all in the passages that he has been brought to see as central, is inagreement with this system. But he forgets that it is Plato as recently inter-preted that has been his vehicle. There had been serious recent work onthe Platonic corpus that had highlighted the metaphysical importance ofa number of brief passages. But Plotinus himself simply takes over a kindof canon of key passages together with some convenient exegetical tools,whereby Plato can always be found in agreement given sufficient ingenu-ity. Anybody who wishes to maintain that Plotinus was greatly originalin his interpretations needs to grapple with VPlot. 3.33–5, where it isremarked that:

Plotinus went on writing nothing for quite a time, but basing his teaching onthe classes of Ammonius; and he went on like that for ten whole years, teachingsome people, but writing nothing.

While the emphasis is on Plotinus’ lack of enthusiasm for writing, thecontext is one that concerns the communication of Ammonius’ teachingmaterial. This implies a considerable intellectual debt to Ammonius, andwhile we find his pupils in disagreement over doctrine, we don’t find anydisagreement over which passages are crucial. It is here then that we canexpect the debt to have been considerable.

What then of Plotinus’ place in Proclus’ work? In book 1 his nameoccurs only once, in relation to his low opinion of the philosophic valueof Longinus. Nothing suggests that he ever paid any attention, evenorally, to the prologue of the Timaeus. In book 2 his name occurs a num-ber of times in relation to Enneads III. 9.1 and once each in relationto six other passages, mostly not directly related to Platonic exegesis.In book 3 there are a couple of references that can be linked with pas-sages in the Enneads,52 and there is a reference to something Ameliusattributes to Plotinus’ oral teaching. There are two references in book 4and five in book 5, most of the latter unrelated to specific passages in theEnneads. One has to allow for the possibility that Porphyry is ultimatelyresponsible for many of the references to Plotinus having entered thecommentary tradition, even though Proclus was of course familiar with

50 On this chapter see Sumi (2006).51 For Plotinus’ Plato as a riddler see Wallis (1972), 17, Atkinson (1983), 191.52 One of these, II. 154.3, is in the context of a large doxography, and the other (II. 11.27)

concerns a Plotinian argument against Aristotle.

43


the Enneads. Rather, it was difficult for Proclus to extract very much ofdirect exegetical relevance from them, and traditions concerning his oralteaching have not supplied us with very much more. At Platonic TheologyI. 1.6 Proclus includes Plotinus in his list of ‘interpreters of the Platonichigher vision’ (exegetai tes Platonikes epopteias), which captures nicely whatPlotinus is doing. It is my contention that he tried to be an exegete ofthat higher vision without ever having grappled with the earlier task ofbeing an exegete of the texts.53 His own claims to be an exegete ratherthan an independent philosopher, which must in any case be seen againstthe background of widespread reverence for ancient wisdom only, can-not alter the fact that it was his philosophy rather than his exegesis thatleft its mark on later Neoplatonism.54

The scholarship needed for the writing of commentaries is ratherto be associated with Porphyry. The extensive fragments of his Timaeuscommentary were long ago edited – with one exception – by R. Sodano.55

Porphyry is of special interest to readers of the initial book of Proclus’commentary, since he may well have been the first commentator to try tooffer a more or less comprehensive account of the material that precedesthe cosmology. Hence he supplies the complete exegesis of the targetdialogue in a way that was completely lacking in Plotinus. Porphyryapparently adhered to a similar division of books in his commentary asis used by Iamblichus and Proclus thereafter,56 another indication of thegeneral conservatism of the genre. Each book was probably introducedby a preface, and for the most part used the same lemmata as are usedlater by Proclus.57 One wonders how it was that commentaries werenot included in the list of Porphyry’s works in the Suda (fr. 2), but thein-house nature of the genre may be the reason. Not only did Porphyry

53 The story of Plotinus’ disappointment with all teachers at Alexandria until he foundAmmonius (VPlot. 14) is clearly the story of a man who wanted to be led directly to theheart of a religious philosophy without the preliminary studies that most would havethought necessary as a first step.

54 For a discussion of the vexed question of the degree to which Plotinus should be seenas an exegete see Gatti (1996), 17–22. However, her alternatives ‘exegete of Plato orinnovator?’ are not the only ones relevant to our discussion. Rather, with regard to bothexegesis and doctrine, there is a considerable question of how original he really was,something that would only be able to be determined if we had adequate knowledge ofNumenius and (more especially) Ammonius. It is my position that, although the doctrinewas probably original in significant respects, the exegesis, besides being severely limited,was only ever original where it was needed to support new doctrines.

55 Sodano (1964); one extra fragment is supplied by Smith (1993).56 See Dillon (1973), 295.57 See Dillon (1973), 54–5; sometimes Proclus has introduced further divisions of his

own. It may be advisable to remember that many of Proclus’ divisions are dictated bythe subject matter.

44


write commentaries,58 he also engaged in debate as to how they should bewritten, promoting, or perhaps rather reviving,59 the view that prologuesare a treasure house of ethical guidance. This has accounted for thefrequency of references to Porphyry in Book 1 (30 in Diehl’s index), asopposed to Books 2 (23), 3 (20), 4 (3) and 5 (1).60 The place of Porphyrywill be apparent in the translation that follows, and it will probably besufficient here to underline the importance for Porphyry’s exegesis notonly of Plotinus (who provides the philosophic framework within whichexegesis needs to occur), but also of Numenius and Cronius, Longinusand Amelius.

One cannot leave Porphyry, however, without mentioning the rea-sonable theory of P. Hadot (1968) that the fragments of the anonymousCommentary on the Parmenides from a Turin palimpsest are actually fromPorphyry’s own commentary on that work. The authorship will proba-bly never be able to be confirmed, but, in spite of efforts to show that itcould have been written earlier,61 it remains likely that it is a Neoplaton-ist work dating from before ad 400. If it belongs to this period then theinfluence of Porphyry is in any case not improbable, and one suspectsthat there would have been a number of pupils, and pupils of pupils, whohad built their own lecture notes on the commentaries of Porphyry. Theform of this commentary is certainly very different from the Theaetetuscommentary, and a few remarks about how it differs would perhaps bein order, regardless of authorship. First, unless we are misled by the oneexample we have (III. 1–36 = Parm. 141a5–d6) the lemmata are long,giving a suspicion that it belongs early in the traditions of Parmenides-commentary.62 Second, the subject matter is much more philosophical

58 Besides the extant commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories and Ptolemy’s Harmonics, thisis clear in the case of the commentary on the Timaeus which is attested (should anyreader of Proclus doubt it!) by both Philoponus and Macrobius. On Porphyry’s workssee Smith (1987).

59 See Sedley (1999a), who tries to trace the tactic back to the Old Academy; the useof the introduction to the dialogue within the dialogue for ethical purposes by theearlier anonymous On the Theaetetus confirms that Porphyry’s position cannot havebeen entirely original.

60 We are confronted, then, by the possibility that Porphyry’s commentary either stoppedshortly after 41e (Dillon (1973), 63), or was lost after that point, or simply faded inimportance after that point as far as Proclus was concerned. That his importance isalready fading from book 4 on makes this last a possibility, and Proclus might feel thatPorphyry had lost sight of anything like the main theological themes as the dialogueprogressed.

61 See for instance Bechtle (1999).62 Here one should mention that Aspasius’ second-century commentary on the Nico-

machean Ethics is the closest comparable philosophic commentary, and Wittwer’s carefulstudy of its lemmata (1999) makes it plain that there is indeed a fairly close relationship

45


and closely argued. However, the commentary is similar to both theanonymous in Theaetetum and Proclus in Parmenidem, but unlike the inTimaeum, insofar as it avoids naming rival interpreters. Whether therewere different traditions in commenting on different texts it is hard totell, and this does make it difficult to argue from the nature of Porphyry’sCommentary on Aristotle’s Categories or Commentary on Ptolemy’s Harmonicsto what his commentary on any Platonic work would have looked like.The Anonymous Turinensis, as it is sometimes called, is unfortunatelythe only part-extant commentary on Plato, other than the peripheralones of Galen and Calcidius, between the Theaetetus commentary andProclus, and as such it needs to be compared seriously with what is donelater by Proclus.

Unfortunately the excellent research of Hadot has been somewhatundermined in recent times by the work of Tardieu (1996), that hasshown that many of the similarities between Victorinus and our com-mentary, hitherto thought best attributed to Porphyry, are shared by theGnostic Zostrianos.63 This text, or some version of it, was among manythat were fascinating other religious teachers in the time of Plotinusand Porphyry (VPlot. 16), and we are given the specific information thatAmelius wrote forty books (!) against Zostrianos. The interesting pointhere is that both Zostrianos and Amelius can reasonably be associated withNumenius.64 Amelius may well be taking on this revelationary book inthe belief that it is a perversion of the true Neopythagorean philosophy.Amelius is in fact an author who should be reckoned a candidate for hav-ing composed this commentary on the Parmenides: a work on which heclearly had a very detailed interpretation (see pp. 38, 42 above). If thereis something Numenian about the commentary, as Bechtle and Brissonbelieve, while it is at the same time rich enough in argument to associatewith Plotinus’ circle, then the hypothesis of Amelian authorship wouldoffer an excellent explanation.

The Iamblichan legacy

As may be seen from the entry in Diehl’s index, which is at least halfas long again as that of Porphyry, the debt of Proclus to Iamblichus isconsiderable. It can be observed in a number of areas:

between the lemmata we have and the lemmata Aspasius used. More importantly, thelonger a tradition of commentary lasts, the more detailed the treatment of individualpassages, so that we should expect further division of lemmata as time goes on, as seemsto have happened in the case of the Timaeus (Dillon (1973), 54).

63 Bechtle (1999), n. 683, gives a list of illuminating parallels between the commentary andVictorinus, also adding in most cases a reference to comparable material in Zostrianos.

64 See Brisson (1999); Bechtle (1999), 257 and 248–9 n. 683.

46


1. The structure of the commentary;2. The important principle that everything within a Platonic dialogue

aims at a single goal or skopos, and requires interpretation in relationto that goal;

3. The canon of dialogues that constitutes the late Neoplatonistcurriculum;

4. A more overt move towards making just about everything con-tribute in some way to theology, together with the presence of atheurgic element, and enhanced use of theurgic texts such as theChaldean Oracles.

Significant for structure is a running commentary on the complete text,generally with short lemmata. It involves also the book division andindividual prologues to each book that may be traced back to Porphyry(see p. 00 above).65 On the nature of the skopos we shall have cause tocomment in relation to the initial few pages of the commentary, and Ihave dealt with it previously.66 The most illuminating text on the lateNeoplatonic skopos is Anon. Prolegomena 21–2, though caution needs tobe exercised in using it as a source for Iamblichus himself. Some seem-ingly very strange ‘targets’ were proposed by persons prior to the likelyperiod of the composition of the Prolegomena (perhaps mid-sixth cen-tury), with the Demiurge becoming the skopos of the Gorgias, and thedemiurge of the sublunary world becoming that of the Sophist. Thislast is Iamblichus’ view according to a scholiast on the Sophist, and thatshould serve to discourage anybody from seeing the word as meaninganything like a ‘central topic’. Rather it is what we are expected to geta vision of as a result of the correct reading of the dialogue in question,and while everything was expected to contribute to such a vision, noteverything (if anything!) was supposed to be about that vision. Divine ortranscendent entities seem to have been generally involved. The skoposof the Philebus was the Good (in Phlb. fr. 1); that of the Phaedrus was thebeautiful at every level, including the Beautiful itself (in Phdr. fr. 1);that of the Timaeus must have been the total vision of the physicalworld itself, a god in its own right, but containing other gods withinit, since Proclus assumes that there is nothing uncontroversial aboutthis view (I. 1.7–8). Significantly, however, Iamblichus seems to havebeen less thorough than Proclus in his referring all the content of theTimaeus to an ultimately divine vision, for he seems early in book 1 tobe regularly associated with what Proclus sees as physical explanations

65 See Dillon (1973), 54–5, who makes an exception in the case of books 3 to 4 of Proclus,which he believes were a single book in Iamblichus (see n. 62).

66 Jackson, Lykos and Tarrant (1998), 23–4; Tarrant (2000), 92–4 etc.

47


of problems in the text rather than with theological ones (such as he andSyrianus preferred).67 The reason is partly that Iamblichus thought thatit was Pythagorean methodology to preface one’s in-depth discussion ofrealities with first likenesses (such as the physical world offers), and thensymbols (I. 19.9–20.27 = in Tim. fr. 3).

The Iamblichan curriculum involved twelve proper dialogues, i.e.twelve works that had the required unity of skopos: Republic and Laws werenot included. There was a decad of dialogues, consisting of Alcibiades I,Gorgias, Phaedo, Cratylus, Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, Phaedrus, Sym-posium, and Philebus. This was followed by the two perfect dialogues, theTimaeus (tackling all reality through physics) and the Parmenides (doingthe same through theology), on which see I. 13.14–19 (= Iambl. in Tim. fr.1). It survived even in the works of Ammonius’ successors, when strangelymuch of the rationale for it would no longer have been accepted.68

Iamblichus’ interest in theurgy, along with a great deal else that had todo with various theories and practices concerning the gods, has ensuredthat he is rightly regarded as a turning point in Neoplatonism. Whileit could have taken a purer and more detached scholarly route associ-ated with Porphyry’s Letter to Anebo, the movement followed the linetaken in Iamblichus’ reply, the De Mysteriis. In the present commentarythe main way that influence is felt is in the large number of quota-tions from the Chaldean Oracles, that influential second-century textthat was itself supposed to be linked intimately with theurgy. Similarly,quotations from late Orphic texts are surprisingly numerous. In Diehl’sindex the couple of lines of references to Origenes are submerged intwo and a half pages of what is otherwise dedicated to the Oracles andOrpheus!

The influence of Iamblichus will to some extent be apparent as weread on. Less apparent is that of the only known pupil of Iamblichus tobe mentioned in the current commentary, Theodorus of Asine. In book1 he is mentioned only once (12.8), tellingly in relation to Amelius, buthe receives four mentions in book 2, three each in books 3 and 4, andten in book 5. Besides Amelius, he is closely associated with Numenius(II. 274.10–14 = Numenius fr. 40). A reader of the present commentarymight be surprised to find that Theodorus’ name occurs in the Bacchiccompany of Platonist philosophers in the Platonic Theology (I. 1.6). Hisimportance is difficult to determine, and there is little doubt that herepresents the later influence of the line passing from Numenius throughAmelius rather than that passing from Plotinus through Porphyry.

67 This is most explicit at 117.19 (= Iambl. in Tim. fr. 12), but cf. also 16.20–17.9, 19.9–20.27 (= fr. 3), 25.8–14, 27.26–30, 30.2–19.

68 See Jackson, Lycos and Tarrant (1998), 14.

48

Proclus on questions concerning the Timaeus

This brings us to the end of our survey, and to the Athenian Schoolin which Proclus himself was to work. Plutarch of Athens (d. ad 432),important in other ways for understanding Proclus’ background, is notmentioned here. He is, however, of vital importance in setting the inter-pretation of the Parmenides on track in Proclus’ eyes (1059–61). Syrianus(d. ad 437?), not mentioned by name but often as ‘our teacher’, is such apervasive influence that he is difficult to separate from the still youthfulProclus himself. That he wrote a commentary on the present work isattested at various points, and it is a matter of some regret that we do nothave a Platonic commentary in his name. His Commentary on Aristotle’sMetaphysics does however compensate for this, and it is now customary touse the commentary of Hermeias on the Phaedrus as more or less directevidence for Syrianus himself. He is an object of much reverence, and iscalled at III. 14.19 ‘the most theological of interpreters’. Whether oneshould except Proclus is perhaps a question that needs to be asked!

proclus on general quest ionsconcerning the timaeus

There has been much recent attention to the prolegomena of ancientcommentaries in general, and to those of this commentary in particular.69

It seems that in late antiquity there were recognized topics for introduc-tions to Platonic works, some or all of which would be expected to bepresent, either as distinct strands of the prefatory material, or at least asidentifiable elements that could be tracked down. The topics had evolvedpartly according to the needs of the commentators and partly accordingto the theory of the rhetoricians. The primary topic, to which all elseneeded to relate in some way or other, had, since Iamblichus, been theskopos, less the ‘subject’ of the work than its intended focus, the entity orentities that it was designed to illuminate. This would frequently, thoughnot necessarily, be a Neoplatonic divinity. The correct way of identifyingthe skopos had been an important item of discussion in the Prolegomena toPlato’s Philosophy (21–3) associated with the Olympiodoran school, andin many cases it must have remained the same for generations of post-Iamblichan Platonists. There were, however, important exceptions, as inthe case of the Sophist and the Gorgias.70 The skopos of the Timaeus was notcontroversial, except perhaps in the details of how it was to be expressed,

69 See Mansfeld (1994), particularly 30–7 on Proclus’ Plato commentaries. Mansfeld(30) describes Proclan practice as ‘less scholastic, or schematic, than that recorded inAnon. Proleg., though not less systematic’. For this commentary see now Cleary (2006),136–41.

70 I discuss these in Tarrant (2000), 135–9 and 194–5.

49


and consequently Proclus can keep his discussion relatively brief. Thoseseeking a lengthy discussion of the treatment here should refer to AlainLernould’s study.71 It does, however, commence the discussion, and isfollowed by several other standard topoi.

Festugiere identifies the sections dealing with these topoi as follows:

� target of the dialogue 1.4–4.5� treatment of subject72 4.6–7.16� character of the dialogue 7.17–8.29� background of the dialogue 8.30–9.13� participants in the dialogue 9.13–24.

This is clearly correct for the most part, though one can quarrel overdetails. While the first section is marked as tackling the skopos bycomments at 4.6–7, a large part of this is given over to the allegedlyPythagorean nature of Platonic physics, and the five-cause system that itimplies. As in Seneca’s Epistle 65.7–10 the five causes are the four of Aris-totle, plus a paradigmatic cause, but no attempt is made to justify the attri-bution of such a system to Pythagoras. And while a degree of dependenceon ‘Timaeus Locrus’ On Nature (as it is here called, 1.9) is assumed,73 weare given no reason to associate the five-cause system with that text. Inthe end it would seem that for Proclus the approach is Pythagoreanbecause, standing in sharp contrast to Ionian physics, it is naturallyattached to the western Presocratic tradition from Italy and Sicily.

For Lernould the second section (to 6.16 at least) is the divisio textus,dealing with how the work may be split into sections. Anybody wishingto work out precisely how Proclus envisages the breakdown of the text ofthe Timaeus and plans his own commentary is recommended to examineLernould’s treatment.74 Lernould excludes 6.16–7.16, which is primarilyconcerned with the agreement between Plato and Aristotle, at least onthe more worldly subjects discussed in the later parts of the dialogue.Divisions of the dialogue are included in the proems of the Alcibiadescommentaries of both Proclus and Olympiodorus, as also of the latter’sGorgias commentary. Further, it is debatable here whether there is anyreal division between background and characters. Separate sections oncharacters and their symbolism are certainly not mandatory, but they arefound in Olympiodorus On the Gorgias and Damascius On the Philebus. Itwould be fair to say that Proclus’ procedure, like that of Olympiodorus,Damascius, and Hermeias, is not driven by any notion of abstract rules

71 See Lernould (2001), 27–38.72 The section is described as being about its oikonomia at 9.26.73 This was obviously a regular assumption at that time, 7.18–21.74 Lernould (2001), 63–79.

50

Proclus on questions concerning the Timaeus

with which he must conform, but is adapted to suit the particular needsof the dialogue at hand.

The section on ‘the genre and literary character of the dialogue’ doesnot discuss issues of classification as one might expect from reading Dio-genes Laertius’ distinction between various ‘characters’ (3.50–1). Rather,Proclus is concerned to select various qualities that attach to the dialoguebecause of Plato’s debts to Socrates on the one hand and to Pythagoreanson the other. Literary qualities are here treated as having a great dealto do with Plato’s methods of communicating with his audience, so thatthey stem from the educational methods that Plato has inherited from histwo major influences, not upon mere aesthetic considerations. The dia-logue is depicted as a perfect blend, mixing ‘the demonstrational methodwith the revelational’ (8.3–4). This is important, for it is at 8.9–13 thatTimaeus is explicit about the dialogue mixing physical and theologicalcontent in a way that matches the character of its subject, the cosmos.

The section on the background links the Timaeus firmly with theRepublic, assuming that Socrates narrated the conversation in that dia-logue to Timaeus, Critias, Hermocrates, and the unnamed fourth per-son on the day after it actually happened. This then is the third day ofproceedings, but the second dialogue in a series. The number of the par-ticipants is then raised as a problem, which is in turn quickly answeredwith reference to the correspondence of the participants to the Fatherof Demiurges and the Triad of Demiurges below him.

After these standard topoi have been discussed, there is a digressionon nature (9.25–12.25), made necessary, Proclus believes, because of theconfusion that can occur through the multitude of conceptions of ‘nature’used in philosophy. Proclus uses doxographical methods to clarify hisown position, or rather the position that he would attribute to Plato: ‘anon-bodily substance inseparable from bodies, possessing their formalprinciples [logoi] but unable to see into itself’ (12.27–8). The digressionthen leads into another regular topos,75 that of the work’s place in thecurriculum, or at least its place in the final stages of Platonic enlighten-ment, along with the Parmenides (12.26–14.3). It is of course importantthat Proclus’ readers are now supposed to have read the group of tendialogues selected by Iamblichus to precede these two, as well as a greatdeal of Aristotle, and, as we learn from 1.13–16, the work attributed to‘Timaeus Locrus’.

Before we leave this kind of general question we should considerbriefly material at the end of the book that is of a similar type, relating

75 I should perhaps note here that Olympiodorus in his Commentary on the Gorgias alsotreats this topic in the course of his preliminary discussions (proem 6–7), and withoutactually flagging it as a topos.

51


both to the speakers and to the sequence of dialogues. At 198.25–199.11Proclus embarks on an attempt to show how among the speakers inthe (projected) Timaeus–Critias Timaeus is both a top and a mean,thus mirroring nature. The order of lengthy speeches is supposed tobe:

Socrates–Critias–Timaeus–Critias–Hermocrates

placing Timaeus at the centre, while he is foremost in knowledge. Proclusdeals next (199.11–200.3) with the question of what might have beenleft to Hermocrates, suggesting that he was needed to make the citizensspeak. Then he moves on to tackle the problem of why the Timaeus wasnot made to precede the Republic. Strangely, while the first two sectionsof the resumed general discussion had tended to assume the unfinishedsequence Timaeus–Critias–Hermocrates, this one presumes the completetrilogy Republic–Timaeus–Critias! It is the kind of problem that mighthave occurred ever since sequences of dialogues were taken for granted(following Aristophanes of Byzantium’s trilogies, D.L. 3.61–2), and doesindeed seem to presume his trilogy rather than Thrasyllus’ tetralogy(which placed Clitophon at the front). But the problem would have beenseen as a greater threat when structure and its ability to mimic the naturalorder had come to loom so large in interpreters’ minds, as they hadfor Proclus. It is unfortunate that Proclus does not put a name to theobjector, but, since he is so ready to name Porphyry, Iamblichus, andothers, one wonders whether the objection may be reflecting his ownearlier concerns.76 After several other considerations, Proclus looks toPorphyry for a solution, but makes it clear that Porphyry had not hadthis problem in mind, strongly suggesting that it is a post-Porphyrianproblem. For Porphyry:

Those who are going to get a real hold on the study of the universe must first havebeen educated in character, so that by assimilation to the object contemplatedit [their character] should become properly prepared for the recognition of thetruth. (202.5–7)

So the Republic comes first so that we may correctly organize our innerconstitution, thus being in a more satisfactory condition to appreciatethe constitution of the heavens.

76 Note that the Iamblichan curriculum, which treats the Republic at best as a side-dishand omits the Critias (Anon. Proleg. 26), precludes any such solution, and actually makesnonsense of the problem itself.

52

Proclus on the constitution in the Timaeus

proclus on the summary of theconst itution in the timaeus

Fidelity to the text and religious interpretation

We come now to matters pertaining to the detailed reading of a text. Howone read texts in antiquity was largely bound up with authorial intent.One might show either the message the author hoped to communicate,or the message that some higher power (speaking through the author)had intended for us. Hence interpretation depended on how one thoughtone’s authority was communicating. Usually authors did not broadcasttheir views on how other authors communicated, which were the mosteffective methods of communication, or on what principles their ownworks were to be interpreted in their turn. Plato had left us strong hints,but their enigmatic nature warns us that even these were not intendedto supply rules for the would-be definitive interpreter. Proclus was justsuch a definitive interpreter, with a firm intention to interpret Plato’stexts rather than to present an alternative source of Platonist doctrine,like Plotinus for instance. But he was an interpreter with such contemptfor purely literal readings that the text became a two-edged sword: manydetails, when interpreted literally, were an obstacle, though welcomed iftreated in the appropriate manner.

It did not escape Proclus that Plato did not think knowledge, as dis-tinct from information, could be transmitted by straightforward didacticprocesses, whether written or oral. Where Plato’s writing seems to adopta more didactic approach, as in Timaeus’ cosmology as well as here inthe summary of the constitution, there are sufficient indications to showthat even here one may not be hearing the simple truth. Hence Proclus,like Iamblichus before him,77 is at liberty to select where he will allow aliteral reading and where he will not, and to choose where he will resortto his more distinctive and more controversial methods of interpreta-tion. In some cases he will go out of his way to avoid literal readings.In others, as with the Atlantis story, he will not disallow the validityof the literal reading, but will insist that deeper readings are requiredif Plato is to be properly understood. But for this very case he makesliteral use of the statement of Critias that his logos is true in every way(20d8).

There has recently been a good deal of discussion of Proclan strate-gies of interpretation, including the tactics of iconic and symbolic inter-pretation that appear to give him, as Professor Gonzales has recently

77 See 174.28–32 = Iambl. in Tim. fr. 23.

53


pointed out to me, all the latitude of a Straussian Platonist, if not more.78

However, most of the attention given to this problem has been focussedon matters that involve the issues on which Proclus also appealed tothe inspired poets and religious groups,79 or at least to his strategiesfor theological interpretation. In this context we now have two newarticles on Proclus’ strategies for interpretation which deal with Pla-tonic Theology I.4,80 where Proclus is quite explicit about how his com-ments apply to Plato’s communicative strategies for theology: ‘the waysin which he teaches to us the mystical ways of conceiving of thingsdivine.’ Plato communicates his theology by means of likenesses, sym-bols, or dialectic, or in the inspired ‘entheastic’ manner characteristicof the central passages of the Phaedrus. It is likenesses and symbolsthat prove most relevant to Proclus’ treatment of the early pages of theTimaeus.

Fortunately, not even Proclus believes that Plato is always teachingus theology. How does he approach Platonic interpretation in passageswhich are not openly theological? What is his interpretation like whenhe is turning his mind to less exalted texts? We must remember thatwhat survives of Proclus’ commentaries is such that it is bound to placea heavy emphasis on theology: the Parmenides and the Timaeus are theculmination of the Neoplatonic education programme, and together aresupposed to reveal its highest secrets. A well-received recent book tack-les, among other issues of importance, this interlacing of physics andtheology in the in Timaeum.81 The Republic commentary is not a run-ning commentary and allows Proclus much scope for concentrating onthose parts where theology is an issue, or is at least able to become onefor Neoplatonist readers. The commentary on the Cratylus seems to bemost eloquent when reaching the etymologies of the gods and whentreating the secret divine names by which gods refer to things, though ithas been subject to reworking in accordance with an editor’s seeminglytheological tastes. Like the Commentary on the Alcibiades it is truncated.This last may more easily be read as a Proclan commentary on a textoffering fewer theological opportunities. It is a welcome challenge to beoffering the first book of the in Timaeum, dealing with the early discus-sion that precedes Timaeus’ monologue, because introducing theologywould at first sight seem to be a considerable challenge, and yet Syrianusand Proclus, being committed to a unitary interpretation of a dialoguewith joint physical and theological implications, must find theological

78 On symbolic interpretation in Proclus and others see Rappe (2000). Note the strongclaim ‘The language of Neoplatonism is the language of symbols’ (117).

79 Coulter (1976), Sheppard (1980), Kuisma (1996), van den Berg (2001).80 Pepin (2000) and Gersh (2000). 81 See Lernould (2001).

54


significance throughout. I believe that their strategies become ratherinteresting as a result.

Proclus is offered some scope by the very mysteries that the textconfronts us with. From the outset the Timaeus itself is recalling thediscussion between the participants concerning the constitution. This isvery different from the way a sequel is made to resume the discussion inthe series Theaetetus–Sophist–Statesman, or indeed from the way that theCritias will follow the Timaeus itself. Apart from Socrates, the charactersare new to us, and we witness them reassemble after the previous day’sexposition of the Socratic constitution. The relation to the content ofparts of the Republic is evident, but from the beginning there are mysteriesabout the fourth person present at the gathering, how the constitutionwas presented, and how the new protagonists came to agree to offerSocrates something in return. Mysteries invite us to think more deeply,and that, if anything, can cause wonder. Proclus frequently finds withinthe text ‘wonderful indications’ of what he took to be the higher truthsunderlying Platonic philosophy – and indeed all inspired philosophy. Infact Jan Opsomer has recently written, concerning Proclus’ attention todetails of Platonic texts, that ‘it may make us call into question our ownhermeneutic tools. It should provoke wonder, and hence philosophy.’82

The legacy of history

The summary of the politeia of the Republic is introduced at Timaeus17b5 and continues for less than three pages of OCT to 19b2, at whichpoint Socrates’ first long speech commences, in which he reminds theother participants of what he would like to hear from them. The corre-sponding passage of Proclus’ commentary stretches from 26.21 to 55.26,some thirty pages of Teubner text. Plato has represented this summaryas a reminder, and reminders are seldom of great interest to anybodywho has the original available. The material relates primarily to parts ofbooks two, three, and five of the Republic, and should be considered as asummary of a social arrangement or politeia rather than of the total dia-logue in which it appeared. Opinions will differ as to whether Plato reallywants his target audience to remember all features of that politeia, or onlythose to which he chooses to draw attention. The fact that we did notencounter the figures of Timaeus, Critias, and Hermocrates (let alone amysterious fourth person) as narratees in the extant Republic may evensuggest a different occasion on which Socrates had communicated hissocio-political views, when they had been set out in ways not entirely in

82 See Opsomer (2001b), 68.

55


accord with the Republic. In fact there is enough here to get the sensitivereader of Plato seriously wondering about the circumstances.

While Proclus was himself such a reader, he already had a traditionto draw on. I very much doubt whether he routinely read commentariesprior to Porphyry, but Porphyry was scholarly enough to have introduceda number of predecessors and contemporaries into his deliberations.The most prominent here are Longinus and Origenes. At that time itmay have been novel enough to bother with the prefatory material ina Platonic dialogue at all, and Porphyry searched these pages, and thecorresponding parts of other dialogues, for material with some kindof moral content. With Iamblichus comes a significant change. Thedialogue has become the unit, just as it has again today. We have nowto bear in mind that all material in a dialogue, including the dramaticmachinery etc., is now expected to relate to a single overriding skopos.Sequences of dialogues cannot operate in such a way as to threaten theintegrity of the individual dialogue; if two dialogues are more closelyunited then they should rather be viewed as one single dialogue, but weknow that this did not happen in the case of the Sophist and Politicus forinstance.

The relevance of this for the early pages of the Timaeus should beobvious. When Porphyry had interpreted them he could legitimatelyresort to seeing in them a different sort of material with a primarilyethical and political purpose. After Iamblichus, Neoplatonists were nolonger able to do this, for the Timaeus’ skopos involves, almost inevitably,‘the whole of physical inquiry, rising to the study of the universe, dealingwith this from beginning to end’. The summary of the politeia musttherefore have something to do with this overall purpose, and a moralexplanation of a lemma’s function can never be the complete explanation.This is the case in spite of Proclus’ seeing the Timaeus as the close sequelof the Republic, to which he takes it to be referring. The sequence doesnot override the integrity of the dialogue.

Whereas Iamblichus seems to have been content to offer a morestrictly physical interpretation of everything in the Timaeus, Syrianusinsisted also on finding something theological, since at the summit ofthe natural world were various divinities involved in its direction. Theresult is that Proclus may approach the text in various ways:

� linguistically (generally in response to considerations adduced byLonginus),

� ethically (generally in response to considerations adduced byPorphyry),

� physically (in the manner of Iamblichus),� theologically (in response to the requirements of Syrianus).

56


It is important that these approaches are not mutually exclusive; rathereach successive interpretation is more complete. On occasions ethical,physical, and theological interpretations are presented without any indi-cation that they are specific to given interpreters, and the effect of thisis to suggest strongly that Proclus accepts each of the interpretationsto some degree. The impression one receives is that he considers Platoto be the kind of writer who is so inspired that the most unpromisingsnippets of text can yield at least three worthwhile levels of meaning:passages where others had sometimes failed to detect one! In someways, though, this is not so surprising. The same patterns are alwaysbeing reflected at different levels of reality in Athenian Neoplaton-ism, and consequently a pattern that exists among the gods, and canbe reflected in the text of Plato, will also be reflected in some way in thephysical world. Furthermore, patterns found among the gods providemodels for human conduct, and thus can be expected to have ethicalimplications. While we sometimes become exasperated at what seemsto be the proliferation of entities in Neoplatonism, everything is sointerlinked that they can concentrate on a comparatively small num-ber of significant patterns. These are seen most clearly and completelyamong the gods, but they are there nevertheless at lower levels too.This enables Proclus to acknowledge both Porphyry and Iamblichus asinspired interpreters,83 Porphyry with his more partial moral insightsand Iamblichus with his more visionary understanding of the cosmos(cf. 204.24–7).

Some features of Proclus’ exposition

We must now be selective, for many of the important themes will actuallyemerge best as one reads the commentary. I shall begin at the end, as itwere, that being the most economical way to discuss this passage. Afterhe has concluded, Proclus says:

Under a limited number of ‘main heads’ Socrates properly summed up the entireshape of the constitution, thus moving back towards the undivided character ofintellect, in order to imitate the god who organized the heavenly constitution inan intelligible way and in the manner of a father. Since everywhere due measuresand completion are being determined for the second things by their causes, onthis account he himself asks Timaeus to state whether he has included the entireform of the constitution; for all intellect is reliant upon the god that precedesit and determines its own boundaries by looking to it. For to have set forth‘the main heads’ (kephalaia) is also a symbol of his having organized the primary

83 Note that at Theol. I. 1.6.21 he includes even Amelius as inspired (as also Plotinus, whois less relevant here).

57


elements of the whole, i.e. its head, things which the universal demiurge willarrange more perfectly with an eye on the whole and on the single life of thecosmos. (I.54.28–55.9)

We notice that squeezing the politeia into comparatively few words, intofive principal points in fact, is seen as an upward movement, a movementtowards the intelligible. There is a movement from multiplicity towardsunity. Socrates, under the guidance of Timaeus (who has a higher status)rises towards a higher level than had been exhibited in the Republic. Wenotice too the analogy between the various characters of the dialogueand Proclus’ four demiurgic figures, the Father of Demiurges and theDemiurgic Triad. This assists Proclus to argue for the theological rele-vance of the summary, for which his main argument is the analogy thathe routinely applies between the constitution applied to the state andthe constitution that is laid up like a paradigm in the heaven (Rep. 592b),which cannot be separated from the paradigmatic motions of the heav-enly soul that humankind should be contemplating in order to set theirown souls aright at Tim. 90a–d. For the constitution is also imperfectlyimitated in the soul of the human being. Soul, state, and heaven are allbased on the same constitutional pattern. Furthermore, when we thinkof the heaven we think also of the gods laid up there, so that the samepattern is present in the visible heavens and in their divine causes.

For Proclus, therefore, the summary of the constitution functions asan image of things of vital importance to the physical and theologicalsubject matter of the dialogue in which the summary occurs. A constitu-tion is the organizing principle that brings about an organic unity in anentity consisting of distinct parts or forces, whether soul, state, heaven,or something else. So this is an image of a pervasive unifying principle,whereas the story of Atlantis functions as an image of a pervasive princi-ple of division and separation. This message occurs already at 4.7–26, andit is reinforced once again in the opening of book 2 (I. 205.4–206.16).The constitution was an image of the ‘first creation’, the war was animage of the second; the constitution reflected the formal cause, the warthe material cause. Between them they prepare the way for a study thatshows the imposition of harmony on potentially belligerent contraries.Socrates offered his account in a non-embodied way, offering the intelli-gible pattern itself, whereas Critias offers an account of material events.Although the constitution penetrates to the lowest levels of reality andthe opposition is already present in the heaven, even so the former ismore akin to the heaven and the latter to the realm of generation – theformer belonging to Zeus and the latter to Poseidon.

So Proclus sees the two main sections of his first book as explaining thesignificance of the constitution and the war as images of principles that

58


pervade the cosmos. His treatment of them is thus ‘iconic’, images beingparticularly appropriate to the Pythagorean manner of philosophizing(129.31–130.1),84 and thus to the dialogue, as well as to the Socraticmanner (7.32–8.1), and thus to the constitution. At this point we shouldperhaps examine Proclus’ response to the separation of crafts:

Did we not first of all separate in it the class of farmers and of those withall other crafts from people of the class who were going to go to war for it?(17c6–8)The discussion on the constitution and the short condensed summary of theclasses in it makes a contribution to the entire account of the cosmic creation.For they act like images from which it is possible to re-focus on the universe.Indeed the Pythagoreans were the outstanding exponents of this very method,tracking down the similarities in realities by way of analogies, and passing fromimages to paradigmatic cases. That is what Plato is doing now too, showing us atthe outset things in the universe as seen in human lives, and enabling us to studythem. It is not remarkable either, for the constitutions of weighty (spoudaioi)persons are moulded on the organization of the heaven. Accordingly we tooshould relate the present images in words to universal matters, beginning withthe matter of the division of the classes. This split of classes, you see, imitatesthe demiurgic division in the universe . . . (33.1–18)

We note here that it is again the Pythagoreans who are to be associatedwith the use of such images, tailored to capture the universal via theparticular, and that the images concerned are not so much the imageswithin the soul or state, but the images in words that had seemed toapply to these lesser levels. Proclus goes on to develop his comparison invarious ways, showing just how versatile his hermeneutic methods canbe. In fact one of the most striking correspondences in this lemma is thatbetween the seven ‘planets’ and the various jobs in society at 34.12–27:

� Moon farming sector� Aphrodite those arranging marriages� Hermes those arranging lots� Sun educators and judges� Ares warfarers� Zeus those who lead through intelligence� Kronos philosophers who ascend to the first

cause

This seems to offer a remarkably detailed comparison between the heav-ens and the classes of the constitution. But Proclus now has to answerthe objection that Plato’s lemma had only actually made one division,

84 Compare Theol. I. 4.20.8–12 for the Pythagorean nature of this method.

59


between the military class and the rest. The text is not as obliging as itmight be.

We shall conclude this section with a gem of a miniature lemma from32.20–9:

And as far as all of us are concerned it was described very much as intelli-gence requires. (17c4–5)Narration in accord with intelligence, not in accord with pleasure nor in accordwith opinion, indicates his admirable perfection and intellective grasp, and thereis a riddling reference to the preceding consensual convergence of all the sec-ondary causes into one intellect and one united creative process. Furthermore theaddition of ‘very much’ signifies the transcendent nature of this unity, throughwhich all the creative causes converge upon the single paternal cause of all thingsas if upon one single centre.

We have here:� an ethical dimension, rejecting pleasure� an epistemological dimension rejecting mere opinion� a primary reference that is not too obscure� a riddling (much more obscure) reference to the harmonious agree-

ment of a variety of demiurgic forces� a linguistic observation� a link with the single Father to whom all creative causes revert.

Proclus can be ingenious, at times no doubt too ingenious. But let nobodydoubt that his comments spring from serious engagement with the detailsof the text.

proclus and his predecessors on atlantisIntroduction

Proclus is the single most important source for the status of Plato’s storyof the war between ancient Athens and Atlantis. That is because thecommentary tradition seldom threw away anything that it consideredinstructive or interesting, so that Proclus’ text preserves what little evi-dence there is to supplement anything that one can derive from the textof Plato itself. This evidence goes back to the days of the Old Academy,and to the first ever commentary on the Timaeus, penned by Crantor andpresumably dating from early in the third century bc, or shortly before.85

However, the likelihood that Proclus at the age of twenty-eight hadimmersed himself in all the earlier authors to which he refers, trying

85 Dates for Crantor are variously given. I tend to follow Sedley (1997), 113, who gives 275as his death, rather than Dillon (2004), 216, who gives 290.

60

Proclus and his predecessors on Atlantis

to understand their work independently and to reassess its import, isslim indeed. Rather one must consider which of those whom Proclusread is likely to have assembled early material and introduced it intothe commentary tradition. The only earlier thinkers whom we know tohave commented in any detail upon the Atlantis section of the Timaeuswere Porphyry and Iamblichus (204.25–9). We know for certain that theMiddle Platonist Severus did not, and we also know that the excessively‘philological’ Longinus made it his practice to omit any detailed treat-ment of the story (204.17–24). Besides these figures Proclus mentionsonly Crantor, Amelius, Origenes, and Numenius as interpreters86 of thestory in the course of his exposition between 75.27 and 204.29, and thelast three have probably been mentioned because of their importance forthe formation of Porphyry’s own views (cf. 77.6–7 and 23 on Origenesand Numenius). Porphyry must also be the source of what would appearto be reports of Longinus’ oral views;87 indeed, he is the kind of scholarwho would be expected to assemble whatever information he could fromdisparate sources, thereby ensuring a rich tradition in subsequent com-mentaries.

Perhaps what we can be most sure of is the liveliness of debate con-cerning the meaning of the Atlantis episode in the time of Plotinus andhis friends. Even so, Longinus’ habitual reticence on the Atlantis storysuggests that it was Porphyry who encouraged that debate, and devel-oped a real interest in producing the first proper commentary on it. Sowhat must hitherto have been skipped over quickly, being regarded aspreliminary material that supplied the setting for the serious study,88

now became a repository of ethical and psychological wisdom that couldoccupy most of the first book of a multi-volume study of the dialogue(204.27–9).

Early reactions to Atlantis

Literature on Atlantis may speak of a clash about the status of theAtlantis story even among Plato’s immediate followers, contrasting the

86 I do not find any strong evidence that Atticus, mentioned at 97.30–98.3, was genuinelyinterpreting the story, though it may be that he was treating the establishment of Athensprior to Sais at 23d–e, and defending Plato’s version. If so, then he was presumablyadopting a literal reading. The reference at 112.25–113.3 to Plutarch of Chaeronea,whom I tackle below, is to extant material unrelated to Atlantis.

87 It seems most unlikely that Longinus wrote much on a story that he could not be botheredto lecture on (204.18–24), and the exchange between Origenes and Longinus reportedat 63.24–64.3 clearly derives from an oral encounter witnessed by Porphyry.

88 With Severus’ attitude at 204.17 we should compare anon. Tht. IV which declaresthe conversation between Euclides and Terpsion to be something that requires nointerpretation.

61


view that it is pure fiction, plausibly associated with Aristotle, and theidea that it was verifiable history, associated with Crantor. At 190.4–8 weread as follows:

Hence one should not say that the one who obliterated the evidence [elenchon]undermines his subject matter [hypokeimena], just like Homer in the case of thePhaeacians or of the wall made by the Greeks. For what has been said has notbeen invented [peplastai], but is true.

This innocuous-sounding sentence takes us straight to the earlyevidence for Plato’s having invented the story of Atlantis. Posidonius(F49.297–303 Kidd), the Stoic from the second and first centuries bc, isbeing quoted by Strabo 2.3.6. He refers to the second Homeric exampleused by Proclus, and says of Atlantis ‘He who invented it obliterated it,like the poet in the case of his Achaean wall.’ The same verbs (plasso,aphanizo) are used by Strabo and Proclus for ‘invent’ and ‘obliterate’.These verbs are perfectly tailored to remarks about the status of thestory, since Plato himself uses the passive of aphanizo for the vanishingof Atlantis beneath the sea (Critias at 25d3), and plasso for the inventionof such stories (Socrates at 26e4). The first passage is the climax of thestory, the second is the battleground over which the status of the storymust even today be fought.89 These passages are thus related, and theoriginal suggestion seemed to be that Plato had followed the best literaryprecedents by making sure that nobody could ask for the evidence fora story they invented, and actually incorporating the destruction of theevidence in the story. I suspect that both Homeric examples were usedwhen the original remark was made, but one cannot be sure. The keyquestion is that of the relation of the examples to the story of Atlantis’destruction, and it seems that they are indeed well chosen to suggest theelimination of evidence by gods using destructive waters.90 Somebodythen had suggested that Plato had pre-empted doubts about the absenceof evidence for Atlantis by writing into the story an account of how itwas washed away.

Strabo gives us a strong clue to the identity of this person at XII.1.36.Here the theme of the inventor of a story causing his constructs todisappear in the story, and the example of the Homeric wall, are againused, but here it is to Aristotle rather than Posidonius that the quip isattributed. Aristotle, like other significant pupils of Plato, is likely to have

89 Cf. Johansen (2004), 45–6.90 See Il. 12.1–33 (cf. 7.433–63), Od. 13.149–87. One notes that Poseidon is in both

cases involved, after receiving Zeus’s consent to the destructive act, which is more orless implied in the curtailed story of Atlantis, where Zeus did indeed speak (Critias,121b7-c5), but the final destructive act through earthquake and flood (tsunami?) bore allthe hallmarks of Poseidon (Tim. 25c7-d3).

62


had insights into the circumstances of the composition of the Timaeusand Critias, and it is possible that references go back to either an anecdoteconcerning him or to a lost work. Somehow that remark was noted bythe geographical tradition followed by Posidonius and Strabo, and itcould have reached Porphyry either via Posidonius91 or via Crantor,92

or perhaps through Ptolemy, geographer of the previous century.93

The principal difficulty in having Aristotle make a remark that clearlyimplied that the story of Atlantis was a fiction is that another seeminglygood early authority, Crantor of Soli, has been understood as offeringearly support for the view that it is simple history. We have already raiseddifficulties about this view, but it is now time to examine properly whatProclus says.

Some say that all this tale about the Atlantines is [76] straightforward historia, likethe first of Plato’s interpreters, Crantor. He says that [Plato] was actually mocked(skoptesthai) by his contemporaries for not having discovered his constitutionhimself, but having translated the [ideas] of the Egyptians. He took so littlenotice of what the mockers said that he actually attributed to the Egyptians thishistoria about the Athenians and Atlantines, which says how the Athenians had atone time lived under that constitution. The prophets of the Egyptians, he says,also testify [for him], saying that these things are inscribed on pillars that stillsurvive. (75.30–76.10)

What is not in doubt is that Proclus understood from his source thatCrantor took the story of Atlantis as a historical account. So that historiais taken roughly as the equivalent of our ‘history’. The original senseof the word, ‘inquiry’, had long since given way to meaning II in LSJ:‘written account of one’s inquiries, narrative, history’. In other words ithad become more of a name for a written genre, and it was rapidly takenover by the Romans in this sense. A discussion of the failings of Rome inhistoria is found in Cicero, On Laws 1.6–7, where Atticus asks Marcus totake up writing history, and what is quite clear is that Atticus’ expectationof those who write historia is not the truth (which could be provided bymere annals). Rather it is an oratorical style that tells a narrative withdignity. The state that Cicero has saved could be embellished by him(ornata, 1.6), and his friend Pompey could be praised (laudes inlustrabit,1.8). The genre had long accepted the idea that gaps in the historical

91 Quoted at III. 125.14.92 Posidonius almost certainly used and responded to Crantor’s commentary when offering

his own interpretation of parts of the Timaeus dealing with the soul, since his position atPlut. Mor. 1023c–d clearly responds to Old Academic ideas (1012d–f), as Merlan (1960),34–58, made clear.

93 Ptolemy’s name is found a number of times in the commentary as a whole, and in theAtlantis section he makes an appearance just before Aristotle at 181.16–20.

63


record would be filled, and that fictional speeches would be written forleaders, throwing light on events for sure, but embellishing and evendistorting what was actually known to suit one’s agenda or that of one’sbackers.

In these circumstances historia is not a word that carries any necessaryimplication of truth, even though it may perhaps suggest some attempt tofind out what may have happened. All of Herodotus was unquestionablyhistoria, even if there is a considerable amount of myth, travellers’ tales,distortion, and especially magnification involved. The story of Atlantiscould similarly be labelled historia, even though myth, travellers’ tales,distortion, and exaggeration were an integral part of it. That the labelcould be applied to the particularly disreputable genre of travellers’ talescan be seen from the title of Lucian’s parody of the genre in which thenarrator visits the moon: Alethes Historia (True [hi]story). What is told byCritias in the Timaeus is in fact a traveller’s tale from an ancient poet.

For a final proof we should take the story of Phaethon from withinthe Atlantis episode, which Proclus announces that he will treat in threeways (109.8–9): historikos, mythikos and philosophikos (i.e. as historia, asmyth and as philosophy).94 He continues:

The historia asserts that Phaethon, the son of Helios and Clymene daughter ofOcean, veered off course when driving his father’s chariot, and Zeus, in fear forthe All, struck him with a thunderbolt. Being struck, he fell down upon Eridanus,where the fire coming from him, fuelling itself on the ground, set everythingalight. Upon his fall, his sisters, the Heliades, went into mourning. It is a basicrequirement that the conflagration should have happened (for that is the reasonfor the story’s being told) . . . (109.9–17)

Nobody would affirm that the outline of the myth of Phaethon givenby Proclus was exactly what happened, but it is precisely this outline ofputative events that is labelled a historia. Proclus correctly sees that suchstories are aetiological, i.e. are invented to serve an explanatory purpose.Consequently he does demand that the event requiring explanation, inthis case a conflagration, should have happened. Physicists will then beable to treat it as a myth and explain the meaning of the story in theirown terms, while philosophers will seek a loftier explanation. But themain point is that the historia was the bare narrative, and that nobodyis urged to treat that bare narrative as ‘history’ in the modern sense. Infact, what was for him the historia is for us the myth!

Once it is realized that historia carries no necessary implication oftruth it may easily be seen that the word translated ‘straightforward’

94 Festugiere marks off the sections as follows: explication historique 109.10–16; explicationphysique 109.16–110.22; explication philosophique 110.22–114.21.

64


which qualifies it, psile, is not present to suggest straightforward truth, ameaning that would require something like the alethes historia of Lucian’stitle above. The adjective’s basic meaning is ‘bare’ or ‘unclad’, and it mayalso mean ‘light-weight’ or ‘simple’, and it is regularly used in this bookto mean ‘free of any more weighty meaning’ (such as most interpretersfrom Numenius to Proclus himself attached to it). Hence the phrase asa whole suggests a narrative with no allegorical meaning.

Taking historia in its generic sense also throws light upon the first,unnamed group of interpreters to be contrasted with Crantor’s group:

Others say that it is a myth and an invention, something that never actuallyhappened but gives an indication of things which have either always been so, oralways come to be, in the cosmos.

Now it may be seen that ‘myth’ is treated as a rival genre, in which anarrative story is consciously composed in such a way as to reflect eternaltruths. It seems clear that the position of this group was that the storywas ‘false on the surface and true in its hidden meaning’ (76.15–16).There is a contrast of genre95 and a contrast between surface and hiddenmeanings, even without an explicit contrast of true and false. The nextgroup of interpreters, however, seem to agree with Crantor regardingthe genre, and with the other group with regard to the presence of anadditional and more important meaning. Yet their agreement on theformer issue with Crantor does not lead them to affirm the historicaltruth of the story, but rather to admit that things might have happenedthus (76.17–18). As Proclus puts it himself ‘nothing he said happened wasimpossible’ (190.9). In conformity with this he attempts with reference toAristotle to make credible the account of the flooding and disappearanceof Atlantis (187.21–188.24), and with reference to various geographicsources to make credible the account of Atlantis’ size (180.25–182.2).This last extract ends with the words:

We should not be sceptical about it, even if one were to take what is being saidas historia only.

Here we have yet another indication that historia involves no implicationof truth, for in that case the statement would be like saying ‘we shouldnot disbelieve it, even if one were to take it as true only’.96

95 This contrast is what is brought out again at 129.10: ‘it is neither a myth that is beingrelated nor a straightforward historia. While some understand the account only as historia,others as a myth . . .’

96 The meaning of historia in this debate will be clarified further in relation to Longinusbelow.

65


But let us move on to the real problem.97 When Crantor’s explanationof Plato’s tactics is given, nothing is said about Plato remembering anancient family story and being anxious to have the truth recorded. Onthe contrary, this is Plato’s response to mockery. Public mockery camemost often from the comic poets, to whose activity the verb for mocking(skoptein) had continued to be particularly appropriate, as one sees fromits close conjunction with the verb komoidein itself in Aristophanes’ finalplay (Plutus 557). It is thus most likely to be comic poets who are sug-gesting that the substance of his constitution in the Republic was takenover from the Egyptians. Aristophanes’ Assembly-Women98 already con-tained satire at the expense of some philosopher promoting at around393 bc the community of property and sexual partners, so such ideaswere certainly capable of attracting comic attention. What, then, is itabout the ideas that had brought Egyptians to mind? Is it that the chargewas plagiarism, plagiarism is reprehensible, and the actual origin did notmatter? Or was the borrowing of ideas from some quarters acceptable,and from others (including Egypt) ridiculous? I suggest that the paraba-sis of Aristophanes’ Clouds (545–59) shows clearly that the poets did noteschew plagiarism, and that nothing was considered wrong about utiliz-ing good ideas from other people. There was nothing wrong in imitatingwhatever it was about the Spartans that gave them an outstanding recordin warfare, nor did other cities shrink from introducing the cultural her-itage of Athens. Thus the ridiculous thing was that Plato took his ideasfrom Egypt.

Now while Egypt scarcely had the kind of political institutions thata normal Athenian citizen would think worthy of imitation, what wasimportant was the Athenian image of the Egyptians. This has recentlybeen discussed in relation to Atlantis by Johansen, who draws attention tocriticism of the Egyptians in Plato’s own Laws99 and even at Republic 436a.Plato is shown to be building on a stereotype, perhaps present alreadyin Aeschylus (fr. 373), but more visible in comedy,100 and continuing

97 The difficulties are also felt by Dillon (2003), 219, (2006), 22–3; they are explainedaway by Cameron (1983).

98 See 571–82 for the intellectual character of the proposals, 590–610 for the communityof property, 614–34 for the community of sexual partners, 635–50 for the recognitionof children/parents, 651–4 for the provision of essentials, 655–72 for the novel justicethat will prevail under these arrangements, 673–6 for the community of living andeating.

99 Johansen (2004), 39–40: though Plato admired some aspects of their education, there isa significant reservation at 657a5, and then the charge of knavery and lack of liberalityat 747b8–c8.

100 Johansen (2004), 40, citing Ar. Thes. 921–2 (as understood by the scholiast), and Crati-nus fr. 378K = 406PCG; tantalizing too is Cratinus Jun. 2, and Antiphanes 147.1–2K =145 PCG.

66


on to Theocritus 15.47–50. Egyptians, it seems, were generally creditedwith a crafty and untrustworthy nature. Furthermore, discourse on thesubject of Egypt was not such as to be trusted, neither the more imag-inative parts of Herodotus book 2 where the author’s claims of autopsiaseem particularly dubious, nor Socrates’ tales from Egypt such as theTheuth-story at Phaedrus 275b3–4.101 The Athenians would have beenwell aware that Plato had an interest in certain aspects of Egyptian loreand learning (including geometry), and the comic potential of tracinghis precious political ideas back to the devious and illiberal Egyptianswas quite considerable.

Mocking ridicule is only successful if there is some element of truthbehind it, but it is at first sight implausible to think that the whole accountof a Socratic state in the Republic could be stolen from Egypt. The Priestof Sais in the Timaeus does of course draw attention to the sharp separa-tion of the classes, allowing for a separate priestly caste where knowledgeresides, and a separate military class too (24a–b). He also draws attentionto unremarkable similarities in weaponry, and to the Egyptian devotionto various kinds of divine learning from which things useful to humansmay be found. But this does not add up to an especially close similarityto the state that Socrates has just recalled at 17c–19a, and it leaves outanything to do with community of property and community of wivesamong the guardians, as well as the arrangements for begetting childrenand selecting which of them are to be raised. It also makes no referenceto most of the educational arrangements. In Laws, however, Plato notesthings that he likes about the Egyptian rules, including the prohibition ofany kind of artistic innovation, resulting in permanent traditions (656d–657a), and of course the importance afforded to mathematical education(747a–c). And to anybody who had studied the Republic carefully, thesearch for a near-permanent social system, inspired by a love for math-ematical order and making much of the study of mathematics among itsgoverning class, must have had something of an Egyptian ring about it.

So what response did Plato offer to such ridicule? According to Cran-tor, we are told, he was so untroubled by it that he actually attributed thestory of the Athenians and Atlantines, including no doubt the idea thatthe Athenians themselves had once lived under Socrates’ constitution,to the Egyptians. In fact Plato willingly takes up at 24a–c the idea thatthe original instantiation of the Socratic state shared some of the organi-zation still known in Egypt, as if he were embracing in part the allegedcharges of his mockers. For the summary of the Socratic constitutionshows how limited the similarities are, even as regards education andlearning (18a). But in having the Egyptians tell Solon that this sort of

101 Quoted by Johansen (2004), 41.

67


constitution, with an emphasis on promoting valour and wisdom, wentback to the earliest Athenians, as well as implying that the ideals had cap-tured the imagination of the respected Athenian social architect Solonhimself, Plato turns the charges around. He suggests there is nothingforeign about the proposed social structures, and implies that they area legitimate part of Athenian heritage, lost through the ravages of time.Certainly they can be suspected of belonging elsewhere, but they can betraced back further, if not so much to Athens herself, then to the verygoddess of wisdom who is their protector.

What we achieve by following through Crantor’s interpretation is toreveal just how unexpectedly well it fits Plato’s text, explaining the sum-mary of the Republic and the Atlantis story together as part of an investi-gation into the real model for the Socratic constitution. This model willeventually be supplied by the discourse of Timaeus, when it offers theheavenly motions themselves as the pattern for the human soul to imitate(90a–d),102 a ‘paradigm in heaven’ as Republic 9, 592b2 would describeit. But in seeing the beauty of Crantor’s exegesis we also see that he isattributing to Plato a highly contrived opening dialogue, which excludesany possibility that the story of Atlantis is just an attempt to write plausi-ble history. The more precisely the story is tailored to suit Plato’s imme-diate objective of placing the Socratic state in its true context, the less itscontents can be determined by any supposed historical truth. Further-more, if Plato had been working from within his mockers’ assumptionsand accepting here the stereotype of the unreliable Egyptian,103 then hewas himself subtly undercutting Critias’ story.

Is it really possible, then, that Crantor held both that the story ofAtlantis was intended to be simple history, and that it was used by Platoas a means of turning the mockers’ charges against them?104 It is theo-retically possible that history will coincide with exactly what one needsto make one’s point, but it is unlikely that Crantor could at that time havebeen intentionally contributing to any vibrant debate about whether thestory was historically true. Further, too strong a statement from the first

102 It is important here that Crantor, unlike Xenocrates, explains the structure of theworld-soul that displays these motions in terms of its cognitive capacities, Plut. Mor.1012d.

103 One notes that Socrates at 26e, though doing his best to respond positively, fails tomake any comment at all about the possible implications of taking such a story fromEgyptian sources.

104 It may be argued that Proclus himself would have had no difficulty in accepting thatthe story was true in historical details, and yet carefully tailored by Plato to serve a non-historical purpose; but this is due to his assumption that Plato’s purpose is to presenta recurrent paradigm, for this should be able to be presented through an episode ofhistory in which it is instantiated.

68


commentator that the tale was factual might have discouraged the devel-opment of allegorical interpretations, and indeed it might have beenexpected to ensure that the early pages of the Timaeus did not receivesuch neglect from early commentators as 204.16–24 may suggest. Yetsomething must have been said to make Porphyry think that Crantortook it as factual.

We now have to employ the distinction so important to those whoadopt dramatic interpretations of Plato. We must distinguish, I think,between the view that Plato was trying to engage in historical inquiry andthe view that Plato represents Critias as trying to do so. Commentariesoften use the third person singular of verbs of speaking etc. in quitea confusing manner, so that one cannot easily determine whether it isPlato who is meaning something or his character. The problem is at itsmost acute in the case of characters who can be taken as ‘spokesmen’ fora Platonic position. Unlike Timaeus, Critias is not listed among Plato’sspokesmen by Diogenes Laertius (3.52), but clearly a literal interpreta-tion of Atlantis as Platonic history may regard him as such. Crantor did nothave to regard him in this way. Now it is strongly suggested by 20d8-e1that Critias thought he was offering a logos in the genre of history, beingultimately based on the same kind of historical inquiries as Herodotushad conducted. That the story had the authority of the respected Solonwas enough. It is much less clear that Socrates accepts this because of therelatively obvious irony of his response at 26e4–5.105 So Crantor couldlegitimately have been suggesting that Critias was offering his story ashistoria rather than as mythos, while explaining Plato’s purpose in offeringthe story as quite independent of its genre or its truth-status. So far thiswould make the best sense of Proclus’ evidence.

However, the evidence for Crantor then concludes with remarksabout the Egyptian priests of his time: ‘The prophets of the Egyptians . . .also give evidence, saying that these things have been inscribed on pillarsthat still survive.’ Proclus presents this as evidence used to confirm thetruth of the story, but can we be sure that Crantor was doing any morethan repeating the element of the story that has the priest affirm that thestory is written and preserved in the sanctuaries there (23a4–5)? Let usassume that Crantor was indeed saying that priestly characters in his ownday would affirm that the story is recorded. Even this does not guaranteethat Crantor accepted it at face value, for there was plenty of scope forirony in such a remark. If the whole discussion had developed from thecritics’ notion that the Egyptians are unreliable, and from Plato’s usingtheir unreliability to explain Critias’ convictions about the story’s truth,then the commentator’s additional note about what present Egyptians

105 See Johansen (2004), 45–6.

69


say would be confirming something. However, this would not be thetruth of the story, but their own untrustworthy nature. It is easy forthose who have listened to the myths preserved by modern tour guidesto imagine the Egyptians trying rather too hard to oblige their Greektourists. Proclus, in his anxiousness to say whatever he could on behalf ofthe literal as well as the symbolic truth of the Atlantis episode, certainlyunderstood whatever report he received as a confirmation of literal truth,but Crantor’s intentions were in all probability different. No commenta-tor since Crantor, we may assume, was ever able to discover the accountof Atlantis on the stone pillars of Egypt, and the geographers assumedthat it was a fiction.

Our report of Crantor’s discussion is of great value, but unfortunatelyCrantor’s purpose in making these remarks could be very far removedfrom what Proclus wishes to achieve by quoting them. What is cer-tainly interesting is that Crantor offered an account of the connectionsbetween the Republic, Timaeus, and Critias, seemingly in the course ofoffering some interpretation of the preliminary parts of the Timaeus,parts which some had refused to address. Whether we can say what typeof interpretation he offered, beyond the fact that he did not postulate anydeep allegorical meaning and that he stressed Plato’s interaction with hisown intellectual world,106 seems to me to be highly doubtful.107 Yet hehas provided for us, in a very different fashion from Iamblichus, a pathtowards an understanding of the link between the preliminary materialand the main dialogue. This was the link between prologue and sub-stance that some figure associated with the Platonic tradition had oncefelt to be lacking in the dialogues of Theophrastus and Heraclides.108

The forerunners of Porphyry

Following discussion of Crantor, Proclus moves on at 76.10–77.6 to dis-cuss several interpreters much closer to Porphyry, whose work was forthis reason more likely to have been accurately reported by Proclus.

106 One notes the similarity between this material and reports in authors such as DiogenesLaertius and Aulus Gellius of Plato’s relations with figures such as Xenophon andAntisthenes.

107 Attempts by Sedley (especially 1999a) to trace back the approaches to prologuesencountered in Proclus, in Parm. 658–9 to Crantor’s time seem to me to be read-ing far too much into Proclus’ term ‘ancients’, which need only go back to the time ofthe early Neoplatonists. The three approaches listed are those of Severus, Porphyry,and Iamblichus in this book of the in Tim. But Sedley’s use of the connection withHeraclides and Theophrastus (639) is indeed tantalizing.

108 Bastianini and Sedley (1995), 489, on the end of Proc. in Parm. 659; see also note 118below.

70


Even here, however, there are problems. It seems at first sight that nospokesman is named for the allegorical interpreters who denied outrightthat there was any historical truth in the story. This is followed, in anunusual order, by a great many who seem to have postulated a primar-ily allegorical interpretation: Amelius, Origenes, Numenius, Porphyry.Belonging to the middle of the previous century, Numenius is out ofplace, and his view appears to have been introduced as an afterthoughtbecause it is needed to explain the dependent position taken by Porphyry.My inclination is to assume that something is wrong with the way thatProclus has set out his material, and that Numenius had in fact deniedthe literal truth of the story. I believe this in part because it is muchmore likely that the first outright allegorical interpretation would havebeen prompted by the conviction that no alternative was possible. But at83.25–7 Origenes is said to have followed Numenius’ school to the extentthat he claimed that the story was concocted. This seems unequivocal,as we shall show in relation to Origenes.

Numenius was typical of his age in respecting the religious traditionsof various nations, including the Egyptians (fr. 1a), and his reverence forthem would no doubt have made Crantor’s explanation of the Atlantis-story very difficult for him to understand. Furthermore, it seems clearthat he would not be expecting to find literal truth in such a passage. Forhe had a particularly strong interest in myth and in allegorical interpre-tation, which he applies to Homer’s Cave of the Nymphs from Odyssey 13(frs. 30–2), to Odysseus himself (fr. 33), to the Myth of Er from the Repub-lic (fr. 35), and to the soul’s prison (phroura) in Phaedo 62b.109 Indeed,his interpretation of Timaeus’ monologue discovered much hiddenmeaning.110

Soul and, in particular, a sharp dualism concerning soul are at the heartof Numenius’ system. Myth had a history of representing pictorially theexperiences of the unseen soul, and a key Platonic text on the interpre-tation of myths (Gorgias 493a–c) explained ‘Hades’ as ‘the unseen realm’(b4) associated with the soul. It is therefore scarcely surprising that thestory of Atlantis is taken by Numenius to reflect the conflict that is cen-tral to his psychology, the conflict between a finer and an inferior type ofsoul. The former souls are described as the foster-children or nurslings(trophimoi) of Athena, since in Athena’s case the Athenians cannot bechildren but those she has adopted; the latter are generation-workersbelonging to the god who has oversight of generation, i.e. to Poseidon.How far Numenius worked out the details of his interpretation is unclear,

109 This is interpreted as pleasure in fr. 38, perhaps influenced by the bond of desireassociated with Hades at Crat. 403bc.

110 See now Tarrant (2004).

71


for he was not writing commentaries that required smaller matters to betackled.

The same was presumably true of Origenes, who retained the ideathat the war represented a conflict between unseen forces, but sees themrather as daemones (76.30–77.3). Once again there should be no sur-prise here, since one of Origenes’ two written works was the treatise OnDaemons (Porph. VPlot. 3), suggesting that the subject was a particularinterest of his. Numenius’ interpretation was presumably unattractiveto anybody who did not recognize two kinds of soul, one intrinsicallygood and the other intrinsically bad, such that they could be forever inconflict. The study of daemones more readily allows for such divisionswithin its ranks. There is a problem in Origenes similar to the one thatI raised regarding Numenius. He seems to be being classed by Proclusamong the allegorical interpreters who acknowledge that the story maystill be literally true. At 83.25 we read:

Origenes claimed that the narrative had been invented, and to this extent heagreed with Numenius’ party, but not that it had been invented in the interestsof artificial pleasure, in the manner of Longinus.111 Yet he did not add a reasonfor the invention.

The term I translate ‘invented’, peplasthai, is Proclus’ usual term fora manufactured story, directly connected with the noun plasma whichProclus had used to describe the views of those who denied the literaltruth of the Atlantis story (76.10) as well as picking up Plato’s plasthentamython at 26e4. That would make Origenes too a holder of the view thatthe story is without historical foundation. If this is the case, Proclus mustbe speaking somewhat loosely at 76.21, where ‘of these’ (touton) mustrefer to both sub-groups of interpreters who postulate a deeper meaning,both those who deny the literal truth of the story and those preparedto entertain it. Linguistically, the more natural reference would havebeen solely to the latter sub-group, but in fact the latter sub-group mayconsist only of Iamblichus, who at 77.25–7 is the first to be credited withthe view that the metaphorical meaning of the war does not invalidate itshistorical meaning, plus Syrianus and Proclus. In that case Numenius,Origenes, Amelius, and Porphyry would all have denied that the storywas literally true.

Origenes’ tendency to attack Longinus is again in evidence at 86.25–87.6, where Longinus’ linguistic observations are scorned as the utter-ances of somebody who thought Plato’s primary purpose here was to

111 As will be shown, this is not intended to credit Longinus with the view that the storyis fictitious.

72


devise a feast of artificial pleasures for the readers,112 turning Platointo a rhetorician rather than a philosopher.113 Origenes thought thatPlato’s aim was rather to strive for a spontaneous intuitive rightness,without ornament, capturing with precision the hidden truths to whichhe alluded. This, I take it, confirms that he did not seriously considerthe possibility that the war with Atlantis had ever taken place. ThoughOrigenes was clearly dissatisfied with the linguistic points that Longinusused to raise, this did not stop him from commenting on similar pointsof his own. We find him at 93.7–15 solving his own puzzle about the useof the term ‘most free-spirited’ (eleutheriotatos, 21c2) for Solon qua poet.While this proves that he did have some use for philology, in this casethe philology seems to have been tailored to the idea that the frame-work of the story at least was meant, like the regular material of Platonicprologues, to illustrate practical ethics.114 He also discusses the alleged‘temperance’ (eukrasia) of the Athenian climate (162.27–30), but in thelatter case the philological point relates firmly to the main subject of theTimaeus, and in particular to the heavenly motions and through themto soul. It is worth noticing that Origenes says nothing about daemoneshere, even though his own interpretation was supposed to involve a bat-tle between daemones rather than heavenly motions (Amelius) or souls(Numenius).

The position of Amelius, who interpreted the story as an image of thestruggle between the planets and fixed stars, was clearly an interestingone, but is not mentioned elsewhere. The Athenians represented thefixed stars, the Atlantines the planets, but in the struggle between theirmotions the overall movement of the universe (and hence that of the fixedstars) was bound to be dominant. We are given a clear indication thatAmelius saw some kind of ‘map’ of the universe in the picture of a centralisland, surrounded by three ‘wheels’ of water and two of earth, and finallymore land beyond the outside wheel of water (115d–16a, etc.). This doesnot fit with the seven circles of Proclus’ text (176.28), but at least it canrepresent the earth, the outer circumference with its fixed stars, and five

112 Another concept relating to pleasure, charis, seems to work itself into the very firstsentence of the Timaeus according to Longinus (14.19 = fr. 24.14; cf. fr. 14b.2–3, 12),and shortly after at 19b (59.11 = fr. 28.2). Here Origenes agreed to the term charis, butstill resists the suggestion that the aim is pleasure (160.1–3).

113 It is no accident that Plotinus’ famous remark about Longinus being philologos ratherthan philosophos (Porph. VPlot. 14, Longinus fr. 7) is recalled immediately betweenLonginus’ observation and Origenes’ response, while the idea of Plato aiming at acontrived pleasure recalls the orator and other flatterers in the Gorgias.

114 The conviction that prologues concern themselves with ethics would also quite natu-rally have led to his attack on Longinus for assuming that Plato aimed here to gratifyhis readers (60.1–3, 83.27–8, and 86.25–7).

73


planetary orbits. It seems to me likely that Amelius had been remindedhere of the Spindle of Necessity with its interlocking whorls in Republic10 (616d–617b), which clearly did represent the heavenly motions. Italso effectively reduced the number of separate motions between thecentre and circumference to five by linking the fifth, sixth, and seventhtogether.

When one considers Proclus’ own interpretative persistence and inge-nuity, it is not difficult to understand the assertion that Amelius went togreat lengths to justify his interpretation, even though we should notexpect to be convinced by it. However, one point is perhaps worth mak-ing, and that is the way Amelius did arrive at an understanding of Atlantisthat linked it firmly with the subject matter of the Timaeus. In partic-ular it linked it with the important circles of the Same and the Otherwhich will determine the heavenly motions and set the standard for themotions of our own souls (36c–d, 90a–d). In that respect he was moresuccessful than either Numenius or Origenes. The main problem withAmelius’ ideas is that they do not seem to be explaining anything thatcannot be well explained directly, so that it is hard to know why Platoshould have needed to tell this story at all. The invisible life of the soul isconveniently conveyed through images, but the motions of the heavensdo have their visible indicators.

There is one other important predecessor of Porphyry whom we haveyet to tackle, one who is not mentioned in Proclus’ introductory remarkson the interpretative history of Atlantis. This is not Plotinus, who evi-dently felt no need to interpret such passages, but Longinus, who, inspite of his relative lack of interest mentioned at 204.18–24 (=fr.37), isnevertheless mentioned more than the others in the detailed discussion(= frs. 32–6). He is usually present as an object of attack, but his overallview of the story is never openly stated. At 83.25–8, quoted above, Ori-genes was said to follow Numenius in claiming that the narrative hadbeen invented ‘in the interests of artificial pleasure, in the manner ofLonginus’. Here ‘artificial’ translates memechanemene (83.27, cf. 86.26),and the point is that, like the word before (peplasthai, ‘invented’) it is sug-gestive of a kind of Platonic manufacturing. Though Origenes acceptsNumenius’ kind of manufacture as worthy of Plato, he does not go sofar as to accept Longinus’ hedonistic kind.115 So it is important here notto assume that Longinus followed Numenius’ view that the story is man-ufactured, for it is doubtful whether Longinus would have felt flatteredto be accused of following Numenius in anything.116

115 Longinus apparently supported his view that the story was meant to give pleasure withreference to the term charis at Tim. 21a2.

116 I judge from fr. 4 and fr. 23.

74


Once this is acknowledged, there is no obstacle to crediting Longinuswith the view that the story of Atlantis was intended literally, and fourarguments against finding deeper meaning in it found at 129.11–23 canreadily be attributed to him. They exhibit both signs of his language117

and his reason for Plato’s having included the Atlantis episode: for seduc-ing the reader into persisting with the work, rather like Lucretius’ honeyon the medicine-cup. The arguments may be summarized as follows:

� Plato’s remarks at Phaedrus 229d discourage ingenious non-literalinterpretations;

� Plato’s methods of communicating doctrine are not obscure, likethose of Pherecydes, but in most cases direct;

� allegorical interpretation is only necessary if one cannot explain thepresence of an episode otherwise, whereas this episode is adequatelyexplained by the need to attract readers into continuing;

� if one tries to offer a non-literal interpretation of everything, onewill end up wasting as much time as people who explain every detailof Homer.

Clearly somebody was cautioning against the trend towards allegoricalinterpretation that had begun with Numenius. Although Proclus repre-sents them as arguments for the story being just historia and not mythos,there is absolutely nothing here that affirms that the story is true. Ratherhistoria is being used for an ordinary narrative exposition, while mythosimplies the presence of a hidden meaning within the narrative. Since thisis the same language as was applied to Crantor’s interpretation and itsconverse at 76.1–10, we may be confident that Crantor was not neces-sarily taking the story as history in our sense of the word. We can nowexplain Longinus’ absence from the main discussion of the interpreta-tion of the story, for there is no reason to suppose that Longinus wasadding substantially to the position espoused by Crantor. In fact Longi-nus’ liking for Crantor may well be the main reason why material abouthim, and through him about his contemporaries,118 still found a place

117 I refer to the language of literary seduction (��), which had already occurred at59.28 (Longinus fr. 28.20) and 83.23 (fr. 32.5). For this term’s place in literary criticismsee Patillon and Brisson (2001), 314–15.

118 Taking my lead from Sedley’s insight into references to the dialogues of Theophrastusand Heraclides at the end of Proc. in Parm. 659, e.g. Bastianini and Sedley (1995), 489,and Sedley (1999a), I have thought it right to ask myself how fairly obscure referencesto intellectuals of the late fourth and early third centuries might best have found theirway into the in Tim. There seems to be no need to hold Crantor responsible forthe use of Timon on the opening page, or to Eratosthenes and Theophrastus on theNile (120.4–121.12), but when one finds a reference to Praxiphanes, the comrade ofTheophrastus, sandwiched between material from Longinus and Porphyry’s firm reply

75


in Porphyry, and hence in Proclus’ commentary seven clear centuriesafterwards.

Remarks about his views on the Atlantis story confirm that Longinuswas resisting the trends that he detected in Platonic hermeneutics, mak-ing much of some details of language and puzzling over others. Interest-ingly he thinks that Plato is not committed to the remarks about Solon’spoetic status offered by the elder Critias at 21c–d (fr. 34 = 90.18–20),and he goes to great length to explain away in particular Plato’s seem-ingly non-factual remark on Athens’ climate (fr. 35 = 162.15–27). ButLonginus was of course Porphyry’s example of how not to do philosophy.

Porphyry on the Atlantis episode

One may assume from the outlines of early interpretations at 76.1–77.24that the principal influences on Porphyry’s interpretation of 20d–27bwere the three allegorical interpreters just covered. Proclus actually saysthat Porphyry thought he was offering a mixture of the positions ofNumenius and Origenes, and he is particularly struck by how Numenianhis view sounded (77.6–7, 22–4). Longinus, however, was a significantcontributor to the exegetical debate, and remained a figure to be reck-oned with. Porphyry directly engages with him at 94.7–9 and 162.31–3.

There are a total of seventeen fragments between 77 and 202, nos.X to XXVI in Sodano’s collection, and it is not surprising that there aresome recurrent themes among these. The majority of fragments con-tribute to the picture of a man of wide learning, well able to deal withgeographical and religious matters, among others. Similarly many dealwith, or at least touch on, matters of ethics. Since Porphyry thinks the warbetween Athens and Atlantis represents the struggle between superiorsouls and daemons associated with matter, it is inevitable that a numberof fragments involve one or both of these. The moon seems virtually torepresent Athens, being closely associated with Athena herself (165.16–19), with Asclepius (cf. Tim. 24c1) as lunar intellect whose craft is fromAthena (159.25–7), and with Hephaestus because Earth and Hephaestus(Tim. 23e1), the parents of the Athenians, represent the moon and

at 14.20–8, one should ask who has ensured that his contribution to the philologicaldebate was preserved. Theory has it that Crantor’s commentary would have includeda high proportion of philological material, e.g. Sedley (1997), 113. Again, at 90.21–8,immediately following material from Longinus, and still printed as Longinus fr. 34 byPatillon and Brisson (2001), 174, we have reference made to Heraclides, Callimachus,and Duris (this last a pupil of Theophrastus, ibid. 315). The dates of Crantor’s death(possibly 275 bc) and Callimachus’ birth (possibly 305 bc) are somewhat in doubt,but, if chronology allows, it would make excellent sense for Longinus to be followingCrantor at this point.

76


technical expertise respectively – while technically expert souls leavingAthena are sown into the moon (147.7–12). The type of soul sown intothe moon then descends with a nature that reflects the terms ‘war- andwisdom-loving’ applied to Athena at 24d1. They engage with daemonicforces associated with matter, performing great and marvellous deeds(171.17–21). The location of Atlantis is in the west, because this wasallegedly the place of badly-behaved daemonic powers (77.20–1).

It is characteristic of Porphyry that he specifies types of daemones, andthat while the term may be applied to the heroic souls in the retinue ofAthena, the daemonic forces whom they fight are described as characters(tropoi) embedded in matter, which have the power to affect the character(ethos) of souls (171.20–2). These kinds of daemones are the lowest two ofthe three classes posited at 77.9–15, the highest being divine daemoneswhose relevance to the story is not entirely clear. They may be identicalwith the ‘archangels’ of 152.12–14, who are turned towards the gods andserve as their messengers. In that case they would be ‘divine daemones’ inthe sense of daemones belonging to the gods.

A similar tripartition of what are called daemones by Plato119 is foundin Calcidius’ Commentary on the Timaeus (120), which was written wellafter Porphyry’s time but is often thought to be dependent on Numeniusfor such materials. The three groups are associated with ether, air, and‘humid stuff’. The highest group are called angels,120 then there are gooddaemons, and finally contaminated daemons, not specifically called ‘evil’(133). Here it seems that as in Porphyry the middle rank of daemons,who differ from the angels only in degree, are actually souls and havea care for bodies (135). But certainly not all daemons can be souls forCalcidius himself, for there are specific denials at 136 that certainly applyto the highest and lowest ranks. The lowest kind, who are defectors fromthe rank of angels, stand close to matter,121 which Calcidius reports ashaving been called ‘bad soul’ by the ancients.122 The Calcidian parallelsimmediately suggest that much of Porphyry’s material is as compatiblewith his Middle Platonic influences (mostly Numenian) as Calcidius’demonology had been. Proclus clearly had good reasons for seeing aclose link between Porphyry and Numenius, and it may be that themain differences between Numenius, Origenes, and Porphyry were overwhich groups were best described as ‘souls’ and which as ‘daemons’.

119 Chapter 119; see Somfai (2003), 133, for discussion.120 See Somfai (2003), 137–8.121 No doubt the liquidity of the essentia with which they are connected symbolizes the

flux of matter; cf. Calcidius on Numenius on Pythagoras at chapter 296 (Numenius fr.52.33–7).

122 135; cf. Calcidius on Numenius on Plato at chapter 297 (Numenius fr. 52.64–70).

77


When one considers the use of the moon that Plutarch made in hisimaginative discussion of souls and daemons in the De Facie, De Iside,De Defectu, and Eroticus, the Middle Platonist heritage seems almostoverwhelming.

Porphyry does not restrict discussion of souls to his treatment ofAtlantis, but also takes the general material about destruction by fireand flood as referring to the destruction of souls by inner forces, theconflagration of the passions and the floods of matter (116.27–117.18).He also uses comparative material from the myth of the war againstthe Titans (174.24–7). He imports material on the soul’s cycle of livesfrom Phaedrus 248–9 into his discussion at 147.18 (cf. 28). And even theextensive scholarly material about children’s memories at 194–5 can beseen as further development of psychological subject matter.

The following table, though occasionally requiring subjective judge-ment, might be useful for giving a general impression of the type ofcontent that Porphyry is known to have included in his commentary.

Diehl SodanoGenerallearning Ethics Soul Demons Moon Critique∗

77 X Egypt yes yes94 XI language yes109 XII comets116–17 XIII Homer &

Heraclitusyes yes

119 XIV Egypt/Nile146 XV yes147 XVI Egypt/rites yes yes152 XVII Egypt ??156 XVIII yes ??159a XIX ??159b XX yes162 XXI geography yes165 XXII rites yes yes yes171 XXIII yes yes yes174 XXIV myth yes yes196 XXV memory yes200–2 XXVI possibly204 XXVII yes

∗ usually critique of Longinus[Note that 200–2 is not from this part of Porphyry’s commentary, but doesimply an answer to a previous question, while 204 is a general remark of Proclusimplying Porphyry’s dissatisfaction with Severus and Longinus among others.]

78


From this table we have a rough idea of the coverage of the Atlantis chap-ters, and it must be said that we have a clear indication from 204 that histreatment was extensive. There seems little doubt that it was not propos-ing a particularly original line, but developing the work already done byNumenius and Origenes, perhaps with some attention to Amelius. Whilehis treatment was not polemical in itself, it could not avoid offering firmanswers to Longinus, who was at that time the surviving representative ofthe view that the story was to be read literally. Porphyry therefore musthave provided information about a lively debate, extending from thegeneral approach to interpretation to the details of individual passages.

This picture may be extended somewhat if one accepts that Longinusis the source of the literalist arguments at 129.9–23, for that would makeit almost certain that the reply on behalf of the non-literalists at 129.23–130.8 is in essence Porphyry’s reply. Let us briefly examine this:

Others, however, base their view on the story of Phaethon, of which Plato saysthat it ‘takes the shape of a myth, whereas its true reference’ is to somethingelse, one of the things that happens in the natural world; and they think it rightto trace this story back to its connection with nature. For the Egyptians too,whom he makes the fathers of this story, put the secrets of nature into riddlesthrough myths, so that the allegorical unveiling of this narrative would alsosuit the character who is telling it. Just as Timaeus himself will set forth hisarguments in the way that is proper to Pythagorean philosophy, by interpretingnature through numbers and shapes as through images, so too the Egyptianpriest would be teaching the truth of things through symbols, the manner thatis proper to himself.

In addition to this even Plato himself elsewhere censured those who weresaying everything straight off, so that even to the cobblers, as he says, they maymake their wisdom obvious. Consequently discourse that communicates truthin riddles is not foreign to Plato. This is what either side says.

There are really three arguments here. First Plato actually states thatthe story of Phaethon is to be interpreted allegorically; second Egyptianpractice is to teach via myths that are devised so that a symbolic inter-pretation will teach us the nature of things;123 third Plato thought itcrude to reveal everything to the philosophically uninitiated. Now first,Porphyrian material at 116.27–117.18 is in fact talking about the Por-phyrian interpretation of the result of Phaethon’s journey, which dealswith the overheating of quick-tempered souls, so there is no doubt thatthe story of Phaethon has been given a transferred meaning (somewhat

123 Note that Theol. I. 4.20.2–12 agrees with this extract in associating the Pythagoreanswith the method of teaching through images, and myths with teaching through symbols;it mentions only Orphics in connection with myths and symbols, being silent aboutEgyptian methods.

79


further removed from the basic meaning of the story than Plato’s textinvites). Second the amount of Egyptian material evident in the Por-phyrian fragments confirms that he is likely to have related his inter-pretation to Egyptian interpretative practice if at all possible; and thefinal argument seems no more difficult to attribute to Porphyry than toother non-literalists. So we are supplied with rather more detail aboutthe underlying rationale for Porphyry’s interpretation.

These considerations help to lead us to the conclusion that not onlyhad Porphyry adhered to a non-literal interpretation in which everythingwas being brought to bear on the unseen experiences of souls, but thathe had also actually denied the literal interpretation, like Numenius andOrigenes. And that in turn allows us to see the whole debate up to thetime of Iamblichus in terms of a dispute over whether the Atlantis storyshould be read as a straightforward narrative or as an allegory. We arenot convinced that there was ever an interpreter who was convinced thatthe story of the conflict between Athens and Atlantis was historically truein our sense, and hence questions of the detailed truth of the Atlantisstory never actually arose. Porphyry had no need to try to compromiseby allowing that, though allegorical, it might also have been historical.This would happen only when the terms of the original debate had beenmisunderstood.

Plutarchean interlude

Before proceeding to Iamblichus we should take a few moments to con-sider how Plutarch had responded to the story of Atlantis. Since hehimself used Crantor and Posidonius in his De Animae Procreatione, onewould expect the influence of any keen debate about the status of thestory to have surfaced in his work. Plutarch does find the occasion toinclude material on the story in his Life of Solon (26.1, 31.6–32.2), andthere were three allusions to the Critias (though none to the relevant sec-tion of the Timaeus) in the Moralia according to R. M. Jones (1980, 118).One of these is to the universe as conceived by ‘Timaeus’ (106a at 1017b),while the other two concern the moral values of the ancient Athenianstate (109b–c at 483d and 801d). None of these has any implication forthe status of the story.

Since he usually favoured a fairly literal reading of Platonic texts, itis not surprising that Plutarch treats the story as a straightforward nar-rative, and its connection with Solon as a broadly historical one.124 Hedoes not find it difficult to believe that Solon had heard that story from

124 However, Plutarch does deny Critias’ account of why Solon never managed to writehis poem on Atlantis, attributing it to old age rather than lack of time (31.6).

80


respected priestly figures in Egypt. However, he seems to have had nointerest in finding any historical content in the accounts of prehistoricAthens, Atlantis and their war. The lack of interest is perhaps reflectedin 31.6, where he talks of ‘the Atlantic account (logos) or myth (mythos)’,a seemingly neutral expression, yet one which clearly calls into ques-tion the sincerity of Socrates’ assumption that it is a logos as opposed toan invented mythos (26e4–5). Plutarch was not likely to miss the hintsof irony here. Perhaps this perception helped his Academic caution totriumph over his sense of devotion to Plato.

In 32.1 Plutarch ventures to say a little about Plato’s plans for the story,but the main motives attributed to him seem to be family obligation andambition. There is nothing about the preservation of history or anyulterior purpose within a sequence of dialogues. Plato’s ambition is sup-posedly shown in the glorious detail of his picture of Atlantis – the kindthat no other logos or mythos or poetic composition ever had. This seemsto indicate that Plutarch thought that, at very least, Critias’ account ofAtlantis was full of material that was not part of any received story andhad been added so as to import an entirely contrived grandeur and mag-nificence into it. Plutarch, I would claim, viewed the story in its Platonicversion as no better than historical fiction. Hence Plutarch does noth-ing to alter our picture of a scholarly world without any notable advo-cate of the view that the story of Atlantis was strictly and literally true.

It would be worth adding here that Seneca’s Natural Questions wouldbe a natural place for some mention to be made of the Atlantis story –if its literal truth had been suspected. The work deals with floods andearthquakes, and mentions well-known examples. The disappearance ofHelice and Buris beneath the waves (373 bc) is mentioned at 6.23.4,6.25.4, 6.26.3, 6.32.8, 7.5.3–4 and 7.16.2, while Atalante’s similar fateduring the Archidamian War (Thuc. 3.89.3) is reported at 6.24.6. Yeteven the last cannot prompt a mention of Atlantis. And in Pliny’s NaturalHistory (6.199) we do find a mention, in a geographically vague section onislands off Africa, of an existing island called ‘Atlantis’, again without thisprompting any mention of Plato’s sunken island. What we do find in thisperiod is the claim in Strabo (2.3.6 = F49.297–303 Kidd), going back toPosidonius, that it is possible that such a catastrophe might have occurred.But this occurs in a context with implications for physical science, notfor Platonic exegesis.

Iamblichus and Proclus

In its broad outlines the Iamblichan interpretation of Atlantis is alsoSyrianus’, and therefore Proclus’ interpretation. This is immediatelyclear at 77.24–8 (in Tim. fr. 7):

81


Well, these people at any rate were in my view given a really splendid caningby Iamblichus. Both he and my own teacher prefer to explain this conflict notat [the expense of] setting aside the surface meaning, but on the contrary, in theconviction that these things have happened in every sense.

It should be immediately obvious that ‘these people’ are Amelius, Ori-genes, Numenius, and Porphyry, and that the thrust of the attack wasdirected against the view that the surface meaning should be set asideor invalidated. Iamblichus’ strategy had been to view the story as a goodhistorical example that could be used to illustrate with considerable pre-cision the rivalry that is fundamentally embedded in the cosmos, appear-ing at a succession of metaphysical levels in slightly different guises. Atthe highest level it appears in the juxtaposition of the Dyad with theOne (not the supreme One) that is opposed to it. At some levels it ispresent eternally, at others it appears in a temporary fashion that can bespelled out in a narrative. The ubiquity of the pattern can explain whyPlato could take a particular true story and make it mean something ona universal level, so offering a story that accords with Critias’ words inbeing ‘true in every way’ (20d8). Because earlier thinkers had failed tosee the universality of the pattern, and only sought one level at whichthe narrative would fit some truth, none of them had been in a positionto see that a symbolic truth does not exclude a literal truth. This wasIamblichus’ invention.

Naturally, an important step towards this interpretation wasIamblichus’ conviction that everything within a dialogue must be seen ascontributing to its single goal or skopos. That meant that the Atlantis storyhad to be contributing in some fundamental way to the understanding ofthe natural world. This would require an interpretation rather differentfrom the ethical and psychological approaches adopted by Porphyry andhis predecessors. At times he may be found trying to substitute an inter-pretation that suits a physical study for one better suited to a study ofsouls and their lives (in Tim. frs. 12, 15), though signs of anti-Porphyrianpolemic are not limited to such cases. Furthermore, the single-skopos ideawould entail that not merely the narrative of the war had additional sym-bolic meaning, but also the frame story about Solon (93.15–30 = in Tim.fr. 10) and the passing of the story to Critias (in Tim. fr. 24). But occasion-ally Iamblichus surprises by refusing to postulate a symbolic meaning forsome details of the text (in Tim. fr. 23), though this may be inspired asmuch by his dislike of Porphyry’s approach as by theoretical considera-tions.

As will readily be seen, Iamblichus’ position involves postulating acolumn of opposites, whose inspiration was the famous Pythagorean

82


column, through which tension or conflict pervades all metaphysicallevels below the primal One. This means that the war between Athensand Atlantis symbolizes something that is found everywhere and at everylevel, being quite as important for the construction of the cosmos asHeraclitus had long ago maintained. So whether Amelius found thatconflict in the heavens, or Porphyry found it in a clash between goodsouls and awkward daemons, they would be unnaturally focussing on apart of the meaning that the story needs to have. Its symbolism was ofthe greatest importance, and, as we have seen in relation to Socrates’constitution, the constitution and the war were images of the unifyingand divisive elements in the cosmos respectively. One way in which Ifeel that Iamblichus differs from Porphyry is in his removal from theLonginus-inspired environment where the text is mined for all that itcan yield. An Amelius or a Porphyry can seize upon clues in the text thatwill support their specific understanding of it, but Iamblichus looks ratherat ‘wholes’, relating big episodes to the themes of the whole dialogue,and he needs no clues in Plato’s language to narrow his idea of Atlantis’sphere of relevance.

Obviously, given the breadth of Iamblichus’ interpretation he had tobelieve that in human history things like that do happen. If Plato’s storyaccurately reflects a central feature of the cosmos that is instantiated atevery level, then it must be instantiated at our level too. Hence we readat 76.17 that ‘Some do not rule it out that this could have happened inthis way’, and this already points forward to Iamblichus. Further, 77.25–8 suggests that the main tenet regarding the outward meaning of thestory was that it did not have to be seen as a lie in order for the fullallegorical significance to be appreciated. Perhaps he was already keento claim what we read in Olympiodorus (in Gorg. 46.6), that Platonicmyths (as opposed to poetic ones) do one no harm if one takes themliterally and fails to see an allegorical meaning. What we do not find inIamblichus is any attempt to prove that the literal meaning is historicallytrue.

Proclus may perhaps have gone one step further in the quest for his-torical truth. Though much of the argument to support the acceptanceof a historical meaning is designed to prove that details given here byCritias are not as impossible as they seem, there are occasions whenProclus seems to demand more than this. While 190.7–8 again stops atcautioning against dismissing the story, his discussion of the less cred-ible details at 177.10–21 and 180.25–182.2 does use material from thegeographers that can be seen to support there having been an Atlantisof the general size and type described. Often, however, he speaks as ifPlato had been at liberty to alter details, and often he seems to think of

83


the demands of history as those of a genre rather than historical accu-racy. Some of the tensions here may be due to the particular blend ofIamblichan considerations and what Proclus has updated, but to demandstrict accuracy would be superfluous. Neither Iamblichus nor Syrianusnor Proclus ever intended that the historical meaning should get in theway of their metaphysical one.

84

On the Timaeus of Plato: Book 1

Proclus on the Socratic Stateand Atlantis

Analytical table of contents

Proclus in Timaeum 1.1–204

Prefatory remarks, 1.1–14.3

Preliminaries I: the target of the Timaeus, 1.1–4.5Preliminaries II: the plan of the Timaeus, 4.6–7.16Preliminaries III: the literary character of the Timaeus, 7.17–8.29Preliminaries IV: the background of the discussion, 8.30–9.24Digression on nature, 9.25–12.25Relation to the Parmenides, 12.25–14.3

Introductory texts, 14.4–26.20The missing person, his sickness, and its consequences, 14.4–26.20

Socrates’ constitution, 26.21–75.25Remembering the Socratic constitution, 26.21–28.13Why recapitulation is appropriate and why it fits here, 28.14–32.29The separation of classes, 33.1–36.31The role and character of the military class, 37.1–40.13Education and upbringing of the guardian class, 40.14–42.8Community of property and of lives, 42.9–45.27The position of females, 45.28–50.3Arranged marriages, 50.4–52.10The demotion of children in the universe, 52.11–54.10The lessons from the summary of the constitution, 54.11–55.26Explaining Socrates’ desire, 55.27–59.7Socrates’ feeling and Plato’s beautiful creation, 59.8–61.29Point two: Socrates’ inadequacies, 62.1–63.12Point three: the inadequacies of the poets, 63.13–66.32Point four: inadequacies of the itinerant sophists, 67.1–28Point five: those capable of such praise, 68.1–69.10The qualifications of Socrates’ companions, 69.11–72.15Transition to the story of Atlantis, 72.16–75.26

Atlantis, 75.27–191.13The early debate over the genre of the story of Atlantis, 75.27–77.24The Iamblichan view of Atlantis, 77.24–80.8Details of the text at Tim. 20d7–e1, 80.8–19Family trees and their significance, 81.20–83.14The appropriateness of the Atlantis story, 83.15–85.30Three lemmata in brief, 86.1–88.8

87


Athenian religious history, 88.9–89.5The hidden lessons of the events at the Apaturia, 89.6–90.12Praising Solon’s story and handing down his work, 90.13–93.30Two brief lemmata, 93.31–94.28Dynamics of the passage on Sais and Egyptian geography, 94.29–96.2Individual questions on Egyptian geography and its symbolism, 96.3–97.9The history and religion of Sais, 97.10–99.26Ancient and more recent history, 99.27–100.16Greek and Egyptian antiquities, 100.17–101.24Was the priest’s reply an insult? 102.1–103.6Seniority and youth as universal symbols, 103.7–104.17Cyclic processes of generation and destruction, 104.18–108.7Introduction of, and various approaches to, the myth of Phaethon,

108.8–114.21The problem of deviations in the heavens, 114.22–116.1The temporal spacing of catastrophic events, 116.1–21Iamblichus criticizes Porphyrian allegorical interpretation, 116.21–117.27Brief discussion of the theological implications of two more passages,

117.28–119.6Geographical interlude: the swelling of the Nile, 119.7–121.26Temperate climate and continuity of human habitation, 121.27–123.15The preservation of memory and its universal counterpart, 123.16–124.29Several lemmata more briefly considered, 125.1–129.8The question of the status of the story resumed, 129.9–132.30Solon’s request, the priest’s response, and what they signify, 132.31–134.22Digression on the peplos, 134.22–135.15The symbolism resumed, 135.15–136.8General digression on cosmic divisions and divine lots, 136.9–139.17Readiness for the reception of a god, 139.17–140.15How Athena comes to have Athens and Sais, 140.15–142.10Hephaestus, 142.11–144.18The priority of the Athenians, 144.18–145.4An Iamblichan difficulty and its solution, 145.5–31The dates of ancient Athens and of Sais, 146.1–148.16Lexis: details of the text interpreted, 148.17–150.18The Egyptian class structure compared, 150.19–156.11Weaponry compared, 156.12–157.23The wisdom of the goddess and her two cities, 157.24–158.30Lexis: some details considered, 158.31–160.22Allotment and selection, 160.23–162.10Earlier thought on the balance of the seasons, 162.10–30Proclus on the balance of the seasons, 162.31–164.21Miscellaneous additions, 164.22–165.5The dual character of Athena – earlier interpretation, 165.6–30The dual character of Athena – Proclus’ interpretation, 165.30–168.27Other epithets of Athena, 168.28–169.22

88

Analytical table of contents

The Athenians and what they stand for on a universal level, 169.22–170.24The Athenians’ greatest deed and its paradigmatic significance,

170.25–171.23The Athenians’ opponents and what their confrontation represents,

171.24–175.2Lexis: the overall interpretation applied to details of the text, 175.2–177.9The compatibility of historical and symbolic interpretations, 177.10–178.10Lexis: principles applied to details of the geography, 178.10–180.4Symbolism of the confined sea, 180.5–21The size of Atlantis, 180.22–182.2The symbolism of the power and influence of Atlantis, 182.2–183.20The description of Atlantis’ power as narrative, 183.20–30Atlantine power unified within the straits, 184.1–23What the Athenians stand for, 184.24–185.11The Athenians and other peoples within the straits, 185.12–186.7Lexis: details of the text explained, 186.7–187.12Science, symbolism and the destruction of Atlantis, 187.13–190.30Summary of interpretation of Atlantis, 190.31–191.13

Closing considerations, 191.13–204.29The status of Critias and his story, 191.13–192.27Critias’ delayed memory, 192.28–194.9On the memory of children, 194.10–195.30The cosmic significance of the agreement with Timaeus and Hermocrates,

196.1–29Socrates agrees on the story, 197.1–24Luck, listening, and their cosmic significance, 197.25–198.20The order of the trilogy: Republic – Timaeus – Critias, 198.21–202.10Lexis: details of this passage and the next considered, 202.11–204.15Conclusion, 204.16–29

89


Prefatory remarks (1.1–14.3)

Preliminaries I: the target of the Timaeus

It seems to me to be glaringly clear to all who are not utterly blind to seri- 1ous literature that the aim of the Platonic Timaeus is firmly fixed upon 5

the whole of physical inquiry, and involves the study of the All, deal-ing with this from beginning to end. Indeed, the Pythagorean Timaeus’own work has the title On Nature in the Pythagorean manner. This 10

was, in the sillographer’s words, [the point] ‘from which Plato beganwhen he undertook to do Timaeus-writing’.1 We used this work as anintroduction to our commentary, so that we should be able to knowwhich of the claims of Plato’s Timaeus are the same, which are addi- 15

tional, and which are actually in disagreement with the other man’s –and make a point of searching for the reason for the disagreement. Thiswhole dialogue, throughout its entire length, has physical inquiry asits aim, examining the same matters simultaneously in images and inparadigms, in wholes and in parts. It has been filled throughout with 20

all the finest rules of physical theory, tackling simples for the sake ofcomplexes, parts for the sake of wholes, and images for the sake of theiroriginals, leaving none of the originative causes of nature outside thescope of the inquiry.

The more sharp-witted of us ought now to go on to observe thatthe dialogue engages appropriately with an aim like this, and that Plato 25

alone, while preserving the Pythagorean character of the study of nature,has fine-tuned the teaching that he had adopted. For physical inquiry, 2to put it briefly, is divided into three, one part busying itself with matterand material causes, the next including investigation of the form too andrevealing that this is more properly a cause, and the third part demon- 5

strating that these do not even have the role (logos) of causes (ratherthey play the role of supplementary requirements), postulating that the‘causes’ in the strict sense of natural occurrences are different: the pro-ductive, the paradigmatic, and the final.

1 Timon of Phleious, 54.3 = 828.3 (Lloyd-Jones and Parsons). Timon’s story and thequestion of the Pythagorean background to Plato’s work together provide much of theimpetus for Siorvanes (2003).

91


The majority of physicists before Plato have spent time on matter,10

some affirming that one thing is the substrate, others that somethingelse is. For even Anaxagoras, who seems to have seen that intellect isresponsible for occurrences ‘while the rest slumbered on’,2 makes nofurther use of intellect in his explanations, but instead holds various kindsof air and of aether responsible for events, as Socrates says in the Phaedo15

(98c). Those who have led the faction after Plato,3 not all of them, butat least the more exacting, believed that the physicist should study theform too, alongside matter, tracing back the origins of body to matter andform.4 For although they may perhaps make mention of the productive

2 Commentators note that the phrase occurs at Rep. 390b6. Though that passage couldbe quite unrelated, one notices a similar irony, insofar as the very one who exhibitsthe greatest wakefulness (there Zeus, here Anaxagoras) lapses into forgetfulness. Thepioneering (but largely unexploited) causal role of Anaxagoras’ intellect was perhaps thebest-known feature of his thought, following Phd. 97c1–2, Arist. Metaph. 984b18–20,985a18–21 etc.

3 The term haeresis, which sometimes signifies a school in the doctrinal sense, though it doesnot do so in an institutional sense (Glucker 1978, 166–93), should not here be interpretedas a school, but as an approach to nature that continues to emphasize the part playedby matter and material change in a broadly Ionian tradition. It is natural that Proclusshould contrast that tradition, which he associates with the synaitia or supplementaryrequirements, with the Pythagorean tradition, linked below with the study of true causes.The germ of this contrast is present in Aristotle, who tackles the Ionian tradition atMetaph. 1.3–4, then the Pythagoreans and Plato in 1.5–6; he could be interpreted asseeing the former as his own predecessors (983b1). Hence Festugiere errs not only inhis interpretation of the word as a formal School (Ecole philosophique), but in theconsequent notion that this is the Academic tradition of which Aristotle was seen asa leader. Clearly, for this to be the Platonic tradition, some Platonists or Aristotelianswould have to be seen as neglecting form as well as the motive cause.

4 This is widely assumed to be Aristotle (see Phys. 2.1, 192b13–193a2), but the pluralsuggests that it is not exclusively a reference to Aristotle. I assume that Proclus has post-Platonic materialistic philosophy in general in mind, seeing Aristotelians as offeringa version that may at least be reconciled with Plato. While one might legitimately askwhether Aristotle’s well-known theory of four causes was ever such as to encourage hissystem to be seen in two-cause terms, one should note that Proclus does not considerAristotle to be any more than a willing user of Plato’s system of causes (and then onlyof four rather than five of them), and that the issue is not one of paying lip-service to atype of cause (as may be seen in the traditional criticism of Anaxagoras), but of actuallymaking use of it. At the universal level it is quite legitimate for Proclus to accuse Aristotleof having no qualifying creative power and no purposeful intent. The veiled criticism ofAristotle’s theory of causes has its antecedent in Syrianus, e.g. in Met. 1080a4, 121.22–31,where the fact that only enmattered form is allowed calls into question the existence ofa creative cause motivated by the desire to bring about a form-related end. The absenceof the paradigmatic cause effectively excludes the final, which in turn severely limits theconcept of the creative cause, so that all three causes in the strict sense of the term areunable to play a significant role in Aristotle. He is therefore left in the company of thosewho fully utilize only the synaitiai.

92

Prefatory remarks

cause as well, as when they affirm that nature is the origin of motion,5 20

they still deprive it of any vigorous (drasterios) or strictly productive role,since they do not agree that this [cause] embraces the structures (logoi)of those things that are created through it, but allow that many thingscome about spontaneously too.6 That is in addition to their failure toagree on the priority of a productive cause to explain all physical things atonce, only those that are bundled around in generation.7 For they openly 25

deny that there is any productive [cause] of things everlasting. Here theyfail to notice that they are either attributing the whole complex of theheavens to spontaneous generation, or claiming that something bodilycan be self-productive.8

Plato alone follows [the tactics of] the Pythagoreans: his teaching 30

includes the supplementary requirements of natural things, the recep- 3tacle and the enmattered form, that are subservient to what are strictly‘causes’ in the process of generation; but prior to this he investigates theprimary causes: the one that creates, the paradigm, and the goal.9 It isfor this reason that he sets over the All:

demiurgic intellect, 5

an intelligible cause in which the All is pre-established,and the Good, which stands before the creator in the role of object

of desire.

For because that which is moved by another is dependent upon the powerthat moves it, it evidently cannot naturally bring itself forth, nor completeitself, nor preserve itself. For all these tasks it needs the productive cause 10

and its integrity is maintained by it. That means that the supplementaryrequirements for physical things ought to be dependent on the truecauses:

5 On nature as the origin of motion, Festugiere refers to Phys. 2.1, 192b13ff. and, morespecifically, Metaph. 5.4, 1014b16–21.

6 The absence of the logoi in the creative principle (equivalent to Ideas or paradigms towhich the creator can refer) deprives that principle of creative intent, and so allows forunintentional creations. For spontaneous generation in Aristotle see Phys. 2.4–6, 195b31etc.

7 While it can be seen from the attention afforded to the gods and the heavens in thepresent work that the physical world of Proclus extends far beyond generation, he nowhas in mind Aristotle’s ungenerated and imperishable bodies made of aether.

8 Though Festugiere notes that Epicurus took the first of these alternatives, this is anunwitting dilemma into which Aristotle is thought to plunge. What Proclus is doing isdeducing the consequences of this denial, based on the true premise that for any x, xmust either be produced by another, or be self-produced, or be un-produced.

9 Proclus ascribes to Plato the same five causes as had already been found in Seneca Ep. 65,and which are also present in Porphyry fr. 120 Smith (which adds a sixth, the accessoryor organikon). See on this Baltes (1987–), IV Bausteine 116–17.

93


by which a thing is produced,in relation to which it has been fashioned by the father of All,and for the sake of which it has come into being.10

So it is with good reason that Plato investigated and taught in detail aboutall these [three], plus the remaining two, form and matter, which are15

dependent on these. For this cosmic order is not the same as intelligibleor intellective cosmic orders, which are rooted in pure forms, but thereis in it a part that acts as structure (logos) and form, and a part that actsas substrate. However, this can be investigated another time.20

That it was with good reason that Plato attributed the cosmic creationto all of these causes is evident from this much. [the Good, the intelligibleparadigm, the productive force, the form, the substrate.]11 For if hewere speaking about the intelligible gods, he would only be indicatingthat the Good was their cause, as the intelligible number derives from25

this cause alone. If it were about the intellective gods, then he wouldhave posited both the Good and the intelligible as their cause, as theintellective plurality proceeds from the intelligible Henads and fromthe single source of realities. If it were about the hypercosmic level,then he would be producing them from the intellective and universalcreation, plus the intelligible gods, plus the overall cause – for that is, in30

a primary, ineffable, and inconceivable manner, the basis of all that thesecond things are generative of. Since, however, he is to converse aboutimmanent things and about the cosmos in its entirety, he will allocate it4both a matter and a form that enters into it from the hypercosmic gods,he will link it to the whole creative process, he will assimilate it to theintelligible Animal, and he will declare it a god through participation inthe Good. In this way he will bring the whole cosmos to completion asan intelligent and ensouled god.125

10 At 3.13 editors reject the MSS �� in favour of Kroll’s plural; bearing in mindthe singulars in the two lists of 3.3–6, an excellent alternative might be to change thepreceding relatives (�� , �) to the singular, for, though the antecedent ‘causes’ isplural, that could involve three separate singular causes. At the cosmic level there can beonly one final cause (and plausibly one ‘father’ and one paradigm), but 3.11–13 seemsto be a statement about causes in general, so that the plurals would not be out of place.Fortunately the question need not affect the translation.

11 I excise these words as a gloss on ‘all of these causes’. They break the natural connectionbetween �� and the reasons that follow.

12 Note that the five causes are now linked with a fivefold metaphysical hierarchy: (i) asingle final cause, that is a cause of everything, (ii) a limited number of intelligiblegods or henads that function as paradigms of all that comes into being, (iii) intellectivegods responsible for demiurgic creation of all that comes after, (iv) hypercosmic godsthat are a source of form to what lies below within the world, and (v) matter thatis needed as the last of the causes for the physical world that we know. While the

94

Prefatory remarks

Preliminaries II: the plan of the Timaeus

So we’ve now identified and described the target [skopos], at which,according to us, the Timaeus aims. This being so, it’s quite appropriatethat at the beginning the order of the All is indicated through images,in the middle the total creation is recounted, and towards the end the 10

particulars and final stages of the creation-process are fitted in with theuniversals. The resumption of the Republic’s constitution, you see, and themyth of Atlantis, are instances of the study of the cosmos through images.For if we focus on the unification and the plurality of things within thecosmos, we shall say that the constitution summarized by Socrates is the 15

image of its unification, establishing as its goal the all-pervasive com-munion of things, while the war between Atlantis and Athens narratedby Critias is the image of their division, particularly of the oppositionimplied by the two columns.13 Whereas if [we go] by the distinction 20

between heavenly and sublunary realms, we shall claim that the consti-tution is assimilated to the heavenly arrangement (for Socrates too saysthat its paradigm is founded in the heavens),14 while the Atlantine waris likened to generation, which subsists through opposition and change. 25

So these things precede the universal physical inquiry for the reasonsstated.

Following upon this he teaches the demiurgic cause of the All, andthe paradigmatic, and the final. With these pre-existing, the All is fash-ioned both as a whole and in its parts. For its bodily component is con-structed with forms,15 being divided both by demiurgic divisions and by 30

divine numbers, and the soul is produced by the demiurge, and filled

passage gives a very economical picture of Proclus’ divine hierarchies, it is particularlyuseful for showing how a complex system of divinities is able to be reconciled with thefairly modest requirements of the Timaeus: essentially Good, Paradigm(s) or intelligibleAnimal, and Demiurge. Given that the five-cause system is itself of much earlier origin,found already in Seneca’s Epistle 65, it is not surprising that in this economical versionthe Proclan divine hierarchy seems relatively easily reconciled with some of MiddlePlatonism, where the pattern Good – Intellect/Ideas – Soul – Body/Forms – Matterrecurs (see Tarrant 1985, 136 n.7). Five causes and a five-stage metaphysic are similarlylinked in Plutarch of Athens (Proclus in Parm. 1059.3–7) and his Rhodian predecessor(1057–8), so the traditional nature of this material is assured.

13 Referring to a quasi-Pythagorean series of pairs of opposites introduced into the inter-pretation of the story by Iamblichus, and retained by Proclus; see below 78.1–25 etc.for these systoichiai.

14 A reference to Rep. 592b, a passage late in book 9 to which Platonists of antiquity oftenreferred.

15 I differ from Festugiere and Lernould here in taking the first dative with the main verb(is the bodily component cut by forms?), the first �� as ‘both’, and the second twoparticiples with the participle.

95


with harmonic ratios (logoi) and with divine and demiurgic symbols,16

and the total living creature is bonded together17 in accordance with the5unified compass18 of the cosmos in the intelligible realm, while the partsthat are within it19 are appropriately positioned in the whole – both thebodily parts and the life-giving ones. For individual souls that are beingsettled within it are enlisted in the company of their guiding gods,20

and become worldly via their own vehicles,21 imitating their leaders,225

and the mortal creatures are fashioned and given life by the gods of theheavens.

16 The symbols are, to the reader of the Timaeus, the unexpected element of the list.There is a distinct possibility that its presence here is influenced by Or. Chald. fr. 108(des Places) = Proclus in Crat. 21.1–2.

17 This involves the interweaving of soul and body at 36d–e, where Plato uses a differentverb of weaving (e2).

18 For comparable meanings of �� cf. I. 73.14, 148.26. Lernould translates ‘contenu’,rejecting Festugiere’s ‘plan’, and includes considerable discussion at 76 n.34. It seemsclear to me that we have a reference to the paradigmatic living creature at 37c–d towhich the universe is assimilated, and which contains all that is to be contained by theuniverse of our experience (39e).

19 This ‘it’ is masculine or neuter, and could in theory refer to either the total livingcreature (so Festugiere and Lernould) or to the intelligible realm (which I feel makesbetter sense). Lernould (68) makes the mention of parts a major new step in Proclus’conception of the plan of the Timaeus in spite of the fact that the language does notsuggest any shift, as it certainly does at 4.26 and at 6.7. It seems to me that the place ofthe parts within the whole is still concerned with the creation of the whole.

20 While the equal allocation of souls to each of the stars at 41d8-e1 is the passage thatProclus has in mind here, also relevant are the gods of Phaedrus 246e4–247c2, in whosetrain human souls attempt to follow. Zeus is there spoken of as ‘the great guide in heaven’,but one can try to follow any one of eleven gods (cf. 250b, 252c–d), so that Proclus’idea of guiding gods fits this text well. So he argues that the examination of humansexamines the universe through the microcosm (cf. 202.26–8), as well as coupling theobserver with the object under observation.

21 The doctrine of a pneuma-like chariot for each individual soul has a long history, as can beseen from the relevant appendix in Dodds (1963), 315–21. The Platonic passages that thedoctrine is based on are drawn from the Phaedo and Phaedrus as well as the Timaeus. Thepresent passage makes it imperative to locate discussion of the chariot in the Timaeus,but the only relevant use of this term for ‘chariot’ occurs at 41e2. Festugiere here deniesthat Proclus has in mind the allocation of the souls to stars (or astral souls guiding thosesouls), so much as their being mounted in a type of chariot (which Proclus distinguishedfrom the stars themselves in his interpretation of 41d8-e2). That each individual soulhas its own personal chariot is made clear at in Tim. III. 265.22–266.14. In this context,Lernould’s reference (69) should read ‘41d8-e1 et 41e1–42d4’.

22 It is worth noting that one should not speak of the ‘fall of the soul’ in Proclus, forwhom the descent is a proper function of soul. See on this Trouillard (1983), who seesthat, just as the process of demiurgic creation necessarily involves a carefully mediatedincursion into generation (with the ‘buffer’ of the younger gods etc.), so the soul’sdescent (mediated by the psychic vehicles) imitates the generosity of god. This analogyis pursued by Proclus at in Tim. III. 324.5–24 (discussed by Trouillard at 188–9).

96

Prefatory remarks

This is the place where the human being is examined,23 both themanner of its composition and the reasons for this; and the humanbeing comes prior to all the others, either because its examination isalso particularly appropriate to us, as we hold before ourselves the defi- 10

nition of a man and live in accordance with this,24 or because the humanbeing is a miniature cosmos25 that contains partially all those things thatthe cosmos contains divinely26 and completely. For we are in posses-sion of active intelligence,27 and rational soul that proceeds from thesame father and the same life-giving goddess28 as the universe, and a 15

23 This refers to the preliminary discussion of human souls from 41d to 47e, which belongsto the works of reason, and is placed before the discussion of the receptacle and the bodilyelements. From 5.7 until 6.6 we have in effect an attempt to explain exactly why humanbeings, though partial, are discussed in relation to the whole.

24 Proclus is thinking of the widespread logos of a human being as a rational animal, ratio-nality allegedly being the area in which humans differ from other animals. The philoso-pher will try above all to foster that which is most distinctive in him, his reason. Humanrationality is particularly important to the Neoplatonists’ interpretation of the Alcibi-ades, which is viewed as an essay on the nature of the human being, and as the first stepin the process of acquiring a Platonic education.

25 I.e. a microcosm, embracing all the basic ingredients that constitute the cosmos, par-ticularly body, soul, and intelligence. Proclus finds this in the Philebus (29a–30d) as wellas in the Timaeus (see in Tim. I 202.25–8), and it had been a commonplace of Greekphilosophy since Democritus B34.

26 Presumably here ‘divinely’ = perpetually.27 Here Proclus uses the now standard tactic of seeing the active intelligence of Aristotle’s

De Anima 3.4 as a Platonist feature and as part of the human being.28 The life-giving goddess, of whom Proclus also speaks at 11.19–20, 2.151.7–10, etc., is

identified by Festugiere (and those who write on the Chaldean Oracles, e.g. des Places1996, 133) with Hecate, whose place in the Chaldean Oracles is discussed by Brisson(2003), 118–19. However, this goddess is not mentioned by name in this work exceptfor III. 131.26 (where she and Artemis are said to be residents of the moon) and in thecitation of Or. Chald. 32 at I. 420.14. If we were to insist on finding a goddess within thisdialogue to fulfil this function it would have to be Ge, 40b–c, though she would makea strange parent of soul. Rather it is clear that he has in mind the mixing-bowl of 41d,seen from Iamblichus (fr. 82) on as an originative cause of all life, as it is for Syrianus(in Tim. III. 247.26–248.5) and Proclus (III. 248.12–13; 249.27–250.8). It would at firstsight seem that Proclus’ introduction of a mother-goddess for rational soul departs fromthe authority of Philebus 30d, insofar as both soul and intelligence are there seen withinthe nature of Zeus. However, the situation is more complicated than this, for when weexamine his discussion of the mixing-bowl we find that Syrianus had indeed seen thefemale power as well as the male as belonging (i) to the father and demiurge of all and(ii) his heavenly imitator, and yet thought that the mixing-bowl had been used to give aseparate indication of the female life-giving power. Philebus 30d is then quoted by Proclusin further discussion (249.3–26) with considerable approval for its suggestion of twinpowers in one. This passage would also make Hera (cf. III. 251.7–8) the most appropriateadditional divine name describing the female generative power. Hera is found to be agenerative force alongside Zeus at 46.27 (following Orphic fr. 163; cf. I. 450.21), at79.5–6 she is the choregos of rational animal birth, and at III. 318.6–7 the younger gods

97


vehicle of aether that has the same role [for us] as the heaven does [for theuniverse], and an earthly body composed of the four elements – to theseit is also coordinate.29 So, granting that it was necessary to observe the Allfrom many perspectives, in both the intelligible and the sensible realms,in paradigmatic and iconic modes, in universal and particular modes, itwould be a plus that the account of the human being should also have20

been fully worked out in the course of the study of the All. Moreover, onecould even use the old argument, that, in conformity with Pythagoreancustom, he had to link his object of study with an account of the studyingsubject. Since we are trying to apprehend what the cosmos is, we shouldpresumably add this further question: what ever is it that views these25

things and comes to apprehend them through reasoning? He showedthat he had kept an eye on this too, when he explicitly declares near theend (90d), that whoever would obtain a life of well-being ‘must liken thatwhich tries to apprehend to what it is apprehending’. For the totality isalways in a state of well-being, and our part too will be well-off when30

likened to the All. Moreover, in this way it will be returned to its cause.Since the human being here stands in the same relation to the All as theintelligible man does to the Animal itself, while there secondary things6always cling fast to primary ones, and the parts do not stray from thewholes and are founded in them, whenever the earthly human being isassimilated to the universe, he will also be imitating his own paradigm inthe appropriate fashion, becoming orderly (kosmios) through his likeness5

to the cosmos, and well-off through his being modelled on a god whoenjoys well-being.

In addition to what we have mentioned, the final stages of creationhave also been elaborated, both their general kinds and specific details,30

imitate Hera in the creation of life. At III. 190.6–7 Iamblichus is reported as makingher cause of power, coherence, fulfilment and life. The situation is complicated by thefact that in Crat. 143 (81.2–4) identifies the life-giving power with Rhea, and does soin the context of Or. Chald. fr. 56 des Places (p. 30 Kroll), causing commentators (e.g.des Places, p. 134) to speak of Rhea-Hecate. For careful consideration of these issuesand discussion of a triad of life-giving goddesses (Rhea/Demeter, Hecate, Kore) see vanden Berg (2003). However, the moral of this is that simplistic identifications of a givenunnamed divinity in Proclus with a related power in one of the texts that he sees asinspired are unhelpful. Proclus is assuming that there is a female divine power with agiven kind of function; the name that might be given to this power in riddling texts isless of a concern to him.

29 ‘it is likewise coordinated’ (Taylor), ‘avec lesquels il a affinite’ (Festugiere). The phrasein fact means that the four elements play the corresponding role for us to the one thatthe elements play in the universe.

30 General are the works of necessity, 47e–68d, the receptacle and the four elements,including material on motions within the universe, and also on sensations. Specific arethe details of animated physical beings that follow (works of reason working together

98

Prefatory remarks

those that arise in the skies or on earth or within living creatures – thosethat are contrary to nature and those that conform with it. Just here 10

the basic principles of medicine are also revealed, this being the pointwhere the natural philosopher leaves off, since he is a student of nature– for what accords with nature goes together with nature, while whatis contrary to nature involves passing beyond it. Accordingly, it is thephysicist’s job to establish in how many ways this deviation occurs, andhow one may be restored to balance and to the natural state, but it is 15

for the medical craft to unravel what follows from all this. It is in this[passage] that Plato most closely joins company with the other physicists;for they spent their time on the lowest works of nature that are the mostdeeply embedded in matter, by-passing the heavens as a whole and theorders of encosmic gods, because they had matter in view, abandoning 20

the forms and the primary causes.It seems to me that the incredible Aristotle was also pursuing Plato’s

teaching to the best of his ability when he arranged his whole treatmentof physics like this.31 He saw there were common factors in all thingsthat have come to exist by nature: form, substrate, the original source of 25

motion, motion, time and place – things which Plato too has taught abouthere, [talking of] distance, time as image of eternity coexisting with theheavens, the various types of motion, and the supplementary causes ofnatural things32 – and that other things were peculiar to things divided 30

in substance. The first of these were what belonged to the heaven –in agreement with Plato insofar as he made the heaven ungeneratedand composed of the fifth essence; for what is the difference between 7calling it a fifth element and calling it a fifth cosmos and a fifth shapeas Plato did?33 The second were what was common to all the realm ofcoming to be, an area where one can admire Plato for the great detail in

with necessity, 68e–90d), including the healthy and diseased states of those beings andhow they might best be restored. For a different view see Lernould (71–2).

31 My division is as follows: The totality of creation (Books I–IV): (1) form, substrate,the original source of motion, (2) motion, time and place; Things peculiar to regions:(3) Heavens and fifth element, (4) Sublunary world (a) skies (detailed), (b) animals(treated materially). See also Festugiere (p. 30).

32 Distance is spoken of in relation to the world-soul at 36a, where the musical meaningof ‘interval’ is paramount; time as image of eternity at 37d, types of motion at 40a–band 43b–c, supplementary causes at 46c–e. Proclus is trying to relate these Aristoteliantopics to material in the discussion of the works of reason.

33 The dodecahedron of 55c and the question of whether there is one world or five at 55dhad long been linked, being clearly present in Plutarch Mor. 421f. 427a ff. under theacknowledged influence of Theodorus of Soli. The issue of whether Plato acknowledgeda fifth element had been hotly debated among Platonists in Middle Platonist times, evenwithin the pages of Plutarch (Mor. 422f–423a), with Atticus fr. 5 resisting any such idea.Alcinous (13–15) makes use of it somewhat inconsistently (Dillon 1977, 286).

99


which he studied both their real natures and their properties, correctly5

preserving both their harmony and their polarities. As for what concernscoming to be, part belongs to things in the skies, whose principles Platohas accounted for, while Aristotle has extended their teaching beyondwhat was called for; but part extends to the study of animals, something10

which Plato has given a detailed explanation of with regard to all theircauses, including the final causes and the supplementary requirements,while in Aristotle’s work they have only with difficulty and in a few casesbeen studied in relation to form. For in most cases he stops at the pointof matter, and by pinning his explanations of physical things on this he15

demonstrates to us just how far he falls short of the teaching of his master.So much for these matters.

Preliminaries III: the literary character of the Timaeus

After this let us state the genre (eidos) of the dialogue, and its literarycharacter.34 There is universal agreement that Plato took over the bookof the Pythagorean Timaeus, the one that had been composed by him on20

the subject of the universe, and undertook to ‘do Timaeus-writing’ in thePythagorean manner.35 Moreover, this too is agreed by those who havehad a mere fleeting encounter with Plato, that his character is Socratic –both considerate and demonstrative. So if there’s anywhere else that hehas combined the distinctive features of Pythagorean and Socratic, then25

he obviously does this in this dialogue too. In the Pythagorean traditionit contains loftiness of mind, intuition (to noeron), inspiration, a tendencyto link everything with the intelligibles, to depict the Whole in termsof numbers, to give an indication of things in a symbolic and mysticalfashion, to lead upwards, to remove one’s focus on the particulars, to30

state with affirmation.36 From the considerate Socratic [manner] it pos-sesses approachability, gentleness, a tendency towards demonstration,8to studying reality through images, to moral content, and so on. There-fore the dialogue is elevated, and derives its conceptions from above,from the very first originative principles. It mixes the demonstrational

34 Note that this is not a reference to the various types of dialogue-character popular inthe second century ad, and found in Albinus Prol. 3 and D.L. 3.49. That classificationhad in fact been based more on philosophic criteria, while Proclus here deals with thedialogue’s literary character and approach.

35 An allusion to Timon of Phleious 54.3, as quoted at the opening of our treatise.36 The Pythagorean character is crucial for Lernould in his explanation of the way that

physics is transformed into theology (2001, 341), but he makes much of the implicationalready encountered (2.29–3.19) that the Pythagoreans concentrated on the three high-est causes rather than form or matter. Note, however, that these causes do not reappearin the discussion of the Pythagorean character of the Timaeus here.

100

Prefatory remarks

method with the revelational, and it prepares us to understand physicalthings not only from the point of view of physics but also from that of 5

theology.37 For nature itself, which guides the All, is dependent on thegods and animated by them when it directs the bodily element; thoughit is not really a god,38 it is not excluded from the characteristics ofthe divine because it is illuminated by what are really gods. If then oneshould actually be making one’s words similar to the things ‘of whichthey are interpreters’ as Timaeus himself will say (29b), it would be 10

appropriate for this dialogue also to have a theological element too aswell as its physical element, in imitation of nature that is the object of itsstudy.

Furthermore, since things are divided into three in conformity withthe Pythagorean view, into intelligible things, physical things, and things 15

in between the two, those which they are in the habit of calling mathe-maticals,39 and [since] it is possible to observe all of them in all of themin the manner appropriate to each (for the middle and final things areforeshadowed in a primal way in the intelligibles, and both [the othertwo] are present in the mathematicals, the first things iconically and thethird paradigmatically, and there are glimmers of what had preceded 20

them in the physicals), it was surely with good reason that Timaeus, inestablishing the soul, gave an indication of40 its powers, its ratios (logoi),and its elements through mathematical terminology, while Plato distin-guishes its peculiar characteristics from the geometrical figures,41and 25

37 The theological perspective of Proclus is of central importance to Lernould, who usessuch passages as I. 217.25–9, 204.9–15, and 227.2–3, appealing also to Beierwaltes (1969,131).

38 I am tempted to read �� for ��! "�, and Tim Buckley points out to me thata scribe may have deleted what he thought was a dittography, mistaking for � inminuscule.

39 Diehl compares Iamblichus VPlot. 157, but the tripartition would seldom be thoughtto precede the Academy, and is perhaps most reminiscent of the so-called unwrittendoctrines of Plato (see Arist. Metaph. 1076a17–22 etc.).

40 The term endeiknusthai, translated ‘give an indication’, is used in the context ofmetaphorical, and in particular symbolic, meanings. That is to say that the mathe-matical terminology does not directly describe what the soul is like. Plato reserves hismore straightforward use of mathematics for the construction of the physical bodies.

41 This translation takes a different view from that of Festugiere, who translates ‘definisseles proprietes de l’ame a partir des figures’. First, there must here be some kind of contrastbetween ‘Timaeus’ and ‘Plato’ which Festugiere fails to capture, a contrast indicatedby the marked change of subject, and implied by the principal point of this section –that the dialogue blends the Pythagorean approach with the Socratic or Platonic (cf.9.27 below). Second, this seems to force the meaning of ��#�$�� %, which wouldnormally indicate separation. Plato, I take it, is thought of as reserving his treatment ofgeometrical figures proper until the physical elements are explained, while still takingover from the Pythagorean original appropriate mathematical terminology for describing

101


declares that the causes of all these things pre-exist in an originative way(archoeidos)42 in the intelligible and demiurgic mind. That suffices on thistopic, and our inquiry into the details will be able to give us a better graspof the dialogue’s character.

Preliminaries IV: the background of the discussion

The background is roughly as follows: Socrates had come to Piraeus30

for the festival and procession of the Bendidea, and held a conversationon state organization with Polemarchus the son of Cephalus, Glaucon,9Adeimantus, not to mention Thrasymachus the sophist. On the day afterthis one, in the city, he had told the story of the discussion at Piraeus toTimaeus and Hermocrates and Critias and another unnamed fourth per-son in addition to these, as described in the Republic. After this narration5

he encouraged the others too to repay him with an appropriate banquetof words on the day after that. So they have reassembled on this dayto listen and to speak, the second day43 after the discussion at Piraeus,since the Republic said ‘I went down to the Piraeus yesterday’ (327a),10

while this dialogue says ‘the banqueters of yesterday who are now theentertainers’.

However, they were not all present for this session, as the fourthis missing because of illness. You might perhaps ask why it should bethat the listeners for this discussion should be three, when the subject isthe entire universe. I shall reply that it’s because the father of the words15

should have a position analogous to the father of the deeds,44 becausethis cosmic creation according to word (logos) is an image of the cosmiccreation according to intellect. Analogous to the demiurgic triad that takeover the one universal creation of the father is the triad of those whoreceive the words.45 Of these Socrates is the uppermost, who through20

the kinship of his life [with the others’] fastens himself directly uponTimaeus, just as the first member of the paradigmatic triad is united

the various features of the soul. The ‘powers’ could be connected with various circularmotions (36b–d), the ‘ratios’ with those of 35b–36b, and the ‘elements’ with the basicsof its construction (35a–b).

42 The term is confined to Neoplatonist or Neopythagorean authors: Theon, Syrianus,Proclus, and Simplicius.

43 The Greek says the third, counting inclusively.44 For the idea of a father of words, analogous to the Father of Deeds of 41a, see further

the note to 95.15 below.45 Proclus operates with a Father of Demiurges, lowest member of the triad of Intelligi-

ble and Intellective Gods, and a triad of demiurges below this, themselves IntellectiveGods.

102

Prefatory remarks

with the one before the triad. These things, if it so please the gods, weshall express more clearly in what follows.46

Digression on nature

So now that we have identified and shown the breadth of the dialogue’s 25

aim, described its tactics, the literary character so admirably blendedtogether within it,47 the whole background, and also the participantsand how they are appropriate to the present discussions,48 it would beappropriate to pass on to the actual detailed reading49 and investigate 30

everything as well as we are able. However, bearing in mind that theterm ‘nature’, being applied in different ways by different people, isa source of confusion to people fond of investigating Plato’s view – 10his way of looking at it, and what he wants the essence of nature tobe – let us treat this matter first. For presumably this is appropriatefor the dialogue, with its inquiry into natural studies, to know whatnature is,50 whence it proceeds, and how far it extends its own productive 5

activity.51

This is because some of the ancients (i) used the term ‘Nature’for matter, like Antiphon,52 some (ii) for form, as Aristotle did inmany places,53 and some (iii) for the whole thing, like some of thosebefore Plato of whom he says in the Laws (892b5-c7) that they calledwhat arises by nature ‘natures’,54 whereas others (iv) equated it with

46 See next 23.31–24.11. 47 I prefer to delete the first comma of 9.27.48 On the preliminary topics see Introduction, pp. 49–52; also Mansfeld 1994, particularly

30–7 on Proclus’ Plato commentaries. Mansfeld (30) describes Proclan practice as ‘lessscholastic, or schematic, than that recorded in Anon. Proleg., though not less systematic’.

49 The lexis is the study of successive lemmata of the text, as opposed to free discussion oflonger passages (or of general issues as here).

50 Festugiere compares the proem of Ps.-Plut. Epitome.51 This is effectively asking at what levels in the hierarchical structure and progression of

reality nature belongs.52 An unexpected figure to feature in a Neoplatonist doxography, but of course this material

is ultimately dependent on Aristotle’s Physics itself, to which (2.1, 193a9–23) Festugierecorrectly relates it together with its sequel – even while showing (pp. 35–6) that Antiphonbelongs to the Aetian tradition, usually as revealed in Stobaeus only (Dox. 1.22.6, 2.20.15,2.28.4 (both sources), 2.29.3, 3.16.4 (Ps.-Plut.)).

53 See especially Phys. 2.1, 193a30-b12.54 Aristotle does not indicate that such a view was seriously held, but rejects it anyhow, Phys.

2.1 193a5–6. Diehl and Festugiere note that Plato had used the singular, as opposed toProclus’ plural, without observing that the plural is what appears in our MSS at 892b7,corrected by editors from Eusebius (who has a different version of the following sixwords too), because of a singular relative pronoun that is assumed to refer back to it.But when the Platonic text is in doubt, Proclus’ text might perhaps have been used asevidence for it. The text of Plato’s manuscripts may be defensible (though I prefer to read

103


natural properties – things being heavy or light, and rare or dense – like10

some of the Peripatetics and of even earlier physicists; others (v) calledgod’s craft ‘nature’,55 others (vi) the soul, and yet others (vii) some-thing like this. But as for Plato, he does not believe that the term natureshould refer primarily to matter, or the form-in-matter, or the body,or the physical properties, yet he stops short of identifying it outright15

with soul. He taught us the most accurate approach to it by locating itsessence in between the two, i.e. between soul and bodily properties, infe-rior to the former by its being ‘divided about bodies’56 and by its failingto revert back to itself,57 yet excelling the things that come after it58 byits having the formal principles (logoi) of all things and generating them20

all, and bringing them to life. It accords with our common notions thatnature and what agrees with or happens by nature should be two differentthings, just as the product of craft is other than craft itself.59 And intelli-gent soul and nature are two different things, for nature is what belongs25

to bodies, deeply embedded in them and existing as something insepa-rable from them, whereas soul is separable and is rooted within itself,60

and belongs at the same time to itself and to another – being ‘another’s’by the participation of others in it, and ‘its own’ by its not sliding intowhat participates,61 just as the father of the soul is only ‘his own’ bybeing unparticipated. Moreover, before him, if you like, the intelligi-30

ble paradigm of the entire world is just ‘itself’; for these constitute a

& �� '�()� '�$*#�+� ��% ��,�� for the problematic - �� '�()� '�$*#��+� . . .),the ��% ��,�� being included precisely in order to explain, and mitigate the harshnessof, the singular relative. These people’s use of ��+�� involves an illegitimate meaningof ��+��.

55 An adaptation of Stoic theory, in which fire that operates according to craft is identifiedwith nature, e.g. SVF 1.171; 2.774, 1133–4.

56 The phrase links nature with one of the starting-points of soul at Tim. 35a2–3.57 The text of Diehl implies that nature fails to revert to soul, but we follow Festugiere

in preferring �.�� to ��, seeing the typical Neoplatonic concept of self-reflexivityhere.

58 As the text stands this presumably means ‘after soul’, and it would be necessary to read$(� �.�� for $�� to make it clear that ‘after nature’ is meant. We should thusassume that nature is not seen as something unequivocally ‘after soul’.

59 Refuting view (iii) above, perhaps along lines suggested by Laws 892b, where the dis-tinction between craft (b3) and what arises through craft (b8) is similarly present. Atb6–7, Plato might not be objecting to the term �/ ��+� but to the description of suchthings as ��+��.

60 Again we follow Festugiere in preferring �.�� .61 I.e. its identity remains higher than that of a participator, which in this case would be

the ensouled creature. My soul will be mine, but insofar as it remains separable it willalso be its own.

104

Prefatory remarks

series: itself, its own, its own and another’s, another’s, other.62 This [last] 11is obviously the whole sensible world, in which there is separation anddivision of every kind, while of the others one was nature that is insepa-rable from bodies, another the soul that is within itself and gives the light 5

of a secondary life to another, another the demiurgic mind that ‘remainswithin the character of its own according to its manner’ (Tim. 42e5–6),63

and another the intelligible and paradigmatic cause of all things madeby the demiurge, which Plato also saw fit to call ‘animal itself ’ for thisreason. So nature is the last one of those causes that construct this sen- 10

sible bodily world and the limit of the plane of bodiless substances, butit is full of formal principles and properties through which it directsimmanent things, and while it is a god, it is a god through its havingbeen divinized and does not have its being a god from itself.64 We alsocall the divine bodies gods in the sense of images of the gods. Nature 15

gives the lead to the whole cosmos through its own powers, preservingthe heaven at its own highest point, governing generation through theheaven, and everywhere securing links between particulars and univer-sals.65 With a character like this, nature has processed from the life-givinggoddess:66 20

Up on the back of the goddess Boundless Nature is hung.67

From this goddess all life proceeds, both the intellective [life] and thatwhich is inseparable from things managed.68 Being attached from thatpoint and suspended from it, it pervades all things unhindered andbreathes life into them. On her account even the most lifeless things 25

62 ‘Itself’ is the natural translation of the Greek ��, since ‘the same’ would technicallybe �% ��, yet ‘same’ would preserve the intended contrast with ‘other’. It is temptingto relate this fivefold metaphysic to the system of five causes. In two cases they canbe equated: paradigmatic cause = paradigm (itself/same), creative cause = demiurge (itsown); a looser connection may perhaps be postulated between final, formal and materialcauses and (respectively): soul (its own and another’s), physical nature (another’s), thesensible world (other).

63 See Festugiere’s note. It is necessary to read this passage alongside Proclus’ treatmentof 40e at III. 315.7ff., where 0(�� is taken to indicate the sameness of rest, and �� the distinctive manner of the demiurge’s rest. Plato’s original meaning is unclear.

64 At 8.5–9 above its status is somewhat less provocatively explained: nature is ‘breathedinto’ by other gods, and given light by them.

65 Or ‘partial entities and wholes’, which would include particulars and universals.66 Festugiere favours Hecate, but see note on 5.15 above. Note Proclus’ lack of interest in

either naming or explaining this goddess.67 Or. Chald. p. 29 Kroll = fr. 54 des Places.68 I.e. from the things of this world; cf. Festugiere who translates ‘des etres administres

par la Providence’.

105


partake of a kind of life, and things that perish remain eternally in thecosmos, maintained by the causes of the specific forms within her. As theoracle says:

Unwearied Nature rules over worlds and over works,So that the Heaven may run on, sweeping along his eternal course.6930

And so on. Hence, if one of those who speak of three demiurges chose12to relate them to these three principles – the demiurgic mind, the soul,and nature as a whole, he would be quite correct for the reasons stated;whereas if he is postulating three other demiurges of the universe over5

and above soul, he is not correct. For the demiurge of the whole is one,70

but particular powers have received from him an allocation from theoverall demiurgic task. So whether Amelius wants to establish a hierar-chy like this, or Theodorus,71 we don’t accept their account, but we shallremain keen to abide by the theories of Plato and Orpheus. Moreover,10

all those who have claimed that nature is demiurgic craft72 are incorrectif they mean the craft that resides in the demiurge himself, but correct ifthey mean that which proceeds from him. For craft should be conceivedas threefold, that which does not venture from the craftsman, that which15

proceeds from him but reverts back, and that which has already pro-ceeded and comes to exist in another.73 The craft within the demiurgeremains in him and is in fact him; it is by virtue of this craft that he is called‘crafter of works’ by the oracle, and ‘crafter of a fiery cosmos’.74 Intel-lective soul is craft, but craft that stays fixed even while it proceeds; and20

nature is craft that proceeds alone. On this account it is called ‘instru-ment of the gods’, not as something lifeless or deriving motion onlyfrom another, but somehow possessing self-motion by operating from

69 Or. Chald. p. 36 Kroll = fr. 70.1–2 des Places. Festugiere equates the ‘worlds’ here withstars.

70 It is worth noting this statement, given the tendency to see Proclus as one who unnec-essarily multiplied the machinery passed down by Plato.

71 For the theory of Amelius, partly influenced by Numenius, see III. 103.18–104.22; forProclus’ interest in exactly what he might mean by them see also I. 361.26–8. Theodorustoo stands in the tradition that derived from Numenius (II. 274.10–11), and Proclusassociates him with a more sophisticated version of the three-demiurge view at I. 309.14–20. On Amelius and Theodorus see Introduction, pp. 37–40, 48.

72 Again the Stoics; see on 10.12.73 While the triad and its expression are typically Proclan, its relevance is not confined

to late Neoplatonist systems; we too can speak of the potter’s craft being present indifferent ways in the master potter, in the apprentice whom he supervises, and in thepot that is produced.

74 Or. Chald. p. 19 Kroll = fr. 33 des Places, parts of which are also encountered at in Tim.I. 142.23, 361.30; II. 58.1–2, 87.26.

106

Prefatory remarks

within itself. For the instruments of the gods have their essence groundedin vigorous principles, and are alive, and keep time with the gods’ 25

activities.75

Relation to the Parmenides

So now that we have explained what nature is according to Plato, [stating]that it is a non-bodily substance inseparable from bodies, possessing theirformal principles [logoi] but unable to see into itself,76 and [now that] itis clear from this how it is that the dialogue is natural (physikos) when itteaches about the entire cosmic creation, it would be appropriate to add 30

here what follows directly from this. With the whole of philosophy being 13divided into study of intelligibles and study of immanent things – quiterightly too, as the cosmos too is twofold, intelligible cosmos and sensiblecosmos as Plato will go on to say (30c) – the Parmenides has embraced the 5

treatment of intelligibles, and the Timaeus that of the sensibles. That one,you see, teaches us all the divine orders, and this one all the processions ofthings in the cosmos. But neither does the former entirely leave aside thestudy of things within the All, nor does the latter fail to study the intelli-gibles, because sensibles too are present paradigmatically in the intelligi-bles, while the intelligibles are present iconically among sensibles.77 Yet 10

the one spends more time over physics and the other over theology, asbefits the gentlemen after whom they are named, because a similar bookhad been written about the universe by Timaeus, and also by Parmenidesabout the really real. So it is correct for godlike Iamblichus to say that the 15

whole of Plato’s research is contained in these two dialogues, Timaeus andParmenides. For the whole of his treatment of encosmic and hypercosmicthings has as its goal what’s best in them, and no level of reality has beenleft uninvestigated.78 It would be obvious to those who don’t encounter 20

Plato as dabblers that the Timaeus’ manner of treating things is verysimilar to that of the Parmenides. For just as the Timaeus gives respon-sibility for all immanent things to the first demiurge, so the Parmenideslinks the procession of all entities with the One. And while the former 25

teaches how they all have a share in the creator’s providence, the latterteaches how existent things participate in unitary substantive existence.

75 Syndroma can suggest either the following of the same course or synchronized operation,but the former here is surely inappropriate, since nature does not return.

76 For the formal principles of things see 10.19–21. The inability to see into itself is linkedwith its failure to ‘revert’ to itself, 12.13–21.

77 Cf. 8.17–20.78 Iamblichus in Tim. fr. 1. For commentary see Dillon (1973), 264–5. I have written on

the Iamblichan curriculum in Jackson et al. (1998), 13–15.

107


Furthermore just as the Timaeus, prior to the account of nature, offersthe study of immanent things through images, so does the Parmenidesget the inquiry into immaterial forms under way prior to its theology.79

This is because one should only be brought to the appreciation of the30

universe after being trained in the discussion of the best constitution,while only after competing in the demanding problems concerning theforms should one be escorted to the mystical study of the Henads.14With this stated, it would be the right time to get to grips with thedetailed reading of Plato,80 and to put each phrase to the test as far as wemay.

Introductory texts (14.4–26.20)

The missing person, his sickness, and its consequences

One, two, three – but hello, where, my dear Timaeus, do we havethe fourth of yesterday’s diners who are now to be hosts of the5feast? (17a1–3)

Longinus the expert on criticism,81 approaching this phrase from thephilologist’s perspective, says that it is composed of three cola.82 Thefirst is thin and colloquial on account of the loose expression, and isgiven a higher-sounding finish by the second through the change of the10

terminology83 and the coherence of the terms, but even more addedgrace and majesty is given to both of these from the third. For the One,two, three, being composed of disconnected terms, puts the diction ona low level; what comes next, i.e. but hello, where, my dear Timaeus,do we have the fourth, through the term fourth which represents a15

variation on the numbers so far, and which is composed of grander terms,showed more majesty of expression; but of yesterday’s diners who arenow to be hosts of the feast, along with the charm and elegance of the

79 Note that the summary of the Republic and the story of Atlantis together are alreadybeing treated as the Timaeus’ equivalent of the whole of the examination of the notionof Ideas that we think of as part one of the Parmenides, and therefore as a major part ofthe investigation.

80 Cf. 9.30; the lexis or detailed reading of the text is usually contrasted with more discursivematters (theoria), but this commentary does not persist with formal alternation betweenthe two, and hence the term is less technical than in some commentaries.

81 On Longinus see Introduction, pp. 35–6, 74–6; this text = fr. 24 (Brisson andPatillon).

82 The colon is a linguistic ‘limb’ of the sentence, and the term is much used by thegrammarians.

83 Ordinal rather than cardinal number is used.

108

Introductory texts

language, has also given lift and majesty to the whole period84 throughthe figure of speech.85 20

Praxiphanes, however, the friend of Theophrastus,86 criticizes Plato,saying first of all that this One, two, three he attributed to Socratesis obvious and can be recognized by the senses – for why did Socratesneed to count for the purpose of ascertaining the numbers of those whohad met up for the discussion? Secondly, that he substituted this fourth, 25

which does not harmonize with what preceded, for it’s ‘four’ that goeswith One, two, three, while ‘first, second, third’ go with fourth. That’swhat he has to say.

The philosopher Porphyry, however, pursues close on his heels.87 30

Against the second he argues that this is typical of Greek usage, giving 15the phrase an aura of beauty.88 Indeed Homer often spoke like this; forhe said that: ‘unyielding bronze came parting six layers,’ but it was halted‘at the seventh.’89 He speaks in this way in these exact words,90 as he does 5

in many other places. But still the substitution has an actual reason here,for Socrates was able to count those present by pointing them out, andthe sequence ‘one, two, three’ has a pointing function; but as for theabsent person, because it was not possible to point him out, he indicatedhim through the term ‘fourth’, for we use ‘fourth’ for what is absent aswell. In answer to the earlier objection, he said that when the number 10

present corresponds to the number expected to be there, counting isindeed superfluous, but when somebody who is not known by name ismissing, then the counting of those present gives an impression of themissing one as if by feeling the need for what’s left and by ‘missing’ a partof the total number. So Plato too was indicating this when he depicted 15

Socrates as counting those present and asking after the one left behind. Ifhe had been able to identify that person as well and it had been possible toname him, he would perhaps have said that he sees Critias, Timaeus, andHermocrates, but he doesn’t see so-and-so. However, since the absent

84 A rhetorical ‘period’, here the sentence as a whole.85 Rightly identified with the dining-metaphor by Festugiere.86 For the possibility that such early material was already present in Crantor’s commentary

see Introduction., pp. 70, 75; Theophrastus also had his views on the Timaeus, on whichsee Baltussen (2003).

87 Porphyry in Tim. fr. I (Sodano); Festugiere has ‘lui repond point par point’, but both� ��*� and ��/ �� are military metaphors, and combine to suggest one warriordrawing closer to, and perhaps catching, another who flees (LSJ s.v. ��* b III. 2, s.v. �,� 5 b).

88 With Festugiere and Kroll, I prefer to read 1��#�$� for the MSS 1��#�$2��.89 Il. 7.247–8.90 Festugiere takes �� '�$�� to refer simply to the term ‘seventh’, but there is room for

doubt.

109


one was a stranger and unfamiliar to him, it is only through counting20

that he personally knows that somebody is missing and makes this factclear to us who have lived so long afterwards.

Well all this is pleasant enough, and as much of this kind of thing thatone would wish to take into consideration for the study of the languagein front of us. But one should also bear in mind that the dialogue isPythagorean, and one should make one’s interpretative comments in25

a manner that is appropriate to them. You could surely derive from itPythagorean moral doctrines91 of the following kind: those gentlemenmade friendship and the life of concord the target of all their philosophy.So Socrates too has adopted this aim above all, calling Timaeus a friend.They believed that the firm agreement that they had made ought to be30

binding on them. It is this that Socrates too is asking for in desiring16the fourth [to be there] too. They welcomed the fellowship involvedin the discovery of doctrines, and the writings of one person were thecommon property of all. Socrates also reaffirms this, encouraging thesame people as were feasted to be feasters, the same as were satisfied5

to be satisfiers, and the same as were learners to be teachers. Otherpeople had written handbooks on duties,92 through which they expectto improve the habits of those educated by them. Plato, however, givesus an outline impression of our duties through dramatic depiction of thebest of men, an impression that has much that is more effective than what10

is committed to lifeless rules. That is because dramatic imitation informsthe lives of the listeners according to its own distinctive character.93 Heis demonstrating through this what the philosopher will most involvehimself with, i.e. giving a hearing to serious discourse; and what heconsiders to be a true feast, i.e. that it’s not what most people think15

(that’s just bestial), but that which feeds the human being within us.94

91 There is a good chance that this outline of how the lemma sketches appropriatebehaviour (to 16.20) still derives ultimately from Porphyry.

92 Of those pre-Porphyrian philosophers who had written such handbooks it is natural forus to think of Panaetius, the ‘source’ of Cicero’s extant De Officiis, but such handbooksgo back at least to the Old Stoa to judge from works entitled ‘On Duties’ attributed toZeno, Cleanthes, Sphaerus, and Chrysippus. They are given separate status in the realmof ethical teaching by Philo of Larissa (Stob. Ecl. 2.41). It is not surprising that Plato’smethods should be found superior in an age when Platonism’s triumph over Hellenisticphilosophy, particularly Stoicism, was being sealed.

93 ��/ �3 4��5� 6�� is well interpreted by Festugiere as meaning the distinctivecharacter of the person actually imitated, and Proclus’ comment relates closely to thedoctrines of the Republic’s earlier treatment of dramatic imitation, 392d–398b, wherethe influence of persons imitated on the character of the audience is an important factor(395d).

94 Man and beast within us recall Republic 588c–d. For Proclus’ vegetarianism, see Intro-duction, p. 15.

110

Introductory texts

Hence the metaphor of feasting on discourse is often used by him. ‘Oris it obvious that Lysias feasted you on speeches?’, and ‘You are feastingyourselves alone, and not sharing it with us.’95

This, and similar explanations, are ethical; but the following con- 20

siderations belong to natural philosophy.96 They [Pythagoreans] saidthat all physical creation is held together by numbers, that all the prod-ucts of nature are composed according to numbers, and that thesenumbers are shared by other things, just as all the forms within thecosmos are shared. It is with good reason, then, that even at the start 25

the discourse proceeds through numbers, and uses the numbers thatare there for counting as opposed to those very numbers in which eventhese participate. For ‘monad, dyad, triad’ is a different thing from ‘one,two, three’. The former are simple, and each is itself, while the latterare participating in those, and Aristotle was not right to say that the 30

gentlemen located numbers in the sensible realm.97 How could they,when they celebrated number as ‘Father of the blessed ones and of men’,and the tetractys as ‘Source of ever-flowing nature’?98 So since the dia- 17logue is ‘physical’, its first line of inquiry begins with the numbers inwhich it participates, the same kind as all physical numbers. Furthermorethe gentlemen affirmed the community of nature, both in the realm of 5

coming-to-be, where all things are rendered rationally expressible andable to be measured against each other, and in the things of the heaven –for they too grant each other a share in their own particular properties.So it is right and appropriate to his purpose that Socrates too is expectingthe same people to be givers and recipients of the feast.

On theology,99 one might discover from these [words] considerations 10

of the following kind. The gentlemen generated everything throughthe primal and leading numbers, and they explained the foundation ofall things in the world as dependent upon the three gods. The monad,dyad, and triad give an indication100 of these, so that the would-be stu-dent of nature should begin from them and keep them in view. Fur- 15

thermore the subsidiary causes (synaitiai) of the things of nature hadbeen studied among other groups too, but the final, paradigmatic, andproductive causes were investigated among them in particular.101 Sothese causes are shown through the numbers that have been listed. The

95 Phaedrus 227b, Lysis 211d.96 A switch from Porphyrian to Iamblichan material (until 17.9) seems indicated, cf. 19.27.97 Metaph. 1083b11. 98 Carm. Aur. 47.99 Presumably an indication that we now have Syrianus’ contribution.

100 This terminology (endeixis, endeiknusthai) regularly implies that the indicator is a symbolof that which is indicated.

101 This debatable idea is already implied at 2.29–3.4, and presupposes the view of Aristotle(2.15–29) as a crypto-materialist.

111


final [is shown] through the monad, for it stands at the head of the num-20

bers at the level of the Good. The paradigmatic [is shown] through thedyad, for the otherness between intelligibles102 is what distinguished theprimary causes of the universe, and furthermore the dyad is the startingpoint of the tetractys of intelligible paradigms. And the productive causeis shown by the triad, for mind is related to the triad, being the third25

from reality with life as intermediate,103 or from the father with poweras intermediate, or from the intelligible with intelligence as intermedi-ate. For by analogy, as is monad to dyad, so is being to life, father topower, and intelligible to intelligence. And as is dyad to triad, so is life,30

or power, or intelligence to mind. Moreover all things divine are in all18things, and they are unified by one another, so that all are in one andeach is in all and they are held together by divine friendship. The Spherein that realm contains the single conjunction of the gods. So it was withgood reason that Socrates too, with the divine in view, makes sharing and5

agreement his starting point, and urges the others too in this direction.Furthermore both feasting and the banquet are names that pertain tothe gods, and not least to the gods within the universe. For they ascendtogether with the liberated gods to the banquet and dinner, as Socratessays in the Phaedrus (247a), and the feast at the birthday celebration of10

Aphrodite takes place at the residence of great Zeus.104

Hence Socrates too thinks that this should apply to himself and hisfriends by analogy, sharing among themselves their divine intellections.It is in no way remarkable that Timaeus should give a feast to the others,and receive a feast from them, for among the theologians too the sharing15

out of powers and participation in them is lauded, with divinities enhanc-ing one another and being enhanced by one another. We have heard thisfrom the poets inspired by Apollo, that the gods greet each other withintelligent activities or with provident works towards the universe:20

And they with golden gobletsWelcome one another, looking upon the city of the Trojans.

(Il. 4.3–4)

But if they recognize one another, they also have intellection:

For the gods do not pass one another unrecognized.(Od. 5.79)

102 Diehl suggests ��) for the less attractive ��.103 Proclus has the common Neoplatonic triad being–life–mind in view here. There follow

two more triads, Father–power–mind, and intelligible–intelligence–mind.104 Symp. 203b (the myth of the mating of Poverty and Plenty).

112

Introductory texts

And that which is intelligible is food for the intelligent according to the 25

oracle, evidently because (i) exchanging feasts belongs ultimately withthe gods, and (ii) those who are wiser among humans imitate the gods inthis respect too,105 with each ungrudgingly allowing the others a shareof his own private intellections.

Some indisposition has befallen him, Socrates; for he would not 30voluntarily have missed this gathering. (17a4–5)

Porphyry the philosopher asserts that a moral obligation is suggested in 19these words, namely that (i) this is the only reason for sensible peopleto miss such gatherings, physical indisposition, and (ii) that one shouldconsider all of this as circumstantial and involuntary; or again (iii) thatfriends should offer for other friends every available apology whenever 5

they seem to be doing something incorrectly, transgressing a decisiontaken in common. Consequently this lemma combines an illustrationof Timaeus’ character with the necessity afflicting the absent person,showing how the former was gentle and truth-loving, while the latterwas a hindrance to the life of reason.106

The divine Iamblichus, however, using this lemma as an excuse to 10

speak exaltedly of those who are trained in the contemplation of intel-ligibles, says that such people do not have a proportionate facility fordiscussion of sensibles. As Socrates himself says somewhere in the Repub-lic (516e-518b) those brought up in the pure sunlight squint when theydescend into the cave because of the darkness there, just as those who 15

come up from the cave do when they unable as yet to confront the light.And the fourth person is missing for this reason, because he’s suited fora different vision, that of the intelligibles, and indeed this indispositionof his is actually a superabundance of power, in which he surpasses thepresent study. For just as the power of bad people is actually more of an 20

impotence,107 so weakness in respect of secondary things108 is a super-abundance of power.109 Hence the passage says that the missing person isabsent because he is unsuited to discussion of physics, but that he wouldwish to join them if they were intending to discuss intelligibles.

In just about everything that precedes the physical theory, the one, 25

Porphyry, offers a more socially-oriented interpretation, relating it to

105 The human goal of assimilation to the divine is of course present.106 Porphyry in Tim. fr. II. The conflict of reason and necessity prefigures that of the main

powers that must come to cooperate in the cosmology (Tim. 47e etc.).107 This recalls the arguments with Polus in the Gorgias 466b–468e.108 I.e. in respect of sensibles rather than intelligibles.109 Iamblichus in Tim. fr. 3. For commentary see Dillon (1973), 265–6.

113


the virtues and the so-called ‘duties’, while the other adheres more tophysics. For he says that everything must be consistent with the proposedtarget, whereas the dialogue is on physics, not ethics. These are thedifferent systematic approaches that the philosophers put forward about30

this section.I ignore those who harass us with a lot of details with the intention of

demonstrating that this fourth person was Theaetetus, because he hadbecome a familiar of those from the Eleatic school,110 and because he20[Plato] had depicted him as sick.111 So they say he’s absent now because ofsickness again. That’s how Aristocles argues that Theaetetus is the miss-ing person. Yet it was just before the death of Socrates that Theaetetusbecame an associate of both Socrates and the Eleatic Stranger. But even5

if he was that person’s associate long before, what is Timaeus’ connec-tion with him?112 Ptolemaeus the Platonist113 thinks that it’s Clitophon,because in the dialogue named after him he is not even thought worthyof an answer from Socrates. Dercyllides thinks that it is Plato, because10

this man had also missed the death of Socrates through sickness.114 As Isaid, I am leaving these people aside, since even our predecessors havealready rejected them as unsatisfactory, exposing their investigations asunworthy of investigation and their claims as unfounded. All adopt animpoverished approach, and it will be irrelevant to us even if we find15

what they are after. To say that it is Theaetetus because of his infirmity,or Plato, doesn’t even accord with the chronology, as the one was ill atSocrates’ trial and the other at his death; while to say that it is Clitophonis utterly strange, as he wasn’t even there on the previous day whenSocrates was narrating what Clitophon had said the day before that in20

the discussion at the Piraeus.115 However, Atticus does make one goodpoint, that this missing person seems to be one of the foreigners withTimaeus, because Socrates asks Timaeus about where this fourth per-son could possibly be, and he excuses his absence as if he were a friend,25

110 Aristocles makes the common assumption that Eleatics are a branch of the Pythagoreanschool, on which assumption see Mansfeld (1992), 50–2, 243–316. Festugiere identifiesAristocles with the Rhodian, mentioned at 85.28, possibly the contemporary of Strabo.

111 Tht. 142b. 112 I.e. it does not follow that he was Timaeus’ friend too.113 Festugiere had once identified this figure with Ptolemy Chennos, but seems to doubt

this following A. Dihle (RE XXIII 1859–60), who makes him post-Porphyrian. ButPtolemy’s concerns suggest the Middle Platonist period, to which Dercyllides andAristocles also belonged, and directly or indirectly, Porphyry was surely the source ofour knowledge of this debate, since these people had been refuted by ‘those before us’at 20.12. Further, these are all included in the generation of Atticus at 20.26.

114 Phaedo 59b, interpreted literally; on these ideas see Dillon (2006), 21–2.115 Note that Proclus makes day one that of the conversation at the Piraeus narrated in

the Republic, day two that of the actual narration involving new friends in the city, andday three that of their reconvening for the contributions of Timaeus and others.

114

Introductory texts

indicating that it is something forced upon him against his will. That’sthe contribution of the more ancient critics.

We must now say what my teacher [Syrianus] concluded about thistext, as it follows Plato particularly closely. His position was that themore solemn and elevated the lessons become, the more the number 30

of the listeners is reduced, and that the argument moves on to a new 21degree of religious fervour and secrecy. Consequently at the gatheringat the Piraeus on the day before the handing down of the constitutionthe audience was considerable, while those who received a name weresix in all.116 On the second day those who were privy to the arguments 5

as conveyed by Socrates’ narration were four. But on this day the fourthtoo is missing, and the audience numbers three, and the reduction of theaudience is in proportion to the increase in the purity and intellectualnature of the topic.

In all cases the number in charge is a monad. But in some cases itsmanner is competitive, so that the listeners have both an indeterminate 10

and a determinate element, extending to a plurality in which the odd isinterwoven with the even.117 In other cases it is instructional, thoughnot yet quarrel-free nor purged of dissension of the dialecticians, so thatthe listeners are four in number, a tetrad having similarity and samenessthrough its squareness and kinship with the monad and otherness and 15

multiplicity through the influence of the even. <But in still other cases>it is free of all competitive teaching methods, and the lesson is composedin an openly doctrinal and instructive manner, so that the triad is properto those who are receiving it, as it is in all respects of a similar nature to 20

the monad – in being odd, primary, and complete.118

In the case of the virtues some belong among those who are at war,and introduce measure to their struggles, while others separate us fromthe warring elements but have not yet removed us from them entirely,and still others happen to be entirely separated.119 Likewise in the case

116 Cephalus, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, Clitophon, Glaucon, Adeimantus – butCephalus had soon disappeared.

117 Six is seen as just such a number, being the product of the first even and the first oddnumber (when one is not classed as either).

118 It is interesting to ask how Syrianus would have applied his theories to other dialoguesin the Neoplatonic canon. Presumably he would count three listeners again in theParmenides, and four in the Sophist and Politicus. But there is only one in the Alcibiadesand the Phaedrus, two in the Cratylus, Theaetetus, and Philebus, four in the Gorgias, andmany at the conversations narrated in the Symposium and the Phaedo (though only oneat the narration).

119 These are (i) the constitutional virtues that operate within a divided, tripartite soul andare found in book four of the Republic and in the Gorgias; (ii) the cathartic or purgativevirtues supposedly depicted in the Phaedo; and finally the theoretic virtues. Plotinus,Ennead I.2 is crucial for the establishment of the division.

115


of discussions some are competitive, some are openly doctrinal, and some25

a kind of intermediate between the two.120 Some are appropriate tothe intellectual calm and the soul’s intellection, others to our opinion-forming activities, and others to the lives that are between these. More-over, of the listeners some have an affinity for more elevated studies,others for humbler ones. And some of those who listen to grander top-30

ics are also capable of confronting the inferior ones, but those who aresuited to the lesser ones are ill-equipped for the loftier ones. So too those22who have the greater of the virtues also have the lesser ones, whereas hewho is graced with the less exacting ones is not entirely in a position tograsp the more accomplished.

Why then is it any longer a surprise that this person who had beenlistening to the discussion of the constitution has been left out of the5

study of the universe? Further, how is it not essential in the deeper kindof discussion that the accompanying persons should be fewer? How is itnot appropriate to the Pythagoreans that different standards for listen-ers should be determined, bearing in mind that of those who attendedat their auditorium121 some had a deeper and some a more superficial10

grasp of the doctrines?122 How is it not in harmony with Plato that heshould blame an indisposition for the absence, bearing in mind that thesoul’s weakness in respect of the more divine thought-objects separatesus from higher studies, in which case there is room for an involuntaryelement? Everything, you see, that gives us the greater kind of assistanceis voluntary, but to fall away123 in the face of higher perfection is invol-15

untary. Or, more accurately, this [failure] is not voluntary,124 whereas thatwhich not only separates us from the greater goods, but also slips awayinto the unending sea of vice is involuntary. Hence Timaeus says thatthe fourth person did not voluntarily miss this gathering – he hadn’tmissed it as one who was entirely shunning study, but as one who was20

unable to be initiated into the greater mysteries.125 So to claim thata student of the theory of cosmic creation is also capable of studying

120 There had long been a basic division of Plato’s works into a more dialectical (zetetic)and a more doctrinal (hyphegetic) group, in which ‘competitive’ is properly a species ofthe former (D.L. 3.49).

121 homoakoeion: Festugiere compares Iambl. VPyth. 30, but it occurs more widely, ibid.6.30, Porph. VPlot. 20, Olymp. in Alc. 132.

122 The well-known distinction (cf. Iambl. VPyth. 18, Porph. VPlot. 37) between the akous-matics and the mathematics, implying literally that the former merely heard what thelatter understood.

123 apoptosis, cf. ET 209.124 The distinction between involuntary and not-voluntary occurs in Arist. EN 1110b18.125 The language that had originally alluded to the Eleusinian Mysteries, as at Symposium

209e–210a, is now conventional, and is applied here rather to the two different stagesof Pythagorean study.

116

Introductory texts

constitutional theory, whereas somebody who clings to constitutionaltheory should be missing from studies of the universe because of a ‘sur-passing of power’,126 is to claim something impossible. Hence the fourth 25

person is missing from the proposed discussions through somethinghe lacks rather than something he surpasses in as some would claim,and his ‘indisposition’ should not be described as the failure of the oth-ers to measure up to him, but as his own falling short (hyphesis) of theothers.

Let us grant that there is a weakness both among those who descendfrom the intelligibles and among those being led up from the study of 30

sense-objects, of the kind that Socrates relates in the Republic.127 Even so,he who has become a student of constitutional theory would not through 23his surpassing ability have gone missing from the study of nature withouthis friends knowing. And the word befallen indicates the inferior kind ofdifference from those present, but to my mind128 it certainly doesn’tadequately bring to mind a difference involving the surpassing type.Indeed it is unlikely that his being unnamed signifies for this gathering 5

anything outstanding or beyond description129 about him, but rather thatit indicates his indeterminate and inferior nature. Plato certainly makes ahabit of doing this in many places – in the Phaedo, for instance, he doesn’teven think the author of a trifling objection worthy of consideration(103a); the same with the father of Critobulus, because he was not up to 10

the conversation at that time (59b); and he made a general unspecifiedreference to many others (59b). That kind of listener would also havehad no profit from attending the present discussion, seeing that evenamong those present here Critias does say a bit but Hermocrates attendsin silence. Thus he differs from the missing person only to the extent 15

that he is more fitted to listen, given a lesser role than all the rest throughhis being left out of the speaking.

Isn’t it up to you and these others to fully supply his part for him in hisabsence? (17a6–7)

This too agrees with what we have claimed. In things that are always 20

causally more important and divine there is a reduction in quantity and a

126 Festugiere correctly associates this phrase with Iamblichus, with whose position Syr-ianus must have contrasted his own. However, Festugiere’s translation here betrays amisunderstanding of the Greek.

127 Referring back to Iamblichus’ argument at 19.9–16.128 The rare first person singular, because Proclus has reported Syrianus separately.129 aperigraphos: Festugiere translates ‘transcendent’, and one assumes that Iamblichus had

claimed that being unnamed meant that he was indescribable, and that it is primarilywhat is transcendent that is beyond description.

117


lessening of multiplicity, but a surpassing of power. This too is a doctrineof the Pythagoreans, for whom the triad is holier than the tetrad, thetetrad than the decad, and everything within the decad than whateverfollows it. To put it simply, the closer a thing is to the principle the more25

primary it is, and the more primary the more powerful, since all powerhas been subsumed in advance in the principle and distributed to therest from the principle. So if the principle were multiplicity, there wouldbe a need for what was more multitudinous to be both more primaryand more powerful than what was less so. But since the principle is amonad, the more monad-like is greater and more powerful than what is30

further removed from the cause. So it is with good reason that Socratesmakes the reduction in the number [of participants] a symbol of thehigher perfection that has subsumed in advance, as far as possible, allthat comes second, and fully supplied what is lacking in them.130 But24since, as has been said before,131 he is the pinnacle of the triad of theselisteners, and he connects himself with the monad that organizes thediscussions in the image of the demiurgic gods, it is worth seeing how heselects Timaeus from the others and refers to him as to an organizer of5

the entire discussion, while including the others alongside him as if theyfell somewhat short of him in merit. This too sets us on the road to thedivine causes, among which the first member of the triad, being unifiedwith the primordial monad, draws the others up towards it, encourages10

the productive activity of the monad, and awakens the activity of theothers directing it towards generation.132 This is consonant with whathas been said before.

Porphyry on the other hand records here a moral lesson,133 thatfriends should abide by all agreements on one another’s behalf both inwords and in deeds, and should turn around any deficiency confronting15

them until they negate the lack, fully supplying their contribution.For this is characteristic of pure, straightforward friendship. Iamblichus,however, having once adopted the position that the unnamed personis greater than those present and a dedicated contemplator of intelli-gibles, says that Socrates is indicating through this that, although the20

130 Festugiere explains that � � 7��+�� takes up � � 7��, in the lemma. Timaeus,the healthier, having to supply what is lacking is a symbol for the higher, the morepotent, having to supply what is missing from the lower.

131 9.20–2 = 3f.132 Proclus is utilizing the doctrine of three demiurges, identified with Zeus, Poseidon,

and Hades and the Father of Demiurges that stands above this triad. For the triad seePlat. Theol. I. 4.18.25–7 etc. and the discussion of divine allocations below. Timaeus isanalogous to the monad above the demiurgic triad, Socrates to the highest member ofthat triad, cf. 9.17–22 above.

133 in Tim. fr. III, in accordance with Porphyry’s overall approach to the prologue.

118

Introductory texts

creations of nature fall short of what is genuinely real, yet they derivefrom them a certain similarity to them. According to the same princi-ple the study that occupies itself with nature participates in a way inthe knowledge of the intelligibles, and this is what the fully supplyindicates.134

Certainly, and to the best of our powers we’ll admit no deficiency, 25

because it wouldn’t be right after being treated to those handsome135

gifts of hospitality by you yesterday, for the rest of us not to be eager togive you a full return feast. (17b1–4)

With these words he is indicating the character of Timaeus, which is 30

exalted and prudent, lofty and attuned, friendly and generous. The cer- 25tainly highlights his enthusiasm on the matter of the missing person andthe perfection of his knowledge, in accord with which he is ready to fullysupply what others have left undone, and also his sincerity. The wordsand to the best of our powers we’ll admit no deficiency are suffi- 5

cient to suggest that there’s reliability in his promises and yet a degreeof modesty in what he says about himself. These are the moral lessonsthat one can derive from this.

The physical lessons are that the repayment of the verbal feast offers animage of the sharing and exchange of powers in the works of nature, in 10

which all things are arranged together and together accomplish the singleharmony of the universe. And of the alternation of nature’s activitiesaccording to time, as different things perform different tasks for differentthings at different times. This is rather like giving a return feast foryesterday’s host.

The theological lesson is that the creative cause advances throughout 15

all things, and fully supplies all things, and does away with all deficiencythrough his own power and the surpassing of his productivity, as a resultof which he allows nothing to be devoid of himself. For he is character-ized by an overflowing, a sufficiency, and a completeness in everything.Moreover the phrase give a full return feast is drawn from the pictureof feasting in the divine myths, in which the gods greet each other – 20

And they with golden gobletsWelcome one another. . .

(Il. 4.3–4)

– having their fill of nectar from Zeus the greatest one. And Plato didn’tjust say ‘give a return feast’ (anthestian), but give . . . a full return feast

134 Iamblichus in Tim. fr. 4. For commentary see Dillon (1973), 267.135 I have translated prepon (‘fair-seeming’) as ‘handsome’ on this occasion, since the aes-

thetic sense is more important than the moral sense in Proclus’ comment.

119


(antaphestian), for the full return feast has incorporated the notion ofcomplete fulfilment. This is also observable in the universe, because the25

visible orders,136 via their uppermost part, invite the invisible powers,while they, on account of their surpassing readiness, perfect the for-mer too, and the offer of perfection functions as a repayment for theinvitation.

Furthermore that all this is done in accord with what’s right intro-30

duces an image of Justice who orders all things along with Zeus, thereference to handsomeness an image of the cause that illuminates26the universe with the demiurgic beauty, and the hospitality gifts ofthe exchange that is determined by the special properties of the divini-ties (for each of the divinities has its own powers and activities). Justas Socrates feasted Timaeus on the discussions involved in his own phi-5

losophy, so indeed does each of the gods, by activating its own powers,contribute to the completion of the Demiurge’s one overriding provi-dential order of the universe.

Hopefully this has brought out the details of a training lesson137 in thestudy of reality, a lesson that gets reflected like an image in the proem.Also evident from this passage are the dramatic dates of the dialogues,10

of the Republic that is and the Timaeus, bearing in mind that the formerhas its setting at the Bendidea that were being conducted at the Piraeus,while the latter came on the day after the Bendidea.138 Those who havewritten about festivals agree that the Bendidea at the Piraeus took placeon the nineteenth of Thargelion,so that the Timaeus would be set on15

the twentieth of the same month. If, as will be said next, it is also setduring the Panathenaea, it is clear that this is the lesser Panathenaea,139

as the Greater Panathenaea took place on the third day from the end ofHecatombaeon, this too being recorded by our predecessors.20

136 LSJ associate the term ��+$�+�� particularly with texts influenced by Pythagore-anism (beginning with Arist. Metaph. 986a6), in later Neoplatonism with the meaning‘order’ = ‘class’ (as here); I usually prefer ‘arrangement’.

137 Progymnasmata, a term from the rhetorical schools.138 It is strange that Proclus seems now to forget that the narration of the conversations

described in the Republic was supposed to have taken place the day after the Bendideaand in Athens itself (9.2–5).

139 This is quite wrong, for the Panathenaea took place at the same time each year with theGreater being celebrated every fourth year, and the Lesser in other years. Festugierepresumes a confusion with the Plynteria on the 25th of Thargelion, judging perhapsfrom 84.27: ‘around the same time’. However, if he starts from the conviction thatRepublic–Timaeus–Critias is a single sequence, and that Timaeus and friends were theaudience for the story narrated in the Republic, then Proclus must assume the LesserPanathenaea had a different date from the Greater. See Festugiere also on 84.27.

120

Socrates’ constitution

Socrates’ constitution (26.21–75.25)

Remembering the Socratic constitution

Then don’t you remember the sum and subject of what I directed you tosay? (17b5–6)

One should first run through the order of the topics. It began with thequestion of the full number of those participating in the conversation,and then followed the question of fully supplying the role of the absent 25

person. Thirdly he tacks on the question of the rendering of the returnspeeches for which they had been asked. These questions follow on fromone another. Who had to meet relates to the threefold tasks of thoseassembled, and the fact that they spoke as a threesome relates to whohad to speak. Further, in addition to the order, one should ponder the 30

precise choice of the terms.Remember signifies the divided recognition of the discussions among 27

the participants. For there is also memory of all things in the demi-urge, the separate and transcendent and unitary recognition that accordswith the Remembrance (Mnemosyne) within him, that being the stable 5

foundation of divine intellection, and among the second gods there issubordinate intellection. Those in attendance are images of the lat-ter. On account of this memory pre-existing in the universe, (i) soulsin their entirety are founded in the intelligibles, and (ii) the demiur-gic principles (logoi) have their inevitable and unchanging character, 10

so that all things that are deprived of it drift away from their ownparticular causes,140 like particular souls and the natures of generatedthings.

The expression sum and subject is suggestive of the quantity andquality of realities, which proceed sometimes from the universal creation,but sometimes too from the more particular gods.

The term directed, if it were addressed to Critias and Hermocrates, 15

would obviously have to be pointing them upwards towards realities(ta pragmata) and to the origins of the creation-process; whereas if it isaddressed to Timaeus as well, it is not a token of transcendence, but ofthe invocation of the intellections within him. In this regard let us lookat Timaeus’ answer.

Some we remember, and what we do not, you will stand by and remind us 20

of. (17b7)

140 Neoplatonism associates recollection with reversion (see Tarrant 2005, 174–6), so thatprocession is naturally aligned with forgetfulness.

121


In this you can find a moral principle, as Porphyry notes, the meanbetween false modesty141 and boastfulness. For he claimed to know nei-ther all nor nothing, but to know some things rather than others. Its25

lesson in reasoning is that one should provide an excuse for the sum-ming up of one’s deliberations (problemata); this is a matter of dialecticalprocedure. Its lesson in physics is that physical principles are both perma-nently fixed and in flux, just as the present memory is in a way preserved,but in another way lost. For those things that are said of man should betransferred also to the whole of nature.30

The theological lesson is that the one creation, even of its own self,retains the unswerving and immaculate character among its offspring,28but that through the secondary and tertiary powers it is supported as itadvances and is given an escort by them as it were, as they calm the con-fusion among generated things in its path;142 though it is transcendentof itself, it is even further removed on account of its setting secondary5

powers over the realm that it manages.143

Furthermore the recollection-motif introduces an image of therenewal of the principles (logoi) in the universe. For whatever flows offfrom them is recalled back in a circle to the same or a similar point,and the ranks of generation remain unfailing on account of the circu-lar motion of the heaven, and this latter is always accomplished in the10

same way because of intellect’s checking and arranging the whole cir-cular motion by its intellectual powers. Therefore it is reasonable thatSocrates should be the one who reminds them of the discussions, theone who tells the story of the constitution for which the paradigm is inthe heaven.144

Why recapitulation is appropriate and why it fits here

Better still, if it’s not a chore for you, go back briefly over it again fromthe beginning, so that we can be a bit more sure of it. (17b8–9)15

While the constitution comes in three phases, the first description ofit was genuinely difficult on account of its sophistical struggles, the

141 Or ‘irony’; coming from Porphyry (in Tim. fr. IV) these words remind us that theSocratic profession of ignorance could become an embarrassment; see Tarrant (2000)108–11.

142 Festugiere construes the Greek rather differently.143 It is here crucial that Timaeus, who stands to be reminded by Socrates, is regarded as

analogous to the Father of Demiurges, while Socrates is here (qua the first of the triadof listeners) analogous to the highest member of the demiurgic triad that are to takeover the creation from the Father (9.15–24).

144 See Rep. 592b. This passage becomes the basis for Proclus’ entire approach to thesummary of the constitution.

122


second was easier than what went before, but the third is the easiest,embracing in a nutshell the entire outline (eidos) of the constitution.145 20

Recapitulation of this kind suits the things of nature, on account of therebirth among them and their cyclic return to the same form. This ofcourse is the source of the forms’ actually remaining firmly fixed in theworld, as the cyclic return recalls them from dispersal and destruction –the return through which the heaven too has eternal motion, and, though 25

tracing many circles, wheels back round146 to the same life. For whatreason then did he make no mention of the present matters in the nar-ration of the constitution, neither of the characters of the dialogue norof their promises,147 and yet add this here? It is because in the universe 30

too the exemplars have embraced all the principles of the images, but 29their copies are not able to embrace all the power of their causes.148 Sojust as he mentions at the second gathering those characters assembledat the first, so he makes mention at the third gathering of what hadbeen suppressed at the second. This is because effects may be studied 5

more completely in the context of their causes that lie over and abovethem.

You might also give a theological explanation: the Timaeus,149 in theposition corresponding to the universal creation, has embraced every-thing, the characters, their promises, their verbal contributions, whereasSocrates in the Republic, in a position corresponding to the highest level 10

of the triple creation,150 spins out only the form of the constitution,which is of heavenly origin. So here everything has been absorbed asif into one total animal, the primary, intermediate, and final stages: theentire unfolding of everything.

145 Festugiere relates this to material at 8.30ff., where the actual discussion of the Timaeustakes place on day one, the narration of the discussion to Timaeus and others on daytwo, and now the recapitulation on day three.

146 On the verb anakampto see note on 126.13.147 Proclus means the sequence of conversation which terminated in the promises of

Timaeus, Critias, and Hermocrates to present further material for discussion the nextday.

148 Essential here is the theme of the heavenly order being the paradigm of the idealconstitution, so that one does not expect a proper outline of the heaven in a work onthe constitution.

149 For reasons given by Festugiere we follow him in assuming a reference to the workrather than the character here. The contrast is hence with the Republic rather than withSocrates.

150 Festugiere is quite justified in amending 8 7�� to �� here; the text will nototherwise accord with Proclan doctrine on the various demiurgic powers. While Fes-tugiere correctly draws attention to the fact that 9.17–24 has already aligned Socrateswith the highest member of demiurgic triad, and Timaeus with the power set over this,the schema is possibly best studied in Plat. Theol.

123


Yet how is it that the constitution has been handed down a thirdtime too? For what reason? Is it because the life of soul too is also15

some triple life? First comes the life that restrains the irrational part,151

makes it subject to the order of justice, and gives it the appropriatedirections. Second is the life that is turned in towards itself, and desiresto contemplate itself in accordance with the justice that is germane to it.The third is that which ascends towards its causes and implants within20

them their own proper activities. Even the word briefly,152 you see,introduces an image of the life that is wrapped in concentration uponthe one intellect, and of the intellectual embrace of all things; while goback offers an admirable indication of the gathering in perfection uponthe highest goal,153 and, if you like, of the more everlasting intellection:25

for that is what is signified by ‘be made more sure’, being in a morestable and everlasting condition with the same objects in focus.

Well, yesterday the principal question of my discourse on a constitutionwas which constitutional type and which kind of men would make it turn30

out best in my eyes. (17c1–3)

Those who explain the return to the constitution154 more in accordancewith ethics say that it is showing us that we should embark upon the30study of the universe [only] when we have acquired orderly patterns ofbehaviour. Others155 commend the view that it has been placed beforethe account of all nature as an image of the entire organization of theworld, explaining that the Pythagoreans had the habit of placing beforetheir scientific instruction an indication of the topics investigated, by5

means of similes and analogies. It is after this that they introduce theinexpressible illustration of the same things through their symbols,156

and then, after the stimulation of the soul’s intellection in this way andthe purgation of its eye,157 they apply the total scientific investigation10

151 Again read with Festugiere �% 97�� for �% 7��, for otherwise the text makes poorsense. As he shows, the corruption has taken place by a simple palaeographic confusionin uncial script.

152 Here the Greek says literally ‘the speaking briefly’, while the lemma had ‘go back tothem briefly’.

153 I.e. 1 *7( is here being interpreted as ‘go up’ as well as ‘go back’, hence as anindication of the Neoplatonic process of reversion.

154 The term 1 *�� picks up the 1 *7( from Plato’s text in the previous lemma.155 Iamblichus in Tim. fr. 5 (to ‘ways of communication’), answering more Porphyrian

theory (in Tim. fr. V). For commentary see Dillon (1973), 264–5.156 The movement from illustrations to symbols is a movement away from indications

grasped primarily by the senses and towards things grasped rather by the mind. Diehlcompares here Iamblichus VPyth. 66.

157 �3 ��, �$$�� *(��+�. Dillon (109, cf. 268) translates ‘the purging of its (=the soul’s) vision’, correctly. We have been talking here of the purgation that takes

124


of the topics before them. So here too the epitome of the constitutionpreceding the account of nature brings us face to face with the universalcreation through images, while the narration about the Atlantines doesso through symbols. And in general myths have the tendency to give an 15

indication of things through symbols. So the element of natural scienceis something that pervades the dialogue as a whole, but it does so inone way in one place and in another way elsewhere, differing accordingto the various ways of communication. This will suffice regarding thetarget of the discussions before us.

That the summary of the constitution has been included in this inves-tigation with good reason we could deduce from many considerations. 20

The political art first exists in the demiurge of universe, as we havelearned in the Protagoras,158 and true virtue shines forth in this cosmosof ours. That’s why Timaeus says that it is an acquaintance and friend foritself ‘through its virtue’.159 Furthermore the constitution is triple,160 25

with the first being consecrated to the universal creation, as we demon-strate elsewhere,161 so it is reasonable that its form is described in themost concise form here, where the aim is also to study the universalcreator as he engenders and organizes the totality of things.

It is possible to work this out to a greater degree, but let us return to the 30

text and to the actual words of Socrates. This is an area of considerable 31controversy among the interpreters, who write and reply to each otherabout just one punctuation mark, and who interpret the target of theRepublic this way or that on the basis of this punctuation mark. Thosewho punctuate at ‘constitution’ define its target with a view to the title, 5

appealing to Plato too that it is about a constitution, whereas those whopunctuate at ‘discourse’ say that its target concerns justice, but that whatis about a constitution is actually this summary of what had been said

place through the images of mathematics in the Republic itself (527d–e, 533d), which isrepresented as the lifting of the soul above ordinary visual influences. But while 527d–etalks of ‘an organ of the soul better than countless eyes’, 533d has dialectic, assisted bymathematics, lifting ‘the eye of the soul’ from impure depths to a non-sensory level.

158 321d. As Plat. Theol. shows, Proclus does make some use of Prt. for theological purposes,even though it is not included in the Iamblichan canon.

159 34b7–8; the quotation, referring to the cosmic soul, is incomplete, yet Proclus has doneno violence to its meaning.

160 The language is reminiscent of 28.17; though that seemed to be talking of variousconstitutional discussions, this seems rather to be talking of types of constitutions thatrelate to the three phases of creation.

161 Festugiere refers to 29.10 above, and, again, in Remp. II. 8.15–23, where the key elementis that the first constitution is concerned with sharing things in common, the secondis concerned with the distribution, and the last is concerned with corrective measures.But surely Proclus is referring to the fact that the ‘constitution’ is present (i) in theorganization of the universe, (ii) in the state, and (iii) in the soul.

125


with justice in view, that is introduced like a scene on the ekkyklema.162

However, if we are not to grope in the dark with our claims and counter-10

claims, we must state that in a sense both views coincide. The discussionabout justice is on the inner constitution, for it achieves the correct dis-position of the faculties within us; and the discussion about a constitutionis in the interests of the justice that arises within the multitude. Hence15

both amount to the same thing, and justice in the soul, constitution inthe state, and orderliness in the cosmos are the same thing; one shouldnot make trouble for oneself by dividing from one another things thatare joined by nature.

So much for that. Yet Longinus163 and Origenes begin from a differentissue when arguing with each other over the type of constitution that20

Socrates discusses here, namely whether it is the first or the intermedi-ate constitution. They claim to see the constitution there as involving(iii) a natural life, (ii) a warlike life, and (i) an intellective life.164 SoLonginus thinks that the discussion here has come to concern the mid-dle life, because he calls the assistants ‘guardians’, and says that it is the25

guardians who will fight. Origenes however thinks it is about the first;for it is in the context of this that he prescribes the subjects to be learnedby the guardians. In answer to these too we shall say that one shouldnot tear apart the one constitution or separate off the continuum of life,one part from another. For there is a single constitution that perfectsitself and is increased by the addition of more perfect life-types. This30

whole constitution has its physical element in the thetes, its warlike ele-ment in the assistants, and the intellective element in the guardians.And so the discussion is about the whole constitution, and it is not32about these matters one should be disputing; one should rather examinehow reasonable it is that one should claim that constitutional study165

162 The ekkyklema is a wheeled platform that introduces into the Greek theatre, throughthe central door into the acting area, a scene representing what had happened withinthe building behind. For Proclus, therefore, this language introduces us to a separatescene as if through a window, and as Festugiere notes, citing also 92.13 and 204.18,the idea of a digression is always present. Theatrical analogy had been particularlypopular with some early interpreters, including presumably Aristophanes of Byzantium.See Tarrant (2000), 28–9. Of the different texts, the former would mean ‘yesterdaythe principal point of my discourse was about a constitution, i.e. which constitutionaltype . . .’ etc., while the latter would mean ‘of my discourse yesterday on a constitutionthe principal question was which constitutional type . . .’ etc.

163 Longinus fr. 25; Origenes fr. 8.164 Festugiere naturally links this threefold life with the three different classes, artisans,

soldiers, and philosopher-kings, which emerge as the establishment of the Socraticstate proceeds. Proclus seems to be saying that this is a different division from thatwith which one might begin when discussing three constitutions.

165 It is tempting to read �3 �7�� for �3 �7�� at 32.3–4.

126


is both inferior and superior to the study of physics. Insofar as it hashuman affairs as its subject matter and desires to organize them it has a 5

place secondary to physics, but insofar as its foundation is in universalprinciples and its structure is incorporeal and immaterial it is superiorand more universal. For the world-order too is also a kind of constitu-tion and a particular one, since all body is particular, and overall ‘con-stitution’ has a prior existence in the intelligible, it is established also 10

in the heaven, and finally it exists in the lives of humans beings too.And so, to the extent that it is superior to physical creation, it is placedwith good reason prior to the Timaeus, whereas, to the extent that it isinferior, because this had been an ethical order while the other is cos-mic and totally perfect, we should arguably need to be ascending frominferior things to more elevated matters. Both points of view are correct 15

for the reasons stated. Accordingly, because as we were saying the form ofthe constitution (i) is universal, and (ii) has been stamped upon particularmatter, Socrates too has taken up the question of which [constitutional]type because of the form, and that of which kind of men on account ofthe matter.

And as far as all of us are concerned it was described very much as 20

intelligence requires. (17c4–5)

Narration in accord with intelligence, not in accord with their plea-sure nor in accord with their vote, indicates his admirable perfectionand intellective grasp, and there is a riddling reference to the preced-ing consensual convergence of all the secondary causes into one intellectand one united creative process. Furthermore the addition of very much 25

signifies the transcendent nature of this unity, through which all the cre-ative causes converge upon the single paternal cause of all things as ifupon one single centre.

The separation of classes

Did we not first of all separate in it the class of farmers and of those with 33all other crafts from people of the class who were going to go to war forit? (17c6–8)

The discussion on the constitution and the short condensed summaryof the classes in it makes a contribution to the entire account of the 5

cosmic creation. For they act like images from which it is possible torefocus on the universe. Indeed the Pythagoreans were the outstandingexponents of this very method, tracking down the similarities in realitiesby way of analogies, and passing from images to paradigmatic cases. That 10

is what Plato is doing now too, showing us at the outset things in the

127


universe as seen in human lives, and enabling us to study them. It isnot remarkable either, for the constitutions of weighty (spoudaioi) per-sons are moulded on the organization of the heaven. Accordingly we tooshould relate the present images in words to universal matters, begin-15

ning with the matter of the division of the classes. This split of classes,you see, imitates the demiurgic division in the universe. According tothis it is possible neither for incorporeals to mutate and adopt the natureof bodies, nor for bodies to secede from their own being in favour of20

an incorporeal existence. Again, according to this mortal things staymortal and immortal things are fixed and unfailing for eternity. Andthe various orders [in the Republic] have their paradigmatic causes pre-established in things universal. You might care to draw a parallel in whichthe entire city is analogous to the entire cosmos (for it does not followthat while a human being is a mini-cosmos, the city would not be a mini-25

cosmos), to split it all in two, the upper city and the lower,166 and toplace the former alongside the heaven and the latter alongside genera-tion. You would then find the analogy plausible in every way. Pursuingthe tripartition, you would get in the city the labouring, warfaring, and30

guardian elements; whereas in the soul you would get the appetitivefaculty that looks after the needs of the body, the spirited faculty thathas been given the job of repressing all that is injurious to the animal,34acting as bodyguard to what rules in us, and the rational part, which isin essence philosophical and lord over all our life. Further, in the total-ity of souls there is the part that labours over generation, that whichhelps out with the providential plans of the gods in the cosmic periph-5

ery, and that which returns to the intelligible; and among all the crea-tures in the cosmos there is the race of things mortal, the family of dae-mons, and the order of gods in heaven. These last are genuine guardiansand saviours of the universe, while the daemons provide an escort fortheir creation, and check all the error in the cosmos, but there exists10

also a kind of natural providence among mortal things, which bringsthese into existence and conserves them in accordance with the divineintelligence.

Moreover, by another division, the farming sector of the state(i) is analogous to the Moon,167 which embraces the ordinances of

166 Upper and lower cities are simply description of the warfaring+guardian class and theartisan class, and the descriptions accurately capture the degree to which these classesare kept separate. As Festugiere points out, the idea will recur, first at 34.30, then at39.25–6, and 53.8–9.

167 What follows makes it clear that Proclus is comparing classes with the seven planets,each conceived as a god (hence the capitals).

128


generation-producing nature; that which presides over the shared mar- 15

riages (ii) to Aphrodite who is responsible for all harmony and the unionof male with female and form with matter; that which is taking care ofthe craftily worked-out lots (iii) to Hermes, both on account of the lots,over which this god presides, and on account of the element of trick-ery in them And the educational and judicial section (iv) is analogous 20

to the Sun, in whose domain according to the Theologians are Justice,the Upward Leader, and the Seven-Rays;168 the warfaring class (v) to therank of Ares that presides over all the rivalry of the cosmos and the differ-ence of the universe; the kingly element (vi) to Zeus who takes the leadin the wisdom of leadership and intelligence in action and organization; 25

and the philosophic element to Kronos, insofar as it is intellective, andascends even as far as the first cause.169 This is what should be graspedfrom analogies in this way.

However, Plato seems to split the state in two, and to posit the farmersand tradespeople, which he calls the craftsman element, as one class,while as another he posits the warfaring class as his upper city.170 This 30

is not, as Longinus claims, because he is now giving a summary of the 35warring constitution,171 but because he has included both the auxiliariesand the guardians under the heading of the warfaring element, becausethe former defend it with their hands, and the latter with their policies.Similarly, among the Greeks, Ajax fought as the ‘defence-wall’ of the 5

Achaeans (Il. 3.229), but there fought also the ‘watcher over’ the Greeks,Nestor, the latter repelling the enemy as a guardian with his counsels, theformer using his hands against them. Perhaps, though, he is also makingspecial mention of the warfarers here, because he wants to inquire intothe military achievements of such a constitution.

168 On the basis of Julian Or. 5.172a–d etc. Festugiere tentatively identifies the last twomembers of this Chaldean triad with Attis and Mithras respectively.

169 The detection of a parallel between the tasks fulfilled in the state and the seven planetsseems particularly artificial, and may originate with those of astrological interests.The division of tasks seems not to be inspired by anything here in the Timaeus, nordoes it well reflect anything in the Republic itself, separating out philosopher and king,for example, who are famously supposed to be one in that work. One assumes thatcertain interpreters have begun with the notion that Plato’s state mirrors the heavenlyparadigm, cf. Rep. 592b, and so required that the seven-fold planetary system must beincluded among features to be found in the state. Comparison with his view of theAtlantis myth on 77.17–30 suggests that we could be discussing Amelius’ view.

170 See on 33.26.171 Longinus is not only relying on Socrates’ professed desire to see his constitution

engaged in armed conflict, 19c, but also using the notion of a triple constitution withthe three lives (natural, warring, and intellective) seen above at 31.18–25.

129


And granting according to nature only the one operation that belonged10

to each personally, we said of those who should make war above all. . .(17c10-d2)172

To begin with one should distinguish two readings of the lemma: either‘we granted according to nature one activity to each of the citizens,15

so that each would have his own proper operation to perform’, or ‘wegranted to each to perform the operation according to his nature, theone that belonged to each in accordance with the talent that belongs tohis nature.’173 Next one should investigate the reason that led Socratesto divide them in that way. Either it is for the reason that he himself20

stated,174 that each operation is rightly performed by one who (i) hasthe right nature and (ii) diligently applies himself to the operation; forneither can diligence achieve anything perfect if suitability is lacking,nor can cleverness advance into activity without diligence. So the goalis a combination of both. But if that is so, then if somebody were to25

perform more tasks he would not be able to be equally adapted to themall or to be diligent about them all equally, his attention being divided byhis concern for them all. As these concerns are reduced, it is inevitablethat the operations of the citizens should turn out less satisfactory; andif this is not proper, one must distribute one occupation to each of the30

citizens, one that he has natural talent in, and instruct him to applyall his diligence to a single thing. For one who is naturally clever in36such and such a life, and approaches his natural task diligently, wouldin all probability become excellent at his appropriate job. It is easy toobserve this division in the case of our human constitutions, for our5

nature is divided, but how can it be true in the case of the gods, seeingthat what is divine is all-powerful and all-perfect? In fact it should besaid to apply to the gods, because, while all are in all, it is according

172 Proclus’ text probably lacks the words $�� 4�*+��: �2�� or anything similar, whichis also absent from Calcidius’ Latin translation.

173 The key words are ��/ ��+�, which are taken either as indicating the naturalness ofthe general principle of ‘one person, one job’, or as underlining that each will have ajob to which he or she is naturally suited. To the modern reader it is relevant that eachperson’s nature is the consideration at Rep. 370a7–b2 etc. Proclus seems uninterestedin preferring one reading over the other, and at the end of the discussion he appearsto confirm that he regards both the one-job principle and allocation in accord withnatural abilities as reflecting the cosmic order, and therefore natural.

174 This seems to relate to Republic 369e–370c, where each craftsman must have naturalability for his own job, and diligence (369e6) in servicing the needs of others for hisproduct, a diligence that is manifested in his making the most of all opportunities(370b–c). The twin factors of natural ability and attention to opportunity are bestseen at 370c3–5. That Proclus finds his claims in the Republic means that 35.20–2 is anaccusative and infinitive construction, and the infinitive 1 ��+(�� does not requireemendation or an understood �;, as Diehl and Festugiere suppose.

130


to the individuality of each that it is all things and has the cause of all,one in Sun-wise, another Hermes-wise. For, beginning with the Divine 10

Henads, individuality passes through the intellective entities, throughthe divine souls, and through their bodies. It is on this account that, ofthese things too, some have received a share of demiurgic power, someof productive, some of cohesive, and some of divisive, and this is thenature of their action upon [the world of] generation.175

So individuality pre-exists among things divine themselves, distin- 15

guishing the henads in accordance with the limitlessness there and thedivine dyad.176 But otherness exists among intellects, dividing off bothwholes and their parts, allocating the intellective powers, and providingdifferent things with different roles of their own, as a result of which thepurity of the intellects is not compromised. And procession and distinc- 20

tion according to their different lives occurs among souls,177 lives that givesome a divine subsistence, others an angelic one, others a demonic one,and other a different kind again; and in bodies there is physical sepa-ration, giving different properties to different things. It is among thesethat one finds the final reflections of intelligibles, according to whichdifferent things have different effects, and one thing reacts in sympathy 25

to another, while a third has this sympathetic reaction to another still.So, just as in the universe it is natural for each thing to perform that roleover which it has been given charge since creation, so in the city too theoperations of each class have been distinguished, with each person beinggiven charge of whatever he’s naturally suited to. As for the precise jobs 30

of the warfarers, Socrates himself will shortly go on to clarify them.

The role and character of the military class

That they should only be guardians of the state – whether somebody 37were to come from outside to do it harm or even if one were to comefrom those within – passing judgement with humanity upon those whowere their natural friends and under their control, but getting tough in 5

battle with whichever of their enemies they met. (17d–18a)

In this he wants the guardians and auxiliaries to be judges of thosewithin, should any harm the city, and opponents of those outside, hav-ing one way in mind for the auxiliaries, and another for the guardians, 10

as has been said before. That they should only be guardians is not a

175 Demiurgic power is associated with the Sun, generative with the Moon (often associatedwith souls below), cohesive with Aphrodite, and divisive with Ares.

176 Festugiere observes that this is one thing, a single dyad, rather than two.177 Procession is not, of course, a description of another means by which x can be distinct

from y, but rather it is in procession that distinct types of lives can emerge.

131


diminution of their power. For neither, when we assert of the first prin-ciple that it is only One do we diminish it and entirely enclose it withinnarrow confines; for neither is what has only the best diminished by this,but, quite the contrary, for such a thing as this any accretion would be15

a diminution.178 The result is that on these terms not being alone woulddiminish the whole, as opposed to its being alone, and the more youmultiply it the more you would diminish whatever has the status of aprinciple. This applies here.

Again, we must examine how we are to observe what is now being saidin the universe. For what is there that is external to the universe? How20

does the universe not enclose everything? Well surely evil is doublyestablished within the universe itself, in souls and in bodies, and it isnecessary for those who abolish fault and disorder from the universeto extend justice and measure to souls, and to take as their opponentthe restlessness of matter. Souls belong naturally to the intelligible, on25

which account they could be described as within and as being fromthe entire intelligible plain, but those things that are enmattered andfar from the gods are alien to them and foreign and external. On thisaccount the administrators of justice treat the former with humanityas friends by nature, but with those bodies that travel in a faulty and30

disorderly fashion they get tough, because they are out of sympathy with38them and are trying utterly to wipe out their disorder and to eliminatetheir greed for material supremacy. Some of these do not even abidesuch an order, but are immediately off and transported into non-being,whereas others that move in a faulty way are held in check by the Justice5

within the universe and by the irresistible force of the guardian powersof order. That’s why he said now that those who wage war for the stateare tough on whomsoever they meet; for some would not even enduretheir sight. And in general there are (i) both uplifting and purifyingpowers for souls themselves, presiding over judgements and justice, and10

it is clear that the former correspond to the guardians, and the latterto the warfarers; while (ii) for bodies some powers are cohesive whileothers are divisive, and it is clear that the former correspond to theguardians, and the latter to the warfarers. They reunite with the universe15

those things that are no longer able to remain in their given order, sothat everything may be orderly, and nothing may be indeterminate orfaulty.

178 Since the material here relates to the ethical treatment of the lemma, with the physicaltreatment to follow, and is thus more likely to relate to Porphyry than to Iamblichus, itis important to note how reminiscent this material is of Anon. in Parm. I (often ascribedto Porphyry, see Introduction, p. 45), where Speusippus’ minimal One is criticized.

132


If you were to fix your gaze on the very universal demiurge himself andthe unvarying and unyielding nature of the gods,179 whom the inspiredpoem too has named guardians of Zeus, you would grasp also the pre- 20

existing cause of these twin kinds (genos); all things, you see, have beenadorned on account of the Demiurgic Being, while all creation remainseternal on account of the unvarying vigilance within him. You would seethere also Justice ‘with Zeus’ applying correction to all things – for she 25

accompanies him ‘as an avenger for the divine law’ – 180 and the armedbrigade with which he organizes the universe, as those who write aboutbattles against Titans and battles against giants say. But this can waituntil another time.

As for the outside and within, one could also understand them in the 39following way. The faulty and disorderly flux of bodies at times comesabout through the weakness of the principles of order (logoi), and at timesthrough matter’s greed for supremacy. The principles are closely linkedwith the productive causes, but matter, because of its own indeterminacyand its extreme subordination, is alien to the powers that bring order to it. 5

The irresistible strength of the gods, with their unvarying order and theirvigilance in the creation process that removes its faultiness in every sortof way, renews the principles of order and gives them encouragement intheir weakness, while struggling against matter’s greed for supremacy;this is not because matter is actively resisting the gods that bring her 10

forth, but because, fleeing order on account of its own indeterminacy, itis mastered by the forms on account of this vigilance in creation, againstwhich nothing is able to make a stand and to which all things must beobedient, so that all things in the world may endure for ever and theirdemiurge may be the father of things everlasting, because he is unmoved 15

and fixed in transcendence and in eternity.181

We said, I believe, that the nature of the souls of the guardians hadto be at one and the same time outstandingly spirited and philosophic,so that it could get humane to the one group and tough with the other. 20

(18a4–7)

179 For the language Diehl and Festugiere refer to Or. Chald. 36 (p. 21 Kroll), cf. 166.8–9,167.6 and 168.15 below.

180 Laws 716a2–3: Plato has ‘avenger of transgressions of the divine law’, while Proclus’ ‘for’( ��) implies that she protects that law.

181 In this final section Proclus discusses the notion that matter can be akin to an externalenemy, while the formal principles can on occasion be more like a friend within who isfalling short of requirements. As Festugiere points out, we have already met the ideaof enmattered flaws as an outside enemy at 37.27–8, but it was there opposed to flawswithin soul, so that the contrast was between soul and body rather than between formand matter.

133


The terms ‘philosophic’ and ‘spirited’ apply similarly to both types, tothe auxiliaries and to the guardians in the proper sense of the word, justas the term ‘appetitive’ fits the third type that is known as the ‘labour-25

ing’ one. Because his contrast opposes the upper city to the lower, hehas indicated the differences of the orders within it [sc. the upper] usingthese two names, just as if, in dividing the world into heaven and becom-ing, somebody were to say there are daemonic and divine orders in theheaven, and to say that both of them were protective of generation and30

of the universe. For the universe is watched over both by the gods and bythe daemons, by the former in a universal and unitary and transcendent40fashion, and by the latter in a partial and multiplicitous fashion morein keeping with the things that they watch over. For in the case of eachgod there is a plurality of daemons that divide up among themselves hissingle universal providence. So in these circumstances the term ‘philo-sophic’ belongs to the gods insofar as they are united [in their focus] on5

the intelligible and insofar as they are replete with being, while the term‘spirited’ belongs to the daemons insofar as they expel all fault from theuniverse, insofar as they form an escort for the gods in the same way asthe heart does for the reason, and insofar as they are the saviours of thedivine laws and of the ordinances of Adrasteia.182 For these reasons they10

are humane towards those close to them, carefully encouraging them,as if natural relatives, to get over their weaknesses, but tough on out-siders, as if making an exceptional and extreme effort to eliminate theirindeterminacy.183

Education and upbringing of the guardian class

What about upbringing? Didn’t we say they were to have been broughtup on gymnastic and music,and on all the disciplines that belonged with15

these? (18a9–10)

The discussions so far were a kind of blueprint that extended to all incommon, distinguishing in accordance with the demiurgic allotmentand the otherness within the divine the practices that belonged to each20

group, and properly allocating the properties to the things that were toreceive them.184 From this point on the life of the citizens is constructed

182 The ordinance of Adrasteia (another name for Nemesis) was well known from Phaedrus248c.

183 The insiders and outsiders are now once again souls with faults and bodies with faults,and Proclus’ concern here remains the universal correction of disorder rather than thepreservation of the state.

184 For the correct punctuation see Festugiere.

134


through their upbringing, their practices, their social interaction, andtheir child-raising, advancing in the correct way from beginning to end.

So what is their upbringing, and how is it an image of the universe?There is an education of the soul in the city, formatting the irrational 25

part through music and gymnastic. Here the former slackens the stringsof the spirit and the latter, arousing the desire, renders it perfectly in tuneand proportion with the spirit when it has become too relaxed on accountof its descent into the material realm and infected with lifelessness from 41that source. Likewise it formats the reason through the mathematicalsciences, which have a drawing power185 to reacquaint one with realityand which lead the intellective power in us up to the very ‘brightestlight of being’.186 This is clear to those who have not entirely sunk into 5

forgetfulness of the things that are set out there.187

It is now our task to inquire into what the upbringing within the uni-verse is, what its music and gymnastic are, and which are the studies of theguardians of the universe. Suppose we were to say that their upbringingwas the perfection that makes each replete with the good qualities thatbelongs to it and renders it self-sufficient in its intellections and its acts 10

of providence; and that their music and gymnastic were respectivelywhat brought their lives to harmonious fulfilment and what fashionedthe rhythmical and tuneful divine motions, always unswervingly pre-serving the same disposition of the chariots of the gods – for this is thereason why he called the divine souls ‘Sirens’ in another place,188 and 15

said that the heavenly movement is ‘rhythmical’, there being ‘gymnastic’among them as opposed to ‘medicine’ in sublunary things, those that arecapable also of admitting what’s contrary to nature. Suppose we wereto say this, we should perhaps be correct. From the intelligibles above,you see, powers reach down to the whole heaven, illuminating their lives 20

with the finest of harmonies and imbuing their chariots with unflinch-ing strength, since even mathematics are intellections of the souls ofheavenly beings, in accordance with which they have recourse to theintelligible, following the great Zeus and observing the unitary numberand the real heaven and the intelligible shape. Hence you could say that 25

in them is the truest arithmetic, astronomy, and geometry – for theyview speed-in-itself and slowness-in-itself, the paradigms of the circuits

185 We are perhaps expecting ‘upward drawing power’, but the text Proclus has in mind,Rep. 521d3–4, has no similar word; it also has <7�% for �7��.

186 Cf. Rep. 518c9.187 I.e. in the Republic, according to Festugiere. There may also be a suggestion of our

forgetting higher truths, such as is postulated by the Platonic theme of recollection.188 Proclus refers to Rep. 617b5 and c4; cf. the long important passage on Sirens at in Remp.

II. 237.16ff. Plato refers to the single harmonious sound of the Sirens of the variousplanetary spheres, but he does not use the terminology of rhythm.

135


of the heaven, and, summing up, the primary and intelligible circuit42and the divine number and the intelligible shapes – and prior to thisdialectic, in accordance with which they apprehend the entire intelligiblerealm and are united upon the single cause of all the henads. And, if one5

may say it in divided terms, through such mathematical sciences theiractivity is directed to the primary things, through gymnastic they haveunchallenged leadership of the second things, and through music theyharmoniously draw together the strings that unite the whole.

Community of property and of lives

Furthermore, it was said surely that those who were raised in this waydidn’t consider either gold or silver or any other possession as their own10

private property. (18b9–10)

The requirements laid down for the city with the best laws have anobvious justification, and it was stated by Socrates in those discussions.How, though, are we going to apply these principles to the heaven? Surelywe have to notice the reason why humans pursue gold and silver, and15

what they are thinking of in conceiving this unbounded desire. Clearly[they do so] out of the will to attend to their own needs from whateversource, and out of the desire to provide themselves with what contributesto their pleasure. ‘There are many comforts for the rich at least’ as20

Cephalus claims.189 If this is right then, the perfection of the heavenlygods, which is self-sufficient and directed towards beauty and the good,has no need of this imported and superficial self-sufficiency, nor doesit have need as its focus and as its aim, but being situated far from all25

wants and from material necessity, and being replete with advantages, ithas the leading role in the universe. Indeed it does not have anythingto do with the partial and divided good, but has fixed its aim upon thecommon and undivided good that extends to all, and it is with this that it30

is particularly associated. Hence the words didn’t consider either goldor silver or any other possession as their own private property fit43these [heavenly beings] also.

If you prefer, let it also be explained in this manner, in physical fashion.Gold, silver, and all sorts of metals, just like everything else, arise onearth as a result of the heavenly gods and the efflux therefrom. Indeed5

the theory is190 that gold is the Sun’s, silver the Moon’s, lead Saturn’s,

189 Rep. 329e. The words are actually used by Socrates, and claimed as the opinion of themajority, but Cephalus does express qualified agreement. Obviously the details of theaporetic first book of the Republic are not of great concern to Proclus.

190 Clearly Proclus does not accept this theory, as it would have the heavenly gods somehowdividing property between them; the theory is associated with ��7�(*$�� at 43.12,

136


and iron the property of Mars. So these things are generated from there,but they are founded upon the earth and not among those things thatrelease these effluxes, for they (the heavenly bodies) receive nothing from 10

enmattered things. And while all of these metals are from all of them,nevertheless different qualities dominate in different ones, a Saturnianquality in one and a solar one in another; it is with this in mind thatthe sight-lovers refer one [metal] to one [astral] power and another toanother. For they are not the private property of particular gods, beingthe offspring of them all, nor are they among them, seeing that their 15

makers have no need of them, but they have solidified in this region ina manner dependent upon the effluxes from these [makers].

Why is it then that human enthusiasm for these things is divided? Itis because they possess a material life and reach out for what is partialin isolation from the universal. That’s why there is a great deal of ‘mine’and ‘not mine’ among them, and why a life of unity and sharing has failed 20

them.

But they should be like assistants receiving whatever wage for theirguardianship is reasonable from those who are kept safe by them, theamount reasonable for moderate persons, and should spend money incommon and live sharing their lifestyle with one another, havingcontinual concern for virtue and enjoying a respite from all other jobs. 25

(18b3–7)

There would be nothing surprising in the existence of favours and returnfavours in human life, and in a wage for services rendered. Socrates toohad been right (Rep. 420b) when he said in that discourse that our goal 30

was to make the whole city happy (eudaimon) rather than one particularclass in it, such as the guardian class. If this is right, then one class 44would need to save the city through forethought and wisdom, while theother class does so through service and labour. This service would fulfilthe needs of the saviours of their constitution – just as nature withinus provides calm for the thinking part for its own proper activities by 5

attending to the organism’s development and integrity. But then whatkind of return favour (not to say wage!) will the argument say is paidfrom mortals to the gods in heaven?191 Perhaps this is a characteristic of

and, when discussing the summary of the Republic (cf. 475d etc.), Proclus must bemeaning this as a term of criticism, implying an excessive preoccupation with thethings of the senses. This is natural, for the property of colour is clearly among thosethat cause some metals to be associated with some heavenly bodies.

191 Having applied the analogy between state (upper and lower classes) and individual(highest and lower parts of the soul), Proclus now insists on finding how this analogyis to work on a cosmic level (earthly and heavenly beings). The question recalls theproblems raised at the end of the Euthyphro (14e–15a), where Euthyphro is unable togive a convincing account of what the gods need from us.

137


human weakness that it doesn’t possess self-sufficiency, but every god is10

self-sufficient. And in addition to their being self-sufficient, because ofthe superabundance that accompanies this sufficiency, they fill needierthings with benefits while not actually receiving anything from them.Well, even if the divine receives nothing, because it is adequate and self-sufficient, it still needs some sort of wages from us and a return for itsbeneficence, the acknowledgement of the favour and gratefulness for15

it, through which we revert to them and are filled with even greatergoods.192 This is because, being good, it wants everything to look uponit and be mindful that all exist from it and because of it. For this is whatpreserves all that follows, the fact that each thing is attached to its divinecause.

However, if we interpret these things in this way, resorting to rever-20

sions and acknowledgement of the favour as explanations of the wages,how will the following continue to be in harmony with us: that the godslead their lives together and actually spend this wage? So it is better tounderstand this wage more along physical lines: since effluences havecome to this world from that, while there are exhalations being set in25

motion to that world from this, and it is through these that the crafts-manship of the gods concerning mortal things is brought to completion,he called such changes and transfers from earthly things a wage beingpaid from the whole earth to the heaven, so that generation should beunfailing. By the common life he meant the integrated life of the divine30

creation and the like-minded forethought of the gods in heaven.193 It is45on account of this that all that comes in exchange from the earth is spent,while generation is exchanged in a variety of ways through the dance194

of the heavenly bodies.It is to this that Timaeus looks when he says (34b) that the whole

cosmos is ‘a friend to itself ’ and ‘an associate because of its excellence’,5

and that ‘it offers as food for itself its own decay’, doing everything itdoes to itself, and suffering everything from itself (33c–d). What then is thegoal of this one common life of the citizens? Excellence is what he says,excellence – clearly divine excellence, as excellence appears first with thegods, and then after them a portion of it comes down to the superior races10

and to us. So the guardians of the world live in accordance with it and haveremission from all other practices (for they do not look to their needs nor

192 Proclus is here seeing prayer and offerings to the gods as a part of that general patternof things by which all that ‘owes’ something to a cause ‘repays’ it by the process ofreversion. Compare the account that Proclus gives of prayer beginning at II. 209.13that turns to reversion at 210.2.

193 This like-minded forethought matches the guardians’ common concern for virtue inthe state.

194 For the dance metaphor see Tim. 40c3.

138


to what is outside, since all things are within them), and they preserve all 15

things and fill them with beauty and goodness, serving and assisting theone father and demiurge of all. Since they determine a measure even forthe changes on earth without stepping outside themselves, but by havingturned inwards towards themselves and being within themselves, on thisaccount he has also spoken of a wage that is reasonable for moderatepersons. Being moderate through being in control of themselves,195 20

they measure out secondary things too, circumscribing their multifariouschanges within the simplicity of their own life.

So much for this path. But according to another we shall claim that itis above all holiness and reversion to the gods that involve measure and 25

are in the grip of the good, while this [measure] is determined by thegods themselves, who are able to preserve both themselves and the restin accord with their divine wisdom.

The position of females

Moreover we made additional mention of women, saying that theircharacters have to be brought into harmony much the same as the men, 30

and they all should be given a share in all the jobs, both in warfare and inthe economy in general. (18c1–4)

Plato had good reason to approve of men and women having the same 46virtues, as he declared that humankind was one species, refusing to holdthat the male was one thing and the female another. Those things thathave a different species of perfection are themselves of a different species, 5

while those that are the same in species have one and the same perfec-tion. Other people,196 while admitting that there is no difference ofspecies in this case, have refused to concur,197 even though Plato hasgone on to prove that this is both possible and advantageous. It is pos-sible, because history gives confirmation of it, as many women turn outfar superior to men after a good upbringing; it is expedient, because it 10

is far better for those who display valour in deeds to be twice the num-ber rather than half.198 So just as we have perfected guardians with this

195 It seems likely that we should read at 45.20 �� 4��) <��> =�� or �� 4��)<$2��> =��.

196 Proclus has Aristotle in mind, as is clear from in Remp. I. 252.24–6. Festugiere citesArist. Metaph. 1058a29ff. as well as Pol. 1260a17ff. and 1277b20ff.

197 I take it that what they deny is the substance of the lemma (differing here slightly fromFestugiere and Praechter [1905], but adopting with Festugiere the reading of M andP), and that this is made clear by what follows.

198 It is characteristic of Greek to think comparatively here, so that one number is double(that with which it is contrasted), and the other half (that with which it is contrasted).

139


kind of upbringing and education, so, as a result of the same upbringing,we shall bring guardianesses too to perfection – female as well as male15

warfarers.However, so that we can admire Plato’s plan all the more, we should

turn our attention to the wider issues, i.e. to the organization of theuniverse, where we shall find an amazing integration of the lives of maleand female. For among the gods these things are so intertwined, that a20

single individual can actually be designated male-female (arsenothelus),such as the Sun, Hermes, and certain others.199 Even where gender hadbeen divided, male and female of the same rank have the same tasks; itis accomplished in an initial way by the male, and in a subordinate wayby the female. Hence in mortal creatures too nature has revealed the25

female to be weaker in all things than the male.200 Indeed everythingthat proceeds from the male is also brought to birth by the female, pre-serving its subordinate role. So Hera processes in company with Zeus,giving birth to all things together with the father, for which reason she iscalled ‘his equal accomplisher’;201 and Rhea processes in company with47Kronos, for this goddess is the recess that harbours all the power ofKronos; and Ge processes in company with Uranus, as Ge is mother ofall that Uranus has fathered. And if we were to assume, prior to thesebasic divinities,202 limit and unlimited, which have been given the sta-5

tus of principle and cause in respect of them, we shall find that every-thing that proceeds in any fashion into being is generated from both ofthem.203

199 A problematic reference, since Festugiere found no reference to a genderless Helios,nor even to a Hermes of this type, even though a male-female supreme principle isto be found in the Hermetic Corpus (Poimandres 9). It was of course Hermes’ sonby Aphrodite, Hermaphroditus, who was of both genders, though Aphrodite herselfmay also be regarded as arsenothelus, and another god with some gender ambiguityis Dionysus. Present references probably result from an uncritical attempt to collectmaterial on gods of common gender. Various material was available, including (oddlyenough) that on the Moon in Plutarch’s On Isis and Osiris 368c, while one branch ofthe Pythagorean tradition had made the One arsenothelus (Theol. Ar. 5; cf. the pentadat 32).

200 Cf. Rep. 455d8-e2, where nature is again a prominent concept, and it is again greaterweakness that is attributed to the female.

201 Orph. fr. 163; the term is isoteles, which is somewhat ambiguous and interpreted hereaccording to the requirements of the context.

202 It would be less appropriate, given the choice of gods discussed, to postulate here theHellenistic sense of +��;� as planet (LSJ II. 5, noted by Festugiere).

203 Cf. Phlb. 26d7–9, where the huge class of things that is the combined product of limitand unlimited is described as ‘generation into being’ (�2+�� 6� ��+��).

140


Here you have the coalition of male and female among intelligiblegods,204 among intellective ones, and among hypercosmic ones. See,then, how the same thing applies to the heaven, since all generationtakes its directions from the Sun and Moon, predominantly and in a 10

fatherly way from the former, and secondarily205 from the latter. Henceshe has been described by some as ‘a lesser Sun’.206 [And there are lunarorders corresponding to the male gods in the sun.]207 Then again, if youwere to observe the matter in daemons, you will see that the providen-tial assistance of these two kinds is everywhere conjoined, because the 15

godlike daemonesses accomplish everything in unison with the godlikedaemons, playing a secondary role to their primary one. The psychicdaemonesses [are in unison with] psychic daemons, the natural with thenatural, and the corporeal with the corporeal, the females having thesame relation as mothers to the males and as dyads to the monads. For 20

they give birth in a derivative way to whatever the others bring forth intheir fatherly and unitary way. So if our previous comparison was cor-rect,208 making the guardians the heavenly gods and the auxiliaries theattendant daemons that serve their providential plans, it is with goodreason that Plato welcomes among these types the same conjunction of 25

male with female, granting each sex a share in common virtues and com-mon jobs – just as nature bound these types together with each otherand made them bring forth with each other’s help. It did not divide theone from the other, but either sex is infertile in isolation, reproduction 48requiring both. For sure the difference in respect of physical organs isgreater than the difference in their lives, but still, even as far as the organsare concerned, nature has made for them a single task. So much the more,then, is it right to approve of their sharing in their jobs and in their life 5

overall.

204 I suspect the omission here of ‘and in intellective and intelligible’ (�� 1 ��;� �� ;�), so that reference is being made to each of the three generations of divinepairs, plus the prior principles of limit and unlimited. For a different view see Festugierep. 76 n.2.

205 It is tempting to translate ‘derivatively’ here, since such theory is probably linked tothe fact that the moon merely passes on the light that originates with the sun.

206 Diehl and Festugiere cite Arist. Gen. An. 777b25; note here that the male gender ofthe Sun (Helios) is not in question, and contrast 46.21.

207 The problem here is that it is other male gods, not daemons for instance, who aresupposed to be within the Sun. Festugiere says ‘Mysterieux, et l’on ne peut que con-jecturer.’ His long note cites Hermetic and astrological texts, but the sentence needsexplaining from within Proclus if it is to stand. It adds nothing, and reads like a gloss,and in these circumstances it is legitimate tentatively to excise it.

208 See 34.8–12.

141


What about the business of child-raising? Or was this pretty easy toremember until now on account of the unfamiliarity of what was said?up to This too is easily remembered as you state. (18c6–d6)209

If somebody were to inquire as to why what is unfamiliar is easily remem-10

bered, it wouldn’t be difficult to answer that it makes more of an impactupon the imagination as being unexpected, and it implants its own out-line in greater detail within us. Furthermore it is an easy business tofollow Plato in stating how the community is meant in the case ofwives. He wishes the couplings to take place, along with prayers and15

sacrifices, on predetermined occasions in accord with the judgementof the magistrates, and that the female in the union should not be theprivate partner of any one man, but that she should be separated afterthe coupling and live apart [from the male], and on other occasions sheshould again be allocated to whatever man the guardians have approved20

for her. Well, this shows how the study of these things has a bearingon natural philosophy. So let us state how these things pertain to theorganization of the universe, for this too is established far earlier amongthe gods on account of their union. All offspring, you see, are the off-spring of all, even though some are characterized by their own special25

relationships, and all are in all, and all are unified with all with an unde-filed purity210 that befits the gods. It is with an eye on this purity211

that Socrates welcomed both this community [of wives] and the indi-vidual one-to-one allocation of the jobs to each person according to his49nature. For even the failure to recognize one’s own offspring individuallyis found among the gods: their intellections are shared, and so are theircreations. Each assists and preserves what has been born on the assump-tion that it is the common concern of all. Indeed to regard all one’s5

own rank as brothers, all one’s superiors as fathers and ancestors, andall one’s inferiors as descendants and children, is a feature that has beentransferred from the gods into this constitution [of Plato’s]. The simi-larity of substance, deriving from the same cause, signifies brotherhoodamong them;212 the procreative cause signifies the ancestor element; the10

209 Note that the final words here are from Timaeus’ reply to Socrates, and the majority ofSocrates’ present speech has been omitted. For abridged lemmata of this sort, rare ina commentary that deals with minutiae (but not towards the conclusion of the Atlantissection for instance), see Festugiere’s note.

210 amiges, literally ‘unmingled’, but, since ‘mix’ was a common expression for ‘have sex’it is unlikely that the sexual sense is meant to be forgotten here.

211 There are perhaps two points: (i) the community of wives is not proposed as a meansof legitimizing impure conduct, as some might think; (ii) there is no adulteration ofan individual’s own special qualities in the kind of union that is followed by enforcedseparation.

212 Festugiere here strangely translates 1 1�� as ‘chez les etres d’ici-bas’.

142


outflow of substance that goes forth into a second or third series (seira)signifies the class of descendants. As for the same female being yokedto other males and the same male to a plurality of partners, you coulddeduce this from the mystical texts and the ‘Holy Marriages’ that arerelated in secret texts213 – marriages with which Plato compared the 15

circumstances of his citizens and their marriages in calling them ‘holymarriages’ (Rep. 458e).

Indeed, in physical theory one can see that one and the same receptaclecan come about for different formal principles (logoi), and a single formalprinciple can be reflected in a plurality of receptacles and pervade amultitude of substrates. The forms correspond to the males, and the 20

receptacles to the females. Why ever should it be, then, that this sameprinciple is observed in the universe, but seems paradoxical when appliedto human lives? Because, I shall claim, all human soul has been slicedoff from the whole and become separate, and it is on this account that 25

it214 finds doctrines that cling to the principle of sharing to be very hardto accept. But if one were to eliminate this lower standing215 and raiseoneself back to the whole, then one would accept such a sharing, ignoringthe divided communal feelings among the multitude. Insofar as each of 30

us is drawn down towards the part and becomes isolated and deserts the 50unified whole, to that extent he is confined to the corresponding life,a life of ungoverned conditions, of unordered order, and of undivideddivision.216

213 Clearly Proclus has ‘Holy Marriages’ of Plato’s own day in mind, but perhaps also morerecent religious texts that he considered indebted to them, one of which Porphyryrecalls having read aloud (VPlot. 15). Festugiere speaks of the ‘marriage’ of the wife ofthe King Archon to Dionysus at the Anthesteria, of various celebrations of the unionof Zeus with Hera or Demeter, and finally of the marriage of Cybele and Attis. Thekey thing, however, is the Proclan tendency to seize upon almost any hint of ritualisticlanguage in Plato, though here the original �*$�� . . . ��+�$ >��?� (we shallmake marriages . . . holy) involved a predicative rather than an attributive sense of theadjective.

214 Following the text of Praechter (1905), 516, and Festugiere, which delete �� between�� and ��.

215 For a detailed note on this meaning of ��*��@�� and cognates see Festugiere, whocites from book 1 also 50.3, 53.30, 89.14.

216 Festugiere admits that he is at pains to understand the last of the three paradoxicalexpressions (9+�� . . . +�2+� �� *��@� ��*�� +�)that are applied to the life of maximal separation. It seems to me that one should keepin mind various Platonic notions about the descent into plurality and beyond: (i) Phlb.16d–e, the notion that, after a plurality has been divided as far as it can go, it can thenbe released into an infinite or indeterminate multiplicity; (ii) Parm. 159b–160b (thefifth hypothesis according to the Neoplatonic count, and often linked with matter),where the plurality that is deprived of the one loses all characteristics and all number,and ends up looking rather like a unity as a result; and (iii) Platonic concepts of matterstemming from the receptacle of the Timaeus itself.

143


Arranged marriages

Moreover, so that they should become, right from birth, of the bestcharacter possible up to thinking luck was to blame for their5

draw. (18d7–e3)

Plato made a special point of treating geometrical similarity, sameness,and equality along with arithmetical kinds in his Republic (524d-527c)in order to preserve in its entirety this comparison between state and10

heaven (as far as objects of sense are concerned), and between stateand intelligibles (as far as hyper-heavenly lives are concerned). It isfor this reason that in marriage he joins excellent women to excellentpartners, and lower quality women to inferior partners, since amongthe gods too the primary ones have preferred to become united withother primary ones, and the secondary ones with other secondary ones.And along with their union their purity is undefiled.217 So even in the15

second ranks, those coming after the gods, such a distribution accord-ing to merit is accomplished as the gods intend. Hence divine dae-monesses are paired with divine daemons, psychic ones with psychicdaemons, and those with material connections with partners with mate-rial connections.218 Everywhere the analogy proceeds down the ranks20

until the very last. For even the fact that the rulers should devise insecret gives an adequate reflection of how the cause of such comingtogether is hidden among the gods, a coming together that arises pri-marily from that [higher] region, and secondarily also from the place-ment that the lot indicates for each. This lot has a power to bind25

couples together through the similarity of their lives, which has deter-mined how each is coordinated with one similar, the divine with thedivine, the enmattered with the enmattered, the intermediate with theintermediate.

On this account all quarrelling and dissension has been eliminatedfrom things divine, as each cherishes (stergein) its own partner in confor-mity with its own placement, and sees this [placement] as a direct con-30

sequence of its own nature, and not as an artificial import. As an image51(eikon) of all this he introduces the point about the citizens attribut-ing the pairings to the drawing of lots, and failing to see how inge-niously they are contrived. For in the things of nature too receptacles are

217 This translation requires the repositioning of the definite article in the text of 50.15.218 For the tripartition of daemons and daemonesses see above 47.15–18, where the last

group are called corporeal (+�$��) rather than materially connected ( ��+�7��).These daemons are not, of course, thought of as consisting of body or matter, but aslinked closely with bodily matter.

144


distributed so as to suit the forms,219 and each of the forms would hold its 5

own standing in relation to the changes it undergoes – even though thistoo is achieved in accordance with the causes that preside over creationas a whole, which correspond to the guardians. Let that conclude whatis said with a view to the study of the universe.

Longinus220 raises a difficulty here about whether Plato can think 10

that the souls are deposited along with the sperm, bearing in mind thathe couples like with like so that the best possible offspring can arise.Porphyry221 counters this objection, but not forcefully enough. My ownteacher thought it right to observe firstly that Plato himself added ‘so 15

that they should become of the best character possible’. For childrenreceive a natural likeness of their fathers and get an allocation of thenobility of their parents in respect of their natural good qualities. Next,he thought, one should consider the following, that even if it is true thatsouls are not deposited along with the sperm, the distribution of physical 20

organisms [to them] nevertheless occurs according to their merits: i.e. itis not the case that all souls settle in any organism they encounter, buteach settles in the one that suits it. As Homer says ‘the good man puts onwhat is good, but to the inferior inferior is given.’222 Furthermore, just as 25

the initiate, by decorating the statues with certain symbols, makes themreadier223 for the reception of higher powers, so too universal nature,by using natural formulae to fashion bodies as outward images of souls,implants a different suitability in different bodies for the reception ofone kind of soul or another, better ones and worse ones. The politician, 30

having a correct understanding of this, takes a great deal of account ofthe seeds and of natural suitability in its entirety, so that he also gets the 52best souls to arise in the bodies with the best natures. This is also whatmust be said in answer to Longinus’ difficulty. Why, though, did Platosuppose it to be better that the citizens think chance to be the reasonfor such a distribution? Presumably because while it is beneficial, in thecase of what we consider to be goods, to be aware of the reason for them 5

too – for we admire that still more – in the case of what are supposedby us to be evils, it is better to believe that their presence is without acause than to put the blame on some cause that distributes these thingsfor the better. This tends to stir us into looking down on the giver, or

219 It is important that female and male are now being related, as often, to receptacle andform.

220 Longinus fr. 27. 221 Porphyry in Tim. fr. VI.222 Il. 14.382. The quotation concerns the putting on of armour.223 The concept of readiness is related to theurgic theory, and will appear again at 139.20–

140.15.

145


rather into hating him, seeing that every creature must shun that which10

does it harm.

The demotion of children in the universe

Indeed, that we claim that the offspring of the good are to be raised,while those of the bad are to be secretly passed on to the rest of thecity.224 (19a1–2)

This too is among things determined there, but its occurrence in the uni-verse is prior by far. Of the things that are produced by the gods and dae-15

mons, you see, some remain among them, pure in race and far removedfrom generation, which are also called immaculate on this account; butsome descend into generation, being unable to remain in the heavenwithout slipping. Some are from good stock, and others from inferior –20

for bad signifies inferior here. The ‘horses and charioteers of the godsare all good’,225 and from good stock, but the corresponding attributesof individual souls are mixed.226 Hence there is among them a ‘turn ofthe scales’, a ‘falling away’, and a ‘loss of feathers’,227 and they get sentinto generation by the <gods> in the heaven and by the daemons incharge of the descent of souls. Further, the classes of soul that are heav-25

enly and immaculate receive nourishment as they are carried round ‘inthe company of the gods’ ‘to a feast and banquet’,228 as it is said in thePhaedrus, while the generation-producing classes are sent from there toassociate with generation.

The lemma says secretly, indicating the invisible and secret cause53among the gods of the descent of souls, <while passed on to the rest ofthe city indicates>229 how the souls that descend from there are placedunder a different providential power and under different overseers, thosein charge of generation.

224 Cf. Rep. 460c, which is rather less specific than is the Timaeus, though it does appear toentail it. Festugiere corrects the view that these children are being given to a differentpolis, which besides misunderstanding the Greek would make nonsense if the analogyof the universe is to work for Proclus.

225 Quoting Phaedrus 246a7–8 with slight variation.226 Proclus is presumably thinking of the tripartite soul as illustrated again in the Phaedrus,

where the horse that stands for the appetitive part is an inferior beast, while the otherhorse is better and obedient to the charioteer, 253d1-e5.

227 The first and third terms are inspired largely by the Phaedrus 247b4, 246c2, 248c8;the second is already part of the same vocabulary (indicating the fall of the soul) byPlotinus’ time.

228 The second phrase was well known from Phdr. 247a8, the first is an allusion to 248a2.In both cases there is variation in the direction of a less poetic style.

229 Festugiere is clearly right in postulating some such supplement as this to fill the lacunamarked in Diehl.

146


And as they grow up, they should continually be on the lookout for 5

worthy ones and bring them [back] up again, while transferring unworthyones in their own number back to the place the others were beingupgraded from. (19a3–5)

In the Republic he advocates the transferral not only of those being dis-tributed from the higher ranks to the lower city,230 but also of those 10

born [down] there with a golden streak, whereas here [in the Timaeus]he advocates the return of those who had been sent down.231 So howcould these two passages be reconciled with each other? Perhaps it ispossible to make this lemma too agree with his determinations there ifyou take as they grow up to refer not to those who have been sent downfrom above alone, but rather to all those being reared below. Whether 15

they are simply born below or have got down there from on high, <onemust> investigate their natures, determining their types, and accord-ingly bring back the ones who deserve it. But if you want to take it aswe said in the beginning, one has to say that Socrates took up now asmuch as accorded with the purpose before them. For it is the souls who 20

have descended who go up again, without all those who have their initialfoundation in generation and in the material realm – the type of soulbelonging to most non-reasoning creatures. So much concerning thelemma.

Observe how the same arrangements apply in the universe as Socrates 25

had laid down in his constitution.232 Certain things always have the sameplace in the heaven, remaining divine and unshifting, others have sunkfor ever into the material realm, but intermediate things belong to both ina sense, sometimes dependent on those divine things, and at other timesmingling with those that welcome generation. So one cannot identify the 30

race of daemons with what is being given a [new] station above or below,nor are the various lives or deaths concerned with daemons, but they are 54concerned with individual souls, which at one moment commune withgeneration, and at another transfer to the portion of daemons or gods.Knowing this, Socrates has legislated for corresponding arrangementsin the Republic, because heavenly Zeus had earlier arranged for gods in 5

230 I am tempted to read at 53.9: �� $�� <�)> � % �) 9�(.231 Proclus draws attention to the slight difference between the two works, insofar as Rep.

415c3–4 talks solely or primarily of the promotion of those born to the lower ranks, notof those who had previously been demoted. In the Timaeus it looks as if he is concernedwith restoring previously demoted individuals back to guardianship (which would ineffect be admitting that a mistake had been made). There is a slight ambiguity in thatthe word used in the lemma for ‘bring up’ (�*��) may also mean to ‘recall’ an exile,but the *7� strongly suggests that Proclus is not misunderstanding this text.

232 I decline to take this as the title Republic as others appear to have done; the work isPlato’s, but the proposed constitution is that of (Plato’s) Socrates.

147


heaven and daemons to bring individual souls back up, and others tosend them down into generation, so that the descent and ascent of soulsshould never entirely desert the universe; for you would see this soulreturning to square one,

But another the father sends in to be numbered among them

according to the inspired teaching on these things.23310

The lessons from the summary of the constitution

Then have we now covered it as we did yesterday, to go back over themain heads again, or do we still desire something that’s been left outfrom what was said, Timaeus my friend? (19a7–9)

The resume of the constitution taught us through images how the uni-15

verse has been made replete with the finest principles (logoi). For thingsgenerated have been kept separate in it, and each operates according to itsown distinctive character in its association with the rest. The first thingshave been separated from the second, and they employ activities of thelatter as something necessary for the completion of the All. The second20

things are organized by the first, and the best of them are harnessed sym-biotically with the best of encosmic things, the middle ones with middlethings, and the last with the last. The same principles penetrate severalsubstrates, and the same receptacles participate in several principles. At25

various times living creatures exchange their various allotted portions inaccordance with their personal deserts. All this was enough to focus ourattention on the organization of the universe.

Under a limited number of main heads Socrates properly summed upthe entire shape of the constitution, thus moving back towards the undi-vided character of intellect,234 in order to imitate the god who organized30

the heavenly constitution in an intelligible way and in the manner of afather. Since everywhere due measures and completion are being deter-55mined for the second things by their causes, on this account he himselfasks Timaeus to state whether he has included the entire form of theconstitution; for all intellect is reliant upon the god that precedes it anddetermines its own boundaries by looking to it.235 For to have set forth5

the main heads (kephalaia) is also a symbol of his having organized theprimary elements of the whole, i.e. its head, things which the universaldemiurge will arrange more perfectly with an eye on the whole and on

233 Od. 12.65 is used in normal late-Platonic fashion.234 For the undivided character of intellect (A ��/ �$2��) see Festugiere’s note.235 Socrates is analogous to the highest member of the demiurgic triad, Timaeus to the

Father of Demiurges who precedes that triad: see especially 9.15–24.

148


the single life of the cosmos.236 So much for the analogy between partsand the whole.

It is not particularly problematic for us to inquire whether this lemma 10

is stating that he has now gone through the main heads of the consti-tution that he went through yesterday, or that he had included it allunder main heads both yesterday and again today.237 That’s because,whether he sketched it in greater detail yesterday and under main headstoday, or whether he outlined the main heads in both cases, the divine 15

Iamblichus is satisfied,238 and it makes no difference to us. Perhaps,though, it is rather the latter that agrees better. ‘To go back over themain heads again’ signifies that it had been stated ‘under the mainheads’ yesterday too. It would not be at all surprising that its sum-mary nature should not be mentioned in the Republic, because many 20

other things that are stated here as if they had been said the daybefore are not mentioned there. On the other hand it may be thathere too the again should not be taken with the main heads butwith go back over, because he who narrates the previous conversa-tion goes back, while he who summarizes the long account under main 25

heads goes back again.239 However things are, it is not a problematicmatter.

Explaining Socrates’ desire

Now then, about this constitution that we’ve run through, kindlylisten next to the kind of feeling that I happen to have experiencedabout it. (19b3–4)

There are five points here, to list the main heads, that the forthcoming 30

speech of Socrates has incorporated. First, what it is that he yearns for as a 56supplement to what has been said, after the exposition of the constitution.Second, that he himself is not capable of supplying this. Third, that neitherdoes any of the poets have the capability for this. Fourth, that neithershould one entrust such a task to the sophists. Fifth, that only those 5

who’ve been listening could give a worthwhile account of what Socratesis keen for.

236 I.e. the upper member of the triad of demiurges arranges only the highest level of theuniverse, which must be integrated with the lower levels by the universal demiurge; cf.57.31–58.2.

237 Though the puzzle is not attributed to any particular pre-Iamblichan commentator, itsphilological character strongly suggests Longinus.

238 Iamblichus in Tim. fr. 6. For commentary see Dillon (1973), 268.239 One must bear in mind that Proclus views the Republic as going back over a conversation,

whereas this summary can be seen as going back again.

149


What then is this thing that Socrates yearns for after this constitution,as we must necessarily say something about that first of all? It is toview this city in motion, as he says, in struggles, in competitions, and in10

warfare, so that after its life in peacetime, which he himself recounted,he should inquire into its behaviour under outside pressure. So that iswhat he’s looking for.

One might here raise the puzzle240 of what this desire of Socrates hasin view, and for what reason he yearns for this to occur. Porphyry offers15

a solution to this puzzle, saying that it is activities that bring states-of-being (hexeis) to completion, not only those prior to the states-of-beingbut also those that proceed from them. For that which is complete inits state-of-being comes after activity; otherwise, it slumbers in a kind ofpotential existence, if deprived of its activity. Therefore, so that Socratesmay genuinely observe the constitution in completion, he asks also for20

an animated picture in words of its deeds in warfare, and of its strugglingagainst the others. It is likely, [Porphyry] says, that [Plato] is proposingthat the condition of virtue is not by itself sufficient for happiness, butwhen in activity.241

Well if the goal were war-related, one might say to him, he ought25

indeed to be saying that war perfects the constitution, but if it is peace-related, what need is there to drag in Peripatetic doctrines to solve puzzlesin Plato? Surely, even if the goal is not war-related war still shows up theextent of one’s virtue more clearly than peace, just as ‘triple-waves’,242

a strong swell, and external pressures in general, show the qualities ofthe helmsman, as the Stoics too are accustomed to say: ‘Add external57pressure, and find the real man.’243 For to be undefeated by pressuresthat enslave others shows up comprehensively the quality of one’s life.

Perhaps, though, it is odd to make this the only reason, even if it5

does offer a political explanation,244 and not to keep in view the overall

240 Another puzzle that one might naturally attribute to Longinus, given that Porphyry isanswering it.

241 Aristotle had not only made wide use of his distinction between potency (��$��)and act(ivity) (12��), but had also placed some emphasis on happiness as activity inaccordance with the best of the virtues, e.g. EN 10.7, and it is clear that Porphyry (inTim. fr. VII) is taking a broadly Aristotelian approach to Plato’s text at this time.

242 Practically a proverbial expression for a mighty wave or group of waves, first appear-ing in its literal sense in Euripides (Hipp. 1213), but used prominently by Plato ina metaphorical sense (Rep. 472a, Euthd. 293a), thus inviting further use among hiscommentators.

243 = SVF 3.206, p. 49.33.244 Here I consider Festugiere to have missed the point, misled perhaps by the rather odd

phrasing; the point is that this explanation of the difficulty appeals only to the world ofpublic conduct, and takes no account of physics or theology. That of course is typical

150


target of Plato, [and see] how the god who arranged the constitutionof the heaven wishes (i) that generation too should be directed by theheavenly gods and (ii) that the warfare between the forms and enmat-tered things should be established, in order that the cycle of generation 10

should mirror the heavenly cycle.245 And this is what it is to view thecity actively engaged in deeds of war, to view generation being mar-shalled alongside the heavenly, and united in taking its lead from there.This seems analogous to what will very shortly be said about the uni-versal demiurge: ‘And when the father who brought it into being saw it 15

in motion and transformed into a living image of eternal things, he waspleased and delighted.’246 Presumably this is what Socrates wants too:247

to see his own city in motion and activity in the same way as the mainstayof the heavenly constitution248 wants to behold the things of this worldactively at work in organizing the generation-producing conflict. That 20

will be how we explain the correspondence between these things fornow.

Don’t be surprised that we earlier linked the lower city with gen-eration, and now link it with war. It is a sound practice to correlate thesame things with different ones according to a variety of analogies, since, 25

though generation resembles the lower city in its plurality of insepara-ble lives, it resembles war and hostilities in its conflicts and its materialdisturbance.

Then again, so that we may link all these claims with the study ofcosmic wholes before the separate examination of each, consider how the 30

second claim249 is in harmony with this. Because Socrates corresponds 58to the first of the Three Fathers, the one who organized the first stages,he declares that he is not capable of fashioning the next stages too – forthe founder of all is different from the founder of the middle or thirdthings.

of Porphyry’s exegesis of Plato’s prefatory material, and already outdated by the time ofIamblichus. The objection to Porphyry, then, may be designed as an ad hominem objec-tion that remains within Porphyry’s interpretative strategy, probably either devised orreported by Iamblichus before demanding a skopos-related interpretation.

245 On the superiority of the text of MP to that of C (printed by Diehl) see Festugiere’snote, which explains well the way in which the heavenly cycle must be reflected in thecyclic changes within the realm of matter.

246 The quotation seems to have been from memory, as there are several variations fromthe text (37c6–7).

247 It may be significant that Proclus has replaced terminology of desiring with a verbindicating rather a rational wish.

248 Presumably the overall Demiurge, to which Socrates somehow corresponds; see9.15–24.

249 We have returned to points two to four enumerated above at 56.2–5.

151


[Consider] the third claim, that the poets are not capable either, andthe fourth, that neither are the sophists. These [agree] because the one5

group imitate those things in the midst of which they were broughtup,250 and the other group are wanderers who fail to combine philos-ophy with community politics.251 See once again how these claims fol-low from what has been said, for the powers that are going to mastergeneration must not be inseparable from it while operating within it –10

these, you see, are analogous to myth-weaving poets and imitators,for they too spend their time on images, admiring only those thingsthat they are also familiar with, enmattered and particular things, andunable to rise up above matter. Nor yet must they be separated, whilebeing subject to frequent change and ascending or descending to otherlevels at different times – that is a property of individual souls, that are15

likened to sophists because they too have beautiful reasoning devices,252

but they wander to different sectors of the cosmos at different times.It is consequently imperative that the powers that control generation,which is steered from the heaven, should be philosophically and com-munally minded, so that, being separable from what they govern on20

account of the philosophic element and providential on account ofthe communal one, they may manage their own domains intelligently.The natural power, being ‘poetic’, is inseparable from matter, whilethe class of individual souls, being ‘sophistic’, is nomadic. But before25

things in motion must come the eternally stable providential plans ofthe gods, and before the domains of change must come the changelessrealms.

After these, as his fifth claim, he identifies the ones who are capableof doing this – for this too should be transferred from the verbal sphereinto deeds – the universal and transcendent demiurge of the whole, and30

the remaining Fathers, of which one is the founder of the middle things,59and the other of the final things; to these are analogous Timaeus, Critias,and Hermocrates. Of these the first has been marvellously praised (withSocrates adding ‘in my opinion’ (20a5)), the second moderately so in5

250 Since the Platonic view of a poet, especially in Republic 10, is that they are inevitablyimitators of life rather than ideals, they cannot depict what lies outside theirexperience.

251 The emphasis would appear to be on their inability to really become part of a polis andbe communally minded because of their travelling lifestyle. Proclus has in mind theRepublic’s ideal of the philosopher-politician, and would not be worried about Plato’s lackof enthusiasm for those who occupy the middle ground between philosophy and politicsat Euthd. 305c–306d.

252 I have tried to preserve the idea that the sophist’s reasoned speech is akin to the principlesof reason (logoi) in the soul.

152


accordance with the rank <given> him by his own <people> (a6),253

and the third in the most basic fashion in accord with the evidence ofothers (a8).

Socrates’ feeling and Plato’s beautiful creation

My feeling is actually rather like this up to and participatingcompetitively in one of the challenges thought to be the province ofthe body. (19b5–c1)

At this point Longinus254 says that Plato employs a decorative style, on 10

account of the bold similes and the graceful vocabulary that adorns thediction, making a point against certain Platonists who claim that thestyle of this passage is spontaneous, and not something contrived by thephilosopher. He says that the selection of terms has been carefully pon- 15

dered by Plato, and that he doesn’t adopt the first words that occur [tohim] for everything. Well, one could say that it’s because of the modeof expression customary at the time that this ability has come to himtoo, but (says Longinus) he also puts a great deal of forethought intotheir composition. For the atoms of Epicurus could more readily come 20

together to make a cosmos than a random combination of nouns andverbs could make the perfect sentence. Certain people found fault withPlato for his choice of words because he used metaphors, but everybodyadmires him for the way he put them together. Nevertheless, not evenfrom this alone could one establish his meticulousness over expression, 25

but rather from his habit of doing this kind of thing, the kind he displayshere. For Socrates doesn’t simply state the treatment he is longing toreceive from Timaeus’ group, but he is like someone who uses beautifi-cation to win the listener over: My feeling is actually rather like this, as 30

if somebody who was watching beautiful animals either reproducedby drawing etc. That’s what Longinus says.

Origenes agreed that Plato is taking care over the grace of his writing, 60not however because he is aiming at pleasure, but in the course of usingthis comparison for the presentation of what he felt. Similarly, we shouldclaim that this comparison has also been adopted because the constitution 5

has been written up in such a way as to resemble things divine; thatthe grace of the language mirrors the grace that has been instilled into

253 It is obvious that Proclus must be commenting here on the source of this estimation ofCritias, and I read ��/ �3 <�)> 4��, �*@�, < �! 1+�*�� / �3 [�)] 977� . .., postulating the misplacement of this article by a scribe who was an educated but hastyreader. It is also tempting, if unnecessary, to read �@��+� for �*@�.

254 Longinus fr. 28; Origenes fr. 9.

153


heavenly things by the demiurge; and that the scientific contrivance(technikon) of his communication blended with some spontaneity mirrorsthe divine creation, which has both a self-derived element of control and10

a factor that proceeds from being (einai) and essence (ousia).255

If one were to undertake an examination of the analogy itself, thephrase beautiful animals would signify those bodies that outshine othersin beauty, and reproduced by drawing or even really living [signifies]that they display both bodily images and actual lives that precede them;15

for the outward shape of the gods is a representation (agalma) of the liveswithin them. The phrase keeping still [signifies] that they are repletewith intelligible order and with smooth, continuous life, while moving[indicates] their proceeding to another level of arrangement and a sec-ond creation. The [phrase] participating competitively in one of the20

challenges thought to be the province of the body signifies the thingsthat give a share of their own effluences and powers to things less com-plete, and that act upon other things with their own powers. So muchfor the image. As for the phrase whether reproduced by drawing oreven really living, both its parts are correctly applied to divine bod-25

ies, for they are both reproduced by drawing in the dodecahedron,256

and by living vigorous and craftsmanlike lives. And if it were under-stood as a disjunction it would be signifying that the stated constitutionhad been fashioned by reason and assimilated to the heaven, and thatit exists among true or daemonic lives though not among humans. Fur-30

thermore the desire to see the state in motion corresponds to whereit is said: ‘and when the Father saw it in motion, he was delighted,61and still more’ did he wish ‘to liken it to its paradigm’ (37c–d). That

255 ‘Tres mysterieux’ says Festugiere. ‘Element of control’ translates B��, but ‘a factor’represents only the neuter of the article, which therefore suggests that the masculineB�� cannot be understood with it. To begin with it should be clear that this is particularlyconcerned with heavenly creation; second, that ‘creation’ here means ‘totality created’,and not the creation process; thirdly, I think, unlike Festugiere, that the key here isthat the term ‘spontaneity’ (�% ��2�) can likewise signify ‘sprung from itself’, and istherefore analogous to the ‘self-derived element of control’, which is to be identified withthe extent to which heavenly souls have control over their own motion. In spite of the factthat they are self-moved, there are limits imposed upon this motion by factors akin to thescientific standards of which Plato’s writing has to take account. It seems clear that thesetechnical requirements for heavenly motion must derive from the intelligible patterns bywhich it functions, and we should perhaps think of the various abstract elements that areused for the construction and organization of the soul at 35a ff.; these are what makes itbe what it is, and indeed one of these elements is a new intermediate essence described at35a. Heavenly soul at least cannot engage in motions that contravene the requirementsof intelligent psychical motion.

256 Proclus is perhaps excessively reliant on the fact that Plato at 55c says the creator hasused the dodecahedron for the whole diazographon (sketching it out?).

154


is how the arranger of the heaven too wants to see it moving, and [to seeit] guiding along the war of generation through this motion. He used 5

the phrase in one of the challenges thought to be the province ofthe body because some of them belong to souls, some to bodies. Forinstance running, wrestling, and gymnastics are called challenges of thebody.

I too felt the same way about the city that we described up to in respect of 10

their verbal communications with each of the cities. (19c1–8)

Here you have a concise defence of Socrates’ having associated withAlcibiades and Plato’s visit to Dionysius. Both expected that they wouldbecome manufacturers of a decent constitution, and that they would see 15

constitutional life in action, because it is for this that Socrates yearnshere too: [he yearns] for some praise to be spoken of such a polis as ittriumphs in war; and it has been stated why [he wants it] and to whatsort of paradigm he is looking.257 Now cities use both words and worksagainst their adversaries: words in embassies, in compacts, in challenges 20

to battle, and all things of this sort; works in pitching camp, ambushes,skirmishes. Because of this he wants such a city to be praised in bothareas, for its sensible, secure, high-minded, and firm use of words, and 25

for its bravery, exertion, and discipline in works. In both of these ways hewould be imitating his paradigm, a paradigm which controls the entire‘war’ of generation as it shines through in both physical and intellectualcreations.258

Point two: Socrates’ inadequacies

This is the charge, Critias and Hermocrates, that I’ve accused myself of, 62that I should never have been capable of delivering an adequateencomium of the city myself. (19c8–d2)

This is the second of the main points before us. The reason for it we have 5

already stated, but now we have to examine it again in a different fashion.For among earlier interpreters (presbuteroi) the point has already beenmade (i) that the genre of the encomium is fulsome, solemn, and grand,while the Socratic manner is lean, precise, and dialectical, i.e. it is diamet- 10

rically opposed to the other. Hence Socrates too avoids using encomia,being well aware of what his inner abilities are suited to. Besides directly

257 Referring back to 60.30–61.2.258 These ‘physical and intellectual creations’ (��;� � ��+��;� ��++� �� ;� ��;�)

correspond to the works and words referred to above.

155


questioning the authenticity of the Menexenus,259 those who make thisclaim seem to me to be insensitive even to the grandiloquence of Socratesin the Phaedrus. There are others (ii) who claim that those who craft such15

encomia ought to have had some experience of the deeds of war too, andhence that many of the historians slip up in how they describe things260

through inexperience of battle strategy. However, Socrates at least hadbeen on campaign at Delium and Potidaea, and was not inexperienced20

in any of these things. Others (iii) claim that it is in irony that he assertshere that he is unable to praise this city adequately – just as he professesnot to know various other things too. However, this irony of Socrateswas directed towards sophists and young men, not towards gentlemenof such wisdom and knowledge.261 Rather than these [explanations] it is25

preferable to say that he is avoiding becoming ‘third from the truth’,262

because the deeds of the correctly constituted state are third from theparadigm of the constitution. So wishing to remain at the second level hesays that he is not able to endure the descent to the third type of life. And30

such a ‘lack of power’ is a superabundance of power.263 For to remain asfar as possible among paradigms occurs through excess of power.

Observe how this too is consonant with what we have said before63about the analogy between these things and the universe. For the sec-ond creation had been made a likeness of the previous one, and on thisaccount it is directly linked with it. Indeed all the demiurgic series is5

one, possessing unification as well along with division. So in all like-lihood Socrates deliberately appeals to Critias and Hermocrates, and

259 ‘Authenticity’ refers not to the attribution of authorship to Plato, but rather to theassumption that the work accurately depicts Socrates himself. Confusions over whetherthe authorship or Socraticity of a work are questioned are natural among Socratic dia-logues, and Panaetius (fr. 126) seems to have sought for truly Socratic works among thefollowers of Socrates; it may be this that gave rise to the later belief that he had rejectedthe Phaedo, meaning that he had rejected its Platonic authorship (frs. 127–9). See Tarrant(2000), 56–7.

260 ‘How they describe things’ translates 1 ��;� ��(2++�, and I presume that the originalinterpreters had historical descriptions of battle arrangements in mind, but Proclus’response seems either to presume that it was in encomia that the performance of thesehistorians was criticized, or to assume that such descriptions will be part of the encomiumthat Socrates prefers to avoid.

261 On this passage see Tarrant (2000), 110. It is interesting that young men (many no doubtSocrates’ friends) are considered an appropriate target for irony just as sophists are,but the division reflects the two species of investigative or ‘zetetic’ dialogue, one that iscompetitive and the other that is used for training.

262 Appropriately the allusion is to the final book of the Republic, 599d2 etc.263 Cf. 19.19 above, where Iamblichus is explaining the ‘weakness’ of the fourth person in

the same terms.

156


thinks it right that they should weave on264 what comes next. Timaeus,you see, is going to hand down this teaching in a more universal and moreelevated way, and not through images, directly preserving his position 10

analogous to the universal demiurge, mapping out the heaven with thedodecahedron and generation with the shapes appropriate to it.

Point three: the inadequacies of the poets

My own condition is in no way surprising, but I have come to the sameconclusion about the poets too, both those who lived long ago and those 15

who live now. [This is] not out of any disrespect for the poetic race;rather it is clear to anybody that the imitative tribe will imitate mosteasily and most excellently the things that one’s brought up with. For anygroup to give a good imitation of what is beyond their native experienceis hard in deeds and harder still in words. (19d2–e2)

This is the third of the main points recorded earlier. Here he shows 20

that poetic ability also cannot extend of itself to the praise of such men,because they have been put by fortune in position for deeds of war.Difficulties for the account are raised by Longinus265 and Origenes, who 25

don’t believe that he could have included Homer too among the poetswhen he says that he has come to the same conclusion not only aboutthe present poets (that’s nothing peculiar) but also about those who hadlived long ago. And so, says Porphyry, Origenes spent three whole days 30

shouting and going red in the face, and getting into quite a sweat, saying 64that the claim (hypothesis) was important and problematic, and very keento demonstrate that the imitation in [the works of] Homer adequatelydepicts actions of excellence. Who, after all, is more grandiloquent thanHomer, who, even when he brings gods into strife and battle, does not 5

fall short of capturing their likeness, but matches the nature of theirdeeds in his majestic language. This is the argument that confronts us.

In answer to it Porphyry says that Homer is quite capable of dress-ing their passions in intensity and majesty and lifting their deeds to animposing magnificence,266 but he is not able to convey a dispassionateintellective state or the activities of the philosophic life. Personally I 10

wonder whether Homer could be incapable of these things while Critiasis capable or Hermocrates is worthy to speak on the subject.267 My view

264 prosyphainein here recalls Timaeus 41d1, where the lesser gods must weave on the mortalparts of living creatures. Once more there is an analogy between the events of the dramaticsetting and the cosmology presented by Timaeus.

265 Longinus fr. 29; Origenes fr. 10.266 Porphyry in Tim. fr. VIII; on the meaning of ��+�� here see Festugiere.267 Or ‘while Critias or Hermocrates is worthy . . .’, if one deletes the second >��%� in 64.12

as a gloss.

157


is that Plato distinguishes god-given poetic ability from poetic skills, adivision that makes the gods responsible for inspired grandiloquence and15

majesty. It is oracles above all that have this fulsome and grand style, and[Plato] is making the point that the [poetry] derived from human skillsdoes not have the required capacity for praise when compared with thevalour of this city and the achievements of men raised in it. Even if there20

is some majesty due to skill in the works of any of the poets, its artifi-cial and bombastic character is considerable, relying for the most parton metaphors, like the work of Antimachus.268 What Socrates needsis an encomiast who displays a spontaneous majesty and possesses anunforced and refined grandiloquence, in the same way that the achieve-25

ments too don’t acquire their grandeur from chance, but as somethingthat is intrinsic to the upbringing and education of the men. Socrateshimself, I believe, has shown that he does not reject either the divinelyinspired poet or the whole of the poetic art, only the skilled kind, whenhe actually states himself that he isn’t showing disrespect for poetry –30

‘Certainly the poetic race too is divine’, as [Plato]269 himself said else-where – just the imitative kind, and not even this in its entirety, only thepart raised on poor laws and character. Because this has an inclination65towards things inferior, it is not of a nature to imitate a more elevatedcharacter.

This much should be said in answer to the difficulty, so let’s give dueclarification to the end of the lemma, which is in a way rather prob-lematic. Here it is: For any group to give a good imitation of whatis beyond their native experience is hard in deeds and harder still5

in words. It seems easier, you see, to imitate their words than theirdeeds, and certainly there is no shortage of persons who set themselvesup as sophistic teachers,270 whose display of excellence extends to theirwords, while in practice they are totally divorced from it. So perhapsit is better to interpret these statements like this: understand what’s10

beyond their native experience as what’s most excellent, and take indeeds and in words as the equivalent of ‘in respect of their deeds’ and‘in respect of their words’, and [substitute] for give a good imitation‘get well imitated’. Putting [the threads] together from all this, ‘Forthe most excellent to be well imitated is hard in respect of deeds, and15

harder still in respect of its words, though it is imitated verbally – this is

268 An epic poet of the late fifth century bc.269 Technically, perhaps, one should understand ‘Socrates’ here, but it is the ‘Athenian

Stranger’ who speaks these words in Laws 3, 682a, which suggests that Proclus hereconflates ‘Socrates’ and Plato.

270 One thinks of rhetoricians of the age, though Proclus may have a range of educators inmind.

158


basic to poetry.271 And you see how this is in agreement with the facts:somebody who relates in a verbal account the deeds of excellent personsis composing history, while somebody who composes their speeches,if he is to preserve the character of the speaker, must himself adopt a 20

disposition that matches the character of the speaker.272 That’s becauseinner dispositions obviously make a difference to speeches. Accordinglywe ridicule those who have written defence-speeches of Socrates – mostof them apart from Plato – because they haven’t preserved the characterof Socrates. Yet when they are recording this basic story, how Socrates 25

was accused and defended himself and met with such and such a verdict,they wouldn’t deserve of ridicule; rather it is the failure to capture alikeness in their imitation of words that shows up the imitators as ridicu-lous. Even in the case of Achilles, it is not difficult to say that he cameout armed in some such fashion as this, and did some such deeds as 66this, but to supplement this with an explanation of what words he mightsay if caught in the river (Il. 21.273–83) is no longer easy – this is thework of one who is able to assume the character of the hero and to speakforth his words while rooted in that character. A further indication of the 5

difficulty of imitating speeches is given by Socrates in the Republic (386c–98b).273 Most of his rebukes274 to Homer there concern his imitation ofspeeches.

In the case of the gods, however, they say that it is easier to imitatein words the words of the gods than their deeds. For who could crafta worthy description of their productive acts? Or maybe the imitation 10

of words and of deeds is just the same in their case, for because theirwords are their intellections, and these in turn are their acts of creation,

271 Proclus’ strategy here is difficult to understand. Festugiere is concerned to answer Tay-lor’s belief that Proclus was taking Plato’s $�$;+(�� as a passive. My translation is slightlydifferent from Festugiere’s, and it is based on the view that there is a sharp contrastbetween the ‘in deeds [=in one’s actions]’ – ‘in words [=via a verbal medium]’ distinctionand the distinction between deeds and words as objects, and that Proclus thinks thatimitation through the medium of words is a lot easier than ‘in deeds’ imitation, while‘in deeds’ imitation of words is nevertheless harder than ‘in deeds’ imitation of deeds.So presumably Proclus’ rhetorical opponents are imitating in their words rather than intheir deeds, in which domain they are no more successfully imitating the words of truevirtue than its deeds.

272 Proclus has in mind the theory of speech-imitation present at Republic 3, 393c.273 In the passage Socrates distinguishes narrative compositions from dramatic and mixed

ones, and assumes in the case of dramatic content (where characters deliver speeches indirect discourse and so in character) that the assimilation of the artist to the characterimitated is involved (393c), contrary to the rule that we should imitate only good char-acter. The specific criticisms of Homer, however, mostly precede the general complaintsabout the use of direct discourse.

274 The verb chosen by Proclus, 1 � 7�++�, though not foreign to Attic prose, has anarchaic ring, and is itself used by Homer.

159


the imitator of their words is also an imitator of their deeds: to whateverextent he falls short of the one, to that extent he will be failing in theimitation of the other.

Longinus used to puzzle over the phrase before us.275 Presuming this15

to be the reason that the poets are not worthy imitators of the deedsand words that belong to such a city, that they have not been raisedaccording to the city’s standards, then neither could Critias and his sortachieve the business before them. They had not lived among people whoconducted themselves like that either. Whereas if it is because they don’t20

have knowledge, but are merely imitators,276 why will they not be ableto take the outlines from us277 and imitate them, seeing that the abilitythat they have is mimetic? We should say in answer to these problems,that the imitation of such a constitution proceeds through a life thatis in agreement with the paradigms, for somebody who doesn’t live in25

accordance with virtue is unable to express the words that befit personsof moral stature. Accordingly it is not sufficient for its imitation thatone should merely hear what type of life exists under the constitution,as implied by the sceptical argument of Longinus. Porphyry278 adds thatjust as for painters not everything is imitable, like the midday light, so30

neither is the life of the best constitution [imitable] for the poets, for ittranscends their power.

Point four: inadequacies of the itinerant sophists

Again, as for the race of the sophists, I consider them very experienced in67many fine [types of] speech up to they might act and speak. (19e2–8)

Sophists often used to be involved in the practice of astronomy, or of5

geometry, or of politics, or of division, and because of this they are nowsaid to have many fine [types of] speech. But, since they did not havescientific speech, they were called experienced. The term experiencedimplies a non-rational routine applied in insignificant debates withoutthe knowledgeable cause.279 Because they not only reaped a living in10

different cities at different times, but were also full of deceit, false wis-dom, and unscientific error, they have justly been termed wanderers.

275 Longinus fr. 30. 276 As suggested by Republic 10, 595c–599d.277 Festugiere’s translation fleshes out the Greek to offer more explanation: ‘why, after we

have taken over the models, could they not imitate them . . .’. There is no indication thathe proposes to alter the text.

278 Porphyry in Tim. fr. IX.279 Proclus’ description is closely linked to Socrates’ treatment of rhetoric in the Gorgias,

462c ff. That dialogue (e.g. 465a, 501a) does not so easily explain the notion of ‘theknowledgeable cause’ (A C$�� 6��), to which Phlb. 23d ff. may be relevant.

160


Because they led a disorderly and uneducated life, operating accordingto the passions, it is quite reasonably said that they had not occupiedtheir own proper dwellings, when each should have put himself in order 15

ahead of the rest – for everything that applies in the household and thecity applies also to the realm of character, and this should be correctedahead of what is outside one.

So who then are the fitting imitators of the deeds and words of thebest constitution, if neither poets nor sophists are? These are surely thoseof political and philosophical character, as he himself says. One needs 20

both, so that one is able to survey their deeds through statesmanship,and their words through philosophy, with a prior insight into their livesas something within one, and so that one may comprehend their practi-cal wisdom through the former and the intellective activity of the rulersthrough the latter. From these images one should cross to the demiur- 25

gic causes as well, [and observe] that these too must be intellective andconcerned with the entire universe280 if the universe is to be brought tofulfilment, and if generation is to possess as images all that the heavenhas in a primary way.

Point five: those capable of such praise

Then there remains the type in your own condition, [the type] that 68through nature and through nurture shares in both together.(19e8–20a1)

Longinus,281 who does not disdain to examine the diction, says that thephrase ‘as for the race of sophists, I am afraid that because it is nomadic’is characteristic of one who is beginning282 to change the expression 5

out of a desire for grandeur; that the next [phrase] ‘the quantity andnature of their deeds in war and battles’ and what follows is character-istic of one who distorts the natural expression; and thirdly that ‘thenthere remains the type in your own condition’ is altogether grating. 10

For [he says] it’s not at all unlike ‘the force of Heracles’ and ‘the holymight of Telemachus’ and so on. Origenes took the mode of address inthe phrases at issue as being characteristic of historical writing, because

280 I translate holikas here in this way, since it is clear that in order for the analogy to work thedemiurges must be acting like universal statesmen. While one might have been temptedto read instead politikas, one should note that the received text is supported by 69.8–9.

281 Longinus fr. 31; Origenes fr. 11.282 Festugiere postulates a lacuna, and his supplement would yield <and trying> at this

point. However, there must be some doubt as to whether the lacuna must be postulated,for it would be bold to believe that 9��$�� (‘I begin’) cannot take an infinitive in lateGreek in a context like this (as in Homeric Greek).

161


such periphrases are suited to such diction, just as it is to poetic style.15

Our position, however, is that Plato everywhere alters his communica-tive strategy to suit his subject matter and pursues changes in mode ofaddress for changes in topics. Still, we deny that the phrase before us is aperiphrasis. It doesn’t indicate the same as ‘you’ like ‘the force of Hera-20

cles’ indicates the same as ‘Heracles’, but indicates the actual type in thebest condition; when they began from this [condition] they alone couldgive a fitting return [of a favour] by imitating the best constitution. Theydo this by operating in accordance with this condition of theirs, a con-dition that differs from the poetic and sophistic conditions. So much forthe details of the text. With our attention fixed on the intentions (ennoiai)25

behind these words, we shall say that Socrates is motivating Critias andHermocrates to [discuss] what remained to be said of the constitution,but he is exhorting Timaeus too to apply himself to what he requires.For this is the fifth of the main heads that we had proposed to exam-ine.283 And see how respectful he has been towards the gentlemen right30

from his introductory words, referring to their [stable]284 condition, sothat you eliminate all sophistic straying;285 speaking of them as sharing69in political art ‘by nature and by nurture’286, so that you draw a con-trast with the political imitation that is nurtured under inferior laws; anddefining their final state287 in terms of their nature and nurture, so thatyou do not make their nature defective by depriving it of nurture or think5

that their nurture had been set aside for an unsuitable or incompatiblerecipient (hypodoche). This much has been said in general about the men.And if you would like to move on to discuss the paradigms, we are leftthe lesson that the demiurgic type, that is concerned with the entire uni-verse and intellective,288 should be assigned to the providential care ofthe universe. But we also have to inspect what is being said about each10

individually.

The qualifications of Socrates’ companions

Timaeus here is from Locris in Italy, a city with the best of laws, and inproperty and family he is second to none of those there. He has turnedhis hand to the highest magistracies and roles of honour available in his

283 Cf. 55.30–56.7, and for the fifth 58.27–59,6.284 It is characteristic of a hexis that it is stable; see Lee (1997).285 7*� is a word for error that literally means ‘wandering’.286 Cf. 20a7 (Hermocrates).287 Festugiere translates ‘perfection’, and indeed the implication is that the final state is one

of perfection in certain respects, but such a translation seems to pre-empt the possibilitiesfor misjudging them that are then suggested.

288 Cf. note to 67.26 above.

162


city, yet as regards philosophy in its entirety, in my judgement he has also 15

got to its summit. (20a1–5)

What testimony could be more full of admiration than this? What praisecould be greater? Has he not first of all testified to Timaeus’ politicalskill, and then to his intellective insight, saying that he has got to thesummit of philosophy in its entirety, and adding in my judgement, 20

which has put the coping stone on all his praises? What other [testimony]among men could better assimilate him to the one [universal] Demiurgethan this picture? To begin with, by his being a man of politics and aphilosopher he is Zeus-like, and next by his being from a city with the 25

best of laws he imitates the god brought up in the intelligible realm byAdrasteia,289 and that god’s universal, intellective, and unitary nature ismirrored in his excellence of family – for he has all these [qualities] byparticipation in the Fathers that precede him. [Mirrored in Timaeus’]having turned his hand to the highest magistracies is his kingly nature 30

and power over the whole universe, seeing that his sceptre according to 70the theologians is of four and twenty measures,290 while his surpassingtranscendence of all things ‘in seniority and power’ (Rep. 509b) [is mir-rored in] his enjoying the highest roles of honour. Indeed, it is he whodistributes the roles of honour to other things besides him. And you 5

could say that his stamp has been completely reproduced by [Timaeus’]having got to the summit of philosophy with respect to his havingall knowledge together within himself. Consequently you could graspfrom all the things that have been said, as if from images, the identity ofthe universal Demiurge – that he is an intellect embracing many intel-lects, ranked among the intellective gods, and filled with the very first 10

intelligibles, deserving royal honours, and enthroned above the otherdemiurgic gods in seniority. It is not at all surprising that [Plato] calledthe city of Timaeus Locris, when the Greeks are accustomed to call it notthat, but merely ‘Locrians’, to distinguish it from the Locris that is setopposite Euboea. For he makes many changes in order to signify more 15

clearly what he’s aiming at. It is obvious that the Locrians had good laws,because Zaleucus was their law-giver.

289 As Festugiere notes, this should be understood in the light of in Tim. III. 274.17ff.,where Proclus reports that in Orphic cosmology the Demiurge is nourished by Adrasteia,consorts with Necessity, and engenders Fate. The universal demiurge is of course rootedin the triad above the triad of demiurges, in a realm that is intelligible as well as intellective.Adrasteia is seen as akin to an intelligible law at this point.

290 This Orphic theme also appears below at I. 451.1ff., and at in Crat. 101, p. 52.26–30,where Zeus is thought of as ruling hypercosmic and cosmic worlds, each of which issomehow seen as twelvefold.

163


And surely all of us here know that Critias is not an amateur in any partof our subject! (20a6–7)20

Critias was of a stout (hadros) and noble nature, and he was taking partin philosophical gatherings as well. He was called ‘an amateur amongphilosophers, but a philosopher among amateurs’, as history says.291 Hewas personally involved in tyranny, after becoming one of the Thirty, but25

it is not fair to blame Socrates just because he held him worthy of somepraise at this point. In the first place one should pay attention to themanner of his praise: he is not an amateur in any part of our subjectbecause of his nature and his spending time in philosophic gatherings.Next, note that the tyrannical element itself is also evidence of naturalgifts, as the myth in the Republic292 teaches us when it shows those souls71‘who come down from the heaven’ specially drawn towards the tyrannicallife. That’s because, after becoming used to ‘spinning about with thegods [up] there’,293 and managing the universe with them, they rush offto what appear to be roles of power here too – just as it is those whohave a memory of the intelligible beauty who welcome the appearance5

of beauty.294 That he is linked by analogy with the middle creation youmay infer firstly from his taking over the discourse of Socrates, then fromhis narration of the story of Atlantis, and thirdly from his personal life:10

for the leadership role, and extended influence over many, and powerin general are among the middle things – hence it also has the middleposition in [Socrates’] praise. That he has been called no amateur, whilestill not sharing in Timaeus’ outstanding qualities, signifies his lower rankas compared with the first, while the fact that he does not entirely lack15

them signifies his close relation to him.

291 This material is also present in the Platonic scholia to 20a, but since it is reproducedvirtually word for word, with the omission of ‘as history says’, it seems clear that thescholia are indebted to Proclus. Whether the Critias of Tim. and Critias is to be identifiedwith the tyrant himself or his grandfather has been a matter of controversy (the case forthe grandfather being based on the assumption that the chronology is otherwise toodifficult), but Proclus assumes the obvious identification.

292 619b7–d3: the man who is unfortunate enough to choose the life of a tyrant, with itsmany concealed misfortunes, has been sent on the better path in the other world as aresult of an orderly life beforehand – a life governed by virtues of habit without theguidance of philosophy. Such people were said to be ‘not in the minority’ to be caughtmaking reckless choices.

293 Now Proclus uses Phdr. 248a concerning the best human souls (cf. 246b7 and Tim. 41a3for the verb �� 72�).

294 Now alluding to Phdr. 250c–251c, a passage explaining homoerotic attraction to beautifulyouths. It may be a point against Proclus that the tyrannical life comes ninth and lastafter the visions of the world above at Phdr. 248e3.

164


Furthermore, concerning the nature and nurture of Hermogenes, giventhat many testify that it is sufficient in all these areas, one has to believeit. (20a7–b1)

Hermogenes is a Syracusan general with a desire to live lawfully. Hence 20

he participates in a way in both politics and philosophy. He too has a rolein the analogy, having a resemblance to the third creation. Generalshipis appropriate to the one who orders the last and most disorderly parts ofthe cosmic composition; that many testify belongs to one who advancesthe creation to total multiplicity and the ultimate partition. So that is how 25

we rank him in our scheme, so that the men may stand in analogy withthe subject matter too.

Others,295 however, rank Critias lower than Hermocrates. Still, if the 72missing person is fit neither to speak nor to listen, then of those presentthe one who listens but does not make a speech himself ought also tocome second to the one who speaks as well, who, in so doing, imitatespeople like Socrates and Timaeus. Next one should also consider thispoint, that Socrates has given Critias pride of place in his speech by 5

praising him after Timaeus.There are some also296 who distribute the following kind of ranking

to these characters, and who rank Timaeus with the paradigmatic cause,Socrates with the productive, Critias with the formal, and Hermocrates 10

with the material. It is for this reason that he is fit to listen but not tospeak, because matter too receives its instructions (logoi) from elsewhere,but is unable to generate any. Such a distribution of rank would makeconsiderable sense, quite apart from its not conflicting with our previousapproach. 15

295 Who are these others? The fact that the prologue is being extensively discussed, but thatthe characters and their order (as implied by the previous sentence) have no symbolicsignificance, suggests Porphyry, who sought for ethical lessons in the prologue. This rankwould naturally be accompanied by a lower view of Critias than the one that Proclus isinclined to take at 70.21–71.15, and concentration on moral issues would lead to sucha view. Note how Proclus has already felt the need to defend the tyrannical element inCritias’ character at 70.25–30.

296 Clearly this is a position that Proclus feels an affinity with, but one wonders how theomission of the final cause has occurred. This would normally be placed at a very highlevel among the causes, and indeed occurs first at 17.18–27 where it is correlated withthe monad, followed by paradigmatic (and dyad), and creative (and triad). If it is indeedviewed as the highest of the causes then it would naturally be correlated with a charactereven higher than Timaeus, and only Iamblichus, with his view that the missing person istoo elevated for physical inquiry (19.9–29), has somebody with whom to associate thatfinal cause.

165


Transition to the story of Atlantis

This was what I had in mind yesterday also when you requested me torun through the discussion on the constitution up to and most ready of allto receive it. (20b1-c3)

The summary of the constitution, as Socrates now says, appears to have20

taken place with a view to the narration of the wartime struggles ofthe city with the correct constitution. In fact both [parts] are directedtowards the single creation of the cosmos, both the brief overview of theconstitution and the story of Atlantis. For prior to the universal creationand the whole scheme of cosmic ordering, it is better to begin one’s25

study, as was said before,297 with its parts and its images. So it is rea-sonable that Socrates should resume the constitution in rough outlines,and, after first imitating the universe through this, take his own placein [the realm of] being as it were,298 and stimulate others too to [take30

up] the argument, people who can laud the power of such a city and73imitate those who arrange the All according to the intermediate typeof creative activity and who make the rivalries within it and its multi-faceted movements cohere. So as Homer’s Zeus, sitting upon the top5

fold of Olympus,299 and remaining in his own accustomed oneness,300

sends the gods in charge of cosmic rivalry to the Greek war, so toodoes Socrates, taking up a position of purity in the intelligible kind ofconstitution, prepare those that follow him, who are able to laud the10

movement and power of this constitution – summoning the science ofTimaeus to a general study of the universe, and preparing the othersfor a general and concise summation of the parts. Just as he gave a gen-eral description of the whole constitution, so he wants its power to be15

hymned by the others; but, since all these accounts bear an image of thecreative tasks and the whole encounter is [an image] of cosmic creation,it is quite reasonable that Socrates said that he had arranged himself inorder and was ready to receive the accounts, having equipped himself20

for the discourse with the appropriate form of excellence, i.e. orderliness(kosmiotes).

And indeed, as Timaeus here said, Socrates, up to we were examining thisvery matter on our journey. (20c4–8)

297 30.2–18; Festugiere announces that this is Iamblichus’ doctrine, and indeed this had beenthe only alternative offered to the ethically-based view of Porphyry (29.31–30.2).

298 Festugiere aptly compares 73.8 below for the idea that Socrates’ interest is not situatedfirmly in the intelligible constitution.

299 An allusion to Il. 20.22.300 Festugiere compares Tim. 42e: ‘remaining in his own accustomed character’.

166


Hermocrates had to say something too, and not be there in silence like 25

the characters in comedy who stand idly by. Hence he too has beendepicted as saying something to Socrates. That was a compositional mat-ter, whereas there is another point that pertains to the subject itself. Thatthe final powers of creation follow the one father of the universe, andon account of their likeness to him consent to the one providential plan 74for the cosmos, <you could deduce>301 from what is now being said,as if from images. For Hermocrates, taking the lead from Timaeus,302

says that they are in no way lacking in either the enthusiasm or powerfor the accounts sought by Socrates; for these two things are particu- 5

larly inclined to hinder us in our cooperative activities, our own lackof interest and any external obstacle that may pertain. So he eliminatedboth of these in saying that they neither lacked enthusiasm nor had anyexcuse to prevent them from fulfilling the requirement of Socrates. So 10

it was reasonable that he (Hermocrates) called upon Critias too for thenarration of the ancient works of the city of Athens, deeds in which therequest of Socrates finds its fulfilment (much as Socrates called uponTimaeus), and that he makes himself an associate in Critias’ account.For he says that on the previous day they303 had examined the questionalong with him, just as in the universe the third demiurge participates 15

in the creation of the second. For the whole of generation requires alsoreturn contributions from the entire304 subterranean world.

[If this is how that is, it seems appropriate that the Atlantis storyhas occupied third place in the telling. They say that the dyad and thetriad are numbers that belong to the intermediate creation, the former 20

through its power and the latter through its creative providence that isperfective of encosmic things. Hence, whether you assign to it the secondor third telling, you are able to work back from either of these numbersto the notion of the median position.]305 25

301 These three words are a translation of Diehl’s supplement to the manuscript text.302 Timaeus demonstrated enthusiasm and affirmed their ability to deliver at 17b.303 Or perhaps ‘he’ (�� for ��); that would suit the analogy with third and second

demiurges better, but fit less well with the original text.304 Reading �� for the MS *��; the position of the adverb here, within the noun-

phrase and well separated from the verb, would be hard to explain, but the emendationproduces a parallel between universal generation and universal underworld.

305 This is at best an afterthought, fitting only loosely into the structure, and with no specialapplication to the lemma. Unless there is some way of relating it to wider themes ofProclus, it is tempting to regard it as a gloss. The identity of the subject of ‘they say’ isfar from clear. It is obscure how the remarks are to be reconciled with those expressedearlier (4.7–26 above), where it is the relation between the summary of the constitutionand the preview of Atlantis that interests Proclus; these remarks seem rather to pertainto the order of the dialogues Republic–Timaeus–Critias, whose main speakers do not inany sense correspond to the three creators and their creations.

167


So this man related to us a story from ancient oral tradition. Tell it againnow, Critias, for him, so that he may test whether it suits his request or75not. – This should be done if our third participant, Timaeus, alsoagrees. – Indeed I agree. (20d1–6)

Treating these words too as images, you could find in them a wonderfulindication of matters divine. As among them the second rank call for-5

ward the generative powers of the first and direct them to the providen-tial care of things they manage, so among the persons here Hermocratescalls Critias forward to speak and to fulfil the request of Socrates.306 Fur-ther, as among them the things that are caused revert to clinging closely10

to their causes, so among these persons Hermocrates strives [to attachhimself] to Critias, while Critias looks toward the request of Socrates.Again, as among them the creative causes depend upon the one fatherand steer everything according to his will, in the same way here too they15

all seek refuge in Timaeus, and in Timaeus’ nod, assent, or will, so that,by making that the root they start from, they may handle the argumentas intended by him. That is how what is going to be said would make acontribution to the overall depiction of the cosmos. Moreover the phrasefrom ancient oral tradition signifies temporal age if the story is of a20

historical kind, while if it is an allegorical indication of things that goon taking place in the cosmos it could be hinting at the principles thathave existed within souls from eternity. If again it is offering an imageof the divine causes, it shows that these divine causes, themselves receiv-ing fullness from the most senior gods above, give a share of their own25

providential care to their subordinates too.

Atlantis (75.26–191.11)

The early debate over the genre of the story of Atlantis

Hear then, Socrates, an account that is very unusual, yet certainly true inall respects, as Solon, the wisest of the Seven, once used to claim. (20d)

Some say that all this tale about the Atlantines is straightforward nar-76rative, like the first of Plato’s interpreters, Crantor.307 He also says that

306 Reading 7��, with Festugiere’s note.307 An extremely important testimony, though its source is not clear. While it is unlikely

that much information on Crantor had survived until Proclus’ day, Plutarch may indeedhave had access to an exegetical text of Crantor’s when writing his On the Procreation ofthe Soul in the Timaeus. However, Plutarch does not give us reason to believe that there isa substantial difference between the form of exegesis coming from Crantor and the formthat had already come from Xenocrates. I deal with Crantor’s contribution at Tarrant(2000), 53–6, and in the introduction to the Atlantis section, but see also Cameron (1983),Clay (1999).

168

Atlantis

[Plato] was mocked by his contemporaries for not having discoveredhis constitution himself, but having translated Egyptian originals.308 Hetook so little notice of what the mockers said that he actually attributed to 5

the Egyptians this narrative about the Athenians and Atlantines, sayingthat the Athenians had at one time lived under that constitution. Hesays309 that the prophets of the Egyptians also give evidence, saying thatthese things are inscribed on pillars that still survive.

Others say that it is a myth and an invention, something that never 10

actually happened but gives an indication of things which have eitheralways been so, or always come to be, in the cosmos. These people payno attention to Plato when he exclaims that the account is very unusual,yet certainly true in all respects. For what is true in all respects isnot true in one way and untrue in another, nor false on the surface and 15

true in its hidden meaning. No such thing could be true in all respects.Some do not rule it out that this could have happened in this way, but

think that it is now adopted as [a series of] images of pre-existing rivalryin the universe. For [they say that] ‘War is the father of all’ as Heraclitus 20

puts it (B53 DK). Of these310 some look upwards for the solution tothe fixed stars and planets, supposing the Athenians to be analogous tothe fixed stars and the Atlantines to the planets, with the conflict arisingfrom the counter-revolution, and the one side winning because of the 25

single turning-motion of the cosmos. The goodly Amelius is certainlyof this opinion putting up such a fight to support its being so, becauseof the island of Atlantis being clearly divided into seven circles in theCritias,311 that I know of nobody else [who fought as much] in support 30

of their personal doctrines.

308 By ‘translated’ I do not necessarily mean ‘rewrote in a different language’, but littlemore than ‘transferred to a different culture’. Nor does the Greek make it clear that theEgyptian ideas had ever been committed to writing.

309 This appears again to be what Crantor says, because of the indicative mood of the verb.Cameron (1983) takes it rather as what Plato says, but the earlier parenthetic ‘he says’ at76.1 counts against this.

310 A problematic reference most naturally taken to refer to the last group mentioned, but infact embracing all non-literal interpreters. See Introduction, pp. 60–84, on the Atlantisstory.

311 How Amelius manages to argue this is not obvious, and Festugiere refers to 113ewhere the island is divided into ten parts, a figure that is repeated elsewhere, making itunlikely that Amelius’ interpretation could be explained by a different reading. Whathas a greater claim to stand for the heaven is the arrangement of land and canalsaround the central royal island of the kingdom, involving three circuits of water andtwo of land, of varying widths (115d–16a). Five circuits could equally be interpreted asrepresentative of the heaven, since the motions of the Sun, Mercury and Venus wereinterlinked (cf. Tim. 38d). If one then counts the inner island and the land beyond thecircuits, one does get seven areas, but surely not seven areas that could be directly linked

169


Others interpret it as a conflict of daemons, with some being better andothers worse, the one side superior in numbers, the other in power,77with the one being victorious and the other vanquished, as Origenessupposed.312 Others interpret it as a dispute between the finer souls –the foster-children of Athena – and others who work at generation andwho belong to the god presiding over generation.313 Others combine (or5

so they believe)314 the views of Origenes and of Numenius and say that itis a conflict between souls and daemons, with the daemons being a down-dragging force and the souls trying to come upwards. Their view is thatthere are three kinds of daemons, a divine type of daemon, a type now in10

that condition (kata schesin) which is made up of individual souls who havereceived a daemonic lot, and the other corrupt kind – the soul polluters.So daemons of the final type strike up this war with souls on their descentinto generation. And they claim that, just as the ancient theologians refer15

this to Osiris and Typhon or to Dionysus and the Titans, Plato attributesit to Athenians and Atlantines out of reverence. For he hands down thetradition that, before they come into three-dimensional bodies, there isrivalry between souls and the enmattered daemons that he assigned315 to20

the west;316 for the west, as the Egyptians say, is the region of harmfulsouls.317 The philosopher Porphyry is of this view,318 and one would besurprised if he is saying anything different from the view authorized byNumenius.

The Iamblichan view of Atlantis

Well, these people at any rate were in my view given a really splen-did caning by Iamblichus.319 Both he and my own teacher preferred to25

with the seven planets. The probability is that Proclus has misinterpreted an account ofAmelius that he read in Porphyry or a similar source.

312 Origenes fr. 12 in Weber (1962).313 Clearly the latter are the Atlantines, who are the descendents of Poseidon, who is in this

context the god of generation.314 Proclus thinks they are in fact indistinguishable from Numenius; see below, 77.22–4.315 It seems that ��+�� may here be an astrological term for influences that reside in

the same heavenly parts; see LSJ ii 3.316 As Festugiere points out, this is Atlantis’ location.317 Festugiere’s note draws attention to Lact. Div. Inst. 2.9.5–6 and Porph. Antr. Nymph.

29. For Porphyry’s attention to the moon in his interpretation see the Introduction,pp. 76–7, and table on p. 78.

318 Porphyry in Tim. fr. X. Bearing in mind that Porphyry thinks the position combines thebest of Origenes and Numenius it is clear that Proclus would have been able to deducetheir positions from reading Porphyry alone.

319 Iamblichus in Tim. fr. 7. For commentary see Dillon (1973), 268–70, who assumes thatthe wording is largely post-Iamblichan.

170

Atlantis

explain this conflict not [at the expense of] setting aside of the surfacemeaning, but on the contrary, in the conviction that these things havehappened in every sense. However, as we are accustomed to refer whatprecedes the primary discussions to the same target as the discussions, so 78we prefer to take this rivalry also from the human realm and to distributeit, in this same way and according to a similar pattern, across the wholecosmos and particularly among generated things, so giving it widespreadmeaning to all things, and studying how they partake of this rivalry in 5

accordance with their variety of powers. I mean that since everythingis from the One and the Dyad that comes after the One, and they aresomehow brought into unity with each other and have acquired opposingnatures, just as there is also an opposition among the Kinds of being,320

of Same against Other and of Motion and against Rest, and everything 10

in the cosmos participates in these Kinds, it would make sense to studythe rivalry that runs through everything.

Moreover, assuming that we have observed the analogue of the con-stitution in the entire cosmos, we must surely also take note of this ‘war’that is embedded in the whole of nature. For the constitution is analogousto being and the substances, while the war is analogous to their powers 15

and their unvarying motions. And one should say that the former, theconstitution that makes all things in common, is assimilated to the totalunification, while the latter is assimilated to the ascendancy of strife.321

So if you bisect the whole into incorporeal and corporeal, and then the 20

incorporeal into the more intellective and the more enmattered parts,and the corporeal into heaven and generation, and the heaven into theopposing revolutions but generation into the contrasting properties –or however you understand this contrasting life either among gods oramong daemons or among souls or among bodies – you would in every 25

case be able to bring analogies that begin with humans to bear uponthings.

For the divine Homer develops oppositions,322 setting Apollo againstPoseidon, Ares against Athena, the River against Hephaestus, Hermesagainst Leto, and Hera against Artemis.323 It is necessary, you see, to 79

320 See Dillon (1973), 270, for the meaning the phrase will have for Iamblichus and thenoetic nature of the Kinds, themselves of course relating to Sophist 254d.

321 Festugiere suspects the influence here of Empedocles’ cosmic cycle, hence I have cho-sen to translate ��+�� by a term suggesting temporary domination. However, itsderivation from ��$�� must here be of significance.

322 Il. 20.67–74; the River is Xanthus, the divine name for Scamander at Troy. See also Crat.391e–392a.

323 The first three pairs put the pro-Trojan god first, but the remaining two put the pro-Greek god first. Zeus and Aphrodite are not considered here, though the latter will bementioned at 79.17.

171


view generation in incorporeals, bodies and combinations of the two,and to posit Poseidon and Apollo as demiurges of all of becoming, theformer universally and the latter partially; to make Hera and Artemis as5

the leaders of animal birth, the former of rational life and the latter ofphysical life; to make Athena and Ares responsible for the rivalry thatruns through both, through being and through life, her for the [rivalry]determined by intellect, him for the more material and more impassionedkind, and to make Hermes and Leto the chiefs of the double perfection of10

the soul, the former of the one [achieved] through cognitive powers andthe offering324 of reasoned arguments, the other through the smooth andwilling and assenting elevation of the vital forces; to make Hephaestusand Xanthus the chiefs of all bodily composition and of the properties15

within it, the former of the more active properties, and the latter of themore passive and more material so to speak.325

As for Aphrodite he leaves her all by herself so that she may be thelight behind all unification and harmony, fighting as an ally of the weakerpowers, because in the things of this world the one is weaker than plural-ity. For all rivalry is properly studied along with the one, for it (the one) is20

either prior to it, or naturally implanted in it, or somehow supervenientupon it.326 It is this that Plato like the theologians327 has noticed whenbefore the single cosmology he rightly hands down the multiple one,and before the whole the parts. And discovering all this in images before25

their paradigms, he studies in the human realm this rivalry that exists alsoin a corresponding form within the universe, requiring no battles withTitans or Giants.328 How [in that case] was he to say anything acceptableto the Socrates who had yesterday criticized the poets for inventing thesestories? Rather, he took his subject matter from history to avoid setting30

in the divine realm his account of mutual hostilities. Rather, by introduc-80ing events in the human realm, through the cautious use of analogy hetries to bring it to bear upon the gods as well. Such wars are traditionally

324 While it is tempting read ��+D�75� for ��D�75� (this would give the sense of ‘appli-cation’), one must remember the special connection of Hermes with the delivery ofspeeches.

325 There seems to be an acceptance of the Stoic idea that body is either active or passive,and the association of fire with the former.

326 One wonders here about a possible relationship, perhaps indirect, with the hypotheses(specifically two, four, and five) of the Parmenides, in which the one is now the source ofsubsequent opposition, or such that the opposition participates in it, or arises afterwardssince privation of unity removes all differentiation that could establish a genuine plurality(Parm. 142d–143a, 157c, 159d–160b).

327 Festugiere assumes simply that Proclus refers to Homer here.328 These conflicts from Hesiod are themselves explained by the Neoplatonist allegorists in

terms of the natural oppositions within the universe, as we see in what follows.

172

Atlantis

placed by the inspired poets too before the single order, but that is their 5

proper manner, whereas this is Plato’s. His, with its political context, ismore prudent, while theirs, with its priestly context, is more inspired.329

So much for the account as a whole.

Details of the text at 20d7–e1

Of the diction under examination the word hear has a proem-likecharacter, and is being used in the circumstances where one wishes to 10

appeal for attention on the part of the reader. It is the equivalent ofsaying ‘take note of things worth hearing’.330 The word unusual indi-cates what’s illogical, as when it’s said in the Gorgias (473a1) ‘Certainlyunusual, Socrates’; or what’s unexpected as in the Crito (44b3) whenhe uses the expression ‘What an unusual dream, Socrates!’; or what’s 15

wondrous,331 as when he says in the Theaetetus (142b9-c1) ‘Actually it’snothing unusual, but it would be a great deal more wondrous if he werenot like this.’ [The term] has been adopted here as indicating ‘worthyof wonder’. He shows this straight away while continuing with the samesubject, saying that the ancient deeds of this city were ‘great and won-drous’.332 The term account makes plain the truth of what is about to 20

be said, for that was how myth was said to differ from an account inthe Gorgias.333 That Solon should have been called the wisest of the

329 Festugiere, following Trouillard, draws attention to material on Homeric myth in inRemp. I. 69–86; one might add 159–63, and material in post-Proclan commentaries.In Crat. 70 treats ‘Homer and the other poets’ as similarly inspired (C(��), a lessonthat Proclus has derived from Crat. 391d and a good deal of the next fifteen or sopages until our version of his commentary fails. It appears from in Parm. 646.21–34that Proclus considers the link between such inspiration and mythical language to beimportant. This creates difficulties, since Plat. Theol. I. 4 links symbolic rather thaninspirational communication with myth, but Gersh in Steel and Segonds (2000), 18,interestingly observes that ‘(a) when Proclus considers Plato alone as theologian, heranks the entheastic mode of exposition above the symbolic; and (b) when he considersPlato and Homer together as theologians, he allows the entheastic and symbolic modesof exposition to coincide.’

330 Compare the comment of Olymp. in Gorg. 47.1 on the opening of the Gorgias’ myth.331 Proclus here (as opposed to 80.17–20 below) uses (��$�+�� (wondrous) in the sense of

‘surprising’ rather than ‘admirable’, but Plato himself uses this sense in the passage citedas well as at Tht. 154b6 and probably 151a3. He may be trying to tell us something aboutthe experience of wonder here, for that is the beginning of philosophy (155d), but he isalso prone to using non-‘admirable’ senses of this word elsewhere.

332 Notice how Proclus now assumes that Plato uses (��$�+�� in the sense of ‘admirable’.333 523a1–3, where the story’s alleged truth is precisely what justifies the term logos rather

than mythos. Olympiodorus does not make anything of the role of truth at Gorg. 523a1–3,which he takes to be a symbolic truth rather than a literal one. The best to be said forthe literal meaning in his eyes is that it is harmless (Olymp. In Gorg. 46.6–47.1).

173


Seven was entirely reasonable, given that it was said (i) by a relative,334

(ii) to another Athenian, (iii) at the Panathenaea, and (iv) to demonstrate25

that what will be said is aiming at complete wisdom. And one shouldn’t besurprised that he is described as wisest of them all, nor be over-desirousfor a way that he could be being called wisest of the other men, but one ofthe sages, all of whom were wisest.335 What would be strange even in oneof those ranked with him being called ‘wisest man’? Anyway as testimonyto his wisdom there is (i) his lawgiving, (ii) his feigned madness is in30

defence of Salamis, (iii) his armed336 opposition to Pisistratus the tyrant,81when he declared himself cleverer than those who did not see throughhim and braver than those who understood, (iv) his conversation withCroesus, and (v) his response to the man who said he’d instituted thefinest laws: for he said that he hadn’t made the finest, but those that were5

possible – though he knew better ones.337 Furthermore (vi) the storyabout the tripod trawled up by some youths, even though not everybodyrecords it, relates that, when the god proclaimed that it should be givento the wisest, it was first given to Thales, but he sent it to another of the10

Seven, he to another, and finally it came to Solon, when everybody else

334 Proclus adheres to the view, probably false, that Solon was the brother of Dropides(81.28–82.1), and so related to both Critias and Plato.

335 This piece of philological ingenuity would have the phrase mean rather ‘he from theSeven, wisest Solon’. The subject matter, and the excessive puzzling over such details, issuggestive of Longinus.

336 This is clearly an encounter firstly through public speaking and then through poetry as canbe seen at Plut. Solon 30, where, in addition to some words delivered on leaving theAssembly, his poetry (fr. 11 West) is held to criticize the stupidity of those who trustedPisistratus, and the cowardice of those who didn’t. Straightforward ‘armed’ oppositionto Pisistratus would have been something other than an indication of wisdom at the ageof seventy-five or eighty! One might suspect therefore that C� 7�� should be emendedto 1� 7��, a regular term for martial poetic rhythm (the enoplion is in fact encounteredin the last three and a half feet of lines 1, 3, 5, and 7 of fr. 11). However, Plutarch isnot Proclus’ immediate source here, and the story told at D.L. 1.49 does have Solondonning his arms to denounce Pisistratus publicly for aiming at tyranny. Here too(D.L. 1.52) fr. 11 is seen as criticism of the people after the tyranny is inplace.

337 While Plutarch’s lives are often a significant source for Greek biographical materials inNeoplatonist writings (see particularly Olymp. in Gorg. and the index loc. of Jackson-Lycos-Tarrant 1998), Diehl and Festugiere give an exaggerated picture of Proclus’ likelydependence here. The story behind (ii) is told at Plut. Solon 8 (Solon cannot openlyrevive the Athenian claim to Salamis because it was banned by law, so feigns madnessand recites the poem of which fr. 1 is the beginning), and the very famous material behind(iv) is found at 27. Variant stories are told at 30 (iii), of Solon’s opposition to the risingPisistratus, and (v) has a weak parallel at 15. However, story (vi) is not told about Solonhimself in Plutarch, whereas (ii) is also found at D.L. 1.48, (iii) at 1.49, and (iv) at 1.50.Clearly there would have been a range of possible sources for Proclus to draw on forvery similar information.

174

Atlantis

had deferred to him, but he returned it to the god from himself sayingthat it was he who was really wisest.338 It is also to Solon’s credit (vii)that the lunar month is not of thirty days, and hence he was the first torefer to the ‘Old and New’,339 and the backward count of the days [of 15

the month] from the twentieth on is also attributed to him. Some peopleclaim (viii) that he also declared that intellect is in charge of the universebefore Anaxagoras did so. From these considerations it is obvious thathe participated in some kind of wisdom.

Family trees and their significance

He was close to us and a special friend of Dropides my great- 20

grandfather, as he mentions at several points in his poetry. He [Dropides]said to Critias my grandfather, as the old man related to us in turn,that there had been great and admirable deeds of our city in ancienttimes, which had vanished through the passage of time and mortal 25

catastrophes. (20e1–6)

The history that deals with the family of Solon and Plato’s kinship withhim goes like this.340 The children of Exekestides were Solon and Dropi- 82des, and Dropides’ son was Critias, whom Solon mentions in his poetry,saying:

Tell Critias with the golden hair to listen to his father;For he will not be obeying a leader with an errant mind.

From Critias there came Callaeschrus and Glaucon, and then fromCallaeschrus came this Critias. The ‘Critias’ in the Charmides identi- 5

fies Glaucon, the father of Charmides, calling him his uncle.341 FromGlaucon came Charmides and Perictione, and so from Perictione came

338 The story has a parallel at Plut. Solon 4, but in Plutarch’s alternative versions it is Thalesor Bias who finally receives the tripod a second time and so dedicates it to Apollo ofIsmenus or of Delphi.

339 Besides Plut. Solon 25, Proclus would have known this from Ar. Clouds 1134, 1190.Material about the count-down to days after the twentieth is closely connected with hisother reforms of the lunar month in the account of Plutarch.

340 The identity of the Critias who speaks in the Timaeus and Critias is one point of con-troversy in what follows. Some favour identifying him with the tyrant’s grandfather. Ifthis latter path is rejected, on the grounds that Plato’s audience would certainly haveseen the tyrant here in the absence of indications to the contrary, then Plato appears tohave omitted two generations. For literature see Morgan (1998), 101 n.3. Davies (1971),322–33 includes useful discussion, but the main point on which he differs from Proclusis in refusing to infer from Tim. 20e1–2 that Dropides and Solon were brothers; in factPlato’s expression seems to exclude this.

341 The relevant passage is 154a8–b2.

175


Plato. So Glaucon was the uncle of Critias, Charmides was his cousin and10

the uncle of Plato, while Solon was the brother of the great-grandfatherof Critias.342 The real position was like this. The divine Iamblichus,however, hands down rather a different account of the family history.He makes Glaucon an immediate son of Dropides.343 Others say thatCritias and Glaucon were sons of Callaeschrus, as does Theon the Pla-15

tonist.344 And yet ‘Critias’ says in the Charmides that Charmides is theson of ‘Glaucon our uncle’, using these exact terms, ‘and my cousin’. SoGlaucon was neither the son of Dropides, nor the younger brother ofCritias. But enough of this. The truth of these matters is of no signifi-20

cance to the man whose concern is with realities.345

If you proceed to realities, you could grasp from this as if from imagesthat the whole mapping of the cosmos and the columns of coordinatepairs within it346 are not only joined to contiguous demiurgic causes butalso are related to other more intellective and more senior causes, and25

that the causal factors behind this motion [in our world] are contiguousand unified and stemming from one point.347 And [you could also learn]that the higher ones are senior in their intellective activity, and thatthe second [generation] take over the creation of the first, and whilediffering from them still have a family connection with them. In addition

342 Here is a family tree according to Proclus:

Solon

Exekestides

Glaucon

Perictione

Plato

Charmides

Dropides

Critias I

Callaeschrus

Critias II

343 Iamblichus in Tim. fr. 8 Dillon. The error is a puzzle to Dillon (1973, 270–1), but suchmatters may be complicated by the duplication of names that tends to occur every twogenerations.

344 Presumably Theon of Smyrna, whose introduction to the reading of Plato was used laterin the Arab world (al-Nadım, Fihrist, trans. Dodge p. 614). On him see Dillon (1977),397–9. Proclus utilized him at in Remp. II. 218–19.

345 After Proclus has shown sufficient concern to enter the debate over Critias’ family history,demonstrating his ability to compete on matters of prosopography, it comes as a shock toread such a strong disclaimer, but cf. ‘Socrates’ at Prt. 347b–348a. One wonders whetherthe ‘errors’ of Theon and Iamblichus were due to information unavailable to us, to amisunderstanding of what they had said, or to the lack of any desire to get the historicaltruth correct.

346 The term is +�+��. We have here the Neoplatonic successor of the Pythagoreancolumns of opposites; cf. 4.18 above, a preview of the current interpretation of theAtlantis story. See further 84.1, 97.1, and regularly from 130 to 190.

347 Here perhaps we see why it is thought that Solon and Dropides were brothers.

176

Atlantis

to this [you could also learn] that a double forgetting arises in souls 30

of things universal and of their study of universal things that are mag- 83nificent and wondrous, either through their being far removed in timefrom such a life or through their falling too steeply into generation –this being the death of the real human being.348 But the souls with recentexperience349 and a memory of things there easily remember the truth 5

because they do not become immersed in matter.350 This is how oneshould deal with this.

One should not be surprised that he called Solon simply by the termclose. For it was not only one’s acquaintances but also one’s relatives thatthey called ‘close’.351 By the addition of and a special friend he shows 10

that the family relationship among the ancestors of Plato was no lightmatter, but a sameness or similarity of life. He called the elder Critiasan old man to indicate his good sense, his intellect, and his aptitude forgrey-haired lessons.352

The appropriateness of the Atlantis story

There was one single greatest thing of all, which it would now be 15

appropriate for us to tell you of, and so repay you while also fairly andtruly, in a kind of hymn, singing the praises of the goddess at hergathering. (20e6–21a3)

Longinus353 raises the difficulty of what the presentation of this narrativemeans for Plato. For it hasn’t been composed for the relaxation of the 20

audience nor because he requires them to remember it. He solved this,as he thought, with the observation that he had taken it up prior to thephysical theory to charm the listener on and to make the presentation

348 See Festugiere’s note, and consider also Gorg. 492e, with its use of Euripides to suggestthat real life is other than this embodied life. If I understand Proclus correctly, it is notembodiment as such that Proclus sees as the destruction of what is really human, butrather the sudden embodiment that results in the obliteration of our connection throughmemory with the higher world.

349 The term ��7�� suggests the recent initiation in some rite, as at Phdr. 250e1 (cf.��7�� 251a2). Festugiere cites many parallel Proclan passages, but overlooks theirPlatonic original.

350 Compare Phdr. 250e–251a, where the notion of immersion in matter is absent; this mightrather be sought from 248c5–8 (which is also related to the theme of forgetfulness) withPhd. 81c–d and similar passages.

351 Proclus is forced to comment because of linguistic change. In classical times the adjective�6�;��, originally ‘of one’s household’ and hence ‘one’s own’, could be used as a noun,meaning either a close acquaintance or a relative. It is ironic that Plato had only meantthat Solon was a close friend!

352 As Festugiere points out, the phrase is reminiscent of Tim. 22b8, and refers there toancient history.

353 Longinus fr. 32; Origenes fr. 13.

177


an early antidote to the dryness of its style. Origenes claimed that the25

narrative had been invented, and to this extent he agreed with Nume-nius’ party, but not that it had been invented in the interests of artificialpleasure, like Longinus.354 He didn’t add the reason for the invention.

As for us, we have repeatedly said that it is helping to complete theentire study of nature, and moreover we claim in the case of these words30

that he is labelling as the greatest and most wondrous of deeds thesingle common principle of the twin columns of opposites in the cos-mos, and the single conflict that extends through the universe, on the84grounds that it holds in an unbreakable unity the entire creation thatis founded upon opposites, upon Limiters and Unlimiteds as Philolaus(fr. B1 DK) says – and as he says himself in the Philebus (30c) when he5

says that there’s much limit in the cosmos, much unlimited also, the twobeing opposites that combine to make up this All.355

Since everything that helps complete the creation is said to showgratitude to the universal causes, it is with good reason that Critias too is10

saying that it’s appropriate for him to repay the favour to Socrates, afterhe [Socrates] has set in motion the second and third powers.356 Thismuch you can grasp straight away.

But what about the gathering in honour of Athena? Would you notsay that this too involves an indication of works of creation? For thisgoddess holds together the whole cosmic organization and holds intel-15

ligent lives within herself which she uses to weave together the whole,and unificatory powers which she uses to manage all the cosmic oppo-sitions. The gathering in honour of Athena indicates the gift from thegoddess that pervades all things and fills all things with itself, and theunion that traverses all complexity. For it is particularly at such gath-20

erings357 that we welcome a shared life in concord. And if we have gotthis right, it is possible to transport ourselves from this too to the variedand single life of the cosmos and to observe the difference betweenthe Parmenides and this dialogue. For both have their setting at the25

Panathenaea, the former at the greater [Panathenaea] and the latter at

354 Festugiere draws attention to the earlier passage, at 60.1–4 above, where Origenes (fr. 9)resists Longinus’ belief (fr. 28) that Plato’s aesthetic concerns aim at artificially contrivedpleasure, and also to the comparable passage at 86.19–30 below. By talking of artificialpleasure Origenes hints that such pleasure is in a sense unnatural, and so to be avoidedeven in Epicurean philosophy.

355 This is paraphrase, and clearly shows Proclus’ tendency to quote from memory, as wellas being designed to exaggerate the degree to which Plato’s principles are parallel ingre-dients in reality.

356 Socrates, Critias, and Hermocrates correspond to the first, second, and third membersof the demiurgic triad (9.17–24).

357 The panegyris is technically a gathering, usually religious, of the whole people.

178

Atlantis

the Lesser, for the Lesser Panathenaea was celebrated at about the sametime as the Bendidea.358 Reasonably so, for while the creation associatedwith Athena is twofold, universal and particular, hypercosmic and cosmic,intelligible and sensible, the former [dialogue] partners her transcendent 85creations, unveiling the intelligible series of the gods, while the latterdeals with her lower ones, communicating the powers of the gods inthe cosmic area. It is likely that the festival of the Bendidea signifies the 5

conflict that comes upon the whole from the barbarian surge outside,359

that is brought under control by the gods presiding over the festival.Hence word is handed down that it was being held in the Piraeus, thatbeing most akin to the remotest and closest parts of the universe tomatter. But the Panathenaea signifies the orderliness that comes downinto the cosmos from intellect and the unblending separation of the 10

opposing cosmic powers; for this goddess is ‘a lover of wisdom and ofwar’ (24d1). So this is being dedicated to the goddess as a different kindof peplos,360 in which the foster-children of Athena are victorious, just asthat peplos at the Panathenaea has the Giants being vanquished by the 15

Olympians. It is a fair and true hymn (cf. 21a2–3) being offered up tothe god: fair because it is fair that all that proceeds should revert to itsown origin, and true because the hymn has been drawn from the realworld via actual happenings. Bearing in mind that some hymns praisethe substance of the gods, some their providential care, and some their 20

works, this last kind being the final type of laudation – reverent accountsof their substance are the most outstanding type of all, as Socrates tellsus in the Symposium361 – it was reasonable that he added a kind of hymn,because it is from the works of the Athenians that he is going to praise 25

the goddess. The commentators affirm that the Panathenaea followedthe Bendidea, and Aristocles of Rhodes relates that the Bendidea at thePiraeus are conducted on the twentieth of Thargelion, followed by the 30

festival of Athena.362

358 On the erroneous chronology (which might be anticipated from the vagueness of thereporting) see 26.10–20, and Festugiere’s notes on both passages.

359 Bendis being a Thracian goddess first celebrated in Athens at the beginning of theRepublic, while the ‘surge’ is meant to recall the floods that will finally destroy Atlantis(25c7).

360 The new robe that was woven for the cult statue of Athena at each celebration of theGreater Panathenaea, and which contained martial representations, well known fromthe description at Euthph. 6c.

361 In fact Agathon at 195a; to refer to 198d3 etc. with Festugiere and Diehl seems to me tooverlook the only clear statement of the principle that Proclus wants to espouse.

362 Aristocles has appeared at 20.2 above in relation to the ‘missing person’, while Proclushas earlier given the date as the nineteenth of Thargelion (26.14). As this is an all-nightfestival there may be no conflict.

179


Three lemmata in brief

Well then, what deed was this that Critias was relating as unreported, but86actually performed by this city of old? (21a4–6)

Socrates, inciting Critias to take up the story, demands the telling of5

this greatest of deeds, which Critias the elder heard from Solon, onenot circulated at all but that still happened. Here this is the first pointworth examining, that many things go unnoticed by the masses in theuniverse too (this being how the elite differ from the rest, that they see10

things of this kind too and observe them happening), and next that themore perfect of causes delight in simplicity and proceed from compositethings to principles, while debased things on the other hand descendfrom simples to composites. This is the way that Socrates here too hashastened back up to Solon from below, while Critias on the contrary15

began with Solon and came down to his own memory (20d–e).

I shall set forth an ancient account, heard from a man not young.(21a7–8)

Longinus363 points out here too that Plato worries about the freshness20

and variety of his diction, pronouncing the same things in different ways.The deed he called ‘ancient’, but the man he called ‘not young’, yet heis making the same point throughout and able to call everything by thesame term. But he was ‘a philologist’, as Plotinus says of him,364 and25

‘not a philosopher’. Origenes would not agree that he was aiming atartificial pleasure and various embellishments,365 but [said] that he wasconcerned about a spontaneous and unembellished plausibility and accu-racy in his character-portrayal, and moreover that this kind of commu-nication comes spontaneously, as becomes an educated man. He thinks30

Aristoxenus the musical writer was right in saying that the dispositions of87the philosophers extended to their voices, exhibiting an orderly qualityin everything they say366 – as, I presume, this heaven of ours also offersclear images of the splendour of its intellections, images that move in5

time with their invisible circuits.

363 Longinus fr. 33; Origenes fr. 14.364 Porph. VPlot. 14.19–20, the best-remembered feature of Longinus, and one repeatedly

brought out in this commentary.365 See above on 83.27.366 Aristoxenus fr. 75 Wehrli; it seems to me that a polemical context is likely, obliquely

criticizing the discordant remarks of those who would be regarded as philosophers.Origenes seems to be saying that the philosopher does not vary his voice (and hence hiswritten style) from speaker to speaker, an idea associated in the Republic (396c–397c) withthe principle that it is only the best that one should be imitating.

180

Atlantis

The great Iamblichus deems rather that we should refer the varietyof terms to realities, and see how in nature too the opposites are blendedinto the one unity and how the one is varied, and how great an inter-changeability the same principles demonstrate, existing in one way in 10

the intellect of the universe, in another in soul, in another in nature,and finally coming to be in matter and in the realm of matter show-ing the great multiplicity of otherness that exists alongside similarity.It’s this that’s worthy of Plato’s intellect, and not a preoccupation with 15

diction.

Critias was then already nearly ninety years old as he claimed, and I wasabout ten. (21a8–b1)

There are these three characters who have preserved this story, whetherhistory or myth: Solon, Critias the elder, and the present younger Critias, 20

because the causes of the creation that render perfect the things undertheir control are themselves perfect.367 Now Critias heard the story fromSolon, one to one; two heard it from him, Critias and Amynander, and 25

from this Critias three hear it; for via the dyad the monad proceedsto the providence that brings the universe to completion. And theirages, taken as numbers, have considerable relevance to reality, the decadexhibiting the reversion of all encosmic things to the one, and the numberninety a return to square one in the monad after procession.368 Both 88numbers bear a symbol of the cosmos. So if you wished to put it likethis, Solon is analogous to the cause of stability, Critias the elder tothe one that leads the progression, and this Critias to the cause thatturns back what has proceeded and joins it to its origins. And the first 5

preserves the logos of the leading cause,369 the second of the cause thattouches without involvement370 on the cosmic creation, and the third ofthe cause that already takes care of the universe and manages the warwithin it.

Athenian religious history

It happened to be Koureotis at the Apaturia up to many of us children 10

sang. (21b1–7)

The Apaturia is a festival of Dionysus celebrating the single combatof Melanthus against the Boeotian Xanthus, and Melanthus’ victory by

367 I.e. they constitute a complete triad.368 For the significance of ninety, see II. 215.20.

369 Here logos is the correspondence within the analogy.370 On � �7�� see Festugiere’s note.

181


deceit during the war between Athens and the Boeotians over Oenoe.371

It was celebrated over three days. The first was called Anarrhysis because15

many sacrifices are made on it, and the sacrificial victims are called anar-rhymata because they are sacrificed by drawing [their heads] back, anddragging upwards (ano erhyomena).372 The second day was called Dorpia,as there were many feasts and banquets on it.373 The third was Koureo-tis, because on this day they enrolled the boys (kouroi) in their phratriesat the age of three or four. 374 On this day too the brightest boys of20

the phratry sang certain poems, and some won victories over the oth-ers – those who remembered more of them in fact, as they were givingrhapsodic performances of the works of the ancients.

There is a certain amount that one should be aware of about thephratry-members. There had been four tribes after Ion, ten after Cleis-thenes, and twelve after this.375 Each tribe was divided into three, and25

the third portion of the tribe was known as the trittys, and then patria89(fatherhoods) and phatria (brotherhoods).376 Those enrolled in the sametribe or phratry were called Brothers, as being of the same kin, and it isinto these [lists of] Brothers that the enrolment of boys took place. Andthe day took its name Koureotis from this – from the enrolment of boys,5

as we’ve said. So much for history.

371 The legend goes that the war concerned the border villages of Oenoe and Eleutherae,they resorted to single combat to settle it, Melanthus sent a man dressed in a blackgoatskin behind Xanthus, and he then complained about the latter’s bringing an assistant.Thus distracting his opponent, he is able to kill him by trickery. See Festugiere’s note.

372 The drawing back of the neck and slitting the throat while it is held on high is not anunusual procedure in sacrifices to the Olympians.

373 Dorpon was an Homeric word for the evening meal. According to the scholia on Ar. Ach.146, Dorpia is the first day and Anarrhysis the second, but, while this is the acceptedview, it seems counter-intuitive that the main feasting should precede the sacrifices.Nevertheless nothing precludes the carrying out of sacrifices at the Dorpia also, forsacrifices did also take place at the Koureotis; see Zaidman and Pantel (1992), 66.

374 The phratry (brotherhood) was a traditional religious and family unit, the kinship aspectbeing important as part of its function related to the cult of ancestors. Admission of boysto the phratry was thus admission to the extended family.

375 The ten tribe system of Cleisthenes was clearly going to be a landmark in any historyof the number of tribes. This system makes careful use of trittyes that are composedof demes from different areas. The phratry seems not to have been an essential unit ofthe Cleisthenian system, which was part of a political rather than a religious system. SeeFestugiere’s note.

376 We seem to be dealing now with the pre-Cleisthenic division in which phratry and trittysmay have meant the same thing (Arist. Ath. Pol. frs. 3–5 with Festugiere’s note). It is ofcourse the pre-Cleisthenic state of affairs that is pertinent to the story. I find no goodexplanation of the addition of patria, which though used for such an entity ( *�� LSJII. 2) seems not to be an Athenian form. Proclus may be including it for regions linkedwith etymological speculation.

182

Atlantis

The hidden lessons of the events at the Apaturia

The Festival of the Apaturia, then, for which the rationale is a victoryof the Athenians, is consistent with the overall plan, according to whichthe Athenian victory parallels the triumph of all intelligibles over what is 10

enmattered. The aspect of deceit is naturally associated with the encos-mic forms, which leave the undivided and immaterial principles (logoi),and become apparent rather than really real. The enrolment of boys rep-resents the enlisting of individual souls into their own allotted roles andtheir descent into a variety of births, and the festival element represents 15

the everlasting orderliness in the cosmos. In for ever being filled withgods it celebrates an eternal festival.

The competitions for recitation are analogous to the challengesthat souls confront as they weave their own lives together with the uni-verse. This recitation resembles the interlinked and interwoven life of 20

the universe, for <the latter> involves the imitation of the intellectiveforms, just as the former involves the imitation of heroic actions andcharacters along with the preservation of this connecting thread.377 Thephrase many poems from many poets reflects the many natures andmany cosmic <principles>, and in sum the diversity of nature’s imita- 25

tions, while the youthful poems mirror the forms that are for ever intheir prime – ever complete, fertile, and able to act on other things. Somuch for that.

It is not with regard to popular poetry-composition that mention hasbeen made of Solon’s poems, but it is because he blended philosophy 90with composition. For intellect is in charge of both encosmic works andthe composition of the whole. Praise [of Solon] is attributed to anotherperson, Amynander,378 because the judging role is separate from that ofcreating and fathering, as we have learned from the Phaedrus.379 5

Through the entirety of what has been said, referring it to the All asif from images, the entire account makes a further point, that individualsouls, individual natures, divided forms, and above all those which areever youthful and vigorous, contribute something to the war that goes

377 The translation of mimesis as ‘imitation’ is not ideal (Halliwell 2002, 13), but to preservethe Greek in non-poetic contexts would sound strange. Narrative poetry’s constructinga continuous narrative out of episodes seems crucial for the comparison here (thoughFestugiere fails to see this in trying to divorce the ‘preservation of the connecting thread’from poetry and attach it to the universe), and Proclus preserves the priority of plot overcharacter that is found in the tragedy of Aristotle’s Poetics, for Homer is of course ‘thefirst of the tragic poets’ (Rep. 607a3).

378 He is just ‘somebody’ at 21b7, but is identified by a vocative at c4. Note that this materialbelongs more properly to the next lemma (21b7–d3).

379 This is a reference to 274e, where the Egyptian Pharaoh is critical of the clever inventorTheuth.

183


on in the cosmos, and all these things are coordinated by the gods that10

preside over creation with a view to a single cosmos, a single harmony,and a single complete life overall.

Praising Solon’s poetry and handing down his work

So one of the phratry-members said, whether because he reallythought that then, or whether he had the ulterior motive of givingCritias cause for gratitude up to would have become more famous than15

he. (21b7–d3)

At this point once again the dedicated observers of detailed diction pointout to their devotees that, when Plato praises the poetry of Solon, heis safely attributing the praise to an amateur and suiting the tastes ofothers, but not speaking his mind or his reasoning.380 For if anybodyelse is a good judge of poets, Plato too is an excellent one as Longinus20

argues.381 Certainly Heraclides of Pontus says that, though Choirilus’poems were then highly regarded, Plato preferred those of Antimachus,and persuaded Heraclides to go to Colophon to make a collection of theman’s poems.382 So the burbling of Callimachus and Duris is pointless,25

when they claim that Plato is not an adequate judge of poets.383 Onemight regard this discussion as too historical.

The person who investigates facts will require us to say that all thecauses of cosmic arrangement, which keep the rivalry intact, reach back91towards a single principle, and the final things cling to the first thingsvia what is between them. In this way those who received the story fromCritias the elder look back towards him, while he looks to Solon. Andwhile this latter admires the poetic power of Solon, the former are taken5

back to Solon’s poetry through Critias’ intermediate role – in gratifyinghim they are also praising [the other’s poetry].

But what is it that Critias says about Solon? [He claims] that he issecond to the divinely inspired poets for two reasons, because he took10

380 Though there appears to be a little satire at the expense of the Longinus-type, he isnevertheless treated here as a potential ally in divorcing what is said from the true opinionsof Plato. One assumes that Longinus would have pointed to Plato’s own suggestion thatAmynander could not be relied on to speak his mind. For Proclus’ own view Festugierequotes at length in Remp. I. 65.2ff., where Proclus can give some kind of defence of theviews expressed, if not according to standard aesthetic criteria.

381 Longinus fr. 35.382 For Antimachus see above, on 64.23; Choerilus is presumably not the tragedian of the

late sixth and early fifth centuries, but an epicist (like Antimachus) of the fourth century,who wrote Persica.

383 In the Introduction (pp. 75–6), I raise some issues concerning Proclus’ source for Hera-clides, Callimachus, and Duris. The material may go back to Crantor.

184

Atlantis

up poetry as a diversion, and because he found the city of Athens in astate of civil strife when he returned from Egypt, and out of concernfor his fatherland he wasn’t able to compose the story properly that he’sbrought back from there. What that story was he will go on to tell.From this as from images he makes clear that everything that is fore- 15

most in its creative and productive role384 does have other activities asits primary concern, while its production directed towards secondaryentities is a secondary concern. Further [he makes clear] that the discor-dant and unstable aspect of matter often does not accept the order thatcomes from more divine causes, but it is in too unbalanced a state forthe gift that they offer, on which account secondary or tertiary powers 20

have processed, which are the immediate source of arrangement for itsformlessness.

Solon, then, because he was the most free-spirited,385 and in imi-tation of the transcendent causes, did not hand down the story of thewar with Atlantis in poetry, while Critias and his successors relate it toothers as well, in imitation of the secondary and tertiary causes, which 25

bring forth for all to see the variety of the formative principles (logoi)and the arrangement involving the harmonization of opposites. Fur-thermore, that Solon was extremely wise highlights a correspondencewith the primary principles, while his being most free-spirited reflectsthe power of the <cause>386 that is transcendent, founded in itself, andfills all things without becoming involved.387 Such an attribute in a way 92goes hand in hand with wisdom, as it is immaterial, independent, and ofitself.

That Critias here, Critias the elder that is, should have been called anold man symbolizes the remoteness from becoming and the intellectivenature of the cause. For wisdom and true opinions, [Plato] says,388 are 5

welcome to whomsoever they come to, even in old age. Further, that thisCritias should have vividly remembered reflects the secure preservationof the everlasting formal principles and the constantly active attentionof the second causes to the first.

That poetry should have been a diversion for Solon [reflects] thefact that among the first [causes] also productive activities directed

384 Like Solon himself.385 Festugiere includes a long note on the exact sense of this word, in which he approves

this translation of Cornford’s.386 A feminine noun is missing, with ��+�� added in Diehl and Festugiere. I prefer �6��.387 Compare 88.6 for the term � �7��, with Festugiere’s note at that point.388 At Laws 653a; Proclus’ memory of this passage is imperfect, for Plato says that its pres-

ence is eutyches (a difficult word, only roughly translated as ‘fortunate’), not ‘welcome’(agapetos); he also requires that true opinions should be ‘secure’.

185


towards the second take second place, because their first activities are10

intellective, involving their unification by the principles that precedethem.389

If somebody, on hearing this from us and ignoring [deeper] realities,were to investigate what reason Plato had for introducing these apparentdigressions, he would probably find everything in accord with the overallpurpose. Plato’s target had been to tell the story of the war with Atlantis,15

and it was important that the reporter of this narrative should neitherdeceive nor be deceived. Hence Solon was said to be both extremelywise and related to Critias’ family, his wisdom making him impossibleto deceive, and his family links making him free of deceit. However, therecipient of the tale needed to be neither [yet] in his prime, to enhance20

the impression of the story’s antiquity, nor so youthful as to be forgetful.Consequently, Critias is depicted as a youngster, but well able to remem-ber, so as to be able to contend with the others in giving recitations –for which a great deal of memory is required. Furthermore, Critias theelder needed to pass on such stories as this not just to the youth, so that25

they should not seem easily dismissed. So it was with good reason thatone of the phratry-members is represented as inquiring about Solon andhearing the story. Yet this person too needed to be connected with Solonin some way, so that the old man, given the opportunity, would relatethe entire story as he [Solon] had told it. Hence the praise of his poetry,30

that was offered by Amynander to please Critias, precedes the narrative.So much for the handling of the story.

It is clear that Solon did not travel to Egypt simply to research history,93but also so that the Athenians might live according to his laws for a certaintime, a time during which they had promised him that they would notdissolve any of the laws that he had established.390 It was during this timethat he visited Croesus391 as well as sailing to Egypt. On turning back5

he found the city in confusion because of the Pisistratids.392 That willdo for the historical inquiry.

Origenes, raising a difficulty about how Solon was called most free-spirited (for he claimed that it wasn’t the right sort of praise for apoet), solves his problem by claiming that he is so described either as10

389 Cf. 91.8–16. The current comment is more lexis-like (as all material since 91.27), theformer more typical of the theoria.

390 This story concerning Solon’s departure was well known in antiquity, being disseminatedthrough Herodotus (1.29–30) and Plutarch (Solon 25.4–28.4).

391 The famous king of Lydia, with whom Solon converses according to the same passagesof Herodotus and Plutarch .

392 The city had been taken over by Pisistratus himself.

186

Atlantis

somebody who is resourceful in the use of vocabulary (from those who arefinancially generous), or as one who is very free of speech, and con-sequently most free-spirited with no holds barred in his poetry, anemployer of ‘abundant free speech’,393 or as one who is relaxed andunforced in his verses.394 15

Iamblichus,395 though, says none of these explanations is right, butthat this is hinting at Solon’s detachment of intellect, his independence invirtue, and his seriousness and excellence in all else. And indeed the sameinterpreter affirms that Critias’ smiling is an indication of the perfection 20

of the causes’ generative activity, [generative activity] that delights in itsown products, while his vivid memory symbolizes the preservation ofthe productive principles within the cosmos.

So why then would Solon have been so serious about passing down[the tale of] the war with Atlantis in poems? Because, he claims, all worksof nature and the cosmic rivalry are established through imitation. And 25

he [Solon] corresponds to the productive and primary causes, just asCritias corresponds to secondary ones that come next. And why was heprevented by the civil conflict? Because enmattered motions and enmat-tered disturbance gets in the way of the productive principles of encosmic 30

things, as was said earlier.396

Two brief lemmata

About an achievement that was tremendous, he said, and that would haverightly [been (thought)] the most famed of all, which this city did achieve, 94though on account of the passing of the time and the death of theperpetrators the story has not endured to this time. (21d4–7)

Longinus believes that the language here is elliptical, because wouldhave rightly requires ‘been thought’, this being demanded by what 5

393 An allusion to Phdr. 240e6: strangely part of a description of the lover in Socrates’speech that argues he should not be gratified, a speech whose authority is immediatelyundermined thereafter.

394 The meaning of the Greek is not clear; for a different view see Festugiere.395 Iamblichus in Tim. fr. 10 Dillon. In his commentary (273–4) Dillon claims that the

language follows Iamblichus very closely, and that the exposition follows Iamblichus’own principle of fr. 5 (30.4–18), requiring the expression of truths first through images(eikones), then through symbols. This principle is in fact attributed to the Pythagoreans,and the Atlantis story itself was regarded there as symbolic, though Iamblichan exegesisin this passage is clearly iconic.

396 At 91.16–21. Note here that the term logoi serves both for cosmic principles and literaryaccounts, while the term poietikos serves both for ‘creative’ and ‘poetic’.

187


follows, not just ‘been’.397 However, Porphyry398 claims that he did notunderstand that Plato added that would have rightly [been] the mostfamed on account of its being a tremendous achievement, though notyet famous. But let us adhere to the [higher] realities, and state that he10

called the achievement tremendous because it offers an all-pervadingimage of universal rivalry, but most famed because it contributes to thecompletion of the visible creation. Similarly, in Orpheus too the worksof nature are described as ‘glorious’:

Both the glorious works of nature endure, and boundless Eternity.39915

Tell me from the beginning, said he, what and how and from whomSolon claimed he’d heard the truth. (21d7–8)

What refers to the wondrous deed itself; how refers either to the mannerin which it was done or the manner in which it was known to Solon; fromwhom refers to those who preserved it for Solon to hear. It seems that20

through these words he is going on to ask for the very form of universalrivalry, how it is accomplished or recognized, and upon which causesof those invisible to us it depends. Previously he had worked back toSolon’s account through his400 relatives, but now he is seeking a glimpse25

of higher causes for the story than this, or, to speak more plainly, forthe beginnings of this creation process.401 In the investigation of thosequestions you will be investigating all causes right up to the very firstthrough symbols as if in images.402

397 The observation of Longinus seems excessively pedantic, for onomastos can mean some-thing like ‘famous’ or ‘of note’. Whereas a difference might be claimed between beingof note and being thought of note, it is scarcely conceivable that being famous can everbe separated from being thought famous. What is remarkable is the extent to whichProclus feels obliged to record the debates about matters which he would have foundtrivial. Lightweight philological comment is of course what Plotinus had associated withLonginus long before.

398 Porphyry in Tim. fr. XI. 399 Orph.fr. 83.400 The younger Critias’ relatives are also those of Plato.401 Because Solon corresponds to the primary productive causes, and Solon is only the

primary source for the story in the Greek world, a question that seeks to go back to Solon’ssources in a different world must be concerned with causes of being rather than ofproduction and becoming. Hence Proclus assumes that these new questions correspondto questions that the scientists ask about the intelligible and archetypal world.

402 The phrase "� 1 6��+� ��* �� +�$D�7� shows the difficulties of trying to distinguishtoo sharply between iconic and symbolic methods of investigation. As Festugiere shows,the text here is sound.

188

Atlantis

Dynamics of the passage on Sais and Egyptian geography

There is in the region of Egypt, he said, at the Delta around whose 95head the flow of the Nile is split, an administrative region called‘Saitic’. (21e1–3)

Here is the first worthwhile point, to notice how the account constantlysets forth the more confined areas [by approaching] from the moreembracing ones, from Egypt the river, from this the Delta, from this 5

the Saitic region, and from this Sais, the holy city of Athena. Next, withthis in view, to be transported back through the analogy of these things tothe first and most all-embracing causes of the creation process. For youcould see that a given cause here too is embraced from above by more 10

universal causes, and so on until the final ones, and that everywherethose that embrace are immediately prior to those that are embraced bythem, and the more universal [immediately prior] to the more partial.[You could see] the undivided creation of divided things, called the ‘new’creation,403 to which the present account will transport the ‘father of the 15

discussions’,404 being filled thanks to them405 and receiving from Athenain particular a share in their immaculate power, while filling all the vastarray of things in the cosmos with itself.

Overall, since we have associated this war, for the sake of which theentire narration has been set in motion, with cosmic rivalry, it is a good 20

tactic to continue ‘along the same track’406 and liken the complete knowl-edge of the priests in Egypt to the more ancient creation process thatholds in a fixed embrace the creative principles in the universe, but toliken Solon’s ever new and changeable narrative to the still newer one,which governs the varied cycles of encosmic things, and to see how the 25

difference in the creation processes is reflected in images that pertain tohuman affairs. Further, just as in these words Solon summons the priestto the revelation of deeds of old, while he knows also all that is thoughtancient among the Greeks and, before that, the really ancient deeds, 30

so in that area too the new creation has reverted back to the older oneand is brought to completion from it, while that [older one] has a priorgrasp of the causes of this one, and is founded higher than it, through 96

403 A recurrent phrase used to distinguish the creation of all that is subject to change in theworld. See Festugiere’s note as well as the continuation of the text above.

404 The phrase is otherwise introduced only at 9.15 above. At 41a the demiurge calls himselfa ‘father of works’ (erga), inviting the natural comparison with the notion of a ‘fathers ofwords’ (logoi); Timaeus, of course, in some way is analogous to the universal demiurge.Reference to a father of the debate (logos) is made at Symp. 177d5 and at Phdr. 257b2(referring to Phaedrus and Lysias respectively).

405 I.e. the more universal causes. 406 An allusion to Republic 420b3.

189


intellections and powers that are greater and more complete. So muchfor the overall tale.

Individual questions on Egyptian geography and its symbolism

We must also deal with the individual questions.407 As for Egypt, someregard it as an image of matter, others of the earth as a whole on the5

grounds that it is divided in a manner analogous to [the earth],408 someof the intelligible or the intelligible substance. Our view is that it isbeing assimilated here to the whole invisible order, the source of thingsvisible. For the Delta arises as the Nile is split in the region of theSaitic province, turning from its one straight course to the right and10

to the left, and passing out to the sea, so that the hypotenuse of thetriangle is the seashore. This is what Plato meant in describing the Saiticprovince at the point as something around whose head the flow ofthe Nile is split. It corresponds to the single life-generating source of15

the divine life as a whole, and in visible things to the heavenly trianglethat causes all generative force to cohere.409 It neighbours on the Ram,which those people410 especially admired, both because Ammon wasconstituted with a ram’s head, and because the Ram is the starting-pointof generative force411 and most fast-moving of all, because it is positioned20

in the heaven at the equator. Hence his mention at this point of theDelta was appropriate, since the triangle is also the first principle of theconstruction of the elements of the cosmos, as we shall hear in whatfollows.412

They give the Nile a place analogous to the zodiac, as somethingplaced beneath it,413 similarly inclined, and imitating by its branches25

407 A clear indication of the passing from theoria material to lexis material.408 Festugiere has an extensive note on what the intended correspondence of division might

be. More important, if I am correct in supposing that these views are about what Egyptsymbolizes here in the Timaeus, might be the identity of these interpreters, and theirapproach to the Atlantis story as a whole, for it seems that they sought for a deepermeaning behind these details without wishing to make them refer to anything properlytranscendent.

409 Festugiere quotes passages from Prolemy, Tetr., 1.19.1 and 2.3.3, that speak of a triangle(one of four) of Aries, Leo, and Sagittarius, associated specially with the Sun and withJupiter.

410 We now move on to what Proclus sees as Egyptian doctrine, with a strong astrologicalelement.

411 Festugiere cites passages of Nigidius Figulus, Ptolemy, and Lydus that corroborate thisstatement to the extent that the Ram is the starting-point of an annual cycle. This occursin spring, making the connection with generation natural.

412 Simply a reference to the material elements as explained in the Timaeus 53c–55c.413 In the sense of placed under its control; see Festugiere’s note.

190

Atlantis

both the [zodiac’s] obliquity and its being divided in the region of theequinox.414 It introduces a symbol for the life that pours out into theentire cosmos. And indeed the two flanks of the Nile that are carried tothe sea from a single head, in a way resemble the two correlated columns 97of opposites that proceed from the same root as far as generation, andfor which generation is the receptacle – with a triangle emerging fromthe two of them and their common receptacle that they flow into.

The Saitic region is a large portion of the Delta, and has correspon-dence with a large sector of the heaven. Certainly Sais for them has ref- 5

erence, in priestly terms, to the Great Bear, not because it lies beneath itnor because of its cold, but in the belief that it participates in some effluxfrom this divinity, a fact that makes it stable in earthquakes because itreceives a secure foundation from its situation towards the pole.415

The history and religion of Sais

Of this administrative region the largest city is Sais, the very place from 10

where Amasis their ruler came. For them the founder-divinity of theircity is one called in Egyptian Neith, but in Greek (according to theiraccount) Athena. They are very pro-Athenian, and claim to be in someway close to those here. (21e3–7)

The term for administrative region (nome, nomos) gets its name from 15

the way their land has been distributed (nemesthai). Thus the Egyp-tians called the large-scale divisions of Egypt nomes. The entire nomeis called ‘Saitic’ from the name of this city, just like Sebennytic from 20

Sebennytos and Canobic from Canobus. Reference to Amasis has beenbrought in now as one analogous to Solon, as he too cultivated justiceand temperance as compared with kings as a whole. He is therefore apartner of Solon, and has the same relation to him as that of the onecity to the other.416 So from one monad, the goddess, you will see that 25

both the cities and the people have been ordered, and from what is morecomplete [you will see] secondary things always being completed.

Callisthenes and Phanodemus record that the Athenians were fathersof the Saitic people, but Theopompus to the contrary says that theywere colonists from them. Atticus the Platonist says that Theopom- 30

pus changed the record out of hostile jealousy, because in his time cer- 98tain people came from Sais in order to revive their kinship with the

414 Manilius 2.218–20.415 The geography is looked at from the perspective of Egypt alone, giving Sais an extreme

northerly position.416 Sais to Athens.

191


Athenians.417 Plato, however, only says this much, that the people of Saiswere pro-Athenian, and in some way related. And he is able to say this5

because they have a single ‘city-holding’ goddess.418

Concerning the overseer of these cities there is this to be aware of,that as she processes from the intelligible and intellective causes throughthe hyper-heavenly orders down to the heavenly portions and allotmentsupon earth,419 she has drawn as her lot places that naturally belong toher. She doesn’t receive her leadership as something that is inciden-10

tal to the place, but [she gets it] because she has already got withinherself its substance and its form, and in this way she has drawn thislot as something that belongs to her. That the control of this goddessstretches to the very last things is shown by the Greeks when they saythat she was born from the head of Zeus, and by the Egyptians when15

they relate that the following epigram is carved upon the goddess’s innersanctuary:

I am the present, the future, and the past. Nobody has removed the covering ofmy cloak. The fruit that I have brought forth the Sun has generated.420

Hence the goddess is involved in creation processes, invisible and at the20

same time visible, possessing an allocated portion in the heaven whileilluminating generation below by means of the forms. For not only isthe Ram, from the signs of the zodiac, dedicated to the goddess, butalso the equatorial circle itself – the region in which the power thatmoves the whole is specially seated. So it is with good reason that Platowill call her ‘both war- and wisdom-loving’,421 and now describes her25

as founder-divinity of these portions of hers upon earth. [This is so]firstly because he honours the goddess through his native language,for the Athenians called their guardian ‘founder-divinity’, in celebra-tion of her <power> as eponymous and founding divinity; and secondlyto give an indication of her manifold embrace, that is pre-established30

417 Callisthenes of Olynthus, Phanodemus the Atthidographer of Athens, and ‘Theopompus’the falsely-named author of the Tricaranos of Anaximenes of Lampsacus. This is Atticusfr. 17 (des Places), whose notes refer back to Festugiere.

418 ‘City-holding’ ( poliouchos) was a conventional epithet of Athena, as protecting divinityof Athens, and is occasionally used of other divinities.

419 For the range of areas in which Athena functions see also in Crat. 53, 22.19–25.420 On this passage, similar in formula to Isiac aretologies, see Festugiere’s note. Plut. Mor.

354c has a slightly different version, and stops before the last sentence. Proclus findsin the fragment evidence of the goddess’s concealment, but at the same time of herinvolvement with visible life-forms.

421 At 24c7-d1; this influential description appears in discussion of Athena at in Crat. 185,112.4–5.

192

Atlantis

within her under a single form, of the allocations that she governs, andin addition to present us with an explicit statement that it is possible 99for the same entities to be signified by a plurality of names, since thesounds are images of the thing signified by them.422 For many statuescould be made of a single individual out of materials that are different.Consequently both the Egyptians will offer an explanation of why they 5

call her by this name of theirs, and so will the Athenians. It is not atall remarkable that both should name her correctly, because they applytheir names in accordance with a single science.

If, then, there is one overseer of the two cities, Sais and Athens, it iswith good reason that the inhabitants of Sais are a pro-Athenian peo-ple, because they are in some way close to them. The closeness is not 10

absolute; for in the same providence some would be able to participatemore and some less, some in one of its powers, some in another. For oneshould also realize this, that variations occur in various races accordingto the different areas in which each lives, according to the make-up of 15

the air, to the position in relation to the heaven, and still more spe-cific, if you like, in accordance with the seminal formal principles. Youmight say that they differed most of all in relation to the herd-tendingmanagement of the gods and the differences among their overseers,423

thanks to which you will detect variations in colouring, stature, language 20

and movements in different places. The result is that even colonistsoften undergo change in the colouring and the dialect of the settlerswhen they come to different places, just as plants change together withthe quality of the soil if they happen to be transplanted into different 25

ground.

Ancient and more recent history

Solon said that he had travelled there and became particularly renownedamong them, up to he found out . . . about such matters. (21e7–22a4)

Because of his wisdom in political matters and because of the merit of 30

his city it was with good reason that he was shown respect by the priestsof Sais. Yet as far as concerns their communal memory and their history, 100he found that neither he nor any other of the Greeks knew anythingof antiquity. But the memory of ancient things contributes to politicalexcellence, and it also contributes to the observation of the cycles of the

422 Festugiere aptly refers to 204.10–12.423 Herd-tending is an art that appears in the Statesman (275e5), but this language is clearly

ingrained, as shown by in Tim. III. 279.11–13.

193


cosmos. Solon was striving for this,424 and as a result of inquiring from5

the priests he discovered that he was utterly deficient.Here too are symbols of things divine. For among the theolo-

gians425 a ‘young creation-process’ is spoken of, and this received spe-cial honour from the universal Father and from the intelligible gods,among whom there are transcendent and more elevated426 intellec-10

tions, while those among the secondary gods are more partial andweaker. Hence there is this difference among the creative principles,that some are more able to get an overall grasp of the more universalforms, and others a more partial one, and some excel ‘in seniority andpower’,427 while others are young compared with them, and with lowlier15

power.

Greek and Egyptian antiquities

And once, when he wanted to draw them into open discussion aboutancient times, up to to count up the periods of time. (22a4–b3)

That is what all divine causes are like, invoking the more complete20

powers, and through this invocation being filled with more divine andmore universal intellections from them. That is just what Solon is doinghere. Using the more ancient things known to the Greeks as an induce-ment to the priests, he seduces them, as it were, into discussion ofantiquity as they knew it. This was a subject the Egyptians have an25

outstanding grasp of, since they observe the heaven unhindered onaccount of the purity of the air, and they preserve things of old in theirmemory on account of their being destroyed neither by flood nor byfire.428

Iamblichus says that the Assyrians did not merely make observations30

over twenty-seven thousand years, as Hipparchus records, but have also101

424 The reference to his attempts at calculation at 22b2–3 are supposed to indicate hisinterest in cycles, though the actual cyclicity of nature is introduced by the priests at22c.

425 This would usually signify an Orphic reference, but it does not seem to be verse and isnot given in Kern.

426 Tentatively accepting Festugiere’s ��2�� for the meaningless MS readings�6��2�� or D��2��. One might also consider 8��2��.

427 Republic 509c9 is quoted.428 While it seems strange that the Egyptians, whose floods were famed far and wide, are

thought immune from the kind of floods that can wipe out peoples elsewhere, this isto be found at Timaeus 22e, and credited to the absence of precipitation.

194

Atlantis

handed down by memory the total times for return to square one429

and for the revolutions of the seven planets that control the cosmos.One is very far from being able to compare this with the much-vaunted‘archaeology’ of the Greeks. From this it is clear that the narration thatwe are dealing with ought not to be looking to minor matters, but to the 5

universal and the whole.Different Greeks have different versions of ancient history. Whereas

for the Athenians it goes back to Erichthonius the ‘autochthonous’,for the Argives it reaches to Phoroneus and Niobe, because these arethe most ancient among the Greeks, Argus being from Niobe, andfrom him Iasus and Pelasgus, while Argos is called ‘Pelasgian’ from 10

this latter. The stories about Deucalion and Pyrrha, that they weresaved on Parnassus when there was a flood, and that they relocatedand established the human race, are common knowledge – as is thefact that the Thessalians trace their ancestry to them. In some ver-sions the Argive race begins with Inachus, and the Athenian with 15

Cecrops, both of whom precede Deucalion.430 So Solon, by recount-ing this kind of story, induced the Egyptian priests to narrate whatthey see as ancient history. We shall observe431 what one of theelderly priests said in response, and that will become clear through 20

what follows. Solon met at Sais a priest called Pateneıt, at Heliopo-lis Ochaapi, and in Sebennytos Ethemon, according to the records ofthe Egyptians.432 Perhaps that was this Saitic priest who told him whatfollows.

Was the priest’s reply an insult?

O Solon, Solon, you Greeks are always children; there is no such thing 102as an elderly Greek. (22b4–5)

429 The apokatastasis in which all planets return to a starting point, fundamental to thetheory of a ‘great year’.

430 No Dorian race is included since the Dorian arrival was later. Festugiere points outthat neither Erichthonius nor Phoroneus, being born from the seed of Hephaestus andfrom the river Inachus respectively (Paus. 2.15), had human ancestors, and thus theymark points beyond which the history of the Athenians and Argives cannot be traced.Likewise Deucalion is the son of the Titan Prometheus, Pyrrha the daughter of hisbrother Epimetheus. Since the genealogy of the Greek ancestors had been a popularsubject amongst Greek writers, Proclus would have had no shortage of possible sourceswith which to flesh out the Platonic text. What may be of interest is his decision toinclude the Athenian material to which Plato does not allude.

431 Reading (�+�$(� for (�+E$(� at 101.18.432 Seemingly dependent upon Plut. Solon 26.

195


The priest is elderly,433 so that he may avoid being rude in his criticisms,and so that he may have reasonable grounds434 for expounding ancienthistory. He does not employ repetition of the name of the addressee5

solely to strive to give extra force to what he is going to say, but also togive an indication of revolution back to the same point of origin. Thisis grasped in a stable and intellective manner through their indeliblecognition by the more general causes of what arises in the universe,causes to which the priest corresponds. He accuses the Greeks of being10

always children, because, instead of pursuing the multi-faceted wisdomof the Egyptians, the majority of them ‘carried the slavish cut in theirsouls’.435 Alternatively, because of the continuity of the cycle of mass15

destruction that afflicts them, and before the present generation canbecome old they become young again through mass destruction. Oragain, because [the memory of] ancient deeds is not preserved amongthem, whereas their cognition is always of the present and of as much assensation sets before them. By contrast, the past too is always fresh in thememory of the Egyptians, and memory is preserved through historical20

inquiry, while this latter is preserved as a result of the pillars on whichthey record unexpected and remarkable things, whether in achievementsor in discoveries.

‘But why’, people say, ‘did this priest rudely rebuke him? What is sowonderful about the knowledge of the past? “Much learning does notbreed intelligence”, as the noble Heraclitus says. Even if what Eudoxus25

says is true, that the Egyptians called the month a “year”, the count-ing of this many years would not involve anything remarkable. So theEgyptian’s pride in these things is superfluous.’ Indeed it is impossible

433 Part of a few words (22b3–4) that do not feature in the lemma. It is almost as if Proclushad forgotten these when he speaks at 101.18–19 as if going straight on to the contentof the speech, and then checks himself, and remembers to include comment on theidentity of the unnamed elderly priest.

434 Proclus interestingly uses the phrase 6�F� 7�� that usually applies to the account ofthe world given by Timaeus. This passage, in explaining a peripheral feature of thestory in accordance with what is morally appropriate, accords with the standard tacticof Porphyry in the prologue, though Porphyry does of course give a deeper explanationof the Atlantis story itself.

435 The reference is to Alcibiades I, 120b2–3, where in my view it is implied that thisis a saying that was a popular one among women. However, Denyer (2001), 168–9,speculates that the reference to women is related to the fact that a woman’s accent is tobe imitated at this point, referring to the notion of a hair-cut in the soul as ‘bizarre’, andcomparing the plumage of the soul at Phdr. 246c. Yet it would make good sense thatwomen, always ready to criticize cowardice etc., should have referred to alleged slavishtraits of character in males as the equivalent of the short haircut which was normallythe mark of a slave, but could be more quickly outgrown. The metaphor is used in theAlcibiades to indicate the lack of subtlety found in people who turn to politics with noskills for the job.

196

Atlantis

that either memories or sensations should be productive of knowledge, 30

as Aristotle asserts, but one should grant that they nevertheless con-tribute to the recollection of universals.436 For when we tell more andmore similar stories, we display the single form that covers them, and 103when in lots of cases we discover from history how their paths backto square one are in accord, we are on the path back to their singlecause. Philip’s observations of atmospheric phenomena437 were consol-idated in the same way, as were the discoveries of the heavenly motions 5

through astronomy. Let that be the reply from us too to that person’sdifficulty.438

Seniority and youth as universal symbols

We should retrace our steps to the study of the universe, and consider inthat context the new creation that is controlled by Athena and broughtto fullness by the older and first-born causes. It is from there that this 10

[creation-process] has its stability and transcendence, and contributes tothe cosmic rivalry. For everything belonging to this creational processionthat becomes divided and multiplied proceeds as a result of that cause.Given that there are [two sets of] causes in the cosmos, one that is pro- 15

ductive of cyclic rebirth, and another that is protective of the constant

436 The theory of recollection from Plato’s Phaedo is now grafted onto an essentially Aris-totelian theory about the centrality of such empirically discovered universals to allscience, for which see Metaph. 1003a13ff., 1059b24ff., 1060b19ff. While the place ofempirically formed universals had long been acknowledged in Platonism, the interest-ing thing about this passage (and 123.29–124.4 below) is how ‘recollection’ takes onesimply to an empirical concept, but this discovery nevertheless sets one on the road tothe discovery of a transcendent cause. Hence there remains a parallel with the Phaedo,where ‘recollection’ is linked with the Ideas (75c–d, 76d–e), and the Ideas are seen ascauses of related particulars being such as they are (100b ff.).

437 Philip of Opus, usually seen as the author of the Epinomis, is otherwise known to havebeen engaged in studies of such topics as lightning and the rainbow (Dillon 2003, 181with n.11), this latter phenomenon being mentioned in Alex. Aphr. in Mete. 151.31 ff.

438 This indicates that the objection given at 102.22ff. came from another interpreter, whohad assumed that the prologue ought to be offering paradigms of ethical behaviour.The difficulty exists only if there is some obligation on Plato’s part to idealize theEgyptians. The solution also would itself seem to be concerned to give the Egyptiansa legitimate pride in their pursuits; hence it may be that this is presenting what hadonce been Porphyry’s response to Longinus (hence Proclus’ ‘from us too’). Longinusis associated with such difficulties (aporiai) at 51.9, 63.24, 66.15, and 83.19 above (frs.27, 29, 30, and 32; cf. below at 162.16 = fr. 36). The problem in that case would be thatLonginus is known to have habitually declined to tackle the whole passage from 20c4until 27a2, regarding the Atlantis story as superfluous. Even so fragments 32–36 allcome from this passage. Perhaps Porphyry himself had encouraged Longinus to givehis views on elements of the Atlantis story. Hence 204.20 below (= fr. 37) specificallypoints to Longinus’ usual practice.

197


integrity of the creative principles, the priest has been adopted as anal-ogous to these latter causes, and Solon to the former. Hence too theone gives evidence that exceptional memory of antiquity exists in hispeople, while the other is said to relate various stories of change, gen-20

eration, and destruction. That the elder should be given priority overthe younger also seems to me439 to have been adopted in a manner thatfits the organization of the universe. That is the relation to each otherthat things have in the creation-cycle of Zeus: those who are said to liveunder the cycle of Kronos are said to travel from older, as the Eleatic25

Stranger says, to younger, while those under [the cycle of] Zeus go inthe opposite direction.440 Here too (34bc) Timaeus will say about thesoul that the Demiurge introduced soul to be older than the body, andon this account gave it greater seniority. So in this case the priest whois protector of the divine laws441 lays claim to precedence in virtue of30

antiquity, even though the younger comes from a higher rank, insofaras Solon has also come from a city more closely connected with Athena.On the cosmic level the older works have great import.

‘You are young in your souls’, he said; ‘for you have in them no old104opinion stemming from ancient oral tradition, nor any learning grey-haired with time.’ (22b6–8)

These things also have their analogue in that [higher] realm. The youthof their souls is analogous to the rejuvenation of life and the more partial5

causes, while the ancient oral tradition is analogous to stable intellec-tion and the older causes. The grey-haired learning is analogous to theunified and ever-identical content of the nature and constitution of allthings in the cosmos, thanks to which the primary and most divine encos-mic things embrace in a universal and transcendent manner the causes10

of all that comes to be, and have a prior grasp of things in time, whilethe things closer to the totality do so in a partial and less exalted fashionbecause they fall short of the unitary intellection of wholes. Hence tosome of the gods the grey-haired quality has been deemed appropriate,and youthfulness to others. That is because the grey hair is a symbolof intellection and of a life that is immaculate and far from generation,15

while youth is a symbol of a more partial cognition that already involvescontact with things generated.

439 On the first person singular see on 108.20 below.440 A reference to the popular myth of the Statesman, that accounts for the majority of uses

of that dialogue in late antiquity; see 270c–272d.441 There is a correspondence with the causes that are ‘protective of the constant integrity

of the creative principles’ at 103.15–16.

198

Atlantis

Cyclic processes of generation and destruction

The reason for this is as follows: there have been, and will continue tobe, many losses of people’s lives in many circumstances, the greatest byfire and water, though other slower losses occur by countless other 20

means.442 (22b8-c3)

The discourse is asking why the Greeks are always children, and thereis no learning grey-haired with time among them. Or, if you prefer,it is studying443 the paradigms of these things, the reason why the new 25

creation-process controls the variety of things that come to be, as thingsthat grow old are for ever coming to be and getting renewed. But beforeit discovers the cause behind these problems, it first runs through thematter of the cycles in the totality, and demonstrates their variety – avariety that the first orders of the gods have a prior grasp of in secureand united fashion, while the second [orders] do so partially and in the 30

course of touching the nature of the things that they manage. For this 105latter [process] is cognition of what’s present at any given moment, whilethe former is the apprehension through memory of what is absent too.

What then are the cycles of things in the cosmos? One must indeedpostulate that there is always generation and always destruction in the 5

totality. For that which is perceptible is ‘coming to be and passing away,but never really real’.444 But this generation and destruction must bepostulated445 in one way for the heaven and in another for materialthings. In the former realm the motion and the change of figure is fixedbeforehand, and it is because of those changes that generation is governed 10

and turns back upon its proper cycle. But in the latter cycle now someelements and now others gain the upper hand.

And wholes preserve the same or a similar order in conformity withnature, whereas in various parts the natural and the unnatural arise atvarious times. For it is necessary446 that either both wholes and parts are 15

constantly in a natural state, or both are sometimes contrary to nature, orthe one group is contrary and the other in accord: and this last in one of

442 Note that this is the first lemma to generate extensive discussion without involvingearlier interpreters.

443 Reading (��; rather than (E��. I do not see why the sequence of third personsingulars should be broken by an imperative.

444 See 28a, perhaps the best known of all passages from the Timaeus in antiquity.445 Reading (�2� (C) with Festugiere (as also at 105.5) rather than (��2� (NP) with

Diehl.446 At 105.15, I follow Festugiere, who favours Praechter’s neat correction �2�� over

Diehl’s �� <"�>.

199


two ways.447 If everything is in its natural state, the variety of generationis lost, and eternal things are the last of realities to arise and the firstthings are last of all.448 If everything is arranged contrary to nature, there20

will be nothing stable enough to provide for any constancy in thingsthat change, and the cycle of generation will not be preserved. Thatwholes should be contrary to nature, and parts in accord, is problematic,since the parts take their lead from the wholes, and wholes are such as25

to embrace the parts. Hence if the former were contrary to nature itwould be impossible for the latter to remain in the natural state. Forneither449 is it possible, if this living animal of our own is totally alteredand loses its own order, that any of its parts could still be in the naturalstate. It remains therefore that, while the wholes are firmly fixed in30

the natural state, the parts are at one time in the natural condition,following the wholes, and at another time tend towards an unnaturalstate.

Just as, of the partial living things, each is always being subjectedto generation and destruction450 on account of the outflow of materialsubstances, or rather the one is more in generation than another, and106one is more in destruction than another, and one is readier for beingand another for destruction, so, while each of the regions of the earthadmit both, some are more able to stay in the natural state, while othersvariously endure deviations away from the natural state. This may be (i)5

because of their different climate; and then again (ii) because of theirlocation being different from the others; and further (iii) because oftheir relation to the heaven, with different parts being in conjunctionwith different parts of the heaven and being preserved by the differentfigures;451 and besides all that’s been said (iv) because of the power of10

447 Presumably (with Festugiere) either wholes accord and parts are contrary, or vice versa.448 Since passing away involves a movement away from the natural state, the absence of

deviation from that state will entail the eternity of all that exists, so that you will haveno further orders of things beyond the imperishable ones.

449 I follow Praechter’s correction ��! for Diehl’s ��!.450 The view that movements towards and away from the natural state can be seen in terms

of generation and destruction appears explicitly in Plato’s Philebus 54a–55a (cf. AristotleEN 7.11 and 10.3), though Plato distances himself somewhat from this view. However,the replacement of what is lost by new generation in both living bodies and souls is aprominent theme at the climax of the Symposium (207d–208b), and it may be that whichProclus has in mind here.

451 The term +�5$� is here translated in its basic sense, though it is important to realisethat these figure are patterns of cyclic motion, and that the word can mean ‘phases’in the context of astronomy (LSJ 8b); there may also be a hint of the resemblance todance figures (LSJ 7).

200

Atlantis

their overseers452 and of the gods in control of climate who have as theirlot this or that characteristic, some delighting more in motion, some inrest, some in sameness, and some in difference.453

Well, while total and partial cases of destruction occur in this placeor that, the species in the whole universe continue undiminished. There 15

will always be humans, always earth, and always each of the elements.Since destruction and birth occur as a result of the heavenly figures,and these are enactments (mimemata) of the divine intellections, whilethese intellections are dependent upon the intellective forms, so454 it isfrom there that the stability has come, that the security of the species 20

within the cosmos arises, and that the visible heavenly figures are ableto preserve the species while destroying their parts – for destruction toomust come around to those things that are born in time.455 The All doesnot begrudge the preservation of as many things as are able to coexistwith the All, but it is impossible that what is unable to conform with the 25

constitution of the All should endure within the All. The law of Zeusbanishes everything like that from being as if it had lost its civic rights.456

For while remaining without rights it is altogether unable to exist, andwhat is altogether deprived of order is without rights.

The reason for both total and partial cases of destruction occurring 30

in this or that locality has been stated, but we should now say why thegreatest instances of destruction occur through the ambitions457 of fireor water, but not of the other elements. Fire, you see, has a vigorousand productive role among the elements, it has the capacity to pass 107through all the others, and is of such a nature as to divide the others.

452 Such as Athena and Hephaestus in the case of ancient Athens (Critias 109c), and Posei-don in the case of Atlantis (113c).

453 The two pairs of opposites involved in the construction of soul at 35a.454 Read �� with Schneider and Festugiere rather than � with Diehl and the MSS at

106.19.455 The principle that everything created is destructible is clearly to be found in the text

of the Timaeus itself (41a, cf. 38c), though the continued will of the creator for thepreservation of what is well constituted explains the ongoing nature of the world itselfand its gods. Obviously Aristotle had difficulties with the notion that anything could besubject to generation and destruction, yet in fact never destroyed, for which reason hecriticizes the notion of a created universe in the Timaeus (see Introduction p. 26). Themajority of ancient Platonists, who deny that creation is taken seriously in the Timaeus,escape his criticism. On 38b–c Archer-Hind (1888), 122–3, quotes in Tim. 3.30.1–20,where Proclus holds that Plato is demonstrating clearly that the heaven is ungeneratedand indestructible.

456 The metaphors of city life continue to be applied to the life of the universe.457 The word is the moral term pleonexia, often translated ‘greed’ elsewhere. The use of it

suggests that elements too are able to indulge in hubristic conduct by exceeding theirmeasures – cf. Heraclitus B94 etc.

201


Water is easier to move than earth, but less easily affected than air. Byits ease of movement it is able to act, and by its resistance to affec-tion it can avoid succumbing to duress or weakening by dissipation like5

air.Consequently it is to be expected from this that violent and extreme

cases of destruction bring about inundations and conflagrations. Youcould also claim that the remaining two elements belong more naturallyto ourselves. The fact that we are pedestrians links us naturally withearth, while our being surrounded on all sides by air, and living in air10

and breathing it, demonstrates the natural affinity of our own bodies toit. So these things, being somehow more natural to us, are less destructivefor us, while the others, having the opposite properties to those, bringon more violent cases of destruction.

Furthermore these elements, earth and air, seem in another way tooto be operating upon us in conjunction with their being themselves15

affected before we are. It is when air undergoes putrefaction that it causesplagues,458 and when earth is split that it causes widespread entomb-ments.459 But (i) the plague is an affection of air, and (ii) earthquakesand [the formations of] chasms are affections of earth. Yet fire and waterare able to act upon us without themselves experiencing prior affection,the one by submerging us, and the other by exerting pressure from the20

outside. Hence these two work more widespread destruction, becausethey are stronger than those – as they are unaffected in the destruction-process. So these are the greatest [forces of] destruction, inundationsand conflagrations, while famines, plagues, earthquakes, wars, and othercomparable partial affections460 could come about for other reasons25

too.Of all of these things you could say that the cause is the motion of

the heavenly bodies and the general order of the All, and prior to thisthe new creation that is always making something new, and brings onthe occurrence of different things at different times. That is what themyths of the Greeks say, and it is also what the tradition of the Egyptians30

458 Cf., with Festugiere, Theophr. at Diels, Dox.Gr. 487.20. The link between air qualityand health is of course important in ancient medicine, including the Hippocratic tractAirs, Waters, Places.

459 Festugiere gives ‘des goulets serres l’un contre l’autre’, then gives the Greek below asif to indicate uncertainty. Literally the phrase means ‘closely connected swallowings’or similar, but in this context it must be concerned with multiple human deaths (ona similar scale to fire, flood, and plague) for which the element of earth can be heldresponsible. That kind of death would most naturally occur by earthquake in Greece.And it would not be unnatural to think of many earthquake deaths, whether involvingthe opening of ravines or landslides, as the earth swallowing up people.

460 I.e. they occur locally.

202

Atlantis

indicates when it says of the sun in mystical fashion that it undergoes 108various changes of shape in the signs of the zodiac.

Thus it is nothing remarkable that, while many cases of destructionoccur in many places, there is always a human race and always everyother species, because of the unerring procession of the divine forms.It is on account of them that the formal principles in the universe are 5

always fixed in the same condition – for everything that arises from anunmoved cause is constantly linked with its own particular cause.461

Introduction of, and various approaches to, the myth of Phaethon

Take the story that’s told in your country, that once upon a timePhaethon, the son of Helios, yoked up his father’s chariot, and then, 10

because of his inability to steer his father’s course, burnt up things onearth and perished himself in a bolt of fire. The telling of this takes theshape of a myth . . . (22c3–7)

It is quite obvious that the very first principles of existent things embracethings moving in static fashion, things multiplied in singular fashion, 15

things partial in total fashion, and things divided in time in eternal fash-ion. And it is a familiar fact that the theologians trace back the causesof the cycles, of the descent and ascent of souls, and of all pluralizedand divided life, to the [forces] positioned immediately above the world.Hence the account (logos) seems to me462 now too to be tracing the myth 20

of Phaethon back to the Greeks and to Solon’s recognition that463 allsuch generations and destructions are accomplished as a result of thenew creation – the creation from which is accomplished both the cycleof words (logoi) and the variety of physical and psychical cycles.464 For 25

461 Though ‘dependent on’ rather than ‘linked with’ would be the normal translation, thatdoes not capture the everlasting nature of what has one eternal cause. Editors pointout that Proclan doctrine here conforms closely with ET. 76.

462 Proclus uses the first person singular sparingly, generally with the intention of express-ing a strong personal feeling. Since the prologue (1.8, 6.21, 9.15), where personal viewsmight be expected, this has occurred at 20.11–12, 23.4, 49.23, 62.14, 64.11–27, 76.29,77.24, 87.3 and 103.20. Its use here accords with the general impression that there hadbeen very little detailed discussion of these parts of the dialogue before Proclus.

463 Festugiere interprets the B�� as ‘because’ rather than ‘that’; I assume this to be a refer-ence to the latent recollectable knowledge referred to at 108.29.

464 I offer this translation with some hesitation. Festugiere takes the reference to logoi at108.24 to be referring to the seminal principles so often referred to by that word in thistreatise. But with a lemma that concerns myths, which were also thought of as cycles(LSJ s.v. ��7�� II.11, cf. s.v. ��72� II.4, ��7�� II) it seems to me necessary to takethe word here in a verbal sense, contrasting this with the physical and psychical cycles(on which Festugiere aptly compares 95.23–7 and 104.24–6). Given the reference to‘constant integrity of the creative principles’ at 103.15–16, as well as the statement that

203


just as, while they remain among things divine, perfection reaches thesecond from the first, so too the Egyptian, preserving the story as toldamong Greeks, uses this to teach Solon of things he has prior knowledgeof.465

So what riddling message does this account offer? It [signifies] that30

both psychical life and the nature of bodies involve a variety of changes,and that they are controlled by the hypercosmic powers,466 while beingconserved also by the intelligible orders of gods. That the phenomenon109is related among the Greeks is a symbol of the former, but that the priesttracks down the meaning of the story, and unveils for Solon what isrevealed by it, is a symbol of the latter. Let this be what we say for the5

sake of our study-passage (theoria)467 as a whole, as this too would notbe out of tune with the overall purpose.

The myth of Phaethon, however, involves detailed study of variouskinds, for one should first of all treat it from the historical point ofview, secondly from the physical one, then from the philosophic one.468

The narrative asserts that Phaethon, the son of Helios469 and Clymene10

daughter of Ocean, veered off course when driving his father’s chariot,and Zeus, in fear for the All, struck him with a thunderbolt. Being struck,he fell down upon Eridanus, where the fire coming from him, fuellingitself on the ground, set everything alight. Upon his fall, his sisters, the15

Heliades, went into mourning. Such is the account from the historicalperspective. It is a basic requirement that the conflagration should havehappened (for that is the reason for the story’s being told), and thatthe reason given for it should be neither impossible nor anything thatcould easily occur. It will be a case of the impossible if anybody shouldthink that Helios sometimes drives the chariot that belongs to him, and20

at other times changes his tune,470 stands aside, and entrusts his ownproper task to another. It will be a case of what could easily arise ifsomebody postulated that this ‘Phaethon’ was a comet, which produced

‘the formal principles in the universe are always fixed in the same condition’ at 108.5–6,I have problems with the idea that there can be an anakyklesis of such logoi here.

465 Festugiere notes that Solon is analogous to the second, and the Egyptian to the first.Note the passing application here of the Platonic theory of recollection.

466 Presumably this should be connected with ‘the [forces] . . . immediately above theworld’ (108.17).

467 This seems not to be a theoria as opposed to a lexis, for the theoria will continue. Ratherit is a general approach to the lemma that precedes material specific to individualapproaches.

468 Note that ‘philosophic’ here is virtually the equivalent of ‘theological’.469 The divinity Helios is simply a personification of the Sun, which is itself called by the

same name.470 It is of course the notion that a god can change that is thought impossible.

204

Atlantis

an unbearable heat when breaking up. At any rate, Porphyry471 says that 25

people used to take the movement of comets for signs, of storms if itoccurred toward the south, of heat to the north, of plague to the east,and of prosperity to the west (and they called the disappearance of thecomet a thunderbolt): as if the concurrence of these things was quitefamiliar. A great deal has been said by the physicists about comets. 30

If one should be giving the myth more of a physical solution, it is betterto follow my companion Domninus’ approach to interpretation.472 [He 110says] that such a compilation of dry exhalation arises at times473 that itcan easily be ignited by the heat of the sun, and, when this is ignited,it is not at all surprising that it sets alight all the underlying region of 5

the earth. By setting it alight it produces just the kind of conflagrationthat the myth speaks of, and after doing so it is quenched and becomesundetectable. That the igniting force comes from the sun is the reasonfor Phaethon being called the son of Helios by the myth-makers, andhe is male on account of the vigorous nature of the power of fire. For 10

they habitually call fire itself male too, just as earth is female, this latterbeing matter, and the former form.474 The fact that this exhalation didnot occur on the same latitude as the sun is why they say that he didnot drive the chariot along the course of his father. The dissolution 15

of the cloud near the earth [accounts for] the fall of Phaethon, and itsbeing extinguished [accounts for] the thunderbolt from Zeus, while abarrage of rain upon it – for this too happens after great conflagrations –[accounts for] the mourning of his sisters (who are wet exhalations),475

in as much as mourners pour forth moisture. And the exhalations, both 20

the dry and the wet, have in the sun a single cause, but one belongs tothe male and the other to the female. So these ways of explaining thingsare more physical.

But the myth could be saying something loftier. Individual souls haveproceeded from the father of the universe, and have been sown in theregion of the encosmic gods, so that they should not be intellective 25

alone, keeping in contact with the intelligibles and rising above bodies.

471 = in Tim. fr. XII Sodano.472 Domninus is known also from 1.122.18, from Marinus VProc. 26, and from the Suda

(see Damasc. Philos. Hist. 89–90, Athanassiadi (1999)).473 It seems to me that Festugiere’s attempt to have Domninus say this happened only once

is mistaken. This present infinitive (and 1@* �+(�� 110.3) should not be ignored, andthe closely connected aorist infinitives are aorist for aspectual reasons, indications ofdefinite events within a sequence. The key factor is that Domninus is clearly interestedin all sequences of events of this type, as can be seen from 110.17–18 below.

474 Neither the term for fire nor that for form is masculine in gender in Greek, thoughthe Stoics had of course seen fire as the manifestation of Zeus.

475 While Diehl deletes the words �) .��) ��(�$�*+�, I prefer to alter �) to ��+).

205


They should also have an encosmic basis, just as the divine and daemonicsouls were enlisted under secondary leaders, some beneath the divinity ofEarth, others under the Moon, others under Helios, others under Zeus,30

and other under the leadership of Ares. And [note that] what is sownalways acquires something extra from the nature of what it’s been sownin, seeds sown in earth from the earth, seeds sown in an animal from that111animal’s natural characteristics. Consequently with offspring too sometake on the special character of the locality and others the likeness ofthe mother. Because of this, souls too, when they are sown in the regionof their associated stars, receive a special type of life from their leadersthemselves, so that each is not only soul, but a given kind of soul, for5

example Areic, Jovian,476 or Lunar. Whether the god is unresponsive[to the world of generation], or a demiurge or a life-generator,477 somereflection of the special character of the one they have been allocatedto extends to all the souls ranked beneath it. That is hardly surprising,10

when the special character of the presiding gods has reached down evenas far as types of grass and stone – and there is grass and stone dependenton the power of the sun, whether you care to call them ‘heliotrope’or by any other name.478 It’s much the same in the case of othergods.

Of these souls, then, some remain immaculate, always linked with15

their special gods and assisting their governance of the All; others dodescend into generation, but they are workers of greatness who remainundamaged; others descend and are filled with the vice of producinggeneration, and take on something of the character of things governed.For this is the final type of life. So the first are genuine children of20

the gods, because of their <purity and> their inseparability from theirfathers, as if they had been born within them and remained inside, chil-dren who escort their gods, with the rank of bodyguards or possiblyof attendants. The middle rank are called children of the gods, but theytake on the second life in addition and become children of human beings25

476 As this deals with planets, I have thought it best to preserve something of the Latinnames that we use of the planets.

477 Festugiere translates the first as simply ‘transcendent’, but that is not specific enough.Whereas demiurgic and generative activity must at some stage be directed downwardsto this world of ours, the highest divinities never turn towards us. A demiurge may,like that of Numenius (fr. 12.20; cf. also aperioptos at 11.18), turn now one way nowanother, which recalls the helmsman of Statesman 272e5. This figure is of course seenin Proclus too as another Platonic depiction of the demiurge; see 288.14–16 (wherehis phases are important), 315.23–4 etc.

478 This is a reference to the plant heliotrope (which follows the sun) and bloodstone, astone which has a red streak and was thought to have special powers (LSJ I.1 and III).

206

Atlantis

too. The <third> are called children of the gods, but not legitimateones, on the grounds that they have not preserved the form of theirspecial god; they have inclined to earth and experience forgetfulness oftheir proper fathers. So whether the myth-makers say that Tityus is theson of Earth or that Phaethon is the son of Helios, or that Musaeus isthe son of the Moon or some other god, they are calling them children 112in this sense – while they call others [children] in a different sense forthe reasons stated.

With the others we deal elsewhere; Phaethon, however, is the sonof Helios in the sense that he belongs to the Helian chain – hence hisHelian name.479 As long as he stayed on high, went circling round with 5

his father, and shared with him the management of the All, he has beensaid to drive the chariot of his father. Indeed that is because the vehicle480

of Phaethon is one of the Helian chariots. For that too is entirely Sun-like. But when he veered towards generation (for he was not one of thefirst souls) he is said to have been struck by the thunderbolt of Zeus.That’s because the thunderbolt is a symbol of creation, because, without 10

touching them, it passes through all things and preserves them all –not because it is the cause of the destruction of the breath that carriesthe soul.481 There are many transfers of souls from one environment toanother, and from some elements to others, some coming from earth intothe sphere of fire, others from fire to earth, and some in a disciplined 15

way, others suddenly, with a great deal of disturbance and disorderlymotion. That’s the kind of thing they say happened to Phaethon. Afterbeing carried down suddenly from above dragging with him fiery tunics,when he got close to earth, by moving erratically through them482 he 20

set light to certain parts of the earth. For in their descent souls clothethemselves in many tunics, of air or water, though some have fiery ones.For these [souls] the part derived from fire that some have is quite faint,while it is for others intense and with a powerful impact. Some shedit while they are in the air and take on thicker [tunics], others keep 25

479 The name suggests shining or blazing.480 The Neoplatonic doctrine of a soul’s vehicle, connected ultimately with 41e, considered

in relation to the myth of the Phaedrus (248a etc.) which is critical for the doctrine ofgods and their followers found in our present passage.

481 Presumably an earlier theory about the meaning of the Phaethon myth.482 The text is highly dubious. MSS read ��/ �� G�7��)� ��$��, and Festugiere

keeps the first three words, changing the last to D��$��, translating ‘alourdi par cesvetements a la maniere d’un Atlas’. But the adverb is very difficult, and the genitive withthe preposition perhaps unexpected. I prefer to assume that the demonstrative pointsforwards to the parts ($2��) of the earth, and that the adverb should be 7��)�,formed from a well-attested adjective.

207


them in use all the way to earth. I know that Plutarch of Chaeronea483

tells the story that, on one of the little islands around Britain – one thatis reputed to be holy and inviolate, and has for this reason been leftalone by those in power – there often occur disturbances of the air andthe unleashing of either downpours or thunderbolts. Further [he says113that] the inhabitants who are used to such happenings say that one ofthe superior powers has passed on, meaning by ‘superior ones’ souls thatare experiencing a change of bodies and are leaving one life-form. Allthe same one should not dismiss the idea that such things occur alsowhen souls descend into bodies, especially in the case of those who are5

workers of greatness and have received a daemonic lot, such as this mythriddlingly suggests was the case with Phaethon’s soul.

It would not be at all surprising that souls in descent should be moreinvolved in the affections of those elements that correspond to the godsthat preside over them, and attract and clothe themselves in more tunics10

of those elements. So the result would be that Saturnian souls rejoicemore in the humid and damp ones, while the Helian ones rejoice inthe fiery ones, each type preferring bodies with weight and matter toimmaterial ones. And that the gods should use these souls, as they also usematter-bound daemons, as tools for their operations on earth, and that15

through these they should effect conflagrations or plague or various othersufferings for those who deserve to suffer them. And that they shoulduse those souls that are related to the heavenly causes of generation asassistants in whatever tasks they undertake. That there should be manycauses of the same events is not surprising, when some are acting in one20

capacity, others in another.484

So when Phaethon was carried close to earth and, in some daemonicway, ignited by his fiery trail those regions to which he drew near (forindividual souls also do many things when outside the body, as tools ofthe avenging or purifying daemons), he was mourned by the Heliades,25

a group of Helian souls, as a result of which they were also called thesisters of Phaethon. They mourn him not simply because they feel pityat his descent to generation, but also out of concern for how he mightkeep immaculate his care for things that come to be and pass away.For the River Eridanus and his fall to that region give an indication of30

the transport of the soul to the sea of generation. When it is there, itdepends on the forethought of families who are related to him and the114

483 De Defectu 419e ff., as opposed to the passage of the De Facie (941 ff.) referred to byDiehl, where islands off Britain are also mentioned.

484 I assume that this appeals to the distinction between types of cause, and in particularbetween true causes and auxiliary causes.

208

Atlantis

assistance of souls who have stayed behind. The theologians also signifythe concern of Helios through the tears:

Your tears are the much-enduring race of men.485 5

Therefore it is probable that the myth about the Helian souls signalledtheir concern towards Phaethon through their tears. So again a supple-mentary lesson486 should be drawn from this myth too, that the descentof souls is accomplished through a lack of power – for Phaethon too 10

wants to drive the chariot of Helios, but he is unable to do so and fallson account of this lack of power. And that it is not only the souls butalso their vehicles that come to share in the distinctive character of theirleading gods, with the result that it is also from them that they get theirnames, some Helian, some Areic, and the rest from one of the other 15

gods. And that even destructions are accomplished in accordance withthe providence of the gods – for it is actually Zeus who is responsible forthe conflagration, because he hurled his thunderbolt at Phaethon. Andthat the descents of the souls are [all] linked to the one creation-process,for which reason Timaeus too will not inform us only about their sub-stance (ousia), but about their ascents and descents, and their lives and 20

choices of all kinds.487

The problem of deviations in the heavens

Whereas its true reference is the deviation from their course of thebodies that circle the earth in the heaven and the destruction of thingsupon the earth in a huge fire that takes place after long intervals oftime. (22c7–d3) 25

The Egyptian has explained only as much of the myth as contributes tohis present purpose, [mentioning] that there occur cases of widespreaddestruction of things on earth through fire on account of the deviationof the bodies encircling the earth in the heaven. What does he meanby deviation? Possibly the lack of alignment, on the part of earthlythings, with those in heaven. For if everything is aligned with the influ- 30

ences emanating from the heaven it can endure, but out of alignment

485 Orphic material = fr. 354 Kern. The ‘your’ is now singular, indicating a single addressee,not a plurality of Helian souls.

486 Or ‘corollary’: a geometrical term. The corollary is in four parts.487 Festugiere explains that a single providence connects all the arrangements made for the

soul, including the cycle of incarnation and the possibility for their choosing inferiorlives; this is not a secondary happening that comes about from powers in conflict withthe creator’s will.

209


it is destroyed. For those things able to survive the divisive power of115Ares are saved, while those things too weak to withstand its operationare easily dissolved. It is like the case of our eyes being blinded andunable to withstand the rays of the sun, even though something else’s eyecould look directly at them without trouble. A similar situation applies5

to the other gods and their configurations. For the world is one livingcreature, and, because its parts mutually interact, it preserves some ofthese through these ones, and others through those. And none of thethings that occur in it are contrary to nature for the All, for what occurswithin it occurs through it, and the cosmos itself is what acts, and the10

object of its action is itself. So either one should say that this is what thedeviation is, rather as a good father, who, though always concernedfor his son, would sometimes actually strike him for his own good,would seem to deviate somewhat from his normal behaviour, or it isthe variations in the configuration of the heavenly ones. These are those15

[beings]488 that circle the earth in the heaven, exhibiting differentfigures at different times on account of variations in the intellections oftheir souls. For their figures are their writings, or a kind of imprint thatoperates because of them.489

But then again both of these [reasons] are true – both the deviationof those [higher] things and the lack of alignment of things in earthlyregions brings on this kind of destruction. If one must also describe the20

fall of Phaethon from the heaven to the earth a deviation of the bodiesthat circle in the heaven, that’s nothing surprising. For the deviationof the heavenly gods themselves is one thing, a change of figure that isimmune to influence, while that of the souls that revolve in their companyis another, their coming-into-relation with earthly things after life free25

of relations, and that affecting earthly places490 is another, a basicallydestructive change. In this sense neither do souls deviate nor, far less, dothe gods that are leaders of souls. So such cases of destruction to earthlythings arise both through partial souls and through isolated daemons.30

Just as, through the latter, a type of destruction appropriate to theirseries results, so also does it in the case of souls. For those which rejoiceabove in shedding light in an immaterial fashion rush into conflagrations116here.

488 Proclus makes the phrase from Timaeus 22d1 masculine, suggesting heavenly godsrather than heavenly bodies.

489 ‘Because of them’ could be referring to either the souls or their intellections. Perhapswe should think of the writer in the soul which represents the decision-making powerat Philebus 39a, and imagine that Proclus is positing a similar function, visible to all, inthe souls of the heavenly gods.

490 The text here, marked as corrupt by Diehl, is defended by Festugiere.

210

Atlantis

The temporal spacing of catastrophic events

But why do cases of widespread destruction occur after long intervalsof time? Is it because many things must coincide so that such a case ofdestruction may occur? [These include] the condition of things beingaffected, both individually and generally; the united tendency491 of theactive causes (for what if something destructive of one thing were salu-5

tary for another?); the suitability of the matter; the preparation of theinstruments; and appropriate timing. This is so even in limited cases ofdestruction, but occurs more rarely in general cases, and with good rea-son. For nature must necessarily progress from the indestructible to theeasily destructible via what is hard to destroy. So if the universe is ever10

indestructible, while more partial things are easily destroyed, it is withgood reason that what lies between the two should be ranked amongthings hard to destroy, waiting to undergo their destruction after longintervals of time. Those things that endure for the entire cosmic cycleare indestructible and imperishable, for there is no configuration able to15

destroy them, since all have been brought on in the course of an entirecycle of the universe, while partial and particular things492 easily admit ofdissolution. But those partial things that are concentrated are dissolvedonly after long intervals of time, but are dissolved nevertheless. Forjust as an individual man has a life, so does a given species or city ortribe, and cycles too:493 in some cases over a longer span, in others over20

a shorter one as Aristotle says.494

Iamblichus criticizes Porphyrian allegorical interpretation

So at those times all those living among the mountains and in high or drylocations are more subject to destruction than those living beside riversor the sea. (22d3–5)

491 Either the term +�$ ��, usually translated here as co-animation and implying a unityof breath or spirit, has lost its full force, or else we should read +�$ ��H�. I have optedfor a bland translation.

492 The term is atomos, but this cannot in this case mean ‘impossible to split’ as in Epicure-anism, where ‘atoms’ are indestructible precisely because of their indivisible nature.Even in Plato, Phaedo 78–80, what is indivisible has an indestructible nature. Henceatomos here might be thought to be the smallest portion into which a species can bedivided, and yet even that does not seem to be quite what Proclus intends, for the over-all division is of physical things, not the tripartition genus–species–particular. Perhapsone should think in terms of everything that cannot be split without destroying the natureof that thing.

493 On the text here see Festugiere, who argues convincingly against Diehl’s exclusion of��, comparing 124.7–9.

494 The reference is apparently to Long. 465a9–10, where the neuter plurals of Proclus’text are better explained. The terms brachyporoteros and makroporoteros also figure inlater books of in Tim., II. 289.18,III. 23.25, 29.26, 93.30.

211


This is likely to happen in cases of observable destruction by fire, for25

those living close to water are protected from damage arising from fire.However, Porphyry the philosopher transfers the story so that it appliesto souls, and he claims that in these as well the spirited element sometimesoverheats, and that such ‘conflagration’ is the destruction of the person117within us.495 Homer496 says of Agamemnon in a temper:

His eyes were like blazing fire.

But when the appetitive element is weakened when flooded by the5

generation-producing moisture497 and is submerged498 in the rivers ofmatter, this too is another sort of ‘death’ for intellective souls, ‘becom-ing damp’ as Heraclitus says. If these matters have been properly dis-tinguished, all those people remain untested499 by the affections thatgo with temper who have their spirited part relaxed and commensu-10

rate with their oversight over secondary things. This is what the hollowplaces close to water signify. On the other hand, those people [remainuntested by the affections] that go with appetite who have their appet-itive part fitter and more alert in the face of matter. This is what thehigh places indicate.500 For the spirited element has a fast-moving and15

vigorous character, while the character of desire is slack and feeble. But

495 = in Tim. fr. XIII Sodano. For Porphyry’s overall stance on Atlantis, in which he inter-prets it as an allegory involving souls and daemons, see 77.6–24 above. I have preservedthe translation ‘conflagration’ for the term ekpyrosis here in spite of its sounding toostrong (because it is usually applied to cosmic events), but have avoided taking hyperzeoas ‘overboil’, since there is no implication of any liquid element in the soul. The phrase‘the person within us’ has already been encountered in a Porphyrian context at 16.16,but does not recur after this. I am unsure whether the phrase ‘the real human being’at 83.3, cited by Festugiere, is exactly comparable.

496 The reference is to Il. 1.104, and the reference to Heraclitus below is to B77; it seemsclear that Porphyry is responsible for the citation of these texts.

497 See note on 77.4 for the association of generation-production with Poseidon, otherwisegod of the sea and of fresh waters. The term ‘generation-producing’ (genesiourgos) isthere associated with Numenius, probably again reported by Porphyry.

498 For baptizesthai in such contexts see also 179.3, where Diehl and Festugiere compareOr. Chald. 114. But such images are natural to Platonism, particularly where the flux ofmatter is highlighted, and Plutarch has an extended image of the better soul’s rationalpart (or intellect or daemon) sitting like a float above the waves, supporting the otherfaculties that are submerged beneath, while inferior souls have even this part draggeddown beneath the surface (Mor. 591d–e).

499 The meaning of apeiratos, found only here and at 156.3, needs to be determinedin the context of this text. The variation on apeiros (A) would seem to be quitedeliberate.

500 It seems that the locations are thought to signify the psychical environment that therational soul (117.7: psychon ton noeron) finds itself in.

212

Atlantis

it is the way of the ‘musical’ man to relax the strong tension of spirit, andto tighten up the poor tuning of the desire.501

The philosopher Iamblichus, however, thinks it right to interpretthese words in relation to natural, not moral philosophy.502 So he says 20

that when a conflagration occurs those who live in the high mountains aremore liable to be destroyed because they are furthest from the exhalationsfrom water, since these do not rise far up because of the weight of theirdamp nature. Hence the air that surrounds them is not moisture-laden,but dry, and it provides fuel for the fire as it rises naturally upwards. But 25

when inundations occur, on the other hand, those who live in the hollowsare more liable to destruction, since all heavy things are naturally carrieddownwards.

Brief discussion of the theological implications of two more passages503

But in our case the Nile, our saviour in other respects, saves us then tooby its release from this difficulty. (22d5–6)

The observable fact is that the Nile is responsible for a great variety of 118blessings for the Egyptians. It is responsible for geometry, arithmetic,physical inquiry, the growing of fruit of course, and their escaping con-flagrations. Not only is its water able to preserve their bodies, but the 5

divinity that maintains it is able to lift up their souls. You may graspfrom this that the primary causes, which are also full of life and of gen-erative power, not only maintain themselves and endure eternally, butalso grant to those other things that are scattered in flux a right to that 10

maintenance [that derives] from themselves. It seems to me also thatthe name of Saviour reflects divine and transcendent providence, fromwhich even among the gods the gift of maintenance shines out upon allthe intellective and demiurgic causes.

501 Still printed as Porphyry (fr. XIII) by Sodano. The influence of Republic 410c–412a,where there is much talk of achieving the correct ‘musical’ balance in the soul, partic-ularly with regard to its spirited part, is obvious; one may suspect also the influence ofSymp. 187a–c, which provides a link with Heraclitus once more.

502 Iamblichus in Tim. fr. 12 Dillon. The appeal to Porphyry’s habit of mining prologuesfor moral messages seems misplaced here, since any ethics in Porphyry’s explanationseems subordinate to his cosmic psychology.

503 Full discussion of the term ‘release’ in the present lemma is delayed until 199.20; I havesought a translation of the participle 7��$�� that preserves some of the ambiguity thatthe differing interpretations of Porphyry and Proclus reflect. The participle may bepassive (‘getting released’), middle in a reflexive sense (‘releasing itself’), or middle ina transitive sense (‘releasing us from the difficulty’).

213


Yet whenever the gods submerge the earth and purge it with water, those15

who live in the mountains, cowherds or shepherds, survive, while thecities in your country are carried out to sea by the rivers. (22d6–e2)

In these cases504 he explicitly connects the efficient cause with the gods,making it legitimate to say the same thing in the case of the conflagra-20

tions too. The one [type of] purgation arises through water, the otherthrough fire, and in every case purity comes to the second things thanksto the first. Hence in Orpheus’ work too505 Zeus is required to bring thepurgatives from Crete, as the theologians usually make Crete stand for25

the intelligible. He connects the flux of matter with that of water, for hemakes each of these to be carried unthinkingly by its own natural incli-nation. Therefore there needs to be something pre-existing that usesthem well and acts for the sake of the good, [a function] that the storyrightly attributes to the gods. Then, if there are certain purifications on a30

universal scale too, there are surely those who preside over these purifica-tions, acting upon the All as purifiers who precede the partial purifiers –119and divine rites, moreover, where some initiate, others are initiated. Andthese things never fail the Whole. Realizing this, the priest also has calledthe cases of destruction by water or fire by the hieratic name ‘purifica-5

tions’, but not ‘destructions’, as he would have said if he were only doingnatural philosophy.

Geographical interlude: the swelling of the Nile

In this country water has never fallen on the fields from above either thenor at any other time; on the contrary, it is all disposed to rise up frombelow. Wherefore, and for which reasons, stories preserved here are the10

most ancient to be told. (22e2–5)

Even if occasional showers should fall across Egypt, they would stillnot be across the whole of it, but are inclined to occur only in LowerEgypt, and this region is evidently the work of the river according toAristotle.506 Upper Egypt receives no rainfall of this kind. So where15

is it that the Nile rises from?507 Porphyry508 declares that there was

504 Or possibly ‘In this passage’. 505 Orph. fr. 156 Kern.506 Mete. 351b29–352a8, where Aristotle makes the river responsible for the silting which

led to the building up of marshes around the Delta. Proclus’ idea here is simply thatthe Delta is not really part of Egypt proper, but an addition that is subject to slightlydifferent conditions.

507 Festugiere’s note on this long-debated topic of natural philosophy is particularly full.Increasing knowledge of these regions in later antiquity meant that the debate hadcontinued to develop.

508 = in Tim. fr. XIV Sodano.

214

Atlantis

an ancient doctrine of the Egyptians that the water spouted up509 frombelow at the rising of the Nile, for which reason they called the Nile‘the sweat of the earth’. That it should rise up from below for Egypt 20

and ‘save us by its release’ (22d6) does not signify that the release ofsnow makes the quantity of water, but that it is released from its ownsource and proceeds into full view when it was previously contained. We,however, shall understand the term ‘release’ as relating to the difficulty.For the statement that the Nile ‘releases’ us from the difficulty is in Attic.It is neither true that the Nile expands because snows are ‘released’ (for 25

where in the tropics, from which it flows, will snow congeal?), nor thatthe parts beneath the earth rise up as [the ground] is rarefied (for the 120rarefaction of the ground does not bestow on water the property ofrising upward, but there must in any case be something to push it outof the caverns into the air above). So much for the Egyptian theory.Others say that the Nile expands as a result of certain rains that flow off 5

into it, something explicitly stated by Eratosthenes. So this is not whatrising up signifies here, its spouting up from somewhere underneath,but rather that the water is increased from another source and flowsabove [the level of] the ground as water dashes down into it from otherplaces. 10

Iamblichus510 says that one should not look for any such meaning, butthat one should understand the water’s rising up from below in a morestraightforward manner, in the same sense as we use ‘swelling’.511 How-ever, when he offers a reason why the Egyptians escape both droughtsand floods, it is clear that he endorses the [theory of] expansion owing 15

to rain. He states that the primary cause512 of the salvation of the Egyp-tians is the will of the gods who have been allocated them and creation’soriginal determination, while the secondary cause is the climate. Forthe seasons are opposite among those who dwell on the opposite side(of the tropics),513 from whose land the Nile flows into our part of the 20

509 We meet here the particularly rare form anablusthaino that also occurs at 120.7 below;it is found also in a scholion on this lemma. Other versions of this verb are similarlyscarce.

510 Fr. 13 Dillon, concluding at 120.21.511 I.e. as flooding; since the term anabasis is little more explicit than epanodos, and still

captures the notion of upward movement, I am reluctant to use any term as explicit asFestugiere’s crue.

512 We have here a different version of the distinction between primary causes and auxiliarycauses encountered already at 2.29–3.4, with the first cause here including a finalelement, and the secondary cause a material element.

513 See Festugiere’s long note. These are separate from the antipodeans, who not only havethe seasons reversed, but also night and day, living diagonally opposite to the worldaround the Mediterranean, rather than due south of it.

215


world, and the times at which drought and rainfall occur among themare reversed.

If somebody514 criticizes this doctrine on the grounds that expand-ing waters that are swollen by rain are without any regular order, weshould mention that though fluctuations515 in [the level of] the Nileoften do occur too, nevertheless the continuity of the rains is the cause of25

the unrelenting expansion of its waters, together with the magnitude ofthe mountain range where the sources of the Nile are located. Whenthese mountains receive the rains from the clouds that are squeezedupon them by the etesian winds, they cause a flow over all their slopesinto the headwaters, and they fill up the river and cause its expansion.For Theophrastus says that this too is one of the causes of rain, the com-121pression of the clouds against some of the mountains. Moreover, it is stillnot at all remarkable that clouds should not be seen in the region of theCatadupa,516 because it is not from these that the Nile first comes, butfrom the Mountains of the Moon, so-called because of their height, andfrom the clouds that are gathered upon them, which bypass the Catadupa5

but cling to those [mountains] as they are higher. This much is our replyto the Egyptian Discourse of Aristides.517

Eratosthenes, though, says that one should no longer even inquireinto the expansion of the Nile, for certain people are actually known tohave come to the sources of the Nile and seen the rains that occur; and10

so Aristotle’s theory is confirmed. So we give this brief overview of thistopic, and it is on this basis that the story of the Egyptians claims thatneither conflagration nor [total] inundation happens to them.15

All the same, it would not be surprising for this to fail,518 if Aristotle519

is right to say that in the infinity of time every part of the earth is turnedto sea, and that the same place happens to be dry land at one time andsea at another. Hence even in the case of the Nile he did not rule outthat the water should fail, having regard for the infinity of time. For20

what if, because the etesian winds were to blow more gently, they did

514 Aristides, as we see at 121.7; the doctrine is therefore that of Eratosthenes rather thanof Iamblichus.

515 Apobasis; I resist Festugiere’s explanation here, when he translates ‘baisses de niveau’(falls in level) on the grounds that the key term in Iamblichus’ explanation is anabasis,applied to the rising level of the Nile, so that this term ought to signify something todo with its rising also. It makes sense that Proclus should be answering Aristides partlywith the counter-claim that the level of the Nile is not quite as regular as is claimed.

516 The First Cataract of the Nile.517 Aelius Aristides 36.23–6, quoted by Festugiere on p. 163 n.1.518 It is remarkable here that Festugiere is content to have Proclus again return to Aristides’

objection, and to translate ekleipein with ‘il y a manque de l’ eau’. The reference is tothe immunity from fire or flood that the Egyptians boast of.

519 Pseudo-Aristotle in the De Mundo 400a6.

216

Atlantis

not push the clouds into that region? What if the mountains againstwhich the clouds gather were to collapse, with that wind, by which theOracle says cities too are destroyed men and all, ripping them fromtheir ground-level locations? Without that wind the river will constantly 25

diminish and come to a halt,520 as it is absorbed by the ground owing toits aridity.

Temperate climate and continuity of human occupation

Yet in fact, in all places where a violent winter or summer does notprevent it, there is constantly a race of humans, sometimes greatersometimes less. (22e5–23c1)

Mention has already been made of the cosmic cycles,521 and of the vari- 122ous deviations,522 [noting] that salvation is possible for the Egyptians asa result of the position of the land and the Nile’s providential care.523

So now he draws a general inference of the following kind about the 5

places of the earth. Every place that is not flooded or consumed by firealways has a race of humans, greater or smaller, left to survive.524 Forthe greatest cases of destruction are through fire and water, as stated ear-lier (22c2). Yet someone might claim that a race of humans could peterout in other ways too, [arguing that] the inhabitants of particular areasof Attica no longer exist, even though there has been neither inundation 10

nor conflagration – rather some terrible act of impiety that has com-pletely obliterated human life.525 Perhaps one should interpret placesas ‘climatic region’, so that he is claiming that every climatic region hasa race of humans unless inundation or conflagration occurs, sometimesmore, sometimes less. But some people could be saved even during 15

an inundation, as Deucalion [was saved] from the climatic region acrossGreece that was inundated. At least, that is the tale that certain peopletell.

But as my companion526 noticed, Plato could claim that every cli-matic region of the earth that is neither too icy nor too oppressively

520 Reading the future $; in place of the present of Diehl and Festugiere.521 For Plato see 22c1–d3, and for the commentary 105.3–12 as well as 116.1–21 (with

Festugiere).522 See now 22d1–3 and 114.25–115.28.523 For the particular conditions that save the Egyptians see 22d5–6, with Proclus’ com-

ments at 118.1–13, where the term ‘providence’ is used in this context at 118.11.524 The verb perileipomai, occurring in Plato at 23c1.525 Festugiere is surely right to think in terms of Christian atrocities against pagans, though

we do not have to follow him in understanding tousde to be referring to the whole ofAttica!

526 Domninus was so described at 109.31.

217


hot always has people, in greater or lesser numbers. For the mathe-20

maticians527 also say that some places are uninhabited on account of anexcess of heat or cold. So every place and every climatic region suitablefor human habitation has a greater or lesser number of people, and thistoo is arguable and in accord with the details of our text, for where25

a violent winter or summer does not prevent it appears to signify‘where an excess of one or the other of the opposites does not preventit’. And overall, since he first said that the tales of the Egyptians arethe oldest (22e5), he had good reason to add that in fact, every climaticregion compatible with human habitation constantly has humans, either123more or less. Indeed not only the mathematicians speak about not everyclimatic region of the earth having humans, but also Orpheus, when hemakes this distinction:

But for men he determined that they5

Should inhabit a seat far removed from the gods, where the Sun’sAxle turns on a moderate approach, and is neither too sharpWith its overhead frost, nor with fire, but between these extremes.528

This is what Plato now said, that where a violent winter or summer10

is not [found] there is a greater or lesser race of humans. But that a lossof memory occurs among other ancient peoples, not because humansdie out, but because, as continual destructive events occur, a variety ofilliterate and uncultured people are left behind. With us,529 however,many very ancient tales are told because of everything being recorded in15

the temples.

The preservation of memory and its universal counterpart

Whatever happens in your country or here or in another place that wehear about, at least if it’s something noble or grand that took place, orwith something special about it, has all been written down from antiquityhere in the temples, and kept safe. (23a1–5)20

Just as both the position of the country and the god who has been allo-cated it provided preservation for the Egyptians, so too, with regardto the preservation of history, firstly they achieve it through theirown diligent study, through which they control the forgetfulness that25

527 The term now generally referred to astrologers, though we are expecting this to be anaspect of geographical theory, but as Festugiere notes, the two could be easily combined,as they had been in Claudius Ptolemaeus.

528 = Orph. fr. 94 Kern.529 Proclus is paraphrasing the words of the Egyptian priests.

218

Atlantis

comes with time; and secondly they are well assisted by the temples intheir midst, upon which they inscribe all great and remarkable deeds,whether their own or belonging to others, and the unexplained resultsof their undertakings – for this is the meaning of or with somethingspecial about it. The historical study of these things contributes to theirrecognition of similar patterns, as a result of which the recollection of 30

universals occurs,530 and towards the prediction of the future. For it is 124through such watchful investigation that they discover the powers pro-ductive of heavenly figures, because, when they grasp what has occurredin which circumstances, they are able to calculate the causes of what willcome to be from the same signs.

It seems to me also that the discourse (logos) of the Pythagoreans, 5

which prepares souls to recollect their former lives as well, imitates thishistorical study of the Egyptians. For just as in the case of one man – orone soul rather – duty requires that he grasp his different lives, so tooin the case of one race it requires that they grasp their different cycles.So as among the former531 the recollection of their previous existences 10

is perfective of their souls, so too among the latter the historical studyof earlier cycles contributes very greatly to their perfection in wisdom.Furthermore such watchful investigation also assimilates them to thearrangement of the All, since they are imitating the established formal 15

principles of nature, through whose changeless permanence order fallsto changing things too.

If then the most sacred of temples is the cosmos, in which the for-mal principles that conserve the All are eternally fixed, the recording ofancient deeds in their temples would involve an image of the conserva-tion of this world. What the story of the Egyptians would be saying isthat whereas everything in the sensible world that is stable, strong, and 20

ever in the same state originates from the intelligible gods, everythingthat moves in different ways at different times, coming into being andpassing away, derives from the new creation. What is more, their priestlycaste that retains the memory of ancient deeds involves an image of the 25

permanent divine order that conserves the Whole and guards all withinthe divine memory. Deriving fullness from this [memory],532 the newcreation also sheds the light of sameness, coherence, and stability uponunstable things.

530 Festugiere aptly compares 102.31–3.531 The contrast remains one between individual men and races.532 Festugiere takes the feminine noun to be understood here to be the order (taxis), but

the section, dealing as it does with the preservation of memory, is rounded off better ifit is memory (mneme) which must be tapped by the new creation.

219


Several lemmata more briefly considered (Tim. 23a5–d1)

But your [business] and that of the others has always recently30

come to be furnished with writings and everything else that cities need.(23a5–7)125

This ‘furnishing’533 is a symbol for the cause that is always fashioningthings new, producing what does not yet exist, and harmonizing all thingswith a view to the united perfection of the cosmos. In households too,you see, we call the provision of all things necessary their ‘furnishings’.5

In cities writings fall into this category, and skills, markets, baths and allsuch things, but in the universe it is everything admitting a temporal andpartial composition. So just as the temples534 signify the receptacles ofthe eternal formal principles and the powers that maintain and protect,so these cities indicate the foundations of the ever-changing, composed10

of many dissimilar perishable components. The histories of those whohave written about discoveries, by attributing the acts of discovery tocertain people born not long ago, show that the establishment of suchthings (I mean writings and skills) is more recent.

And again, after the customary number of years the torrent from heaven15

comes rushing upon them <like> a plague. (23a7–8)

This also is clear as far as humans are concerned. For it is inundations thatdestroy races, set in motion by the circuits of the heaven, with water astheir matter. Hence this whole [class of events] is called a torrent from20

heaven and like a plague, because that is something else destructive(what is ‘destructive’ is bad for the part, but good for the whole).535 [Hesays] after the customary number of years, because even such cases ofdestruction are accomplished in accordance with certain cycles, cyclesthat also have some correspondence with the entire cycle of the divinity25

that came to be.536 This further point also seems to be indicated throughthese words, that all those things that come about only from universal[causes] are necessarily accomplished according to cosmic cycles deter-mined by the same number, whereas all those that happen as a result ofpartial causes do not turn out the same in all respects, though the same30

cyclical patterns take place.

533 Proclus’ kataskeue picks up ‘furnished’ (kateskeuasmena) in the lemma.534 Tim. 23a5, cf. 124.16–19.535 Proclus is anticipating the observation that one phrase implies a heavenly origin of

the floods, while the other implies that these same events are an evil, and cautiouslyclarifying the extent to which it can be evil. In so doing he refers to the doctrine ofLaws 903b–e that local evils are for the preservation of the whole.

536 I.e. the universe, cf. Tim. 92c.

220

Atlantis

As far as the All is concerned, you could observe the same lesson bybearing in mind that all things that come to be are destroyed and succumbto cosmic cycles and to the revolutions of life as a whole, and that the 126cycles join up with one another and accomplish a single continuous life.

And it has left only the illiterate and uncultured of you, up to all thethings there had been in ancient times. (23a8–b3)

He stated that following the inundation cowherds and shepherds are 5

left, while those in the cities perish. So those left behind are illiter-ate and uncultured, and because of the former they do not have theability to hand down the events of the previous cycle to memory537

through writing, while because of the latter they happen to be inca- 10

pable of preserving what they had previously lived through in hymnsand poetry. Hence it is reasonable that they should come to be in a stateof forgetfulness about everything, and in their forgetfulness wheel backround538 to the life of children. For Aristotle claims that in respect oftheir life ‘one immature in age in no way differs’ from them.539 A rather 15

similar thing happens to those souls that are descending into genera-tion.540 As they exchange their previous intellective cycle for a secondgeneration-producing one, they experience forgetfulness of the intelli-gibles on account of the inundation produced by matter, and any impres-sions of them they have as a result of their observation of them they lose 20

as time goes on. In this way all things within the cosmos wheel backround through rebirth from old age to youthfulness, being carried on a

537 I.e. the collective memory.538 The distinctive verb anakampto, found here at 126.13 and just below at 126.22, owes

something to Phd. 72b3–4 (along with the noun kampe), the only point of the Platoniccorpus where it occurs; this might suggest that the commentary tradition is here draw-ing on an ultimate source that discusses Plato’s ideas on the soul, possibly (as we seebelow) Numenius and/or Porphyry. The verb, not found in Diehl’s index, is also foundin a Porphyrian context at in Tim. II. 309.21 (= Porph. in Tim. fr. lxxvi.17 Sodano),though I find it elsewhere in Porphyry only once, at Harm. 31.10. It is notable for itspresence in Damasc. in Phd. (six times, but is also found in his Parmenides commentary(5 times), as also in that of Proclus (5 times between 1122 and 1189). Total occurrencesin Proclus number fourteen, several of these having a geometrical context; the total inin Tim. is only five. We have already met 28.26, we find two cases here, there is thePorphyrian passage, and a final passage at III. 92.11.

539 Following Festugiere, one could clarify Proclus’ meaning and translate what Aristotlewrites at EN 1095a6–7 (that one immature in character in no way differs from oneyoung in age) rather than the elliptical Greek of the Proclan MSS, but there is no needto do so.

540 This is surely a comment deriving from that part of the tradition that connected theAtlantis myth with the descent of souls, i.e. with Numenius (77.3–6) or Porphyry (77.6–24); the term ‘generation-producing’ (genesiourgos) in the next sentence was alreadyassociated with Numenius at 77.4.

221


variety of paths at different times because their nature is to have the formin motion. Moreover, the fact that when changes occur the illiterate25

and uncultured should be left behind gives an indication, examinedfrom the perspective of physics,541 that it is right down to the formlessand shapeless condition that the dissolution and the destruction of theelements occur (something indicated by the term illiterate).542 Also thata breakdown of the harmony543 takes place, something that the gods whopreside over the rejuvenation will easily heal and restore to its natural30

state.

Certainly the genealogies presently on offer, which you told us about127your people, are scarcely any different from children’s stories. (23b3–5)

The Egyptian compares the solemn and ancient narratives of Solon withchildish stories. For the stories of the wise concern eternal happenings,5

while those of children concern minor temporal matters; and the for-mer have a hidden truth that is intellective, while the latter have onethat is down to earth and gives no indication of anything elevated.544

So Solon’s historical accounts correspond to myths of this latter kind,those of the Egyptians to those of the wise, since the former histories10

have a very limited field of view, and the latter have a very extensiveone; the former are simply histories, the latter contribute to scientificknowledge.

Beginning with these [two kinds] we should consider their paradigms,[noting] that things proceeding from the new creation are called ‘play-15

things of the gods’545 and resemble myths. For they are images of realities

541 This suggests a switch to Iamblichan material, since Iamblichus insists on relating allmaterial in the introduction to the target inquiry, i.e. to the study of the natural world(e.g. 117.18–20 = in Tim. fr. 12 Dillon; cf. especially 19.27–9, the sequel to fr. 3). It isusual for material on Iamblichus’ physical interpretations to follow an ethical accountfrom Porphyry, often with a focus on souls, as 116.27–9 and 171.17–23 (= Iambl. inTim. fr. 22 Dillon).

542 It is important that the term for the elements (stoicheia) is identical with the term forthe letters of the alphabet.

543 Proclus has now moved on to comment on the term translated ‘uncultured’ , whichmeans literally ‘muse-less’, and can thus be interpreted as ‘unmusical’. Festugiere’stranslation becomes contorted because of his failure to see this distinction betweenIamblichus’ comments on the two separate words.

544 It is important that Proclus’ remarks here are not mistakenly applied to Greek myths ingeneral, which are usually taken as offering a deep meaning as well as a superficial one.The Neoplatonic view of myth is well summed up at Olymp. in Gorg. 46.2–6, whichhas parallels in Proclus On the Republic. The literary myths from Homer and elsewherewould here be viewed as myths of the wise.

545 The image derives from Laws 803c (cf. 644d), where humans are such a plaything.Proclus extends Plato’s image to apply to all products of the new creation; cf. 334.7–10where the same idea is dressed in slightly different terms.

222

Atlantis

and participate in the forms at the final stage. But things that owe theirinitial foundation to the intelligibles are intellective and eternal andstatic, and have their being hidden away.

You who firstly remember a single inundation of the earth, though there 20have been many before. (23b5–6)

The Greeks talked incessantly of Deucalion’s flood though many othershad taken place before, as the Egyptian says. Correspondingly, amongwholes, the new creation brings wholes to completion in a partial andreduplicated manner, and by means of regeneration sets the present sit- 25

uation aright, whereas in the intelligibles the causes of the first founda-tion and cyclic return of specific forms are already assumed in a unitaryfashion.546

Moreover, of the finest and most excellent race among humans in yourown land, up to died without a voice in writing. (23b6–c3) 30

He wants the second cycle to link up with the former, and [he wants] thereto be a single continuous life of the Athenians, the first ones and those 128now, through the slender seed of which he speaks. For in the cosmostoo the final stages of the former cycle link up with the beginnings ofthe547 one after it on account of the substantive existence (ousia) of thecauses, the unceasing motion of the all, and ‘the unchanging change’, as 5

someone puts it.548

Let us not be surprised that while he himself says at this point thatSolon is a descendant of those excellent men, we relate him to the cause ofthe whole cosmic rivalry.549 For as a living creature he owes his originsto them, but as a particular intellect, receiving the tales (logoi) of the war, 10

he corresponds to the divine being that conveys550 the principles (logoi)of cosmic conflict from the intelligibles to the sensible world. Further,one should not be confused by objections of this kind, but recognize thenature of analogies – that in analogies the same things are used as thefirst, last, and middle terms.

546 In this difficult sentence ‘wholes’ would appear to be species, which are restored peri-odically in the new creation as many duplicated parts of the whole, but the paradigmsof each and patterns of its regeneration have a single existence in the intelligible world.

547 Festugiere corrects the dative plural of the article to the genitive singular, giving naturalGreek.

548 We do not know who, as Festugiere is able to dismiss Diehl’s alleged parallel.549 For earlier discussion of what Solon symbolizes see 88.1–8, 91.27–92.11; the objection

is that Solon is seen by Plato as a descendant, but Proclus’ interpretation requires himto be viewed as an ancestor.

550 The verb diaporthmeuo recurs in relation to Solon and to the ‘intermediate orders’ at133.23–4.

223


Indeed, Solon, back beyond the greatest destruction by water, the city15

that is now the Athenians’ was once the most excellent in war and in allthings exceptionally lawful. To that city were said to belong the finestdeeds and finest constitutions of any beneath the heaven that we have20

received word of. (23c3–d1)

By greatest destruction he means not the one in Deucalion’s time,but presumably one of the inundations that had occurred previously.He described the city of the Athenians as very warlike and excep-tionally lawful as one that takes after its presiding goddess, whom he25

will shortly describe (24d1) as philosophic and war-loving. They gettheir warlike quality from her love of war, and their lawfulness fromher philosophic quality. By finest deeds is meant the victory againstthe Atlantines, while [he uses the plural] finest constitutions notbecause it had several in succession, but because one could call the single30

system the sum of several systems of government, in the same way as one129would say that the single cosmic arrangement embraces many arrange-ments. For if the life of each man is a kind of constitution, while thecombined life is an association of many particular living creatures, itwould be a unification of many constitutions according to one principle:the fine.

[He says] of any under the heaven that we have received word5

of, because it is the first imitation of the constitution of the cosmos, sothat one could say that it is the best of those under the heaven. For itsparadigm is in the heaven. That’s what we have to say about the separatephrases.

The question of the status of the story resumed

But we should again remind ourselves about this entire business con-cerning the Athenians, that it is neither a myth that is being related nor10

a straightforward historical study.551 Some understand the account only

551 Proclus takes up material from 75.30–76.21, giving more fully argued positions thanhe had given there, and in a different order. In this case the argument for a literalinterpretation is clearly offered in opposition to an already popular allegorical inter-pretation, and bears no resemblance to anything earlier attributed to Crantor. Of thosepost-Numenian figures used by Proclus, it is clearly Longinus who took the most lit-eral approach to the Platonic text, and that this applies to the Atlantis story is evidentfrom 162.15–27 (= Longinus fr. 36). That we should trace these arguments to himis confirmed by the language of seduction (��) in relation to Proclus’ thirdpoint (129.19–20), for this had already occurred at 59.28 (Longinus fr. 28.20) and 83.23(fr. 32.5), which directly concerns the purpose of the Atlantis story. Cf. also Longinusfr. 48.22.

224

Atlantis

as history, others as a myth. And some say that, firstly, the allegoricalunveiling552 of these and similar tales appears to Plato to be ‘for ahard-working person who is somewhat wide of the mark’.553 Secondly, 15

Plato’s communicative method is not of the same riddling sort as Phere-cydes’,554 but gives clear teaching on very many points of doctrine –so one should not be forced into explaining it away when the man isproposing to teach us directly. Thirdly, that an allegorical unveiling ofthe story is not necessary in the present circumstances, since there is an 20

acknowledged reason for the presentation of this narrative – the seduc-tion of the listeners.555 And further, fourthly, if we explain away every-thing, then we shall suffer the same fate as those who waste time withtricky minutiae of Homer.

Others,556 however, base their view on the story of Phaethon, of whichPlato says that it ‘takes the shape of a myth, whereas its true reference’ is 25

to something else, one of the things that happens in the natural world; andthey think it right to trace this story back to its connection with nature.For the Egyptians too, whom he makes the fathers of this story, putthe secrets of nature into riddles through myths, so that the allegorical 30

unveiling of this narrative would also suit the character who is tellingit. Just as Timaeus himself will set forth his arguments in the way thatis proper to Pythagorean philosophy, by interpreting nature throughnumbers and shapes as if through images, so too the Egyptian priest 130would be teaching the truth of things through symbols, the manner thatis proper to himself.

552 An �* ��@�� is literally an ‘opening up’, and sometimes an ‘explanation’. In ‘allegoricalunveiling’ I seek to combine both notions, at the same time as capturing the rarity ofthis term, found only here (129.15, 19, 30) and at III. 29.13. Interestingly, while Proclusdoes more often use the verb �� ++�, the verb that corresponds here is ��7��,129.18, 22.

553 Quoting Phaedrus 229d4, where Socrates himself discusses attempts to explain awaymyths in an allegorical manner.

554 Diehl refers to Pherecydes fr. 4.6, and this fragment had seemed to be a text Porphyryhad in mind at 77.15 above, hence this may be Longinus’ attempt to dampen Porphyry’senthusiasm for allegorical interpretation. Only here and at II. 54.28 does Proclus referto Pherecydes by name.

555 Clearly Longinus’ view of the story, see 83.23 (fr. 32.5).556 It is difficult to say whether Proclus has in mind Amelius, Numenius, or Porphyry

(76.17–77.24), though the first point would suit Numenius’ approach to Plato in On theGood, which proceeds via Pythagoras and respected beliefs in other cultures includingEgypt (fr. 1a); while the second point better fits those who give pride of place to Plato,interpreting Plato through Plato, and hence perhaps comes from Porphyry. CertainlyPorphyry is often the source of the last view considered before that of Iamblichus,whom we know from 77.24–80.7 to have taken this general line.

225


In addition to this even Plato himself elsewhere557 censured those5

who were saying everything straight off, so that even to the cobblers, ashe says, they may make their wisdom obvious. Consequently discoursethat communicates truth in riddles is not foreign to Plato. This is whateither side says.

Let us say that all this is both a historical study and an indication10

of the cosmic rivalry and the universal order, relating things that havehappened among humans, but symbolically including within it the revo-lutions558 in the All and the cosmic rivalry. For from the first intelligiblesat the top level559 came the procession by juxtaposition, and it dividedthe cosmos according to opposing powers. If you wish, let us divide15

the All also in the theological manner according to the divine ordersin turn, and let us see the coordinated ranks in Pythagorean fashion. Atthe level of the two principles, then, there is a division into Limit andUnlimited, or rather into things akin to Limit and Unlimited, becauseof composite things some are on the former side, some on the latter.20

At the level after that, which has a threefold aspect, there is a divisioninto things unified and things multiplied, for it is at that point first ofall that there is multiplicity, in a unified way. At the level of the nexttriad there is a division into things eternal and things perishable, sincefor all things the measure of their existence comes from there. At thelevel of the third [triad] there is a division into male and female, for it25

is in this triad that they appear for the first time. At the level of thefirst triad of intermediates there is a division into odd and even, for thatis where unitary number appears. At the level of the second there is adivision into whole and partial, and at the third into straight and circu-lar. Again, of intellective things at the first level there is a division into

557 The reference is to Tht. 180d3–5, where ‘Socrates’ contrasts the new Heracliteansimplicity with the cautious concealment of the ancient poets who, according to them,were embracing the same doctrines. This fairly obscure passage of Plato, alluded toonly here in this commentary, would have become of interest as soon as the poets weretreated as in some sense ‘Orphic’, providing a text that shows Plato’s approval for theancient manner in which Orphic theology had been presented. The passage is easilyassociated with the Heraclitean etymologies of Ocean and Tethys at Cratylus 402b-d,where Orphic verses are actually cited in support. Note that Proclus introduces Crat.402 and other Orphic texts into a discussion of Tethys (Tim. 40e) at III. 179.8–30.

558 I suspect that the text is corrupt at this point, and that a verb indicating cyclic motionsuch as �� is to be supplied for ��2��. As things stands the second, seem-ingly unrelated occurrence of the same participle gives rise to suspicion, as well asdefying a reasonable translation. Festugiere is clearly puzzled at this point, and thevulgate tradition had already provided its own tradition by reading the middle ��I$�.

559 See 78.6–8 above (= Iamblichus fr. 7 Dillon); the opposition is traced particularly tothe Dyad that follows the One.

226

Atlantis

things in themselves and things in others, at the second level into things 131animate and inanimate, standing still and moving, and at the third levelinto things same and other. At the level of hegemonic principles there isa division into things delighting in similarity and things akin to dis-similarity, at the level of independent principles into separated andunseparated, <at the level of encosmic things into things equal and 5

unequal>.560

Well, these things have been set out in order elsewhere, and may thisnow be the ‘historical account’, as it were, that we give of them.561 For atevery division the goodness of the better, in its desire to fill the inferiorlevel and to remove its imperfections, brings about the war, while the 10

desire of the worse to draw to itself a share of the better provokes manifestopposition. For in [human] wars too those who struggle against oneanother want to subdue their enemies’ [forces] and get them entirely outof their way. That much is clear. Yet one should conceive the opposition 15

of universal powers in the following way, employing a division into thingsarranging and things arranged. First of all [divide] into super-substantialthings and substances, for the whole race of the gods is super-substantial.Next [divide] substances also into eternal lives and those that operate intime, and of those that operate in time [make a division] into souls and 20

bodies, and of bodies into those in the heaven and those in generation,and of the latter into wholes and parts. For division goes on to the lastlevels.

Furthermore, of the super-substantial things [make a division] intothe divine attributes, like male and female, odd and even, unifying and 25

dividing, static and moving.562

And of eternal things [make a division] into whole and partial sub-stances, and of wholes into divine and angelic ones, and again of soulsinto divine ones and their attendants, and of the divine ones into heav-enly ones and those that make provision for generation, and of those 132that are in attendance on the gods into those that are eternally rankedalongside them and those that are constantly seceding, and those that

560 The text at this point has been supplemented by Diehl in accordance with Proclus’other discussions of the metaphysical levels, particularly in Plat. Theol., with some helpfrom scholia. The necessity that encosmic principles should appear may be seen from167.13 and 269.28–30.

561 It is clearly intended that the sort of account that Proclus gives should be analogous tothe quasi-historical account of cosmic opposition supposedly given by the priest, andthere is no need for Festugiere’s surprise or Kroll’s emendation. For the reconstructionof Proclus’ metaphysical hierarchy see now Opsomer (2000, 2001b).

562 As Festugiere notes, this might more correctly have been inserted at 131.18; as in itspresent position it interrupts the progressive division of substances.

227


secede into those that stand immaculate in the face of generation andthose that are corrupted. The descent continues to this point.

Of the heavenly bodies [make a division] into inerrant ones and5

planets, of these latter into those that move on a simple path and thosethat [move] on a complex path, and of those on a complex path into[divisions reflecting] the distinctive characters of their powers. Universalfeatures of all the divisions mentioned are that which arranges, that whichis arranged, that which fills and that which is filled. And if the task is not10

to look at a part, but to get a firm hold on an understanding of theWhole, one should postulate this rivalry everywhere – as it is in gods,intellects, souls, and bodies. At that [first] level it is limit and unlimited,in intellects it is sameness and otherness, in soul it is same and different,and in bodies heaven and generation. The second ones are always drawn15

up in dependence on the better ones.That is why we say that this myth is useful also for the total study of

nature, as, from the activities and movements [depicted], it gives an indi-cation of the cosmic rivalry. For all those who have taught about nature20

begin with opposites and make these principles. As Plato knew this, heconveys to us the rivalry and the races in the All through symbols andriddles, [saying] what it is and how in accordance with the intellectiveactivity of Athena the corresponding inferior things are placed belowthe better. So it was with good reason that Plato referred to both the25

deeds and the constitutions as the Athenians’, because he knew thatthe same kind of proportionate relation (analogia) ran through all things.This relation was maintained by the new creation too, but also, far ear-lier, by the universal powers. Brought to fullness by these, it establishesthe encosmic minds, souls, and bodies according to its own distinctive30

character.

Solon’s request, the priest’s response, and what they signify

So when he heard it, he said he was amazed and very keen indeed,requesting the priests to narrate to him next in detail all about the133ancient citizens. (23d1–4)

In reality this too is peculiar to things divine, that secondary things clingfast to the first and are founded in their immaculate intellections, while5

the first, in their ungrudging power and goodness, cast the fullness thatcomes from themselves like a light upon the second. So amazementcomes first, because in us too it is the origin of the cognition of thewhole,563 while among things divine it joins the subject of amazement

563 Presumably an allusion to Tht. 155d2–5, rather than to Arist. Metaph. 982b12 and983a13 to which Festugiere refers us.

228

Atlantis

with its object. Hence those wise in divinity praise Thaumas too as a very 10

great god,564 who uses amazement to make the second things subject tothe first. And there follows the insistent request, making ready whatneeds to participate in the more perfect goods.

So the priest said, ‘This is not something we begrudge, Solon, but for 15your sake I shall tell you, and for that of your city, and above all as afavour for the goddess. (23d4–6)

Even through the language the story gives sufficient indication of thedivine causes of the phenomena. Solon, as an Athenian, introduces reflec-tive glimpses of the city’s official goddess, insofar as he also holds out 20

for a more complete intellection, while the priest, as if making a pro-nouncement from some inner sanctuary – for he is actually teachingwhat is inscribed upon the temples – also offers a representation of theorders intermediate between the new creation and the paternal cause ofthe whole. These orders transport the gift of the higher causes to theone below, filling the second in rank with the former as if from a kind 25

of spring. And everything is being agreeably fulfilled by the speaker. ForSolon is being perfected, the city is being commended, and the goddessis being hymned – and the upward path leads from Solon through thecity as intermediary to the goddess, in imitation of the goddess’s own 30

power of reversion. It is true that even this has something good about it, 134to engage in one’s activities for the perfection of things secondary, sinceit imitates565 the providential care and overflowing power of the divine.More significant still is [acting] for the sake of the city, because it extendsthe activity wider and harnesses a greater power. But still more divine 5

than this is to reach out and direct the entire narrative to the goddess, andto bring the whole narrative to a conclusion in her.566 All these thingssuggest the ungrudging nature of the priest, not merely indicating theabsence of envy, but also the readiness of the divine to bring forth good 10

things.Here again, however, let us not be secretly worried by these claims,

that at one moment it is the priest, as the one who shapes the story, whois said to be reflecting a greater and more divine cause, while at anotherit is the Athenians, the ancestors of Solon more ancient than the people

564 It is clear from 183.12–14 that we are dealing with an Orphic text (= fr. 118 Kern);cf. III. 186.23, 189.8.

565 Accepting the $�$;�� of Taylor, followed by Festugiere, for the manuscript ��;��which is unsatisfactory. The verb is prominent in this passage, appearing just before at133.29 as well as at 135.16 and 136.6 as noted by Festugiere

566 Reading +�� and ��7�� as active with Festugiere

229


of Sais:567 the ones whom we rank at the level of the organizing causes ofuniversal rivalry. For, as far as their place in the narrative goes, that is the15

rank they have, but as far as the natural procession is concerned, they beara likeness to certain higher and divine orders. And if you like, since thewhole creation and cosmic rivalry are subsumed within the father of theuniverse, both the organizers and the organized, you could by analogy20

find there too the paradigmatic cause of the Athenians in intellectivelives.

Digression on the peplos

Furthermore, the peplos too is a final image of universal rivalry. Thereprecedes it the actual deeds of the gods568 both in the All and in theirproductive and primary causes: where indeed they affirm that Athena25

was made manifest along with her arms. Or rather the peplos, the workof weaving which the goddess weaves along with her father,569 is thefinal stage, introducing an image of the cosmic war and of the creativeorder coming from the goddess that proceeds into the All. But superior30

to this is the [peplos] offered by Plato in words and in riddles about theuniversal rivalry and Athenaic deeds,570 which makes its own contribu-tion to the total picture of creation, in the same way that the formercontributed to the procession of the goddess and the festival as a whole.135For the Panathenaea is an image of Athena’s productive activity uponthe All. Higher than both of these is the [peplos] woven in the All bythe intellective light of Athena, for the rivalry underlies the single lifeof the All, and part of the creation is the war that Athena’s generalship5

directs in a proper fashion. Before all of these things is the [peplos] that is

567 Festugiere’s long note shows how the ancient Athenians are regularly held superior tothe people of Sais.

568 Proclus knew that the peplos represented the battle of the gods with the giants, 85.14–16; his path back from the representations on the peplos to the deeds of the gods isperhaps inspired by Euthphr. 6b–c, where discussion of the deeds of the mythical godsprompts mention of the images embroidered on the peplos at the Great Panathenaea;Proclus would no doubt have taken Euthyphro’s acceptance of all stories told about thegods with rather more seriousness than we should today, making him inclined towards a‘dramatic’ reading in which everything said is potentially the source of serious messages.

569 A strange inclusion from the point of view of mythology, but her father is of course ademiurgic power.

570 Festugiere takes the adjective Athenaikos at this point to mean Athena’s, the deeds ofthe goddess rather than the inhabitants, but Plato’s words have both a riddling lesson anda straightforward meaning, so that it is both about one war and one victorious nation,and at the same time about cosmic rivalry and the exploits of the entire Athenaic seira(‘series’).

230

Atlantis

pre-established among the paradigmatic causes in the intelligible world,which is contained within the single intellection of Athena.571

‘For she is the most accomplished of all immortals at working on a 10

loom’, as Orpheus says.572 So it is there that weaving initially appearsand the web of this goddess’s substance, which, in intelligible fashion, isall of the things that the All is in encosmic fashion. For when she presidesover the universal war she focuses nowhere else but upon herself.

The symbolism resumed

But so that we may get back to our main purpose, the Egyptian is 15

directly imitating the ungrudging and providential care of the Demi-urge, concerning whom it will shortly be said (29e) that ‘He was good,and for one that is good no envy ever arises in respect of anything.’ Foralso the orders that come immediately after him get their ungrudging 20

share of good things supplied from him and because of him. And it isbecause of this liberality that he brings Solon’s idea to fullness, praisesthe city, and hymns the city’s official divinity, joining things partial withthings whole, uniting things maintained with their maintainers, and join- 25

ing all things belonging to the goddess with a single bond in a singleseries.

Who drew as her lot both your land and this one, and nourished andeducated them. (23d6–7)

It is amazing how the Egyptian makes everything revert to the goddess, 30

to proceed from her, and to revert to her once again. For by working backfrom the citizen, through the city, to the official civic goddess, he was 136carrying out a kind of reversion here, while by moving from the goddessto the things that have both primary and secondary participation in her,he imitates the procession from her. But further, by postulating thatparticipants are both nourished and educated by the goddess he made 5

them revert again to her.573 Surely this is an amazing imitation of the

571 We have here five levels of rivalry’s being manifested in some kind of peplos:

1. An intelligible peplos within the intellection of Athena2. Rivalry on the intellective plain woven by Athena’s own creative power3. The Panathenaic Festival that physically re-enacts the rivalry in (2)4. Plato’s account of rivalry on earth that alludes to (2) in riddles5. The pictures on the physical peplos depicting rivalry within the natural world.

The five might be said to belong to thought, craft, deeds, logoi, and images.572 Orph. fr. 178 Kern, quoted more fully at in Crat. 53, 21.25–6.573 We had in the previous lemma the sequence (1) citizen, city, goddess (d5–d6), and in

this one (2) goddess, Athenians, Egyptians and (3) this further twofold process.

231


creative powers, which are themselves founded in the things that precedethem, and, regarding what comes after them, both engender them andget them to revert to their own causes.574

General digression on cosmic divisions and divine lots575

While that will do for these matters, whatever is meant by drew as herlot? And how are the gods said to divide up the All?576 Of lots then,10

some belong to individual souls, others to the immaculate races, othersare demonic, others angelic, while some belong to the gods themselves.For if there were just one single father of all, one providence, and onelaw, then there would be no need for lots or for a distribution between15

574 The engendering is thought of as a procession away from their causes.575 Regardless of the overall importance to Proclus, and to other Neoplatonists interested

in theurgy and astrology, of the notions that particular gods, identifiable with thoseof the ancient Pantheon, had special connections with regions of the heavens and theearth alike, it is clearly difficult to postulate a literal as well as a metaphorical meaningof the Atlantis story without taking for granted the connection of gods like Athena andPoseidon with particular cities or peoples. Also relevant is the connection of individualpersons with individual divine leaders in the myth of the Phaedrus (248a–c, 250b,252c–d, 253a–c), along with other passages of Plato and relevant authors that postulatea divine influence or presence within any part of the sublunary world. Hence we havea digression lasting until 142.10, designed to explain the everlasting presence of theheavenly within the changing world of our experience.

576 The notion of an allocation by the drawing of lots naturally causes Proclus to thinkof the myth according to which Zeus, Poseidon, and Hades divide between them theheaven, the sea, and the underworld, retaining Olympus and earth as common property,a myth best known from Homer, Iliad 15.187–99 (quoted in part by Proclus below). Butthere are other reasons why, for him, the idea of divine lots comes naturally. We shallsee below various divisions that could in Proclus’ time be said to concern the allottedspheres of influence belonging to various divine powers. The allocation of a divinity tothe heaven in particular could apply even to Proclus’ Christian and Jewish opponents,and this leads to the twin lots below; the Homeric division is triple; in Empedocles, seenby Proclus and others as a Pythagorean (e.g. Olymp. in Gorg. proem 9 (with Jackson,Lycos and Tarrant (1998), 63 n.44), 30.5; several Neoplatonic passages are discussedby Mansfeld 1992, 245–62; cf. below 136.29–30). The gods’ names were readily usedfor the four elements (DK 31B6), and a Platonist might find it natural to extend this tothe five regular solids (Tim. 55d). Gods’ names were also used as today to distinguishthe planets Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn, and Sun and Moon, beinglikewise divine, made seven. The twelve signs of the zodiac invited speculation about acorrespondence with the traditional number of the Olympians, endorsed by Plato inthe myth of the Phaedrus (246e–247a), the text most important for the establishment ofthe Neoplatonist theory of various divine series, each dependent on a different god. Sowe should think of the ‘lots’ of the gods as their allocated spheres of influence, withinthe heaven or below it. There is no hint in Proclus that such an allocation could involvechance, as would normally be the case with the terminology of lotteries.

232

Atlantis

gods. But since after the one [father] there is a triad,577 and after theuniform providence a varied one, and after the one law the multitudeof laws of fate,578 there must also be a division of things governed, anda different providential power and different duty for different groups.So it is for this reason that the All has been divided by the creational 20

numbers: dyad, triad, tetrad, pentad, hebdomad, dodecad. For after thesingle creation the division of the whole into TWO, heaven and gen-eration, established twin lots, heavenly and generation-producing. Afterthis that triad divided the All – the triad of which even Homer’s Poseidon 25

speaks the lines:

Nay I drew as my lot the grey salt sea,And Zeus drew as his the broad heaven,While Hades took over the misty gloom.579

And after the triple cosmic arrangement is the fourfold distribu-tion, making a fourfold disposition of the elements in the All, as the 30

Pythagoreans say,580 one in the heaven, one in the ‘ether’, one overthe earth and one below it. After this comes the five-part [division], for 137the cosmos is one, established out of five parts, and divided up both byshapes and by their own gods in charge of them: heavenly, fiery, air-borne, water-dwelling, and terrestrial. After this allotment comes the 5

seven-part one. Starting up above with the inerrant sphere, the heptadwanders through all the components.581 In addition to them all is theallocation of the universe along the lines of the dodecad.582

Linked with the divine lots are those of angels and daemons, witha more varied distribution, since a single divine lot is inclusive of sev- 10

eral angelic lots, and of even more daemonic ones – as each angel alsogoverns more daemons, and every angelic lot has more daemonic lotsrelating to it. For what the monad is among gods, this a number is amongangels, and what each [number] is among the latter, this among dae- 15

mons is a tribe corresponding to each. So instead of a triad we shall getthree companies, and instead of the tetrad or dodecad four numbers andtwelve choruses, each group following their own leader. In this way weshall always preserve a greater unity in the higher allotments. For, asin the case of substances, as in that of powers, as in that of activities, 20

577 See on 9.15–22.578 As referred to at Tim. 42e2–3. 579 Homer, Iliad 15.190–2.580 Thinking presumably of Empedocles, who uses the term ‘aether’ rather than ‘air’

(B100.5), as Festugiere notes, is the earliest extant exponent of four-element theory,and is known to Proclus as a Pythagorean (see n. on 136.10).

581 ‘Components’ here = stoicheia in the astrological sense which relates to the sevenplanets.

582 The twelve signs of the zodiac are referred to.

233


processions engender a plurality, so too in the case of lots the veryfirst [orders], while outstripped in quantity, are pre-eminent in power,because they are closer to the one father of all, and to the one overallprovidence. But the second [orders] are allocated both a reduction inpower and an increase in the quantity. These are the general questions25

to be studied concerning lots.However, since in the course of the division into two we divided lots

into heavenly ones and sublunary ones, no account would have doubtsconcerning what the former are and whether they remain in the samecondition forever, whereas it is right to be puzzled about the sublunary30

ones, whether one were to call them eternal or not. For if they happen tobe eternal, how is this possible? For how, given that things in generation138all change and are in flux, could the lots of those with concern for us becalled eternal? For things in generation are not eternal. But if they are noteternal, how is the machinery of divine control not subject to conditionsthat change in time? The [drawing of the] lot is not some activity separate5

from the gods, so that we should say that this is an exception to thesechanging things, and that it remains unchanged. It is not just somethingunder management – in which case it would be nothing odd that the lotshould be in flux and subject to all sorts of change; but it is a god’s business,his area of providential care over earthly things, and his unchecked [area10

of] control. Further, because of its being managed it does not conformto the definition of something eternal, whereas because of its being incharge583 it defies destruction – so that we do not transfer the experiencesof individual souls to the gods by giving them different lots at differenttimes!

So what account that preserved the unchanging nature of the godsand the change of things in generation could interpret the lot, and15

explain how we should take it? Perhaps if we pursue that manner ofinvestigation which we have often endorsed elsewhere too, our explana-tory task will be easier – where we say that one should not believe thatall things in generation and generation itself are solely derived fromthings in change that disappear in flux, but that there is something20

unchanging in these things too, and of a nature to remain ever in thesame state. For the space that receives all the sectors of the cosmos andembraces them within it, and is stretched throughout everything bod-ily, is immobile, so that by being among things moved it should not

583 Festugiere is content to interpret 1�+�E� as ‘stable’ (a cause de sa stabilite), but thetheme of divine control over the sublunary world runs throughout the discussion of thisproblem; see also 1 �+��+�� at 138.4 and 10, as well as the terminology of managementat 138.7 and 10.

234

Atlantis

itself require yet another place, with an unnoticed regress to infinity. 25

Moreover, the vehicles of ether belonging to divine bodies, in whichthey have been clad, by imitation of the lives in heaven get a substancethat is eternal, and is everlastingly dependent on the divine souls, beingfull of fertile power and engaging in a circular motion conforming to 30

a secondary circle of heavenly things.584 Thirdly, moreover, the totalityof our four elements here remains the same, even though the parts aredestroyed in all sorts of ways. For it is necessary that each form should 139be unable to be lost from the whole, so that the All may be completeand so that what derives from an unmoved cause should be unmovedin its substance. Every totality is a form, or rather585 it is that thingwhich it is called by participation as a whole in one form. Observe howthe nature of the physical things has proceeded in an order. For the 5

first is free from all motion; the next has received locomotion alone –this being the furthest removed from change in substance; the next admitsthe other [motions] too within its parts, but as a whole remains entirelyunchanging.586 The heavenly lots, involving the immediate division of 10

space, divided up the heaven too along with it. By way of contrast, thesublunary lots partitioned those shares that are within space, secondlycarried out the distribution relating to the distinctive vehicles of souls,and thirdly remain ever in the same condition qua entire parts of gener-ation.587 Hence the lots of the gods do not change, nor do they vary in 15

condition over time. That is because they do not have their foundationdirectly among changing things.

Readiness for the reception of a god

So how is it that the luminary influence of the gods is found amongthings here too? How does their residence in temples come about? Howis the same place occupied at different times by different spirits? Per- 20

haps it is the case that, while the gods have eternal lots and divideup the earth according to divine numbers in the same manner as theheavens are partitioned, things here too are illuminated to the extentthat they share the readiness. This readiness is brought about both by

584 Festugiere finds an allusion here to the circuit of the Other at Tim. 40b1–2, and, thoughnot convinced, I have no better solution to offer.

585 Festugiere notes that Proclus must avoid confusion between an entire class composedof all instances, and the intelligible form that unites that class.

586 In isolation the meaning of this tripartition seems unclear, but I believe that it is areference to the order of examples of stability in the natural world just given by Proclus:(1) space, (2) the vehicle of the soul, and (3) each of the four elements taken as a whole.

587 This shows that all three of the types of ‘stability in generation’ apply to sublunary lots,and explains how these types must come in a certain natural order.

235


the revolution of the heaven, which through given configurations pro-25

vides given things with a power greater than their present nature, andalso by nature in its entirety as it puts divine codes into each of the illu-minated things, through which they participate through their very ownnature in the gods; for because [nature] is linked to the gods it placesdifferent images of them in different things. It is also brought about byopportune times, according to which the composition of other things too30

is managed, and by temperate climatic conditions. And in general all that140concerns us contributes to an increase or a decrease in their readiness.

So whenever, in accordance with the conjunction of these manycauses, readiness for participation in the gods arises in something witha natural disposition to change, the divine shines out in these things5

too where it had previously been concealed by the unreadiness of itsfuture recipients. It has the same lot eternally and is offering participa-tion in itself, but participation is not taken up by these unready things.Rather, just as when particular souls are choosing different lives at dif-ferent times, some choose those appropriate to their own gods, while10

others choose different sorts and forget what belongs to them, so toowith holy places some have been adapted to the [god] which drew the lotfor that place, while others are linked up with some other order, and onthis account some ‘travel a more prosperous course’588 and others lessso, as the Athenian Stranger says.15

How Athena comes to have Athens and Sais

Whether it is the ritual or the legislative art that is responsible for ded-icating a given city to a particular god who has received this share inaccordance with the original and everlasting allotment, life there is assim-ilated more closely to its presiding divinity, and its deeds, which are greatand wondrous, are more sure-footed than for one who does not embark20

upon his actions from such a starting point. Furthermore, the one whohas chosen the life of his allotted divinity is more sure-footed than onewho has transferred his allegiance to another god.

It is in this way then that the Egyptian says that Athena drew as herlot both the city named after her and his own city, Sais, possibly using as25

evidence the considerable resemblance of the life of its citizens to her,or possibly by becoming conscious of this allotment through the ritualart or his priestly functions. For just as in the case of the other gods, so

588 The phrase in particular alludes to Laws 771b8, a passage talking about the distributionof 5,040 lots within Magnesia, which brings in both gods and numbers in a mannerthat must have seemed tantalizing to Proclus.

236

Atlantis

there is a lot for Athena too as she proceeds from the intellectivecauses to the earthly region. Certainly she belongs in the first instance 30

in the father; at the second level she is among the hegemonic gods; 141thirdly she embarks on a procession among the twelve rulers; and afterthis she reveals her independent authority in the heaven. [She revealsherself] in one way in the inerrant region, since even there a lot forthis goddess has been unfolded, either the region around the Ram, 5

or that around the Virgin, or one of the Bear-stars, as some say themoon there is;589 in another way at the sun, since there too, along withthe sun, an amazing power and Athena-given order is fashioning thewhole according to the theologians;590 in another way at the moon,as the monad of the triad there; in another way on the earth, according 10

to the likeness of allotments on earth to her heavenly allocations, andaround the earth in different ways in different places, in accordance withtheir peculiarities [determined by] her foresight. So there is nothing sur-prising that it should be said that one goddess has drawn as her lot bothAthens and Sais. For we should not think of the gods too in this way – 15

the way that particular souls are not of a nature to inhabit two bodies,because their exercise of providential care comes with a passing relation.Rather there is participation in the same power in widespread places, inthe one power there is a many, and participation occurs in one way at 20

such and such a place and in other ways in others – sameness predomi-nating in some, difference in others. So if what we are saying is true, then(i) the lots of the gods are eternally established in the All, and (ii), thisbeing the case, there are also manifestations of them in time, differentin different places.

Ancient theology also shows the eternal being of the lots, as when it 25

is said in Homer:

Nay I drew as my lot to dwell forever the grey salt sea . . .591

‘Forever’ here is signifying its eternal nature. And in general, since beforethere can be things temporally participating in the gods there must bethings for ever participating in them, it is necessary that the eternal lots 30

should also pre-exist temporal lots. For just as daemons also follow gods 142

589 It is conceivable that one of the stars of the Great Bear was known as its ‘moon’, thoughthere may be something wrong the text here. The likeliest emendation of J7�� wouldseem to be G(��, and it is also possible that a star of this important constellation wasgiven that name. But Porphyry is said below (165.16–17) to have placed Athena in themoon itself.

590 No references are given in Diehl or Festugiere, and this passage is not listed as anOrphic fragment by Kern.

591 Here the full line of Iliad 15.190, truncated at 136.26, is quoted.

237


in advance of particular souls, so too the allocations are linked eternallyto the gods prior to their particular illumination by them. Encosmic godsconserve their allocations, earth-gods the ones on earth, water-gods the5

watery ones, air-gods those in the air, and prior to these familiar bodiesthey ride on chariots of ether.592 As to whether one should also positfurther sublunary lots that proceed from above together with the divinelight, this has been examined elsewhere.593 This suffices for the present.

Hephaestus

For she [took over] yours a thousand years earlier, after receiving your10

seed from the earth and Hephaestus, and this land later. (23d7–e2)

Concerning the creative activity of Hephaestus, how could one spellit out in order without totally missing the god’s power? What is said15

about him by ordinary people belongs to the totally discredited kind ofstory,594 whereas what more recent people to tackle it are saying mayindeed be true, but needs quite a bit of establishing. So let us startfrom the beginning with the theologians and apply our proofs abouthim to the tradition we have received. That he belongs to the cre-20

ative series, and not to the life-giving595 or conserving ones, or to someother, the theologians show by leaving a tradition of him in the roleof a blacksmith who applies the bellows, and basically as a ‘worker ofcrafts’.596 These same people also show that he is a fashioner of sensiblethings, not of psychical or intellectual deeds. For his manufacture of the25

mirror, his bronze, his being lame, and all such things, are symbols of

592 Rather than following Diehl’s conjecture, with Festugiere, I prefer to take the accusative��?� 1 �� (�� as a gloss. What the earthly allocations require here, as elsewherein this digression, is a heavenly link to explain permanence, not to be completelycontrasted with what belongs in the heavens. Hence the gods that maintain themshould in turn have such a link.

593 Diehl and Festugiere refer only to in Remp. I. 178.6ff. and II. 94.26ff.594 Myth sometimes treats Hephaestus as a rather ridiculous figure, lame and ugly enough

to have provoked his mother Hera into throwing him down from heaven to the islandof Lemnos (alluded to at 142.29–30 etc.); making the gods laugh at himself by trappinghis unfaithful wife Aphrodite in bed with Ares (Od. 8.266–359); and ejaculating uponthe ground as a result of his desire for the newly-born Athena (144.6–10).

595 Numenius identified Hephaestus with ‘the life-generating heat of the sun’, a ‘genera-tive’ fire (fr. 58). Numenius’ explanation of the lameness of Hephaestus (that fire cannotcontinue without fuel) is also something that Proclus will reject.

596 As Festugiere points out, this term has already been used at 12.18, and apparentlyderives from the Chaldean Oracles (fr. 33.1 des Places = p. 19 Kroll), at least as a termfor the demiurge to whom it is there applied. Although ‘theologians’ are mentioned here,there is no certain implication that the term goes back that far.

238

Atlantis

his productivity in the sensible realm. Moreover, that he is a maker ofall sensible things is clear from the same sources, who say that he wascarried from Olympus above all the way to earth, and who make all the 30

receptacles of the encosmic gods ‘Hephaestus-wrought’. 143So if we claim that this is so, then this god would be the over-

all fashioner of the entire bodily construction. He gets the gods’ visi-ble dwelling-places ready for them in advance, contributes everythingrequired for the single harmony of the cosmos, provides all the creations 5

of bodily life, and uses forms to give coherence to the intractable anddense nature of matter. That is the reason why he is also said by thetheologians to be a smith, as being a worker of solid and resistant mate-rials, and because the heaven is brazen insofar as it is an imitation of 10

the intelligible, and the maker of the heaven is a smith. He is said to belame in both legs, because he is the demiurge of the final phase of theprocession of reality – that being bodies – and because he is no longerable to advance to another stage. Also because he is the maker of the All,which is ‘legless’, as Timaeus will say (34a5–6). He is cast from above to 15

the earth, because he extends his creative activity through the whole ofsensible substance. Whether people speak of ‘natural’ or of ‘spermaticprinciples’ one should attribute the cause of all of them to this god.597

For what nature produces by sinking down into bodies, is also shaped in 20

a divine and transcendent manner by this god, setting nature in motionand using it as a tool for his own creative activity. For innate warmthis Hephaestan, introduced by him for the making of bodies. So ouraccount traces the universal cause of things that come to be back to thisgod. 25

Since, however, there is also a need of matter for things that come tobe – for even the gods in heaven ‘borrow parts from the whole as some-thing to be given back again’ for the generation of mortal animals598 –[Plato] has quite remarkably conveyed this too with his reference toearth. For even in the very seed there are formal principles and a sub- 30

strate, and the one comes from Hephaestus’ craft and the other fromthe earth. For at this point one should understand by earth all the

597 One may think here of the Stoics, for whom logoi of a spermatic type were embed-ded in the fiery active principle, occasionally called ‘Hephaestus’ (Chrys. SFV 2.1076,p. 315.14), and who resorted to much allegory to explain away the gods in later antiquity(as in the case of Cornutus). Stoics, however, do not need to go beyond Zeus himself asa source for such logoi, and in Cornutus (De Nat. Deorum 33.12–16) Zeus is connectedwith pure shining ether, while Hephaestus involves impurities through an admixtureof air. In fact the term ‘spermatic’ has more to do with the sperma (seed) of the lemma.

598 A slightly modified or misremembered quotation of 42e9–43a1, where the youngergods borrow earth, air, fire, and water from the whole.

239


material cause, not because the Athenians are ‘autochthonous’,599 but144because they are in the habit of calling all generation ‘earth’ and all thatis embodied in matter ‘earthy’. So of necessity the seeds are from theearth.

Hephaestus’ tool is fire, but his material is earth that is set in motionby fire and generates life,600 though cold and lifeless in itself. Conse-5

quently in this text too it has been introduced as something that fulfilsthis material role for Hephaestus, and accordingly it is said that theseed of Hephaestus founded the Athenian race together with earth. Foraccording to the myth too Hephaestus in his desire for Athena spilt hisseed upon the earth, and it is from this source that the Athenian race10

sprang up. So Hephaestus on the one hand is eternally and completely inlove with Athena, imitating her intellective character in sensible works.But ‘Athenaic’ souls on the other hand, in conformity with this activityof Hephaestus, receive their vehicles from him, and are housed in bodiesbased on the formal principles of Hephaestus and on earth,601 principles15

that have received Athenaic codes. For this god is the one who givesbodies their pre-natural perfection, imposing on different ones differentsymbols of the divine.

The priority of the Athenians

But what is this figure of a thousand years,602 by which the Atheniansprecede the people of Sais? While we may assume that this too hasa historical sense, it appears to signify also the seniority of the life of20

the Athenians insofar as they maintained a life that was in its overallcharacter superior to that of the Saitians. For just as in the invisibleorders several races are linked with the same leader, some more closelyand others at a lower level, in the same way, among Athenaic souls thatdescend into generation, some are assimilated to the goddess to the25

highest extremity, and others come next in line after these. So it is thisextremity that the figure of a thousand years signifies, since it is a measureof a complete generation-producing cycle because of its being a cubic

599 I.e. ‘straight from the land’, as legend stated, Erechtheus (or Erichthonius, above 101.7)having been descended from Earth and Hephaestus.

600 Note the resistance to making Hephaestus a fire-principle; for Apollo, Helios, andHephaestus as separate possible symbols of fire see Betegh (2004), 203.

601 It is not directly clear from the Greek whether one should understand ‘[the formal prin-ciples] of earth’ with Festugiere, or regard earth as giving a matter-like contribution,but the latter accords best with 143.30–2 and 144.3–6, which suggest that Hephaestusis the sole source of the formal principles.

602 LSJ s.v. ��7�*�, under II.

240

Atlantis

number.603 Hence in all likelihood it fits in with the superior kind of lifein generation, life better assimilated to the presiding divinity. 30

If you would like to give these [words a meaning] transferred to theAll, you will see that there too all the visible arrangement is Hephaestan,both arrangers and things arranged, and of arrangers some are more 145universal and some more particular, the former corresponding to theAthenians and the latter to the Saitians. For nothing prevents one instudying the same things, by analogy, among the creative causes, and inthe All, and in the historical account.

An Iamblichan difficulty and its solution

Iamblichus,604 though, raises the difficulty of how the gods are said to get 5

certain places as their lot for determinate periods of time, as for instanceAthena gets Athens first and Sais later. For if they commence occupationof their allocation at a given time, they could also end it at a given time,everything measured out in time being of that kind. Further, [he asks]whether whatever lot that they receive is vacant when they receive it, or 10

presided over by some other god. If it is vacant, how could any part ofthe All be entirely deprived of a god, and how could any place endurewhen totally unguarded by the superior powers? And if it is self-sufficientenough to preserve itself, how could it later become the lot of some god? 15

On the other hand, if it belongs605 under one leader and another godgets it, that situation too is unreasonable. For it can neither be the casethat the second misappropriates the control and the allotment of theformer, nor that they keep swapping places with one another, for noteven daemons engage in an exchange of lots.

So, after raising these difficulties, he offers a solution, saying that the 20

allocations of the gods are eternal, but things that participate in them atone time enjoy the presence of their leaders, and at another are deprivedof them. And these are the cases of participation measured in time, whichthe holy ordinances often call ‘birthdays’ of the gods.606

603 Festugiere cites passages from Iambl. in Nicom. Arithm., but they explain little; giventhe prominent role afforded this cubic number here, it is perhaps worrying that nothinghelpful can be quoted from the rest of this commentary.

604 In Tim. fr. 14 Dillon, who compares Sallustius De Deis 18, pp. 32–4 Nock; note thatwe have not heard anything of Iamblichus by name since 120.9, but we shall now doso regularly until 174.28.

605 Literally ‘pays taxes’, meaning is reckoned as subject to; see LSJ s.v. II.3.606 The meaning of this birthday is discussed in Festugiere’s long note. More circumspect

is Dillon’s note. Since gods were often thought to take up residence at a shrine on agiven day of the year, the celebration of a birthday of sorts would have been naturalenough; but if we could be sure of the identity of the holy ordinances we might betterappreciate the reference.

241


But we have said607 that it is like what happens in the case of souls.25

While every soul also has a presiding god in any case, some choose livesthat really belong to other gods. Accordingly, while every place is a lot ofsome particular god, there are times when it becomes another’s lot, eitherbecause of the passing of certain cycles which make it ready, or becauseof some rite established by humans, when the allotment is double, one30

according to essential nature, the other according to temporal condition.But let us proceed to the next passage.

The dates of ancient Athens and of Sais

The date of arrangements made in this place is written among us in our146sacred writings as amounting to eight thousand years ago. (23e2–4)

To the Athenians he attributed the number of nine thousand, getting5

this too from historical inquiry, but to the Saitians that of eight thou-sand according to the writings in their temples, measuring out the livesof cities in millennia. For daemons too are said to measure time inthis way, as the philosopher Porphyry says.608 Furthermore, by basingthis narration upon the sacred writings, he609 signifies the permanent10

watchfulness of the cosmic divine forms, as Iamblichus would say.610

The numbers also relate to kinds of life, this in accordance with the‘likely account’.611 Eight thousand is a cube times a cube, and the other

607 See 140.9–15.608 in Tim. fr. XV; Porphyry of course linked his whole interpretation of the Atlantis story

with daemons and/or souls (77.6–24).609 The subject of ‘he attributed’ and hence of ‘he signifies’ is the priest; I have deleted the

article B here, which I believe gives a slight improvement in the sense. The participle ��$�� was otherwise dependent upon the verb ‘attributed’ two sentences earlier.There is also a possibility that this sentence is a gloss, since it interrupts the discussionof numbers, intervening between an historical explanation of them and an explanationin terms of what they are an image of (kata ton eikota logon, 146.12).

610 Festugiere admits to uncertainty about the meaning of this permanent watchfulness ofdivine forms, but Dillon (1973, 279) refers us to the watchful role of encosmic gods.Though printng this as fr. 14A, Dillon declines to believe that this is a true fragmentof Iamblichus as opposed to something offered by Proclus in Iamblichan vein. Whilethe mention of Iamblichus immediately after Porphyry is very much a part of Proclus’methods this sentence interrupts the flow (see last note).

611 We now meet the key notion of eikotologia, going back to the status of Timaeus’ cosmol-ogy as an eikos mythos or eikos logos, 29c–d etc. The phrase kata ton eikota logon derivesfrom Tim. 55d5 and in modified form at 53d5–6, and it offers something of a guidingprinciple of this part of the dialogue (cf. 48d6, 56a1, 68b7); in Proclus the phrase occursin full also at Plat. Theol. 5.43.11. This is more than reference to the probability of theaccount since likeliness includes the notion of resemblance, and one of Plato’s methodsof inquiry (according to Proclus) is the iconic method that involves studying imagesand paradigms together (see 1.22 above), associated in the Platonic Theology (I. 1.6) with

242

Atlantis

is a two-dimensional square times a cube. The one gives depth to thesquare, doing so through the indeterminate dyad, while the other, keep- 15

ing the square character for itself in the likeness and perfection derivingfrom the triad, does not allow the cube to remain outside its grasp, buthas embraced that too.612 That which remains in itself and arranges sec-ondary things is the symbol of a better life, while what comes down into 20

those things, assimilates to them, and is infected with a kind of indef-initeness, is more imperfect. But since even the second is not entirelyremoved from similarity to god, the descent for those things sharing aresemblance to the triad takes place by cubes. But it would be betterto imitate what is better through a simpler rather than a more com- 25

plex life, and the square is simpler than the cube. Yet if you were to saythat the figure of nine thousand is also appropriate for those derivedfrom the earth and Hephaestus – for qua cube the number one thousandis associated with earth, while nine belongs to Hephaestus as he sayshimself:

Close to these I forged many skilled works for nine years.613

– you would not be far from the mark. 30

In general the cube is fitting for the earthly works of Athena, as people 147attribute the decad to the heaven, while the procession of the decad stopsfinally at the ‘solid’ number one thousand – for gods have processed fromthe heavenly lots to stop finally at the earthly ones. That is what we have 5

to say.But the philosopher Porphyry,614 when he interprets this, hypothe-

sizes that Hephaestus is technical expertise, and earth is the lunar sphere,since [the moon] is called ‘the earth of ether’ by the Egyptians.615 So thesouls that have received their existence from god616 but participate in 10

the Pythagoreans. So the numbers, besides being historically correct, are also offeredas an image of something higher.

612 I delete the words ‘through the ennead’ here, as a probable gloss, written on themistaken supposition that Proclus wants to say nine contains eight by being greater;in fact Proclus sees the superiority of 9,000 over 8,000 in terms of the superiority ofthe two dimensional (more form-like) over the three-dimensional (‘solid’ and hencebody-like), and with the superiority of the triad (inclusive) over the dyad (ever divisiveand more like matter). Festugiere corrects to ‘through the chiliad’ (1,000), since thatcontains the notion of the cube, which seems reasonable if that is what Proclus wantsto say.

613 Iliad 18.400: the reference of the initial ‘these’ is to Eurynome and Thetis.614 = in Tim. fr. XVI Sodano.615 Festugiere refers to II. 48.17 for the attribution of this view to Orpheus, though in

reality Orphic lines (fr. 81 Kern) that make no mention of ether are merely used thereto support the description, which is associated if anything with ‘Pythagoreans’.

616 Referring to the process mentioned at Tim. 41d–e.

243


technical expertise are sown into the body of the moon, he says, becausethat is where the technically expert sort of soul belongs, and they havebodies that are effluences of the bodies of ether. The nine thousandyears are suited to these souls in the following way. Ten thousand years,he claims, is the period of the soul’s ascent and descent through the five15

planets, so that each [planet] could have it for two millennia. However, itis not a continuous succession, though the time617 [is reckoned] continu-ously by contiguity. That is because it is not618 contiguous with itself.619

Hence the total number of lives is nine,620 which he riddlingly refersto by the nine thousand years – and people carry out nine-day rites tothe dead, and similarly some people give names to the new-born on the20

ninth day, using periods of time as symbols of coming into and passingout of life. So he did not adopt the period of ten-thousand-years at thispoint, but took the figure of nine thousand so that they should still bein the region of the earth drawing near to the [completion of the] tenthousand year cycle.621

This entire line of interpretation is something the divine25

Iamblichus622 refuses to endorse, saying that the account at this pointconcerns not lives but different degrees of participation in the heritage

617 The time in question is the nine thousand years in the Platonic text, for it is this thatconstitutes the source of the problem; it is not a statement about how time in generaloperates. Clearly there must be a gap at one or more points in the ten-thousand-yearcycle. These sentences read like an attempt to sum up Porphyry’s argument far toobriefly, and it is not surprising that uncertainties and textual disputes occur. There is nocertainty that Proclus had understood it himself. My translation involves considerableinterpretation, in which I differ from other scholars, and should thus be treated withcaution. Part of Porphyry’s problem is that the Ur-Athenians of the Atlantis-War shouldperhaps belong to the equivalent point of the cosmic cycle to classical Athenians, whichwould have placed them ten rather than nine thousand years before them; the otherpart is derived from the Phaedrus, from which (248e) Porphyry accepts the number ofnine lives in a ten thousand year cycle. That dialogue clearly demands that there shouldbe a gap in the cycle after the ninth life, so that the soul may enjoy a period in its wingedcondition, when it will attempt to achieve a vision of the place above the heavens.

618 I am adhering to the MS reading at 18, preserving the negative with Festugiere, unlikeSchneider, and Diehl.

619 I.e. the time of nine thousand years does not join up with the next nine thousand, sodoes not involve the complete cycle.

620 That the number of nine lives per 10,000-year cycle, each involving a separate 1,000-year period, is derived from Phaedrus 248d–249a, we may see by the reference to thatdialogue in Iamblichus’ criticism at 147.28.

621 I take it that the modern Athenians here were thought to symbolize souls at the end ofa cycle of nine ‘lives’ and nine thousand years; their next thousand years will thereforebe spent in winged condition, removed entirely from terrestrial circumstances. Theancient Athenians would have been starting the cycle.

622 in Tim. fr. 15 Dillon; Proclus himself is clearly a little more sympathetic.

244

Atlantis

of Athena. So the mention of the cycles from the Phaedrus is beside thepoint.623 But if one must offer an explanation that agrees with Porphyry’sapproach,624 one should say that on high the soul lives intellectively and 148in the way associated with Kronos, but it descends to an awareness ofthe life that is ‘constitutional’ in the primary sense,625 which is associatedwith Zeus, and then it activates the spirit and lives ambitiously – the spiritbeing associated with Ares. In addition to this it succumbs to desireand the lives associated with Aphrodite, and finally it emits physicalcreative principles (logoi). All logoi are associated with Hermes,626 and it is 5

ithyphallic Hermes who is the overseer of all physical creative principles.Through these principles it is bound to the body, and when it takesa body it lives first in a vegetative way, being in charge of the foodand growth of the body, then appetitively, awakening the generativepowers, then spiritedly as it disengages with these things and returns to 10

the spirited life, then constitutionally by moderating the passions, andfinally intellectively.627 So if it completes the return to square one628 itlives intellectively, and the number ten thousand marks the limit. Butwhile in [the realm of] generation, even if it conducts itself excellently,it lives a life that falls a thousand years short of that figure. The number 15

nine thousand is a symbol of this, one that is fitting for the excellentconstitution of the Athenians.

Lexis: details of the text interpreted

Concerning the citizens born nine thousand years ago I shall brieflyshow you their laws and the finest of their achievements in action. Butas for the details of the whole sequence of events we shall get the 20written records themselves and go through it another time at leisure.(23e4–24a2)

623 See note on 147.18 above.624 An approach, that is, that highlights different lives under the auspices of the five planets.

It is difficult to gauge Proclus’ level of commitment here. Note that his idea of aPorphyrian approach is to deny that the final stage of the cycle is completed, not toleave spaces between all the millennial cycles as Festugiere thinks that Porphyry haddone. The term for approach, epibole, is that which Porphyry uses for contiguity in lines17–18.

625 The life of the ancient Athenians typified by the control of the passions exercised byreason.

626 Generally Hermes is the divinity most associated with communication through speech,but it is logoi in a different sense that are relevant here.

627 Proclus depicts an ascent back via similar stages to those of the descent, living vege-tatively (Hermes), appetitively (Aphrodite), spiritedly (Ares), constitutionally (Zeus),and intellectively (Kronos).

628 For the apokatastasis see on 87.30.

245


If you would like to apply this too to the universal arrangement, the ninethousand years will show the whole procession up to the cube and toearthly deeds together with the life that pervades all things, while the25

word briefly will show the unification of the plurality of formal prin-ciples and their being encapsulated by intellect. For its synoptic char-acter629 gives us a reflective glimpse of intellective indivisibility, whilethat which goes forth into multiplicity [gives a glimpse] of the gener-ative power, which multiplies, draws forth, and subdivides the formsthrough otherness. The word laws [gives a glimpse] of how the creation30

has been divided up in accordance with intelligence,630 and finest oftheir achievements [gives a glimpse] of the arrangement that is directed149to the single end of beauty. For that unified beauty proceeds from theintelligibles into the visible creation. That they will get the writtenrecords signifies their recourse to the paradigms, which bring to thepriest the fulfilment needed for him to pass these things on to Solon.5

Hence the account will be of a creation that is divided, multiplied, main-tained according to intelligence, and extending as far as works on earth,as is possible to comprehend from all that has been said.

So compare the laws with those here; for you will discover here and now10many paradigms of those you then had. (24a2–4)

Just as Socrates outlined his constitution ‘under the main heads’,631 sotoo the priest recalls the laws of the ancient Athenians ‘briefly’, in orderthat these may maintain both their subordination to those and their sim-15

ilarity in organization, and with good reason, because those were moreuniversal while these are more particular, and those were the works ofthe mind while these involve imagination too. The subordination shouldbe observed to the extent that Socrates was outlining a constitution, whilethis man outlines laws. A constitution is the unifying principle and com-mon bond of the life of its citizens, while law-giving is an order that20

proceeds to multiplicity and division, the former corresponding to theprovidential cause, and the latter rather to fate. The similarity [shouldbe observed] to the extent that both claim that they are conveying in anutshell the multiplicity of what there is to say. So again this too has agrasp of the universe and of the divine causes, for the middle creation is25

629 The references are a little vague, but seem to be to the general import of the twophrases under discussion. I do not feel that Festugiere’s emendation is warranted here.

630 Festugiere rightly draws attention to the allusion to Laws 714a, which makes law ‘thedistribution [dianome] of intelligence’ and is about to be quoted at 150.14. This passagewas popular in late antiquity (e.g. Olymp. in Gorg. 26.3, 47.4). The notion of thecreator-god as a law-giving intellect responsible for a distribution occurs at Numeniusfr. 13.6.

631 19a8, cf. 54.12, the phrase being discussed at 54.27–55.26.

246

Atlantis

dependent upon the first and is assimilated to it, and each is a cause of theAll, but the former is so according to unity and a single sameness, andthe latter according to the procession and otherness of the things beingcreated – just as the third [creation] is so by reversion. And the first is so 30

by maintaining the ‘war’ in generation in a heavenly fashion, the secondin a secondary and subordinate fashion – just as the third [maintains] thelast things of all.632 So it is with good reason that Critias too is handingdown the laws and life of the Athenians ‘under the main heads’ just likethe priest. This much should be grasped here too. 150

It was images that he called paradigms here, since the Saitians par-ticipate secondarily in what the Athenians have primarily. For even if thearchetypes are first, still it is the images that have first place with respectto our cognition.633 So just as the things that are secondary in nature 5

are called primary, so too [they are called] paradigms. For they serve asparadigms to the things that are being recalled by their means, and it isthrough them that [these things] get to know what is before them.

Here too the Athenian situation is indicating the more universal order,and that of the Saitians the more particular, though both of these stand in 10

the same relation in both particular and universal things. Consequentlythe constitution that will be handed down belongs to the Athenians’ city,though more so to the arrangement of the universe, and the laws thatstretch out across the whole cosmos come from Athens. For it is said –and rightly said – that all law is ‘the distribution of intelligence’, and theAthenians’ laws that have been passed in accordance with their presiding 15

deity reflect the distribution of Athenaic intelligence. Such too are thelaws in the All, which are determined by the single creative intelligenceand the single providential care of Athena.

The Egyptian class structure compared

Firstly the class of priests, which has been separated off apart from therest . . . (24a4–5)

The fact that all this arrangement is somehow more particular than 20

Socrates’ constitution, and more divided than that one through its imi-tation of the intermediate creation, may be learned from the numberand character of the classes in the city. For there had been three classes 25

632 Festugiere notes how Proclus introduces the third creation without warning here,explaining that Socrates corresponds here to the first creation, the priest to the second,and Critias, by retelling things, to the third creation, as we see from the next sentence.

633 Here Proclus explains an unusual, rather weak Platonic use of paradeigma as ‘example’,by adopting the Aristotelian distinction between what comes first by nature and whatdoes so in our cognitive processes.

247


there, guardians, auxiliaries, and labourers – for the triad belongs closelyto the creative monad634 – while here there are double that number,hieratic, military, manufacturing, cultivating, pasturing, and hunting.635151That is because the intermediate creation is in possession of the dyadicelement alongside the triadic. Further, while both of these numbers636

are proper to Athena, the one comes here straight from there – as it isa triad – and the other comes along with generation. For the hexad istriangular637 as a result of the triad. By its triangularity and its derivation5

from the triad he shows both its subordination and its belonging to thegoddess. For even if the whole of creation participates in Athena, thosethat are most filled with her are the first and uppermost things of theAll, the first creation and the first father.

In this way you will find, if you take only these classes, that the number10

is proper to the goddess. And if you should add the power of caring forpractical wisdom, you will find that the heptad is totally Athenaic. Andthis too is something frequently discussed, and the unfeminized characterof the heptad and its derivation from the monad alone are celebrated,638

and it is above all the third monad and the heptad that constitute an15

image of Athena. The former does so through being intellective andreverting to itself and to the monad, the latter through proceeding fromthe father alone. So you could approach things in this way on the basisof the numbers.

But one should also see which of them is inferior and which supe-rior from the actual quality of the classes. The hieratic is inferior to20

the guardian class, which reaches up to the very first cause, just as[Plato] himself in the Statesman subordinated the priests to the states-man and gave them no political power.639 The military is inferior to

634 This strange statement may be due to the fact that there is a triad of demiurges underthe leadership of a single Father of Demiurges, and to the view that odd numbers(particularly three) are somehow held together more closely than even numbers.

635 Much discussion of the list of six Egyptian classes (extending to 24b1) occurs in whatfollows; the six are entirely derived from Proclus’ understanding of Plato’s text, and thediscussion is not informed by the extended knowledge of Egypt in Roman times thatNeoplatonists must have had.

636 Three and six, the number of classes under each constitution, not two and three.637 Because six dots may be arranged in a triangular form.638 Underlying all this are two mythical feature of Athena, her having a father alone and so

missing a source of femininity, and her being a virgin so that none makes a woman ofher. Festugiere aptly compares II. 236.17–20 and Iambl. Theol. Arithm. 71 de Falco; alsorelevant is the fact that seven is a prime number, making it indivisible, and impossibleto derive from the multiplication of two numbers other than itself.

639 290d–e actually refers to the practice in Egypt of kings involving priests in their deci-sions, as well as to magistracies in Greece that incorporated a role in sacrificing animals.The discussion is aimed at showing the closeness of priestly and kingly roles before the

248

Atlantis

the auxiliary, since this latter class orders things inside the city properly 25

and receives sufficient education, while the former pursues only warsand the deeds of war, and this is the only training that it participates in.The labouring class is divided into the remaining classes, so that it dif-fers in being more comprehensive and by its being somehow dependenton the classes preceding it. Hence it has become clear to us both from 30

the number and from the quality that what is now being handed down isinferior to the constitution of Socrates and would take second place afterit.

In the case of that constitution, we were setting out its correspon-dences with the All in the following way. The guardian class corresponds 5

to the heavenly gods, the auxiliary to the superior powers that attend theheavenly ones and guard the All, and the labouring class to those thatconserve enmattered nature and to particular souls; one corresponds tothe fixed stars, another to the planets, and another to enmattered things.We were also assuming that even among the heavenly gods themselvesall these things were present by analogy. 10

But it is worth noticing in this case640 how and in what way theseclasses are to be taken as present in the All. For the philosopher Por-

152

phyry sets it out like this.641 The priests correspond to the archangels inthe heaven which are turned towards the gods whose messengers theyare.642 The military correspond to the daemons who come down into 15

bodies. The pastors correspond to those stationed over the flocks of‘animals’, which they secretly explain as being souls that have missedout on human intelligence and have a condition similar to animals – forof humans too there is a particular ‘protector’643 of their flock and cer-tain particular [powers] some of whom watch over tribes, some cities, 20

and some individual persons. The hunters correspond to those that huntdown souls and confine them in the body – for there are some who alsoenjoy the pursuit of animals, the type that they suppose both Artemis tobe and another host of hunt-oriented daemons with her. The cultivators

statesman’s art can be decisively distinguished from all others, which have the role ofministering to government (290a). However, it reads as if Proclus has an agenda of hisown here, no doubt resenting the political influence of the highest church officials inhis own day.

640 I.e. in the case of the Egyptian classes, as opposed to the Socratic ones just discussedat 152.3–10.

641 = in Tim. fr. XVII Sodano.642 One must bear in mind that ‘angel’ is simply the same word as ‘messenger’ in Greek,

with archangels being the chief messengers.643 Probably an allusion to the Helmsman-god of Plato’s Statesman, the shepherd of a

previous era, who is introduced at 268c and is the object of inquiry throughout themyth (see 274e–275b).

249


correspond to those stationed over fruits. The whole of this constitu-25

tional scheme of sublunary daemons, distributed into many groups, wassaid to be ‘manufacturing’ (demiourgikos)644 by Plato because he was con-centrating on a finished product that was either in existence already orbeing generated.

However, the divine Iamblichus645 criticizes the way this was said asneither Platonic nor true, claiming that ‘archangels’ were never con-sidered worthy of mention by Plato, and that the military class did not30

consist of souls drifting into bodies. For one shouldn’t involve these in153a classification of gods or daemons,646 as it is also out of place that weshould place these in a central category and put daemons or gods atthe lowest productive levels. He also denies that ‘pastors’ refers to thosewho have missed out on human intelligence and acquired a sympathetic5

affinity647 with animals, for the daemons who have oversight of mortalnature do not have their own essential nature (to einai) from humans.Nor does ‘hunters’ refer to those that confine the soul within the bodylike a cage, because that is not the way the soul has been attached to thebody. And this type of speculation is not philosophical; rather it is rife10

with foreign humbug.648 Nor should the cultivators be taken to referto Demeter, for the gods transcend the causes that deal directly withnature.

Accordingly, after offering these criticisms, he makes the priests cor-respond, through likeness, to all the secondary substances and powers,as many as honour and serve their causes before them. The pastors [he15

makes correspond] to all those in the cosmos who have been allotted

644 Plato’s text in fact uses the corresponding verb and noun at 24a5–7, not the adjective,which needs to be rendered here by something other than ‘creative’ in the context ofhuman society. Proclus makes it clear that this use of the term demiourgikos to coverthis range of occupations is unusual, cf. 153.26–7, but it is by no means certain thatPlato had not intended to be understood as using it in just this way.

645 = in Tim. fr. 16 Dillon, commented upon in Dillon (1973), 282–5.646 One should recall that Porphyry had combined the views of Numenius and Origenes by

involving both souls and daemons in his explanation of the Atlantine conflict, 77.6–24.647 The term sympatheia here refers to the condition of being similarly situated with regard

to the emotional faculties (the pathe) as another party (here animals).648 It is barbarike alazoneia, indicating something which is (a) alien to Greek traditions,

and (b) full of empty words designed to impress the reader deceitfully. Dillon (1973,282) rightly finds Iamblichus’ protests particularly amusing, given his own interest inreligious ideas with no Greek pedigree. There may, however, be no need to take thecomments as Iamblichan, for the indicative might be taken to indicate the insertedcomments of Proclus. While all explanations of the basic Iamblichan claims here usethe indicative (152.32, 153.5, 8–9, 11), as if the connective gar were introducing asubordinate clause, one notes that this slur on the general character of Porphyry’swork is introduced by oude, and does not have to be linked with the explanatory clausethat precedes.

250

Atlantis

dominion over life that sinks into the body and over the irrational powers,and who distribute these in order.649 The hunters [he makes correspond]to universal650 powers for adorning secondary things by pursuit of reality,the cultivators who prepare for the germination651 of the seeds cast from 20

heaven upon the earth, and the military to those who convert all that isgodless and bring the divine to victory. That is how the divine Iamblichusputs it. But it is a common point against both that they divide manu-facturers into pastors, hunters, and cultivators, instead of producing all 25

four from the one class. For, if one viewed it rightly, one would neversubsume the pasturing class or the hunting class under the productive.652

So perhaps then it is better that we offer our interpretation in themanner of our teacher, supposing the hieratic and military classes to beone dyad, the productive and cultivating to be another, and the pasturing 30

and hunting to be a third, and that we track down their paradigmaticsignificance on the basis of that kind of arrangement. For the hieratic 154element is present among the uplifting gods, the military among theprotective gods, the manufacturing among those who distinguish all theforms and formal principles among encosmic things, and the cultivatingamong those who set nature in motion from above and disseminate soulsaround [the world of] generation. For Plato too calls the fall of the 5

soul into generation a sowing,653 and sowing belongs most naturallyto farmers, just like gathering in the produce of nature. The pasturingelement [is present] among the powers that are separately in charge ofthe various forms of life that are carried around in generation, for in theStatesman too he has passed on [the notion of] certain divine pastors.654 10

The hunting element [is present] among those that organize all the life-currents within matter, for the theologians are in the habit of calling

649 The verb for distributing, dianemo, in its simple form nemo also means ‘to take out tograze’, and is the root behind the term ‘pastor’ (nomeus).

650 Dillon (1973, 285) makes these identical with the ‘young gods’ of the Timaeus, on theground that their universality makes them gods rather than daemons; he makes thecultivators and military daemonic servants of these. Dillon sees Iamblichus as resist-ing a Gnostic or Chaldean system that allows evil daemons, as well as defending thetranscendence of the gods.

651 The term telesiourgia is also chosen to convey the notion of the efficacy of a ritual.652 See note on 152.27; Proclus denies that Plato’s text at 24a7–b1 should be read as offering

three examples of the different manufacturers who stick to their own line of business(a5–7), something not unnaturally assumed by early exegetes, who had thus been leftwith five classes in Egypt rather than the six of Syrianus and Proclus.

653 The sowing metaphor of such passages as Tim. 41e and 42d had long been noticed byinterpreters, e.g. Numenius fr. 13 with Tarrant (2004).

654 An allusion to 271d6–7, where daemones look after animals that are divided into flocksaccording to types like pastor gods.

251


these ‘wild beasts’.655 All these classes belong to the middle creation,the one responsible for reversion,656 the protective one, the one that15

manages what is allotted to souls, the one that directs the regenerativespecies of life, everything that engages in manufacturing and giving formto material things, and the one that organizes the lowest life-currents.657

Besides all these classes one <must>658 postulate another contempla-tive one whose care is wisdom. He will himself laud this one aboveall,659 though he mentions the hieratic class first, being a priest. So20

there are seven in all, and the monad has been taken separately fromthe hexad. The former corresponds to the single intellect that conservesthe whole creation of generated things, while the latter [corresponds]to the more particular tribes beneath it, uplifting, protective, inform-ing, life-creating, shepherding civilized life, and subduing the bestial25

nature.These things then have been separated from simple things even in

the All. And further, it is possible to see them, he says, among humans,firstly among the Athenians, and secondly among the Saitians, as eachin accordance with the division of classes goes about its proper workseparately. The [words] from the rest show this, and apart, so that we155may understand the unmingled purity of the classes that proceeds fromabove to the lowest [stages] through subordination.

And after this the situation of the manufacturers, that each goes abouthis own task, intermixed with no other task, and the situation of thepastors, of the hunters, and of the cultivators. (24a5–b1)5

This whole tetractys occupies the third order in the division of classesinto three, but it is counted by Plato as second at this point, so thatthrough this too the discourse may imitate the All – in which the lowest10

element is in the middle, encompassed on either side by more divine ones.For the most enmattered and densest thing660 reclines in the middle asa result of the creation process, for even so it is only with difficultythat its arrangement is preserved throughout its entirety and protectedby all that encompasses it. And it is again added in these words that15

655 Festugiere, following Diehl, refers to the Chaldean Oracles, fr. 157 des Places (= 60K), whose relevance is unclear to me; the term ‘theologians’ would normally refer toOrphic writings.

656 The language of reversion briefly replaces the language of lifting up higher (154.1, 24).657 The order is identical to that which has immediately preceded it, except that the

manufacturing class has been placed after both the sowers of souls and the pastors.658 Kroll’s addition has been accepted by both Diehl and Festugiere.659 Proclus thinks of 24b7–c3, though there is here no explicit mention of a class to look

after this wisdom.660 Obviously the earth.

252

Atlantis

the manufacturing element is not intermixed with the others, nor theywith it, but each remains on its own and in its own pure state. For thisachieves not only precision in their occupations and correctness in theirown proper discourse, but also a sympathetic affinity among the citizens, 20

because everybody needs everybody else since each person does not pur-sue many crafts. The manufacturer will need the cultivator, the cultivatorthe pastor, this one the hunter, and the hunter the manufacturer, and soeach of them, being in need of the rest, will not fail to mix with them.Hence there is sameness along with the difference and separation along 25

with their unification.

Furthermore you have surely noticed that the military class here isseparated from all the other classes, people who have been requiredby the law to concern themselves with nothing other than mattersof war. (24b1–3)

The situation as regards their not mixing [trades] and keeping separate 30

applies at all levels, but belongs particularly to the military class. For it isakin to the immaculate order that excises661 everything enmattered and 156obliterates error. Hence it is with good reason that matters of war arethe concern of this class, for it is on their account that the city remainsunused to external and <internal> sources of harm, and this shields itwith its own protection, imitating the protective order. For just like thefirst of the demiurges, so too the middle one has its protective divine 5

power. This is what must be brought to bear from theology. But as for[the term] law let us understand it at the universal level as the ordinancethat comes from the single creative intelligence, since creational law isprior to encosmic things, sitting by Zeus’ side662 and helping with his 10

arrangement of all the providential power in the All.

Weaponry compared

Furthermore, there is the habit of arming ourselves with shields andspears, with which we have been the first men in Asian parts to be armed,because the goddess revealed this to us just as she did in those regions of 15

yours first. (24b4–7)

The discourse makes the activity of Athena extend from the paradigms atthe top down to the lowest classes. For she has things naturally belonging

661 Diehl refers to Chaldean Oracles 53.2 Kroll (= Proclus in Crat. 71.17), but, while itdoes sound as if Proclus has in mind such descriptions of the heavenly order here, it isunlikely that we possess the text that inspired him.

662 The creator is called Zeus because of the mythical idea that Justice (Dike) sits at hisside, alluded to more famously at Laws 716a2.

253


to her, some more universal and some more particular, that partake ofher immaculate powers. Also [she has] encosmic classes, set in orderacross the middle creation-process, corresponding to those things in that20

they both constrain and are constrained, mastered by Athenaic activities,and remaining ever in the same immaculate condition in the All on heraccount. This is what one is required to notice generally concerning allthis [lemma]. But one should state what this arming is, what the shieldsare and the spears, and how these things are preconceived within thegoddess.25

Porphyry calls the shield the body, and for the spear he understandsthe temper, and these things belong to those who fall into generation andinto enmattered things, and they are the instruments not of unflinch-ing preservation but of reproductive life, corrupting the purity of intel-30

lect and destroying the rational life.663 But the divine Iamblichus inhis inspired fashion,664 since all that is divine should act and not be actedupon, so that by acting it might not have inaction similar to matter,157and by not being acted upon it might not have a vigorous quality likeenmattered things that work when acted upon, supposes that the shieldsare powers through which the divine remains impassive and immac-ulate, having hedged itself around with an impenetrable protection.The spears he supposes are powers in accordance with which it passes5

through all things without touching and acts upon all things, severingwhat is enmattered665 and defending the entire generation-producingclass.666 This is first observed in the case of Athena, and explains whyher shield and spear have been depicted on her statues too, and she con-tends against all and remains unswerving as the theologians say667 and10

immaculate in the Father. [It is observed] secondly in the Athenaic pow-ers, both the universal ones and the particular ones, for as the Jovianor creative multitude imitates its own monad, and as the prophetic orApollonian [multitude] imitates the distinctive Apollonian character, so15

too the Athenaic plurality reflects the immaculate and unmixed char-acter of Athena. Finally [it is observed] in Athenaic souls, for amongthese too the shield is the invincible and unswerving character of rea-son, while the spear is that which cuts through matter and rids souls of

663 = in Tim. fr. XVIII Sodano.664 The adverb entheastikos here signifies the manner of one who is actively entheos, moti-

vated by some god within, and hence complements the adjective theios that is regularlyapplied to Iamblichus.

665 Cf. 155.32–156.1666 = Iamblichus in Tim. fr. 17, on which see Dillon (1973, 285), who feels that what follows

is amplification by Proclus; Festugiere, however, appears to regard what follows too asIamblichan (see 209 n.2).

667 Cf. 166.2–23 below, where several of these adjectives occur, and Orph. fr. 174 is quoted.

254

Atlantis

demonic or fate-associated affections. Of these weapons the Athenians 20

were allocated a purer share, and the Saitians a secondary one, gettingtheir share in these things too in proportion to their kinship with thegoddess.

The wisdom of the goddess and her two cities

And as for wisdom, you see perhaps how much care the law here has 25

taken right from our foundation up to having obtained all [branches oflearning]. (24b7–c3)

Shortly he will call the goddess both ‘wisdom-loving’ and ‘war-loving’.Accordingly, so that his depiction of the constitution of the Atheniansand the Saitians might come to accord with his model,668 he gave suf- 30

ficient indication of their training for war in what was said, whereas inthese words he presents their attitude to wisdom – so that in the one 158he might present a reflection of Athena’s love of war, and in the otherof her love of wisdom. So what is her wisdom? It is the study of thewhole of hypercosmic and encosmic669 reality, from which, after theprimary goods that are perfective of souls,670 a certain ease671 was estab- 5

lished for human life, proceeding as far as mantic and medicine,672

and viewing these in one way among the invisible causes, in anotherat a cosmic level, and in the lowliest way at the level of human prac-tice. Since learning is immaterial and this goddess is transcendent,673 10

she accordingly reveals to those that are akin to her all parts of her wis-dom, both divine and human. For in the case of mantic one should positone kind among the intellective gods, another in hypercosmic entities,and another in encosmic ones, and of this [last one should posit] onekind that has come down to us from the gods, another from daemons, 15

668 I.e. Athena herself.669 Accepting with Festugiere the supplement of Radermacher.670 Apparently an allusion to Laws 631b–d, where goods belonging to the soul are distin-

guished from those belonging to the body.671 Reminiscent of the euporia . . . tou biou afforded to humans by the gift of fire stolen by

Prometheus from Hephaestus and Athena at Prot. 321e3.672 Proclus seems to have chosen to concentrate on these two arts simply because they are

mentioned specifically in Plato’s text.673 While it is not spelled out, I should presume that Proclus is assuming that all immaterial

things are able to be shared with others without diminishing what remains with thegiver, much as Numenius does (fr. 14 des Places). He also concentrates on showingthat knowledge is undiminished in the giver (lines 14–16), regarding it as somethingdivine rather than human, and as therefore able to be shared in a divine manner. DesPlaces (p. 109) is also prompted to suggest the influence of Laws 631b–d, as I have doneat 158.4 above. Numenius (fr. 14.19–21) himself draws the parallel with the wisdomproceeding from Prometheus’ fire, as I did at 158.6, alluding to Phil. 16c.

255


and another from the human mind (dianoia), which is more dependenton skill (technikos) and interpreting images (eikastikos).674 Further, oneshould posit in the same way the medicine of Paion among the gods, andthe subordinate and servile kind that assists the gods among daemons,who are the origin of the preparation of materials and of the means20

by which the gods reveal themselves. For just as there are many dae-mons associated with Eros, so also with Asclepius,675 some allocated thepost of attendants, others that of escorts. But in human life [one shouldposit] the medicine that makes provision on the basis of observation andtrial, the medicine in which some relate more closely and others less so25

to the divine medicine. There is also a mixture of these two branchesof wisdom, mantic and medicine, among the Egyptians, because thecauses of these seem to have been prefigured in a single divinity,676 andfrom the one source several separate streams flow around the cosmos.Let this be our general comment concerning the wisdom mentioned30

here.

Lexis: some details considered

As we move on to explanation of individual details, we shall state that lawmeans the pervading order deriving from the single intellect of Athena,care means the providence that has travelled from the universals as far159as the particulars, and right from our foundation shows the naturalaffinity for wisdom of Athenaic souls – for by right from the beginninghe seems to signify that it is neither introduced nor foreign.677 But if5

one were to connect the phrase with the universal order, it seems to methat this right from the beginning shows that the arrangement doesnot proceed from the incomplete to the complete, but that it has alwayshad order and its emergence is linked throughout with goodness.

674 The term eikastikos here is difficult, for it cannot mean purely guesswork, which seemsto be the contrary of skill; rather, it is likely to imply here the use of mental pictures thatrequire interpretation, and one recalls that it is a feature of dianoia at Rep. 510d5–511a8that it uses a kind of image of its own to focus on something higher.

675 Asclepius, the more recent patron divinity of medicine among the Greeks, is herecontrasted with Paion, the divine physician of Iliad 5, normally known as Paion (orPaian) Apollo, and the divine and daemonic medicines are then associated with thefree and subservient doctors at Laws 720a.

676 Diehl offers Imhotep (Imouthes), while Festugiere notes that the same thing couldhave been said of Apollo.

677 This seems to be an afterthought added when it was realized that the initial explanationis not stated clearly, hence the repetition of the entire phrase from the lemma.

256

Atlantis

It is concerning all the cosmos, because there are also invisiblecauses of things arranged in the cosmos, which perfect wisdom studies 10

before these things here, because its character is not technical, as Por-phyry says, or suited to the crafts; for that is the gift of Hephaestus, butnot Athena, as Iamblichus points out.678

It goes as far as mantic and medicine, because even of the encosmic 15

gods one ought first to study their other powers, and then in this position[to study] their signification and their health-giving activity; since it hasfallen to our lot to manage a body as well, and the future is not clearto us when we are laid low679 in the body. That is because enmatteredlife displays a great deal of possibility according to the basic stuff that is 20

carried along in different states at different times.All other branches of learning of course means geometry, astron-

omy, calculation, arithmetic, and those akin to these. By establishing allthese the law lifted the Athenians and Saitians to a remarkable level ofwisdom. So much for this. 25

Porphyry said that medicine too had good reason to come fromAthena,680 because Asclepius is intellect of the lunar order,681 just asApollo is intellect of the solar one. The divine Iamblichus criticizedthese claims,682 saying that they miserably confuse the substances ofthe gods, and, to suit the context of the moment, incorrectly distributethe intellects and souls of encosmic things. For Asclepius too should be 160placed under Helios [the Sun], and should proceed from him into theearthly region, so that, just like the heaven, so too generation through

678 Porphyry in Tim. fr. XIX Sodano, Iamblichus in Tim. fr. 18; Dillon (1973, 286) seemsuncertain whether Porphyry regarded the wisdom referred to in the lemma as technicalor craft wisdom, or whether he opposed this view, but he appears to me to offer verygood reason to believe that he sponsored the view, and that Iamblichus is here criticizinghim. His evidence includes the manner in which the two are cited but not linked,and other extant details concerning Porphyry’s views on the sphere of Athena’s and ofHephaestus’ influence. Furthermore, Iamblichus, in his comments on this section of theTimaeus, is largely adopting a polemical attitude towards Porphyry, his sole significantpredecessor as a commentator on the details of the Atlantis story.

679 Reading ��7�$2�� with Festugiere, following Praechter, rather than the inferior��7�+$2�� printed by Diehl.

680 Porph. fr. XX Sodano. Dillon (1973, 286) finds eikotos problematic, since it does notlook as if Proclus would want to sanction that position by saying that Porphyry had‘good reason’ to make his claim. In fact I feel that word order strongly suggests thatPorphyry is making a claim about what Plato had said ‘with good reason’, since eikotostends to come first when qualifying the main verb.

681 Note the connection between Athena and the moon in Porphyry’s work, 147.6–11,165.16–17.

682 = in Tim. fr. 19 Dillon.

257


secondary participation should be held together by this divinity, being5

filled683 by it with proportion and with harmonious blending.684

So at that time the goddess, imposing this whole arrangement andsystem, founded you people first. (24c4–5)

The term whole indicates the unified embrace within the goddess of all10

things ordered by her, with neither anything being left out nor plural-ity being separably contained in her. The word arrangement gives anindication of the orderly distribution of Athenaic providence, and theword system indicates the unification of these things and their kinshipwith the one cosmos. Furthermore, arrangement signifies the proces-15

sion of wholes from the goddess, and system the reversion to herself.685

But since some of the things in the All are universal, and some particular,with the former corresponding to monads and the latter to numbers, withboth partaking of Athenaic providence, but the universal and monadicdoing so in a primary sense, for this reason the present passage allocates20

the senior and hegemonic role to the Athenians, and the secondary andsubordinate one to the Saitians.

Allotment and selectionAfter selecting the place in which you were born, observing how thetemperate balance of the seasons there would bring men of exceptional25

wisdom. (24c5–7)

While the goddess had previously been said to be allotted the land,she is now said to select it. The two ideas in fact converge, and beingallocated does not imply a lack of will on her part, nor is her selection arandom thing, as it is in the case of the particular soul. That is becausedivine necessity converges with divine will, a choice with a lot, and30

choosing with getting allotted something. The identity of this place161

683 Festugiere, influenced by Diehl, sees the nominative participle 7��$�� (beingfilled) as pertaining to the earthly region, which appears in the text in the accusative;this is very difficult, and I prefer to see it pertaining to the two parallel nominatives‘heaven’ (��) and ‘generation’ (�2+��). As both partake of the same divinity, bothshould be filled with analogous qualities.

684 Festugiere speaks of a well-blended climate here, which is fine as applied to mete-orological conditions, but, as god of healing, Asclepius must be concerned with thewell-blended condition of living bodies too, and I assume that something akin to pro-portion and blending is also being postulated for the heavens.

685 Festugiere remarks ‘pure fantaisie!’, but all Proclus wants to suggest is that diakosmesisrepresents the maintenance of order in separation (dia-), while syntaxis emphasizes thebringing together (syn-) of various elements into a single order.

258

Atlantis

has been stated before,686 identifying it with space, i.e. place in the gen-uine sense. For it is in respect of this that the dividing up of divine lotsoccurs, so that they should be fixed in the same way for ever prior tothings that are established in time. But at this time we should add that 5

the soul of the All, which has the formal principles of all things divineand which depends on what comes before itself, imposes upon differentparts of space a special affinity with different powers and certain symbolsof the various orders among the gods. For this space is suspended imme-diately after her, and functions as her connate instrument. So she, being 10

a rational and psychical cosmos, brings this too to be a perfect cosmosof space and life through the divine tokens. And space itself, though itis said to be both continuous and unmoved, is still not entirely withoutvariance in itself, bearing in mind that not even the soul of the All is 15

entirely invariant from one part to the next, but part of it is the circle ofthe Same and part that of the Other. And why speak of the soul? Noteven the much-lauded intellect is without variance within itself, thougheverything in it is of the same colour, as it were – for not absolutely allcontent of the intellect is of the same potency, but some is more uni- 20

versal, some more particular. Not even this is remarkable. Rather theDemiurge himself has first, middle and last orders within himself. Inconsequence, as I believe, even Orpheus when he gives an indication ofthe order of things within him, says:

Of him indeed is the radiant Heaven his head, 25

His eyes are the Sun and against this the Moon,

and so on. If space here had had one substance with no variation, stillthe power of the soul, the orders of daemons allocated to it, and beforethese the gods who divide it up in accordance with the order pertainingto creation and allocations required by Justice, would have brought to 30

light a great variation of parts within it. So it is from within that the selec-tion should be considered to arise, resulting from the very substance of 162the gods, but not the kind of selection that we see in the case of individ-ual souls. The one is substance-related,687 while the other is determinedonly on the basis of its present life, the former eternal, the latter tem-poral. Moreover, one should understand this place neither as the earth

686 138.21–5: ‘For the space that receives all the sectors of the cosmos and embraces themwithin it, and is stretched throughout everything bodily, is immobile, so that by beingamong things moved it should not itself require yet another place, with an unnoticedregress to infinity.’ Cf. 139.9–15.

687 Proclus means that the very thing that each god is in his or her own right determineswhat that god selects, while it is not the underlying nature of an individual soul butrather its temporary condition that determines how it makes its choice of life; for thelatter Rep. 620a2–3 is an important influence.

259


nor as the air,688 but as the unmoved space that is ever illuminated by5

the gods and divided up into Justice’s lots. For these material things areat times ready for participation in the gods, and at times unready, andbefore the things that participate at times there must be those which everhave the same link with the gods. So that will do for these matters.10

Earlier thoughts on the balance of the seasons

As for the temperate balance of the seasons that produces wise men,Panaetius and some other followers of Plato689 have understood it atthe level of phenomena, supposing that Attica is appropriately con-stituted for the engendering of wise men because of its seasons beingnicely balanced. But Longinus raises difficulties with them, saying that15

what they say is not true. On the contrary, there is considerable lackof proportion in both summer and winter weather in this area. [Healso claims that], even if the area were like that, they would not anylonger be able to preserve [the doctrine of] the immortality of the soulif wisdom grows naturally in them because of the temperate balance20

of the seasons. For that is the doctrine of people who declare the soulto be a blend or the perfection of a blend.690 He [Longinus] himself

688 Clearly no literal reading can take this place as one in the air, and it is safe to assumethat we are dealing here with the non-literal interpretation of either Porphyry orone of those who influence him. Interpretations involving a clash of daemons would beespecially likely to fix the ‘Athenians’ and ‘Atlantines’ in the air, for the ‘battle’ is clearlyset in the region through which souls descend at 77.14–15. This is also the region inwhich Phaethon’s mythical loss of control occurs (cf. 108.8–114.21). It should be notedthat Middle Platonists associated daemons with no element as closely as air (Apuleius,De Deo Socratis 6–8, cf. Philo Gig. 6–9, and by analogy at least Plut. Mor. 416e–f).

689 Some other Platonikoi. Patillon and Brisson (2001, 175) somewhat similarly trans-late ‘commentateurs de Platon’. Panaetius, though well-known for his love of Plato(Glucker 1978, 28–30), always professed to be a Stoic. Indeed, in the second centurybc the term ‘Platonic’ was not employed for members of any school of philosophy, andit became popular only in the early years of the Roman Empire – when ‘Academic’still suggested some kind of allegiance to New Academic doctrine, now in decline,while many sought for a term suggesting a commitment to the philosophy of Plato,usually revealed in the course of interpreting Platonic texts. It is probably the factthat Panaetius had been cited by Porphyry and Longinus before him as an authorityon Platonic matters that causes Proclus to refer to him in this way here. So it would bephilologically rather than philosophically that Panaetius was a ‘Platonic’, suggesting that itwas Longinus who had been responsible for the term. The text is Panaetius test. 157Alesse = fr. 76 van Straaten.

690 Longinus believes that for the soul to be improved by a balance of the elements aroundit, then it must itself have the nature of a balance of elements; but this doctrine wouldbe little different from that of the soul as a harmony (or ‘blend’, krasis, 86b9), said to beinconsistent with immortality by Simmias at Phaedo 85e–86d. For further commentaryon 162.11–27 (= Longinus fr. 36) see Patillon and Brisson (2001), 316.

260

Atlantis

says that this temperate balance does not relate to the quality of theair,691 but is some unnamed peculiarity of its climate, one that helpsto perfect wisdom. For just as there are some waters with prophetic 25

powers, and some places that are unhealthy and ruinous, so too there isnothing remarkable about this kind of peculiarity of a place contributingto wisdom.

Origenes, however, used to refer this temperate balance to the cir-cular motion of the heavens, because it is from there that good or poorcrops692 of souls come, as Plato says in the Republic. 30

Proclus on the balance of the seasons

But this person has too partial a hold on the truth, while Longinusinadvertently makes the peculiarity [of Athens’ climate] a bodily one,and gets embroiled in the difficulties that Porphyry raises against him.693

For how does one peculiarity of the atmosphere make people ready for 163different things? Next, while the same peculiarity still remains, how is itthat there is there no longer the same natural gift among the inhabitants?But if the peculiarity is destructible, what can one blame for destroyingit? It is better to say that, while the gods divide up the whole of space 5

according to the creational order, every sector of space receives soulsthat are applicable to it, Areic space the more spirited ones, Apolloniacspace the prophetic ones, Asclepiac space the medically-minded ones,and Athenaic space the wise ones. And that this is due to its having a kindof quality from the god allotted it, or rather a power of a certain kind and 10

an attunement to lives of a certain kind. So it is this attunement that hecalled a temperate balance, since in every sector there are many powers,both physical and psychical, daemonic and angelic, and the henad ofthe god who is allotted each [of them] unites and combines them all,making an unblended unity of them all. Because the Seasons have been 15

691 That is to say that it is not a climatic feature brought about purely by the surroundingair having a nice balance of hot, cold, wet and dry (as might be suggested by the termfor balance, eukrasia); rather it involves some special quasi-magical power unknown tothe science of the time.

692 The terms phora and more particularly aphoria here, both using an agricultural metaphor,make it plain that Origenes was attempting to relate his interpretation to Republic 546a5,where Plato talks of both souls and bodies, and where the cycles mentioned are notexplicitly linked with the heavens. Festugiere offers an extended note that fails to explainOrigenes’ interpretation, which no doubt was built upon earlier Middle Platonist orNeopythagorean understanding of this cryptic speech, which then had considerableattraction for fringe figures such as Dercyllides and Cronius (see in Remp. 2.22.20–26.14).

693 = in Tim. fr. XXI Sodano.

261


allotted by the Father the job of watching over these sectors or lots, theSeasons:

To whom is entrusted the great heaven and Olympus,

as Homer says,694 and in accordance with whom the attunement of sim-ilar souls to locations is also accomplished, on this account he linked20

this temperate balance with the Seasons, as it is conserved entirelyfrom that source. So the goddess, noticing how that sector of extendedspace was continually kept by the Seasons well attuned for the recep-tion of wise souls, chose it. This does not imply that the place existedonce without Athena and it was at some time acquired as her lot – for25

the account demonstrated quite the reverse – but because in extendedspace itself there are readinesses for the reception of divine illuminations,different readinesses in different locations. These were imposed by theuniversal Demiurge who embraces in a unitary fashion the powers ofall the gods after himself, but they are strengthened and perfected, or30

rather actually proceed, from the gods set in charge of them. So just asin the choice of lives the soul that chooses its own proper life gets thingsright, in the same way too the soul that is positioned in its own proper164place in accordance with its choice of life gets things right more thanone sown into another’s place. The circular motion of the heaven con-tributes greatly to this state of affairs, bringing on good or poor cropsof souls, but in good harvests [land]695 given to producing the wise has5

an especially good crop, while in cases of failure the shortage there isless. So just as a farmer selects land for the bringing of seed to fruition,knowing that he will do better when there is a good crop, while whenthere is a poor one he will be affected less by the cycle’s downturn on10

account of the potential of the land, so too the account states that thegoddess selected this place because it is productive of the wise, so thatwhen there is a good crop it will do better in the production of mindfulpeople, and better when it is poor by falling less far short of a state oflocational readiness for life.15

But even if he were praising the temperate balance of the observ-able seasons here, we shall express no surprise, as a balance good forbodily health is one thing, while a balance helping to welcome mindful

694 Iliad 5.750; the text is used to give a substantially different slant to the lemma by turn-ing the seasons into the divinities of that name, represented by my capital letter. Sinceminuscule was not yet employed Proclus had no such means of identifying personifi-cations.

695 I follow Festugiere here. The noun to be understood is far from obvious, but this seemsto be the required sense.

262

Atlantis

souls – which is the kind of balance Attica has – is another. For even if itis not always the same [type of] wisdom, there is still a bit more of it forthose who inhabit this land696 on account of the peculiarity of the place 20

and the seasons’ being ready for it. So we suggest this much on thesematters.

Miscellaneous additions

On the other hand the divine Iamblichus697 did not identify the placewith any corporeal part of extended space, but the immaterial cause,passing right through the earth, which supports bodies in its life and 25

embraces all space within it. For it is into this kind of ‘space’, he says,that the goddess directs her creative activity, and here that she settlesmen who are truly good. It is possible to deduce from what is beingsaid whether he is in tune with the details of Plato’s language. But if oneshould step back from this and examine the whole by analogy, one should 30

state that, when this goddess fashions and weaves the All with the Father, 165she allocated a more perfect lot to wholes and to the things of the betterof the two columns of opposites. For these are more mindful than theiropposites and more proper to the goddess. How all that is outstandingin wisdom is more Athenaic we shall show directly from the details of 5

Plato’s language.

The dual character of Athena – earlier interpretation

So because the goddess is both war- and wisdom-loving she chose thislocation that would produce the men most similar to herself and settledthat first. (24c7–d3)

In these words Plato himself has handed down to us the more precise 10

concept of this most important divinity, the Athenaic, exposing the subtleindications of the theologians for those able to glimpse the vision. Amongthe interpreters, however, different ones have resorted to different waysof setting it out, some recording their own opinions in a riddling manner,and others openly stating whatever they want, though with no authority 15

696 One should not forget that Proclus is writing in Athens.697 In Tim. fr. 20, commented on (with summary of preceding positions) by Dillon

(1973, 287–9); it seems likely that Iamblichus is attacking the whole earlier traditionhere, and it is notable that Proclus reacts as if this is one of his predecessor’s worstexcesses.

263


in what they said.698 Porphyry, placing Athena in the moon,699 says thatsouls come down from there with both a spirited and a gentle side.Consequently they are both war- and wisdom-loving, escorts of theinitiates at Eleusis, assuming that the family of those who lead the mys-20

teries at Eleusis is from Musaeus of the Moon, and assuming furtherthat Hermes and the family of Heralds is among them700 there in theregion of the moon, as he claims. But the divine Iamblichus criticizesthese persons701 as failing to preserve the analogy properly, and he inter-25

prets the war concerned as that which utterly removed the unordered,discordant and enmattered nature and wisdom as immaterial and tran-scendent intellection, while this goddess is responsible for both. TheAthenians imitate her through their thoughtful and warlike life, andthe Athenaic location is well attuned to the reception of souls of this30

type.

The dual character of Athena – Proclus’ interpretation702

But if it is necessary not only for the approach of these men to becomeclear but also, before them, for the agreement of Plato’s teaching with the166theologians to become clear, one must state things from the beginning asfollows. In the Father and Demiurge of the entire cosmos many unitaryorders of gods are revealed, protective, creative, uplifting, conserving,5

698 Porphyry, it seems, was one of those who stated his view openly, presumably followingafter others who expressed things in riddles. For Porphyry’s own predecessors it iseasiest to think here of Numenius and Origenes who are named as influences uponPorphyry regarding Atlantis (76.30–77.24), particularly the former who thought interms of souls rather than daemons. However, in view of Plutarch’s interest in the moonas a natural place for souls, best seen in the De Facie (943a–5d), and also in religiousrites and daemons (likewise closely associated there with the moon), one should perhapsconsider him as a possible influence on Porphyry – and one less inclined to express hisview dogmatically.

699 = in Tim. fr. XXII Sodano. Festugiere observes the close agreement between this and147.6–11 and 159.25–7 (= frs. XVI, XX).

700 Not ‘according to them’, as Dillon translates (1973, 290).701 Less probably ‘this interpretation’ (taking the dative as neuter, not masculine), Dillon

(1973), 125; but the verb epiplesso naturally takes a dative of the person. In any case onewould anticipate there having been for Iamblichus, as there was for Proclus (165.13–16), more than just Porphyry who indulged in arbitrary interpretation. This fragment= in Tim. 21.

702 Van den Berg (2001, 41) comments on Hymn 7 that the Athena there ‘is the Athenaof the life-making triad of hypercosmic gods. This appears from the fact that in Plat.Theol. VI.11, p. 52, 24–7, this Athena is equated with the Athena mentioned in Tim.24c7f. as a lover of war and wisdom. Proclus’ exegesis of this phrase in his Timaeuscommentary coincides with his treatment of Athena in H. VII . . .’

264

Atlantis

and perfective, and one of the principal intellective henads within him isthis immaculate and invincible divinity, thanks to whom the Demiurgehimself remains unswerving and unflinching,703 and all things that pro-ceed from him participate in an unyielding power by which he thinks allthings in transcendence, removed from all of reality. All the theologians 10

call this divinity Athena, because on the one hand she is born from thehead of the Father, and remains in him as creative thought, transcen-dent and immaterial – that is why Socrates honoured her as Theonoein the Cratylus;704 and on the other hand because she rose up arms and 15

all,705 the one who gives immaculate706 assistance to the one Demiurgein arranging everything and marshalling707 the entire [force] along withthe Father. It is for the former reason that they call her wisdom-loving,and for the second reason [that they call her] war-loving. For she whoembraces all the Father’s wisdom is wisdom-loving, while she who has 20

uniform authority over all rivalry could with good reason be called war-loving. Hence Orpheus too says about her being born that Zeus gavebirth to her from his head,

gleaming with weapons, a brazen bloom to behold.708

However, since she had to proceed to the second and third orders as 25

well,709 she makes an appearance in the person of Kore at the immaculateheptad, and she engenders every virtue from herself and uplifting pow-ers, and she radiates intellect and immaculate life upon those at second

703 For the terminology here (atreptos, achrantos, adamastos, aklines) see 156.29 and 157.11–18; the latter passage again involves ‘theologians’.

704 The Cratylus (407a8–c2) has inspired far more than just the name ‘Theonoe’ here, forPlato already ascribed this kind of interpretation (but without emphasis on transcen-dence) to ‘the ancients’ as well as the majority of Homeric exegetes in his own day; andhe explains ‘Theonoe’ as either god’s intellective thought (b4) or the thought of divinethings (b7), or even as moral thought (b9).

705 Accepting Festugiere’s excellent correction of B 7� for B7� at 166.15.706 The term relates, as also 156.18–157.16 and 166.6 above, to the virginal purity of

Athena, interpreted in terms of a transcendence free from material influences.707 Here the military sense of tasso seems irresistible. 708 Orph. fr. 174.709 For an earlier account of the way Athena’s influence extends into the divine orders

below see 140.30–141.13. First in the father; second among the hegemonic gods; thirdamong the twelve rulers; and fourth, revealing independent authority, in the heaven,(a) in the inerrant region (Ram, Virgin, etc.), (b) at the sun; (c) at the moon, as monadof a lunar triad. Fifth on the earth, in places like Athens. In this location we hearof her subsequent appearances (after her association first with Zeus), second in theimmaculate heptad, third among the independent gods, fourth in the heaven, and fifthbeneath the moon. This illustrates the need for careful work on the exact nature ofProclus’ system of younger gods, such as that of Opsomer (2003).

265


level. Hence Kore too is called ‘tritogenes’,710 and she is allotted this very30

‘koron’ quality, i.e. her purity,711 from her distinctive Athenaic charac-ter. She makes an appearance also among the independent gods, unitingthe Lunar order712 with her intellective and creative light and making it167immaculate as far as acts of procreation are concerned, and also reveal-ing that the one single henad of them is unmixed and free from theinfluence of the powers that depend on them. She reveals herself alsoin the heaven and beneath the moon, everywhere shielding herself withthis double power – or rather providing the cause of both through her5

own unified gift. [I make this correction] because her unyielding char-acter is intellective and her transcendent wisdom is pure and unmixedwith secondary things, while there is this one distinctive character ofAthenaic providence that comes right down to the lowest things. For incircumstances where even those among individual souls assimilated toher shield themselves with an amazing wisdom and display an irresistible10

strength, what could one say about those in her chorus who are daemonsor encosmic, independent, or hegemonic members of the divine orders?All of them receive from this goddess the double characteristic as if froma single spring. Hence the divine poet too, giving an indication of both15

aspects of her in the course of his mythical inventions, says:

Upon the threshold of the Father she spread out the finely wovenpeplos,

Much embroidered, which she herself had made and toiled at withher hands;

While she, donning the tunic of cloud-gathering Zeus,20

Armed herself with gear for the purpose of war.713

710 Unlike Festugiere, I keep the lower case, which does not give the adjective the characterof an official name for Kore, and perhaps points to Kore as the third manifestation ofAthena. That enables me to resist the temptation to delete the article before kore at166.29, which would make Athena herself the subject and avoid giving Tritogenes as anepithet to a divinity other than Athena herself. For Tritogeneia, a name with variousinterpretations in antiquity, is in fact just an ancient name for Athena, while Kore,as a name for a divinity, usually applies to the daughter of Demeter in the Eleusinianmysteries, elsewhere normally known as Persephone. Athena herself was of course anunmarried female, and hence a kore. As Diehl and Festugiere note Kore is later calledMounogeneia below (457.17), which seems to be in direct conflict with Tritogeneia if thatis understood as being derived from tritos (‘third’, hence ‘Thrice-Born’) as I presumeto be the case here (because of Athena’s appearance at three levels).

711 Diehl accentuates koron in such a way as to connect most directly with kore (plausibly tosuggest ‘unmarried’), but Festugiere sees that the accent required is that which makes ita rare synonym of katharon (pure), which is added to explain the term further. Its best-known use within Platonism was in Plato’s Cratylus, 396b6, where Kronos is explainedas pure intellect (koros nous).

712 One should remember here Porphyry’s association of Athena with the moon; see on165.16.

713 The quotation combines Iliad 5.734–5 and 8.385–6.

266

Atlantis

For by the peplos, which she makes and bases on her own designs, oneshould understand her own intellective wisdom, while by the war-tunic ofZeus one should understand the creative providence that cares unflinch- 25

ingly for encosmic things and constantly prepares the diviner forces tovanquish those within the cosmos. It is because of this, I imagine, thathe set her up as an ally of the Greeks against the barbarians, just as Platomakes her an ally of the Athenians against the people of Atlantis, so thateverywhere the more intellective and divine forces should conquer the 30

less rational and less respected ones.It is true that Ares too is fond of war and rivalry, but he is more

closely related to separation and division, while Athena both conservesthe rivalry and lights the path to unity for those she governs. Hence she 168has been said to be war-loving in respect of her unifying influence, butin his case it is with regard to dividing influence:714

For always are strife, war and battles your loves.715

In this case it is because the god drew separation as his supreme lot, but 5

in that case it was because the rival forces are somehow brought togetheron account of this goddess since the better element prevails – and sinceeven the ancients ranked her alongside Victory on this account.

So if this has been rightly stated, she is wisdom-loving qua creativeintelligence and qua transcendent and immaterial wisdom, wherefore she 10

is called Metis (Counsel) in the company of the gods, and accordinglysays about herself:

I have a name for my counsel and for my benefits.716

But she is war-loving qua one who conserves the rivalries within wholesand qua invincible and unyielding goddess – wherefore she also keeps 15

Dionysus immaculate,717 and contends with the Giants along with theFather, and she alone plies the aegis without Zeus commanding it andholds the spear before it:

With which she tames rows of men, 20

Heroes, against whom she of the mighty sire takes offence.718

In her graciousness she provides for us a share in her immaculate wis-dom and the fulfilment of our intellective power, providing us with

714 One may perhaps be reminded of Philebus 23c–d, where ‘all things now existent in thecosmos’ are mixed of the opposites limit and unlimited, while their mixture is promotedby a cause of mixture and perhaps undermined by a cause of separation.

715 Iliad 5.891, addressed by Zeus to Ares. 716 Iliad 13.299.717 On her preservation of the heart of Dionysus see Hymn 7.11–15, with Van den Berg’s

commentary (2001), 274–9.718 Again the quotation is from two sources, Iliad 8.390, and Odyssey 1.100.

267


Olympian benefits that elevate the soul, while casting out the Gigantic,25

generation-producing imaginings, stirring up in us pure and undistortedconcepts concerning all the gods, and radiating upon us the divine lightfrom herself.

Other epithets of Athena

For she is ‘light-bringer’ since she extends the intelligible light in alldirections, ‘saviour’ since she establishes all particular intelligence in theuniversal intellections of the Father, ‘worker’ since she is the director of169creative works – at least the Theologian says that the Father producedher:

So that she might become for him the fulfiller of great deeds.719

She is ‘beauty-worker’ since she conserves all the works of the Father inintellective beauty; ‘virgin’ because she holds before her an immaculate5

and unmingled purity; ‘war-lover’ because she manages the opposingcolumns in the All and presides over war in its totality; ‘aegis-holder’because she sets the whole of destiny in motion and guides its produc-tions.

We should have gone on to the other epithets of the goddess, if I10

didn’t feel that I was extending this discussion on account of my owndeep involvement in what is being said. So let us turn away from thisback to the task before us, and say that Plato called these two godswisdom-lovers, Eros720 and Athena, not both in the same respect, but15

the former as an intermediary between two totalities721 and as one whodraws us up to intelligible wisdom, and the latter as an extreme and asthe unifying force of creative wisdom. For the Demiurge was:

Both Metis the first parent and Eros of great delight,722

and as Metis he gives birth to Athena, while as Eros he is the parent of20

the Erotic series.

719 Orph. fr. 176.720 At Symposium 203d7 and 204b2–5; his intermediate situation between total wisdom and

total ignorance is plain at 203e5 and 204b5. Proclus is certainly correct to distinguishthe ways in which the two gods were described by Plato as ‘lovers of wisdom’.

721 Festugiere has simply ‘intermediaire dans l’Univers’ for $+�� ) B7�, butProclus is surely thinking of the god’s situation between what is ignorant as a wholeand what is wise as a whole in Plato.

722 Orph. fr. 168.9 conflated with 169.4.

268

Atlantis

The Athenians and what they stand for on a universal level

And so you lived under laws of this kind and even more well-governedstill, exceeding all humankind in every virtue, as was to be expectedof those who were the products of divine parentage and of divine 25

education. (24d3–6)

According to the historical narrative the Athenians’ situation was moreancient than that of the Saitians, the foundation of their constitutioncame earlier, and their laws were closer to Athena. But among their 170cosmic paradigms too the wholes are prior to the parts, and they havea more divine order, a greater power, and a diviner form of virtue thatis genuinely Athenaic.723 For the genus ‘virtue’ is proper to this greatgoddess, seeing that she herself is virtue.724 For while remaining in the 5

Demiurge she is unchanging wisdom and intellection, and among thehegemonic gods she reveals her power of virtue:

She is hailed by the noble name of virtue,725

as Orpheus says. That is how [we explain] this. 10

That the more divine things in the All could in the true sense be calledproducts of divine parentage and of divine education is evident, forthey are both established and perfected – or rather they are always per-fect on account of the creative activity of the gods and the immaculateproductive activity of Athena. So all that is linked to gods, proceeds from 15

gods, and reverts to gods displays outstanding virtue. This is so at theuniversal level, since one must also posit divine virtue in the All, and itis also so in human lives in imitation of what is universally so. Hence itis also attributed to the Athenians by the present passage. Making the 20

life of the Athenians one continuous one, it joined up Solon with theancient Athenians, saying so you lived. For their paradigm is one withitself and continuous, since the entire Athenaic series is a single perva-sive one passing right through to the lowest things, beginning with thehyper-heavenly arrangements at the top.

The Athenians greatest deed and its paradigmatic significance

Many great deeds of your own city are recorded and admired here, yet of 25

all of them one excels in magnitude and virtue. (24d7–e1)

After promising to give a summary of the laws and deeds of the Athe-nians (23e5–6) he has actually passed on to their ‘laws’ already in dis- 30

tinguishing their classes, and he will henceforth give a glowing account

723 Accepting Kroll’s emendation, as Festugiere too seems to do without comment.724 At 166.27 she is the origin of all virtue. 725 Orph. fr. 175.

269


of their deeds, in which the city will be lauded, while its official civicdivinity is treated with [silent] respect.726 But since, even of their deeds,171one could give both an enumeration of them on the one hand, andon the other an all-embracing unity through which the entire char-acter of their constitution will be displayed, he announces that he willteach the deed that is greatest and stands out in virtue, [meaning] notone of many, but one prior to the many.727 For such an approach to5

discourse is both proper to the All, in which wholes constitute a sin-gle continuous life, and to the goddess, who draws together the manyrivalries into a single unified whole. So though there were many greatdeeds of the city, it is with good reason that he narrates the singledeed that has been written in the temples. For it has also an intellective10

paradigm, in as much as that which excels in magnitude and virtueis also studied in the cosmos, with excellence in magnitude reflect-ing its being universal, and in virtue its being intellective. For theuniversal and more divine things within the cosmos both have manyparticular operations and constitute a single life and constitution – a15

constitution according to which they gain the ascendancy over infe-rior things under the leadership of Athena. That is how this must bestated.

But Porphyry728 understood all the great and marvellous deedsdirected against matter and material characters as being those of souls,using ‘material characters’ as a term for the daemons. For he says that20

there are two races of daemons, one souls729 and the other daemons,and these latter are material powers with a character-forming effect on

726 The verb euphemein at 170.30 means to show appropriate respect in one’s speech,whether by reverent speech or by silence. The parallel at 138.27–28 causes Festugiereto highlight the former possibility, but the goddess is not directly mentioned in therest of this dialogue’s account of the war with Atlantis, and there appears now to be acontrast between the praise offered to the Athenians and the type of respect that thegoddess will receive.

727 The emphasis is now on demonstrating how what is said in this lemma can reflect theuniversal order, and order that encompasses these deeds as understood literally, thusensuring that the story is true in all senses. It seems reasonable to suppose that whatis said here must reflect the views of Iamblichus, as (i) the universal-and-particularinterpretation is his innovation, and, though Porphyry is criticized below (171.17–22),he escapes mention except in the phrase ‘the interpreter after him’ (171.23). Onlythe lines 171.17–23 are printed by Dillon (1973) as in Tim. fr. 22, though he inclinestowards seeing Iamblichus and Proclus as in agreement throughout the passage, includ-ing 171.1–17 (commentary, 291–2).

728 = in Tim. fr. XXIII Sodano.729 See in Tim. fr. X Sodano, 77.11–12; one type is ‘made up of individual souls who have

received a daemonic lot’; there had also been a third category of daemones here, butthey had been divine (perhaps inspired by the frequent use of the term to refer to godsin early Greece) and have no direct relevance to the interpretation of the Atlantis story.

270

Atlantis

souls. And indeed he had to undergo criticism of these doctrines fromthe interpreter after him.730

The Athenians’ opponents and what their confrontation represents

For the inscriptions state how great a power your city once 25

stopped when it advanced with aggression against all Europe andAsia, . . . (24e1–3)

Here Plato omits no element of panegyric magnification if one wereto understand the war of the Athenians against the people of Atlantisas simple narrative,731 but neither, in his care, has he fallen short of any 30

theological precision if one should care to cross to universals from partic-ulars and to advance from the images to paradigms.732 While many cer-tainly were accustomed to go on and on in their Panathenaic speeches733 172about the Persian invasion force and the Athenian victories by land andsea, stuff with which the new generation of speech-writers734 have filled

730 This being Iamblichus, of course; in Tim. fr. 22. Porphyry’s views, no doubt built sub-stantially on those of Numenius except for their avoidance of any suggestion of materialsoul (Numenius fr. 52. 64–70, where malignam animam = silvam), accord perfectly withwhat is said of them at 77.6–24. Here it is specified that Porphyry was relating Atlantisto the lowest of three categories of daemon, which is bad and has a corrupting influenceon souls.

731 This kind of observation would seem to be most easily associated with an interpreterwho treated the Atlantis episode as an attempt to write history, and to fulfil the stylisticobligations of one composing in that genre. That much would agree with Longi-nus’ ‘philological’ concerns, and his interest in how best to praise people (see fr. 34 =90.16–21); from fr. 36 (=162.15–27) one might deduce that Longinus took the literalinterpretation for granted, for otherwise he would not have gone to great lengths tomake the account of Athens’ climate agree with a plausible factual claim; for Longi-nus as a literalist interpreter see Baltes (1983). Certainly any non-literal interpretationhad to be followed through systematically (as Porphyry had done), while Longinushad taken only a passing interest in Atlantis (fr. 37 = 204.18–24). If one were lookingfor confirmation of Longinus’ influence one might seek it in the grammarians’ termenkomiastikos. This is found only in Book 1, here and at 62.8, where ‘one of the older[interpreters]’, without endorsement from Proclus, contrasts it with the Socratic style.

732 Philological considerations continue to 172.14, but the higher significance of the storyis then resumed.

733 It seems impossible that Proclus, or rather the tradition that he follows, should nothave Isocrates, as a known rival of Plato, in mind as the author of such a speech. Notethe resumption of what might be called ‘philological’ material.

734 I.e. those of the so-called ‘second sophistic’, concerned to display their talents ratherthan to accomplish any civic purpose; Festugiere refers appropriately to the Pana-thenaicus (= speech 1) of Aelius Aristides, an author already cited for his views on theNile (121.7), and whose works Neoplatonists continued to find it necessary to respondto (Olymp. in Gorg. 1.13, 32.2, 36.4–5, 38.2–3, 40.2, 41.3, 11, 45.3). One might notealso that Longinus had admired Aristides greatly as an orator (frs. 52, 54).

271


their speeches too, in his own praise of Athens he does not discuss the5

Persians or tell of any other similar achievement. Instead he introducesinto our region an Atlantic War from somewhere outside it, one withthe power to completely obliterate everything, and he records how theAthenians were valiant and victorious in this, vanquishing a power ofsuch size and quality. Since the Persian invasion force set out against10

the Greeks, and the Athenians in particular, from the east, he himselfbrought the Atlantic War from the west,735 so that you could picture theAthenians’ city, as if in the centre, chastising the barbarian forces thatmoved in a disorderly fashion736 on either side.

Moreover, although in Athenian tradition and in the mysteries the15

war against the Giants was much discussed, and particularly how Athenawon the prize for valour in the battle against them, because she defeatedthese together with the Titans along with her Father, he did not think itsafe to introduce a war directly against gods. That is the very charge that20

he had been bringing against the ancient poets, and it would have beenodd for Critias or Timaeus, after being among Socrates’ audience whenhe found fault with the poets the day before, again to attribute wars anddissension to the gods. So, through the parallel between humans andthings divine, he teaches us even of this war before the origin of the25

cosmos, adopting the Athenians to represent Athena and the Olympiangods and the people of Atlantis to represent the Titans and Giants, forit is possible to study the same things in images as one can in universals.And, so as to remind us of the parallel, he refers his listeners throughthe name of the Athenians to the Olympian column under Athena’s30

generalship, and through the people of Atlantis to the Titanic gods.For presumably, among the Titanic gods, the very great Atlas is also173one. In fact the theologians too say that after the dismemberment ofDionysus, who shows the divisible procession into the All from the indi-visible creation, the other Titans were given a different allotment byZeus, whereas Atlas was stationed in the western regions holding up the5

heaven:737

735 Note how Proclus sometimes writes as if Plato is making a conscious choice in selectingthe details of the story, a feature that undercuts the idea that they are determined byhistory; in cases like this one may ask whether he is not drawing either on what hadbeen said by Porphyry and others before him who were unconcerned with any historicaltruth in the story or on Longinus’ kind of philologically inspired considerations.

736 It is difficult to resist the idea of an allusion to the disorderly motion that the Demiurgehimself must reduce to order at Tim. 30a4–5.

737 Orph. fr. 215; Festugiere notes that Kern (p. 236) has included Simpl., in DC 375.12–16, in which Atlas is himself one ‘of the Titans involved with Dionysus’, but, unlike therest, does not persist in wronging him, inclines towards Zeus, and so receives a different

272

Atlantis

But by constraints of necessity Atlas holds up the broad heavenAt earth’s very limits.738

Furthermore the victory tokens of Athena are celebrated among the 10

Athenians, and they conduct this feast on the assumption that Poseidonwas beaten by Athena,739 the generation-producing defeated by the intel-lective, and that after the provision of necessities the inhabitants of thisland have set out upon the road to life in accordance with intelligence.For they regard Poseidon as presiding over generation and Athena as 15

overseeing intellectual life.So you have a very great help in achieving this goal from the text at

hand. For the Athenians who are named after the goddess correspondto her, while the people of Atlantis, because they inhabit an island andbecause they are said to be the descendants of Poseidon,740 maintain 20

their correspondence with this god, so that it is clear from this that theAtlantic War gives an indication of the intermediate creation, in thecourse of which the second father,741 brought to fullness by Athena andthe other invisible causes, guides the diviner entities to greater power,and enlists under the intellective ones everything multiplied, material, 25

and closer to matter according to their basic nature. For the gods them-selves are eternally united, but things managed by them are infectedwith such division. That’s how one must contemplate these things inprivate.742

So that we may adopt some definite guidelines for the analysis con-fronting us, the habitable regions within the Pillars of Heracles743 must 174be made to correspond to the entire superior column, and those outsideto the entire inferior one, while this last [must be assumed] to have one

fate. Note Festugiere’s insistence that ‘by Zeus’ is to be read with what follows, contraryto what is suggested by Diehl’s punctuation.

738 The quotation is from Hesiod, Theog. 517–18, who, like his fellow epicist Homer, isoften linked by Proclus with Orphic ‘theologians’.

739 In the mythical contest to determine who would have chief honours at Athens, in whichPoseidon could offer only a brackish spring as against Athena’s olive tree.

740 At Critias 113c2–4; one should not forget that Proclus sees no sharp break betweenthe Timaeus and the Critias, and should not be expected to refer to it as he would to anentirely separate dialogue.

741 I.e. Poseidon himself, as second member of the triad of demiurges Zeus (B), Poseidon,Hades (for which cf. 9.16–24), and a generation-worker.

742 I believe that this is not a comment on the type of interpretation just offered, but israther part of the help that Proclus wants to offer his pupils on the basis of this passage(cf. 173.15–16 above). Hence this paragraph has been not so much interpretation, butrather a fairly simple lesson in the theology of the Athenian School.

743 Straits of Gibraltar.

273


continuous life that proceeds in a variety of ways. So whether you startwith the gods and speak of Olympians and Titans, or with intellect of5

rest and motion or of same and different, or with souls of rational andirrational, or with bodies of heaven and generation, or if you partitionsubstances in any other way, throughout all the divisions the whole classof people inside the Pillars of Heracles will correspond to the better,and those outside to the worse. For that is where the real ‘sea of dis-10

similarity’ is,744 and all enmattered life and the life which proceeds toextension and multiplicity away from the one. So whether in Orphicfashion you wanted to set the Olympic and Titanic races in opposi-tion and to praise the one side that masters the other; or whether inPythagorean fashion to see the two opposing columns passing from15

the top right down to the lowest things with the better arranging theinferior; or whether in Platonic fashion to study ‘much unlimited inthe All, and much limit’, as we have learned in the Philebus (30b), andthe unlimited as a whole together with the measures of limit bringingabout a generation that stretches through all encosmic things, you would20

be able to grasp one thing from all of these – that the entire compositionof the cosmos is joined together in harmony out of this rivalry. And ifthe noble Heraclitus was looking to this when he said ‘War is Father ofall’, then not even he was speaking strangely.745

Porphyry at this point, relating his study to daemons and souls, and25

at times making mention of the Titanic War of myth, is in some respectspersuasive, and in others not, in his approach to the text at hand.746 Thedivine Iamblichus,747 however, taking a line that is surprising becauseof his attack on others for rushing into too partial an analysis, decided30

to understand what is being said in no other way than according to itsobvious meaning. And yet he certainly gave us in his prefatory commentssome encouragement for interpretation of our present type. But may this175divine gentleman, who has educated us in so many other matters as wellas this, look favourably on us.

744 Proclus alludes to Statesman 273d6–e1 (where the phrase depicts a state of disorderthat is never quite reached), as he will again at 175.20 and 179.26.

745 Heraclitus, to whose words (B53) this alludes, was known for his proverbial obscurity.746 = in Tim. fr. XXIV Sodano. Proclus, believing that the universal patterns that he requires

must be able to be found at various levels, hesitates to write off everything Porphyryclaims here, being milder than Iamblichus in this regard.

747 in Tim. fr. 23; Dillon (1973, 293) notes that Iamblichus also inclines towards a literalinterpretation in fr. 12 (117.18–28). It is a distinct possibility that both Porphyry andIamblichus suspend their in-depth interpretation for a while (24e4–26b2), as Proclusmentions neither until 194.15, the size of the lemmata increases, and his own treatmentis less detailed.

274

Atlantis

Lexis: the overall interpretation applied to details of the text

As we turn to the interpretation of Plato’s language we shall ourselvessee fit to remind ourselves of the guidelines recorded above,748 and to 5

align the people of Atlantis with all the universal terms of the inferiorcolumn of opposites. For there are some universals and some particu-lars in this. The aggression relates to their procession, their divisionthrough subordination, and their bordering on matter. For that is whattrue limitlessness and ugliness is, for which reason they say that it works 10

aggression upon what borders upon it and upon what is somehow in it.The theologian reveals their paradigm in the following terms:

The ill-planning Titans, with over-violent heart.749

The advance from outside750 relates to their secession to a dwelling-place far from the gods and from the diviner things in the All. For this 15

from outside does not signify an encircling of forces, but the kind ofbeing that has passed beyond all that is stable, immaterial, pure, andunified. The Atlantic Ocean relates to matter itself, whether it is asan ‘abyss’ that you care to describe it, or as a ‘sea of dissimilarity’,751 20

or whatever. For matter receives the names of the inferior column ofopposites, being called ‘limitlessness’, ‘darkness’, ‘irrationality’, ‘mea-surelessness’, ‘principle of otherness’, and ‘dyad’ – just as the AtlanticOcean gets its name from Atlantis. In this way, by understanding the 25

analogies in order, we shall declare that all the inferior column of oppo-sites, both the more universal races with it and the more partial, ischaracterized by procession, division, and a move towards matter. Inthis way it pervades everything, being reflected in each kind in the wayproper to it and appearing in a corresponding manner in each nature – 30

divine, intellective, psychical and bodily. Being of this type, it receivesarrangement and order from the better [column], which you could withgood reason call Athenaic because it is immaculate and takes control ofthe inferior through its own power. When it is set in order, an end is put 176to its division and limitlessness, the race of Titans being held in checkby the Olympian gods, otherness being united by sameness, motion by

748 I.e. 173.28–174.24.749 Orph. fr. 119; in the term hyperbios the latter element (bia) is thought to reflect their

aggression.750 I place this in bold because Proclus continues as if the lemma had included the words

‘advancing from outside, from the Atlantic Ocean’. It may be that the lemma has beenincorrectly recorded.

751 See on 174.10. The term ‘abyss’ (literally ‘bottomless’) is found as a noun in religiousand magical literature of the Roman period, and occurs only here in this commentary.

275


rest, irrational souls from the rational ones, generation thanks to things5

in heaven, and similarly in every case.Let us not because of this account imagine that one should postu-

late distinct first principles for things.752 For we claim that even thetwo columns of opposites are related. The One is the leading princi-ple of all opposition, as the Pythagoreans too say. But since, after the10

single cause, the dyad too revealed itself as one of the principles, andamong these the monad is superior to the dyad (or, if you prefer totalk in Orphic terms, aether to chaos), the divisions continue in thisway both in the gods before the cosmos and in encosmic things right15

down to the last. In the former case the conserving or creative forcecomes under one principle, while the generative or life-producing forcecomes under another, while in the latter the Olympian force comes underthe monad and the Titanic under the dyad, and under the senior onecome sameness, rest, reason, and form, while under the remaining one20

come otherness, motion, irrationality, and matter. For the subordinationof the two principles proceeds right down to these. But since the Oneis over and above the first dyad, what seem to be opposites are broughttogether and ordered in a single arrangement. For there are in the Allthe twin races of gods, the corresponding divisions of reality, the var-25

ious kinds of souls, and opposing kinds of bodies, and the inferior arecontrolled by the more divine. And one cosmos is brought to fulfilment,joined together from opposites, based on ‘limiters and unlimiteds’ inPhilolaus’ words,753 and the nature of its limitlessness accords with the30

‘unlimiteds’ within it that come from the indeterminate dyad, the natureof its limit accords with the ‘limiters’ that come from the intelligiblemonad, but what accords with what comes from all754 of these is a sin-gle, whole, and all-perfect form, being from the One.755 For it is god177who establishes the mixed class, as the Socrates of the Philebus says.756

752 It is possible, with Festugiere, to follow the scholiast in assuming this alludes toManicheanism, though even Plato was aware of its dualist antecedents.

753 Philolaus B1.2 DK, which differs somewhat from the ‘limit and unlimited’ familiarfrom Philebus 23c.

754 I.e. all ‘limiters’ and ‘unlimiteds’ in Philolaus’ terms (not just both classes), and thatmust be the universe.

755 Rather than adding an article with Diehl and Festugiere, I substitute the neuter of theparticiple (� for K) at 177.1.

756 Diehl and Festugiere refer to 61c, but this involves a prayer to the god of the mixingprocess, ‘whether Dionysus, Hephaestus, or whichever of the gods has mingling as hisprivilege’; that Dionysus comes first here is obviously because he controls the mixtureof wine and water, and has nothing to do with his power to mix limit and unlimited.Rather Proclus has in mind the cause of the mixture from the metaphysical passageitself (23d, 26e–27b, 30b–d), which turns out to be a demiurgic power (27b1), wisdomand intelligence (30c6), and hence part of the nature of Zeus (30d1–3).

276

Atlantis

The compatibility of historical and symbolic interpretations

For at that time the sea there was navigable; for it had an island in frontof the mouth that you call, as you say, the ‘Pillars of Heracles’. The island 5

was bigger than Libya and Asia together, and from this it was possible fortravellers at that time to cross over to the other islands, and from theislands to the whole mainland on the far side which rings that genuinesea. (24e4–25a2)

That there was such an island, and of this size, is shown by some of 10

those who give the story of the region of the outside sea. For they saythat there were even in their own time seven islands in that sea sacred toPersephone, and three other huge ones, that of Pluto, that of Ammon,and in the middle of these another belonging to Poseidon, two hundred 15

kilometres in length.757 Those living on it have kept alive the memoryfrom their ancestors of the Atlantis that actually came into being, thehugest island there, which over many cycles of time was the overlordof all the islands in the Atlantic Ocean, and was itself Poseidon’s sacred 20

island. This is what Marcellus has written in his Aethiopica.758

But, even if this is right and some such island did arise, it is still possibleto take the story about it both as history and as an image of something thatarises naturally within the whole universe, both explaining this [island] in 25

terms of what it resembles, and gradually accustoming those who hear ofsuch spectacles759 to the whole study of encosmic things. For it is possibleto study the same correspondences at either a more particular or a moreencompassing level. So it is necessary for the instruction to proceedfrom totalities and to conclude its study with the detail of particular 30

situations.Do not be surprised then that we are investigating this correspon- 178

dence to begin with in one way and in general outline, and now in afashion that is different, but yet the same, with the detail proper to thesubject matter. For there is a double column of opposites in the All,

757 The details are such that they could reflect travellers’ tales of the Canaries and perhapsthe Azores.

758 Festugiere points out that the author is unknown, and suggests confusion with Mar-cianus of Heraclea, who is known to have written, shortly before Proclus’ time, aPeriplous of the Outside Sea. But Marcellus may well have existed. The title given byProclus reveals only that it would have been mainly about Africa. Literature about faraway places was a particularly disreputable genre, known for the imagination of writers– a feature satirized by Lucian in A True History. Pliny, when discussing islands roundAfrica (6.202), mentions one called Atlantis as still being present, but, remarkably,makes no connection with Plato’s story.

759 Festugiere translates ‘considerations’ and complains that the sense is missing in LSJ.But the idea of the word here is ‘wondrous things that somebody has beheld’, and itfits the genre of travellers’ tales with which we must associate Marcellus.

277


as we were saying, beginning with the gods and reaching its limit with5

matter and the enmattered form, with either of them having some moreuniversal elements and some more particular ones – we said this beforetoo. Some also are in between the two (for the divine races are the mostencompassing of all, and the final elements the most individual, whilesome are in between, the intellective and psychical races).10

Lexis: principles applied to details of the geography

So we think it right to first divide the inferior column into three, tak-ing the most universal races in it, the intermediate, and the last. In aposition corresponding to the first we place the Atlantines, to the sec-ond the other islands, and to the third the whole mainland on the15

far side, and to matter the sea and the Atlantic Ocean. For the wholeof the inferior column borders on matter and proceeds towards mul-tiplicity and division, but it still has of itself internal excess and defi-ciency. That is why he said that the Atlantines set out ‘from outside’(24e3), insofar as they are further from the one and closer to matter,20

and that they inhabit an island bigger than Libya and Asia, insofar asthey proceed towards mass and extension. For everything that proceedsfurther from the One gains in quantity as it loses in power, just as thosethat are compressed closer in quantity have a remarkable power, so that25

size here signifies subordination, and procession and extension over all.The sea was navigable because more universal things proceed down tothe last and arrange matter, but when they come to the limit of possi-ble arrangement they stop, and that which remains beyond it is out ofrange. For the utterly non-existent comes directly after the bounds of30

existence. The addition of at that time is indicative of the fact that the179universal causes can pass unhindered even through matter and arrangeit, while we cannot always master it, but are submerged in the unlimitedand indeterminate nature.760

Since the procession of things is continuous, and nowhere is any void5

getting left, but an orderly lowering in rank is observed coming from themost universal things to the intermediates which both encompass andare encompassed, and from the intermediates to the furthest and mostindividual, on this account Plato too says that the passage for the peopleof Atlantis is from Atlantis to the other islands, and from these to the10

mainland situated on the far side. And Atlantis is one, the other islandsare many, and the mainland is largest. For the monad befits individualmembers of the first kind, number and multiplicity befit the second –for multiplicity comes with the dyad – and largeness befits the third on15

760 See note on 117.6–7 regarding the image of the soul’s submersion in matter.

278

Atlantis

account of the advance of largeness to the triad.761 And since the loweststages of the inferior column of opposites are the most enmattered things,he showed that they are the furthest distant from the better through [thephrase] on the far side, and he did not rest content, as in the case ofthe Atlantines, with calling it ‘outside’ only, [a term] which demonstrated 20

that they were of the other sector,762 but he added on the far side so thathe might give an indication of its extreme subordination. Through itsringing the genuine sea he signified its placement in relation to matterand the last of encosmic things. For the genuine sea corresponds to whatis genuinely false or genuine matter, which he called ‘a sea of dissimilarity’ 25

in the Statesman.763

Furthermore, because it is necessary that these two oppositecolumns should be divided off from each other, kept free from cross-contamination by the creational boundaries, he said that the Pillars ofHeracles divided off the inside habitable world from the outside. For 30

it was the strongest point of creational production and the divine divi-sion of the kinds in the All, ever remaining steadfastly and manfully thesame, that he called Pillars of Heracles. For this Heracles is of Zeus’ 180[series]. The one who is divine and precedes him got as his lot the postof guardian of the generative series. So one should assume that the cre-ational division that keeps the two segments of the All apart stems fromboth.

Symbolism of the confined sea

For things here, as many as are within the mouth of which we speak, 5

resemble a harbour with a narrow entrance; up to would most correctly becalled ‘mainland’. (25a2–5)

Things within the mouth gives an indication of the races of the superiorcolumn of opposites, because they are turned in upon themselves anddelight in what is stable and in the unifying power. For the term mouth 10

shows in symbolic fashion the cause that limits and separates the twosegments of cosmic things. The narrow harbour signifies their com-pressed, self-directed, orderly and immaterial existence. For throughthe term narrow he is banishing the extended space and spreading asso- 15

ciated with the inferior column, while through harbour [he signifies]

761 I.e. to three-dimensionality. 762 I.e. from the other column of opposites.763 Proclus’ interpretation of 273d5–e1, where the divine helmsman has to resume the helm

out of fear that the world become so storm-tossed that it would sink into an infinitesea of dissimilarity; hence this is an imaginary condition of the world, representing anextreme from which it is saved, not an actual one.

279


<the stability>764 that transcends the discordant and disorderly motion ofenmattered things. For that is what harbours are like, providing shelterfrom the disturbances at sea. But even if someone were to say that the20

ascent to the more intellective and divine elements of the All becomesa harbour for souls,765 not even this person would miss the truth bymuch.

The size of Atlantis

In this island of Atlantis a great and wondrous royal power wasestablished, up to as far as Etruria. (25a5–b2)

At this point it is necessary to remember Plato’s assumptions about the25

earth: that he does not measure its size according to the same princi-ples as the mathematicians, but supposes its extension to be somewhatgreater, as Socrates says in the Phaedo,766 and that he posits several set-tlements similar to our own inhabited area. Consequently, even in the30

outside sea he tells the story of an island and a mainland of such a size.181For if the earth has by nature the spherical form overall, it must belike this over the greater part of itself. Yet our inhabited region, withits valleys and peaks, displays a great unevenness. So there are on otherparts of the earth levelled plains and an extended area stretching up5

to a height. For there is a story that Heracles after crossing a greatdeal of desert land came to Mount Atlas, whose size recorded by thosewho wrote Ethiopica767 was big enough to touch the ether itself and tocast a shadow to a distance of nine hundred kilometres. For from the10

ninth hour of daylight the sun is hidden by it until it has completelyset. And it is nothing amazing, for even Mount Athos, the Macedo-nian mountain, casts its shadow as far as Lemnos, which is a hundredand thirty kilometres away.768 Not only did Marcellus, who wrote theEthiopian Inquiry, report that Atlas was the only mountain that big, but15

Ptolemy too says that the Mountains of the Moon have an enormousheight, and Aristotle says the Caucasus is illuminated by the sun’s rays

764 I supply what appears to be needed to fill a likely lacuna in the text. The missing wordmay possibly be $��.

765 For the imagery of the harbour see Festugiere, but the reference to souls at this pointstrongly suggests that Proclus alludes to Porphyrian exegesis.

766 109a–b; it is perhaps remarkable that Proclus takes so seriously a passage that seemsto be preparing the way for the myth concerning underground rivers, but, comparing182.1–2 with 197.18–24, Festugiere supplies us with a good reason for him to do so,for he wishes to show that the size attributed to Atlantis is not inconceivable.

767 Presumably thinking of the Marcellus referred to at 177.20 and 181.15.768 An exaggeration. Around ninety kilometres would be closer.

280

Atlantis

for the third part of the night after sunset and the third part beforesunrise.769 20

If somebody were to examine the total size of the earth by using itshigh places to determine it, it would genuinely seem to be immensejust as Plato claims, so that we shall have no need of any mathematicalmethods to suit our interpretation regarding the earth, nor shall we tryto refute them. For those methods measure it with regard to the area 25

inhabited by us, whereas Plato says that we are living in a hollow whilethe earth itself is high up as a whole,770 something which the sacredtradition of the Egyptians has also taught. So much for the alleged size 182of Atlantis; we should not be sceptical about it, even if one were to takewhat is being said as an historical account only.

The symbolism of the power and influence of Atlantis

Concerning its power – that there were ten kings in it born as fivesets of twins, and that they ruled the other islands, some parts of the 5

mainland, and some parts within the Pillars of Heracles – he gives astraightforward narrative account in the Critias.771 But in this context,bearing in mind that the aim is to offer an interpretation of them772

insofar as [their meaning] can be transferred to the All, there is talk 10

of their great and wondrous power because the decad embraces theleaders of the two opposite columns, as the Pythagoreans also claim,when they state that by the decad of opposing forces all things are con-tained. They are twins, so that there are five dyads after five pairs of 15

twins are born from Poseidon and Cleito, because on the one hand thearrangement of even this column of opposites accords with the mea-sures of justice, of which the pentad is an image,773 while its procession

769 Diehl and Festugiere refer to Mete. 350a31ff.770 Phaedo 109c3–d8, which is explicit about the first claim, but makes the second in rather

different terms.771 The five sets of twins born to Poseidon are mentioned at 113e6–7, and the rule over

Atlantis, other islands, and areas west of Etruria and Egypt at 113e7–114a4, 114c5–6,and 114c6–7 respectively. By contrast, rule over the mainland is mentioned only hereat Tim. 25a8. This sentence has the effect of making the Critias the vehicle for theamplification of the literal account, allowing Proclus to move straight on to symbolicmeanings.

772 Using the text proposed by Praechter and followed by Festugiere, which reads ��)for ��, which makes this a reference to the kings of Atlantis.

773 Pace Festugiere, who takes it to be the ‘series’, I think it must be justice of which thepentad is an image, since that is the relationship suggested in Iambl. Theol. Arith. 35.6–40.6, of which Festugiere quotes both beginning and end. One might note that Justiceis not consistently associated with this number in Pythagorean texts.

281


is by twos,774 just as that of the superior column is by ones. Yet all arechildren of Poseidon, because the entire weaving together of oppositesand the cosmic war belongs to the intermediate Demiurge. For this god,20

because he is in charge of the rivalry everywhere, is the instigator ofall coming to be, passing away, and motion of every kind. They holdpower over Atlantis because they conserve all the foremost and mostuniversal races of the inferior column; and they hold power over other25

islands because they also presuppose the middle races on account oftheir own wholeness; and they also hold power over certain775 parts ofthe mainland, because they arrange even the final things to the extentthat is possible; and they lord it over certain parts of the inside world toobecause the final races of the superior column are slaves to the first of30

the inferior column. And there is nothing surprising about this, just ascertain daemons too are subject to certain heroes, and particular souls,183which have a share in the intelligible, are often slaves to fate. Even amongthe gods the Titanic order is of this kind, the order to which Atlas toobelongs, and the commander-in-chief of these ten kings was also calledAtlas, and the name given to the island was his gift, as is said in the5

Atlantic Discourse.776 But the topmost members of the second column arearranged by the Olympian Gods, whom Athena leads, but they dominateall substance that is subordinate to the gods but belongs to the inferiorcolumn, like irrational souls, enmattered solids, and matter itself. And10

it is probable that Plato called the power of the Atlantines great andwondrous for this reason too, that there is a tradition referring to oneof this order called Thaumas and another called Bias by the ancienttheologians.777 And perhaps it is also the case that, because the whole ofthe second column is the offspring in limitlessness – which we claim is a15

superlatively great power – just as the superior column is the offspring oflimit, on this account too he celebrates the power of the Atlantines, justas in the case of the Athenians he celebrates their virtue, which standsfor778 limit; for it is the measure of those who have it. By taking things

774 The absence of the article with the preposition ��* suggests to me a meaning such asLSJ A I.5 which gives the interval, not Festugiere’s ‘au moyen de la dyade’.

775 Reading �� with Festugiere at 182.26.776 Critias 114a5–b1; the dialogue was often known in antiquity as Atlanticus, and, while

Proclus seems to use the names indifferently, he may be deliberately using it here tohighlight another stage in the passing on of Atlas’ name.

777 Orph. fr. 118; but evidence is confined to this commentary, here alone for Bias, but alsoat 133.9 and III.189.8 for Thaumas.

778 ‘Stands for’: the received text’s �� at 183.18, if taken roughly in the sense of LSJ AI.3 (almost ‘as a front for’), fits the appended explanation better than when correctedto �� with Festugiere, which would translate ‘derives from’.

282

Atlantis

thus, I believe, we shall, with a natural spontaneity,779 be able to completeour analysis according to Pythagorean principles.780 20

The description of Atlantis’ power as narrative

The description also involves considerable exaggeration, so that he mightdisplay as something greater and more glorious the achievement of thevictors. For he spoke of power, amplifying it through the use of thesingular, and he also added great and wondrous. Each of the two isdifferent. For it is great irrespective of whether anything else exists, 25

while it is called wondrous in comparison with others. And the morethe loser is wondered at, the greater the victor is shown to be. And inaddition to this, by indicating bit by bit the multitude that has beenvanquished by it (25a7–b2), he showed that [power] to be many timesgreater, and to exceed all of them together. 30

Atlantine power unified within the straits

All this power, concentrated into one, once attempted to enslave in a 184single swoop your land, our land, and every place within the mouth.(25b2–5)

He is not saying that there was ever civil war among things divine, nor 5

that the inferior were anxious to master the better. But while we mayassume that these things are true of human beings, the present storyconcerns the most universal races in the whole of the second column,indicating that they pervade all things. For there is, in the heaven andeverywhere else, a separative and motive781 power, and none of them 10

is without a share [in it].782 But it is not present among the superior

779 The phrase translates autophyos; this implies an intuitively plausible reading, and Fes-tugiere rightly compares the quality that Origenes attributes to Plato’s writing, andProclus then attributes to Origenes’ exegesis, at 89.27 and 29, as well as 275.26 below.

780 Proclus is referring to principles of symbolic interpretation, for the use of symboliccommunication is associated with the Pythagoreans at 7.29–30 above, where they arealso supposed to link everything with the intelligibles and transcend the study of theparticular. Note that the intuitive linking of one thing and another, referred to in thenote to 183.19 above, is associated with symbolism in particular by Ammonius, in Int.40.18–22.

781 Reverting to the text with the best authority, after Festugiere I note that the idea ofmotion is strongly present in the lemma (even though the myth has to depict howthings always are), and that it has just been implied in the verb ‘pervade’.

782 I take the genitive ��) with ��! rather then 9$��, and as referring back to *��.

283


ones783 in a divided fashion or through multiplication, but [as a power]concentrated into one and with a single swoop, that is, in a unifiedfashion and with one continuous life. For just as in the inferior column15

even the one is multiplied, so in the superior multiplicity is unified.Hence multiplicity is at the same time everywhere and mastered throughunification. An image of this is presented by the fact that the Atlantineswish to master all territory in the inside inhabited area [as a power]concentrated into one, and that they are nevertheless mastered by theAthenians. For even multiplicity and division, if they are to be studied in20

the better column, will be studied all the same in a unified fashion andwith the upper hand there being held not by multiplicity but by samenessand by the better races in general.

What the Athenians stand for

Then, Solon, the power of your city became conspicuous in virtue and25

might. (25b5–6)

He set against the Atlantines the power of the Athenians, choosing thisname over others as one that fits the middle creation, and he celebratedthe better power for its virtue and might, so that through the term185virtue he might give an indication of its appropriation of the wisdom-loving character of Athena herself – for some other theology and not theOrphic784 alone has called her ‘Virtue’ – and through the term might itsappropriation of the war-loving character. He called their power con-5

spicuous because it is encosmic and contributes to the creation of sen-sible things, and it is only to the Atlantines that he attributes power,indeed continuous785 power, on the grounds that they belong to theorder of limitlessness, whereas he says that the Athenians master thepower through their overall virtue. For belonging to the column of the10

limited kind they are characterized by virtue, which brings measure tothe passions and employs ‘powers’786 as they should be.

783 We must remember that the superior column is represented by all the places withinthe Pillars, so that it is precisely here that Proclus sees the Atlantines as appearing inunified fashion and even as being subdued by the influence of unity.

784 Orph. fr. 175, quoted at 170.8 above.785 Though the text is difficult, I see no merit in accepting Praechter’s suggestion, which

Festugiere follows. This is comment on Plato’s language, and ought, I think, to relateto the idea of the power being ‘concentrated into one’.

786 Proclus makes use of the fact that ‘power’ is used since Aristotle as ‘potency’ as opposedto ‘actuality’, and hence as something to be associated with the forces of matter ratherthan form.

284

Atlantis

The Athenians and other peoples within the straits

For, because it was foremost of all in bravery and all those arts thatconcern war, up to it freed them all. (25b7–c6) 15

Just as we divide the inferior column into three, the first, intermedi-ate, and final terms, so too we shall divide the superior one too into mostuniversal, most individual, and those placed intermediate between them,and in our division we shall make the Athenians correspond to the first,the rest of the Greeks not yet enslaved to the intermediate ones, and 20

those already slaves to the last. For according to these paths [of inter-pretation] the Athenians master the forces of Poseidon, the first masterthe second, the monadic master the dyadic, and in general the supe-rior masters the inferior. And they preserve eternally the intermediates’[ability] to keep their own order and not be vanquished by the forces 25

of the inferior column on account of their own unity and their endur-ing kind of power, and they also liberate the enslaved from their slav-ery, summoning them to unity and stability. For some things are alwayswithin matter, others always transcend it, and others still sometimesbecome subject to the material races, and sometimes are re-enrolled in 30

separable life – very much like the drama we are caught up in, whenwe are sometimes ranked under the Titanic order, sometimes underthe Olympian, sometimes belonging to generation, and at others to the 186heaven. This privilege belongs to particular souls on account of the ever-unvarying, soul-uplifting providence of the gods. For just as, on accountof there being generation-producing gods, souls too descend who serve 5

their will, so it surely is that, on account of the pre-existence of upli-fting causes ascent from here also remains possible for our own souls.

Lexis: details of the text explained

This covers the overall intention of the passage before us, but let us go onto explain briefly individual points too. That they were foremost of all 10

shows their overall embrace of the first races of the diviner sector, whilein bravery and the arts of war has the same significance as ‘in Athenaicfashion’, as they imitate her love of wisdom in bravery,787 and her loveof war in arts of war. The fact that they sometimes led the Greeks, 15

787 I resist the temptation to modify translation of this word to suit Proclus’ interpretationto highlight the fact that Proclus is here twisting what Plato says. The term eupsychiameans bravery or stoutness of heart: though LSJ claim it is used once in Plato, Laws791c9, for ‘having a good soul’ to match the use of kakopsychia, the context is still onethat concerns bravery. But Proclus analyses its linguistic components to get ‘goodnessof soul’, and then leaps to seeing this as referring to the soul’s intellectual aspirationsonly.

285


and at others faced the danger alone, shows that the first and overallcauses do some things along with second or intermediate [causes], anddo others by themselves withdrawing beyond their creative activities,and becoming isolated in their operation. For the race of the gods andthat after the gods do not equally create, but the creation of the gods20

penetrates further, because the diviner races operate everywhere, beforethe things they cause, along with the things they cause, and after themtoo. It is possible to confirm this from many sources.

The phrase extreme dangers indicates the far-reaching creativeactivity of the first races. The term trophies signifies the enrolment25

of the second column under the first and its being arranged by it, and itsbeing ‘turned’788 so to speak in accordance with the power of it. It alsoshows that there are permanently established indicators of this turning ofthe lesser forces, reaching down among the lowest things from the first.For everything that is even among these things ordered, and given form30

through the subjugation of the material causes, is established as an ade-quate sign of the domination of the better, which is above all the specialpurpose of trophies. The reference to ungrudging freedom [signifies]187the divine and unhindered arrangement from above that penetrates toall, something which the Athenians brought to light for the Greeks bymastering the Atlantines – though rather the Olympian races did so bydefeating the Titanic. It is in this way that the creative will reaches itslimit and the worse are mastered by the better, among particular things5

Atlantines mastered by Athenians, and among universal things Titansmastered by Olympians:

Even though they are strong they come to join up with the better,Inexchange for their deadly aggression and haughty bravado,10

as Orpheus says,789 whom Plato emulates when he says that theAtlantines marched with aggression upon the Athenians.

Science, symbolism, and the destruction of AtlantisBut in later time, when there had been giant earthquakes and floods withone particularly severe day and night arising, your whole fighting force15

was swallowed up together beneath the earth, and in the same way the

788 ‘Trophy’ (tropaion) derives from the same stem as ‘turn’ (trepo). There may also be ahint of the Neoplatonic process of epistrophe.

789 Orph. fr. 20, which Festugiere, admitting uncertainty, translates very differently. I havetried to interpret the lines in such a way as to emphasize the parallel with a powerwhose ignoble drives (‘aggression’, cf. 24d2) are weakened when it pursues a goal thatis superior to it, a goal that is viewed as an enemy, but is actually a desirable source ofimprovement.

286

Atlantis

island of Atlantis sank beneath the sea and vanished. For this reason evennow the sea in that region is impassable and impossible to find a paththrough, because mud lies in one’s way just below the surface, which theisland left behind as it came to rest. (25c6–d6) 20

That what is said is consistent with physics is clear to those who are notentirely unversed in physical science. That an earthquake should occurof such a size as to destroy an island of that size, is not remarkable,since the earthquake that took place a little before our time shook Egypt 25

and Bithynia in one day.790 And that an inundation should follow theearthquake is nothing unexpected, since this always accompanies largeearthquakes as Aristotle reports,791 giving the reason for it at the sametime. Wherever an inundation occurs along with an earthquake, a wave is 188the cause of this phenomenon. For sometimes the wind that creates theearthquake has yet to pass underground, while the sea is being set inmotion by a wind opposed to it; [the wind] rushes on in the oppo-site direction, but is unable to push [the sea] back on account of the 5

gale pushing it forward; yet by stopping and preventing its advance itbecomes cause of a great upsurge being collected under pressure fromthe opposing wind. [Whenever this occurs,] then indeed, with the seasurging high under the counter-pressure, it plunges down into the earthitself with its concentrated flow unleashed upon it and creates the earth- 10

quake, while the sea washes over the place. This is the manner in whichthe earthquake occurred in the region of Achaea at the same time as theonset of the wave that flooded the coastal cities of Boura and Helike.792

So an expert on physics could not discredit this account if he examined 15

it correctly.Furthermore, that the same place could be passable and impassable

or land and sea is one of the things agreed by physicists, as Aristotletoo thinks and as the narrative shows. And the same man tells that thereis mud793 in the outside sea beyond the mouth, and that that place is 20

full of shoals,794 so if mud . . . just below the surface signifies ‘full of790 On the 24 August, ad 358, as reported by Ammianus Marcellinus 17.7.1.791 Mete. 2.8, 368a34–b13, which Proclus now follows until 188.12.792 Proclus offers a well-known example of tidal wave destruction on the southern coast

of the Gulf of Corinth from 373 bc., which had already been discussed by Aristotleat Mete. 1.8, 343b1–4, 2.8, 368b6–13 and Theophr. Phys. Dox. p. 490 Diels, as wellas Paus. 7, 24–5. The level of reliance on the Peripatetics is a sad reflection on theprogress of ancient geophysics.

793 Plato’s discussion of how one might define mud (pelos) at Tht. 147a–c warns us that heuses the word typically for water-infused solids that are slippery and can be moulded,as in the making of pottery, earthenware and bricks. We are not dealing with very softmud here, but with something that will offer a bit more resistance. Indeed, underwaterrocks seem to Proclus to offer an explanation for Plato’s description.

794 Mete. 2.1, 354a22–3.

287


shoals’ it is not remarkable. For even now they call submerged rocks withwater over the top ‘surface-reefs’. So why would anybody be botheredmaking out a detailed case for this?

But we seek proof that these words offer an amazing indication of the25

whole cosmic arrangement by reminding ourselves of the ‘entartariza-tion’ spoken of in Orpheus’ writing.795 For he too, when he has given his189account of the rivalry-in-creation between the Olympians and Titans,brings to an end the whole account of cosmic arrangement down to thefinal things of the All, giving even them a share in the immaculate prov-idence of the gods. So knowing this Plato too carries on teaching about5

the universe through images, consigns these two races to the realm ofdarkness, and through causing them to disappear in this way imitatesthe Orphic ‘entartarization’. For in order that the last things should bearranged and should enjoy divine providence, it was necessary that boththe better column and the inferior one should extend its own power10

from above right down to the foundation of the cosmos, each of the twoin its own proper manner, the one by being shaken [by an earthquake]and sinking beneath the earth, which is the equivalent of ‘advancingsteadily and with solidity’,796 and the other by vanishing, which wouldbe the equivalent of becoming enmattered and without order or form.For beneath the earth is a symbol of an enduring and stable nature,15

while beneath the sea symbolizes what is easily changed, disorderly,and in flux. For even among the last things their foundation and theirgeneration derives from the better column, while their passing away,interchange, and unharmonious motion come from the worse.20

Since these things too are arranged in the course of the completionof the unseen and visible creation, for this reason he says that here tooa severe day and night arose, with night signifying the unseen causesand day the visible ones, while the severity signifies the impossibilityof contending with it, its unyielding nature, and its pervading every-25

thing.Because all these things are brought to completion in accordance

with creative powers, earthquakes and inundations have been implicated,which befit the intermediate creation. If he had wanted to indicate Jovianpowers or operations, he would have spoken of thunderbolts and torna-dos,797 but because he is telling us of Poseidonian creative operations,he has captured their likeness in earthquakes and floods. For they used190

795 Orph. fr. 122, with in Remp. I. 93.22–4.796 I preserve Festugiere’s unexplained quotation-marks.797 Again Proclus’ notion that the tale would have been told very differently if Plato wanted

to reflect different divine truths tends to undermine his own insistence, repeated in afew lines at 190.7–8, that the tale is historically true.

288

Atlantis

to call this god the ‘Earthshaker’ and the ‘One with Sea-dark Locks’.Because time signifies procession in due order or orderly descent, he saysthis all took place in later time. Hence one should not say that the one 5

who obliterated the evidence undermines his subject matter,798 just likeHomer in the case of the Phaeacians or of the wall made by the Greeks.For what has been said has not been invented, but is true, since many partsof the earth are washed over by the sea, and nothing he said happened wasimpossible. But neither does he report this as a lightweight narrative, but 10

he adopts the story as an indication of the providence that pervades allthings, including the last. To sum up then, at the completion of the overallcosmic arrangement, and with the unseen-and-visible creation broughtto fullness by the creational fabrications of the Second Father, both the 15

gift of the better part and that of the worse comes even down to the lastthings. The former masters its materials because of the term fightingforce and spreads the fertile light of its power because of the phrasebeneath the earth, while the latter implants the last and most materialdivision and maintains in indeterminacy the motion of Tartarus.799 And 20

when these things have been arranged it is with good reason that this areaof the sea is impassable and impossible to find a path through there-after. For there is no other passage or procession of the races involved

798 The reference to the Greek wall at Troy, washed away after the war in a huge flooddevised by Poseidon in company with Apollo (Iliad 12.1–33), warns us not to believe,with Festugiere, that this is a contemporary objection to Atlantis. The Greek wall islinked with a witty saying about Atlantis at Strabo 2.3.6: ‘He who invented it obliteratedit, like the poet in the case of his Achaean wall.’ The material derives from Posidonius(F49.297–303 Kidd), and the language ( 7*++�, ��#�) matches the verbs used byProclus for ‘invent’ and ‘obliterate’. But that language had been used in a related contextat least by Aristotle (Strabo 12.1.36; cf. Kidd (1988), 259), and it seems likely (thoughless than certain) that Aristotle too had used it in connection with Atlantis. This mayhave been an oral quip subsequently reported in relevant literature, with Crantor’searly commentary on the Timaeus (above, 76.1–2) being an obvious possibility, since itis highly likely that Posidonius, who also interpreted part of the work, was familiar withit. What Proclus offers in line 5 seems to be an interpretation of the original quip, takingit to imply that it is standard practice to arrange for the destruction of one’s fictionsso as to offer an explanation for the lack of any remaining evidence. The presence ofthe Phaeacians here adds an extra twist, and is a reference to the destruction of thereturning ship after Odysseus had been taken back to his homeland, thus incurring theanger of Poseidon, who is once again the culprit (Od. 13.149–87). This disaster togetherwith the threatening mountain overshadowing the town persuades the Phaeacians tostop accompanying stranded sailors. Presumably the idea is that Homer had to dosomething to explain why Phaeacia disappears from the view of the Greeks, with theland that had routinely been so hospitable and escorted strangers to their destinationsnever again being heard of. That this piece of scepticism too goes back to Aristotle’sremarks is not hard to believe.

799 Again it is difficult to deny the influence of the indeterminate pre-cosmic motions inthe text of the Timaeus; see note on 160.5.

289


in arranging the All. In fact the real ‘mud’ is that of which Socratesalso makes mention in the Phaedo when talking about the underground25

places,800 the region beneath the earth that is dominated by the ‘obscureform’801 of bodiliness, which it possessed because of the inferior columnsettling down in it and advancing to the final point of cosmic arrange-ment. For the Titanic order also, being driven by Zeus as far as Tartarus,fills things in that place too with the protection that derives from the30

gods.

Summary of interpretation of Atlantis

So as for what was said, Socrates, by the elder Critias in accordance withhis hearing of Solon, you have heard it put briefly yourself. When you191were speaking about the constitution, up to for the most part with whatSolon said. (25d7–e5)

It has been stated in what went before how the war between Atlantinesand Athenians belongs to the overall construction of the cosmos, andhow the cosmic rivalry is conserved by the intermediate creation in its5

advance from the first things above to the last. [In this] the Athenaicseries arranges all things with steadfast leadership and mastery, unfoldswhat is detained in matter, and keeps immaculate what transcends matter,while the other, in a manner appropriate to itself, favours created thingswith motion, division and otherness, and proceeds from above to the10

end. And we have commented about this at the proper length.

Closing considerations (191.12–204.29)

The status of Critias and of his story

But since the teller of the story was found to correspond with thegod who conserves this rivalry, he is imitating him in a way, and is15

ascending, through the referral of the narrative back to its fathers,via Critias and his hearing of Solon to the Egyptians. So this isalso presupposed in his paradigm-figure,802 who is filled by the firstand fills those that follow him with the creative power. Furthermore,since he bears the image of the second creation, one that proceeds on20

800 110a5–6, where ‘mud’ is just one of a list that includes also caverns, sand, and mire.801 An allusion perhaps to 49a3–4, where the phrase is applied to the receptacle.802 I.e. Poseidon, on whom Critias models himself. His status is already hinted at as early

as 9.17–22, while Festugiere prefers to refer us to 88.1–8.

290

Closing considerations

from another, on this account he says that he was reminded of thestory803 as a result of what Socrates was saying. For this [type of] ‘rec-ollection’ is not the passing across from images to paradigms,804 butfrom universal concepts to more particular happenings. Consequentlyit also fits with the procession of creation as a whole. For while all 25

things exist in the intelligibles, the creative causes – each accordingto its own order – have distributed among themselves the creativetasks.805 Moreover, if you pursue the linguistic details of the text inanother manner, the Athenians are being admirably lauded, and theconstitution of Socrates is being appropriately celebrated. For this lat- 30

ter has been shown by the life of the Athenians to be possible and tosupply the greatest benefits for whomsoever it is adopted by, which wasjust what Socrates had thought required demonstration in the discus-sion.806 But they, by living in accordance with the best type of con-stitution, have been shown worthy of the greatest admiration. For it 192is genuinely admirable to be cast in the mould of the first paradigm.Indeed, of encosmic things the more divine, which have received to thehighest degree their [paradigms’] whole form are called ‘monadic’ andare so, whereas enmattered things that have the same form in many infe- 5

rior [instances] have the lowest rank. Certainly this feature that in thecreation process belongs to the gods too, that of attaining one’s ownproper paradigm to the highest degree, is displayed also by the city ofthe Athenians when they practise the best-regulated life to the highestdegree.

Furthermore, the cycle of favours imitates the cosmic cycle,807 as the 10

Egyptians were helped by the Athenians through their deeds of war, andthe Athenians by the Egyptians through their priestly words. For the

803 A good example of historia meaning far less than history, and perhaps no more than anarrative or story; this is important for understanding possible confusions concerningthe description of the Atlantis story as psile historia, whose emphasis falls on the lackof any meaning deeper than the literal one, rather than on any truth that the literalmeaning must have.

804 An allusion to the Platonic theme of recollection as it appears particularly at Phaedo74a–76e.

805 This relates to the ‘lottery’ of the mythical gods Zeus, Poseidon and Hades, as well asto Proclus’ three creations.

806 E.g. 592a, but cf. Tim. 19b–c.807 Note how this material is mostly of a straightforward ethical character (such as might be

expected in a Porphyrian exegesis of prologue material), relating to conduct in repayingfavours, but is given cosmic significance by a simple twist. That may suggest thatPorphyrian material has been adapted by Iamblichus or Proclus to suit their demandthat everything said should have a bearing on the cosmos.

291


very fact that they kept the achievement recorded was a return of thefavour, but, when you add the instructive narration of their forefathers’15

deeds to them, it multiplies the gratitude their repayment displays.In addition to this, to suggest that their fortune was daemonic and

makes us think808 is an indication of the value of Plato’s studies, sincefortune and the gift that comes from it is neither blind nor indeterminate,but a power that draws together many disparate causes, arranges things20

unordered, and supplies everything with what it has been allotted fromthe All.

So why was it, then, that Socrates had agreed with what Solon said?I shall claim that it is because of the cause that draws together manydisparate causes and because of the one goddess who conserves theircommon intelligence. For because they are Athenaic, they are moved25

as if from a single source, their presiding goddess, towards the sameconcepts.

Critias’ delayed memory

Yet I did not want to speak up straight away, for with the lapse of time Icould not recall well enough up to speak only then. (25e5–26a3)

This must be observed in the All as well, [noting how] prior to partic-30

ulars the creative cause of what comes to be in time establishes his own193offspring,809 and how it is only when the founder of generated thingshas an intellective grasp of himself, and sees the causes of created thingswithin himself, that he allows other things to enter the stage from him-self. This is so that it may be only when he is sufficient and completethat he grants a share in his own power to secondary things. Thus the5

conceiving and the recalling and all such things show the embrace ofthe creative principles within a single [mind].810

Hence I quickly agreed with what you required of me up to I recalledduring the night. (26a3–b2)

808 This relates to 25e3–4, in the part of the lemma that is not spelled out in full. It shouldperhaps be asked whether Proclus had read ��$�� . . . �� rather than ��$��. . . �� there.

809 Festugiere translates ‘ses pensees’ as if reading ��* for ��$��, though it is inthe next line that Diehl reports C’s variant reading of ��) for ��) (with thefurther variant ��)).

810 Proclus comments on the verb 1��+� and the participle ��7�D��, the former ofwhich suggests universal concepts to a Platonist, and the latter the recovery of innateknowledge of the universal.

292


Because he remembered in one sense, he promised to fulfil what was 10

required, but because he did not remember accurately, he had goneover the story by himself first, thinking that, for requirements of thekind that Socrates had made [in asking] to see the constitution up andrunning,811 it was the hardest task to find the basis on which one would 15

be able to fulfil the requirements appropriately. That is exactly whathe has done in taking from historical tradition the war between theAtlantines and the Athenians as something able to show the life thatheralds in the best constitution, and in recalling this during the night sothat he could also share it with the participants in the discussion withoutstumbling. 20

So let us cross once again from here to the universe. For there toothe creational cause, receiving fullness from the invisible cause812 – forthere in a primary way resided all intellective causes with which it wasunified at its highest peak – thereby brings his own power into the light inaccordance with their will and judgement. Furthermore, that he should 25

not speak straight away,813 but later on, is a symbol of how the prepa-ration of natural things is being made ready in advance, as the source ofperfection for nature’s final products.

You could also speak of an ethical message here, that of being onthe safe side. One should not venture in haste on such accounts with-out first looking back over the whole task, so that we may, as if from a 194bank, publish the statement of account that can genuinely serve as mes-senger of the accounts that lie within.814 Furthermore, that he speakswhen he has recalled in private imitates the reversion of the creationalprinciples upon themselves, and also gives an indication of the soul’s 5

conscious reversion upon itself, through which it studies the principlesof realities within itself. As for find a story able to be an appro-priate basis for what we want, it gives an indication of the closeconjunction in the creation process between the phenomena and theircauses.

811 Referring back to 19b–c.812 Note that Critias is analogous to the second of the demiurgic triads, and Socrates to

the first.813 Proclus has at this point fallen back on elements from the previous lemma, as if offering

a lexis that embraces two lemmata simultaneously. Hence I use bold for words fromthat lemma too.

814 I have only slightly updated the metaphor here, which, as Festugiere shows, reflects atopos also encountered in Gregory of Nyssa; the verb translated ‘publish’ ( ��2��$��),however, strongly suggests the Stoic contrast between the Stoic prophorikos logos thatbrings out in speech the endiathetos logos embedded in the mind.

293


On the memory of childrenHow wonderful a hold on the memory, as the saying goes, our childhood10

discoveries have up to so that it has become permanent like the burnt-inoutlines of a non-erasable picture. (26b2–c3)

That children are better at memorizing is seen in practice, and mighthave a number of plausible reasons. One, as Porphyry says,815 is that15

the souls of children have no experience of human troubles; so, becausethey are neither distracted nor hindered by external matters, they have animage-forming faculty816 that is easily imprinted, though their reasoningfaculty is slower because our experiences make this sharp and quick to20

operate. Another is that in them rational life is more enmeshed in theimagination. Therefore, just as, when the soul responds in sympathy withthe body and gets mixed up in it, the body becomes sturdier and livelier,so in the same way the imagination also is strengthened by getting reason,25

and in being strengthened it receives imprints that are more permanent.It gets a better hold on them because of its own power, just as the bodyalso gets better control of things within its own sphere, being livelier onaccount of its closer communion with the soul. A third reason over andabove these is that the same things appear greater in the imagination30

of children, or rather that they are more amazed at them, so that theyrespond more to them. Hence they remember them more. For when195things have hurt us a lot or delighted us a lot we store them up in ourmemory. At any rate they have more effect on us. So just as what suffersmore at the hands of fire retains the heat it is given longer, in the sameway the image-forming faculty that is more affected by things outside5

grasps the imprint better. Even so, that of children is affected more onaccount of the same things appearing greater to us as children. Hencechildren retain the imprint better, and with good reason because thesame things affect them more.

Critias seems to me817 to be giving an indication of this in stating thatit was with a great deal of pleasure that he had listened to the narrative10

815 in Tim. fr. XXV Sodano, which goes down only to line 20, though there is good reasonto suppose that Porphyrian influence extends beyond this (cf. Dillon 1973, 293), in myview to 195.8. For this lemma has been used as an excuse for a scholarly topos that iseasily regarded as a digression, having only a loose relation to the overall skopos of theTimaeus, and this strongly suggests that its origin is to be sought neither in Iamblichusnor in the school of Syrianus.

816 Simply translating ‘imagination’ sometimes obscures the fact that the first text Platon-ists have in mind when using this kind of language is generally that which introduces‘the painter in the soul’ at Philebus 39b–40a.

817 The rare first person singular is used here, as is usual elsewhere in this book, to showthat Proclus is conscious of offering a personal view. He has passed beyond what hefinds in the commentary tradition stemming from Porphyry.

294


from the old man, and that on this account it had become permanent likethe burnt-in outlines of a non-erasable picture. And just as Socrates,in the summary of the constitution,818 offers us as a reason for remem-bering the unfamiliarity of the things we hear, so Critias in this passage 15

offers the youth of children. And it is likely that the former is also a rea-son for the latter case – unfamiliarity a cause of children’s memory. Forall things seem unfamiliar when they are first encountered by children.And perhaps this too offers an indication of how the reproductive819

creation of secondary things depends upon the permanent sameness of 20

primary things, in the same way that the cause of memory <offeredby Socrates>820 is also the cause of children’s memory as stated byCritias.

But if, in addition to these explanations, one were to persist in the totalstudy of things, let him hear Iamblichus821 when he says that children’smemory gives an indication of the permanent creation, ever new and 25

in its prime, of the formal principles, while the non-erasable characterof the picture – or ‘tincture’,822 as both readings exist – [indicates] theever-flowing and inexhaustible creation, and the enthusiastic characterof the teacher [indicates] the ungrudging supervision of the youngercauses by the elder. For this too has a place, along with the explanations 30

offered.

The cosmic significance of the agreement with Timaeusand Hermocrates

Moreover, first thing in the morning I told just these things to these 196people here up to or should we find some other topic of conversationinstead of it. (26c3–e1)

Previously Critias was making them participants in the discourse, butnow he is encouraging them to share the resource,823 because among

818 Tim. 18c6–8, where sharing wives and sharing children are the unfamiliar ideas inquestion. Again I prefer not to take politeia as the title of a dialogue, but as ‘constitution’:the subject matter that gave the dialogue its name.

819 I suspect that ��$�� here is intended to suggest the reproduction of the species, whichwill depend for Proclus upon the permanent existence of the archetype of that species.

820 Supplement proposed by Kroll, and followed by Diehl and Festugiere. One mustassume, at least, that the sense is correct, and that Proclus is implying that there exists apermanent overall cause of a property F, explaining why individuals generated in timemay pass through the stage of becoming F.

821 in Tim. fr. 24 Dillon; Proclus’ remark at 195.30 suggests that he was in no way privilegingIamblichus’ ideas in this case.

822 Some read D��5� (‘dye’) for ��5� at 26c3 (cf. Vat. 228 as reported by Burnet).823 J�� ;. This word picks up the � ��; 7�� $�� 1$�, in Plato’s text at 26c4–5.

295


their models too824 all are united at the top and make each other replete5

with intellectual powers, while in the cosmos they create along with eachother according to some divine and universal co-animation (sympnoia).825

In accordance with this, and because of it, all things are present every-where in the appropriate manner to each, with paradigms of generatedthings pre existent in the heaven, and images of the heavenly things10

present in generation.Since the whole everywhere precedes the parts, this is observable also

in the second creation,826 and on this account he firstly gave a basicoutline of the war, and after this he will attempt to teach them in fullabout the entire constitution of the Atlantines and the origin of their15

generation, how they turned to injustice, and how the Athenians wentinto the war: the kind of military resources they had prepared, the kindof embassies they sent, the routes they took, the people who they werealigned with, and all that this entails.827 It is the case that the unattributed20

constitution828 is an imitation of the first creation, so that, hinting at itsmystical829 nature and its prior subsistence in pure rational principles,he says that it has been organized as if in a myth, while the attributionto the Athenians as something that was theirs gives an indication of the25

second creation, in which more particular detail is examined, and further,rivalry, movement, and spatial boundaries. Since the latter constitutionis dependent upon the former and follows immediately upon it, he saysthey will conform entirely and we shall not be discordant in ourclaim.

Socrates agrees on the story

What topic should we rather take up in place of this one, Critias up to it’s197not possible. (26e2–6)

824 The various demiurges to which the characters correspond.825 A word common in pythagorizing texts. 826 That corresponding to Critias.827 Festugiere refers here to Critias 112e, but notes that the dialogue has run out before

any details of the Athenian introduction into the war could be given.828 The term �� (�� is used of the ideal constitution because no physical background

conditions are set down with which conformity is necessary, see Anon. Proleg. 26.45–58. So one might call this an ‘unattributed’ constitution, as opposed to the ‘attributed’constitution set out in the Laws. However, one of the key issues for this distinctionappears to be that of private property, which is allowed in the Laws but not (for theguardians at least) in the Republic.

829 At 196.21 Festugiere proposes a reading that would translate as ‘mythical’, and so linkmore directly into the lemma. While he may be correct, the manuscript reading seemsquite adequate, and better reflects the status of this paradigmatic constitution.

296


Socrates welcomes the topic (logos), first because it is pertinent to thefestival of the Athenians (the war being an image of warfare throughout 5

the cosmos) and suitable as a hymn for the rite of Athena – for if peoplehave any use for a voice, they should be using it for hymns. Furthermore,since the goddess is the cause of both contemplation and operations, weimitate her operational activity through the rite, and her contemplativeactivity through the hymn. Secondly, [he welcomes it] as something that 10

will confirm that the constitution is possible. For he himself thought thisworth demonstrating in the course of his discussions on it.830 For on theone hand it was sufficient for him that the shape of the constitutionshould belong in the heaven and in the individual man. For all things areinside that occur without, and the true law has its beginning in the life 15

within.831 But on the other hand, if it could be shown that it had once heldauthority over the Athenians, then its capability is easily demonstrated.So this is what the reasons for that were like.

Then again, we should infer from this passage too that the story of theAtlantines was not a fiction, as some believed, but both a historical study 20

and one with special relevance for cosmic creation as a whole. So eventhe details he gave about the size of Atlantis should not be condemnedas mythical fictions by those who virtually confine the earth to within anarrow strait.832

Luck, listening, and their cosmic significance

But with fortune’s approval you must speak, and I must listen in turn, 25

keeping silence now in return for yesterday’s discourse. (26e6–27a1)

The position of the Stoics, who say that the wise man has no need ofluck, is not shared by Plato. Rather, he wants our thinking activities, 30

whenever they are implicated in material ones in people’s progressionto the outside, to be inspired by good luck, so that they may ensure 198

830 Whether the constitution is capable of being realized is an issue raised by Glauconat 471c (as noted by Diehl and Festugiere), but the answer of Socrates hinges on thepossibility of philosophers becoming kings (473c–e etc.).

831 The theory of natural law in antiquity, though finding supporting statements in Plato’sLaws, Aristotle, and the early Stoa, is explained fully for the first extant time by Ciceroin De Legibus 1.18–34. In relation to the Timaeus, one should remember the law-giving function of the demiurge at 41e–42d, that is already behind Middle Platonicrepresentations of the demiurge as law-giver, as at Numenius fr. 13 and Alcinous 16.2.

832 Here one should compare 180.25–182.2, designed to explain Critias’ extravagantremarks about the size of Atlantis at 24e as well as the actual lemma (25a–b). Pro-clus there makes appeal to Plato’s idea of a mega-earth in the Phaedo (109a–110b). Theterm ‘narrow’ relates to Tim. 25a3, which speaks of the Mediterranean as like a harbourwithin a narrow entrance.

297


the progression is fortunate and the activity towards others has divineapproval. For just as Nemesis is the overseer of words lightly spoken,833

so too does good luck guide words for the good of their recipients andof their giver, so that the former may [listen] with consideration and5

empathy, while the latter renders what is fitting in a divine and capablefashion. So much for the meaning as applied to individuals. As applied tothings universal good luck signifies the divine allocation, in accordancewith which each thing has received the lot that is proper to itself from theone father and from the creation as a whole. Furthermore, that Socrates10

should listen to these accounts in silence involves the repayment of agood deed, for they had also done this when he was telling the storyof the constitution, so that it wasn’t even clear from that work that theyhad been present. Yet it also shows by analogy how the demiurgic causes,15

though all are united with one another, still have separate creative roles.For the listening is indicative of their mutual penetration, while that onespeaks but the rest are silent signifies the freedom from admixture andimpurity with which each, drawing on his own individual nature, creates20

and engenders secondary things.

The order of the trilogy: Republic–Timaeus–Critias

Then consider the type of arrangement we have made for yourentertainment, Socrates up to but from then on discuss them as if theywere indeed our Athenian citizens. (27a2–b6)25

This order makes Timaeus both the top and the mean, for he speaks bothafter Socrates and Critias and before Critias and Hermocrates. In thatway he is a mean, but other ways he’s at the top: in his knowledge, andbecause he engenders the people that Socrates raises and Critias arms.This too is a clear symbol of the universal creation – being a top at the30

same time as a mean. For it is at once removed from all encosmic things199and is present to them all equally, and the topmost parts of the universeare given up to the Demiurge, and also the middle as the Pythagoreanaccount says: that’s where they say ‘the tower of Zas’ is.834 It makesCritias a mean, having him speak again before Hermocrates, while hehas now told his story in outline835 after Socrates. It is to the middle5

833 The origin of the idea, as details of the vocabulary show, is Laws 717d.834 For this expression, referring somewhat oddly to the central fire, see also 2.106.21–3; in

Eucl. 90.14. The idea is already attributed to the Pythagoreans by Arist. fr. 204 Rose2.835 Note that Critias implies that he has given only an outline at 26c6, promising more

detail later.

298


creation that the dyadic nature and the ‘whole with parts’ belong,836 justas the whole belongs to the first and the parts to the last. Hence Socrateshas handed down the constitution in summary form, while Hermocrateswill contribute the specific detail to the story handed down by Critias.So much for the arrangement as a whole. 10

Somebody might raise the problem about what task could be leftto Hermocrates, when Timaeus has explained the origin of these peo-ple, Socrates their upbringing, and Critias their achievements. Thereis nothing to follow on from this. Actually Hermocrates is a partner in 15

Critias’ discourse, because the narration of history involved both deedsand words. Critias promised that he himself would give an account oftheir deeds, but he calls upon Hermocrates too with a view to his shar-ing his resources837 in the words – imitating them was difficult, as had 20

earlier been said (19e1–2).838 Hence in the Atlanticus (= Critias 121bc)Critias says that Zeus, assembling the gods to deliberate on the penaltyto confront the Atlantines, spoke as follows, and terminated his com-munication, handing over the imitation of speeches to Hermocrates. Ifhe didn’t actually go on to the rest of the deeds, that’s nothing improb- 25

able. For in general, by having the gods summoned for the chastisementof the Atlantine violence, he gets everything that follows implied in this:the armament of the Athenians, the expedition, and the victory. Conse-quently Timaeus engenders the men, Socrates raises them, Critias takes 30

them into action, and Hermocrates makes them speak. One imitates thepaternal cause, another the cause that promotes unchanging intellec-tion, another the cause of motion and procession to secondary things, 200and another the cause that brings back the last things to their originsthrough the imitation of words. In this way you could interpret thissymbolically, and perhaps not over-ingeniously.

One might raise the difficulty of why the Timaeus has not been posi-tioned in front of the Republic, when the origin of the human race is 5

explained in it along with that of the rest of the cosmos.839 They haveto be born (which the Timaeus tells us of), and be educated (which theSocrates of the Republic does), and to operate in a manner worthy of theirupbringing (which the Atlanticus somehow shows). And if he had started

836 As Festugiere points out, Critias’ story is split into two parts that together comprise awhole.

837 There is an allusion to the wealth of words that Critias shares with Hermocratesand Timaeus at 26c4–5, but there could be no suggestion there that either would beconcerned with words as opposed to deeds.

838 What makes Proclus confident that the division of labour between Critias andHermocrates concerned the division of narrative into deeds and speeches?

839 This difficulty is already responded to by Porphyry at 202.2–8, and is printed as partof in Tim. fr. XXVI (Sodano).

299


with the end itself and come back to the Timaeus, which is by nature the10

first, we should be able to give the usual explanation, namely that forthe purpose of instruction he had first communicated what is first forus yet last by nature.840 But as things are it looks as if the first has beenplaced in the middle and the middle first. If this order had been simplypassed down to us by the corpus-arrangers,841 it would be less surprising15

for us, but as things are it seems that Plato himself is ordering them likethis. Certainly the main points of the constitution are here very brieflysummarized on the grounds that it has already been treated.

In answer to this objection one should say that if all the subjects werederived from the nature of things that are or have been, then the objection20

would have to prevail and that Timaeus has not properly been placedsecond. And if they were all being invented by reason hypothetically,then in that case too one would have to take first what came first bynature. But since Socrates’ theme follows reason alone and observes25

the universal as it shapes the nurture and education of men, while thefollowing ones treat things that are or have been, it is with good reasonthat these latter are placed with one another, while that of Socrates, whichexists in reason alone, has on this account too been placed before therest. Perhaps Plato also wanted to give an indication of this, that of those30

things proposed by souls that are divine and turned round towards the201divine, all of them at some time come about upon the earth too in accordwith certain favourable cyclic revolutions. That’s certainly what Critiasalso will testify to when he says to Socrates:842 ‘And as for the citizens,whom you had in mind, we shall say that they are those genuine ancestors5

of ours of whom the priest spoke. They are a complete match, and weshall not strike a discord if we say that they are the ones who lived at thattime.’

Even if the Republic falls short of the Timaeus by being partial, bydiscussing things mortal, and843 by spending time on the likeness, it is10

still the case that it excels it in its universality, since it shows how the

840 A standard Aristotelian contrast between the order ‘for us’ and the order ‘by nature’.841 Unusually we seem to have a technical term, diaskeuastes, for those who, like Aristo-

phanes of Byzantium, Thrasyllus, Dercyllides, and Theon, sought to establish anauthoritative order for the dialogues. On them see Tarrant (1993).

842 While the verb $��+� is future, the quotation is from 26d above. This is morelikely to indicate that Proclus had prepared these arguments before incorporatingthem in the commentary, possibly as introductory material for either the Timaeus orthe Republic. One should here note that Porphyry, mentioned shortly at 202.2–8, whois responding to the difficulty raised at 200.4–6, seems to be treating the issues in acontext bearing no relation to this lemma (202.3–4).

843 There is some uncertainty in the text at this point, but the general thrust seems not tobe at issue.

300


same form of life constitutes justice in the soul, constitution in the state,and creation in the cosmos. Further, its proposed subject of virtue isliberal, though the direction of its action towards the outside requires[the imposition of] cosmic ordering.844 Hence the Atlanticus comes afterthe Timaeus, and the condition of its citizens is evidence of their freely 15

adopted virtue. Plato shows through this too that soul, when it is self-mastering, rises above the entire level of nature and fate, though whenit inclines to actions it is mastered by the laws of nature and subject tofate.

Apart from what’s been said one should appreciate this point too, that 20

the sequence of these dialogues conforms with the order of human lifegiven in the Republic. There too men845 first were raised and educatedthrough mathematics, next rose to the contemplation of realities, andthirdly descended from that point to the providential care of the city. 25

So it is in accord with this sequence that the Republic has been placedahead of the Timaeus, which is ahead of the Atlanticus. That’s because,once they’ve been brought up by the Republic and raised on high bythe Timaeus, they will manage such actions as the Atlanticus speaks of 202intelligently in conformity with what they’ve studied, and live a happylife. At last that is how we have answered the difficulty.

The philosopher Porphyry,846 however, while dealing with other mat-ters rather than with this problem directly in mind, provided the follow-ing route towards a solution. Those who are going to get a real hold on 5

the study of the universe must first have been educated in character, sothat by assimilation to the object contemplated it should become prop-erly prepared for the recognition of the truth. This order of the dialoguesis an additional proof of this, for those who listen to the discussion inthe Timaeus must have previously had the benefit of the Republic, and, 10

when set in order by it,847 arrive in that state to hear the doctrines aboutthe cosmos – demonstrating that they have become very similar to thecosmic order of the universe by their education.

Lexis: details of this passage and the next considered

Let us also examine individually the details of the language (lexis).Timaeus is here called best at astronomy, not as being one who had 15

844 A case of the progression that requires reversion, and of life that requires mind.845 A gender-specific term that is essentially a slip, since Plato is keen not to exclude

women.846 in Tim. fr. XXVI (Sodano), which includes the difficulty raised above at 200.4–6 and

responded to here.847 I.e. when they have received the cosmos of the correct constitution.

301


investigated the speed of the [heavenly] movements, nor as one who‘measures the sun’s course by compiling tables’,848 or wastes time on theworks of fate. [He is called this] as one who both ‘pursues astronomybeyond the heaven’ in the manner of the ‘topmost’ man in the Theaete-tus,849 and studies invisible causes that are also the true stars – whence20

Socrates did not reveal the human being that we can see, but the onewhose true being is founded in reason.850 [And he is called it] as one whoimitates the universal Demiurge, in whom the heaven and all the starsare present intellectively, as the theologian says.851

He begins with the generation of the cosmos and ends with25

humankind, because the human being is a microcosm, possessing par-tially everything possessed entirely by the universe, as Socrates demon-strated in the Philebus.852 Certain people had been exceptionally edu-cated by Socrates, because rather than the whole city he educates the30

guardians and auxiliaries. In the universe too that which is exceptionallyendowed with intelligence is the heaven, which actually imitates intellect203by its motion. People are introduced by Critias according to the lawand the tale of Solon, because Solon too related that the Athenians hadonce organized themselves in this way and laid down laws on how boysshould be inducted into the citizen body (politeia), or into the phratries,5

or into the official lists, and which judges should preside, in one casephratry members and in another other pertinent people.853 So in per-sonally accepting the hypothesis that those educated by Socrates wereAthenians, he followed Solon in the tale and in the law by which certainpeople are introduced into the citizen body.10

It looks as though I am going to be repaid with a full and magnificentbanquet of words; so it would be up to you, Timaeus, to make the nextspeech, apparently: or once you’ve made the invocation to the godsaccording to law. (27b)

848 A clear allusion to Or. Chald. fr. 107.3 (des Places).849 176c7 and e6; ‘topmost’ here translates the somewhat poetical image of the coryphaeus

used by Plato; the impractical nature of such a person, that emerges somewhat comicallythere, is forgotten.

850 Cf. 200.24–6, on which Festugiere offers a long note.851 The standard way of referring to Orphic texts. Festugiere refers to the commonplace

‘Zeus is sun and moon’ encountered at De Mundo 401a25 etc., but it seems more logicalto think directly of the text quoted in part at 161.24–5 above (Orph. fr. 168.10–16), andquoted in Festugiere.

852 On Proclus’ doctrine see 5.11–21 above. It is founded in part on Philebus 29b–30c, whereall things that human beings possess an insignificant and impure sample of are found tobe nourished from wonderful universal supplies, including the physical elements, themetaphysical principles of peras, apeiron, meikton, and cause, soul, intellect, and wisdom.

853 The arrangements that Proclus has in mind were those of fifth-century Athens, but therole of Solon himself in establishing such arrangements is dubious.

302


The fullness and magnificence of the repayment give an indication, 15

for those who refer even these words of Socrates to their models, of theoverarching creation process that pervades all things. The banquet ofwords indicates the realization of the creative forms. The invitation toTimaeus signifies the reversion of the partial causes to the universal and 20

the invocation of good things from that source. And the invocation tothe gods symbolizes the creation process that is linked on high with theintelligibles.854 For according to law here is not a reference to the kindof law that ordinary people understand, Italian or Attic law, but the kindthey usually speak in Pythagorean texts – as here: 25

First honour the immortal gods, as is their position by law . . .855

Law signifies the divine order, according to which the secondary thingsare always linked to what precedes, and receive their fullness from them.This law, starting with the intelligibles, descends to the creative cause, 204and proceeds on from there, and is divided about the whole. At thesame time Socrates is revealing through these words that he is askingfor the natural science to be Pythagorean, beginning with the divine 5

cause, and not the kind of cause that he himself rejects in the Phaedo,856

the one that blinds ‘the eye of the soul’ by blaming airs and ethers inAnaxagorean fashion. True natural science must depend on theology,just as nature depends on the gods, and is divided up according to their 10

overall grades, in order that words too should be imitators of the thingsthey are supposed to signify.857 That’s why the inventors of myths haveestablished the tradition that Hephaestus, the one in charge of nature,was seized with love for Athena, the one who weaves the tapestry of theintellective forms and is conductor of intellections for all beings within 15

the cosmos.

854 Again reference to Timaeus symbolizing the universal demiurge, whose activities aredirectly linked to the next level up, while Socrates symbolizes the demiurge of one ofthe parts (the heaven).

855 Carm. Aur. 1, a well-known text in late antiquity.856 See Phaedo 96a–99d, where a mechanical account of causes is rejected. However, the

freeing of ‘the eye of the soul’ from the blindness induced by its low-level materialisticenvironment is a theme of Republic 7, particularly 533d2.

857 The nature of the name’s relation to its original is complex in Neoplatonism; see forinstance Ammonius: On Aristotle On Interpretation 40.18–22, trans. David Blank (Duck-worth 1996): ‘It is no wonder that we want to call the name both a ‘symbol’ [symbolon]and an ‘artificial likeness’ [homoioma techneton], for what is imposed unreflectively ismerely a symbol, while what is imposed according to reason resembles symbols inbeing able to be composed of now some and now other syllables, but in being appro-priate to the nature of what is named it is a likeness, not a symbol.’

303


Conclusion

At this point the proem of the Timaeus is concluded. Severus did notthink it worthy of commentary at all. Longinus858 said it was not allsuperfluous, only the embedded tale of the Atlantines and of the sto-ries told by the Egyptian, so that he used to follow Socrates’ request, I20

mean I am here dressed up for it and most ready of all to receive it,with Critias’ description, I mean Then consider the type of arrange-ment we have made for your entertainment, Socrates. Porphyry and25

Iamblichus,859 though, demonstrated that it was in harmony with theoverall aim of the dialogue, the one in a less complete fashion, and theother more in the style of a full initiate.860 Hence, if we too concludethe book at this point, we shall be providing an arrangement of our ownthat accords both with that of Plato and with these people.

858 Longinus fr. 37 (Patillon and Brisson), showing that he did not normally tackle 20c to27a; that Severus, Platonist of the second century, is mentioned at all is surely due toeither Longinus or Porphyry.

859 Porphyry, in Tim. fr. XXVII (Sodano); Iamblichus, in Tim. fr. 25, with commentary inDillon (1973), 294–5.

860 Note the way in which Proclus invites us to imagine a steady development towards thecorrect view of interpreting prologues., It seems, however, that the Middle Platonistsand their Neopythagorean contemporaries did not all spurn the introductory material,and that there had been considerable discussion of the Atlantis story and its status.For discussion see Tarrant (2000), 39–40 (though n. 42 misinterprets Longinus). Nodoubt Porphyry would have picked out Severus as a particularly bad example of aMiddle Platonist who failed to see merit in the prologues, and Longinus as somebodywhose work was well known to him. Porphyry himself found only ethical significancein the prologues, as may be seen from references above, especially when comparedwith in Parm. 1.658–9 (where, as is usual in this commentary, commentators are notnamed). On the exegetic strategies of Porphyry and Iamblichus in the present worksee Introduction, pp. 44–8.

304

References

annick , c . - s . (1991) ‘Lire Proclus, lecteur du Sophiste’, in P. Aubenque (ed.),Etudes sur le Sophiste de Platon, Paris, Bibliopolis, 475–94

archer-h ind , r . d . (1888) The Timaeus of Plato. Cambridge University Pressathanass iad i , polymnia (1999) Damascius: The Philosophical History.

Athens, Apameaatk inson , m . (1983) Plotinus: Ennead V. i , A Commentary with Translation.

Oxford University Pressbaltes , matthias (1976) Die Weltentstehung des platonischen Timaios nach den

antiken Interpreten i . Leiden, Brill(1983) ‘Zur Philosophie des Platonikers Attikos’, in H.-D. Blume and F. Mann

(eds.), Platonismus und Christentum, Munster, 38–57baltes , matthias et al. (1987–) Der Platonismus in der Antike. Stuttgart–Bad

Cannstatt, frommann-holzboogbaltussen , han (2003) ‘Early reactions to Plato’s Timaeus: Polemic and exe-

gesis in Theophrastus and Epicurus’, in R. W. Sharples and A. Sheppard(2003), 49–71

baltzly , d irk (2002) ‘What goes up: Proclus against Aristotle on the fifthelement’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80, 261–87

bast ian in i g . and dav id n . sedley (1995) Edition of the anonymousIn Theaetetum in Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini, iii: Commentari.Florence, Olschki, 227–562

bechtle , gerard . (1999) The Anonymous Commentary on Plato’s ‘Parmenides’.Bern, Haupt

be ierwaltes , werner (1965) Proklos: Grundzuge seiner Metaphysik. Frank-furt

betegh , gabor (2004) The Derveni Papyrus: Cosmology, Theology, and Interpre-tation. Cambridge University Press

b idez , J. , ed. (1928) Proclus: De sacrificio et magia. Catalogue des manuscritsalchimiques grecs. Brussels, Lamertin

blank , dav id (1996) Ammonius: On Aristotle On Interpretation 1–8. London,Duckworth

boese , h . , ed. (1958) Die mittelalterliche Ubersetzung der Stoicheiosis physike desProclus: Procli Diadochi Lycii Elementatio physica. Berlin, Academie-verlag

bo issonade , j . f. , ed. (1966) Marinus Vita Procli. Amsterdam, Hakkertbr eh ier , e . , ed. (1956) Plotin: Enneades, vol. v. Paris, Les Belles Lettresbr i sson , luc (1987a) ‘Amelius: Sa vie, son oeuvre, sa doctrine, son style’,

ANRW ii.36.2, 793–860(1987b) ‘Proclus et l’Orphisme’, in J. Pepin and H. D. Saffrey (eds.), Proclus:

lecteur et interprete des anciens, Paris, CNRS

305

References

(1999) ‘The Platonic background in the Apocalypse of Zostrianos: Numenius andLetter II attributed to Plato’, in John J. Cleary (ed.), Traditions of Platonism,Aldershot, Ashgate

(2000). ‘La place des Oracles Chaldaıques dans la Theologie Platonicienne’, inA. P. Segonds and C. Steel (eds.), Proclus et la Theologie Platonicienne, Louvain,Presses Universitaires de Louvain, 109–16

(2003) ‘Plato’s Timaeus and the Chaldean Oracles’, in G. Reydams-Schils (ed.),Plato’s Timaeus as Cultural Icon, Notre Dame, Ind., University of NotreDame, 111–51

broadie , sarah (2001) ‘Theodicy and pseudo-history in the Timaeus’, OxfordStudies in Ancient Philosophy 21, 1–28

cameron, alan (1983) ‘Crantor and Posidonius on Atlantis’, Classical Quar-terly 33, 81–91

carbonara nadde i , m . (1976) Gli scoli greci al Gorgia di Platone. Bologna,Patron Editore

chiesara , mar ia l . , ed. (2001) Aristocles of Messene: Testimonıa and Fragments.Oxford University Press

clay, d i sk in (1999) ‘Plato’s Atlantis: The anatomy of a fiction’, Proceedings ofthe Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 15, 1–21

cleary, john j . (2006). ‘Proclus as a reader of Plato’s Timaeus’, in H. Tarrantand D. Baltzly (2006), 19–31

cornford , f. m . (1957) Plato’s Cosmology. New York, Liberal Arts Presscorr igan , kev in (1987) ‘Amelius, Plotinus, and Porphyry on Being, Intellect

and One’, ANRW ii.36.2, 195–203coulter , j . a . (1976) The Literary Microcosm: Theories of Interpretation of the

Later Neoplatonists. Leiden, Brilldav ies , j . k . (1971) Athenian Propertied Families. Oxford University Pressdenyer , n icholas , ed. (2001) Plato, Alcibiades, Cambridge University Pressdes places , E . , ed., trans. (1973) Numenius: Fragments. Paris, Les Belles

Lettres(1996) Oracles chaldaıques: avec un choix de commentaires anciens, 3rd edn. Paris,

Les Belles Lettresdiehl e . , ed. (1965) Proclus Diadochus: In Platonis Timaeum Commentaria. Ams-

terdam, Hakkert. 3 vols. [Reprint of Leipzig, Teubner, text of 1903–5]diller , h . (1957) ‘Proklos’, RE 18.1, 186–274dillon , john (1971) ‘Harpocration’s Commentary on Plato: Fragments of a

Middle Platonic commentary’, Calif. Stud. in Class. Ant.4, 125–46ed. (1973) Iamblichi Chalcidensis in Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta.

Leiden, Brill(1977) The Middle Platonists. London, Duckworth(2003) The Heirs of Plato. Oxford University Press(2006) ‘Pedantry and pedestrianism? Some reflections on the Middle Platonic

commentary tradition’, in H. Tarrant and D. Baltzly (2006), 19–31dodds , e . r . , ed. and trans. (1963) Proclus: The Elements of Theology. Oxford,

Clarendon Press

306

References

duvick , br ian , trans. (forthcoming) Proclus: On the Cratylus. London,Duckworth

edwards , m . j . (2000) Neoplatonic Saints: The Lives of Plotinus and Proclus bytheir Students. Liverpool University Press

festug i e re , a . j . (1966) Proclus: Commentaire sur le Timee. Paris, Vrin(1970) Proclus: Commentaire sur la Republique. Paris, Vrin(1971) ‘Modes de composition des Commentaires de Proclus’, in A. J. Fes-

tugiere (ed.), Etudes de philosophie greque, Paris, Vrin, 551–74festug i e re a . j . and l . mass ignon (1944) La revelation d’Hermes

Trismegiste. Paris, Librairie Lecoffre J. Gabaldfinamore , john, and john dillon (2002) Iamblichus’ De Anima: Text,

Translation, and Commentary. Leiden, Brillgatti , mar ia lu i sa (1996) ‘Plotinus: The Platonic tradition and the foun-

dation of Neoplatonism,’ in Lloyd Gerson (ed.), The Cambridge Companionto Plotinus, Cambridge University Press

gersh , stephen (2000) ‘Proclus’ theological methods: The programme ofthe Theologica Platonica 1.4’, in A. Segonds and C. Steel (2000), 15–27

(2003) ‘Proclus’ Commentary on the Timaeus – the prefatory material’, in R. W.Sharples and A. Sheppard (2003), 143–53

Gioe, Adriano (2003) Filosofi medioplatonici del ii secolo dc, testimonianze e fram-menti. Naples, Bibliopolis

glucker , john (1978) Antiochus and the late Academy. Gottingen, Vanden-hoeck and Ruprecht

gu erard c . (1991) ‘Les citations du Sophiste dans les oeuvres de Proclus’,in P. J. and H. D. Saffrey (eds.), Etudes sur le Sophiste de Platon, Paris,Bibliopolis, 495–508

hadot , p i erre (1968) Porphyre et Victorinus, vols. i and ii. Paris, Etudes Augus-tiniennes

(1990) ‘The Harmony of Plotinus and Aristotle according to Porphyry’, inR. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and theirInfluence, London, Duckworth, 125–140

hall iwell , stephen (2002) The Aesthetics of Mimesis: Ancient Texts and Mod-ern Problems. Princeton University Press

i saac , d . , ed. and trans. (1977) Proclus: Dix problemes concernant la providence.Paris, Les Belles Lettres

ed. and trans. (1979) Proclus: Providence, Fatalite, Liberte. Paris, Les BellesLettres

ed. and trans. (1982) Proclus: De l’ existence du mal. Paris, Les Belles Lettresj ackson , r . , k . lykos , and h. tarrant , trans. (1998) Olympiodorus:

Commentary on Plato’s Gorgias. Leiden, Brilljohansen , t . k . (2004) Plato’s Natural Philosophy: A Study of the Timaeus-

Critias. Cambridge University Pressjohnson t . m . (1988) Iamblichus: Exhortation to Philosophy. Grand Rapids,

Phanes Pressjones , r . m . (1980) The Platonism of Plutarch, and Selected Papers. New York

307

References

kar iv ier i a . (1994) ‘The House of Proclus on the southern slopes of theAcropolis: A contribution’, in P. Castren (ed.), Post-Herulian Athens, Athens,Finnish Institute, i. 115–40

kern , o . (1922) Orphicorum Fragmenta. Berlin, Weidmannk idd , i . g . (1988) Posidonius, vol. ii, The Commentary, Cambridge University

Presskroll , w. , ed. (1899–1901) Procli Diadochi in Platonis Rem Publicam Commen-

tarii. Leipzig, Teubnerkuisma , o . (1996) Proclus’ Defence of Homer. Helsinkilamberton, r . (1986) Homer the Theologian: Neoplatonist Allegorical Reading

and the Growth of the Epic Tradition. Berkeley, University of California Presslamberz , E . (1987) ‘Form des philosophischen Kommentars’, in J. Pepin and

H.-D. Saffrey (eds.), Proclus: Lecteur et interprete des anciens, Paris, CNRS,1–20

lang , h . and a . d . macro (2001) Proclus: On the Eternity of the World.Berkeley, University of California Press

ledbetter , grace m. (2003) Poetics before Plato: Interpretation and Authorityin Early Greek Theories of Poetry. Princeton University Press

lee , john a . l . (1997) ‘Hebrews 5:14 and L M@��: A history of misunderstand-ing’, Novum Testamentum 39, 151–76

lernould , ala in (2001) Physique et theologie: Lecture du Timee de Platon parProclus. Villeneuve d’ Ascq, Presses Universitaires du Septentrion

makowsk i , f. (1997) ‘L’ absent du Timee’, Revue de Philosophie Ancienne 15,115–58

manit ius , c . , ed. (1909) Procli Diadochi Hypotyposis Astronomicarum Positionum.Leipzig, Teubner

mansfeld , jaap (1983) ‘Intuitionism and formalism: Zeno’s definition ofgeometry in a fragment of L. Calvenus Taurus’, Phronesis 28, 59–74

(1992) Heresiology in Context. Leiden, Brill(1994) Prolegomena: Questions to be settled before the study of an author or a text.

Leiden, Brillmansfeld , jaap , and dav id t . runia (1997) Aetiana. The Method and

Intellectual Context of a Doxographer, vol. i. Leiden, Brillmarti jn , mar i j e (2006) ‘The eikos mythos in Proclus’ commentary on the

Timaeus’ , in H. Tarrant and D. Baltzly (2006) 151–67menn, stephen (2001) ‘Longinus on Plotinus’, Dionysius 19, 113–24merlan , ph il i p (1960) From Platonism to Neoplatonism, 2nd edn. The Hague,

Nijhoffmorgan , k . a . (1998) ‘Designer history: Plato’s Atlantis story and fourth-

century ideology’, Journal of Hellenic Studies 118, 101–18morrow g. r . , trans. (1970) Proclus: Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s

Elements. Princeton University Pressmorrow g. r . and j . m . d illon , trans. (1987) Proclus’ Commentary on

Plato’s Parmenides. Princeton University Presso ’ meara , domin ic j . (1989) Pythagoras Revived: Mathematics and Philosophy

in Late Antiquity. Oxford, Clarendon Press

308

References

o ’ne ill , will iam (1965) Proclus: Alcibiades I. The Hague, Nijhoffopsomer , jan (2000) ‘Proclus on demiurgy and procession: A Neoplatonic

reading of the Timaeus’, in M. R. Wright (ed.), Reason and Necessity: Essayson Plato’s Timaeus, London, 113–43

(2001a) ‘Neoplatonist criticisms of Plutarch’, in A. Perez Jimenez and F.Casadesus (eds.), Estudios sobre Plutarco. Misticismo y religiones mistericas en laobra de Plutarco, Madrid-Malaga, 187–200

(2001b) ‘Who in Heaven is the Demiurge? Proclus’ exegesis of Plato Tim.28c3–5’, The Ancient World 32, 52–70

(2003) ‘La demiurgie des jeunes dieux selon Proclus’, Les Etudes Classiques71, 5–49

opsomer , jan and carlos steel (2003) Proclus: On the Existence of Evils.London, Duckworth

pasqual i , g . , ed. (1908) Proclus: In Platonis Cratylum commentaria. Leipzig,Teubner

pat illon , m . and l . br i sson , eds. (2001) Longin: Fragments, Art rhetorique.Paris, Les Belles Lettres

p e p in , j ean (2000) ‘Les modes de l’enseignement theologique dans la TheologiePlatonicienne’, in A. Segonds and C. Steel (2000), 1–14

phill ips , john f. (1997) ‘Neoplatonic exegeses of Plato’s cosmogony(Timaeus 27c–28c), Journal of the History of Philosophy 35, 173–97

praechter k . (1905) Review of Diehl, Gottingische Gelehrte Anzeigen 7,505–35

(1990) Review of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, in R. Sorabji (ed.),Aristotle Transformed, London, Duckworth, 31–54

rangos , spyr idon (1999) ‘Proclus on poetic mimesis, symbolism, and truth’,Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 19, 249–77

rappe , sara (2000) Reading Neoplatonism: Non-discursive Thinking in the Textsof Plotinus, Proclus, and Damascius. Cambridge University Press

resc igno , a . (1998) ‘Proclo lettore di Plutarco?’ in I. Gallo (ed.), L’ ereditaculturale di Plutarco dall’ Antichita al Rinascimento, Naples, D’Auria, 111–41

reydams-schils , gretchen (2001) ‘Socrates’ request: Timaeus 19b–20cin the Platonist tradition’, The Ancient World 32, 39–51

r ichard m. (1950) ‘Apo phones’, Byzantion 20, 191–222r itzenfeld , a . , ed. (1912) Proclus: Institutio Physica. Leipzig, Teubnerrunia , d . t . (1986) Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato. Leiden, Brillsaffrey h . d . (1975) ‘Allusions antichretiennes chez Proclus: Le diadoque

Platonicien’, Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Philogiques 59, 553–62.(1990) ‘How did Syrianus regard Aristotle?’, in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Trans-

formed, London, Duckworth, 173–80saffrey h . d . and l . g . wester ink , eds. (1968–97), Proclus: Theologie

Platonicienne. Paris, Les Belles Lettresschr oder , h . o . (1934) Galeni in Platonis Timaeum Commentarii Fragmenta.

Leipzigsedley, dav id (1997) ‘Plato’s Auctoritas and the rebirth of the commentary

tradition’, in M. Griffin and J. Barnes (eds.), Philosophia Togata ii, 110–29

309

References

(1999a) ‘The Stoic-Platonist debate on kathekonta’, in K. Ierodiakonou (ed.),Topics in Stoic Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 128–52

(1999b) ‘The ideal of godlikeness’, in G. Fine (ed.), Oxford Readings in Plato:Ethics, Politics, Religion and the Soul, Oxford University Press, 309–28

(2002) ‘The origins of the Stoic god’, in M. Frede and A. Laks (eds.), Tradi-tions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background, and Aftermath,Leiden, 41–83

segonds , a . and c . steel , eds. (2000) Proclus et la Theologie Platonicienne.Leuven and Paris

share , michael (1994) Arethas’ Scholia on Porphyry’s Isagoge and Aristotle’sCategories. The Academy of Athens

trans. (2005) Philoponus: Against Proclus on the Eternity of the World, 2 vols.London, Duckworth

sharples r . w. and a . sheppard , eds. (2003) Ancient Approaches to Plato’sTimaeus. London, Institute of Classical Studies

sheppard , anne (1980) Studies on the 5th and 6th Essays of Proclus’ Commentaryon the Republic. Gottingen, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht

s iorvanes , lucas (1996) Proclus: Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Science. NewHaven, Yale University Press

(2003) ‘Perceptions of the Timaeus: Thematization and truth in the exegeticaltradition’, in Sharples and Sheppard (2003), 155–74

smith a . (1987) ‘Porphyrian studies since 1913’, ANRW ii.36.2, 717–73(1993) Porphyrius: Fragmenta, Leipzig, Teubner

sodano , a . r . (1964) Porphyrii in Platonis Timaeum Fragmenta, Naplessomfa i , anna (2003) ‘The nature of daemons: A theological application of

the concept of geometrical proportion in Calcidius’ Commentary to Plato’sTimaeus’, in Sharples and Sheppard (2003), 129–42

sorab j i , r ichard (1988) Matter, Space and Motion: Theories in Antiquity andtheir Sequel. London, Duckworth

(2004) The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200–600 ad: A Sourcebook, 3 vols.London, Duckworth

sumi , a . (1997) ‘Plotinus on Phaedrus 247d7-e1: The Platonic locus classicusof the identity of intellect with the intelligible objects,’ American CatholicPhilosophical Quarterly 71, 404–20

(2006) ‘The Species Infima as the Infinite: Timaeus 39e7–9, Parmenides 144b4-c1 and Philebus 16e1–2 in Plotinus, Ennead VI 2 (43) 22’, in H. Tarrant andD. Baltzly (eds.), Reading Plato in Antiquity, 73–88

tardieu , m . (1996) Recherches sur la formation de l’ Apocalypse de Zostrien et lessources de Marius Victorinus, et Pierre Hadot, ‘Porphyre et Victorine’. Questionset hypotheses, Res Orientales ix, Bures-sur-Yvette

tarrant , harold (1979) ‘Numenius fr. 13 and Plato’s Timaeus’, Antichthon13, 19–29

(1983), ‘The date of Anonymous In Theaetetum’, Classical Quarterly 33,161–87

(1993) Thrasyllan Platonism. Ithaca, Cornell University Press(2000) Plato’s First Interpreters. London, Duckworth

310

References

(2004) ‘Must commentators know their sources? Proclus In Timaeum andNumenius’, in P. Adamson, H. Baltussen, and M. W. F. Stone (eds.),Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries, ICSBICS Suppl., London, vol. i, 175–90

tarrant , h . and d. baltzly , eds. (2006). Reading Plato in Antiquity.London

taylor , thomas (1995) The Platonic Theology in Six Books. Frome,Prometheus Trust

trombley , f. (1995) Hellenistic Religion and Christianization. Leiden, Brilltrouillard , j ean (1983) ‘Proclus et la joie de quitter le ciel’, Diotima 11,

182–92van den berg , robert , ed., trans. (2001) Proclus’ Hymns: Essays, Translations,

Commentary. Leiden, Brill(2003) ‘“Becoming like God” according to Proclus’ interpretations of the

Timaeus, the Eleusinian Mysteries, and the Chaldaean Oracles’, in R. Sharplesand A. Sheppard (2003), 189–202

vogt , e . , ed. (1957) Procli hymni. Wiesbaden, Harrassowitzwall i s , r . t . (1972) Neoplatonism. London, Duckworthwasz ink j . h . (1966) ‘Porphyrios und Numenios’, in Porphyre, Fondation

Hardt, Entretiens ii, 33–78weber , karl-otto (1962) Origenes der Neuplatoniker. Munichwest , m . l . (1983) The Orphic Poems. Oxford University Presswhittaker , john (1987) ‘Proclus and the Middle Platonists’ in J. Pepin and

H.-D. Saffrey (eds.), Proclus, Lecteur et interprete des anciens, Paris, CNRSwittwer , roland (1999) ‘Aspasian lemmatology’, in A. Alberti and R.

Sharples (eds.), Aspasius: The Earliest Extant Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics,Berlin, De Gruyter, 51–84

za idman, l . b . and pantel , p. s . (1992) Religion in the Ancient Greek City.Cambridge University Press

311

English–Greek glossary

This selection of terms is designed to help identify the Greek original of aparticular translation. For best effect it should be used in conjunction with theGreek–English index.

above ano 9�above, from anothen 9�(activity energeia 12��affection pathos *(��aim skopos +�� air aer ��analogy analogia ��7��angelic angelikos ��7��arrange kosmein ��+$;arrangement diakosmesis, diakosmos ��+$�+��, ��*��+$��Athenaic Athenaıkos G(��N��

become gignesthai ��+(��being to on, ousia �% �, ��+��bodiless asomatos �+E$��body soma +)$�

chariot ochema ��$�cohesive synektikos +��column (of opposites) systoichia +�+��complete teleios �27��conflagration ekpyrosis 1� ��+��constitution politeia �7��constitutional politikos �7��corporeal somatikos, somatoeides +�$��, +�$��correspond analogein ��7��;correspondence analogia ��7��cosmic kosmikos ��+$��cosmic creation cosmopoiıa ��+$� ��H�craft techne �2��creation demiourgia ��$��creative demiourgikos ��$��creator poietes ��cycle anakyklesis, periodos ��7�+��, ��

312


daemonic daimonios ��$��demiurge demiourgos ��$��o�depend on artasthai, exartasthai ��O+(��, 1@��O+(��descend katienai ��2��descent kathodos �*(��destruction phthora �(��*destructive phthartikos �(��determine aphorizein ��#�distinctive character idiotes 6��distinguish aphorizein ��#�divided dieiremenos �� P��$2��divided, divisible meristos $��+��divinity (abstract noun) theotes (��dyad dyas ��*�

earth ge �5effluence, efflux aporrhoia � ��element stoicheion +��;�embrace (noun) perioche ��encosmic encosmios 1��+$��end telos �27��enmattered enylos C�7��eternal aıdios ��ether aither �6(��

fall ptosis �)+��fate heimarmene >$��$2�father pater ��fire pyr ,�first protos, protistos �)��, �E��+��forgetfulness lethe 7�(�form eidos =��founded in (be) hidryesthai >��+(��fulfilment apoplerosis � � 7��+��

generation genesis �2+��generation-producing genesiourgos �+��give an indication endeiknysthai 1��+(��goal telos �27��god, goddess theos (��goddess thea, theos (*, (��good agathos ��(��goodness agathotes ��(��guardian (as adjective) phrouretikos ��

harmony harmonia 8�$��heaven ouranos ��

313


heavenly ouranios ��*��hegemonic hegemonikos A�$��henad henas 4*�hieratic hieratikos >��higher hyperteros . 2��history historia >+��human (adj.) anthropinos �(�E ��human (noun) anthropos 9(��

image eikon, agalma 6�E, 9��7$�imagination phantasia ��+��immaculate achrantos 9��immaterial aylos 9�7��incorporeal asomatos �+E$��independent(gods) apolytoi (theoi) � �7�� ((��)indeterminate aoristos ��+��indication endeixis C��@��infinity apeiria � ��inspired entheos C(��instrument organon ��intellection noesis ��+��intellective noeros ��intelligence nous �,�intelligible noetos ��invisible aphanes ��irrational alogos 97��

join synaptein +�* ��

labouring thetikos (��limit peras 2��lot kleros �75��lot, get as one’s lanchanein 7��*�

maintain synechein +�2��male arrhen 9��matter hyle Q7�measure (noun) metron $2��measure (verb) metrein $��;messenger (of gods) angelos 9��7��monad monas $�*�moon selene +7��mortal thnetos (��motion kinesis ��+��multiplicity plethos 75(��multiply plethuein 7�(��

314


mysteries mysteria $�+��mystical mystikos $�+��myth mythos, mythologia $,(��, $�(�7��mythical mythikos $�(��

name onoma ��$�narrate historein >+��;narration often = historia >+��natural physikos ��+��nature physis ��+��number arithmos ��($��

official city goddess poliouchos thea �7��,�� (*operate energein 1��;order taxis �*@��otherness heterotes 4��

part meros $2��partial, particular merikos $��participation metousia $��+��paternal patrikos ��peplos peplos 2 7��perfect teleios �27��perfection teleiotes �7��period periodos ��philosophic philosophos ��7�+��physical physikos ��+��physical inquiry physiologia ��+��7��plurality plethos 75(��portion moira $�;��pre-exist prohyparchein �� *��presiding prostates ��+�*��priestly hieratikos >��primary protourgos ��principle arche ��proceed, process proelthein, proienai ��7(;, ��N2��procession proodos ��procreative gonimos ��$��productive poietikos ��protective phrouretikos ��providence pronoia ��psychical psychikos ��purity katharotes ��(��

rank taxis �*@��rational logikos 7��readiness epitedeiotes 1 ��reason logos 7��

315


receptacle hypodoche . ��recognition gnosis �)+��remain menein $2�representation agalma 9��7$�reproductive genesiourgos �+��rest stasis +�*+��reversion epistrophe 1 �+��revert epistrephein 1 �+��2��rivalry enantiosis 1��+��

sameness tautotes ��secret aporrhetos � ��seed sperma + 2�$�sensation aesthesis �R+(�+��separable, separate choristos �E��+��separation diakrisis ��*��+��series seira +��*signify semainein +�$��solar heliakos A7��soul psyche ��spontaneous autophyes, automaton ��, ��$��stable monimos $��$��subordinate hypheimenos .��$2��subordination hyphesis Q�+��substance ousia ��+��substrate hypokeimenon . ��$�summary anakephalaiosis ��7��+��sun helios S7��superiors hoi kreittones �> ��surpassing excellence hyperoche . ��symbol symbolon +�$D�7�symbolically symbolikos +�$D�7��)�sympathy sympatheia +�$ *(��

target skopos +�� theological theologikos (�7��theology theologia (�7��titanic titanikos ��tool organon ��triad trias ��*�

underlie hypokeisthai . ��;+(��unification henosis ��+��universal holikos, katholikos <7��, ��(�7��unlimited apeiros 9 ��unmoved akinetos ��unswerving atreptos 9��

316


unyielding ameiliktos �$�7��

vacant (of lots) adespotos ��2+ ��vehicle ochema ��$�virtue arete ��visible emphanes 1$��

wisdom phronesis, sophia ��+��, +��

317

Greek word index

This index is intended to be a help in finding terminology of a technical or otherwiseinteresting nature, and also proper names. Technical terms found throughout do not havepage-references listed. Translations offered are intended to be a good indication of how aterm is translated, but because book 1 contains a wide variety of material it has not beenpossible to standardize translations beyond a certain point.

T

9D�� (�E��), desert land, 181.6�D��+��, unforced, 93.15�D�*+��, in an unforced manner, 64.25�D��7��, against one’s will, etc., 20.26;

160.289D�++�� (Q7�), an abyss (of matter), 175.19��(��, of a good sort, 134.1��(�, �%, the Good (Form of), 3.6;

3.22–5; 42.23; 45.25; 118.29; 125.22��(��, (�/) ��(*, good, good things,

22.16; 41.9; 42.27–8; 44.11–17; 45.15;52.5–8; 113.13; 115.12; 118.1; 133.13;134.10; 135.18–21; 158.4; 164.8;168.24; 191.31; 197.25; 198.1;198.4–5; 203.21

��(��, goodness, 25.27; 131.8; 133.69��7$�, image, representation, 11.15;

51.25–8; 57.16; 60.16; 99.3; 157.9G��$2$�, Agamemnon, 117.4��7��, angelic, 36.21; 131.27; 136.12;

137.10–12; 163.139��7��, messenger, reporter, 92.16; 194.2

9��7�� (), messengers of the Gods,152.14

��7��$��* (()), herd-tendingmanagement of the Gods, 99.18

��7*��, shepherd, 154.25��27�, flock, 152.16–19��2�� (��), ungenerated (heaven),

6.328��E�� (>�)), most sacred (of

temples), 124.17��7�N� (�) ��+�), splendours (of

intellections), 87.4

9��, infertile, 48.1��+��, more sharp-witted 2.1��)�, competitions, 89.18

��)� ��7��, dissension of thedialecticians, 21.13

��)� +��+��, sophistic struggles,28.18

��+��, competitive, 21.17–25; (adv.)21. 9

��*$�+��, invincible, 57.18; 166.6;168.15

G��$��, Adeimantus, 9.1��2+ ��, independent, vacant (lots),

92.1; 93.17; 145.10; 201.15��, undivided, 50.3��*�� , unrelenting, 120.25; (adv.)

120.29�� +��, without stumbling,

193.19��*+��, undistorted, 168.26��*��, without variance, 161.14–27��, outside the inquiry, 1.23;

13.19; impossible to find a paththrough, 187.18; 190.21

9��7�� 7��, straightforward friendship,24.17

��2�, �%, inaction, 157.1G��*+��, Adrasteia, 40.9; 69.268��, fulsome, stout, 62.9; 64.16; 70.21��$��, lack of power, 19.20; 22.11;

22.28; 62.31; 39.2; 114.9–129��, �%, inner sanctuary, 98.16��$�*D�7�, �/, ever-changing, 125.10�2��, ever-flowing, 195.27

318

Greek word index

��, air, climate, (sing.) 103.4; 107.3–18;112.24–9; 117.24; 162.5–163.1; (pl.)2.14; 99.16; 100.26; 120.18; 137.4;204.7

�2��, of air, airborne, 112.21; 137.4;142.5

�#�H�, lifelessness, 41.19#� (��), lifeless (instrument),

12.22��, undefeated, 57.39(��+��, immortality, 162.199(��, godless, 153.22�(�;, question authenticity, 62.14�(2��+��, a setting aside, 77.27�(�7��, unfeminized, 151.14G(�O, Athena, 77.4; 78.28; 79.6;

85.13–30; 95.16; 97.13; 103.9–32;134.25–135.8; 140.23–30; 141.14;144.9; 145.6–11; 147.1;150.13–151.15; 156.17; 157.8–159.26;163.24; 165.17; 166.11; 167.33;169.14–170.14; 171.16–173.22; 183.7;185.2; 197.5; 204.13

G(��N��, Athenaic, of Athena, 84.17–28;134.31–135.2; 141.8; 144.12–24;147.27; 150.15; 151.12; 156.21;157.12–17; 159.3; 160.12–9; 163.8;165.4–29; 166.30–167.8; 170.3–23;175.32; 185.22–186.12; 191.6; 192.25

G(��;��, Athenians, 4.19; frequent from74.11

�(��+��, more widespread, 107.21U(��, (Mt.) Athos, 181.12TR��, Ajax, 35.4�6��, plying the aegis, 169.8�6��, aegis, 168.17< T6�� , the Egyptian(s), (sing.)

102.29; 108.27; 114.26; 127.5–23;130.2; 135.16; 135.29; 140.23; 204.19;(pl.) 76.4–9; 77.21; 97.17; 98.15; 99.4;100.26; 101.17–22; 102.11–26;107.30; 118.2; 119.17–120.16;121.13–122.18; 123.21; 124.5–20;127.11; 129.28; 147.9; 158.27; 181.27;191.17; 192.10–12

TR�� , Egypt, 91.11; 93.1–5;94.29–95.21; 96.4; 97.18; 119.12;187.25

��, eternal, 2.26; 11.30; 39.15; 57.16;89.17; 92.7; 105.19; 125.8; 127.6;130.23; 137.30; 138.3–4; 139.20;

140.17; 141.30; 145.21; (adv.) 132.1;141.22

��, eternal nature, 138.11; 141.28�6(2��, of ether, 5.15; 138.26; 142.6;

147.13�6(��, ether, 176.13; 181.9�R��$�, riddle, 130.7; 132.22; 134.31�6��$��E��, of riddling sort, 129.16;

(comp. adv.) 165.14�6�+++(��, talk riddlingly, 32.26; 75.22;

108.30; 147.19�V�+��, choice, selection, 160.28; 164.1;

also faction, 2.16�R+(�+��, sensation, 14.22; 102.18; 102.30�6+(��, sensible, 5.19; 11.2–10; 13.3–10;

16.30; 19.12; 22.30; 50.10; 85.1;105.5; 124.21; 128.12; 142.24–8;143.16; 144.11; 185.7

�=+��, ugliness, 175.10�6��, cause: frequent�6E, eternity, 6.28; 39.16; 94.15�6E��, eternal, everlasting, 38.23;

131.19–26; 162.4; (adv.) 104.11;108.16; 140.7; 185.24; (comp.)29.24–6

��*��, undamaged, 111.17��77� �+��, unembellished, 86.28��*7��, unceasing, 128.4��*��, unordered, 50.3��$�+��, unnamed, 24.17; 162.24��, unmoved etc., 27.9; 39.15; 97.8;

108.4; 124.15; 138.24; 139.2–6;161.13; 162.6

��7��, unswerving etc., 157.18; 166.7;189.24; (adv.) 52.19

9�7��, unswerving, 157.10��7��(��, correspondence, consistency,

125.24; 187.21; 201.26��+��, hearing, lesson etc., 9.12; 16.14;

20.29; 21.29–22.24< ��, listener, student etc., 21.4;

21.8; 22.31; 23.11��D�7�+$��, skirmishes, 61.239��, top, summit etc., 69.15; 70.5;

198.25–199.1��, highest, topmost etc., 9.20;

29.23; 168.5; 183.69��, to the highest degree, 192.4–9

��, highest point, pinnacle, 11.17;24.2; 169.16

��;�, rays, 181.19

319

Greek word index

��E7��, unhindered, 187.1; (adv.) 11.24;100.27; 179.1

�7�(��, truth, 62.26; 80.20; 83.6; 127.8;130.3; 162.31; 180.21; 202.8

G7��D�*��, Alcibiades, 61.13�77��, deriving motion from

another, 12.22�77��, grating, 68.10�7��, irrationality, 175.22�7��+��, irrational, 153.1797��, unreasonable, non-rational, 67.8;

145.16; (comp.) 167.30��3 97��, irrational soul, 53.23;

174.6; 176.5; 183.9�% 97��, irrational part, irrationality,

40.25; 176.21U$�+��, Amasis, 97.11; 97.21�$2(��, unparticipated, 10.29�$�D� $��*�, change shape, 108.2�$�7��, unyielding, 38.18; 166.9; 167.6;

168.15�$2��, indivisibility 54.29; 148.27�$��, undivided, 89.12�$2��+��, undivided, indivisible, 42.29;

95.13; 173.3�$�*D7��, changeless, unchanging,

58.27; 128.5; 138.14–21; 139.9�$��, immaculate, 167.2

�$��3� ��(��, unmingled purity,48.27; 50.15; 155.1; 169.6; 198.18

�% �$��2�, unmixed character, 157.16�$��)�, in unblended fashion, 163.14

9$��, failing to mix, 155.24�$�@��, not mixing, 155.31U$$�, Ammon, 96.18�$��D�, repayment, return, 25.9; 44.14;

192.169$��, formless, 126.27G$��, Amynander, 87.24; 90.4;

92.31�*D�+��, rising, swelling, 119.18; 120.12��D7�+(��, spout up, 119.18; 120.7��E+��, read, 35.14�*��, necessity

(�� *��, divine necessity, 160.29.7��3 �*��, material necessity, 42.26

�*�� , recorded, 192.13��*, recorded, 123.15��, Upward Leader, 34.20��, return, elevation, ascent, 53.11;

79.13; 180.20

��, leading up, uplifting, etc., 7.30;38.10; 118.6; 154.1; 154.24; 166.5;166.28; 168.24; 186.3–6

��+��, return contributions, 74.17��$*, recourse, referral back, 149.4,

191.15��, rise above, 110.26��(�$��+��, exhalation, 44.25, 110.2–20;

117.22��+(��, defy, 138.11��, utterly removing, 165.25��, without a cause, 52.7��7��,+(��, summarize, 4.16;

34.31; 200.17��7��+��, summary etc., 27.26;

30.20; 33.5; 55.19; 72.19; 195.13��;, get under way, 13.29��+��, stimulation, 30.8��, inquire of, 100.5��7�+��, cycle, revolution, 28.24;

95.25; 102.7; 108.24; 126.1; 127.26�*7��, getting, recalling, 149.3; 193.6��7��;, be analogous, correspond, 88.2;

89.17; 93.25; 152.13; 174.8��7��, correspondence, analogy, 33.9;

33.28; 34.27; 55.10; 57.21–4; 63.2–10;71.6; 71.21–6; 78.26; 80.2; 91.27;95.8; 128.13–15; 132.27; 134.20;152.4–10; 165.24; 172.24–9; 173.20;175.25; 177.27; 178.1; 198.15

��7��, explain away, 129.18�*7�+��, solution, dissolution, analysis,

76.22; 126.27; 173.28; 174.30; 182.7;183.20

��$*��+(��, take on, 111.2�*$+��, replete, 60.17��$�$�+�2+(��, recollect, remind

oneself, 124.7; 175.4�*$�+��, recollection, 102.32; 123.31;

124.10; 172.29; 191.22��$�+��% ��, ��, reacquainting

one with reality, 41.2��,, renew, 39.8; 98.2; 104.26��, rise up above, 58.13��2�+��, renewal, rejuvenation, 28.6;

104.5; 126.29��E�+��, irresistible, 38.6; 39.6;

167.11; 189.24�� +(��, be absorbed, 121.26�� 7��+��, fully supplying, 24.24; 26.26�� 7�,, reunite, unfold, 38.16; 191.8

320

Greek word index

�* ��@��, unveiling, 129.15–30�*�$�+��, incompatible, 69.5��$��, anarrhymata, 88.16�*��+��, Anarrhysis, 88.15��O, attach to, link to, 44.19, 140.13��+�277�, repress, 34.1��*+++(��, be stationed, be

re-enrolled, 53.30; 185.31��, draw up, 24.10��277�, rise up, 120.1��*, transfer, 182.8��)�, without touching, 112.10; 157.6��, awaken, stimulate, incite, 24.11;

72.29; 86.4��, without form, 91.20; 126.26;

189.14��77+(��, be confined to, 50.2�2�7� ��, unfailing, undiminished, 28.8;

33.21; 44.29; 106.15; 195.27��, not straying from, etc., 6.2;

12.14; 111.20�27�@��, unfolding, 29.13�7��, wheel round, turn back round,

28.26; 105.10�27�+(��, draw back, 88.16��, without lack, self-sufficient,

24.15; 44.13�@*7� ��, indelible, 102.8�@� *��, impossible to deceive,

92.18� ��, inconceivable, 3.32� �+��$�, unscientific, 67.11�(+��O, give a full return feast, 25.23�(�E �� (=��), human (species), 46.3�(�� %� �,�, human intelligence,

152.18; 153.4�(�E ��, human, 32.4–11; 33.12; 36.4;

43.27; 44.8; 49.23–4; 64.18; 78.2;95.26; 125.17; 158.5–16; 170.18;194.17; 201.21

9(�� , human: frequent< �� 9(�� , real human being,

83.4< 1 A$; 9(�� , human within us,

16.16; 117.2��2��, go up, go back, etc.: frequent

(as opp. ��2��), 29.19; 34.26; 53.21;58.15; 147.16; 151.22; 191.17

��2��, dedicate, 140.169��, ascent, 54.7; 108.19; 114.20�� +��, repayment, 25.29

��*��, reply (in writing), 31.2��;, contrast etc., 39.25; 69.3;

152.32; 176.25��+��, repayment, return favour, 25.8;

43.27; 44.6; 198.12��(��, opposing, 78.7; 78.25��7��, attack on, 174.29��$��7�$D*�, swap, 145.18�� *, counter-revolution, 76.24��*��, set against, 79.1; 174.12�� , intractable, 143.6–99��, those who dwell opposite,

120.19��, clinging closely, 75.10�� ; �%� �% �)�, confront the light

(directly), 19.16; 115.4��$;, celebrate, honour, 166.14; 173.9;

191.29�� , unattributed, 196.209�, above, etc.: frequent9�(, from above, 8.2; 41.19; 53.9–17;

75.24; 95.10; 98.13; 112.18; 128.11;130.13; 137.5; 140.29; 142.8; 142.18;142.29; 143.15; 154.4; 155.2; 156.16;166.2; 170.24; 174.15; 187.2; 189.10;191.5–11; 203.22

��+��, indeterminacy, indefiniteness,39.4–11; 40.13; 146.21

��+��, indeterminate, 21.10; 23.6;38.16; 146.15; 176.31; 179.3; 190.19;192.19

��+��, in unspecified fashion, 23.11� *(��, dispassionate state, 64.9� �(��, impassive, immune to influence,

115.23; 157.4� *��+��, opposition, 81.1� �@��,, disdain, 68.3� ��($�+��, counting, 15.13; 102.28� ��E, full of deceit, 92.19G ��, Apaturia, 88.11; 89.8� ��#+(��, reflect, mirror, 50.23;

57.10; 60.9; 69.27; 89.24; 118.11;134.12; 157.16; 158.2

� ��, improbable, 199.25� ��, untested, unused to, 117.10;

156.3� ��, inexperience, 62.18� ��, infinity, limitlessness, Unlimited,

22.17; 36.16; 121.20; 130.18–19;174.18; 175.9; 175.22; 176.2; 176.31;183.15; 185.8

321

Greek word index

9 ��, inexperienced, 62.20; 187.229 ��, unlimited etc., 47.4; 84.60;

121.17; 132.13; 138.25; 176.29–30;179.3

� ��2��, be unlike, 68.11� 2��, unbounded, 42.16� ��, �%, beyond description, 23.5� ��7� ��, remaining beyond grasp,

146.17� 7��, inerrant, 132.5, 137.5; 141.4

�> � 7�;� �+�2��, the fixed stars,76.22–3; 152.8

9 7�+��, sincere, 25.48 7��, simplicity etc., 29.10; 45.22;

86.11� �D*+�� , W�7��, fluctuations in the

Nile, 120.23� ��2+��, passing out of life, 147.22� ��, descendant, child of, 173.19;

182.19� ��, demonstrational, 7.23–8.4� ��(�+��+(��, return to square one,

54.8; 148.12� ��*+��+��, return to square one,

87.30; 101.1; 103.2� ��7��,, allot, 192.22� �� , do away with, eliminate,

25.16; 38.2; 157.7� �� 6��, secret cause, 53.1� �7�$ *�, desert, leave, 50.1; 113.3G �77�, Apollo, 78.28; 79.3; 159.27G �77��, Apollonian, 157.14–17;

163.7� �7��#+(��, recount, 101.17� �7��, liberated, independent, 18.8;

93.16; 131.5; 141.3; 166.31; 167.13� �7��, without involvement, 88.6;

91.29� � � ��, miss, 142.15� � 7��+��, fulfilment, 25.24; 168.23;

203.19� � 7�� 5� ��, administrators of

justice, 37.27� � 7��, supplying, 192.21� � ��+��, falling away, 22.159 �� (opp. ��+�$��), impassable,

88.16; 190.21� ��;, drift away, flow off, 27.10; 28.7� ��, secret, inexpressible, 30.7;

49.14; 129.29; 152.17; comp. (adv.)21.1

� ��, outflow, dispersal, 28.24;105.33

� ��, effluence, efflux, outflow,43.5–16; 44.24; 49.10; 60.21; 97.7;114.31; 147.12

� �+D+��, extinguishing, 110.16� ��27+$�, finished product, 152.28;

193.27� ��$*�+(��, be sliced off, 49.23� ��2$�, excise, 155.32� �� ,+(��, reproduce, describe,

66.10; 70.6� ��7�,, make blind, 115.3� ��, with affirmation,

revelationary, 7.31; 8.3; 21.25� ��)�, in openly doctrinal

manner, 21.18� ��2��, unthinkingly, 118.27� E7��, destruction, 28.24; 105.7;

116.13; 126.28��$2� (�5), rarefied (earth), 119.28��, strong, 124.21G��;��, Argives, 101.7G��7��% �2��, Argive (race), 101.14U��, Argos, 101.9��, slower, 194.19

��E� ��+�E�, standing idly by, 73.269��, silver, 43.6G�N��, of Ares, Areic, 34.22; 111.6;

114.15; 148.3; 163.7��, virtue, 19.26; 21.21–22.1; 30.23;

43.25; 46.1–12; 47.27; 51.18; 56.23;64.3; 65.9; 66.26; 73.20; 93.17; 100.3;166.27; 170.3–17, 185.4

U��, Ares, 43.6; 78.29; 79.7; 114.32;167.31

��($��, (numbers) for counting, 16.26A ��($��, arithmetic, 41.25; 50.8;

159.22��($��, number 16.21–31; 17.11; 41.24;

136.20; 147.3��+�;�, valiant ones, 172.8XT��, Great Bear, 97.6�� P)�� +�2��, the Bear stars, 141.6

�/ �� P), the north, 109.278�$��, harmony, 7.5; 25.10; 34.15;

41.20; 79.18; 90.12; 126.29; 143.5��(�7��, male-female, 46.20�� )�, manfully, 179.329��, unbreakable, impenetrable,

84.3; 157.4

322

Greek word index

9��, male, 34.16; 46.18–47.25; 49.21;110.9–21; 130.24; 131.24

��, ineffably, 3.32��O+(��, depend on, stem from, be

linked to, 82.26; 94.23; 170.15U��$��, Artemis, 79.1–5; 152.239��, even (number), 21.11–16; 130.26;

131.25��*��7��, archangels, 152.13; 152.30��7��, ancient history,

‘archaeology’, 101.3–6; 102.4��, antiquity, ancestry, 100.25;

101.14; 103.19; 103.30��2�� , archetype, 150.3��

$��, single principle, 91.1; 176.11��, two principles (e.g. 2��, 9 ��),

130.18; 132.21; 176.21��, principles, origins etc., 7.8; 12.2;

27.17; 88.5; 94.26; 128.3; 176.7;200.2

��$��, creative principle, 100.12 �)��, first principles, 91.28; (superl.)

8.3; 108.14��2�� 5� �2+��, ancestors, 83.11G��2��, founder-divinity, 98.27–9��, primal, originative, 1.23;

(comp.) 103.28; (adv.) 8.17��, chief, 79.14��)�, in an originative way, 8.26�+2D��, impiety, 122.12G+��, Asia, 178.21G+�7� ��, Asclepiac, 163.8G+�7� ��, Asclepius, 158.22; 159.26;

160.19+�� , blind, 192.19�+$�, hymn, 126.10G++��, Assyrians, 100.299+��, restless, unstable, 37.24; 91.17�+��, 9+��, star, 141.6; 202.21

�> 2� �+�2��, the five planets, 147.15�+��7��, �+��$��, astronomy,

41.26; 67.4; 103.5; 159.21�+��, unblending, uncontaminated,

85.10; 179.28�+�$$��, lack of alignment (measure,

proportion), 22.27; 114.29; 115.19;162.18

�+�$$2��, in an unbalanced(disproportionate, unaligned) fashion,19.11; 91.18; 114.31

�+��, disconnected, 14.13�+�*7��, being on the safe side, 193.289+��, free of relations, ungoverned etc.,

50.2, 115.25; 138.10�+��7;+(��, be busy with, 2.3�+E$��, incorporeal, bodiless, 11.11;

12.27; 33.18–20; 78.19; 79.2; 164.24;(adv.) 32.7

��, �/, most disorderly parts,71.23

G�7*�� , Mt. Atlas, 181.7G�7��;��, Atlantines, people of Atlantis,

4.19–24; 30.13; 71.7; 75.30–77.17;128.28; 167.29; 171.29; 172.1–173.18;178.13f; 179.8; 179.19; 183.12–17;184.18–185.7; 187.3–6; 191.3;193.16; 196.15; 197.19; 199.22–6;204.19

G�7��, Atlantis, 4.12; 76.28; 175.23;177.17; 179.9–11; 182.1; 182.23;197.22

U�7��, Atlas, 173.1–5; 181.149��$��, individual etc., 116.16; (superl.)

178.9; 179.7�> 9��$��, (Epicurus’) atoms, 59.19

9�� , unswerving, unvarying, etc.,27.9; 27.31; 38.18–39.6; 41.13–21;53.26; 111.7; 156.29; 166.8; 170.6

��2 ��, unflinchingly, 167.25G��, A, Attica, 122.10; 162.14; 164.18G��, Attic, 98.28 (= Athenian); 172.15;

203.24G��)�, in Attic dialect, 19.24

9�7��, immaterial, 13.29; 89.12; 92.1;113.13; 158.9; 165.26; 166.13; 168.10;175.17; 180.14; (adv.) 32.7; 115.32

�Y�� 7��, men and all, 121.23��D��, slowness-in-itself, 41.27��% ��+��, each itself, 16.29��#)�, animal-itself, 6.1; 11.8��, �%, possessing self-motion,

12.22��$��, �%, spontaneous, 2.28; (adv.)

2.23��*��, speed-in-itself, 41.27��, spontaneous, from its own

nature, 50.30; 59.13; 60.8; 64.24;86.27; (adv.) 86.29; 139.27; 183.19

��(�, autochthonous, 101.7; 143.32��$��, dry (of style), 83.24��$E��, oppressively hot, 122.20

323

Greek word index

��, invisible etc., 25.27; 50.22; 53.1;87.6; 94.23; 96.7; 98.20; 110.7;144.22; 158.7; 159.9; 173.23;188.6; 189.20–3; 190.13; 193.21;202.20

��*�+��, disappearance, 109.28; 189.7��+��+��, return feast, 25.23��$��)�, instructional(ly), 21.129�(��, indestructible, 116.9–11��+�*��, separate, 21.23; 22.12��#�, determine, distinguish, divide

off, etc., 7.29; 8.25; 22.8; 26.3; 31.5;36.17; 45.17; 48.16; 55.2; 69.3; 79.8;125.28; 137.7; 145.6; 150.18; 162.3;(adv.) 154.31

��$�, encouragement, route towards,174.32; 202.4

G��+�� #��, lives associated withAphrodite, 148.4

G��, Aphrodite, 18.10; 34.15;79.17

��, unguarded, 145.13G��, Achaea, 188.12G��77��, Achilles, 65.299��, immaculate, 27.31; 52.17–27;

95.16; 104.15; 111.14; 113.29; 133.5;136.11; 155.32; 156.18–157.16; 166.6;166.26–167.1; 168.16; 169.5; 170.14;175.33; 189.4; 191.9; (adv.) 42.6;132.3; 166.15

��E��+��, inseparable, 10.26–11.22;12.27; 57.26–58.23; 131.5

9��, lifeless, 131.1; (superl.) 11.25

Z

D�(�� % 1 � ��, give depth to,146.14

D� ��#�, flood, submerge, 117.6; 179.3D��, heaviness, 10.10D��, tincture, 195.27Z��, Bendidea, 8.31; 26.12–14; 27.29;

84.27; 85.4Z��, Bias, 183.13Z�(��, Bithynia, 187.25Z��, Boeotian, 88.12–13Z�,��, Boura, 188.13�/ D�*��, surface-reefs, 188.22D�� E��, over a shorter span,

116.20Z��, Britain, 112.27

[

��7�� (��*), (intellectual) calm, 21.26;44.4

�*$��, >��, Holy Marriages, 49.14–16��,��, exalted, solemn, 24.29; 62.9��*#�, neighbour on, 96.17��+��, bordering on, 75.9�2(7��, birthday, 18.10; 145.24�+��, generation-producing,

reproductive etc, 7.3; 34.14; 52.28;57.20; 77.4; 111.18; 117.5; 126.18;136.23; 144.28; 148.9; 154.16;156.29–157.7; 168.25; 173.11;186.4

�2+��, generation etc.: frequent��, generative, 3.31; 176.17; 180.2�2��, kind, etc., 6.8; 50.16; 52.16–27;

53.30; 64.30; 69.8; 77.11–14; 78.8–23;112.19–20; 136.12; 175.26; 176.25;178.8–12; 182.24; 184.8; 184.23;185.30; 186.11; 190.23

��$��, geometrical, 8.24�5, earth (as opp. ��), 43.4–8; 44.28;

45.2; 106.3; frequent from 110.5;(= matter), 110.11; 143.29–114.15;146.26; (as element) 107.3; 107.15;112.14–16

[5, Ge, Earth, 7.2–3; 111.28��, earthly, 5.16; 44.27; 144.2[��, Giants, 85.15; 168.17; 172.27[��*�� *+$��, Gigantic

imaginings, 168.25[��%� �7$��, War against the

Giants, 172.15[��$��, battles against giants,

38.28��+(��, become, come to be, etc.:

frequent�/ ��$�, generation etc. (opposed

to �/ �� etc.); 2.7–15; 75.21;76.12; 104.10–17; 113.18–28; 115.8;123.23; 143.24–6; 192.32

[7��, Glaucon, 9.1; 82.5–19�)+��, recognition, insight, knowledge

etc. 27.4; 69.19; 95.21; 102.24;104.16; 108.22; 123.30–1; 133.8;150.4; 202.7

��+��3 ��$��, cognitive power, 79.11��$��, (re-)productive, procreative,

fertile, 25.16; 36.13; 49.10; 89.26;195.18

324

Greek word index

��*$$��, writings, 124.31–126.9;146.2–9; 148.20–149.3; (of souls)115.17

��$$��;� 7�@��, official lists,203.6

��3 �*��, grace of writing, 60.2

\

��$��, daemonesses, 47.16; 50.18��$��, daemonic, of daemons (usually

as opp. (;��, ��7��, A��)34.7; 36.27; 39.28; 53.30–54.2; 60.30;77.11; 110.27 (of souls);136.12–137.13; 157.19; 163.13;192.17; (comp.) 113.6

��$��E��, daemonic, 113.21��$�, daemon: frequent�;�, <, so-and-so, 15.19��*�, decad, 23.23–4; 87.28; 147.2–3;

182.12–13\27��, Delta, 95.5; 96.8; 97.4�@��, cleverness, 35.23�@��,+(��, greet, 18.18; 25.20��, appropriately, etc., 5.2; 29.17;

40.23; 54.29; 79.29; 105.15; 135.6;151.25; 185.12

\��7��, Deucalion, 101.11–16; 122.16;127.21; 128.22

��, second: frequent; as sing. noun,146.22; as pl. noun, 3.31; 6.1; 19.21;23.33; 42.7; 44.21; 50.14; 54.19–55.1;75.5–25; 82.28; 91.16; 92.9; 97.27;100.11; 108.26; 117.11; 118.22;132.16; 133.3–11; 146.19;166.28–167.7; 193.5; 195.19–29;198.20; 200.1; (adv.) 47.11–16; 50.24;136.3; 149.30; 150.2; 154.29; 157.11

��, secondary, 93.27\�7��, Delium, 62.19��7�,, indicate: frequent��7��, indicative, 52.20; 198.17\�$��, Demeter, 153.11��$��;, fashion, 3.12; 4.28; 5.6;

125.1; 141.9; 155.4; 164.26–30; 196.7��$��$�, creation, 16.22; 143.6;

191.11��$��, creation, creative activity:

frequentA B7� (<7��3) �., universal creation,

3.30; 4.3; 12.7; 27.14; 29.7; 30.26;

51.7; 72.24; 84.3; 191.25; 198.10;198.30

A 2� �., new creation, 95.14; 95.31;100.8; 103.8; 104.25; 107.28; 108.23;124.24–7; 127.14–23; 132.27; 133.23

$��, A�$2�, �$2��+�� . etc., one,unified, or divided creation, 27.30;32.25; 72.23; 95.13; 114.18; 136.21;173.3

��$2�, $��+��, divided creation,148.30; 149.6

��;� (etc.), three creations, or first,second, and third creation, 29.10;60.19; 63.3; 71.6; 71.22; 74.20; 92.22;95.31; 149.25–6; 154.14; 156.20;173.21; 182.20; 184.29; 189.27; 191.5;191.20; 196.12–25; 199.6–7

specific types of creation:��*, (��, 3.30; 44.30; 95.26��+$��, ��+��, 32.12; 33.61$��, 94.13; 149.2; 189.21; 190.14��$��, 195.19�2�� 2�7� ��, 195.28

��$��, creative, creational: veryfrequent; also (of persons)manufacturing, 150.28–155.15

��$��, demiurge: frequent< B7�� ., the universal demiurge, 30.29;

38.18; 163.28; 202.23< �) B7� �., (in similar sense) 12.6;

45.16; 63.10< ]� �., the one demiurge, 9.23. 166.16��;� etc., three demiurges (first, second,

third) 12.1–5; 74.15–16; 156.5–6��$E�� , popular

poetry-composition, 89.28��+(��, submerge, 107.20��*(+��, disposition, description, 28.17;

62.18; 65.20–1; 87.1; 152.18��(2��, organizer, describer, 24.5; 134.11��, of division, divisive, 67.5;

114.32; 131.25��, life, 44.30��E��, eternal, everlasting, 89.16;

127.17; 141.24��, eternally, 11.26; 33.21; 118.9;

124.18; 138.28; 173.26��*(��+��, purgation, 30.9��7��,+(��, get an allotment, 173.5��7��+��, allotment, 40.18, 98.9; 137.7;

141.11; 198.8

325

Greek word index

��+$�+��, arrangement, 4.21; 25.25;30.3; 33.14; 38.23; 44.17; 48.22;54.27; 60.19; 90.29; 91.26; 103.21;124.14; 136.29; 144.31; 148.22–149.1;150.12f; 157.29 (= depiction); 159.7;182.17; 187.2; 188.25–189.3;190.13–28

��+$��3� ��, ��,, arranger of theheaven, 61.3

��+$��%� �,�, intelligence inorganization, 34.25

��*��+$��, arrangement, tapestry, 170.24;204.14

��*��+��, separation, division, 63.5; 85.10;131.8; 155.25–31; 167.32–168.5;179.31; 184.20

��, separative, divisive, 36.14;184.10

��7*$ �, shine (through), 30.23; 61.28��7��$��, breaking up (of a comet),

109.23��, �%, the reasoning faculty,

194.19��%� 12��, thinking activity,

197.30��*��, intellect, view, plan, meaning etc.,

9.32; 46.16; 87.14; 109.2; 135.22;149.17; 158.16; 165.31; 186.8;192.18

�� , fall short, 64.5�� 7*��, shape, 143.20��;, be in flux, 118.9��+�� #+(��, dissipate, 107.5��+ �+$%�, dismemberment (of

Dionysus), 173.2��*+��+��, ��*+��$�, extended space,

163.22–31, 164.23, 180.15��+��2�� 3 ��*+�, distort the natural

expression , 68.8��, (trans.) extend, 10.5; 37.24;

78.4; 143.16; 156.17; 168.28; 189.5–6;(intrans.) extend, pervade, aim at,40.18; 42.29; 71.11; 80.26; 84.1; 87.2;94.12; 127.12; 149.7; 150.13

��*��, in disagreement, 1.15��+��7;� �M7��, Eleatic school,

20.1��2 �, manage, 154.16; 169.7��+��, inquiry, 8.28��$�, narrative, narration, 83.20–6;

95.19; 127.4; 129.21–31; 134.15

�� P��$2��, divided etc., 2.2; 6.30; 13.2;27.1; 42.28; 49.29; 96.5; 108.19;137.3; 148.30; 150.22; 162.7; 173.25;176.8; (adv.) 60.27; 160.11; 184.12

\��, Zeus-like, associated with Zeus,Jovian, 69.24; 111.7; 148.2; 157.13;179.33; 189.28

�% ��+��, judicial section, 34.19\��, Justice, 25.31; 34.20; 38.5; 38.24;

161.30–162.9��$�, �%, what is managed, etc.,

11.23; 28.5; 58.21; 75.7; 87.22; 98.30;104.31; 111.18; 136.18; 138.7–10;168.1; 173.26

\��+��, Dionysius (of Syracuse), 61.13\��+��, Dionysus, 77.16; 88.11; 168.16;

173.2��#�, determine, distinguish, 21.10;

35.19; 40.19; 52.14; 53.13��@�+��, opinion-forming, 21.27\�� , Dorpia, 88.17��;, form an escort etc., 28.2; 34.1;

40.7��3 �*@��, the rank of bodyguards,

111.22��7��, be slave to, 3.2; 182.29; 183.1;

185.20–7��O$�, drama, 185.31��+��, vigorous, 2.21; 12.24; 60.26;

90.10; 106.33; 110.9; 115.18; 117.16;157.2; (comp.) 16.10; 79.15

\�� , Dropides 82.1; 82.13–18��, dyadic, 151.1; 185.23; 199.6��*�, dyad, 16.28; 17.13–29, 36.16; 47.19;

74.2; 78.7; 87.25; 136.20; 146.15;153.29; 175.23; 176.11–31; 179.14;182.14–17

��+(��, sink into, become immersed in(matter etc.), 53.27; 83.5

��$��, power etc.: very frequent��, sink into etc., 10.25; 143.19; 189.12��+ �(��, not easily affected, 107.3–4��+ ��, very hard to accept,

49.26��+�(��, hard to destroy, 116.10–12��*�, dodecad, 136.21–137.11

M

4D��$*�, hebdomad, 136.201��+$��, �/, things within the cosmos,

encosmic things, 4.14; 11.13;

326

Greek word index

13.2–28; 17.12; 34.6; 54.22; 74.22;87.29; 131.6; 154.3; 156.9; 160.1;167.25; 171.14; 174.20; 176.15;177.26; 179.23; 180.12; 192.3–10;199.1; 204.15

1��+$��, in encosmic fashion, 135.131��7�� +��, circular motion, 138.291��$��+��, of the encomium,

panegyric, 62.8; 171.27C��, temporal, in time, 104.11; 125.7;

127.7; 141.30; 162.4��, dwelling place, 143.44��;� +�*+��, secure foundation, 97.9�M(�$�, Ethemon, 101.226��, formal, 72.96�� ;, give form, 186.306�� , giving form, 154.17–25=��, form, species etc.: very frequentR��7�, image, 58.11; 127.15; 134.22–76�*�, twentieth, 26.16; 81.16; 85.296��+��, interpreting images, 158.176��, iconic, through images, 5.19;

8.19; 13.10; 26.10; 30.12; 67.276�E, image: very frequent>$��$2�� $��, laws of fate, 136.17

>$��$2�, fate, 149.22; 169.8; 183.1;201.18–19

>�$��, connecting thread, 89.226��$2� #��, interwoven life, 89.206+��#�, settle in, be housed in, 5.4;

51.21; 144.146+�� 1@��, valleys and peaks, 181.4��+��, �/ ��(’, the details, 8.27��+��, �> ��(’, individual persons, 152.20^M��$D��E, Hecatombaeon, 26.191�;, (= in the higher realm etc.), 18.3;

36.16; 53.10; 83.5; 132.13; 176.151�;(, (= from the higher world etc.),

11.23; 43.5–7, 44.25; 50.24; 52.28;53.3; 57.12; 103.10; 106.19; 114.30;162.29; 163.20; 165.17; 203.21

1�(�,, divinize, 11.131�77�$2� 1 �(�$��, relaxed spirit, 40.29C�7��, slack, 117.161�$72�, �%, poor tuning, 117.181��#+(��, be weakened, 117.64��+��, voluntary, assenting, 22.13–15;

79.131� ��,+(��, be consumed by fire, 122.51� ��+��, conflagration, 100.28; 107.7;

107.23; 109.16; 110.5; 113.16; 114.17;

115.32; 117.1; 117.20; 118.4; 118.20;121.14; 122.11–14

C��+��, extension, 178.26; 180.151�� , deviations, 106.5C��+��, revelation, 95.2817*��+��, reduction, diminution, 23.31;

37.11–15�M7��% ��+��7;�, Eleatic school,

19.32�M7�+��, Eleusis, 165.19–21^M7��, Helike, 188.14177*$ �, shed light, illuminate, 11.5;

168.1; 190.18; (pass:) 139.22–7C77�$��, luminary influence,

illumination, 139.18; 142.3; 163.27^M77*�, Greece, 122.16L M77��, Greeks, 70.13; 98.14; 99.5; 100.2;

101.6–9, 102.10; 104.22; 108.21;167.27; 172.11; 185.19; 187.2

< ��’ L M77�+� $,(�� etc., 95.29; 100.23;101.3–9; 107.30; 108.28; 109.2

^M77��, Greek, 14.30; 73.71$ ;, breathe life into, animate, 8.7;

11.241$ ��, fiery, 112.18–22; 113.121$��, visible etc., 91.26; 94.12; 96.15;

98.20; 106.21; 119.23; 143.4;144.31; 149.2; 189.20–23; 190.13;193.23

1$��*#+(��, be reflected in, 95.271$��, suggestive, 27.13C$��+��, reflection, impression, 15.12;

36.24; 111.8; 126.20�, �%, the One, 13.24; 78.6–7; 79.19;

87.8–9, 174.12; 176.9–177.1;178.20–2; 184.15; 193.6

1��+��, rivalry: very common after77

1��$��, harmonious, 41.11; (adv.) 42.74*�, henad, 3.28; 14.1; 36.10–16; 42.4;

163.14; 166.6; 167.2; 171.21��+(��, give an indication of, etc.,

7.29; 8.22; 15.14; 19.8; 24.19;30.1–15; 32.34; 50.25; 53.2; 59.12;83.10; 84.19; 92.4; 93.22; 98.31;102.14; 107.30; 113.31; 126.25;127.9; 132.18; 133.17; 134.9; 157.31;160.13; 161.23; 167.15; 173.21;179.21; 180.9; 184.9; 185.3; 194.4–8;195.9–15; 196.22; 200.30; 201.16;203.16

327

Greek word index

C��@��, indication, 17.13; 29.23; 30.8;54.10; 75.5; 76.11; 80.25; 84.14;102.7; 130.10; 165.12; 178.31; 188.24;190.10; 195.18; 196.24

1��#+(��, reflect, 91.301��*, the number ninety, 87.2912��, activity, operation etc.: frequent1��;, operate, activate, be in activity

etc., 12.23, 26.6; 36.14; 42.5; 54.18;56.18–24; 57.18–19; 64.10; 67.13;68.23; 74.6; 131.19–20; 186.22;200.8

1(�+��)�, in inspired fashion, 156.31C(��, inspired, divine, 7.27; 54.10;

64.14–28; 80.4; 198.8; (adv.) 198.6C� �� 2�, Old and New, 81.141��;��, unitary, 41.24; 69.27; 104.13;

130.27; 166.4; (adv.) 127.25; 166.19(= uniformly)

1��, establish in etc., 29.19; 168.29;(pass.) be founded in, 27.8; 133.4;136.7

4�#�, unite, unify, 42.3; 135.25; 163.14;176.4; 184.16

C��$��, damp, 113.11; 117.244��E��, with greater unity, 137.19C��, concept, notion, intention, 10.22;

68.25; 74.24; 148.1; 165.11; 168.26;191.23; 192.27; 193.5

4��, unitary, 13.26; 27.4; (adv.) 163.294� ��, unifying, 131.25; 180.104��, oneness, 73.64�,, make one, etc.: frequent

A�$2��, in a unified way, 130.22;184.13–21

C+��+��, 51.12; 128.131��,(�, (= in that world etc.), 5.31;

43.16; 71.3; 75.14; 115.32; 176.171��F� ^M�$5�, <, ithyphallic Hermes,

148.61�,(, (= from that world etc.), 44.25;

186.71��, C��, watery, water dwelling,

112.22; 137.4; 142.4–5C�7��, enmattered etc., 3.2; 10.14; 37.27;

40.29; 43.9; 50.27; 57.27; 58.12;89.10; 93.28; 105.8; 105.33; 113.13;144.2; 152.7–9; 154.12; 156.1; 157.2;159.19; 162.8; 165.26; 174.11; 178.6;180.17; 183.9; 189.14; 192.5; (comp.)78.21; 173.25

��+��, unification, 4.14–15; 18.4; 32.27;34.16; 43.20; 48.24; 50.15; 63.6;78.16; 79.17; 84.20; 129.4; 148.25;149.19–27; 155.25; 160.14; 167.33;168.2; 169.17; 171.8; 183.23; 184.17;185.26–8

4��3 ��$��, unificatory power, etc.,84.16; 184.11

1@�77��, change etc., 14.10; 15.5; 26.3;51.5; 68.18; 87.10; 99.14

1@�77*��, change, vary etc., 14.15;25.11; 45.3; 68.6; 68.17; 70.15; 99.21

1@* ��, link, (pass. depend upon), 3.15;4.3; 7.28; 13.24; 106.19; 111.15;135.25; 144.22; 163.20; 203.22;ignite, set light to, 110.3–4, 112.20

1@��O, depend on, be linked with, 3.11;8.6; 11.23; 53.28; 75.13; 82.24;111.12; 114.18; 139.28; 142.2; 149.26;161.6; 162.10; 167.2; 195.19; 203.28

4@*�, hexad, 151.5; 154.22C@��, igniting force, 110.8�M@��+��, Execestides, 81.281@ P��$2��, in transcendent fashion,

39.32; 40.12 (= in exceptionalfashion); 104.10; 143.20

�@��, disposition etc., 23.7; 41.13; 56.16–23;68.21–31; 116.4; 201.15

1@�$;, laud, celebrate, 154.20; 183.171 ��7�+��, cyclic return, 28.221 �*7��, recapitulation, repetition,

4.12; 28.20; 102.51 *��, govern etc., 137.12; 182.221 �+��, imported, introduced, 42.24;

159.41 �+��E��, incidental, artificially

imported, 50.30; 98.101 2��, over and above, etc., 12.5;

176.22; 178.29; 186.181 �D*77�, approach, 110.1; 122.18

(notice); 151.181 �D�7�, approach, focus, etc., 7.30; 8.3;

17.3; 32.23 (= grasp); 72.15; 110.22;147.17 (= contiguity); 147.29

1 ��2�+(��, admit, 41.18; 106.3; 116.17(= accept); 125.7

1 ��7�+��, summoning, 203.211 ��7�#�, wash over, 188.11–13; 190.81 ��, �%, auxiliary, 150.251 ��*��, control, dominion, 98.13;

186.31

328

Greek word index

1 �7*$ �, shed light etc., 41.20; 79.17;124.28; 133.6; 166.28; 187.2

1 �+��+��, control etc., 99.19; 138.4–10;145.17; 153.16

1 �+��$�, knowledge, science, 24.23; 25.3;30.10; 66.20; 73.11; 99.7; 102.30;127.13; 198.28

1 �+��$��, scientific, 30.5; 67.71 �+�� , of reversion, 133.30; 154.151 �+��2��, (trans.) cause to revert, 29.17;

88.4; 95.31; 135.29–31; 136.5–8;151.17; 200.2; (intrans.) revert, 10.19;12.15; 44.15; 75.9; 85.7; 170.15

1 �+��, reversion, 44.20; 45.24; 87.28;136.1; 149.29; 160.16; 194.4–5;203.20

1 ��, readiness, suitability, etc.,25.26; 35.18–22; 51.29–32; 139.23;140.1–3; 163.27; 164.21

1 ��;+(��, ride on, 142.64 �*�, heptad, 137.5; 151.13–16; 166.27�M��(��, Erichthonius, 101.7^M�$�N��, connected with Hermes, 148.5;

(adv.) 36.9^M�$5�, Hermes, 34.18; 46.21; 79.1–10;

148.6; 165.22^M�$��*��, 9.3; 15.18; 23.14; 27.15; 59.2;

63.7; 64.12; 68.1, 198.27–199.30C��, desire, 42.16XM��, 158.21; 169.14–20C+��, extreme, furthest, lowest:

frequent4��+��, otherness, 175.234��, otherness, 17.21; 21.16; 34.23;

36.17; 40.19; 87.13; 106.13; 132.14;141.21; 148.30; 149.28; 155.25; 176.3;176.20; 191.10

1��+��, etesian, 120.27; 121.21MYD��, Euboea, 70.15C��, presiding (adj.), overseer (noun),

etc., 34.15–18; 38.11; 53.4; 77.5; 85.6;90.11; 98.6; 99.8; 99.19; 106.10;111.11, 113.9, 126.30; 128.25; 140.18;144.30; 145.26; 148.6; 150.15; 173.15;192.27

_

_*7��, Zaleucus, 70.18_��, Zeus, 18.11; 41.23; 69.26; cf. 199.3

(_��)

#��%� (��7��), zodiac, 96.24#E��, sign of the zodiac, 98.22; 108.2#��, life: very frequent#��;, generate life, 144.4#��, animal birth, 79.5#��, life-generating etc., 111.8;

142.21#��, life-giving, 5.15; 11.19;

96.14#�� ;, bring to life, 5.7; 10.21#�� , life-creating, 154.25#��, vital, lively, etc., 5.3; 12.24; 79.12;

161.12; (comp.) 194.23#�E��, bestial, 16.15

`

A�$��, (of gods) leaders, etc., 5.4;110.28; 111.5; 114.13; 115.28; 137.18;144.22; 145.15–22

A�$��, leadership, 98.10; 110.30A�$��, leading, hegemonic, etc.,

17.11; 34.24; 42.27; 71.10; 88.5;131.3; 141.1; 160.21; 167.13; 170.6;(adv.) 191.7

a(��, ethical, 8.1; 15.26; 16.20; 19.29;24.13; 25.7; 27.22; 32.13; 193.28;(adv.) 117.20; (comp.) 29.31

a(� ��, character-forming, 171.22^`7�*��, Heliades, 109.15; 113.25A7��, solar, of the sun, 43.11; 110.3;

111.12; 112.3–7; 113.12; 113.25;114.2–6; 115.3; 159.27; 181.19

A7��)�, sun-wise, 36.9S7��, sun, 34.20; 43.5; 46.21; 47.10–12;

108.1–9; 141.7–9; 160.2; 181.11A7�� , heliotrope, 111.1^`7�� 7��, Heliopolis, 101.21b`��, Hera, 46.27; 79.1^`��75�, Heracles, 68.20; 180.1; 181.6�`��, Eridanus, 109.13; 113.30A��, heroic, 89.22A��, hero, 66.4; 182.31^`��+��, Hephaestian, 143.23; 144.3;

144.32; 146.28L `��+��, Hephaestus, 78.29; 79.13;

142.14; 143.31–144.15; 146.27; 147.7;159.13; 204.12

^`��+��, Hephaestus-wrought143.1

329

Greek word index

c

(�7�++�,+(��, be turned to sea, 121.17c�75�, Thales, 81.9c��7�E, Thargelion, 26.14; 85.29c��$��, Thaumas, 133.9; 183.13c��, Theaetetus, 19.32(;��, divine, of the gods: very frequent(�7��, theology, 13.29; 141.24; 156.7;

185.3; 204.9(�7��, theologian 8.13; 13.11; 17.9;

25.14; 27.30; 171.30; (adv.) 8.5; 29.6;130.15

(��, god, goddess: very frequent1��+$�� (��, encosmic gods, 6.19;

18.8; 47.7; 78.24; 110.25; 143.1;158.13

A�$�� (��, hegemonic gods(=A�$��), 5.4; 114.13; 115.28;141.1; 170.7

�� (��, intellective gods, 47.7–8;70.9; 158.13

�d7�$ �� (��, Olympian gods, 85.15;172.25; 174.4; 176.3; 183.7; 189.1

��*�� (��, heavenly gods, 5.7; 34.7;42.22; 43.4; 47.22; 57.8; 115.23;137.3; 152.5–6

e�� (��, Titanic gods, 172.32;174.4

. ��+$�� (��, hypercosmic gods, 4.2;47.8; 158.13

�> . % +7�� (��, sublunary gods,18.8; 166.31

(��, divinity, 110.29; 118.6; 156.6;160.4; 165.11; 166.7–11

(+$�� 5� G��+��, ordinances ofAdrasteia, 40.9

c��7��, Thessalians, 101.13(��, contemplative, 154.20; 197.9(��, study, observation, etc.: frequent(��, concerned with hunting,

150.28; 152.24(��E��, bestial, 154.26(��, labour, 44.2(5��, thetes, 31.31(��, labour, 34.4�% (��, labouring (class), 33.29; 39.25;

150.26; 151.28; 152.7(��, mortal: very frequentc��+�$��, Thrasymachus, 9.1(��7;, talk frequently of, etc., 86.6;

127.21; 151.13; 172.2; 172.16

�% (�$��, the spirited part, 33.31; 117.15(�$��, spirited, 117.1; 165.18; (adv.)

148.10(�$��, temper, spirit, 117.9–17; 148.2–3;

156.27

f

X f�+��, Iasus, 101.106��, distinctive character etc., 7.25;

8.8; 8.24; 16.12; 26.3; 36.8–15; 43.10;48.25; 54.18; 106.11; 114.13; 132.7–8;157.15; 166.31; 167.9

>��+(��, be founded in, fixed in etc.(indicating the ground of something’sexistence): frequent; (active) 72.29

V��+��, foundation, 27.5; 189.17>��E�, sweat, 63.30; (in a name for the

Nile) 119.19>��, hieratic, priestly, 119.4; 124.24;

140.27; 150.27; 151.20; 153.30;154.21; 192.12

>��)�, in priestly terms, 97.5X f��, Inachus, 101.15R��7$�, reflective glimpse, 8.20; 133.19;

148.276+�$��, equator, equinox, 96.20–6;

98.236+��7��, equal accomplisher (of Hera), .28>+��;, narrate, tell, etc.: frequent>+�� (opp. $,(��), history, historical

writing, narration, 30.13; 46.9; 65.18;76.1; 79.30; 81.7; 81.27; 87.19; 89.6;92.16–93; 98.1; 100.1; 103.2; 109.9;118.3; 129.11; 169.26; 171.28; 177.22;188.18; 190.10; 195.10; 199.16

>+��, historical, 75.20; 145.4; (comp.)90.27; (adv.) 109.8; 144.19

X f�, Ion, 88.24

g

��(��$��, purgation, 118.21–119.5��(��, purity, 36.20; 100.26; 118.22;

156.30��(*�+�� $�#�, bring purgatives,

118.24��(��5��, purifiers, 119.1��(��, purifying, 38.10; 113.24��(��, come down (from heavens), 85.9;

111.11; 158.15; 167.8; 204.1

330

Greek word index

��(5��, �%, obligation, 18.31; 19.27;198.12

�*(��, descent, 52.24; 53.2; 54.7; 62.30;77.14; 89.15; 108.18; 113.28–114.20;132.4; 146.23

��(�7��, universal, 153.18; 191.23;(comp.) 149.16; (comp.adv.) 63.8

��(’ B7��, �% (�/), universal(s), 32.6–17;200.25; 201.10

��, vice, 22.17; 111.17g*77��+��, Callaeschrus, 82.5–14�*77��, beauty, 60.12; 71.5; 149.2;

169.4�% ��7�, handsomeness, beauty, the fine,

26.1; 42.23; 129.4g��D��%� �$��, Canobic nome, 97.20g*�D��, Canobus, 97.20��*D�+��, descent, 40.29��#+(��, contend against, struggle

against, 39.9; 157.10; 168.16; 172.18��2+��, inferior etc., 21.31; 174.2;

174.16; 175.27; 178.10–16; 183.8;185.15; 190.27

�/ ��2+��, inferior things, 131.9;176.27; 184.6

g��*�� , Catadupa, 121.2–6��7��, confine, enclose, 37.13;

152.22; 153.7; 197.24��+�277�, restrain, check, control,

29.16; 34.10; 38.5; 85.7��2��, go down, descend, 22.29; 45.11;

52.18; 53.3; 58.15; 71.1; 86.14;111.16–17; 112.21; 113.f.; 126.16;144.24; 146.20; 147.16; 148.1; 152.15;165.17; 186.5; 201.25

��(�+��, correctness, 155.18�*��(, from below, 119.17; 120.7g��+��, Caucasus, 181.18g2��, Cecrops, 101.15�2��, centre, 32.28; 172.13��+��, thunderbolt, 109.29; 110.16g2��7��, Cephalus, 8.32; 42.21g�� 2��, �%, family of heralds,

165.22��+��, motion: frequentg7�+(2��, Cleisthenes, 88.25g7��E, Cleito, 182.15�75��, lot, 34.17–18; 50.25; 51.2; 89.14;

98.13; 98.26–30; 136.11–26; 140.7–8;160.30–162.7

�7��;+(��, acquire a lot, 163.25

�7��, allotment, 137.4; 140.27�7�$�, climatic region, 122.13–23�7�$��*�� (��, gods in control of

climate, 106.11g7�$2�, Clymene, 109.10��;7��, hollow (place), 117.12–26; 120.3g�7��E, Colophon, 90.24��$��, comet, 109.22–30g��, Kore, 166.26–9��+$;, arrange etc.: frequent��+$��, involved in arranging, etc.,

174.16; 190.22; 192.21��+$��, cosmic, of the cosmos, 32.13;

33.6; 57.29; 73.8; 78.18; 85.11; 93.25;95.19; 96.22; 100.4; 103.12; 103.33;116.14; 122.1; 128.8–11; 130.10–12;132.19; 134.18–27; 146.10; 159.5;170.1; 182.20; 189.11; 191.5; 197.5;201.14

��+$��, orderliness, 31.16; 73.20��+$��*��, controllers of the cosmos,

101.2��+$� ��, cosmic creation etc., 3.21; 4.9;

9.17; 12.29; 22.21; 27.17; 71.23;72.25; 73.18; 75.18; 79.23; 84.8–15;87.22; 88.6; 134.32; 172.25; 191.4;197.21

��+$��, cosmos: frequentg��)��, Koureotis, 88.18; 89.5��,��, boys, 88.19; 89.3��O+��, make-up, blend, climate, 99.16;

106.6; 120.18; 162.21��)�, with mastery, 191.7��, �>, superiors, superior powers,

49.6; 113.1; 145.13; 152.5; 184.12;186.31

�/ �� 2�, superior races,45.10

g��, Crete, 118.24�� +� ��, with ram’s head, 96.18g��, The Ram, 96.17–9; 98.22; 141.5g��, Critias: frequent; his family,

82.2–19; 91.3g��D��7��, Critobulus, 23.9g��;+��, Croesus, 81.3; 93.4g��, Saturnian, of Kronos, 43.11; 47.2;

103.23; 113.11; 148.1g��, Kronos, 34.25; 43.6; 47.1��$E��, icy, 122.20��7��, circular motion, 28.9; 162.28;

164.4

331

Greek word index

h

7��*�, get as one’s lot, etc., 36.22;78.8; 98.9; 106.12; 111.9; 113.6;135.27–136.9; 140.17–141.27;145.6–16; 153.16; 158.23; 159.17;160.26–161.1; 163.10–16; 166.30;180.2; 198.9

72@��, (details of the) lemma, lexis,reading, diction, text, 9.30; 14.2;30.31; 35.14; 53.12–23; 55.10; 65.10;87.15; 90.16; 94.5; 122.25; 191.28;202.15

7�(� (h�(�), forgetfulness, 41.5; 82.30;111.27; 123.10; 123.25; 126.12–19;140.11

h5$��, Lemnos, 181.137�@��% ��$$��;�, official lists,

203.575@��, lot, portion, domain, 54.2; 54.26;

58.22–7; 77.12; 98.21; 138.9; 142.2–3;145.19; 147.1; 154.16; 173.5

h��E, Leto, 78.29h�D��, Libya, 178.217��, rational etc., 5.14; 27.25; 34.2;

79.6; 161.11; 174.6; 176.5; 194.21;(adv.) 5.25

7��, reason, account, etc., and (in pl.)principles: very frequent

h��, Locris (in Sicily or Euboea),70.12–15

h��, Locri, 70.1–177�$��, �%, injurious, corrupting, 34.1;

77.12

i

$�(�$��, mathematics, 41.2; 41.22$�(�$��, mathematical, 8.16–22;

181.23i��% ��, Macedonian mountain,

181.12$*�+��, being rare, 10.10$��7��, �>, workers of greatness,

111.16; 113.5$��7��, �%, achievement, 64.19–26$��7��, grandiloquence, 62.15;

64.15–25$��7��, grandiloquent, 64.4$2(@��, participation, 147.27$��,, diminish, 121.25$��+��, decrease, 140.2

i27�(��, Melanthus, 88.11–13$2�, remain, be fixed, be at rest: frequent$��3 ��, particular soul, individual

soul, 5.3; 27.11; 52.22; 54.1–6;58.16–24; 77.11; 89.14; 90.8; 110.23;113.23; 115.29; 136.11; 138.12; 140.9;141.15; 142.1; 152.8; 162.2; 167.10;183.1; 186.2; passim

$��%� �,�, particular intellect, 128.9;168.29

$. (��, ��$��, particular gods etc.,27.14; 152.19

$��E��, more particular, morepartial, 12.7; 27.14; 32.6; 95.12;100.11–14; 104.5; 104.16; 116.11;145.1; 149.16; 150.9; 150.21; 154.24;156.19; 161.20; 175.26; 191.24;196.25; (superl.) 178.7; 185.17; (adv.)99.17; 162.31; 174.29; 177.28; 204.26

$��)�, in partial/particular fashion,5.12–19; 40.1; 43.17; 79.5; 104.12;104.30; 127.24; 202.27

$��, sector, 58.18; 97.5; 138.22; 139.14;163.6; 179.20; 186.11

$��+$��, division, partition, 11.3; 71.25;183.28

$��+��, divided, divisible, 7.30; 36.5;42.28; 49.24; 58.13; 90.8; 95.13;173.3

$2��, part: very frequent$+�$D�� , tropics, 119.25$��*��, translate, 76.4$�*��+��, share, 18.15; 25.30; 135.21;

168.22$��, metaphors, 59.23; 64.22$�+�$��,+(��, experience a change of

body, 113.3$�2��, participate, share: frequent$��+��, participation, 4.4; 18.16; 51.26;

139.4; 140.4–8; 141.18$��;, measure, 21.22; 45.21; 145.23;

146.7–8; 148.12; 180.27; 181.25;185.11

$2��, measure, 22.8; 37.24; 45.17–24;55.1; 130.23; 144.27; 147.27; 157.22;174.19; 182.16; 183.18; 192.9

$��$)� �, �%, utterly non-existent,178.29

$� � ��, �/, what does not yet exist,125.2

i�$�+��, Remembrance, 27.4

332

Greek word index

$�;��, portion, share, etc., 45.11; 97.4;131.11; 139.12; 140.18; 163.28;180.4–12; 183.1; 190.16

$��;��, fate-associated, 157.19; 202.18$��, monadic, 160.20; 185.23;

192.4$�*�, (mathematical) monad, 16.27;

17.13–27; 21.9–20; 23.29; 24.3; 47.19;137.13; 160.18; 179.12; 182.18;(metaphysical) monad, 24.9–20;87.25–30; 97.25; 141.10; 150.26;151.15–17; 154.22; 157.14;176.12–32; 176.32

$��$��, stable, etc., 27.5; 92.7; 103.11;104.6; 105.21; 106.20; 124.21–6;127.18; 131.25; 146.11; 175.17;180.10; 185.26; 189.15; 195.19–25;199.31; (comp.) 29.26; 194.25

$��$��, in stable fashion etc., 95.22;102.8; 104.29; 105.2; 108.14; 179.32;189.13; 191.7

$��, uniform, 136.16; (adv.) 73.3;98.30; 166.20

$�(��, mythical, 167.16$�(�7��, myth, 87.20; 108.21$�(� 7*+��, myth-makers, 110.9;

111.30; 204.13$,(��, myth etc.: frequent$��2�� (-��), ten-thousand-year

(period), 147.14–24$�+��, escort of initiates, 165.19$�+��, �/, mysteries, 165.21; 172.15$�+��, mystical, 14.1; 49.13; 196.21;

(adv.) 7.29; 108.1; (comp.) 21.1

W

W;7��, Nile, 96.8; 96.23–28; 118.2;119.16–122.3

W2$+��, Nemesis, 198.2W2+��, Nestor, 35.5W��, Victory, 168.7W��D�, Niobe, 101.8–9��, intellective, etc.: very frequent

��, in intellective fashion, 31.22;102.8; 135.13; 147.30; 148.12–13;202.24

��$�, consideration, thought-object,17.10; 22.12

��+��, intellection, etc.: very frequent��, intelligible: very frequent

�,�, intelligence etc.: very frequentW�@, Night, 193.18

j

j*(�� (river), Xanthus, 79.14j*(�� (Boeotian), Xanthus, 88.12

d

��, magnificence, 64.9; mass, 178.21�6��$2�, (habitable) world etc., 172.6;

179.30; 180.29–181.3; 182.28;184.18

�6��,, relate, link, connect, 92.28; 106.9;107.9; 158.25

d6��, Oenoe, 88.13�6+��, producing etc., 162.12; 164.6–12;

191.32<7��, universal, entire etc.: frequentB7��, whole: often<7�+��5, �/, totalities, 177.29<7��27��, complete, as a whole, 25.24;

90.12; 139.4<7��, totality, whole, 138.31–139.3;

182.26; 196.11�d7�$ ��, Olympian, 85.15; 168.24;

172.25–30; 174.4–13; 176.3–18;183.7; 186.1; 187.3–7; 189.1

Xd7�$ ��, Olympus, 73.5; 142.30�$D��, rain, 120.22B$��, Homer, 15.2; 51.24; 63.26–64.11;

66.6; 73.4; 78.26; 117.4; 129.23;136.24; 141.25; 163.18; 190.6

�$$� �5� ��5�, eye of the soul, 204.7^d$��;�, auditorium, 22.8<$��*��, of the same rank, 46.23; 49.5;

80.30<$��,�, of the same colour, 181.18�, �%, being, that which is: frequent

�% $3 �, non-being, 38.6�/ �� , (what is) really real,

13.14; 24.21; 89.12��$�, name, 15.12; 18.7; 21.4; 39.26;

89.4; 99.5–7; 112.4; 118.11; 119.4;147.20; 170.8; 172.29; 183.4; 184.28

��, really, genuinely etc., 8.9; 13.14;24.21; 83.4; 89.12; 95.30; 100.7;133.3; 164.27; 170.3; 177.17; 181.21;192.3; 194.1

333

Greek word index

'@��, fast-moving, 117.15' ��, attendants, 47.23; 111.23; 131.28;

152.6��, instrument, tool, 12.21–3;

113.14–24; 116.6; 143.21–144.3;156.29; 158.20; 161.10

organ, organism, 48.2; 51.20–1�d��, Orpheus, 94.13; 118.23; 123.4;

135.11; 161.22; 166.21; 170.10;188.26

�d��, Orphic, of Orpheus, 12.10;185.3; 188.7; (adv.) 174.12; 176.13

Xd+��, Osiris, 77.15��*��, heavenly: frequent��, heaven: frequentd��, Uranus, 47.3��+��, substance, essence, being etc.:

frequent��+��,, found essence (being) in, 12.24,

202.22��+�E��, substance-related, 162.3�d��O �, Ochaapi, 101.22'��, stream, 158.29��$�, vehicle, chariot, 5.5–15; 41.14–21;

112.6; 114.12; 138.26; 139.13; 142.6;144.13

k

*(��, passion, affection, etc., 60.3; 64.8;67.13; 103.4; 107.18–25; 113.2–16;138.12; 157.3; 188.2

��, plaything, 127.15 �;�� (), children of the gods,

111.19–25 ��, educational, 34.19k��E��, of Paion, 158.18 �7��,+(��, grow old, 104.26 �7��+��, rebirth, 28.22; 103.15;

126.22; 127.25 �$$�(2+��, hugest, 177.17 O, �%, the All, the universe: frequentk��(��, Panathenaea, 26.17–18;

80.25; 84.25–85.27; 135.1 ��$��, all-powerful, 36.6 ��27��, all-perfect etc., 25.18; 36.6 ��*��, produce etc., 3.8–12; 4.31;

39.10; 47.21; 52.15; 103.28 ��$��, paradigmatic, 2.8; 4.27;

9.21; 11.7; 17.17–21; 33.23; 72.8;134.21–135.7

��(�7*��, coastal, 188.13 ��*(+��, presentation, 83.20–5; 129.20 ��;+(��, deprive, 56.19 ��, productive etc., 2.29; 193.18 ��*77�7��, latitude, 110.12 ��*7��, �%, what is illogical, 80.12 �� , passing beyond, 6.14 ��, to sit by one’s side, 156.10 ��+��7;, introduce (from a different

area), 31.9; 92.13; 204.18 ��+�2��, drag in, 56.27 *�(��, virgin, 141.6; 169.5k��+��, Parnassus, 101.12 *��, entry to the stage, 193.4 ��;, live close, 116.26 ��+��+��E��, very free of speech,

93.11k��;�, Pateneıt (a priest), 101.21 ��, father, 23.10; 49.6; 82.3–6; 97.28;

108.9–109.11; 115.12; 129.28;191.15;

��3� *�� etc., as cosmic figure,3.13; 5.14; 9.16; 17.26; 39.15; 45.16;46.28; 51.16; 54.9; 57.16; 61.1; 73.30;75.13; 76.20; 100.9; 134.19–29;136.13; 137.23; 140.30; 151.9–17;157.11; 163.16; 164.30; 166.3–17;174.23; 198.10; (plural.) 58.1; 59.1;69.29

��3� ��, second father, 173.22;190.14

��3� 7��, (of Timaeus) Father ofwords, 9.15

��3� $��*��, (of number) Father ofthe blessed ones, 16.32

��, fatherhood, 89.1 ��, paternal, of the father, 32.29;

133.23; 166.19; 199.31 ��, thick, dense, 112.25; 143.7; 155.11k��, Piraeus, 8.30–9.9; 20.21–21.3;

26.13–14; 85.7–28k�+�+��, Pisistratids, 93.6k�+�+��, Pisistratus, 80.32k7�+��, Pelasgus, 101.10 2��, pentad, 136.20; 182.17 2 7��, peplos (robe of Athena), 85.12–14;

134.22–135.12; 167.16–22 2��, limit, 11.11; 47.4; 84.6; 128.2;

130.18; 132.13; 148.13; 173.8;174.17–19; 176.32; 178.28–30;183.16–18; 187.4

334

Greek word index

��, of the limited kind, 185.10 ��,+(��, reach a limit, 178.5 ��, embracing, inclusive etc.,

95.3–11; 105.25; 137.10; 178.8k��, Perictione, 82.8 ��7� ��, all-embracing etc., 70.9;

100.13; 171.2 ��7��, overall embrace, overview,

72.23; 186.10 ��, cycle, period, 14.20 (rhet.);

100.5; 103.24; 108.18–25; 116.13–19;126.17; 127.31–128.2; 147.15–21;164.10; 177.18

��, embrace etc., 5.2; 73.14; 98.30;104.8; 148.26; 160.9; 175.16; 193.6

��+ O, distract, 194.17 ��+��+��, external pressure, 57.1 ��+��, under outside pressure,

circumstantial, 19.3; 56.11 2��, odd (of number), superfluous,

15.11; 21.11–20; 102.28; 130.26;131.24; 204.18

��*, revolution etc., 28.11; 125.23;139.24

��+��, periphrasis, 68.14–19k�+��, Persephone, 177.13k2�+��, Persian, 172.5k�+��%� +��7��, Persian invasion force,

172.2–10 ��+$2��, carefully pondered, 59.15 ��, source, spring, 3.28; 17.1 (Doric);

96.14; 158.29; 167.14; 192.26 � ��, fall, 83.3; 109.14; 113.11 �+��, proof, 142.19 �+��,+(��, seek proof, 186.23 7�O+(��, wander, 58.17

�/ 7�E$�, the planets, 152.8 7�5�� (pl.), wanderers, 58.6; 76.22–4

(planets) 7*��, plane, 11.12; 37.27k7��, of Plato, Platonist, 12.9;

56.27; 59.12; 162.13; 166.1; 180.25 7�*#�, take more time over, multiply,

13.11; 16.13; 37.17 75(��, multiplicity, plurality, number,

3.27; 4.14; 21.1–16; 23.21–7; 79.19;130.22; 148.28; 149.21–3; 174.12;178.17; 179.14; 184.16–22

7�(��, multiply etc., 23.29; 79.23;103.13; 108.15–19; 120.29;148.28–149.6; 173.24; 184.15

7�(�+$2��, in a multiplied wayetc., 40.1; 127.24

7�(�+$��, multiplication, 184.12k7��, Pluto, 177.14 ,$�, wind, 121.22; spirit, life-current,

139.20; 154.12 ��;, guide, 173.23 ��;, guide, lead, 8.6; 11.15; 57.13;

169.8 ��$�, poem, 88.21; 89.28; 90.24;

93.23 ��+��, creation, productive activity etc.:

frequent; poetry, 90.18–91.10;92.30–93.15

��, creator etc.: frequent; poet,18.18; 56.4; 63.15–29; 64.21–8;66.16–31; 79.29–80.3; 89.23;90.20–91.9; 93.9; 167.15; 172.20–2

��, productive: very frequent;poetic, 58.23; 63.15; 90.1–22;91.5–92.9; 93.22–9; 102.30

��3 �6��, productive cause,2.8–3.10; 17.17–24; 39.4; 72.9;134.24

k�72$��, Polemarchus, 8.32 �7$��, war, 4.19–24; 56.26–57.23;

61.4–5; 68.7; 73.7; 76.20–77.13;78.13–16; 80.4; 85.13; 88.8; 90.8;91.23; 92.15; 93.24; 95.18; 107.28;128.10–18; 131.10; 134.28–135.15149.31; 151.28; 155.28–156.12;157.30; 165.25; 167.20–31; 169.7;171.29–172.12; 173.21; 174.23–6;182.20; 185.14; 193.16; 196.14–197.5

�7��,�� (*, ‘city-holding’ goddess;official city goddess, 98.5–28; 133.19;135.23–136.1; 170.31

�7��, constitution, 4.11–12; 13.31;21.3; 22.4; 28.13–33.9; 36.4; 44.3;49.8; 53.25; 54.15–57.7; 60.5–61.14;62.28; 66.24–7; 67.18; 68.22–7;72.19–73.14; 76.3–6; 78.12–27;128.19–129.6; 132.25; 148.16;149.12–20; 152.2; 157.29; 169.27;171.3–15; 191.1–33; 193.13–14;195.13; 196.15–201.11; environment,112.13; citizen-body, 203.5

�7��$�, constitutional scheme,152.25

�7��$��, conduct oneself, 62.27;66.20; 72.21; 147.11; 148.14; 203.3

335

Greek word index

�7��, constitutional, political, 22.31;58.7; 61.15; 67.19–20; 69.24; 100.3;148.1; 151.23–4; (as masc. noun)politician, 51.30; (as fem. noun)political art, politics, 30.21; 67.5;69.1–18; 71.20; 80.6

�7��)�, constitutionally, 148.11 �7��, pole, 97.9 �7��, varied, various etc., 53.31; 73.3;

106.5; 108.31; 136.16 �7�(��7��, much-vaunted, 101.3 �7�$�*D�7��, unstable, subject to

frequent change, 58.14; 124.29 �7� 7��, nomadic, 58.24 ��, sea (in metaphors etc.), 113.30;

174.10; 175.20; 178.15; 179.24–6k�+��E, Poseidon, 71.9; 78.28–79.3;

136.25; 173.10–19; 177.15–19;182.15–19; 185.22

k�+��E��, Poseidonian, 189.29 �+��, quantity, 27.12k��$��, River (= Xanthus), 78.29k��, Potidaea, 62.20 ��*��, bring forth etc., 71.25; 91.26;

135.30; 148.29; 153.26; 193.24;199.30

��*��, record earlier, 63.21;175.4

��DD�E$�, �/, previously livedexistences, 124.10; 126.11

��D�7�, offering (of arguments),79.12

��, procreative, 49.10 ��7(;, proceed, process, 5.14; 11.19;

12.16–21; 85.17; 88.4; 91.20; 110.23;128.26; 135.17; 139.5; 140.30; 151.18;157.28; 159.8; 176.22

�� #�, make ready in advance,143.4; 193.26

��;+(��, precede etc., 4.25; 87.21;133.7; 134.23; 176.9; 196.12

��(+��, aim, 1.4; 1.24; 204.25 ��N��$2��, pre-established, 3.7; 98.29;

135.7 ��N2��, proceed etc., 3.27; 10.4; 11.22;

12.13–20; 27.13–14; 50.20; 56.17;60.11–20; 87.25; 95.11; 97.1; 98.7;103.13; 119.22; 134.29; 149.2–21;155.2; 158.6; 160.2; 163.31; 166.8;174.3–11; 177.29; 178.17–27;191.12–20; 204.2

��*��, make a start, precede, 18.5;92.29; 95.12

��+�277�, give an escort, 28.2 ��7�+��, invitation; invocation, 25.29;

27.18; 100.21; 203.21 ��+�7��, invoking, 100.20 ��7�$D*�, get a prior grasp etc.,

23.26–33; 67.22; 96.1; 98.12; 126.9;127.27; 134.19; 156.26; 158.28;173.29; 182.25

��7*$ �, outshine, 60.13 ��$�(��, forethought, 45.1; 59.19;

113.32; 141.13providential power, 69.9; 156.11

��;, have concern for, 113.28;138.2

��, providential, 18.19; 58.22;149.21

�% ��, that which is takingcare of, 34.17

��, providence,13.25; 26.8; 34.5–11;40.3; 41.10; 47.15–24; 53.3; 58.26;74.1–22; 75.7–26; 85.20; 87.26; 99.11;118.11; 122.3; 134.2; 135.17–136.18;137.24–138.9; 141.16; 150.18; 159.1;160.13–19; 167.9–25; 186.3; 189.4–9;190.11; 201.25; forethought; concern,44.1; 114.2–16

��, procession,13.7–24; 36.20;87.30–88.3; 103.13; 108.5; 130.14;134.16; 136.3; 137.20; 141.2; 143.12;147.3–5; 148.23; 149.28; 160.15;173.3; 175.7–27; 178.26–179.4;182.18; 190.11–22; 200.1; advance,progression, 188.6; 197.31–198.1

��$��, proem, 29.9; 204.16 ��$�E��, proem-like, 80.9 �� $ ��, provide an escort, 34.9 �� $ ��, escort, 111.22; 158.22 ��+�7��+(��, be over-desirous, 80.27 ��+��, name, epithet, 169.10;

175.24 ��+7*$ �, illuminate, radiate upon,

8.8; 162.7; 168.27 ��+��, attention, 80.10 ��+��;, preside over, 145.11 ��+�*��, presiding over, in charge of,

77.6; 79.11; 118.31; 137.3; 173.15;182.21

��+�*��, directing; in charge of, 148.8;169.1

336

Greek word index

��+�7��, close to matter, connected tomatter, 50.19; 85.8; 178.16

��+� �, character, (dramatic)participant; 9.28; 72.7; 73.26; 87.19;129.30

��l *��, pre-exist etc., 4.28; 8.26;27.7; 32.9; 36.15; 38.20; 105.9;118.28; 186.6; 191.17; 196.10–22

��l��+�*��, pre-exist etc., 2.25; 8.17;33.22; 141.30

��;, pour forth, 110.14 ��, preside, 34.22; 88.8; 135.15;

169.7 �E��+��, (very) first, 104.29; 112.8;

137.22; 176.22; 183.4–15 �)��, first: frequent ��, primary, primordial,3.3;

6.21; 17.21; 24.9; 42.1; 93.26; 134.24 ��+��, loss of feathers, 52.23 �)+��, fall, 110.15; 113.30; 115.21; 154.6k�(��;��, Pythagorean, 1.25; 2.30;

7.20–8.14; 15.24–6; 22.8; 23.22; 30.4;33.8; 124.5; 129.31; 130.16; 136.31;176.10; 182.14; 183.20; 199.3; 203.25;204.4; (adv.) 174.14

k�(��, Pythagorean, 1.8; 5.22;7.19–27

�($�, foundation, 189.11 ��+��, being dense, 10.10 ,�, fire, 104.19; 106.33–112.23;

114.24–119.4; 122.7; 144.3–4; 195.3 ��, tower, 199.3 ��, fiery, 12.19; 113.23k��, Pyrrha, 101.11

m

n� �#�, strike, 115.13n2 �, incline, veer (downward),

111.27–112.8; 152.32–153.16; 201.18n��, rationally expressible, 17.5n�#�, root, 75.17; 97.1n� �, falling away, inclination, 52.23;

118.27n�E��, in flux, 189.17n�$�7E��, sturdier, 194.23

J

J*��, Sais (Egyptian city) 95.7–101.21;140.24–141.14; 145.7

J�H��, Saitian; person from Sais, 98.4;101.23; 134.14; 144.19–145.2; 145.2;146.5; 150.2–9; 154.29; 157.21–9;159.24; 160.22; 169.27

J��, Saitic, 95.6–97.19; 97.28J�7�$��, Salamis, 80.31JD��, Sebennytic (district), 97.20JD2��, Sebennytos, 97.20; 101.22+��*, series, 49.11; 63.5; 85.2; 115.31;

135.25; 142.21; 169.21; 170.23; 180.2;191.7

J��5�, Sirens, 41.14J�+��(�, Earthshaker (= Poseidon),

190.1J7��;� ��, Mountains of the Moon,

121.4; 181.16+7��, moon, 34.13; 43.6; 47.10;

110.29–11.29; 141.9–142.8; 147.11;161.25; 165.16–22; 167.3

�> . % +7�� $��, sublunarydaemons, 152.26

�> . % +7�� 75��, sublunary lots,137.27–30; 139.11; 142.8

+7��, lunar, 47.13; 81.13; 111.7;147.8; 159.26; 165.20; 166.32

+�$��, signify: frequent+�$��, signifying, indicative of,

141.28; 159.16; 178.25; 204.11+�$;�, sign, 109.25; 124.4; 186.28–31+5��, putrefaction, 107.16+�� , aim, target, 1.18; 4.6; 9.25; 19.28;

30.18; 31.4–7; 43.30; 57.6; 78.1; 92.15J�7�, Solon, 80.23–81.17; 86.6; 89.28;

91.4–93.23; 97.21–3; 99.30–102.2;103.17–31; 108.22–109.4;127.4–128.16; 133.18–135.22; 149.5;170.21; 191.16–192.23; 203.3–9

+��, wisdom, 165.26–170.6+��+��, be a sophistic teacher, 65.8+ 2�$�, seed, sperm, 51.10–19; 128.1;

143.2–9; 153.21; 164.8+ �$�� 7��, seminal or spermatic

principles, 99.18; 143.18+ �7��, cave, 19.14–16+ ��*, sowing, 154.5+�*+��, rest, stability, 78.9; 97.9; 106.12;

124.28; 174.5; 176.4–5; dissension,civil war, 50.28; 93.28; 172.23; 184.5

+��, solid, three-dimensional, 77.18;143.9

+��#�, punctuate, 31.5

337

Greek word index

+��;�, element, 7.1; 8.23; 47.4 (withnote); 96.21; 105.12–107.8;112.14–113.9; 126.27; 136.30; 138.31;178.9; component, 137.6

+��$��, mouth (of the Mediterranean),188.19

+��$�E��, bombastic, 64.22+��, relative, 40.11; 80.24; 83.9;

94.24+��D*77�, deposit along with,

51.10–19+��;, strike up, 77.14+��+��, disturbance, 112.30+�#��, yoke, harness etc., 47.14;

49.13; 51.11; 54.21; 154.8+�#��, partner, 97.23+�$D�7��)�, symbolically etc., 7.29; 30.13;

114.7; 130.11; 180.11; 200.3+�$D�7�, symbol, 4.32; 23.32; 27.18;

30.7–14; 51.25; 55.5; 88.1; 94.28;96.27; 100.7; 104.14; 109.1; 112.10;125.1; 130.2; 132.21; 142.27; 144.17;146.19; 147.21; 148.15; 161.8; 189.15;193.25; 198.30

+�$$��D*77+(��, change together with,99.25

+�$ *(��, sympathy etc., 36.26; 49.29;153.4; 155.19; 169.11

+�$ �(��, in sympathy etc., 36.25+�$ ��, terminate, 199.23+�$ �� 7;, spin about, revolve, 71.2;

112.4; 115.24+�$ 7��+��, completion, 54.20+�$ ��, co-animation, integrated life,

44.30; 46.18; 116.5(?); 196.8+�$ ��N2��, proceed together etc., 46.27;

142.8+��;, summarize, 55.25

+� P��$2��, in a nutshell, in conciseform, 28.19; 30.27

+�* ��, join, fasten etc., 5.22; 9.21;12.30; 24.2; 25.28; 31.17; 88.5;126.1; 127.31–128.3; 133.9; 135.24;204.20

+�*�$�+��, coalition, conjunction,47.8–26

+��O+(��, be linked to, depend upon,108.7; 137.8; 138.28; 196.7

+�*��+��, conjunction, 194.8+��, with the power to bind, 50.25+��;, divide along with, 139.11

+��;, assist in managing etc., 71.3;111.15; 112.5

+��$�, conjunction, 140.3+��$��, keeping time with, 12.24+��#�, border upon, 175.10+��, cohesive, conserving etc.,

36.13; 38.13; 91.1; 124.26–125.9;129.2; 166.5

+�7��, drive (together), 190.29+�+ ��$2��, compressed,

concentrated, 29.21; 33.5; 180.13+�� ;, share a resource, 196.5;

199.19+�2��, maintain, give coherence,

conserve: frequent; hold in check,176.3

+��(��, special friend, 83.9+�(��, composition, compact, 59.19–23;

61.21+�(�$�, code, token, 139.27; 144.15;

161.12+��, integrity, security etc., 103.16;

106.20; 118.10; 124.28+��, conserving, 142.21; 176.16+��27��, perfection, help in achieving,

124.12–125.3; 173.16+��$��, brief, concise, 33.5; 61.12;

72.23–73.14+��2��, coincide, converge, 31.11;

92.1; 116.2; 160.27–9J��+��, Syracusan, 71.19+�+��+��, composition, establishment etc.,

7.3; 79.14; 104.9; 109.29–110.2;121.24; 124.19–125.2; 137.16;(company of angels); 139.31;142.18–143.3, 174.21

+�+��, column (of opposites), 4.18;82.23; 84.1; 97.1; 130.17; 165.2;169.7; 172.30; 174.1–175.26;180.9–16; 182.10–29; 185.15–186.25;189.10–190.25

+�+��, coordinate, 5.17+�2+��, relation, 99.16; 106.8; 115.25;

141.16; (temporal) condition, 50.2;77.11; 145.31; getting, 194.25

+�5$�, shape, figure, 8.23; 60.16; 63.12;99.20; 105.8; 106.9–17; 130.1; 197.13

+��$��+$��, configuration, 155.6–14J��*��, Socrates, 2.14–86.15 often;

149.12–18; 162.30; 166.14; 172.21;177.2; 180.28; 190.24–204.24 often

338

Greek word index

J��, Socratic, 7.23–31; 62.9; 65.23;152.1

+)$�, body, 2.28; 5.3; 10.17; 47.18;60.14–61.8; 77.18–79.2; 108.25;142.6; 162.32; 175.31; 197.30

+�$��, bodily, corporeal: frequent+�$��, bodily, corporeal, 4.29; 8.7;

11.10; 143.3; 164.23+�$��, bodiliness, 190.26+�+��, able to preserve, salutary,

106.21; 116.5; 118.5

e

��, given to organizing, 154.18�/ ��*, battle-strategy, 62.19

�*@��, order, rank: very frequent��, disturbance, 57.27e*��, Tartarus, 190.20–9��, sameness, 50.7; 83.11; 106.13;

124.28; 132.14; 141.20; 149.27;155.25; 176.4–29; 184.23; 195.20

��, fast-moving, 96.19�7;, initiate, 119.2; belong to, be

enrolled in, 183.3–8; 186.1; 186.25�7��, perfection, 23.32; 25.2; 25.29;

29.24; 32.23; 41.8; 42.22; 46.4–6;108.27; 146.16; 162.21; 193.27

�27��, perfect, complete, 21.30; 22.3;29.5; 55.1; 56.17–19; 69.3; 86.11;87.21; 89.26; 93.20; 97.27; 139.1;159.6; 165.2; 170.13; 203.11

�7��,, perfect, 25.28�7��+��, perfection, 79.10; 134.1�7��, perfective, 124.10�7+��, rendering perfect,

perfective, 74.22; 87.22–6; 158.5;166.5

�7+��, initiate, one giving perfection,51.22; 144.16

�7��;�, �/, the last (things), 95.11;105.19; 178.28; 179.23; 191.6

�7��3 �6��, final cause, 2.9; 4.28; 7.11;17.17–19

�27��, end, goal etc., 3.4; 4.10–17; 6.7;13.18; 29.24; 35.25; 56.25–8; 74.12;190.28–191.11

��E��, full of shoals, 188.20–1��, square, 21.14; 146.14��, tetractys, 16.32; 17.23; 155.7��*�, tetrad, 21.14; 23.23; 136.20; 137.16

�2��, craft etc., 6.16; 10.12–24; 12.11–20;16.6 (= handbook); 33.1; 59.13;64.18; 125.6–13; 143.31; 155.21;159.12; 185.13; 186.12–14

��, �%, product of craft, 10.23��, craftsman, 12.14–19��+��, observation, investigation, 103.4;

124.1–14��$��;, do Timaeus-writing, 1.11;

7.21e��O�, Titans, 77.16; 172.17–173.14;

175.13; 176.2; 187.7e��, Titanic, 172.32; 174.4–26;

176.19; 183.2; 185.32; 187.4; 189.1;190.28

e��$��, battle against Titans, 38.27;79.27

e��, Tityos, 111.28�� , place, space, 6.26; 161.3; 169.5–18;

196.26��+�� / �� , locomotion, 139.6

��, triadic; to the triad, 146.23;151.2

��*�, triad, 9.18–19; 16.28–17.29; 21.19;23.22–24.2; 74.21; 130.23; 136.24–6;141.10; 146.17; 150.26–151.4; 179.15

��, �%, triangularity, 150.5��, triangular, 150.4

�% ��, triangle, 96.17e��2��, Tritogenes (name for

goddesses), 166.29��, trittys, 88.26�� , figure of speech, 14.19�� .7��, material character (=

daemon), 171.19–21�� , guideline, imprint, pattern, 16.9;

18.13; 66.21; 68.13; 72.27; 78.2;173.28; 175.4; 178.2

e��), Typhon, 77.16

ϒ

.��, moisture, 117.6

.7�;��, material, matter-bound, 113.15;185.30

Q7�, matter, subject matter, 2.10; 32.4;32.17; 37.25; 39.4–10; 51.5; 53.21;58.13–23; 72.12; 83.5; 87.12; 91.17;96.4; 99.3; 116.6; 117.6–14; 125.19;126.18; 143.7–25; 157.1–19;175.8–28; 178.5–179.25; 183.10;185.29; 191.8–9

339

Greek word index

.7��, material, enmattered, 2.3; 38.2;42.26; 72.11; 77.19; 79.9–14; 118.26;143.31; 171.19–21; 186.30

Q$�+��, laudation, 85.22Q ��@��, substantive existence, subsistence,

basic stuff, 13.26; 36.22; 159.20;180.14

. ��+(��, fight to support, strive togive extra force, 76.27; 102.6

. �#;, overheat, 116.29

. ��+(��, be enthroned (or founded)above, 70.12; 96.1

. ��+$��, hypercosmic, 3.29–4.2;13.17; 47.8; 84.29; 108.32; 158.3–13

. ��*��, hyper-heavenly, 50.11; 98.8;170.24

. ��+��, super-substantial, 131.17–23

. ��, surpassing excellence, excess,19.22; 22.25–23.4; 27.18; 70.3;171.12; 178.18; 193.23

. � 7��, overflowing, 25.17; 134.2�% . � 75��, superabundance, 44.11

. 2��, higher, superior, 23.32; 29.6;51.27; 103.31; 134.17; 144.21–9

. ��, receptacle, reception, 49.18–21;51.4; 54.24; 69.5; 97.2–3; 125.8;142.30; 163.23–164.18; 165.30

. ��;+(��, underlie; be basic etc., 3.23;26.12–18; 92.22–6; 96.24;109.16–110.14

�% . ��$�, the substrate, 2.10;3.16–19; 6.25; 49.20 (pl.); 54.24 (pl.);143.30; 192.5; the subject matter etc.,68.16; 77.29; 190.5

. �+��+��, foundation, basic nature etc.,17.22; 33.20; 53.21; 96.22; 110.27;125.10; 127.26; 139.17; 173.25;175.18; 179.23; 201.17

. �+�*��, founder, 58.3; 59.1; 193.2

. �+��, supplying the basis of, 3.32

. ��*��, rank beneath etc., 111.9;151.23; 173.24; 201.19

. ��3 6��, servile medicine,158.19

Q ��, assistant, 113.18.��$2��, subordinate, inferior, lower;

etc., 10.18; 22.2; 23.6; 24.7; 27.6;32.3–14; 49.7; 50.13; 71.27; 85.3;86.13; 100.16; 133.25; 137.24; 144.23;151.20; 152.2; 160.22; 171.16; 182.31;189.9

Q�+��, subordination etc., 22.28; 39.5;46.27; 71.14; 149.14–30; 151.6; 155.2;175.8; 176.22; 178.25–179.5; 190.3

.��+��, teaching, instruction, 7.15;32.22

.��)�, instructively, 21.18

.��#*�, settle down, 190.27Q��, majesty, 14.12; 64.8–23.��,, give majesty to, 14.20

o

o�2(�, Phaethon, 108.21–110.15;111.29–115.21; 129.24

o��, Phaeacians, 190.6��$��, apparent, visible, 25.25;

71.3–5; 89.12; 131.11 (manifest);142.6; 202.21

��*#+(��, be reflected, 49.19��+��, imagination, 48.12; 149.17;

194.21–30�*��+$�, imagining, 168.25��+��, �%, image-forming faculty,

194.19��+��, imposing, 64.9��, brotherhood, 89.1�(��, destructive, 106.22; 107.13;

115.26–116.15; 125.21; 163.4�(��, perishable, destructible, 130.23;

163.3�(��*, (case of) destruction, 102.15;

103.20; 105.4–108.3; 114.15–117.1;119.4; 122.12; 125.23; 138.12; passingaway, 182.22; 189.18

�(��E��, ruinous, 162.26��7�7��, philologist, 86.24��7�7��, from a philological

perspective, 14.7��7�+��, philosophy, 13.1; 15.28; 26.5;

71.20; 90.1; 129.32��7�+��, philosophic, philosopher,

wisdom-loving, 19.29; 34.2–25;58.7–20; 64.10; 67.20–1; 69.24–70.28;86.25–87.1; 90.27; 153.9;157.27–158.2; 165.6–166.19; 168.9;169.13; 185.2; 202.2

��7�+��, from a philosophic viewpoint,109.9

�72��, ignite, 109.13; 110.4–5; 113.22��D�7� ��, inspired by Apollo, 18.17o��, Phoroneus, 101.8

340

Greek word index

��*��, brother, phratry-member,88.19–89.3; 92.26; 203.5–6

��+��, (practical) wisdom, 34.24;44.1; 45.26; 67.23; 124.12; 151.11;154.19; 162.20–6; 164.19; 165.4;167.10

��, protective; guardian, 38.6;103.15; 125.9; 154.2–25; 156.5–6;166.4; 180.1

��7��, guardianesses, 46.14��7�, tribe, 88.24–8��+��, physical, natural, 3.1; 10.3; 12.29;

17.2–4; 19.23–8; 25.8; 27.26; 28.21;34.11; 48.4; 49.17; 51.3–18; 79.6;89.25; 93.24; 110.22; 118.3; 134.16;187.21–2; 201.17–19

< ��+��, the physicist, 2.8; 6.1–15�/ ��+��*, physical things, things of

nature, 2.25; 3.11; 7.14–8.20; 23.2;51.3–18

�% ��+��, physical element, 8.12;31.31; 58.23

��+��3 ��$��, physical creation,32.12

��+��3 ��+��, physical creation, 16.23;61.28

��+�� 7��, physical (creative)principles, 27.27; 143.17; 148.4–6

��+��7��;, do natural philosophy, 119.5��+��7��, physical inquiry, account of

nature etc., 1.5–17; 4.26; 13.27; 19.25;30.4–11; 32.3–5; 83.33; 204.4–8

��+��7��, natural science, 30.15��+��, nature: very frequent��#�, shed light, 115.32

p

��$��#�7��, humbler, 21.30��$�� , down to earth, 127.8�*��, chaos, 176.13��, literary character, manner,

7.17; 9.26; 62.10��#�, characterize, 25.18; 42.30;

48.25; 175.28; 185.11p��$��, Charmides, 82.7–17�*+$�, chasm, 107.18��, �/, the worse, the weaker, the

inferior, 79.18; 131.10; 132.24; 174.9;185.24; 186.27; 187.5

�(��, earthly, on earth, 142.4; 147.1–4;148.24–149.7

��, tunic (of the soul), 112.19–113.11��, dance, 45.3��, one in a chorus, 167.12��, supervision (as of a chorus),

195.29��, leader, promoter (as of a chorus),

34.25; 79.5; 88.3; 199.32��, chorus, 137.17�E��+��, separation, 198.17�E��+��, separate, separable,

transcendent, 10.26; 27.3; 28.4;58.14–21; 131.5; 165.27–166.9;185.30

�

��@��, cold, 122.22��, soul, passim

��3 �(�� , human soul, 49.24��3 7��, rational soul, 5.14��3 �2��, intellective soul, 12.19�� 97��, irrational souls, 176.5;

183.9�� $��, daemonic souls,

110.28; 138.28�� (;��, divine souls, 36.11; 41.15;

52.25; 110.28; 200.30�� 77��, finer souls, 77.3�� $��, individual or particular

souls, 5.3; 27.11; 52.22; 54.1–6; 58.16;77.11; 89.14; 90.8; 110.23; 136.11;138.13; 140.9; 141.15; 142.1; 152.8;160.29; 182.31; 186.2

�� B7��, universal or entire souls,27.8

�� *��, heavenly souls, 41.22��, of soul(s) or psychic(al), 30.9;

47.17; 50.19; 52.25; 53.2; 108.18–25;142.25; 154.15; 161.11; 163.13;175.21; 178.10

q

�q��, Ocean, 109.10��, elegance, freshness, 14.19; 86.20;

season, 181.10"��H#+(��, use decoration or

beautification, 59.10–28

341

General index

The primary vehicle for finding material within the translation is intended to be the wordindex and glossary; this index is chiefly designed to help readers locate names, passages,and topics discussed in the introductory material and the notes.

Academy 2–3, 4Adrastus 32Aeschylus 66Alexandria 2Alexandrian Neoplatonism 11, 23allegorical interpretation 17, 43,

70–80Amelius 11, 35, 37–9, 46, 48, 61, 71,

73–4, 83, 106, 169–70Ammonius, Neoplatonist Commentary on

the De Interpretatione 15, 303Ammonius Saccas 36, 43, 44Anaxagoras 92Antimachus 184Antiphon 103Apaturia 182Apuleius 35Archiadas 6, 7Aristides 216, 271; 36.23–6: 216Aristocles 114, 179Aristophanes 66Aristotle 2–3, 11, 12–13, 26, 50, 62–3,

65, 92, 99–100, 103, 150, 289de Longaevitate 465a: 208, 211Metaphysics 1083b: 111Meteorologica 343b: 287; 351b–352a:

214; 354a: 287; 368a–b: 287[de Mundo] 400a: 216

Aristoxenus 180Asclepigeneia 5, 9Asclepius 4, 6, 7, 76, 256, 258Aspasius 45–6Atalante 81Athena 2, 4, 67, 71, 76–7, 248, 264,

265–6Athenian Neoplatonism 1, 3, 6, 7, 11,

49

Athens 2–3, 4–5, 6–7, 73, 76ancient 60, 76–7, 230 (see also

Atlantis)Atkinson, M. 41–2Atlantis 16, 22–4, 27, 60–84, 95Atticus, Platonist 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 61,

192authenticity 156

Bechtle, G. 46Bendis 179biographies (of philosophers) 23Blank, David 15Brehier, Emile 41Brisson, Luc 39, 46Buris 81, 287Byzantium 2

Calcidius 31, 33, 35, 77–8Callimachus 76Canon see curriculumCarmen Aureum 111, 303causation 93–4, 99–100Chaldean Oracles 9, 12, 13, 47, 48; 33:

106; 36: 133; 70: 105; 107: 302;108: 96

Chaldeans 5‘character’ of Dialogues 51, 100chariot, of soul 96Christianity, Christians etc. 3–4, 6, 7,

9–10, 217Cicero On Laws 1.6–8: 63–4column of opposites 82, 176commentaries 1, 7, 11, 13–14, 20, 44–6,

47, 50–1, 69Constantine 6Cornford, F. 10

342

General index

Crantor 23, 24, 60, 61, 62, 63–70, 75–6,77–8, 80, 168

Critias, Platonic character 25, 51–2, 55,58, 69, 82, 164, 165, 247

Critias the Elder 76, 82, 164Cronius 31, 38, 39curriculum (Neoplatonist) 13, 47, 48, 51,

52cycles of time 244, 245

daemons 72–3, 77–8, 80, 260Damascius, On First Principles I.291.23–5:

10–11Demiurgic Triad 51, 58, 118, 148, 273Dercyllides 114Dillon, J. 26, 27Diogenes Laertius 3.52: 69division of text 16–19, 21–3, 50dodecahedron 99Domninus 3, 9, 23, 24, 203, 217Duris 76

Earth (goddess) 76Egypt, Egyptians etc. 5, 30, 63, 66–8,

69–70, 71, 78, 79–80, 190, 214Egyptian castes 248, 251Eleatics 114Empedocles 171, 233entheastic theology 54Eratosthenes 75, 216ethics 45, 73, 78, 80, 110, 132, 165, 197,

213, 291Eudocia 2

Father of Demiurges 51, 58, 118, 122,148, 149

Festugiere, A.-J. viii, 50first person singular 203

Galen 32, 33gender ambiguity 140geographers 70Greek wall at Troy 61, 62, 289

Hades 71Hadot, Pierre 45, 46haeresis 92Harpocration 39Hecate 5Helice 81, 287Hephaestus 39, 76, 238, 240

Heraclides Ponticus 70, 75–6Heraclitus 83; B53: 274; B77: 212Hermeias 15, 49Hermocrates, Platonic character 25,

51–2, 55Herodotus 64, 67, 69Hesiod Theogony 517–18: 273historia 63–5, 291historia psile 28, 65Homer 12, 62, 75, 173

Iliad 1.104: 212; 5.734–5: 266; 5.891:267; 7.247–8: 109; 8.385–6:266; 8.390: 267; 12.1–33:289; 13.299: 267; 14.382:145; 15.190–2: 233, 237; 18.400:243; 20.22: 166; 20.67–74: 171

Odyssey 1.100: 267; 12.65:148; 13.149–87: 71, 289

‘House of Proclus’ 7

Iamblichus 9, 11, 12, 13, 19, 21–2,38–40, 41, 46–8, 56, 57, 61, 72, 81–4,117, 165, 166, 222, 264

de Mysteriis 48in Timaeum fragments 107, 111, 113,

119, 124, 149, 170, 176, 187, 213,215, 226, 241, 242, 244, 250, 251,254, 257, 263, 264, 270, 271, 274,295, 304

iconic interpretation 53–4, 59, 187inspired poetry 173 (see also Homer)introductory topics 49–52, 103Isocrates 271

Johansen, T. K. 66Julian, the Apostate 4, 6Julian, Chaldean 9

Lachares 5Lang, H. and Macro, A. D. 10lemmata 15–16Leonas of Isuria 2Leontius 2Lernould, Alain 50lexis see theorialife-giving goddess 97Longinus 35–7, 56, 61, 72–3, 74–6,

108, 125, 126, 129, 145, 149, 150,153, 157, 160, 161, 177, 178, 180,184, 188, 197, 224, 225, 260, 271,304

343

General index

lotteries, divine 232, 291Lucian 64, 65Lycia 2

Mansfeld, Jaap 49Marcellus (travel writer) 277, 280Marinus 2–3, 4, 7, 9, 14marriages, holy 143Maximus of Ephesus 6Melanthus 182Middle Platonism 1, 30–5, 36,

77–8Moderatus 38Moon 78, 80, 170

natural law 297nature, Proclus’ concept of 51Neopythagoreans (see also Numenius)

37, 38Numenius 31, 33–4, 37, 40, 46, 48, 61,

65, 71–2, 74, 75, 76, 77–8, 221, 225,238, 255, 264

Odysseus 71Old Academy 26, 28, 60Olympiodorus (Neoplatonist) 15; in

Gorg. Proem: 51; 41: 23; 46:83; 47: 173

One and Dyad 82, 226Opsomer, J. 55Origenes, friend of Plotinus 35–7, 56,

61, 71, 72–3, 74, 76, 77, 178, 180,264, 283

On Daemons 72Orpheus, Orphics 9, 48, 163, 226, 243Orphic Fragments 20: 284; 83: 188; 94:

218; 119: 275; 163: 140; 168–9:268, 302; 175: 269, 275; 178:231; 215: 272; 354: 209, 212

pagan religion 3–6, 10Panaetius 260Panathenaea 120 (see also peplos)Parmenides 107Parmenides-Commentator 31, 45–6Patricius 2peplos 179, 230Peripatetics 104Phaeacians 62Phaethon myth 64, 79–80Pherecydes 75, fr.4: 225

Philip of Opus 197Philo of Alexandria 1, 29Philolaus B1 DK: 276Plato 23–5, et passim

[?] Alcibiades I 114e: 24; 120b: 196Apology 21–22: 24Charmides 154a–b: 175[?] Clitophon 52Cratylus 396b: 266; 402b–d:

226; 407a–c: 265Critias 1, 25, 55; 106a–109c:

79–80; 113c: 273; 113e–114c:281, 282; 121b–c: 62

[?] Epistles 312d: 42; 312e–313a: 37,39–40, 42; 314a: 42; 323d: 42

Euthyphro 6b–c: 230Gorgias 462–6: 160; 466b–468e:

113; 493a–c: 71; 523a: 173Ion 22, 24Laws 23, 39, 66, 67, 103; 653a:

185; 714a: 246; 716a: 133; 720a:256; 771b: 236; 803c: 222; 892b:103, 104; 896e: 30; 903b–e: 220

Lysis 211d: 111Meno 31Parmenides 1, 17, 39–40, 45–6, 49, 107,

197; 144b: 42; 159b–160b: 143Phaedo 14, 30, 31, 92, 62b: 39, 40,

71; 74a–76c: 291; 91c:23; 96a–99d: 303; 109c–d: 281

Phaedrus 39, 47; 227b: 111; 229d:75; 240e: 187; 246a:146; 246d–247e: 41, 96; 248–51:78, 80–1, 164, 177, 207, 244; 253d–e:146; 256a–b: 23, 24; 274e:183; 275b: 67; 276c–d: 23, 25

Philebus 39, 47; 16c: 42; 16d–e:143; 26e–30d: 42, 97; 27b:26; 29b–30c: 302; 30c: 178

Protagoras 125; 321d: 125Republic 1, 12, 25, 39, 42, 51, 55, 67,

95, 102; 329e: 51, 136; 369e–370c:130; 390b: 92; 393c: 159; 410–12:213; 415c: 147; 420b: 189; 509c:194; 521d: 135; 534bc: 20; 536a:66; 537c: 20; 546a: 261; 592b:58, 68; Myth of Er: 71, 74; 617b–c:135; 619b–d: 164

Republic–Timaeus–Critias 23, 25, 51–2,70, 298–301

Sophist 47; 254d–255e: 42

344

General index

Statesman 39, 270–272: 198; 271d:251; 272c: 26; 273d–e: 274,279

Symposium 195–8: 179; 203b:112; 203d–204b: 268

Theaetetus 30, 41; 180d: 226Theaetetus–Sophist–Politicus 55, 56Timaeus passim

pleasure (of reader) 73, 75Plotinus 11, 32, 61, 74

Enneads I.2: 41; III.8: 18; III.9: 41,43; V.1: 41–2; V.8: 41; VI.2:42–3

Plutarch of Athens 2, 9, 13, 14, 49, 95Plutarch of Chaeronea 10, 29–30, 36, 78,

80–1, 212, 264De Animae Procreatione 29; 1012–3:

27, 30, 79, 80De Defectu Oraculorum 208, 211Life of Solon 174; 26–32: 79–80

Porphyry 2, 9, 11–71, 83, 114, 132, 150,165, 197, 225, 245, 264, 304

De Antro Nympharum 29: 170Fragments (Smith) 120: 93in Timaeum fragments 109, 113, 118,

145, 160, 170, 188, 205, 213, 214,242, 243, 244, 254, 257, 261, 264,270, 274, 294, 299, 301, 304

Introduction 13Letter to Anebo 48Life of Plotinus 2; 3: 37, 38, 43,

72; 14: 32, 35, 40, 44, 180; 16–21:37–8; 17–20: 36

Poseidon 58, 62, 71, 169–70, 212, 289Posidonius 28, 63, 78; F49: 62, 81Potamo of Alexandria 29Praxiphanes 109Prayer 138Presocratics 11, 92, 104Proclus passim

Commentary on the Alcibiades 8, 13, 54Commentary on the Cratylus 8, 14,

54Commentary on Euclid Book I 8Commentary on the Parmenides 8, 13,

17, 22, 24, 658–9: 28, 70; 989.13:20; 1026.18: 20; 1059–61: 49

Commentary on the Republic 12,51; II.8: 125, 126

lost commentaries 8, 9On the Eternity of the World 10

Platonic Theology I.1.6–7: 11, 44,48; I.4.20: 79; I.5.25–26: 12

works in other genres 8–9Prolegomena see introductory topicsProlegomena to Plato’s Philosophy 21–23:

47, 49prologues 28, 32, 73, 304psychology 78, 80Ptolemy 63Ptolemy, Platonist 114Pythagoreans, Pythagoreanism etc. 9,

12, 29, 40, 50, 59, 79, 83, 91, 93–4,99–100, 111

readiness 145rhetoric 2

Sais 67Saffrey, H. D 6Sedley, D. 27, 70, 75Seneca

Epistles 65.7–10: 50, 93, 95Natural Questions 81

Severus 21, 31, 33–4, 61Simplicius

On Epictetus 13in Phys. 286.20ff.: 18

Siorvanes, L. 2skopos 12, 17–20, 47–8, 49–50, 56, 82Socrates, Platonic character 25, 51–2,

58, 69, 247Socratic character 100Sodano, R. 44Solon 69, 73, 82, 173, 188, 223Sorabji, R. 15Speusippus 26–7Stoics 239Strabo 2.3.6: 62, 81; 12.1.36: 62, 289symbolic interpretation 12, 53–4, 79,

101, 124, 173, 187, 283 (see alsoallegorical interpretation)

Syrianus 1, 2–3, 5, 14–15, 49, 56, 81Commentary on the Metaphysics 49

Tardieu, M. 46Taurus, Platonist 31Taylor, A. E. 10Theaetetus commentary, 30–1, IV: 21,

61Theagenes 5Theocritus 67

345

General index

Theodorus of Asine 11, 48,106

Theodorus of Soli 29Theodosian Code 4Theon of Smyrna 176Theophrastus 28, 70theoria and lexis 15–16theurgy 6, 48Thrasyllus 29Timaeus, of Locri 29, 50, 51, 91,

100Timaeus, Platonic character 25, 51–2,

55, 58

Timon, of Phleious 75, 91, 100Titans 78travellers’ tales 277

Van den Berg, B. 264Victorinus, Marius 46

Xanthus, river-god 171Xanthus, man see MelanthusXenocrates 26–7

Zeus 58, 62, 253Zostrianos 46

346

Proclus~ Commentary on Plato's Timaeus~ Volume 1, Book I~ Proclus on the Socratic State and Atlantis

Documents

Transcript of Proclus~ Commentary on Plato's Timaeus~ Volume 1, Book I~ Proclus on the Socratic State and Atlantis