Samuel - WaqarStephen F. Austin High SchoolPro Blocks

A2 Federal Overreach

Its possible to ban private prisons in states, because many dont use them, and 2 states were able to ban them outright.

Kirkham 2012[footnoteRef:1], [1: Kirkham, Chris. Private Prison Corporation Offers Cash In Exchange For State Prisons.Huffington Post. 14 Feb 2012. Web. 4 November 2014..]

At this point, it's unclear how many states will be interested in selling off prisons.Arizona, New Hampshire and Florida are considering privatizing the management of state prisons, but so far none have specifically broached the topic of a sale. State corrections officials who were contacted in California, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Montana, Georgia, Texas, Illinois and New York all said they were not considering such prison sales at this time. In Illinois and New York, laws prohibit state inmates from being housed in private prisons, according to corrections officials.

The government is able to undermine federalism if its legally justified; the 13th amendment gives it the power to override state powers.

Marion 2009[footnoteRef:2], [2: Marion, Ryan S. Prisoners for Sale: Making the Thrteenth Amendment Case AgainstState Private Prison Contracts. William and Mary Journal of Law. 2009. Web. 4Nov 2014..]

The Thirteenth Amendment states, "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime where of the party shall have been duly convicted,shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."' 3 Sinceits passage, the "Punishment Clause" has been a bane for prisoners who argue that they are being subjected to conditions resembling slavery or involuntary servitude. Finding support from the Slaughter-House Cases, 4 federal courts have held that the main purpose of the amendment was specific-to abolish African-American chattel slavery and its incidents. As such, the Punishment Clause renders any current prisoner's argument that they are slaves or involuntary servants void and frivolous. 5 In these cases, the Court either implicitly assumes or directly states that private prison inmates have no ThirteenthAmendment claim without further elaboration. This Note argues that, given the history of the Thirteenth Amendment and the current state of private prison contracts, inmates working in these privately owned and operated facilities do indeed have a constitutional claim. The Punishment Clause does not, in fact, justify the current relationship between government entities and private prison companies. In its current form, the state is handing over control of prisoners to private companies who, in turn, use the prisoners to improve their facilities and increase profits, thus indirectly benefiting these companies' shareholders. Such a system of private, unpaid use of labor too closely resembles the slave system that the Thirteenth Amendment sought to abolish, and was not the punishment scheme envisioned by its drafters when they carved out an exemption for convict servitude

A2 Innovation

Governments actually have a greater long term financial capability than the private sector in terms of innovation.

Mazucatto 2013[footnoteRef:3], [3: Mazucatto, Mariana. Its a Myth That Entrepreneurs Drive New Technology. SlateMagazine, September 2013.]

A quick look at the pioneering technologies of the past century points to the state, not the private sector, as the most decisive player in the game. Whether an innovation will be a success is uncertain, and it can take longer than traditional banks or venture capitalists are willing to wait. In countries such as the United States, China, Singapore, and Denmark, the state has provided the kind of patient and longterm finance new technologies need to get off the ground. Investments of this kind have often been driven by big missions, from putting a human on the moon to solving climate change. This has required not only funding basic researchthe typical "public good" that most economists admit needs state helpbut applied research and seed funding too.

The logic of the free market cannot apply to the prison scenario because nobody chooses to purchase a time in prison.

Culp 2011[footnoteRef:4], [4: Culp, Richard. The Failed Promise of Prison Privatization. Prison Legal News, October2011.]

The prison business is fundamentally different in that no one can freely purchase incarceration services as a private individual. There is no natural market for incarceration services. The power to incarcerate someone to hold a person against his or her will is a defining characteristic of the state. The government holds a monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force and the power to incarcerate. Only the government has the legitimate power to restrict a citizens liberty; individuals are prohibited by law from incarcerating another person under false imprisonment statutes. The government can delegate this power on a limited basis for example, shopkeepers privilege allows merchants to temporarily detain suspected shoplifters. But long-term incarceration is a different matter. The only potential buyers who can legally purchase incarceration services are the government jurisdictions that have custody over indicted, convicted or detained persons. In order to privatize its incarceration function, the government has had to create a market since one does not and cannot exist without its direct intervention.

The competition and innovation supposedly promised with privatization has not materialized because there are so few companies controlling such a large market share.Culp 2011[footnoteRef:5], [5: Culp, Richard. The Failed Promise of Prison Privatization. Prison Legal News, October2011.]

Secondly, the development of the private prison industry has resulted in a highly concentrated producer market where only four companies control over 90% of the incarceration services business. Economic theory tells us that when production is highly concentrated in very few companies, the market becomes an oligopoly, a market situation that is inherently less competitive and innovative than a market with more broad-based representation. An oligopoly is characterized by interdependence, avoidance of competition and a rigid attachment to the status quo among the leading firms.

Because there is no actual free market with regard to prison services, there is no real incentive to innovate.

Culp 2011[footnoteRef:6], [6: Culp, Richard. The Failed Promise of Prison Privatization. Prison Legal News, October2011.]

A third part of the story is that government itself unwittingly stifles innovation in the private prison industry. Since the only legitimate customers of prison companies are the jurisdictions that can indict, convict or otherwise detain people, the potential customer base for incarceration services is very limited. In practice, this has led to a situation where only a handful of customers, an oligopsony in economic terms, has come to dominate the customer base. The limited number of customers serves to dissuade private prison companies from conducting research and development into innovative correctional programming, as the tiny customer base tends to demand only those services that mimic what the governments themselves are accustomed to providing.

A2 Alternative Regulations

The profit motive will lead to private prisons consistently trying to increase prisoners and criminal laws; this will systemically increase prices.

Recognizing the opportunities behind increasing federal incarceration and the challenges around decreasing state incarceration, private prison companies must work hard to expand or maintain their market share. At the same time that some states may be looking to close private facilities, others may continue to move people to private facilities for a variety of reasons. Stricter immigration laws and enforcement increase the number of people in federal detention facilities, and increases in the number of offenses listed as federal crimes leads to more people held in federal prisons. While private prison companies may claim that changes in criminal justice legislation are outside our control, they are in fact engaged in a number of activities aimed at increasing their control of the market; this includes applying political pressure to lawmakers, working to influence elections, and building relationships within agencies or with government officials to directly formulate policy.[footnoteRef:7] [7: Gaming The System: How The Political Strategies Of Private Prison CompaniesPromote Ineffective Incarceration Policies. Justice Policy Institute. June 2011.Web. 4 Nov 2014.]

The profit motive will always lead to the private prison to try and force more prisoners, expanding the number of people incarcerated through excessive laws; private prisons will do so because high profits allow increased lobbying.

Shen 2012[footnoteRef:8] [8: Shen, Aviva. Private Prisons Spend $45 Million On Lobbying, Rake In $5.1 Billion ForImmigrant Detention Alone. Think Progress. 3 Aug 2012. Web. 4 Nov 2014..]

A decade ago, more than 3,300 criminal immigrants were sent to private prisons under two 10-year contracts the Federal Bureau of Prisons signed with CCA worth $760 million. Now, the agency is paying the private companies $5.1 billion to hold more than 23,000 criminal immigrants through 13 contracts of varying lengths. CCA was on the verge of bankruptcy in 2000 due to lawsuits, management problems and dwindling contracts. Last year, the company reaped $162 million in net income. Federal contracts made up 43 percent of its total revenues, in part thanks to rising immigrant detention. GEO, which cites the immigration agency as its largest client,saw its net income jump from $16.9 million to $78.6 million since 2000. As the AP explains, these remarkable profits come in the wake of an equally remarkable lobbying campaign. In the past decade, three major private prison companies spent $45 million on campaign donations and lobbyists to push legislation at the state and federal level. At times, this money has gone to truly nefarious legislation. A 2011 report found that the private prison industry spent millions seeking to increase sentences and incarcerate more people in order to increase the industrys profits. 30 of the 36 legislators who co-sponsored Arizonas now mostly invalidated immigration law which would have landed many more people in detention received campaign contributions from private prison lobbyists or companies, including CCA and GEO. According to a report released last year, CCA spent over $900,000 on federal lobbying and GEO spent between $120,000 to $199,992 in Florida alone during a short threemonth span in 2011. $450,000 went to the Republican national and congressional committees, while Democrats received less than half that number. House Speaker John Boehner (R-OH) and Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) were also among the private prison lobbys top benefactors.

Private prison lobbying has been effective in influencing conservative politicians that entrenches support for the expansion of private prisons.

Fang 2013[footnoteRef:9], [9: Fang, Lee. How Private Prisons Game the Immigration System. The Nation. 27 Feb2013. Web. 4 Nov 2014. < http://www.thenation.com/article/173120/how-privateprisons-game-immigration-system?page=0,1 >.]

The private prison industry grew quickly thanks in no small part to its close ties to politicians and its ability to take advantage of right-wing trends, starting with the with privatization wave in the eighties and on to the politics of crime, terrorism and immigration. The money spent on influencing lawmakers has coincided with a sharp increase in immigrant detention and deportation. Immigrant detention costs taxpayers about $2 billion a year, and private prisons are increasingly tapped by the federal government to house the over 400,000 undocumented immigrants detained annually, a number that has more than doubled over the last decade. In 2012 alone, the two publicly traded prison companies, CCA and Geo Group, took in over $441.9 million in federal contracts to house so-called criminal aliens for the federal Bureau of Prisons. That year, the two companies combined netted $296.9 million in revenues from ICE contracts. These figures could grow or shrink depending on the details of the immigration reform overhaul debated in the coming months. As immigration talks began formally in January with the so-called Gang of Eight negotiations in the Senate, legislators close to the industry were quick to promote policies that are in line with what critics call the business of detention.

A2 Budget Savings and accountability

Private prisons cherry pick data in order to appear cheaper; often public prisons are cheaper in price.

Oppel 2011[footnoteRef:10], [10: Oppel, Rachel A. Private Prisons Found to Offer Little in Savings. NYT. 18 May 2011.Web. 4 Nov 2014.]

Such has been the case lately in Arizona. Despite a state law stipulating that private prisons must create cost savings, the states own data indicate that inmates in private prisons can cost as much as $1,600 more per year, while many cost about the same as they do in state-run prisons. The research, by the Arizona Department of Corrections, also reveals a murky aspect of private prisons that helps them appear less expensive: They often hous[ing] only relatively healthy inmates. Its cherry-picking, said State Representative Chad Campbell, leader of the House Democrats. They leave the most expensive prisoners with taxpayers and take the easy prisoners.

Arizona and Florida are two major examples of where private prisons refuse to take high healthcare cost prisoners, and push them on to public prisons.

Oppel 2011[footnoteRef:11], [11: Oppel, Rachel A. Private Prisons Found to Offer Little in Savings. NYT. 18 May 2011.Web. 4 Nov 2014.]

While private prisons collect a daily rate per inmate, some expenses disproportionately borne by states are not counted. The most significant are terms limiting sicker inmates. Five of eight private prisons serving Arizona did not accept inmates with limited physical capacity and stamina or severe physical illness or chronic conditions, according to the states analysis, issued last month. None took inmates with high need mental health conditions. Some inmates who became sick were returned to state prisons due to an increase of their medical scores that exceeds contractual exclusions. Unlike the private contractors, the analysis said, the state is required to provide medical and mental health services to inmates regardless of the severity of their condition. Medical costs averaged up to $2.44 a day more for state inmates, a third higher than private prisons. That gap can be wider. In Florida, officials found that two private prisons spent only about half as much on health care per inmate as comparable state prisons, a difference of $9 million over two years. Florida officials say that the new plan will better balance costs, and that private prisons comply with a 7-percent-savings law.

Accounting for the full costs shows that theres actually a budgetary loss.Oppel 2011[footnoteRef:12], [12: Oppel, Rachel A. Private Prisons Found to Offer Little in Savings. NYT. 18 May 2011.Web. 4 Nov 2014.]

But skeptics like State Senator Mike Fasano, a Republican, fear cherry-picking may be the only way they can do that. In Arizona, minimum-security state inmates cost 2.6 percent or $1.39 per day more than those in private prisons, before accounting for extra costs borne by the state. But after eliminating these, state prisoners cost only three cents more per day, the analysis found. And state medium-security inmates cost 4.4 percent less before adjustments and 8.7 percent less afterward. That is more than $2 million annually at one prison, or $1,679 per inmate. Using 2009 corrections data, state auditors calculated the difference at up to $2,834 per inmate.

Even reducing crime rates will still cost the states, which isnt a problem with public prisons.

Habibi[footnoteRef:13] [13: Habibi, Shar. Lockup quotas guarantee profits for the U.S. private prison industry. Inthe Public Interest. .]

Other states see the effects, too. According to our study, the most frequent quota in private state and local prisons was 90 percent, and three for-profit prison contracts in the state of Arizona operate under contracts that guarantee an astounding 100% occupancy. In effect, if communities realize their objective of a lower crime rate, taxpayers will see no benefit. They will still be on the hook to pay the private prisons as if they remained filled to capacity. A recent article reported by the Tennessean that followed up on the ITPI study found that taxpayers shelled out nearly $500,000 for empty prison beds in a local womens prison that had a 90% quota. A spokesperson for CCA, the company that runs the facility, defended the use of quotas to pay for fixed costsno matter how many inmates are housed and that they enabled us to cover those fixed costs and ensure the State has access to needed capacity, which can fluctuate. Which sounds reasonable, if you buy into CCAs premise that incarceration exists to help private prison companies get a return on their investment, rather than to punish and rehabilitate lawbreakers.

A2 Economic Benefit to Community

Low salaries and poor training, especially in comparison to the public sector, mean that private prisons do not ensure long term employment.

McEntee[footnoteRef:14], [14: McEntee, Gerald. Dont be a prisoner to empty promises. American Federation ofState, County and Municipal Employees. ]

According to The Corrections Yearbook, 2000, the average annual starting salary for public corrections officers was $23,002, compared to $17,628 for private prison guards. The poor pay undoubtedly contributes to the high turnover that exists in private prisons, a whopping 52.2 percent, compared to 16 percent in publicly run prisons. Plenty of anecdotal evidence substantiates a high level of staff turnover in privately operated prisons. Wackenhut Corporation, now the GEO Group Inc., won a contract to build and operate the East Mississippi Correctional Facility. City and county officials hoped the facility would create up to 350 jobs. News reports from2005 revealed that the facility currently employs 220 people with an annual turnover rate of 65 percent.

Prisons attract larger businesses that replace local ones, thus hurting tax revenue overall and harming the local community.

Huling 2002[footnoteRef:15], [15: Huling, Tracy. Invisible Punishment: The Collateral Consequences of MassImprisonment. The New Press, 2002.]

Prisons may also fail to foster significant retail development. Because prisons, as a large-scale enterprise, attract chain stores, there is a "replacement" effect, with giants such as McDonalds and Walmarts pushing out locally-owned enterprises. In Tehachapi, California, home to two state prisons, 741 locally-owned businesses failed in the last decade of the 1990s, while box-store chains absorbed the local markets. As a result, there may be no net increase in tax revenues, and, because profits made by chain stores are not locally reinvested in the way that locally-owned profits may be, the circulation of dollars within a community may drop in absolute terms.

A comprehensive, national look at the effects of prisons on employment shows the impact of these economic harms.

Genter 2013[footnoteRef:16], [16: Genter, Shaun. Prisons, Jobs And Privatization: The Impact Of Prisons On EmploymentGrowth In Rural U.S. Counties, 1997-2004. Washington State University,January 2013.]

Most studies of prison privatization have focused on cost efficiencies (or inefficiencies) and comparisons of the quality of imprisonment with that found in public facilities. Our research broadens the scope to consider local employment impacts. Consistent with recent studies, we find that prisons do not contribute to growth. Furthermore, we demonstrate that a states decision to privatize some of its prisons does not improve employment prospects for the host county. In fact, it impedes them. Proponents of privatization have long stressed its potential to induce a transformation of public agencies and services these agencies provide (McFarland, McGowan and OToole 2001; Osborne and Gaebler 1992). However, few studies have empirically examined this assertion. Our research into county employment impact of prisons takes initial steps towards assessing this claim; our findings challenge these optimistic claims. That is, in states undergoing a rapid shift towards privatization, prisons run by public agencies have reduced staffing to levels similar to private prisons (see Figure 3, especially trends in medium and maximum security facilities). In turn, we provide evidence that these shifts in staffing have consequences for the rural counties hosting prisons. Specifically, new prisons in states undergoing a rapid shift towards privatization are inversely related to employment growth.

A2 Private Prisons Compete for Highest Quality

The monopoly in the prison system decreases competition.

Privatization advocates argue that competition in the for-profit sector is the key to quality. This argument holds that for-profit operators, knowing they could be replaced if they fail to deliver, have incentives to provide quality service. This theory assumes a system in which there is an adequate supply of competitors. However, this is definitely not the case in the for-profit corrections industry. In general, the market is characterized by many buyers (in this case the jurisdictions) and a very limited number of sellers. CCA and Wackenhut control over 75 percent of the privately managed beds in the United States. The big two are often the only companies with enough resources to go after a contract. The use of speculative prisons, which only CCA and Wackenhut have been building, has further increased their competitive advantage over the rest of the industry. Speculative prisons often result in a sole source contract, which cannot be readily replaced because the company owns the facility. The market-efficiency argument also assumes that the buyer has adequate information to make a decision. The lack of public access to for-profit prisons means that the public officials who buy the service, as well as the taxpayers that pay for it, do not have adequate information. Spec prisons pose a unique challenge. A host jurisdiction may have difficulty getting information about a spec facility, let alone the contracting state. A contracting state may not find out about problems at a contract facility until it is hit with a lawsuit or there is extensive media coverage.[footnoteRef:17] [17: The Record For-Profit Prisons Raise Quality Concerns. American Federation ofState, County & Municipal Employees, 1999.]

The contract system for prison companies limits potential competition.

Donahue 1988[footnoteRef:18], [18: Donahue, John. Prisons for Profit: Public Justice, Private Interests. Economic PolicyInstitute, 1988. ]

Neither theory nor the limited data which exist suggest that the task of incarceration is very well suited to the advantages offered by profit-seeking organizationschiefly, cost consciousness and an aptitude for innovation. There are serious structural barriers to genuine competition for prison management contracts; not only are incumbent contractors likely to become entrenched, but the quality of performance may be so difficult to monitor and evaluate that quality-based competition is unlikely to develop. In general, the enterprise of incarcerating people has relative little scope for technical progress in trimming costs: once the decision to imprison a criminal has been made, the task does not allow much room for innovation.

Cost-cutting techniques decrease prison quality.Mason 2012[footnoteRef:19], [19: Mason, Cody. Too Good to Be True. Sentencing Project, January 2012. ]

Privately managed prisons attempt to control costs by regularly providing lower levels of staff benefits, salary, and salary advancement than publicly-run facilities (equal to about $5,327 less in annual salary for new recruits and $14,901 less in maximum annual salaries). On average, private prison employees also receive 58 hours less training than their publicly employed counterparts.57 Consequently, there are higher employee turnover rates in private prisons than in publicly operated facilities. These dynamics may contribute to safety problems within prisons. Studies have found that assaults in private prisons can occur at double the rate found in public facilities. Researchers also find that public facilities tend to be safer than their private counterparts and that privately operated prisons appear to have systemic problems in maintaining secure facilities.

In Arizona specifically, security lapses, under-trained guards, and decreased job and rehabilitation programs hurt the community overall and decreased quality.

There are six prisons operated by Corrections Corporation of America that house prisoners from other states (such as Hawaii and California) and the Federal government (Immigration and Customs Enforcement). There have been serious problems in these facilities, including riots, deaths, and abuses of prisoners. AFSCs analysis found patterns of serious safety lapses in all the private prisons for which data was available. Together, this data demonstrates a set of problems endemic to the industry and could lead to future tragedies like the Kingman escapes. Under-trained guards combined with poor state oversight leads to assaults, disturbances, and riots. For-profit prison staff members are unprepared, or unwilling, to intervene in these events, and risk losing control of the facility. Insufficient rehabilitation programs, educational opportunities, or jobs for the prisoners provide idle time for conflicts to brew. The result is facilities that are unsafe for the people living and working inside them, as well as the surrounding community.[footnoteRef:20] [20: Private Prisons in Arizona More Costly and Less Safe. American Friends ServiceCommittee, December 19 2011. ]

A2 For Profit Prisons More Cost effective

Because many for-profit prisons only house healthy inmates, statistics saying they are cheaper are misleading.Harris 2013[footnoteRef:21], [21: Harris, Craig. Arizona Faces Growing Cost of Private Prisons. Arizona Central,December 29 2013.]

In fiscal 2013, which ended June 30, the non-adjusted average daily cost per inmate at a medium-security prison was $64.52, compared with the private-prison cost of $58.82. However the states number includes inmates who have significant medical or mental-health issues. The private prisons house only healthy inmates. When an adjustment is made for the medical costs, the balance tips significantly in the states favor. The adjusted 2010 daily cost of housing a medium-security inmate in a state-run facility was $48.42, compared with the private-prison cost of $53.02. Ryan acknowledged that private-prison inmates are a healthier, less-expensive population to house.

Even if states may initially appear to save money with private prisons, these prisons renegotiate their contracts to increase their profits and force the government to pay more.Contracts that may seem like a good deal at the beginning can shortly become a drain on taxpayer dollars. Once states have committed to working with for-profit prisons, they are vulnerable to shifting contract terms that raise costs. Indeed, in CCAs 2010 Annual Report, the company explicitly cites, enhancing the terms of our existing contracts as one of the approaches it uses to develop its business and increase profits. Potential amendments include raising the per diem rate (the rate the state pays per prisoner per day to the contractor), or inserting occupancy guarantees that ensure that the state will either keep a facility filled to a certain level, frequently 90%, or pay the contractor for the empty beds if occupancy dips below the required threshold.[footnoteRef:22] [22: The Costs of Private Prisons. In The Public Interest, April 2014.]

Many studies claiming an economic benefit from for-profit prisons ignore oversight costs and other factors that make public prisons seem more expensive.

One method for making private prisons look more cost effective is to pad the costs of public prisons. Ohios experience is not unique. For example, the Florida Department of Corrections central office has overhead costs that are often not even factored into cost comparisons of public and private prisons. Additionally, there are costs that the state must incur regardless of whether the prison is public or private, such as sentence calculation and review of grievances and disciplinary actions, which are often not properly included in cost comparisons. Similarly, the costs to the state to oversee and monitor private prisons are also rarely included in cost comparisons, but can be a significant expense if the state properly oversees its contractors.[footnoteRef:23] [23: The Costs of Private Prisons. In The Public Interest, April 2014.]

A2 Early Release

In California, inmates released early showed lower rates of recidivism.Miles 2012[footnoteRef:24], [24: Miles, Kathleen. Inmates Released Early In California Under Prop 36 Have LowRecidivism Rate, Report Says. Huffington Post, 11 September 2012. Web.http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/11/inmates-released-earlycalifornia_n_3901363.html]

The report says the 1,000 prisoners released early so far have a recidivism rate of 2 percent -- as opposed to the usual 16 percent for all California inmates. They were released because California voters in November passed Prop 36, revising the state's three strikes law, which mandates a life sentence for anyone convicted of a third felony.

Even when there are savings, they are negated by higher rates of recidivism in the long term.

Bayer 2003[footnoteRef:25], [25: Bayer, Patrick. The Effectiveness of Juvenile Correctional Facilities: Public VersesPrivate Management. Yale University, July 2003.http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp863.pdf]

This paper uses data on juvenile offenders released from correctional facilities in Florida to explore the effects of facility management type (private for-profit, private nonprofit, public state-operated, and public county-operated) on recidivism outcomes and costs. The data provide detailed information on individual characteristics, criminal and correctional histories, judge-assigned restrictiveness levels, and home zip codesallowing us to control for the non-random assignment of individuals to facilities far better than any previous study. Relative to all other management types, for-profit management leads to a statistically significant increase in recidivism, but, relative to nonprofit and state-operated facilities, for-profit facilities operate at a lower cost to the government per comparable individual released. Cost-benefit analysis implies that the short-run savings offered by for-profit over nonprofit management are negated in the long run due to increased recidivism rates, even if one measures the benefits of reducing criminal activity as only the avoided costs of additional confinement.

A2 International Success

Private prisons fail to create the benefits they promised.