Privileged Places: Race, Uneven Development and - UCI Webfiles

Privileged Places: Race, Uneven Development andthe Geography of Opportunity in Urban America

Gregory D. Squires and Charis E. Kubrin

[Paper first received, 20 April 2004; in final form, July 2004]

Summary. David Rusk, former Mayor of Albuquerque, New Mexico, has observed that “badneighborhoods defeat good programs”. This paper identifies the underlying causes of badneighbourhoods along with their costs to local residents and residents throughout the region. Itis a critical essay that traces recent patterns of uneven metropolitan development, the socialforces generating these patterns, their many costs and potential remedies. It demonstrateshow the interrelated processes of sprawl, concentration of poverty and racial segregation shapethe opportunity structure facing diverse segments of the nation’s urban and metropolitanpopulation. In so doing, it draws on recent scholarly literature from various disciplines,government data and documents, research institute reports and the mass media. Topicsaddressed include income and wealth disparities, employment opportunities, housing patterns,access to health care and exposure to crime. While recognising the role of individual choice andhuman capital, the paper focuses on public policy decisions and related private-sector activitiesin determining how place and race shape the opportunity structure of metropolitan areas.Finally, the paper explores various policy options to sever the linkages among place, race andprivilege in the nation’s urban communities.

The housing market and discriminationsort people into different neighborhoods,which in turn shape residents’ lives—and deaths. Bluntly put, some neighbour-hoods are likely to kill you (Logan, 2003,p. 33).

Real estate mantra tells us that three factorsdetermine the market value of a home: location,location and location. The same could be saidabout the ‘factors’ that determine virtuallyany aspect of the good life and people’saccess to it in metropolitan America. Placematters. Neighbourhood counts. Access todecent housing, safe neighbourhoods, goodschools, useful contacts and other benefits islargely influenced by the community in whichone is born, raised and currently resides.

Individual initiative, intelligence, experienceand all the elements of human capital areobviously important. But understandingthe opportunity structure in the US todayrequires complementing what we know aboutindividual characteristics with what we arelearning about place. Privilege cannot beunderstood outside the context of place.

A central feature of place that has con-founded efforts to understand and, whereappropriate, alter the opportunity structure ofthe nation’s urban communities is the roleof race. Racial composition of neighbour-hoods has long been at the centre of publicpolicy and private practice in the creationand destruction of communities and indetermining access to the elements of thegood life, however defined.

Urban Studies, Vol. 42, No. 1, 47–68, January 2005

Gregory D. Squires and Charis E. Kubrin are in the Department of Sociology, George Washington University, Phillips Hall,Room 409, 801 22nd Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, USA. Fax: 202 994 3239. E-mail: [email protected] and [email protected] authors would like to thank Ivy Kennelly for her helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

0042-0980 Print=1360-063X Online=05=010047–22 # 2005 The Editors of Urban Studies

DOI: 10.1080=0042098042000309694

Place and race have long been, and continueto be, defining characteristics of the oppor-tunity structure of metropolitan areas. Dis-entangling the impact of these two forcesis difficult, if not impossible. But where onelives and one’s racial background are bothsocial constructs which, on their own andin interaction with each other, significantlyshape the privileges (or lack thereof) thatpeople enjoy.

The impacts of place and race are notinevitable. If place matters, policy counts aswell. The uneven development of metro-politan America is a direct result largely ofa range of policy decisions made by publicofficials and policy-related actions taken inthe private and non-profit sectors. Policydecisions could be made to alter that patternof development.

The linkages among place, race and privi-lege are shaped by three dominant socialforces—sprawl, concentrated poverty andsegregation—all of which play out in largepart in response to public policy decisionsand practices of powerful private institutionalactors. This perspective emerges from whathas been variously referred to as ‘the newurban sociology’, ‘urban political economy’and other labels which place class, race andrelations of domination and subordination atthe center of analysis. In general, this requiresunderstanding how individualistic characteri-stics and choices (such as human capital andhousehold neighbourhood preferences) andvoluntary exchanges that occur via competi-tive markets are both framed and complemen-ted by structural constraints (such asexclusionary zoning and deindustrialisation)in determining the distribution of valuedgoods and services. Specifically, this involvesexamining how land use practices, urbanpolicy, the dynamics of race and class, andother social forces determine who gets whatand why (Feagin, 1998; Gottdiener andFeagin, 1988; Horan, 1978).

The following discussion traces recentpatterns of uneven metropolitan development,the social forces generating these patterns,their many costs and potential remedies. Weexamine some of the contours of current

policy debates and suggest directions foraltering the inequitable opportunity structureconfronting many residents of urbanAmerica today. Specific policies that havealready been shown to ameliorate the linka-ges among place, race and privilege are ident-ified. Potentially promising ideas for futureinitiatives are also noted. An underlyingassumption is that no outcome is pre-ordained.Severing these linkages is possible, but notinevitable.

Place, Race and Uneven Development

Do the kids in the neighborhood play bas-ketball or hockey? (Anonymous insuranceagent, quoted in a personal communicationfrom A. Luquetta, 20 September 2000).

Dominant features of metropolitan deve-lopment in the post-World War II years aresprawl, concentrated poverty and segregation(if not hypersegregation). Clearly, these arenot separate, mutually exclusive patterns andprocesses. Rather, they are three criticalunderpinnings of the uneven development ofplace and privilege.

Sprawl has crept into the vocabulary ofmetropolitan development in recent years,with different observers offering diverseperspectives on its causes and conseque-nces (Galster et al., 2001). Yet mostwould concur with Anthony Downs’ obser-vation that

Suburban sprawl has been the dominantform of metropolitan-area growth in theUnited States for the past 50 years(Downs, 1998, p. 8).

While there is no universal agreement on adefinition of sprawl, there is at least a roughconsensus that it is a pattern of developmentassociated with outward expansion, low-density housing and commercial develop-ment, fragmentation of planning amongmultiple municipalities with large fiscaldisparities among them, auto-dependenttransport and segregated land use patterns(Downs, 1999; Katz and Bradley, 1999;Orfield, 1997, 2002; Squires, 2002).

48 GREGORY D. SQUIRES AND CHARIS E. KUBRIN

A few numbers illustrate these spatialdevelopments. Between 1950 and 1990, USmetropolitan areas grew from 208 000square miles housing 84 million people to585 000 square miles housing 193 million.So population increased by 128 per cent,while the land on which residents livedexpanded by 181 per cent. Population densitydeclined from 407 to 330 persons per squaremile. During these years, the number ofjurisdictions within metropolitan areas grewfrom 193 to 9600 (Rusk, 1999, pp. 67, 68).And while recently some major cities havewitnessed growth in their populations,between 1970 and 2000 the suburban shareof the nation’s metropolitan area populationincreased from 55.1 per cent to 62.2 per cent(US Department of Housing and UrbanDevelopment, 2000, p. 63). This trend accel-erated during the 1990s when the suburbanpopulation grew by 17.7 per cent, comparedwith just 8.0 per cent for central cities (USCensus Bureau, 2001).

But people are not moving randomly. Ingeneral, income levels have been consistentlyhigher and poverty levels have been lower inthe suburbs. In 1960, per capita income incities was 105 per cent of suburban percapita income. By 1990, this had fallen to 84per cent which is where it remained in 2000(Cisneros, 1993, p. 25; Logan, 2002a, p. 4).Between 1970 and 1995, poverty increasedin cities from below 13 per cent to 20 percent, while rising just slightly in the suburbsfrom 7 to 9 per cent (US Department ofHousing and Urban Development, 1997,p. 32). During the 1990s, disparities betweencities and suburbs remained virtuallyunchanged (Logan, 2002a, p. 4) and concen-trated poverty has grown during these yearsas well. Between 1970 and 1990, the numberof census tracts in which at least 40 per centof the population was poor increased fromunder 1500 to more than 3400 and thenumber of people living in those tracts grewfrom 4.1 million to more than 8 million.

But there were some positive developmentsduring the 1990s. In that decade, the numberof tracts where the poverty rate reachedat least 40 per cent dropped to 2510 and

their residents dropped below 8 million(Jargowsky, 1996, p. 30; 2003, pp. 4, 20). Asimilar pattern was found using a 30 per centthreshold. And conditions in those tractsimproved. The share of adults without a highschool degree, the share of families headedby women and the share of households receiv-ing public assistance declined, while the shareof women who were working increased(Kingsley and Petit, 2003). But the 2000census occurred at the peak of the economicboom of the 1990s. Most observers believethat circumstances have deteriorated sincethen, although it is unclear by how much.There were gains, to be sure. How permanentthey are remains to be determined (Kingsleyand Petit, 2003, p. 10). Despite the progressof the 1990s, the number of poverty tractsand the population of those neighbour-hoods were higher in 2000 than in either1970 or 1980. Concentrated poverty persistsas a defining characteristic of urban America.

The non-randomness of sprawl is alsoreflected in the racial composition of cityand suburban communities. Racial disparitiesbetween cities and suburbs and racial segre-gation in general persist as dominant featuresof metropolitan areas. Cities are disproportio-nately non-White with over 52 per cent ofBlacks and 21 per cent of Whites residing incentral-city neighbourhoods, while suburbsare disproportionately White where 57 percent of Whites but just 36 per cent of Blacksreside (McKinnon, 2003, p. 2). Segregation,particularly between Blacks and Whites, per-sists at high levels and Hispanic–White segre-gation has increased in recent years (Icelandet al., 2002a, 2002b; Lewis MumfordCenter, 2001). While Blacks account forabout 12 per cent of the nation’s total popu-lation and Hispanics for about 13 per cent,the typical White resident of metropolitanareas resides in a neighbourhood that is 80per cent White, 7 per cent Black, 8 per centHispanic and 4 per cent Asian. A typicalBlack person lives in a neighbourhood thatis 33 per cent White, 51 per cent Black, 11per cent Hispanic and 3 per cent Asian. Anda typical Hispanic resident lives in a commu-nity that is 36 per cent White, 11 per cent

PRIVILEGED PLACES 49

Black, 45 per cent Hispanic and 6 per centAsian (Lewis Mumford Center, 2001, p. 3).Thus, while racial minorities tend to live inrelatively diverse neighbourhoods, Whitesremain highly isolated.

As in the case of concentrated poverty,there have been some favourable segregationtrends in recent years. Nationwide, theBlack–White index of dissimilarity hasdeclined from 0.73 in 1980 to 0.64 in 2000(Iceland et al., 2002a, p. 60). (A score of1.00 would indicate total segregation, whereevery neighbourhood was entirely Black orWhite and a score of 0 would indicate thateach neighbourhood has the same percentageof Blacks and Whites as does the entirearea.) Racial minorities increased their shareof the suburban population from 19 per centin 1990 to 27 per cent in 2000 (Frey, 2001,p. 1). In the nation’s 10 largest metropolitanareas, the number of predominantly Whiteneighbourhoods fell by 30 per cent and thenumber of mixed-race neighbourhoods grewin 9 of those 10 communities (Fasenfestet al. 2004). And between 1996 and 2001,the Black home-ownership rate increased bymore than 4 percentage points (from 44.3per cent to 48.4 per cent) compared with anincrease of just over 2 percentage points forthe nation generally (from 65.4 per cent to67.8 per cent) (Joint Center for HousingStudies, 2002a, p. 31). But despite thechanges, suburbs remain highly segregatedand segregation between Blacks and Whitesexists at very high levels. Where segregationhas declined, it has generally been in rela-tively small sunbelt communities with smallBlack populations. In older north-easternand midwestern industrial communities,traditional levels of segregation persist.Between 1980 and 2000, segregation declinedby 6 points in metropolitan areas where 20per cent or more of the population wasBlack compared with 12 points where theyaccounted for less than 10 per cent of allresidents. And in cities like New York,Chicago, Detroit, Milwaukee and Newark,segregation scores were in the 80s in 2000(Lewis Mumford Center, 2001; Logan et al.,2004).

City–suburban barriers have broken downsomewhat in recent years and levels ofBlack–White segregation have moderatedslightly. However, racial segregation remainsa prominent feature of the nation’s metropoli-tan areas and, in conjunction with the concen-tration of poverty and growing economicinequality, results in growing isolation ofpoor minority households.

If segregation is declining, albeit slightly,for Blacks, it does not appear that this hastranslated into their being able to move intobetter neighbourhoods. The median censustract or neighbourhood income for thetypical Black household in 1990 was$27 808 compared with $45 486 for Whites,a gap of $17 679. By 2000, that gap hadincreased to $18 112. More puzzling, whenlooking at households with incomes above$60 000, similar patterns were observed. Forexample, in 1990, the typical Black householdwith an income above $60 000 lived in aneighbourhood where the median incomewas $31 585 compared with $46 760 forthe typical White household in this incomebracket, a gap of $15 175. By 2000, thesefigures changed to $35 306 for Blacks and$51 459 for Whites, making an even largergap of $16 152 (Logan, 2002b, Tables 2 and3). The same pattern holds for Hispanics, notsurprisingly, given that they have becomeeven more segregated in recent years.Further confounding the intersection of placeand race is the fact that in 2000 poor Blacksand Hispanics were far more likely thanpoor Whites to live in poor neighbourhoods.Whereas over 18 per cent of poor Blacksand almost 14 per cent of poor Hispanicslived in such areas, less than 6 per cent ofpoor Whites did (Jargowsky, 2003, p. 10).

These neighbourhood effects, of course, arefelt by individuals and their families. For atleast the past 25 years, for example, medianBlack and Hispanic family income has beenapproximately 60 per cent that of Whitemedian family income (US Bureau of theCensus, 1999, Table B-4). And wealth dispari-ties are far greater. While Blacks earn about60 per cent of what Whites earn, their netwealth is approximately one-tenth that of


Whites. These substantial wealth disparitiespersist even between Whites and non-Whites who have equivalent educationalbackgrounds, comparable jobs and similarincomes (Conley, 1999; Oliver and Shapiro,1995). A number of factors contribute tothese disparities.

Inheritance is one major contributor.Whites are more than three times as likely asBlacks to inherit money and among thosewho do, Whites average $76 000 comparedwith $31 000 for Blacks. And these differen-tials to not take into account disparities in theamount of money children receive from theirparents while they are still alive (Shapiro,2004, pp. 67–71).

These wealth disparities also reflect, at leastin part, the fact that middle-class Blackfamilies are more likely to have poor andworking-class friends and relatives who lookto them for financial support. Moreover,Black middle-class neighbourhoods are farmore likely than White middle-class com-munities to be located in close proximity topoor neighbourhoods, which residents fre-quently pass through while commuting towork, going to the grocery store and engagingin most normal daily activities (Pattillo-McCoy, 1999). Proximity to problematicneighbourhoods also affects the value ofhomes and, therefore, further contributes tothese economic disparities.

Home-ownership, in terms of the share ofdifferent groups that own their homes andthe value of the homes they do own, isanother significant contributor to racialwealth disparities. Whereas almost 70 percent of White families own their homes,approximately half of Black families do so(Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2002a,p. 31). For Blacks, home equity accountsfor two-thirds of their assets compared withtwo-fifths for Whites (Oliver and Shapiro,1995, p. 106). Biases in the nation’s hous-ing and home finance markets have costthe current generation of Blacks about$82 billion with the disparity in homeequity averaging $20 000 for those holdingmortgages (Oliver and Shapiro, 1995, pp.151, 171).

A large part of these gaps can be accountedfor by racial discrimination and segregation inhousing and financial service markets. A studyof the 100 largest metropolitan areas foundthat Black home-owners received 18 percent less value for their investments in theirhomes than White home-owners (Rusk,2001). That is, for every dollar of incomeBlacks owned $2.16 worth of housing com-pared with $2.64 for Whites. For example, inBaltimore, Black home-owners had a meanhousehold income of $41 466 and ownedhomes with a mean value of $69 600. So forevery dollar of income, they owned $1.68worth of home. Whites had a mean incomeof $55 429 and owned homes with a meanvalue of $133 000. They owned $2.40 worthof home for every dollar of income. In deter-mining the causes of the variation in this‘black tax’ across the 100 communities,several factors were examined includingthe size of the metropolitan area, economicinequality across neighbourhoods, minoritypopulation, rates of home-ownership amongeach group and two measures of racial segre-gation (dissimilarity and isolation indices).Rusk found that only the segregation mea-sures were significant. The importance ofplace is also indicated by the success ofefforts to relocate poor and minority house-holds from low-income central-city neigh-bourhoods to middle-income suburbancommunities. Evaluations of the Gautreauxprogramme in Chicago and early returnsfrom HUD’s Moving to Opportunity (MTO)programme have found evidence that studentswho relocate are doing better in school,their health status has improved and their per-sonal and families’ lives have improved ina number of additional ways (Goering andFeins, 2003; Goering et al., 2002; Rubinowitzand Rosenbaum, 2000).

Segregation remains a central feature ofmetropolitan areas and discriminationremains prevalent. In its 2000 nationwidehousing discrimination study, the UrbanInstitute found that Black homebuyersencountered discrimination in 22 per centof their searches for rental units and 17 percent of their efforts to purchase homes.


For Hispanics, the figures were 26 per centand 20 per cent. Although this represented asubstantial drop from the Urban Institute’sprevious study in 1988, it reveals continuinghigh levels of racial discrimination in thehousing market (Turner et al., 2002, pp. iii–v). And these figures represent a very conser-vative estimate of the number of instances ofdiscrimination that occur. The Urban Institutestudy focused on initial visits of homeseekerswith managers of rental units and real estateagents. Follow-up visits and phone callswere not included. So, for example, thestudy did not capture what occurred whenhomeseekers followed up initial visits withsubsequent requests for assistance or tomake offers on a home. The study also didnot examine discrimination in mortgagelending, property insurance, appraisals andother aspects of the home rental and buyingprocess. As the National Fair Housing Alli-ance noted, if a typical apartment searchinvolves a visit to at least four or five unitsand racial minorities are encountering dis-crimination in one out of every four or fivevisits to a rental agent, it may be the casethat Black and Hispanic renters encounter dis-crimination virtually every time they move(National Fair Housing Alliance, 2003a, p. 1).

At the same time, there is mounting evi-dence that many inner-ring suburbs areexperiencing urban ills previously associatedprimarily with inner-city neighbourhoods(Orfield, 1997, 2002; Rusk, 1999). So thegrowing presence of racial minorities in thesuburbs in recent years makes the 1990s, asthe title of one Brookings Institution reportstates, “A Decade of Mixed Blessings”(Berube and Frey, 2002). Ethnic diversitymay be growing in metropolitan areas, butneighbourhood integration lags behind(Lewis Mumford Center, 2001).

The Costs of Spatial and Racial Inequality

These patterns are not just statistical or demo-graphic curiosities. These spatial and racialinequalities are directly associated with accessto virtually all products and services associ-ated with the good life. Sprawl, concentrated

poverty and racial segregation tend to con-centrate a host of problems and privileges indifferent neighbourhoods and among differentracial groups (Frazier et al., 2003; Massey,2001; Massey and Denton, 1993; Sampsonet al., 2002). These ‘concentration effects’shape opportunities and lifestyles throughoutthe life-cycle and across generations.

Health disparities may constitute the mostconcrete disadvantages associated with thespatial and racial divide in urban areas andthey manifest themselves quite early in life.The Black infant mortality rate in 1995 was14.3 per 1000 live births compared with 6.3for Whites and Hispanics and 5.3 for Asians.More troubling is the fact that the ratio ofBlack to White infant mortality increasedfrom 1.6 to 2.4 between 1950 and the 1990s(Kington and Nickens, 2001, pp. 264–265).Access to clean air and water, exposure tolead paint, stress, obesity, smoking habits,diet, social isolation, proximity to hospitalsand other medical treatment facilities, andavailability of health insurance all vary byneighbourhood and contribute to long-estab-lished disparities in health and wellness(Bullard, 1996; Dreier et al., 2001 pp. 66–82; Kington and Nickens, 2001; Klinenberg,2002). Recent research has documented thatthe environment can affect the fundamentaldevelopment of the brain which leads to vari-ations in the growth of a range of intellectual,emotional and social abilities. An on-goingcontroversial debate is the role of IQ, widelyassumed to be inherited, in determining indi-vidual achievement (Herrnstein and Murray,1994). But as the National Academy ofSciences reported in its book From Neuronsto Neighbourhoods, the causal arrow pointsin both directions (Shonkoff and Phillips,2000). Intelligence no doubt influencesachievement, but environment clearly influ-ences development of the basic tool thatdrives intelligence, the human brain. To illus-trate the impact of place, in the WashingtonDC area, the affluent and predominantlyWhite suburb of Bethesda, Maryland, hasone pediatrician for every 400 children,while the poor and predominantly Blackneighbourhoods in the District’s south-east


side have one pediatrician for every 3700 chil-dren. And while the hospital admission ratefor asthma in the state of New York is 1.8per 1000, it is three times higher in the MottHaven area of the South Bronx (Dreieret al., 2001, pp. 68, 70).

Education has long been regarded as theprincipal vehicle for ameliorating such pro-blems. If education is to be “the great equa-lizer of the conditions of men—the balancewheel of the social machinery” as the Massa-chusetts educator Horace Mann anticipatedover 150 years ago, that day has yet to arrive(Bowles and Gintis, 1976, p. 23). Relianceon property taxes to fund public educationnurtures on-going inequality in the nation’sschools that is explicitly tied to place.Although some communities have introducedequalisation formulas, wealthier communitiesstill provide substantially greater financialsupport for public schools, with a lesser taxeffort, than poorer ones. Given the demo-graphics of metropolitan areas, spatialinequalities are readily translated into racialdisparities (Anyon, 1997). After two decadesof progress in desegregating the nation’sschools, it appears that progress may havecome to a halt in the 1990s or perhaps mayhave even been reversed. For example, in2000, 40 per cent of Black students attendedschools that were 90–100 per cent Black com-pared with 32 per cent of Black students whoattended such schools in 1988 (Orfield andEaton, 2003). The percentage of White stu-dents in the schools of the typical Blackstudent declined from more than 36 to lessthan 31 during these years. And the share ofHispanic students attending schools thatwere 90–100 per cent minority grew from23 per cent during the late 1960s to 37 percent in 2000 (Frankenberg et al., 2003, pp.30, 33). John Logan (2004) has suggestedthat demographic changes rather than resegre-gation account for these patterns. That is, inpublic schools, Whites simply account for asmaller share of total enrollments, so studentsof all races are in schools that have higherminority enrollments. Yet, Logan concludesthat public schools remain highly segregatedand he observes that “Separate continues to

mean unequal” (Logan, 2004, p. 16). Continu-ing disparities result in fewer educationalresources, less qualified teachers and higherteacher turnover and, ultimately, lower edu-cational achievement in low-income andminority communities (Frankenberg et al.,2003, p. 67).

If there is one single factor that is most criti-cal for determining access to the good life, itmight be employment. This is particularlytrue in the US where individuals and house-holds are far more dependent on their jobs tosecure basic goods and services than is thecase with virtually all other industrialisednations that provide far more extensivesocial welfare states (such as national healthinsurance, child care, family leave) (Wilson,1996, pp. 149–182). The importance ofplace and race have long been recognised byspatial mismatch theorists (Kain, 1968,1992, 2004) who posit that lower-income resi-dents of poorer communities generally residein or near central cities while job growth hasbeen greater in outlying suburban commu-nities. Those most in need of employment,therefore, find it more difficult not only tolearn about available jobs but more expensiveto get to those jobs when they find one. This isparticularly true for welfare recipients who, inrecent years, have come under increasingpressure to secure employment (Allard andDanziger, 2002). Once again this dynamic isnot racially neutral. As of 2000, no racialgroup was more physically isolated fromjobs than Blacks, and those metropolitanareas with higher levels of Black–Whitehousing segregation were those that exhibitedhigher levels of spatial mismatch between theresidential location of Blacks and the loca-tion of jobs (Raphael and Stoll, 2002).Racial minorities tend to search for jobs inslower-growing areas while Whites tend tosearch in faster-growing communities. Andthe differences in the quality of these jobsearches is accounted for primarily by resi-dential racial segregation, even after takinginto consideration racial differences in socialnetworks and search methods (Stoll andRaphael, 2000). Compounding these troublesare the ‘mental maps’ many employers draw


in which they attribute various job-relatedcharacteristics (such as skills, experience, atti-tudes) to residents of certain neighbourhoods.A job applicant’s address often has an inde-pendent effect, beyond his or her actualhuman capital, that makes it more difficult,particularly for racial minorities from urbanareas, to secure employment (Tilly et al.,2001; Wilson, 1996). Moreover, recentresearch has found that it is easier for aWhite person with a felony conviction to geta job than a Black person with no felony con-victions, even among applicants with other-wise comparable credentials or where Blackshad slightly better employment histories(Pager, 2003). Such divergent employmentexperiences, of course, contribute directly tothe income and wealth disparities describedearlier.

Another critical quality of life factor iscrime and associated with that is the fear ofcrime. If most indices of serious crime havegone down in recent years, crime remainsconcentrated in central cities and selectedinner-ring suburbs. For example in 2000, theestimated violent crime victimisation rateper 1000 population in urban areas was 35.1compared with only 25.8 in suburban areas(US Department of Justice, 2001). Andin 2002, for every 1000 people, 7 urban, 4 sub-urban and 3 rural residents were victims ofan aggravated assault, with urban residentsbeing robbed at about 4 times the rate ofrural residents. Race enters the picture aswell. Surveys of 12 cities in 1998 found thatBlack residents in urban areas experienceda higher rate of violent crime than urbanWhites in a majority of the cities (US Depart-ment of Justice, 1999).

Tense police–community relations furtherexacerbate crime problems for racial mino-rities. Ironically, the communities most inneed of police protection—disadvantagedBlack communities—are also those in whichmany residents view the police with themost ambivalence. This stems, in part, froma recognition that colour counts as a mark ofsuspicion used as a predicate for action—stop-ping, questioning, patting down, arresting andso forth. Such practices cause residents who

might otherwise be of assistance to policeto avoid them, decline to co-operate withpolice investigations, assume bad faith ordishonesty on the part of police officers andteach others that such reactions are necessary(Anderson, 1999; Kennedy, 1997; Kubrin andWeitzer, 2003). In an age where race is usedfor purposes of calculating suspiciousness(what some refer to as racial profiling), it isno surprise that residents of poor Blackcommunities distrust the police. Research onpolice behaviour supports residents’ percep-tions. Unwarranted police stops, verbal andphysical abuse, and racial bias towards resi-dents of disadvantaged communities continueto strain minority residents’ relations with thepolice.

Crime, of course, reflects and reinforcesseveral quality of life factors including home-ownership rates, job opportunities, access toretail and commercial businesses, family lifeand many others. For example, Alba et al.(1994, p. 412) find that owning a homeenables residents to live in safer communities.According to their study, home-owners residein communities where violent crime ratesare nearly 250 (per 100 000) units lowerthan in communities where comparablerenters reside. In other words, the concen-tration of crime does not simply reflect theconcentration of individuals prone to criminalactivity, but various neighbourhood charact-eristics as well (Sampson et al., 2000). Onceagain, racial segregation is a critical culprit.Segregation tends to concentrate poverty anda range of social problems long associatedwith older urban communities, includingacts of crime (Massey, 1995; Peterson andKrivo, 1993).

Access to financial services, and the cost ofthose services, also varies by neighbourhood.In recent years, a two-tiered financial servicesmarket-place has emerged with conven-tional lenders (commercial banks, savingsinstitutions) concentrated in outlying urbanand suburban areas and so-called fringebankers (cheque-cashers, payday lenders,pawn shops) in central-city neighbourhoods(Caskey, 1994, 2002; Sawyer and Temkin,2004). In addition, sub-prime and predatory


lending have grown dramatically in olderurban and minority communities increasingthe cost of housing for area residents whileconventional prime loans remain the norm inthe balance of most metropolitan areas. A par-ticularly severe family and community costhas been the dramatic increase in foreclosurerates that cost many poor and workingfamilies their life savings (Immergluck andSmith, 2004; Renuart, 2002; Squires, 2003).To illustrate, between 1975 and 1995, thenumber of banking offices in low- and moder-ate-income areas declined by 21 per centwhile increasing by 29 per cent overall(Avery et al., 1997). That withdrawalcreated opportunities for fringe institutionsto become major players in those markets.Cheque-cashing businesses increased from2151 to 5500 between 1986 and 1997(Leonhardt, 1997, pp. 84–86). A case study ofMilwaukee, Wisconsin, found that in 1996there were 2 banks for each cheque-cashingbusiness in the city’s economically distressedneighbourhoods (as determined by theMilwaukee Comptroller) compared with 10banks for each cheque-casher elsewhere.In predominantly African American neigh-bourhoods, there was 1 bank for eachcheque-cashing business compared with 15in predominantly White areas. For Hispanicneighbourhoods, there were 2 banks for eachcheque-casher compared with 8 banks innon-Hispanic communities. Equally proble-matic, there was just over 1 bank per 10 000households in African American areas com-pared with 6 in Hispanic neighbourhoodsand almost 8 banks per 10 000 households inWhite areas (Squires and O’Connor, 1998,pp. 131–132). Access to mainstream financialservices, however, is not simply a matter oflocation. Where conventional branch banksare located nearby, they still do not effectivelymarket to low-income and minority house-holds, thus creating a vacuum that fringebankers fill (Sawyer and Temkin, 2004).

Areas served by fringe bankers pay for that‘service’. One study of banking customers inNew York City found that a cheque-cashingcustomer with an annual income of $17 000would pay almost $250 a year for services

that would cost just $60 at a bank (Moskowitz,1995). The Federal Reserve Bank of KansasCity reported that a family with a $24 000annual income would spend $400 for servicesat a cheque-casher that would cost $110 at abank (Lunt, 1993, p. 52). Today, cheque-cashers process approximately $60 billion incheques annually. They charge 2 or 3 percent of the cheque’s value, generating feeincome of more than $1 billion every year(Sawyer and Temkin, 2004, p. 9).

Perhaps most problematic is the impact ofuneven development on children and howthe proverbial vicious cycle recreates itselfover time. In addition to the impact ofunequal educational opportunity notedabove, the neighbourhood effects literaturehas demonstrated links between neigh-bourhood characteristics (like poverty andinequality) and teenage pregnancy, highschool drop-out rates and delinquent beha-viour (Fischer, 2003, p. 690). Patterns ofprivilege emerge early in life, persist through-out the life-cycle and recreate themselvesin subsequent generations.

More provocative is the evidence that allparts of metropolitan areas are adverselyaffected by sprawl, concentrated poverty, seg-regation and uneven development generally.Central-city per capita income is correlatedwith suburban income. Consequently, ascities do well, so do their suburbs. Conversely,where city income declines, so does suburbanincome. And regional economies with rela-tively large city–suburban income disparitiesgrow more slowly than those communitieswith lower levels of inequality (Dreier et al.,2001, p. 36). Once again, race enters in.According to the National Research Council,high levels of racial segregation lead to a3–6 per cent decline in metropolitan-levelproductivity while increasing costs of policinga disadvantaged group that believes it hasbeen unfairly denied opportunities (Bollens,2002, p. 634).

Place and race do matter. In many cities,racial differences in poverty levels, employ-ment opportunities, wages, education, housingand health care, among other things, are sostrong that the worst urban contexts in which


Whites reside are considerably better thanthe average context of Black communities(Sampson, 1987, p. 354). Sampson andWilson (1995, p. 42) assert that in not onecity over 100 000 in the US do Blacks livein ecological equality with Whites when itcomes to the basic features of economic andfamily organisation. A depressing feature ofthese developments is that many of thesedifferences reflect policy decisions which, ifnot designed expressly to create disparate out-comes, have contributed to them nevertheless.The upside is that, if policy contributed tothese problems, it is likely that it can help toameliorate them as well.

Policy Matters

Inequality has long been explained by eco-nomists to be largely a function of varyinglevels of human capital that individualsbring to various markets, but particularly thelabour market. Human capital consists prima-rily of a combination of skills, experience andeducation (Becker, 1964). More recently therole of culture, attitude (for example, workethic) and other attributes individuals bringto the market(s) have been noted as contribut-ing to the varying rewards people receive(McWhorter, 2000; Mead, 1992; Murray,1984). But the basic model prevails wherebyindividual buyers (such as employers) andsellers (employees) enter into voluntaryexchanges in the labour market with eachtrying to maximise their ‘utility’. Inequalityof place also has been explained in terms ofindividualistic characteristics and voluntarymarket exchanges. It has long been arguedthat individuals or households make voluntarychoices, based on their financial capacity, inselecting their communities when they ‘votewith their feet’ by moving to those areas offer-ing the bundle of services for which they arewilling or able to pay (Tiebout, 1956). Butindividualistic models of labour marketinequality have been challenged by insti-tutional theorists in economics who identifya number of structural characteristics ofthose markets that impede consummationof individual, voluntary exchanges (for

example, race and gender discrimination,internal and dual labour markets, labour lawincluding minimum wage statutes, unionactivity) (Holzer and Danziger, 2001). Manyurban scholars have noted the role of publicpolicies and institutionalised private practices(such as tax policy, transport patterns, land useplanning) that serve as barriers to individualchoice in housing markets and contributorsto spatial inequality in metropolitan areas(Dreier et al., 2001; Feagin, 1998; Orfield,1997, 2002; Rusk, 1999).

Individuals do make choices, of course.Many households select their neighbourhoodsand many do so on the basis of the services,jobs, cultural facilities and other amenitiesthat are available within the constraints oftheir budgets. Critical for many householdsis a dense network of families, friends andother social ties that bind them to particularlocations. Even the most distressed neigh-bourhoods, including some notorious publichousing complexes, often have a culture,social organisation and other attributes thatresidents want to retain (Fullilove, 2004;Rae, 2003; Suttles, 1968; Venkatesh, 2000).Particularly in diverse urban communities,what appears to outsiders as the minutiae ofeveryday life takes on important symbolicsignificance to local residents. In what shereferred to as the ‘sidewalk ballet’, JaneJacobs described how seemingly minor dailyrituals of life—neighbours unlocking theirbusinesses to start a new day, young childrenmarching off to school—deliver the impor-tant message to local residents that ‘all iswell’ (Jacobs, 1961, pp. 50, 51). Community,defined in many different ways, attractsand retains residents of all types ofneighbourhoods.

But, again, these choices are made in acontext shaped by a range of public policydecisions and private practices over whichmost individuals have little control. Thosedecisions often have, by design, exclusionaryimplications that limit opportunities formany, particularly low-income householdsand people of colour. It is precisely becauseof the history and on-going reality of econ-omic and racial exclusion that many find


their family, friendship and other social ties indistressed neighbourhoods. And it is the con-flict and hassles that racial minorities faceoutside their communities that lead some tochoose a segregated neighbourhood for theirhome, even when they could afford to liveelsewhere. As an accountant who lived in aBlack suburb of Atlanta stated in referenceto her neighbourhood

There are not any White people around herestaring us in the face and trying to prove wedon’t matter. So much goes on at the jobthat we have to endure, the slights and thenegative comments, and feelings thatwe’re unwanted. When I have to workaround them all day, by the time I comehome I don’t want to have to deal withWhite people anymore (Fullwood, 1996,pp. 204–205).

Choice matters. Individual tastes and talentscount. But all too often such decision-making is framed and limited by a range ofstructural constraints. Individuals exercisechoice, but those choices often do not reflectwhat is normally understood by the term‘voluntary’.

If suburbanisation and sprawl reflect thehousing choices of residents, these arechoices that have been influenced by a rangeof explicit public policies and private prac-tices. Suburbia has been sold as much as ithas been bought (Judd, 1984). Creation ofthe long-term 30-year mortgage featuringlow downpayment requirements, availabilityof federal insurance to protect mortgagelenders, federal financing to support a secon-dary market in mortgage loans (Fannie Maeand Freddie Mac) which dramaticallyincreases availability of mortgage money, taxdeductibility of interest and property tax pay-ments, and proliferation of federally fundedhighways created sprawling suburban com-munities that would not have been possiblewithout such public largesse (Jackson, 1985).

The federal government’s underwritingrules for FHA and other federal mortgageinsurance products and enforcement ofracially restrictive covenants by the courtsalong with overt redlining practices by

mortgage lenders and racial steering by realestate agents virtually guaranteed the patternsof racial segregation that were common-place by the 1950s. Concentration of publichousing in central-city high-rise complexes(many of which are now being torn down)reinforced the patterns of economic andracial segregation that persist today. Exclu-sionary zoning ordinances of most suburbanmunicipalities that created minimum lot sizeand maximum density requirements forhousing developments (often prohibitingconstruction of multifamily housing) comple-mented federal policy (Hays, 1995; Hirsch,1998; Ihlanfeldt, 2004; Jackson, 1985, 2000;Massey and Denton, 1993; Rusk, 1999;Yinger, 1995).

Government policy has also encouraged theflight of businesses and jobs from cities to sur-rounding suburban communities and beyond.Financial incentives including infrastructureinvestments, tax abatements and depreciationallowances favouring new equipment overreinvestment in existing facilities all havecontributed to the deindustrialisation and dis-investment of urban communities. The pursuitof lower wage and tax bills, and fewer govern-ment regulations, have also encouraged theflight of business from cities and regionsviewed as high-cost areas to other regions ofthe country, and other nations altogether,that present capital with lower costs (Blue-stone and Harrison, 1982, 2000). In order to‘meet the competition’, localities oftenbelieve it is necessary to provide incentivesto businesses that they cannot afford andwhich undercut their ability to provide tra-ditional public services for less privilegedcommunities more dependent on those ser-vices (Barnekov and Rich, 1989; Reed,1988). Research has generally failed todemonstrate that these incentives encouragenew investment or employment or targetdevelopment to economically distressed com-munities (Peters and Fisher, 2004). Often,incentives are offered but little effort ismade to ensure that the terms and conditionsrecipients are supposed to meet (such asjob creation goals) are in fact met. Andfrequently such expenditures are offered for


development that would have occurred withoutthe benefit (Barnekov and Rich, 1989; Ellenand Schwartz, 2000; LeRoy, 1997). As oneobserver noted, “Subsidising economic devel-opment in the suburbs is like paying teenagersto think about sex” (Wray, 1999). The endresult is often an unintended subsidy ofprivate economic activity by jurisdictionsthat compete in a ‘race to the bottom’ inefforts to attract footloose firms and mobilecapital, starving traditional public services—like education—for resources in the process.A downward spiral is established that furtherundercuts the quality of life, includingthe business climate, and deindustrialisationbecomes both a cause and consequence ofuneven development.

Place, Privilege and Policy

Bad neighborhoods defeat good programs(Rusk, 1993, p. 121).

Who gets what, and why? That is howGerhard Lenski defined the study of socialinequality almost 40 years ago in his classicbook Power and Privilege (Lenski, 1966,p. 1). If the distribution of privilege today isless determined by ascriptive characteristicsand more determined by achieved characteri-stics than was the case during most of thecenturies examined by Lenski, meritocracyis hardly around the corner. This state ofaffairs has not occurred simply or evenlargely due to differences among individualsin terms of their skills, abilities and other attri-butes. Key determinants of who gets what andwhy today are social realities associated withplace and race. These realities reflect policydecisions that have been made at all levelsin both public and private institutions. Butsociety is not an iron cage. Social realitiesthat have been nurtured by policy can bealtered by policy as well.

Knowing what to do constitutes part of thechallenge. Equally if not more critical ishaving a political strategy that will, in fact,encourage those who need to act to act inappropriate ways, if the distribution of privi-lege is to change. Basically, this comes

down to understanding self-interests andhow they can be moulded to alter realitiesthat in many ways currently benefit powerfuland privileged interests. Sometimes suchinterests can be mobilised by organiserswho can get seemingly disparate groupsto recognise their common ground. On otheroccasions, litigation, legislation and otheractions are necessary to force people to dothings they would not otherwise voluntarilydo. Below we offer general observations forsevering the links between place, race andprivilege. We attempt to identify ideas thatmight actually work and feasible strategiesfor implementing them. Some have alreadybeen implemented and yielded at least someof the intended outcomes. Others are ideasthat offer future promise. Clearly, there is nosingle magic bullet. Therefore, a multipolicyapproach is essential. Cities and states canprovide ‘laboratories for democracy’. Butthe federal government, non-profit organis-ations and the private sector all have impor-tant roles to play.

Universalistic vs Race-specific Remedies:A False Dichotomy

One of the more unfortunate debates inrecent years has been over the question ofwhether ‘race-specific’ or ‘universalistic’remedies are more appropriate for addressingthe issues of race and urban poverty. (Aneven more unfortunate debate, of course, iswith those who simply think we have doneenough, or perhaps too much, and thatneither race nor class remedies are needed.)But the world does not come to us neatlywrapped in race or class packages. Sometimesthe issue confronting a mayor, communitygroup or federal agency is an explicit, neigh-bourhood-level poverty issue, sometimesit is one of overt racism. All too often, ofcourse, it does indeed involve a combinationof race, class and other fundamental divisions(such as gender, ethnicity). The nature of theissue often dictates the appropriate response.

The primary attraction of the universalisticor class-based approaches, according to itsproponents, is pragmatism. Recognising the


many common interests of poor and work-ing households of any colour, it is arguedthat the most significant barriers confrontingthese groups can be addressed with policyinitiatives and other actions that do notignite the hostility often associated withrace-based discussions and proposals. Race-neutral policies that assist all of those whoare working hard but not quite making itreinforce traditional values of individualinitiative and the work ethic, thereby provid-ing benefits to people who have earned themrather than to the so-called undeservingpoor. Given the socioeconomic characteristicsof racial minorities in general, it is furtherargued that such approaches will disproportio-nately benefit these communities, nurturingintegration and greater opportunity in a farless rancorous environment than is createdwith debates over race-specific approaches.Given the ‘race fatigue’ among many Whites(and underlying prejudices that persist),class-based approaches are viewed as a muchmore feasible way to address the problemsof urban poverty that affect many groupsbut particularly racial minorities (Edsall andEdsall, 1991; Kahlenberg, 1996; Skocpol,2000; Teixeira and Rogers, 2000; Warren,2001; Wilson, 1999).

In response, it is argued that while thequality of life for racial minorities hasimproved over the years, such approachessimply do not recognise the extent to whichrace and racism continue to shape the opportu-nity structure in the US. ‘Colour blindness’ isoften a euphemism for what amounts to aretreat on race and the preservation of Whiteprivilege in its many forms. In a world ofscarce resources, class-based remedies diluteavailable support for combating racial dis-crimination and segregation. From this pers-pective, it is precisely the controversy overrace that the class-based proponents fearwhich demonstrates the persistence of racismand the need for explicitly anti-racist remediesincluding far more aggressive enforcement offair housing, equal employment and othercivil rights laws. Race-based remedies alonemay not resolve all the problems associatedwith race and urban poverty given the many

non-racial factors that contribute to racial dis-parity as indicated above. But, according tothis perspective, they must remain front andcentre as part of the nation’s opportunityagenda (Bonilla-Silva, 2003; Edley, 1996;Feagin, 2000; Fiss, 2003; Steinberg, 1995).

But this debate presents a false dichotomy.Policy decisions affecting the opportunitystructure and quality of life of American com-munities are made everyday, some of whichare explicitly associated with economic orclass disparities and others tied to traditionalcivil rights or race-specific matters. Decisionsin each of these areas influence, and are influ-enced by, inequalities of place and race. Thatis, ‘universalistic’ problems and solutionshave racial implications and matters that areaddressed through a racial lens have impli-cations for entire regions. The ensuing dis-tribution of privilege, in turn, affects howsubsequent problems are defined anddecisions are made. Policy responses, someclass-based (such as increasing the minimumwage and earned income tax credit, imple-menting ‘living wage’ requirements) andsome race-based (more comprehensive affir-mative action and related diversity require-ments), are essential if the underlyingpatterns of privilege are to be altered.

Coalitions that cut across interest-groups,including racial groups, are essential. Manyland use planning, housing and housingfinance policy proposals, for example, aregenerally articulated in colour blind terms.Fair-share housing requirements, tax-basedrevenue sharing and inclusionary zoning (dis-cussed below) are ‘universalistic’ in character,although they often have clear racial impli-cations. That is, these proposals are designedto benefit poor and working families ingeneral, although racial minorities are likelyto benefit disproportionately. Clearly, suchproposals are important parts of an effort toameliorate spatial and racial inequalities.

But sometimes the issues are racial andresponding in racial terms cannot be avoi-ded. If African Americans and Hispanics facediscrimination in one out of every four or fivevisits to a housing provider, it is difficult toavoid recognising the need for stronger


enforcement of the Federal Fair Housing Actand other state and local rules prohibitingracial discrimination in housing markets.And such enforcement works. Since 1990,private, non-profit, fair-housing organisationshave generated more than $190 million forplaintiffs from lawsuits utilising leverageprovided by the federal Fair Housing Act(National Fair Housing Alliance, 2003b).

While racial minorities constitute ‘pro-tected groups’ targeted by fair housing law,it is also the case that communities generallybenefit by ameliorating racial inequality andthe ensuing conflict. If Atlanta does not liveup entirely to its slogan as ‘a city too busyto hate’, the local economy has certainly bene-fited by the city’s ability to alter its image inthe area of race relations in recent decades(Jacoby, 1998; Rutheiser, 1996).

Universalistic and race-based policies areamong the essential remedies for challengesposed by inequalities of place and race andeach has implications for the potentialsuccess of the other. It is important to over-come the polarisation that frames much ofthis debate. As Christopher Edley Jr argued,each should have a place in “the opportunityagenda” (Edley, 1996, p. 46). The nature ofa particular issue or campaign should dictatethe emphasis that will be placed on any par-ticular set of policies. Saul Alinksy famouslyargued that there are no permanent friendsand no permanent enemies. A similar senti-ment would appear to apply to the choice ofweapons.

‘Pro-place’ vs ‘Pro-people’: A Second FalseDichotomy

Another unfortunate debate is that betweenproponents of so-called pro-place policiesand those who advocate pro-people policies.Once again, there is a need for both. And itis also the case that the distinction betweenpolicies that focus on improving neighbour-hoods and those emphasising individualdevelopment is not as great as is oftensuggested.

Place-oriented policies (such as communityreinvestment and related efforts to combat

redlining and predatory lending practices) infact benefit both distressed neighbourhoodsand many of the less privileged householdsin those neighbourhoods (Joint Center forHousing Studies, 2002b; Squires, 2003).Enforcement of the Community ReinvestmentAct, a federal law passed in 1977 prohibitingredlining, has generated more than $1.7 tril-lion for underserved urban communities withlow- and moderate-income and minoritymarkets receiving a disproportionately highshare of those funds (Joint Center forHousing Studies, 2002b; New York Times,2004). Policies designed to create greateropportunities for individuals and theirfamilies (such as Moving to Opportunity andother mobility programmes) benefit entirecommunities by reducing the concentrationof poverty and segregation, along with asso-ciated costs including the various socialservice demands that these problems generate(Goering and Feins, 2003; Goering et al.,2002; Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum, 2000).

One example of a policy that appears to beeffectively responding to what is explicitlyboth a ‘pro-place’ and ‘pro-people’ agendais HUD’s $5 billion Hope VI programmethat began in 1992. The objectives of HopeVI included: improving the living environ-ment of residents of severely distressedpublic housing through demolition, repairand replacement of those projects; improvingneighbourhoods around public housing sites;decreasing the concentration of poverty;and, building sustainable communities.Preliminary research indicates that Hope VIhas successfully demolished many of thenation’s most problematic public housingcomplexes and replaced some of them withhigher-quality housing often in mixed-income communities. Many former residentsof the rased projects have been rehousedin their former neighbourhoods or providedwith housing vouchers that enabled them tofind better, safer housing in other com-munities. One limitation is that many ofthem have not yet been successfully relocatedand HUD has initiated steps in efforts torespond to on-going needs (Popkin et al.,2004).


It is difficult to disentangle the impact ofthese two types of policies. But, as with uni-versalistic and race-specific initiatives, thenature of the problems confronting particularneighbourhoods and metropolitan areas ingeneral should dictate the policies of choice.Again, as Edley argued, there is a clear needfor both approaches in the “opportunityagenda” (Edley, 1996, p. 46).

Regional Responses to Inequities of Placeand Race

A linchpin of spatial and racial inequality isthe flight of people, jobs and other resourcesto the outlying parts of metropolitan areas, aprocess subsidised in part by taxpayersthroughout the region who are paying for theroads, schools and other infrastructurerequired by the new development. Any effec-tive response must find a way to capture thewealth that is accumulating at the edge forreinvestment throughout the region. Suchregional responses include regional tax-based revenue sharing (where a portion ofthe increasing tax revenues from growingcommercial and residential property in theoutlying suburbs is utilised for developmentthroughout the region), fair-share housingprogrammes or inclusionary zoning (requiringjurisdictions throughout metropolitan areas toprovide a reasonable number of affordablehousing units for working and poor house-holds) and land use planning initiatives (likeurban growth boundaries that encouragedevelopment in or near the central city anddiscourage further sprawl) to stimulatebalanced development throughout the region(Abbott, 2002; Nelson et al., 2004; Orfield,2002).

Regional and metropolitan approaches togovernment have long been debated but,with some notable exceptions (such as Min-neapolis–St. Paul, Indianapolis, Louisville),few communities have taken serious steps inthis direction. There are reasons to believethat more may do so in the future. First,the number of voters and jurisdictions whostand to benefit is growing. Many inner-ring suburbs now recognise that they are

experiencing problems previously associatedwith central cities. Myron Orfield hasestimated that nationwide approximately 7per cent of metropolitan area residents livein what he refers to as the “affluent jobcenters” (Orfield, 2002, p. 171). Even if that7 per cent represents a disproportionatelypowerful coalition, these numbers shouldwork in favour of more progressive publicpolicy.

Growing income inequality among house-holds and communities, and the increasingnumber of gated communities that concretelysymbolises that polarisation, increasinglyhave become a subject of public policydebate (Blakely and Snyder, 1997; Low,2003). What former Labour Secretary RobertReich described as the “secession of thesuccessful” has drained the fiscal capacity ofmany distressed communities as well-offfamilies leave cities and move into suchcommunities where they utilise private secur-ity forces (thereby relying little on publicpolice officers), private recreational facilities(such as country clubs instead of publicparks) and send their children to privateschools (Reich, 1991). In many ways—financially, psychologically and otherwise—these families withdraw from their surround-ing communities and particularly the fiscallydeprived central cities of which they wereformerly a part. Responding to this demo-graphic and political reality has been agrowing concern for public officials at alllevels.

Even many of those who presumably arethe beneficiaries of sprawl have recognisedsome of the costs they have begun to pay aswell as the benefits of more balanced regionaldevelopment to mitigate those costs. Thecongestion and environmental degradationassociated with sprawling patterns of develop-ment undercut the quality of life that manyresidents are pursuing. And as indicatedabove, economic growth of the periphery isnot disconnected from what is happening inthe central city. Concentrated poverty, thecosts of segregation and uneven developmentgenerally undercut prosperity throughout theregion.


Uncommon Allies

Many constituencies that traditionally findthemselves at odds with each other can findcommon ground on a range of policiesdesigned to combat sprawl, concentratedpoverty and segregation. Identifying and nur-turing such political coalitions is perhaps thekey political challenge.

For example, many suburban employers(some of whom may have left their respectivecities as part of the sprawling pattern of localdevelopment) are unable to find the workersthey need in part because of the high cost ofhousing in their local communities. Oftenthere are local developers who would like tobuild affordable housing and lenders who arewilling to finance it, but local zoning prohibitssuch construction. These interests could joinwith anti-poverty groups, affordable housingadvocates, civil rights organisations andothers who are generally on the other side ofthe development table to challenge effectivelythe traditional exclusionary suburban zoningordinances. Such groups came together inWisconsin and secured passage of a stateland use planning law that provided financialincentives to local municipalities who devel-oped plans for increasing the supply of afford-able housing units in their jurisdictions (Officeof Land Information Services, 2001; Squireset al., 1999).

Welfare reform advocates and affordablehousing groups are often on opposingsides of political controversies yet there arecommon interests on which they couldunite. One objective of welfare reform is toenable people who have been dependent ongovernment services to become economicallyindependent. For many, access to saferneighbourhoods where jobs are more readilyavailable can be a critical step to achievingself-sufficiency. In fact, some states havebegun to co-ordinate federal and statehousing and welfare services simultaneouslyto facilitate the entry of former welfare recipi-ents into the workforce and to help them findbetter housing (Sard and Daskal, 1998).

Similarly, school choice and fair housinggroups—two groups that rarely ally—might

recognise that severing the link between theneighbourhood in which a family lives andthe school which children must attendmay well reduce homebuyers’ concernswith neighbourhood racial composition. Thiswould reduce one barrier to both housingand school segregation while giving studentsmore schooling options (Katz, 2003).

This list is hardly meant to be exhaustive.The point is simply that there are some creativepolitical alliances that have begun to be made,and others waiting to be made, that can exercisea positive impact on some longstanding andseemingly intractable problems. Sprawl, con-centrated poverty and segregation have manyidentifiable causes. The confluence of place,race and privilege becomes less mysteriousover time. At least some approaches to reduceuneven development and its many costs areavailable. Land use planning tools like tax-based revenue sharing and the delineation ofurban growth boundaries can be utilised moreextensively to reduce sprawl and some of theassociated costs. Community reinvestmentinitiatives, housing mobility programmes andinclusionary zoning ordinances can be ex-panded to diminish further the concentration ofpoverty. Fair housing law enforcement canbe strengthened to reduce racial segregation.With emerging, and yet to be discovered,political alliances and strategies, what haslong been viewed as the seemingly inevitableuneven and inequitable development ofmetropolitan areas can be ameliorated.

Severing the Connections

When 10-year old Lafayette Rivers, one oftwo brothers living in a West Side Chicagopublic housing complex chronicled in AlexKotlowitz’ award-winning book There AreNo Children Here, described his hopes hebegan, “If I grow up, I’d like to be a busdriver” (Kotlowitz, 1991, p. x). Childrengrowing up in more privileged neighbour-hoods often ponder what they will do whenthey grow up, but not if they will grow up.The fact that place and race exert such aprofound impact on one’s future, or whether


there even will be a future, violates acceptednotions of equal opportunity and fair play.The legitimacy of virtually all institutions ischallenged when privilege is so unevenly dis-tributed and for reasons beyond the control ofso many individuals.

The costs are not borne by the LafayetteRivers of the world alone. The security andwell-being of every community are threatenedwhen oppositional cultures at such greatvariance with mainstream norms become aspervasive as they have in many cities today(Anderson, 1999; Massey and Denton, 1993;Wilson, 1996). To paraphrase David Rusk’sobservation noted above, such neighbour-hoods defeat good programmes and goodintentions of all kinds, all the time.

By virtually any measure, access to thegood life varies dramatically across commu-nities in metropolitan areas today. One con-stant is the close association betweenneighbourhood and race. But such disparitiesundermine the quality of life for residentsof all areas. This threat is compounded whenthese patterns are the outcome of non-meritocratic factors, like the neighbourhoodwhere people live or the colour of their skin.One of the researchers who participatedin Russell Sage’s recent multicity study ofurban inequality concluded that

Race is woven into the fabric of residentialand industrial location choices, of hiringand wage determination, and of the humanperceptions that underlie all these processes(O’Connor, 2001, p. 28).

This is one tapestry that needs to be unra-velled. If policy is largely responsible forgetting us where we are today, policy canhelp us to pursue a different path tomorrow.It is time to sever the links among place,race and privilege.

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