Privata och offentliga normer i parkeringsreglering
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Transcript of Privata och offentliga normer i parkeringsreglering
Public and private orderings in
parking Björn Hasselgren, PhD Arkitektur och samhällsbyggnad VTI Transportforum, 8 januari 2015
Research questions
How can the use of local (off) streets, such as parking
regulation, in cities be effectively managed and organized?
Is it true that public sector governance is the most efficient?
What happens when different governance models collide?
What alternative models might be viable and in which
situations? Spontaneous ordering? Local governance?
Some parking related research
Parking regulation as part of urban planning – standards,
good practices, economic benefits etc (Marsden)
Parking regulation as related to road use and congestion
management (Button)
The balance between regulation and markets (Shoup,
Barter)
Explorations of private ordering-models in parking
(Pennington, Roth, Klein, Levinson)
Public or private goods (common pools)?
Roads and streets
on different geographical levels
Public goods
non-rivalrous, non-excludable, externalities
Private monopoly or association
Public monopoly
Private goods
(rivalrous, excludable)
Market
Public sector provision
Market failure?
Government failure?
Government failure?
Market failure?
Spontaneous order
Centralized planner
Market failure Government
failure
Management models (Hayek, Ostrom)
Coordinated
Un-coordinated
Centralized
knowledge
Individual
knowledge
- Parking
regulated by
public
regulation but
adjusted
through
customs
- New regulation
implemented,
”one size fits
all”
- Customs and
local
spontaneous
order broken
Institutional levels, governance and change (Williamson, similar in Ostrom)
INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS – Language, Culture 100 - 1000 y
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT – Created rules and regulations, politics
10 - 100 y
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND ORGANIZATION 1-10 y
RESOURCE ALLOCATION – Prices and incentives Continuous
Private and public squares
(Wagner, 1997/2007)
- Private ownership - Collective ownership
- Voluntary - Coercive
- User financing - Tax financing
- Agreement - Regulation
Private
square
Public square
Commercial and Guardian syndromes – and
”monstrous hybrids”
Jane Jacobs
”Systems of Survival”
Commerce Syndrome Guardian Syndrome
• Shun force • Compete • Be efficient • Be open to
inventiveness and novelty
• Use initiative and enterprise
• Come to voluntary agreements
• Respect contracts • Dissent for the sake of
the task • Be industrious • Be thrifty • Invest for productive
purposes • Collaborate easily with
strangers and aliens • Promote comfort and
convenience • Be optimistic • Be honest
• Shun trading • Exert prowess • Be obedient and
disciplined • Adhere to tradition • Respect hierarchy • Be loyal • Take vengeance • Deceive for the sake of
the task • Make rich use of
leisure • Be ostentatious • Dispense largesse • Be exclusive • Show fortitude • Be fatalistic • Treasure honor
Tensions between carriers of guardian and commerce syndromes shape “monstrous moral hybrids”
Public and private (Levinson, Roth, Foldvary)
Private, Local Private, Corporate
Private
Public
Local National
Private
roads
Streets,
Commons
Motor-
ways
Monstrous hybrids and market failure (or a
possible Coasean bargaining area)? (Jacobs,
Coase)
Efficient
Inefficient
Local National
Public
management
Private
management
?
Incentives aligned?
- From
regulation to
local
management
- Private or
association?
- Possible
revenues
transferred
to local
residents
(Shoup)
Conclusions
How can the use of local streets, such as parking regulation, in
cities be effectively organized? A variety of models according to
the situation are possible.
Is it true that public sector governance is the most efficient? No that
is probably true only for “true” public goods, which might be
scarcer than generally thought of.
What happens when the different governance models collide?
Monstrous hybrids created. Clash of local use and formal
regulation occurs.
What alternative models might be viable and in which situations?
Spontaneous ordering? Local governance? Private ordering,
associations, public sector, corporations.
Björn Hasselgren, PhD
KTH Royal Institute of Technology
Architecture and the Built Environment
+46-70-762 33 16
www.kth.se/blogs/hasselgren
@HasselgrenB