Prism Neg – MNDI BT 2015

Topicality - Curtail

Curtail = Decrease

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“Curtail” means to prohibitFriman and Andreas ‘99 (H. Richard Friman - associate professor of political science at Marquette University. Peter Andreas - academy scholar at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. The Illicit Global Economy and State Power. Google Books p. 76)

The efforts of governments to curtail illicit financial flows today bear more similarity to the

initiatives of the 1920s that those at Bretton Woods. To begin with, international efforts to prohibit capital flight have been almost nonexistent.

Violation –702 doesn’t prohibit domestic surveillance – allows loopholes

“TFA” language in 702 allows NSA to bypass restrictions against domestic surveillanceDonohue ‘15 --From the Georgetown university of law.(Laura K., “Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content,” Georgetown Law. n/a date. http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2364&context=facpub)//TS

The component statutory interpretations, particularly TFA and the assumptions that mark the foreignness determination, undermine the protections created for U.S. persons in

Sections 703 and 704 of the statute. They make it possible for the NSA to obtain significant amounts of American citizens’ communications. Until the FAA, the surveillance of U.S. persons outside

domestic bounds took place under the weaker standards of Executive Order 12,333. Part of the purpose of the FAA was thus to increase the protections afforded to U.S. persons travelling abroad.

214 The way in which Section 702 is being used, however, allows the NSA to bypass Section 703 by making assumptions about legal status and location and potentially subjecting U.S. persons to surveillance without meeting the requirements of Section 703. The amount of information at stake is not insubstantial. For years, the volume of intercepts under Section 702 has been one of the principal concerns of legislators familiar with the program. Senators have consistently

expressed unease about the intelligence community’s claim that it is impossible to quantify how many Americans’ communications have been implicated in the operation of Section 702.215

What has gradually become clear is that the program significantly more expansive than initially understood.21

Vote neg – destroys limits - aff justifies bi-directional plan texts, which undermines core neg ground like terrorism and politics DA and CP’s that compete on not decreasing domestic surveillance

Proves no solvency – TFA language creates letter of the law loophole

Topicality - Domestic

Domestic Surveillance = Data TFA US persons for Coercive Purposes

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Domestic surveillance means that it must target US persons – not just be collected within the USMcCarthy, 6 – former assistant U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York. (Andrew, “It’s Not “Domestic Spying”; It’s Foreign Intelligence Collection” National Review, 5/15, Read more at: http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/122556/its-not-domestic-spying-its-foreign-intelligence-collection-andrew-c-mccarthy

Eggen also continues the mainstream media’s propagandistic use of the term “domestic surveillance [or 'spying'] program.” In actuality, the electronic surveillance that the NSA is doing — i.e., eavesdropping on content of conversations — is not

“domestic.” A call is not considered “domestic” just because one party to it happens to be inside the U.S., just as an investigation is not “domestic” just because some of the subjects of interest happen to reside inside our country. Mohammed

Atta was an agent of a foreign power, al Qaeda. Surveilling him — had we done it —

would not have been “domestic spying.” The calls NSA eavesdrops on are “international,” not “domestic.” If that were not plain enough on its face, the Supreme Court made it explicit in the Keith case (1972). There, even though it held that judicial warrants were required for wiretapping purely domestic terror organizations, the Court excluded investigations of threats posed by foreign organizations and their

agents operating both within and without the U.S. That is, the Court understood what most

Americans understand but what the media, civil libertarians and many members of Congress refuse to acknowledge: if we are investigating the activities of agents of foreign powers inside the United States,

that is not DOMESTIC surveillance. It is FOREIGN counter-intelligence.

That, in part, is why the statute regulating wiretaps on foreign powers operating within the U.S. — the one the media has suddenly decided it loves after bad-mouthing it for years as a rubber-stamp

— is called the FOREIGN Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The United States has never needed court permission to conduct wiretapping outside U.S. territory; the wiretapping it does inside U.S. territory for national security purposes is FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, not “domestic surveillance.”

Surveillance is monitoring with preventive intent Lemos, 10 - Associate Professor at Faculty of Communication at Federal University of Bahia, Brazil (Andre, ““Locative Media and Surveillance at the Boundaries of Informational Territories”, http://www.irma-international.org/viewtitle/48348/

Although they often appear to be synonymous, it is important to distinguish between informational control, monitoring and surveillance so that the problem can be better understood. We consider control to be the supervision of activities, or

actions normally associated with government and authority over people, actions and processes. Monitoring can be considered a form of observation to gather information with a view to making projections or

constructing scenarios and historical records, i.e., the action of following up and evaluating data. Surveillance,

however, can be defined as an act intended to avoid something , as an observation

whose purposes are preventive or as behavior that is attentive, cautious or careful. It is interesting to note

that in English and French the two words “vigilant” and “surveillance”, each of which is spelt the same way and has the same meaning in both languages, are applied to someone who is particularly watchful and to acts associated with legal action or

action by the police intended to provide protection against crime, respectively. We shall define surveillance as actions that imply control and monitoring in accordance with Gow, for whom surveillance

"implies something quite specific as the intentional observation of someone's actions or the intentional gathering of personal information in order to observe actions taken in the past or future" (Gow. 2005. p. 8).

According to this definition, surveillance actions presuppose monitoring and control, but not all forms of control and/or monitoring can be called surveillance. It could be

said that all forms of surveillance require two elements: intent with a view to

avoiding/causing something and identification of individuals or groups by name. It seems to me to be difficult to say that there is surveillance if there is no

identification of the person under observation (anonymous) and no preventive intent (avoiding something). To

my mind it is an exaggeration to say, for example, that the system run by my cell phone operator that controls and monitors my calls is keeping me under surveillance. Here there is identification but no intent. However, it can certainly be used for that purpose. The Federal Police can request wiretaps and disclosure of telephone records to monitor my telephone calls. The same can be said about the

control and monitoring of users by public transport operators. This is part of the administrative routine of the companies involved. Once again, however, the system can be used for surveillance activities (a suspect can be kept under surveillance by the companies' and/or police safety systems). Note the example further below of the recently implemented "Navigo "card in France. It seems to me that the social networks, collaborative maps, mobile devices, wireless networks and countless different databases that make up the information society do indeed control and monitor and offer a real possibility of surveillance.

Violation – PPD28 limits foreign information gathering, not surveillance for coercive purposes on domestic people.

Voting issue – for limits and ground. They explode the topic –

(1) All information gathering is topical under their interpretation and the negative loses security based disads and critiques

(2) Expanding ‘domestic’ to cover immigration and foreign counter-intelligence – which are both big enough to be separate topics

AND, Extra-Topicality is illegit – adding PPD 28 is necessary for their solvency, which means they have unique advantage from the non-topical part of the plan. Reject the entire aff as not topical - don’t allow severance.

PPD-28 Regulates Foreign Surveillance

T- PPD 28 regulates foreign intel Litt and Joel 14 (Robert Litt, he second General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and Alexander W. Joel, the first Civil Liberties Protection Officer for the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Interim Progress Report on Implementing PPD-28”, October 17, 2014, http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-and-publications/204-reports-publications-2014/1126-interim-progress-report-on-implementing-ppd-28) // AW

PPD-28 reinforces current practices, establishes new principles, and strengthens oversight, to ensure that in conducting signals intelligence activities, the United States takes into account not only the security needs of our nation and our allies, but also the privacy of people around the world. ¶ The Intelligence Community already conducts signals intelligence activities in a carefully controlled manner, pursuant to the law and subject to layers of oversight, focusing on important foreign intelligence and national security priorities . But as the President recognized, “[o]ur efforts will only be effective if ordinary citizens in other countries have confidence that the United States respects their privacy too.”¶ To that end, the Intelligence Community

has been working hard to implement PPD-28 within the framework of existing processes, resources, and capabilities, while ensuring that mission needs continue to be met.

A2: We meet - American Companies are US Persons

American companies irrelevant to 702 authority – communication content determines domestic persons, not holder of the data – this means NSA’s interpretation of the plan would still allow for domestic surveillance according to LETTER OF THE LAW

Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr6304pcs/html/BILLS-110hr6304pcs.htm)//LP

Requirement to adopt.--The Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall adopt targeting procedures that are reasonably designed to-- ``(A) ensure that any acquisition authorized under subsection (a) is limited to targeting persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States ; and ``(B) prevent the intentional acquisition of any communication as to which the sender and all

intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the United States.

Especially true because, per the American companies, individuals own data, not companies Verizon ‘14 (“Amicus Brief: U.S. Search Warrants Do Not Apply to Data Stored Overseas,” 12/15/14, http://publicpolicy.verizon.com/blog/entry/us-search-warrants-do-not-apply-to-data-stored-overseas )//LPToday, Verizon filed an amicus brief in support of Microsoft’s appeal to reverse a federal court’s decision that allowed the U.S. government to use a warrant to compel Microsoft to produce a customer’s email stored overseas. We were joined on our brief by Cisco, Hewlett-Packard, eBay, salesforce.com and Infor. The case does not involve Verizon or any Verizon customers’ data. Indeed, Verizon has not received any warrants from the U.S. government for customer data stored in our enterprise data centers outside the United States and we do not expect to receive such demands. Still, we have submitted this brief in order to turn back an unlawful overreach by the U.S. government. The law does not allow the U.S. government to use a search warrant to obtain customer data stored overseas. The U.S. Supreme Court has reiterated many times that U.S. statutes are presumed not to have extraterritorial application unless Congress “clearly expressed” its “affirmative intention” to the

contrary.Congress has not clearly expressed its intention in any U.S. statutes that domestic warrants should apply to data stored in other countries. And there is good reason

for that. For starters,the data at issue (the contents of private emails) belongs to a customer, not to the provider. Moreover, if U.S. law were to require a U.S. business to turn over customer data stored overseas it would conflict with the laws of many other countries that protect the privacy of such data and limit disclosure outside the country in which the data is stored. Furthermore, permitting the U.S. government to use a warrant to obtain data stored overseas would just encourage foreign governments to claim that they can obtain data stored in the U.S., which would threaten the privacy of Americans.

Domestic = In US Territory

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“domestic” in the context of surveillance means collection of data in US territoryThompson, ‘13 -- Legislative Attorney (Richard M. Thompson II is writing for the congressional research service, 4/3/13, http://www.pennyhill.com/jmsfileseller/docs/R42701.pdf) LP

In a series of cases that provide the closest analogy to UAVs, the Supreme Court addressed the use of manned aircraft to conduct domestic surveillance over residential and industrial areas. In each, the Court held that the fly-over at issue was not a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, as the areas surveilled were open to public view.

Domestic is only Domestic networksSavage and McConnell 15 (John E. Savage, An Wang Professor of Computer Science Box 1910, Computer Science Department Brown University Brown University, Bruce W. McConnell Bruce McConnell is responsible for leading EWI’s communications and networking with public and private sectors around the world, Senior Vice President, January 20,2015 http://www.ewi.info/idea/exploring-multi-stakeholder-internet-governance accessed June 28, 15)PA

It is domestic when the data transits only domestic networks. It can become an international issue when it crosses territorial boundaries, for example, when data is encrypted.

Violation – American companies store data internationally – this is the data that their internal links assume and it means that aff restricts foreign surveillance

Voting issue – for limits. They explode the topic –

Expanding ‘domestic’ to cover territory outside the US justifies surveillance of US bases, embassies, and international drones. Makes neg research burden impossible.

AND, Extra-Topicality is illegit – they may restrict some domestic servers, but they must also limit international servers to solve the aff. Reject the entire aff - don’t allow severance.

Data stored on non-US servers

Data is stored outside US territory by domestic companies Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai 6/12/14 http://mashable.com/2014/06/12/microsoft-u-s-government-data-foreign-servers/ “Microsoft Fights U.S. Government Over Rights to Data on Foreign Servers” Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai is a reporter at Mashable's New York headquarters, where he covers cybersecurity, tech policy, privacy and surveillance, hackers, drones, and, more in general, the intersection of technology and civil liberties. Before Mashable, Lorenzo was an intern at Wired.com, where he wrote for Danger Room, and Threat Level. A recent graduate of Columbia's Graduate School of Journalism Lorenzo is also a Law graduate at University of Barcelona. Microsoft is challenging a data request from the U.S. government in an unprecedented case that could have sweeping ramifications for online privacy around the world. In December 2013, the U.S. government obtained a search warrant requesting information about an email user for an investigation apparently involving drugs and money laundering. But Microsoft is refusing to cooperate because the data in question is stored in Ireland, and the company argues the U.S. can't force it to hand over data stored outside American soil. The case is a perfect example of how new technologies like cloud computing clash with pre-Internet laws. These are the answers to the most basic questions about the case. What is the government

requesting? The government is looking for data associated with an Outlook.com email account, including the content of all emails and the identifying information of the account, according to the search warrant sent to Microsoft. The actual email address is redacted in court documents, and the details of the case are still unclear. What did Microsoft say to the request? Microsoft responded providing some information related to the account, but declined to turn

over the content of the user's emails because that data is stored in a Microsoft server in Ireland. The company then asked the judge to throw out the request, arguing that the U.S. government doesn't have the authority to request

data overseas with a search warrant. But a judge in New York ruled in April that Microsoft was compelled to turn over the data regardless of where it's stored. Microsoft disagrees and is still challenging the data request. What are Microsoft's arguments? In a court filing made public on Monday, Microsoft argued that a search warrant doesn't apply overseas. Since it doesn't give authority to "break down the doors of Microsoft's Dublin facility," it shouldn't give the government authority to access data within that facility, Microsoft argued. Moreover, the company argued, the warrant is too broad and vague, as it requests all content in the user's account. "It is, in a sense, the broadest possible warrant that one literally can imagine in the 21st century," Brad Smith, Microsoft's general counsel, said at a conference in New York last week. Lastly, Microsoft says that the government should use another, legal way to access this kind of data: a so-called mutual legal assistance treaty, or MLAT. Thanks to this legal agreement with Ireland — as well as many other countries — U.S. authorities can access data in that country but, in turn, have to comply with local laws. Law enforcement authorities routinely use this kind of assistance to obtain evidence held in another country. Whart are the government's arguments? The U.S. government argues that companies can't refuse to comply legal requests "simply by storing the data abroad," as Preet Bharara, United States attorney for the Southern District of New York, said in a court filing. The danger, Bharara continued, is that criminals could skirt investigations by lying about their locations and thus forcing Microsoft to store data outside the U.S., and far from American law enforcement's reach. The judge in the case, James Francis, agreed

with the government, arguing that the search warrant issued in this case applies to data in Ireland because it's more of an hybrid between a warrant and a subpoena. What this means: the request would be legal since subpoenas have reach outside the U.S. But legal experts don't agree with this interpretation. The relevant law in the case, the oft-maligned 1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), clearly requires warrants when accessing content information, and subpoenas have

different requirements. "It's a bad interpretation of the statute," Christopher Sprigman, a law professor at New York University,told Mashable.

Non-US data is stored on US servers Dean Wilson January 23, 2014 http://www.techradar.com/us/news/internet/microsoft-to-store-foreign-data-on-non-us-servers-amid-nsa-controversy-1218010 Irish journalist and author

Microsoft will begin allowing non-US customers to store their personal data on servers located outside the US, following leaks of extensive government snooping by the National Security Agency (NSA). The move will give consumers and business customers the option to shift their information to local data centres, such as those based in Ireland, which will take them outside the NSA's jurisdiction. "People should have the ability to know whether their data are being subjected to the laws and access of governments in some other country and should have the ability to make an informed choice of where their data resides," Brad Smith, general counsel at Microsoft, told the Financial Times. Surveillance shake-up Revelations over the past year about the NSA's widespread internet and phone surveillance have strained relationships between the US and its allies. Some countries that were the victims of spying, such as Brazil, are now bringing in new laws to prevent citizen data from being stored outside their own country. Many rival companies are opposed to the idea of letting

customers choose where data is stored, which will likely be cost prohibitive, but Microsoft's decision will possibly cause some

to change their minds. The move was welcomed by privacy advocates.

Ex Post CP

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Text: The United States federal government should require ex post review by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of NSA surveillance targeting criteria, establish a public advocate at the FISC, and establish a cabinet-level privacy agency.

The CP restore domestic and international confidence in US surveillance without restricting the scope of NSA activities – instead it conducts post-surveillance minimizationMargulies, 14 - Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law (“CITIZENSHIP, IMMIGRATION, AND NATIONAL SECURITY AFTER 9/11: THE NSA IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: SURVEILLANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM” 82 Fordham L. Rev. 2137, April, lexis)

While I have concluded that U.S. surveillance policy does not violate the ICCPR, further reforms could highlight

this point and silence persistent doubts here and abroad. These reforms could also remove any barriers to cooperation between the United States and foreign states, such as those

in Europe, which are subject to the European Convention on Human Rights. This section identifies reforms that would add a public advocate to FISC proceedings, enhance FISC review of the criteria used for overseas surveillance, establish a U.S. privacy agency that would handle complaints from individuals here and overseas, and require greater minimization of non-U.S. person communications. These reforms would signal U.S. support of evolving global norms of digital privacy.Although President Obama's speech in January 2014 proposed a panel of independent lawyers who could participate in

important FISC cases, n161 further institutionalization of this role would be useful. A public advocate would scrutinize and, when necessary, challenge the NSA's targeting criteria on a regular basis. n162 Challenges would be brought in the FISC, after the NSA's implementation of criteria. The NSA would be able to adapt the criteria on an exigent basis, subject to ex post review by the FISC at the public advocate's behest. A public advocate and enhanced FISC review would serve three valuable functions: (1) ensure that the FISC received the best arguments on both sides; (2) serve as a valuable ex ante check on the government, encouraging the government to adopt those criteria that could withstand subsequent scrutiny; and (3) promote domestic and global confidence in the legitimacy of processes

governing NSA surveillance .A U.S. cabinet level privacy agency would also

bolster the legitimacy of surveillance . The agency could provide more regular recourse to subjects of

surveillance, as the ECHR requires. That change would ease the barriers to continued U.S.-Europe cooperation on counterterrorism. A national agency would also work hand in hand with privacy officers in executive departments. It would increase the leverage of those officials, who could advocate vigorously in internal debates, knowing that their views would also have a champion in a free-standing executive department independent [*2166] of the national security bureaucracy. There are downsides to this proposal, of course. A new agency would add expense, and create some redundancy in government functions. Moreover, current models that provide recourse, such as the approach currently taken by the Department of Homeland Security, n163 have been criticized as unduly burdensome. n164

However, preserving cooperation with Europe and enhancing the overall legitimacy of U.S. surveillance provides a compelling justification.

Each of these instrumentalities - a public advocate at the FISC and a new privacy agency - could also work to strengthen minimization requirements for foreign communications. The NSA says that it disposes of all irrelevant communications within five years. There may be ways to shorten this time and require even more rigorous controls on sharing of information that lacks a clear link to

terrorism or other foreign intelligence matters. More exacting minimization would also promote U.S.-European information sharing and enhance global legitimacy .

Net benefit is terrorism – the plan restricts the collection of 702 surveillance data to individualized and specific threat categories. That prevents the programmatic surveillance necessary for pattern analysis that can identify future terrorist threats Sales, 14 - Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law (Nathan, I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, “Domesticating Programmatic Surveillance: Some Thoughts on the NSA Controversy” 10 ISJLP 523, Summer, lexis)

Programmatic surveillance initiatives like these differ in simple yet fundamental ways from the traditional forms of monitoring with which many people are familiar--i.e., individualized or particularized surveillance. Individualized surveillance takes place when authorities have some reason to think that a specific, known person is breaking the law. Investigators will then obtain a court order authorizing them to collect information about the target, with the goal of assembling evidence that can be used to establish guilt in subsequent criminal proceedings. Individualized surveillance is common in the world of law enforcement, as under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. n23 It is also used in national security investigations. FISA allows authorities to obtain a court order to engage in wiretapping if they demonstrate, among other things, probable cause to believe that the target is "a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power." n24

By contrast, programmatic surveillance has very different objectives and is conducted in a very different

manner. It usually involves the government collecting bulk data and then examining it to identify previously unknown terrorists, spies, and other national security threats. A good example of the practice is link analysis, in [*528] which authorities compile large amounts of information, use it to map the social networks of known terrorists--has anyone else used the same credit card as Mohamed Atta?--and thus identify associates with whom they may be conspiring. n25 (It is also possible, at least in theory, to subject these large databases to pattern analysis, in which automated systems search for patterns of behavior that

are thought to be indicative of terrorist activity, but it's not clear that the NSA is doing so here.) Suspects who have been so identified can then be subjected to further forms of monitoring to determine their intentions and capabilities, such as wiretaps under FISA or other authorities. In a sense, programmatic surveillance is the mirror image of individualized surveillance. With individualized monitoring, authorities begin by identifying a suspect and go on to collect information; with programmatic monitoring, authorities begin by collecting information and go on to identify a suspect.

Programmatic surveillance is a potentially powerful counterterrorism tool . The Ra'ed al-Banna incident is a useful illustration of how the technique, when coupled

with old-fashioned police work, can identify possible threats who otherwise might escape detection. Another example comes from a 2002 Markle Foundation study, which found that authorities could have identified the ties among all 19 of the 9/11 hijackers if they had assembled a large database of airline reservation information and subjected it to link analysis. n26 In particular, two of the terrorists--Nawaf al-Hamzi and Khalid al-Mihdhar--were on a government watchlist after attending a January 2000 al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia. So they could have been flagged when they bought their tickets. Querying the database to see if any other passengers had used the pair's mailing addresses would have led investigators to three more hijackers, including Mohamed Atta, the plot's operational leader. Six others could have been found by searching for passengers who used the same frequent-flyer and telephone numbers as these suspects. And so on. Again, the Markle study concerns airline reservation data, not the communications data that are the NSA's focus. But it is still a useful illustration of the technique's potential.The government claims that programmatic surveillance has been responsible for concrete and actual counterterrorism

benefits, not just hypothetical ones. Officials report that PRISM has helped detect and [*529]

disrupt about 50 terrorist plots worldwide, including ten in the United States. n27

Those numbers include Najibullah Zazi, who attempted to bomb New York City's subway system in 2009, and Khalid Ouazzani, who plotted to blow up the New York Stock Exchange. n28 Authorities further report that PRISM played an

important role in tracking down David Headley, an American who aided the 2008 terrorist atrocities in Bombay, and later planned to attack the offices of a Danish newspaper that printed cartoons of Mohamed. n29 The government also claims at least one success from the telephony metadata program, though it has been coy about the specifics: "The NSA, using the business record FISA, tipped [the FBI] off that [an] individual had indirect contacts with a known terrorist overseas. . . . We were able to reopen this investigation, identify additional individuals through a legal process and were able to disrupt this

terrorist activity." n30 Quite apart from foiling attacks, the government also argues that the NSA programs can conserve scarce investigative resources by helping officials quickly spot or rule out any foreign involvement in a domestic plot, as after the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing. n31 These claims have to be taken with a few grains of salt. Some observers believe that the government could have discovered the plots using standard investigative techniques, and without resorting to extraordinary methods like programmatic surveillance. n32 The metadata program has elicited special skepticism: The President's Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies bluntly concluded that "the information contributed to terrorist investigations by the use of section 215 telephony meta-data was not essential to preventing attacks and could readily have been obtained [*530] in a timely manner using conventional section 215 orders." n33 The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board reached the same conclusion. n34 (Judicial opinion is split on the program's value. One judge has expressed "serious doubts" about its utility, n35 while another has concluded that its effectiveness "cannot be seriously disputed.") n36 Furthermore, we should always be cautious when evaluating the merits of classified intelligence initiatives on the basis of selective and

piecemeal revelations, as officials might tailor the information they release in a bid to shape public opinion. n37 But even if specific claimed successes remain contested, programmatic surveillance in general can still be a useful counterterrorism technique. As these examples imply,

effective programmatic surveillance often requires huge troves of information--e.g., large databases of airline reservations, compilations of metadata concerning telephonic and internet

communications, and so on. This is why it typically will not be feasible to limit bulk collection to particular, known individuals who are already suspected of being terrorists or spies. Some officials have defended the NSA programs by pointing out that, "[i]f you're looking for the needle in a haystack, you have to have the haystack." n38 That metaphor doesn't strike me as terribly helpful; rummaging around in a pile of hay is, after all, a paradigmatic image of futility. But, the idea can be expressed in a more compelling way.

Programmatic surveillance cannot be done in a particularized manner. The whole point of the technique is to identify unknown threats to the national security; by definition, it cannot be restricted to threats that have already been identified. We can't limit programmatic [*531] surveillance to the next Mohamed Atta when we have no idea who the next Mohamed Atta is--and when the goal of the exercise is indeed to identify the next Mohamed Atta.

Solvency – Legitmacy

Incorporating oversight in the surveillance process boosts U.S. cred and legitimacy and also gives a voice to U.S. citizens Sales, 14 - Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law (Nathan Alexander, “Domesticating Programmatic Surveillance: Some Thoughts on the NSA Controversy”, 8/12/14, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2014/08/12-Sales.pdf, pg. 16-17 , accessed: 6/23/15, JR)

In addition to oversight by outsiders, a programmatic surveillance regime also should feature a system of internal checks within the executive branch, to review collection before it occurs, after the fact, or both. As for the ex ante checks, internal watchdogs should be charged with scrutinizing proposed bulk collection to verify that it complies with the applicable constitutional and statutory rules, and also to ensure that appropriate protections are in place for privacy and civil liberties. The Justice Department’s Office of Intelligence is a well known example. The unit, which presents the government’s surveillance applications to the FISA court, subjects these requests to exacting scrutiny with the goal of increasing the likelihood of surviving judicial review.65 Indeed, the office has a strong incentive to ensure that the applications it presents are airtight, so

as to preserve its credibility with the FISA court.66 Ex post checks include such commonplace mechanisms as agency-level inspectors general, who can audit bulk collection programs, assess their legality, and make policy recommendations to improve their operation, as well as entities like the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, which perform similar functions across the executive branch as a whole. Another important ex post check is to offer meaningful whistleblower protections to officials who know about programs that violate constitutional or statutory requirements. Allowing officials to bring their concerns to ombudsmen within the executive branch (and then eventually to Congress) can help root out lawlessness and also relieve the felt necessity of leaking information about highly classified programs to the media.

Cabinet-level privacy agency key to gut unnecessary data collection Sales, 14 - Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law (Nathan Alexander, “Domesticating Programmatic Surveillance: Some Thoughts on the NSA Controversy”, 8/12/14, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2014/08/12-Sales.pdf, pg. 17, accessed: 6/23/15, JR)These and other internal checks can achieve all three of the benefits promised by traditional judicial and legislative oversight

— executive branch watchdogs can veto surveillance they conclude would be

unlawful, the mere possibility of such vetoes can chill overreach, and increasing the costs of monitoring can redirect scarce resources toward truly important surveillance. External and internal checks thus operate together as a system; the two types of restraints are rough

substitutes for one another. If outside players like Congress and the courts are subjecting the executive’s programmatic

surveillance activities to especially rigorous scrutiny, the need for comparably robust safeguards within the executive branch

tends to diminish. Conversely, if the executive’s discretion is constrained internally through strict approval processes, audit requirements, and so on, the legislature and judiciary may choose not to hold the executive to the exacting standards they otherwise would. In short, certain situations may have less need to use traditional interbranch separation of powers and checks and balances to protect privacy and civil liberties because the executive branch is subject to an “internal separation of powers”67 that can accomplish much the same thing.

The CP solves miscalculation- it allows for a broader scope of expert data analysisSales, 14 - Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law (Nathan Alexander, “Domesticating Programmatic Surveillance: Some Thoughts on the NSA Controversy”, 8/12/14, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2014/08/12-Sales.pdf, pg. 9 , accessed: 6/23/15, JR)

Programmatic surveillance thus can help remedy some of the difficulties that arise when monitoring covert adversaries like international terrorists. FISA and other particularized surveillance tools are useful when authorities want to monitor targets whose identities are already known. But they are less useful when authorities are trying to identify unknown targets. The problem arises because, in order to obtain a wiretap order from the FISA court, the government usually must demonstrate probable cause to believe that the target is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power.39 This is a fairly straightforward task when the target’s identity is already known—e.g., a diplomat at the Soviet embassy in Washington, DC. But the task is considerably more difficult when the government’s reason for surveillance is to detect targets

who are presently unknown—e.g., alQaeda members who operate in the shadows. How can you convince the FISA court that Smith is an agent of a foreign power when you know nothing about Smith—his name, nationality, date of birth, location, or even whether he is a single person or several dozen? The government typically won’t know those things unless it has collected some information about Smith—such as by surveilling him. And there’s the rub.

Programmatic monitoring helps avoid the crippling Catch-22 that can arise under particularized surveillance regimes like FISA: officials can’t surveil unless they show that the target is a spy or terrorist, but

sometimes they can’t show that an unknown target is a spy or terrorist unless they have surveilled him.

A public advocate solves the perception link and spurs global compliance—President Obama’s willingness to be transparent on surveillance is keyMargulies, 14 - Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law (Peter, “The NSA in Global Perspective: Surveillance, Human Rights, and International Counterterrorism” II. THE LEGAL MERITS OF NSA SURVEILLANCE ABROAD UNDER THE ICCPR, pgs. 16-17, 1/23/14, http://fordhamlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/Vol_82/Margulies_April.pdf, accessed: 6/23/15, JR)

Having determined that the ICCPR applies as a threshold matter, we next ask whether NSA surveillance abroad is “arbitrary” or “unlawful” under Article 17. I assume in what follows that most surveillance conducted on non-U.S. persons outside the United States is lawful under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and U.S. statutes. Therefore, this section focuses on whether NSA

surveillance is “arbitrary.” I conclude that NSA surveillance is not arbitrary under Article 17, because it targets terrorists, national security threats, and espionage in a tailored fashion. In reaching this conclusion, I rely on the principle of complementarity, which seeks to harmonize a body of

international law with other international law doctrine and with the prerogatives of states. To integrate all of the relevant international law doctrines, I read Article 17 in tandem with the law of armed conflict and U.N. Security Council resolutions on counterterrorism. To reconcile Article 17 with these norms and with sovereign prerogatives, I

advance a model of procedural pluralism that gives states flexibility in creating protections if they honor core principles such as notice, oversight, and minimization but does not mandate the same itemized menu of safeguards required in European Union (ECHR) jurisprudence. In fact, as I note, ECHR jurisprudence permits exceptions to procedural safeguards, including exceptions designed to preserve the effectiveness of national security surveillance, that are not radically different from U.S. practice. I note, however, that

certain reforms of NSA surveillance, such as a public advocate, would further strengthen compliance, affirming that NSA programs are consistent with the ICCPR. President Obama’s initiatives, including a clearer articulation of the bases for U.S. surveillance abroad, buttress this case.

CP allows for domestic and foreign legitimacy - reforms and minimization of surveillance in CP solveMargulies, 14 - Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law (“CITIZENSHIP, IMMIGRATION, AND NATIONAL SECURITY AFTER 9/11: THE NSA IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: SURVEILLANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM” 82 Fordham L. Rev. 2137, http://fordhamlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/Vol_82/Margulies_April.pdf)//MR

While I have concluded that U.S. surveillance policy does not violate the ICCPR, further reforms could highlight this point and silence persistent doubts here and abroad. These reforms could also remove any barriers to cooperation between the United States and foreign states, such as those in Europe, which are subject to the

European Convention on Human Rights. This section identifies reforms that would add a public advocate to FISC proceedings, enhance FISC review of the criteria used for overseas surveillance, establish a U.S. privacy agency that would handle complaints from individuals here and overseas, and require greater minimization of non-U.S. person communications. These reforms would signal U.S. support of evolving global norms of digital privacy. Although President Obama’s speech in January 2014 proposed a panel of independent lawyers who could participate in important FISC cases,161 further

institutionalization of this role would be useful. A public advocate would scrutinize and, when necessary, challenge the NSA’s targeting criteria on a regular basis.162

Challenges would be brought in the FISC, after the NSA’s implementation of criteria.

The NSA would be able to adapt the criteria on an exigent basis, subject to ex post review by the FISC at the public advocate’s behest. A public advocate and

enhanced FISC review would serve three valuable functions : (1) ensure that the FISC received the best arguments on both sides; (2) serve as a valuable ex ante check on the government, encouraging the government to adopt those criteria that could withstand subsequent scrutiny; and (3) promote domestic and global confidence in the legitimacy of processes governing NSA surveillance. A U.S. cabinet level privacy agency would also bolster the legitimacy of surveillance. The agency could provide more regular recourse to subjects of surveillance, as

the ECHR requires. That change would ease the barriers to continued U.S.-Europe

cooperation on counterterrorism. A national agency would also work hand in hand with privacy officers

in executive departments. It would increase the leverage of those officials, who could advocate vigorously in internal debates, knowing that their views would also have a champion in a free-standing executive department independent of the national security bureaucracy. There are downsides to this proposal, of course. A new agency would add expense, and create some redundancy in government functions. Moreover, current models that provide recourse, such as the approach currently taken by the Department of Homeland Security,163 have been criticized as unduly burdensome.164 However, preserving

cooperation with Europe and enhancing the overall legitimacy of U.S. surveillance provides a compelling justification. Each of these instrumentalities—a public advocate at the FISC and a new privacy agency—could also work to strengthen minimization requirements for foreign communications. The NSA

says that it disposes of all irrelevant communications within five years. There may be ways to shorten this time and require even more rigorous controls on sharing of

information that lacks a clear link to terrorism or other foreign intelligence matters. More exacting minimization would also promote U.S.-European information sharing and

enhance global legitimacy.

Net Benefit - Links

Programmatic techniques avoids restrictions that stagnate surveillance of terrorism Sales, 14 - Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law (Nathan, I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, “Domesticating Programmatic Surveillance: Some Thoughts on the NSA Controversy”, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2014/08/12-Sales.pdf)//MR

Programmatic surveillance thus can help remedy some of the difficulties that arise when monitoring covert adversaries like international terrorists. FISA and other particularized surveillance tools are useful when authorities want to monitor targets whose identities are already known. But

they are less useful when authorities are trying to identify unknown targets. The problem arises because, in

order to obtain a wiretap order from the FISA court, the government usually must demonstrate probable cause to believe that the target is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power.39 This is a fairly straightforward task when the target’s identity is already known—

e.g., a diplomat at the Soviet embassy in Washington, DC. But the task is considerably more difficult when the government’s reason for surveillance is to detect targets who are presently unknown—e.g., al- Qaeda members who operate in the shadows. How can you convince the FISA court that Smith is an agent of a foreign power when you know nothing about Smith—his name, nationality, date of birth, location, or even whether he is a single person or several dozen? The government typically won’t know those things unless it has collected

some information about Smith—such as by surveilling him. And there’s the rub. Programmatic monitoring helps avoid the crippling Catch-22 that can arise under particularized surveillance regimes like FISA: officials can’t surveil unless they show that the target is a spy or terrorist, but sometimes they can’t show that an unknown target is a spy or terrorist unless they have surveilled him.

Net benefit - Impacts True

Using programmatic surveillance is successful – it undermined 50 terrorist plotsSales, 14 - Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law (Nathan, I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, “Domesticating Programmatic Surveillance: Some Thoughts on the NSA Controversy”, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2014/08/12-Sales.pdf)//MR

Programmatic surveillance initiatives like these differ in simple yet fundamental ways from the traditional forms of monitoring with which many people are familiar—i.e., individualized or particularized surveillance. Individualized surveillance takes place when authorities have some reason to think that a specific, known person is breaking the law. Investigators will then obtain a court order authorizing them to collect information about the target, with the goal of assembling evidence that can be used to establish guilt in subsequent criminal proceedings. Individualized surveillance is common in the world of law enforcement, as under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.23 It is also used in national security investigations. FISA allows authorities to obtain a court order to engage in wiretapping if they demonstrate, among other things, probable cause to believe that the target is “a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”24 By contrast, programmatic surveillance has very different objectives and is conducted in a very different manner. It usually involves the government collecting bulk data and then examining it to identify previously unknown terrorists, spies, and other national security threats. A good example of the practice is link analysis, in which authorities compile large amounts of information, use it to map the social networks of known terrorists—has anyone else used the same credit card as Mohamed Atta?—and thus identify associates with whom they may be conspiring.25 (It is also possible, at least in theory, to subject these large databases to pattern analysis, in which automated systems search for patterns of behavior that are thought to be indicative of terrorist activity, but it’s not clear that the NSA is doing so here.) Suspects who have been so identified can then be subjected to further forms of monitoring to determine their intentions and capabilities, such as wiretaps under FISA or other authorities. In a sense, programmatic surveillance is the mirror image of individualized surveillance. With individualized monitoring, authorities begin by identifying a suspect and go on to collect information; with programmatic monitoring, authorities begin by collecting information and go on to identify a suspect. Programmatic surveillance is a potentially powerful counterterrorism tool. The Ra’ed al-Banna incident is a useful illustration of how the technique, when coupled with old-fashioned police work, can identify possible threats who otherwise might escape detection. Another example comes from a 2002 Markle Foundation study, which found that authorities could have identified the ties among all 19 of the 9/11 hijackers if they had assembled a large database of airline reservation information and subjected it to link analysis.26 In particular, two of the terrorists—Nawaf al-Hamzi and Khalid al-Mihdhar—were on a government watchlist after attending a January 2000 al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia. So they could have been flagged when they bought their tickets. Querying the database to see if any other passengers had used the pair’s mailing addresses would have led investigators to three more hijackers, including Mohamed Atta, the plot’s operational leader. Six others could have been found by searching for passengers who used the same frequent-flyer and telephone numbers as these suspects. And so on. Again, the Markle study concerns airline reservation data, not the communications data that are the NSA’s focus. But it is still a useful illustration of the technique’s potential. The government claims that programmatic surveillance has been responsible for concrete and actual counterterrorism benefits, not just hypothetical ones. Officials report that PRISM has helped detect and disrupt about 50 terrorist plots worldwide, including ten in the United States.27 Those numbers include Najibullah Zazi, who attempted to bomb New York City’s subway system in 2009, and Khalid Ouazzani, who plotted to blow up the New York Stock Exchange.28 Authorities further report that PRISM played an important role in tracking down David Headley, an American who aided the 2008 terrorist atrocities in Bombay, and later planned to attack the offices of a Danish newspaper that printed cartoons of Mohamed.29 The government also claims at least one success from the telephony metadata program, though it has been coy about the specifics: “The NSA, using the business record FISA, tipped [the FBI] off that [an] individual had indirect contacts with a known terrorist overseas. . . . We were able to reopen this investigation, identify additional individuals through a legal process and were able to disrupt this terrorist activity.”30 Quite apart from foiling attacks, the government also argues that the NSA programs can conserve scarce investigative resources by helping officials quickly spot or rule out any foreign involvement in a domestic plot, as after the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing.31 These claims have to be taken with a few grains of salt. Some observers believe that the government could have discovered the plots using standard investigative techniques, and without resorting to extraordinary methods like programmatic surveillance.32 The metadata program has elicited special skepticism: The President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies bluntly concluded that “the information contributed to terrorist investigations by the use of section 215 telephony meta-data was not essential to preventing attacks and could readily have been obtained in a timely manner using conventional section 215 orders.”33 The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board reached the same conclusion.34 (Judicial opinion is split on the program’s value. One judge has expressed “serious doubts” about its utility,35 while another has concluded that its effectiveness “cannot be seriously disputed.”)36 Furthermore, we should always be cautious when evaluating the merits of classified intelligence initiatives on the basis of selective and piecemeal revelations, as officials might tailor the information they release in a bid to shape public opinion.37 But even if specific claimed successes remain contested, programmatic surveillance in general can still be a useful counterterrorism technique.

Minimization regulations ensure the NSA data collection and transfer is only collected with the instances outlined in 702 Sales, 14 - Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law (Nathan, I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, “Domesticating Programmatic Surveillance: Some Thoughts on the NSA Controversy”, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2014/08/12-Sales.pdf)//MR

While the NSA programs feature several important safeguards to help protect privacy and civil liberties, there is room for improvement. Policymakers should consider altering the minimization rules to better prevent mission creep, adding an adversarial element to certain aspects of the FISA court’s proceedings, and enacting new legislation to place the telephony metadata program on a more stable statutory footing. First, the minimization rules that govern the section 702 program allow intelligence officials to share information with federal law enforcement if it contains “evidence [of] a crime.”96 The government ecently has clarified that “nonpublicly available signals intelligence that the United States collects in bulk” may only be used to counter certain enumerated national security threats, as well as “[t]ransnational criminal threats.”97 Even with that restriction, however, the rules seem too permissive. On their face, the minimization rules permit the fruits of PRISM surveillance to be used in investigations of even minor federal offenses, such as mail fraud and theft, so long as they have some “[t]ransnational” aspect. The problem is that the relative costs and benefits of surveillance depend on the magnitude of the offense under investigation. Just because we’re willing to countenance the use of extraordinary methods to prevent terrorism, it doesn’t mean the same techniques should be used to combat tax delinquency. Policymakers should tighten the list of crimes for which sharing is allowed. Of course, intelligence officials certainly should be able to tell their law enforcement counterparts when they come across evidence of terrorism, espionage, and other national security threats—the need for cops and spies to share more counterterrorism information is one of the enduring lessons of 9/11.98 And other serious crimes like those involving risk of death or serious bodily injury, or child exploitation, should be on the list as well. At the same time, we should not overestimate the NSA’s enthusiasm for sharing the intelligence it gathers. Regardless of what the minimization rules permit, the NSA will have strong incentives to resist sharing information with or otherwise helping its bureaucratic rivals.99 Indeed, the New York Times recently reported widespread frustration among law enforcement officials over the NSA’s reluctance to assist their investigations of routine offenses like “money laundering, counterfeiting and even copyright infringement”; their requests are usually denied “because the links to terrorism or foreign intelligence” are considered too “tenuous.”100 (Note that the story addresses NSA resources in general, not telephony metadata and PRISM data in particular.) In short, institutional self-interest and legal restrictions on sharing can be rough substitutes. And while self- interest will often lead the NSA to refuse access to sensitive intelligence in garden-variety criminal cases, these naturally occurring bureaucratic incentives should be supplemented with strong minimization rules that prevent inappropriate mission creep.

A2: Perm do both Perm links to the net benefit -- stopping bulk collection of data abolishes pattern analysis, making it impossible for the U.S. to detect terrorists – that’s Sales in the 1nc

A2: Perm do CP

Perm is severance – severance illegit – makes the aff a moving target destroying CP and DA ground

a) Public advocate requirement is outside PPD authority Lawfare 2014 (Benjamin Wittes; chief of Lawfare, Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, member of the Hoover Institution's Task Force on National Security and Law, “The President's Speech and PPD-28: A Guide for the Perplexed”, 1/20/2014, http://www.lawfareblog.com/presidents-speech-and-ppd-28-guide-perplexed)//MR

Obama's speech announces reforms and changes beyond those outlined in the PPD . The

president announces more routine declassification review of FISC opinions---which is both good and unsurprisingly. He also

announces, in a carefully-worded part of the speech, that he is "calling on Congress to authorize the establishment of a panel of advocates from outside government to provide an

independent voice in significant cases before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court." The wording here is important. Obama stops short of endorsing the Public Advocate idea , which has

constitutional difficulties and to whose strong form the Judicial Conference has objected. By describing these lawyers as "outside government," he seems to be leaning more towards an amicus model of adding adversarial process to FISC proceedings. But he leaves this point a bit vague, intentionally I think. And basically kicks the matter to Congress.

b) CP doesn’t include 702 authority to limit domestic surveillance

c) CP doesn’t apply PPD use restrictions

Here is a list of the use restrictions for reference: White House 14 (Office of the Press Secretary, “Presidential Policy Directive -- Signals Intelligence Activities,” 1/17/14, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-directive-signals-intelligence-activities)The limitations contained in this section do not apply to signals intelligence data that is temporarily acquired to facilitate targeted collection. References to signals intelligence collected in "bulk" mean the authorized collection of large quantities of signals intelligence data which, due to technical or operational considerations, is acquired without the use of discriminants (e.g., specific identifiers, selection terms, etc.). only for the purposes of detecting and countering: (1) espionage and other threats and activities directed by foreign powers or their intelligence services against the United States and its interests; (2) threats to the United States and its interests from terrorism; (3) threats to the United States and its interests from the development, possession, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; (4) cybersecurity threats; (5) threats to U.S. or allied Armed Forces or other U.S or allied personnel; and (6) transnational criminal threats, including illicit finance and sanctions evasion related to the other purposes named in this section. In no event may signals intelligence collected in bulk be used for the purpose of suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent; disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation, or religion; affording a competitive advantage to U.S. companies and U.S. business sectors commercially; or achieving any purpose other than those identified in this section.

Case Debate

Solvency

General

No solvency - Can’t get data from overseas servers – major companies have information on servers abroad

No solvency- 702 still allows for overreach- vague implementationLoConte ‘10. (FISA Amendments Act 2008: Protecting Americans by Monitoring International Communications - Is It Reasonable; LoConte, Jessica. 2010 Pace Int'l L. Rev. Online Companion 6 (2010) Vol I:6. Pg 6. http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?men_tab=srchresults&handle=hein.journals/piliewco2010&id=7&size=2&collection=journals&terms=702&termtype=phrase&set_as_cursor=)//LPThe procedures used are consistent with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.20 If the FISC finds

that the above requirements are met, then it will issue a warrant.21 Note that in order to obtain a warrant from the FISA court, it is not necessary for the Attorney General or the DNI to specify who the target of surveillance will be. In fact, the statute specifically states that any "certification made under this subsection [section 702] is not required to identify the specific facilities, places, premises or property at which an acquisition ... will be directed or conducted.'22 Nor does the statute state that the government must have a reasonable belief

that the targets of surveillance have a connection to criminal or terrorist activities. Although section 702 requires the government to adopt minimization procedures, the FISC is not provided with any details regarding the specific minimization procedures to be implemented, which limits the court's review of the ways in which intelligence agencies will use the intercepted intelligence data in the future. Another provision that causes concern is section 702(g)(1)(B) of the FAA, which provides a temporary exception to the warrant requirement: surveillance may begin under the authority of the Attorney General and DNI without court authorization if "time does not permit the submission of a certification."

Circumvention

No solvency – multiple reasons --

a) “TFA” language in 702 allows NSA to bypass restrictions against domestic surveillanceDonohue ‘15 --From the Georgetown university of law.(Laura K., “Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content,” Georgetown Law. n/a date. http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2364&context=facpub)//TS

The component statutory interpretations, particularly TFA and the assumptions that mark the foreignness determination, undermine the protections created for U.S. persons in

Sections 703 and 704 of the statute. They make it possible for the NSA to obtain significant amounts of American citizens’ communications. Until the FAA, the surveillance of U.S. persons outside

domestic bounds took place under the weaker standards of Executive Order 12,333. Part of the purpose of the FAA was thus to increase the protections afforded to U.S. persons travelling abroad.

214 The way in which Section 702 is being used, however, allows the NSA to bypass Section 703 by making assumptions about legal status and location and potentially subjecting U.S. persons to surveillance without meeting the requirements of Section 703. The amount of information at stake is not insubstantial. For years, the volume of intercepts under Section 702 has been one of the principal concerns of legislators familiar with the program. Senators have consistently

expressed unease about the intelligence community’s claim that it is impossible to quantify how many Americans’ communications have been implicated in the operation of Section 702.215

What has gradually become clear is that the program significantly more expansive than initially understood.21

b) Foreign Program goal requirement -- NSA can collect data about any U.S. citizen as long as the program has a foreign goal Donohue ‘2015. From the Georgetown university of law.(Laura K., “Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content,” Georgetown Law. n/a date. http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2364&context=facpub)//TS

Speier, a California Democrat, continued: “The bottom line is, this FISA bill permits the collection of Americans’ emails and phone calls if they are communicating with someone outside of the U.S.”235 Representative Rush Holt (D-NJ), a member of HPSCI, opposed the bill on similar grounds: “It permits massive warrantless surveillance in the absence of any standard for defining how communications of innocent Americans will be protected; a fishing expedition approach to intelligence collection that we know will not make Americans more safe.”236 Representative Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) opposed the legislation for the same

reason: “There’s no requirement for the government to seek a warrant for any intercepted communication that includes a U.S. citizen, as long as the program in general is directed towards foreign targets.”237 Kucinich added

c) Server location – foreign routing or servers allow NSA surveillance Donohue ‘2015. From the Georgetown university of law.(Laura K., “Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content,” Georgetown Law. n/a date. http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2364&context=facpub)//TSWhat is clear is that the inclusion of “about” communications significantly expands the volume of Internet intercepts under Section 702. By 2011, NSA was acquiring approximately 26.5 million Internet transactions per year as part of its upstream

collection.179 Three points related to the volume and intrusiveness of the resulting surveillance deserve notice. First, to obtain “about” communications, because of how the Internet is constructed, the NSA must monitor large amounts of data.180 That is, if the NSA may collect not just e-mail to or from the target’s e-mail account (badguy@ISP.com), but, in addition, other communications happening to mention badguy@ISP.com that pass through the collection point, then the NSA is monitoring a significant amount of traffic.181 And the

agency is not just considering envelope information (for example, messages in which the selector is sending, receiving, or

copied on the communication) but the actual content of messages.182 Second, wholly domestic conversations may become swept up in the surveillance simply by nature of how the Internet is constructed. Everything one does online involves packets of information. Every Web site, every e-mail, every transfer of documents takes the information involved and divides it up into small bundles. Limited in size, these packets contain information about the sender’s IP address, the intended receiver’s IP address, something that indicates how many packets the communication has been divvied up into, and what number in the chain is represented by the packet in question.183 not, include the other packets of information contained in the message. If a roadblock or problem arises in the network, the packets can then be re-routed, to reach their final destination. Domestic messages may thus be routed through international servers, if that is the most efficient route to the final destination. What this means is that even if the NSA applies an IP filter to eliminate communications that appear to be within the United States, it may nevertheless monitor

domestic conversations by nature of them being routed through foreign servers. In this manner, a student in Chicago may send an e-mail to a student in Boston that gets routed through a server in Canada. Through no intent or design of the individual in Chicago, the message becomes international and thus subject to NSA surveillance. Third, further collection of domestic conversations takes place through the NSA’s intercept of what are called multicommunication transactions, or MCTs. It is important to distinguish here between a transaction and a communication. Some transactions have only single communications associated with them. These are referred to as SCTs. Other transactions contain multiple communications. If even one of the communications in an MCT falls within the NSA’s surveillance, all of the communications bundled into the MCT are collected. The consequence is of significant import. FISC estimated in 2011 that somewhere

between 300,000 and 400,000 MCTs were being collected annually on the basis of “about” communication—where the “active user” was not the target. So hundreds of thousands of communications were being collected that did not include the target as either the sender or the recipient of the communication.184

d) Lack of specific targeting requirements allows NSA broad parameters in determining domestic surveillance – allows for general data gatheringDonohue ‘2015. From the Georgetown university of law.(Laura K., “Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content,” Georgetown Law. n/a date. http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2364&context=facpub)//TS

The FAA is largely silent about what burden must be borne by the government to establish whether the target is a U.S. person . Instead, Section 702 directs the

Attorney General to adopt targeting procedures reasonably designed (a) to ensure acquisition

is limited to persons reasonably believed to be outside U.S.; and (b) to prevent the acquisition of domestic communications.186 In other words, the statute only requires that the NSA not know (a) that the target is in the U.S.; or (b)

that it is intercepting entirely domestic communications. There is nothing in the targeting requirements requiring intelligence agencies to take certain steps to ascertain whether the target is a U.S. person or what must be done to ascertain the target’s location. Sections 703 and 704, which are designed to deal with U.S. persons, say nothing in turn about what is required to demonstrate whether a target either is or is not a U.S. person.187 Instead, these provisions address situations where the applicant has probable databases or other surveillance systems that could be consulted to determine whether the target is a U.S. person or a non-U.S.

person, the document uses the word “may”—the present tense articulation of a mere possibility. As an auxiliary verb, it adds a functional meaning to the resultant clause—specifically, in the case of

“may,” to intone possibility in a manner that equally incorporates the possibility of “may not.” The NSA thus may consult its databases to determine whether a target is a U.S. person. It also may decide not to. At no point does the document itself suggest what the NSA “must” do.192

Ext. Circumvention - TFA

The NSA is exploiting the to, about, for policy—they have used this to collect domestic data.Donohue ‘2015. From the Georgetown university of law.(Laura K., “Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content,” Georgetown Law. n/a date. http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2364&context=facpub)//TS

The most concerning aspect of the NSA’s targeting practices under the FAA is the inclusion of TFA. Together with generous assumptions with regard to foreignness and the vague requirements

embedded in the foreign intelligence determination, TFA has allowed the NSA to collect data beyond what might otherwise be considered incidental. Congress may not have anticipated this possibility in 2008. But by 2012 the information had been made available to any Members inclined to read it. The legislature, however, did not take steps to end programmatic collection. Nor did FISC play a strong role with regard to the legality of knowingly collecting entirely domestic conversations. The court’s decision encouraged willful blindness: as long as the NSA did not develop sophisticated technologies, it could collect more information and fit within the statutory bounds. Critique of these developments could be read as simply a complaint that the law went the other way. After all, three branches of government appear to have given the NSA their blessing: Congress through renewal of the FAA, the FISA Court of Review via its approval of certification, targeting, and minimization procedures, and the AG and DNI in their oversight capacities. But the burden borne by the government in the realm of national security is one that requires the

public authorities to be consistent with practice. It is concerning that what is being done in practice looks very different than what the law says on its face.

Their own author concedes that statute is not adequateEoyang and Bishai, ’15 – Eoyang is Director of Third Way's National Security Program, Chief of Staff to Representative Anna Eshoo (D-CA), and Defense Policy Advisor to Senator Kennedy/Bishai is National Security Fellow at Third Way and previously served as the press director at the Embassy of Iraq and a news producer at Al Jazeera English (Mieke and Chrissy, “Restoring Trust between U.S. Companies and Their Government on Surveillance Issues,” Third Way, 3/19/15, http://www.thirdway.org/report/restoring-trust-between-us-companies-and-their-government-on-surveillance-issues)//CT

Of course, FAA Exclusivity wouldn’t solve every problem. It would not prevent foreign governments from collecting information themselves and then providing it to U.S. intelligence agencies, as U.S. law cannot bind

a foreign government. And some may argue that FAA provides inadequate civil liberties protections for Americans. This proposal says nothing about the adequacy of that statute in this respect. What it says is that for data held by an American company about a target that is not a U.S. person, the checks within FAA are stronger than those solely under E.O. 12333.

A2: Multi-Stakeholder Model Good/Data Localization Bad

US-centric model rejected now – Russia and China want data localization – plan doesn’t restrict surveillance of foreign intelligence which is what their internal links assume is primary concern for other great powers

Multistakeholder model will fail – Western controlMarks 14 (JOSEPH MARKS Joseph Marks covers cybersecurity for POLITICO Pro. He previously covered government technology issues for Nextgov, part of Atlantic Media, and covered local and state politics and higher education for the Grand Forks (N.D.) Herald and the Albert Lea (Minn.) Tribune. He interned for Congressional Quarterly’s Homeland Security section and The Associated Press’s Jerusalem Bureau. He holds a bachelor’s degree in English from the University of Wisconsin in Madison and a master’s degree in international affairs from Georgetown University. 07/17/14 http://www.politico.com/morningcybersecurity/0714/morningcybersecurity14668.html)PA

THE WEST DOMINATES INTERNET GOVERNANCE, BUT THAT CAN CHANGE — Some developing nations have a legitimate beef with the “multi-stakeholder” model of Internet governance that the U.S. champions, the State Department’s ambassador to the Internet acknowledged yesterday. The current slate of stakeholders just isn’t diverse enough, Daniel Sepulveda said. In theory, the multi-stakeholder model means major decisions about how the Internet is organized are made by technical specialists at ICANN and other consensus-based non-profits rather than by national governments or multi-national organizations such as the United Nations. In practice, however, those non-profits are inordinately filled with Western government representatives, Western companies and Western civil society members, Sepulveda said on the sidelines of yesterday’s Internet Governance Forum meeting at The George Washington University.

China already rejecting US-centric control of internet – wants “internet sovereignty” Mozur and Jie 14(Jun 23, 2014 Paul Mozur writes about technology from The Wall Street Journal's Beijing bureau and Yang Jie computer scientist whose research interests include multimodal human-computer interaction (modeling and learning), computer vision, and pattern http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/06/23/chinas-lays-out-argument-for-internet-sovereignty-convinced/ “China Argues for ‘Internet Sovereignty.’ Is It a Good Idea? “ accessed 06/28/15)PA

As the Internet becomes more and more crucial to the day-to-day operations of government and multi-national companies, it’s no surprise its geopolitical import is growing to rival that of other industries like energy that dominate foreign policy. In a

full-page spread on the Monday, the Communist Party’s mouthpiece newspaper laid out China’s position on how the Internet and its supporting infrastructure should be dealt with across the globe. The page featured interviews with five Chinese experts, including the so-called “father” of China’s Great Firewall Fan Binxing. The upshot: They believe each country should have ultimate power to determine what Internet traffic flows in and out of its territory. It’s a concept China has termed “Internet sovereignty,” and though the opinions of each expert in the article varied, the core message is that each nation should have the right to govern the Internet as it sees fit.

The addendum is that the U.S. has too long exerted too much control over the Internet, and the revelations of former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden exposes U.S. hypocrisy in calling for a more

open Internet while simultaneously monitoring foreign governments, companies and individuals. The U.S. government recently said it plans to give up control over the body that manages Internet names and addresses, in a move designed to assuage concerns following Mr. Snowden’s leaks and also to encourage international cooperation over management of the Web. Still, a number of U.S. hardware and Internet

companies continue to control huge swathes of the globe’s Internet traffic. “’Internet sovereignty’ is an idea that is in line with the rules of international law,” the People’s Daily said. “From a practical point of view, each country should have the right to

implement its own Internet policies and regulations according to its needs. Other countries have no right to interfere with this.” On the flip side, some have argued that a smaller role for the U.S. could result in the Balkanization of the Internet – making the Chinese Internet, for example, even more cut off from the rest of the web than it already is. Outrage over U.S. cyberspying is set to continue, but the more salient

question at this point is whether the world would be better off with a less U.S.-centric Internet, even if that means the risk of an Internet in which more countries take steps to censor and block content.

Internet sovereignty solves better than multi-stakeholder Lewis 13 (James A. Lewis is the Director and Senior Fellow of the Technology and Public Policy Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. OCTOBER 2013 https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/no4.pdf “Internet Governance: Inevitable Transitions” accessed 06/28/15)PA

The extension of Westphalian sovereignty into cyberspace has been incremental and gradual: a problem appears, the current multi-stakeholder approach fails to address it, and governments seek other solutions using their national authorities. There will be no rush to a global treaty, where the UN suddenly takes control of the Internet. Instead,

nations will take steps to establish rules and penalties for behaviour on the Internet that are consistent with their national laws; over time this will aggregate into a new sovereign framework. Governments are unlikely to be involved in the day-to-day operations of the Internet, but they will put new rules in place for its operation. The process will leave proponents of the

current governance structure confused and complaining as they are increasingly hemmed in by a range of national controls. This extension of sovereignty is not the balkanization of the Internet — a pejorative term coined by defenders of the status quo. The definition of borders in cyberspace is no more a balkanization than the existence of borders in the physical world; only those who still believe in the one-world global commons could interpret this as such. There will still be a global network where the primary motives Internet Governance: Inevitable Transitions for design and architecture are commercial and the primary differences among nations will be over the

treatment of content and expression. This extension is shaped by the larger debate over sovereign authority versus universal human rights, but it was naive to think that technology would trump politics and that nations would meekly surrender control to some US construct reflecting US values.

Data localization inevitable

Root cause- Countries have seized this opportunity to compete with American markets, not b/c snowden.Hill’ 14. International affairs consultant, Worked on National security Staff in the White House as cybersecurity coordinator. (Jonah Force Hill, “THE GROWTH OF DATA LOCALIZATION POST-SNOWDEN: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS AND BUSINESS LEADERS,” 5-1-2014. Pg. 8-9, The Hague Institute for Global Justice. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2430275)//TS

Powerful business interests undoubtedly see data localization as an effective and convenient strategy for gaining a competitive advantage in domestic IT markets long dominated by U.S. tech firms. To localization proponents of this stripe, the NSA programs serve as a powerful and politically expedient excuse to pursue policies protective of domestic businesses. As an illustration, data localization in Germany presents clear economic benefits for a most powerful industry advocate for localization, Deutsche Telekom (DT). Whether by way of its “email made in Germany” system or the Schengen area routing arrangement, DT looks poised to gain from efforts to reduce the prominence of American tech firms in Europe. It is no wonder that the company has been spearheading many of the localization proposals in that country. As telecommunications law expert Susan Crawford has noted, DT has been seeking to expand its cloud computing services for years, but has found its efforts to appeal to German consumers stifled by competition from Google and other American firms. 79 T-Systems International GmbH, DT’s 29,000-employee distribution arm for information-technology solutions, has been steadily losing money as a result.80 Moreover, Crawford suggests that DT would not be content with gaining a greater share of the German market; she points out that through a Schengen routing scheme, “Deutsche Telekom undoubtedly thinks that it will be able to collect fees from network operators in other countries that want their customers’ data to reach Deutsche

Telekom’s customers.”81 Similarly, companies and their allies in government in Brazil and India look to profit from data localization proposals. Indeed, the governments of both nations have for years sought to cultivate their own domestic information technology sectors, at times by protecting homegrown industries with import tariffs and preferential taxation. Brazilian President Rousseff has on numerous occasions stated that her government intends to make Brazil a regional technology and innovation leader; in recent years the government has proposed measures to increase domestic Internet bandwidth production, expand international Internet connectivity, encourage domestic content production, and promote the use of domestically produced network equipment.82 India, more controversially, has at times required foreign corporations to enter into joint ventures to sell ecommerce products, and has compelled foreign companies to

transfer proprietary technology to domestic firms after a predetermined amount of time.83 Brazil and India are, of course, not alone in this respect. Indonesian firms are constructing domestic cloud service facilities with the help of government grants, 84 while Korea is offering similar support to its own

firms. 85 For the governments and corporations of these nations, long frustrated by their inability to develop a domestic IT industry that can compete on an even playing field with the U.S. technology giants, data localization is one means to confront, and perhaps overcome, the American Internet hegemony.

Data Localization is inevitable -- European companies benefit from it.Hill’ 14. International affairs consultant, Worked on National security Staff in the White House as cybersecurity coordinator. (Jonah Force Hill, “THE GROWTH OF DATA LOCALIZATION POST-SNOWDEN: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS AND BUSINESS LEADERS,” 5-1-2014. Pg. 8-9, The Hague Institute for Global Justice. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2430275)//TS

The problem for U.S. tech companies is that there are actually a wide variety of forces and interest groups driving the data localization movement, and many of these forces

and groups have objectives beyond the professed goals of data protection and counter-NSA surveillance. One can easily discern in foreign governments’ interest in data localization a combination of anti-American populism, a desire for greater ease of foreign (and domestic) surveillance, and a sense among

policymakers and business that the Snowden backlash presents an opportunity to cultivate domestic cloud and other tech services industries, industries that have long been

outcompeted by American tech companies in their home markets—old-fashioned protectionism tailored for the digital age. A

quick look at four select localization studies25 reveals this complex mix of purposes, and helps to explain why U.S. technology firms – as well as those organizations and individuals abroad who also recognize the problems data

localization laws would introduce – are having such a difficult time arguing their case, despite the logic working in their favor and against the policies they are contesting.

Data localization pushed to protect domestic businesses – not because NSA Hill’ 14. International affairs consultant, Worked on National security Staff in the White House as cybersecurity coordinator. (Jonah Force Hill, “THE GROWTH OF DATA LOCALIZATION POST-SNOWDEN: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS AND BUSINESS LEADERS,” 5-1-2014. Pg. 8-9, The Hague Institute for Global Justice. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2430275)//TS

Upon first glance, the preceding case studies present a consistent narrative: for the nations now considering localization for data, the Snowden revelations exposed an NSA that had overstepped the boundaries of acceptable surveillance, violated citizen privacy, and catalyzed public and government opinion in favor of forceful action in response. For policymakers, data localization offers a seemingly simple and effective solution.

Under closer examination, however , a more complicated picture emerges. The localization movement is in fact a complex and multilayered phenomenon, with the objective not only—or even primarily—of protecting privacy. Depending on the country in which it is being

advanced, localization also serves to protect domestic businesses from foreign competition, to support domestic intelligence and law enforcement ambitions, to suppress dissent and to stir up populist enthusiasms for narrow political ends. Direct evidence of these other objectives for which privacy seems to be a pretext is by its nature difficult to uncover: rarely to policy-makers admit to seeking protectionist goals, to spying on

their populations, to suppressing dissent or to exploiting populist emotions. Yet, by viewing the localization movement in the context of other state and corporate interests and activities, it is possible to uncover these other, less exalted ends.

Countries already passed data localization laws – Snowden revelations only furthered pre-existing movementsGross 15 (Grant Gross, “Two years after Snowden leaks, US tech firms still feel the backlash,” Channel World, 6-10-15. http://www.channelworld.in/news/two-years-after-snowden-leaks,-us-tech-firms-still-feel-the-backlash#sthash.lhuYY7rA.dpuf)//TS

In addition to the upcoming Russian regulation, France and Germany are creating their own dedicated national networks, and other countries, including China, Australia and India, have passed data localization laws, the ITIF report said. Asked during the conference about ITIF's new estimates, Erich Andersen, deputy general counsel at Microsoft,

questioned them. Even before Snowden's leaks, many countries had begun to press for new laws dealing with data security and privacy, and the leaks "galvanized" the debate, he said. Panel moderator Robert Boorstin, senior vice president at Albright Stonebridge Group, suggested that it's difficult for governments to pass laws that keep up with the constantly changing technology industry. But Andrea Glorioso, counselor for the digital economy for the European Union's delegation to the U.S., defended the EU's efforts to protect privacy and pass other consumer-protection regulations. Some tech companies argue against regulation, saying they want "frictionless innovation," he said. "When you're in a car, friction is a very good thing, because it's what allows you to brake," Glorioso said. "A world without friction is a world in which you just go ahead, and you cannot stop, even when you want to."

Credibility/Soft Power

General

FAA solves perception - Any evidence about U.S. legitimacy before June ‘15 is irrelevant the U.S. already restoring its legitimacy

Legitimacy K

The Vietnam War proves that adopting the false mindset of credibility leads to bad decision making, resulting in useless conflicts with harmful consequences.Fettweis ’07. Assistant professor of national security affairs in the National Security Decision Making Department at the U.S. Naval War College. ( Christopher J. “ Credibility and the War on Terror,” winter, vol.122, no. 4. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.)//TS

The credibility imperative had become firmly embedded in the psyche of the U.S. foreign policy establishment by the time some of the crucial decisions regarding the war in Vietnam needed to be made. Without the imperative, the war would not have been fought. More than any other single factor, a fear of the message that a communist victory would send to the neighboring (and not-so-

neighboring) states compelled the United States to try to prop up the corrupt,

unpopular, Roman Catholic South Vietnamese rulers. In a 1965 memo released with the Pentagon Papers, Secretary of Defense John McNaughton described the reasons that the United States was in Vietnam as 70 percent ‘‘to avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat (to our reputation as guarantor),’’ 20 percent to prevent communism from overtaking South Vietnam, and only 10 percent to help the people of South Vietnam. 23 The damage that a failure in Vietnam could do to the reputation of the United States was potentially catastrophic. President Lyndon Johnson warned his cabinet that ‘‘if we run out on Southeast Asia, there will be trouble ahead in every part of the globe—not just in Asia, but in the Middle East and in Europe, in Africa and Latin America. I am convinced that our retreat from this challenge will open the path to World War III.’’ 24 Kissinger agreed, warning that if South Vietnam were allowed to fall, it would represent a ‘‘fundamental threat, over a period of time, to the security of the United States.’’ 25

Only when framed inside the prism of the credibility imperative did victory in Vietnam become a vital national interest. Skepticism grew steadily as the war dragged on, and as

the credibility imperative drove policymakers to believe that withdrawal from what seemed to be an unwinnable war would lead to national catastrophe. Intellectuals in the anti -war movement led the way, expressing moral outrage that a war would be fought primarily for the

messages it would send to our enemies and allies. 26 Academic skepticism about the importance of credibility grew alongside questions about the tangible interests at stake, especially after it became clear that the costs in blood and treasure were not proportional to any potential benefits that could conceivably be gained from the survival of an anti-communist South Vietnam. To prominent realists such as Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, intervention in isolated, resource-poor Vietnam was irrational, ‘‘moralistic,’’ and mistaken. Only ‘‘if developments in Vietnam might indeed tilt the world’s balance in America’s disfavor,’’ argued Waltz, would the war be worthwhile.27They did not, of course, since from a purely material perspective,

Vietnam was next to irrelevant to U.S. national security. The cost of a loss t o U .S. credibility, however, appeared incalculable. The war in Vietnam marked the beginning of the current debate over the importance of credibility, and the point of divergence between scholars and practitioners. Despite dire warnings from many of its leaders,

the United States not only withdrew its forces from Southeast Asia but also cut back on its aid and watched North Vietnamese troops overrun Saigon in 19 75.Since this ‘‘cut-an d-run’’ and subsequent loss of an ally were

undoubtedly unmitigated disasters for the credibility of the United States, presumably a string of foreign policy setbacks should have followed. If international actions are truly interdependent, as policymakers believe, then the 1970s would probably have seen evidence of allies beginning to question U.S. commitments, dominoes falling where the reputation of the United States maintained the status quo, an d increased levels of Soviet activity in the third world. The conventional wisdom suggests that the humiliating rooftop helicopter evacuation of the U.S. embassy in Saigon should

have heralded a dark period for U.S. foreign policy. However, no such string of catastrophes took place. Perhaps most obviously, there is no evidence that any allies of the United States were significantly demoralized, or that any questioned the wisdom of their allegiance. If anything, many of Washington’s closest allies seemed relieved when the war ended, since many of them had doubted its importance in the first place and had feared that it distracted the United States from other, more pressingissues.28Certainly no state, not even any ‘‘client’’ states in the third world, changed its geopolitical orientation as a

result of Vietnam. The damage to U.S. credibility also did not lead to the long-predicted spread of communism throughout the region, as even Kissinger today grudgingly

acknowledges. On the contrary, in the ten years that followed the fall of Saigon, the non-communist nations of Southeast Asia enjoyed a period of unprecedented prosperity.30The only dominoes that fell were two countries that were even less relevant than Vietnam to the global balance of power—Cambodia and Laos, both of which were hardly major losses for the West, especially given the tragedies that followed. Nationalism proved to be a bulwark against the spread of communism that could not be overcome by any loss of confidence in U.S. commitments.

US Credibility doesn’t affect other countries reactions - Cold War and Vietnam proveFettweis ’07. Assistant professor of national security affairs in the National Security Decision Making Department at the U.S. Naval War College. (Christopher J. “Credibility and the War on Terror,” winter, vol.122, no. 4. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.)//TS

There is actually scant evidence that other states ever learn the right lessons. Cold War history contains little reason to believe that the credibility of the superpowers had very much effect on their ability to influence others. Over the last decade, a series of major scholarly studies have cast further doubt upon the fundamental assumption of interdependence across foreign policy actions. Employing methods borrowed from social psychology rather than the economics-based models commonly employed by deterrence theorists, Jonathan Mercer argued that threats are far more independent than is commonly believed and, therefore, that

reputations are not likely to be formed on the basis of individual actions.39While policymakers may feel that their decisions send messages about their basic dispositions to others, most of the evidence from

social psychology suggests otherwise. Groups tend to interpret the actions of their rivals as situationa l , dependent upon the constraints of place and time. Therefore, they are not likely to form lasting impressions of irresolution from single, independent events. Mercer argued that the interdependence assumption had been accepted on faith, and rarely put to a coherent test; when it was, it almost

inevitably failed.40Mercer’s larger conclusions were that states cannot control their reputations or level of credibility, and that target adversaries and allies will ultimately form their own perceptions. Sending messages for their consideration in future crises, therefore, is all but futile. These arguments echoed some of the broader critiques of the credibility imperative that had emerged in response to the war in Vietnam, both by realists like Morgenthau and Waltz and by so-called area specialists, who took issue with the interdependence beliefs of the generalists. As Jervis observed, a common axis of disagreement in American foreign policy has been between those who focus on the specific situation and the particular nations involved (often State Department officials or area experts), and those who take a global geopolitical perspective (often in the White House or outside foreign policy generalists). The former usually believe that states in a region are strongly driven by domestic concerns and local rivalries; the latter are pre-disposed to think that these states look to the major powers for their cues and have little control over their own fates.4

Other Countries base their perceptions on national interests – basing US decisions the myth of legitimacy causes ineffective policy responses Fettweis ’07. Assistant professor of national security affairs in the National Security Decision Making Department at the U.S. Naval War College. ( Christopher J. “ Credibility and the War on Terror,” winter, vol.122, no. 4. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.)//TS

Press argues that national capabilities and interests—not past behavior—provide the foundation for the formation of perceptions. However, the credibility imperative has a powerful intuitive logic behind it, based upon lifetimes of interpersonal experience. There are therefore significant impediments infront of those who would challenge the wisdom of the policymaker’s obsession with reputation.

This divergence in conventional wisdom between policy and scholarship would not be a major issue for twenty-first-century international politics if policies that are primarily based upon the need to appear credible were not often counterproductive, costly, and dangerous. The imperative has clear effects upon policy, and is employed in debates in predictable, measurable, and uniformly unhelpful ways.

Warming

No impact and its not anthropogenic Lupo 08 (NAPSA, Anthony R. assistant¶ professor of atmospheric science at¶ the University of Missouri at¶ Columbia and served as an expert¶ reviewer for the UN’s Intergovernmental¶ Panel on Climate Change, “Global Warming Is Natural, Not Man-Made,” 2008, http://www.napsnet.com/pdf_archive/34/50144.pdf) //AWOne of the fundamental tenets of our justice system is one is innocent until proven guilty. While that doesn’t apply to scientific discovery, in the global warming debate the prevailing attitude is that human¶ induced global warming is already¶ a fact of life

and it is¶ up to doubters to¶ prove otherwise.¶ To complete the¶ analogy, I’ll add that¶ to date, there is no¶ credible evidence to¶ demonstrate that the climatological¶ changes we’ve seen since the¶ mid-1800’s are outside the bounds¶ of natural variability inherent in¶ the earth’s climate system.¶ Thus, any impartial jury¶ should not come back with a¶ “guilty” verdict convicting humanity¶ of forcing recent climatological¶ changes.¶ Even the most ardent supporters¶ of global

warming will not¶ argue this point. Instead, they¶ argue that humans are only partially¶ responsible for the observed¶ climate change. If one takes a¶ hard look at the science involved,¶ their assertions appear to be¶ groundless.¶ First, carbon dioxide is not a¶ pollutant as many claim. Carbon¶ dioxide is good for plant life and is¶ a natural constituent of the¶ atmosphere. During Earth’s long¶ history there has been more and¶ less carbon dioxide in the atmosphere¶ than we see today.¶ Second, they claim that climate¶ is stable and slow to change, and¶ we are accelerating climate¶ change beyond natural variability.¶ That is also not

true.¶ Climate change is generally a¶ regional phenomenon and not a¶ global one. Regionally, climate has¶ been shown to change rapidly in¶ the past and will continue to do so¶ in the future. Life on earth will¶ adapt as it has always done. Life¶ on earth has been shown to thrive¶ when planetary temperatures are¶ warmer as opposed to colder.¶ Third, they point to recent¶ model projections that have¶ shown that the earth will warm¶ as much as 11 degrees Fahrenheit¶ over the next century.¶ One should be careful when¶ looking at

model projections. After¶ all, these models are crude representations¶ of the real atmosphere¶ and are lacking many fundamental¶ processes and interactions¶

that are inherent in the real¶ atmosphere. The 11 degrees scenario¶ that is thrown around the¶ media as if it were the mainstream¶ prediction is an extreme¶ scenario.¶ Most models predict anywhere¶ from a 2 to 6 degree increase over¶ the next century, but even these¶ are problematic given the myriad¶ of problems associated with using¶ models and interpreting their¶ output.¶ No one advocates destruction¶ of the environment, and indeed¶ we have an obligation to take care¶ of our environment for future generations.¶ At the same time, we¶ need to make sound decisions¶ based on scientific facts.¶ My research leads me to¶ believe that we will not be able to¶ state conclusively that global¶ warming is or is not occurring for¶

another 30 to 70 years. We simply¶ don’t understand the climate system¶ well enough nor have the¶ data to demonstrate that humanity¶ is having a substantial impact¶ on climate change.¶

Cyberterror

Congressional oversight prevents NSA backdoors already - no link to cyber terrorism.Mazmanian June 6, 2015. ( Adam, “CJS funding bill would limit high-tech surveillance,” 6-6-15. The Business of federal technology. http://fcw.com/articles/2015/06/04/cjs-funding-bill.aspx) // TS

The House passed a $51.4 billion Commerce, Justice and Science funding bill for fiscal 2016 on June 3 that would pare back the government's authority to conduct surveillance on communications. Taken together, they constitute something of a follow-on to the USA Freedom Act, just signed into

law, which put new rules on the bulk collection and searching of telephone metadata by spy agencies. The bill , passed 242-183, includes: *An amendment by Ted Poe (R-Texas) that would prohibit funding for government to require technology companies to build in support for tapping encrypted communications. The provision would put the brakes on efforts by FBI Director James Comey to guarantee that law enforcement agencies have access to encrypted communications. The amendment was adopted by voice vote. * An amendment by Darrell Issa (R-Calif.) that would bar funding of efforts by federal law enforcement to use "stingray"

devices, which simulate the activity of cell towers to capture location and identifying information from mobile phones, to collect data in bulk without a court order. The amendment was adopted by voice vote. * An amendment by Jared Polis (D-Colo.) that would ban the Drug Enforcement Administration from collecting phone records in bulk. The amendment was

adopted by voice vote. * An amendment by Thomas Massie (R-Ky.) that would bar the National Institute

of Standards and Technology from coordinating on encryption or computer security standards with the CIA and the National Security Agency, except for the purposes of

improving information security. The Massie amendment was a response to revelations from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden and other sources about collaboration between NIST and the intelligence community to insert flaws into highly complex encryption standards – revelations that led NIST to ultimately disavow the standards. The amendment was adopted 383-43. "Don't you want the best security available that the minds in this country can create ... to safeguard your health records, maybe to safeguard your gun records, maybe to safeguard your bank accounts and your credit cards? We are more safe when we have better security and better encryption, so it makes no sense for [NIST] to work with the NSA to weaken our encryption software," Massie said. Supply chain, census, other IT measures The bill would renew federal policy requiring supply-chain vetting for the acquisition of high-impact and moderate-impact IT systems, including an assessment from the FBI or other appropriate agency to evaluate cyber risks posed by any system whose manufacture is touched by firms controlled or subsidized by the Chinese government, or other sources identified by the U.S. as posing a cybersecurity threat. The House bill would extend the language of the measure to encompass the renewal as well as the acquisition of systems. Appropriators are worried about the looming 2020 census. The bill includes $848 million in funding for the count, but there are some strings attached related to IT delivery. The bill would mandate that half the IT funding for the 2020 census be withheld pending the Census Bureau's delivery of a spending plan for the large-scale Census Enterprise Data Collection and Processing project, which would put all the census data gathering, analytics and dissemination technology under a single system for the first time. The bill would deliver drastic cuts to the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace, a Commerce Department program designed to fund pilot projects to create new methods of online authentication that go beyond simple usernames and passwords. Under the bill, funding of new grants would cease, and second-year awards under 2015 grants would be canceled, with the allowed funding being used to wind up the program. The White House issued a veto threat before the bill went up for a vote. On the IT side, the Obama administration is particularly concerned about census IT funding, the NIST appropriation, Internet governance transition work being performed by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration at Commerce, funding for Commerce’s digital service team, and budget requests by NASA and the National Science Foundation to comply with the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act.

Big tech companies have installed encryptions—the NSA cannot access backdoors anymore.Kharpal ‘2015. Citing Glen Greenwald who received a Pulitzer award for his work on the Snowden revelations. (Arjun, “iPhone encryption 'petrified’ NSA: Greenwald,” CNBC, 3-18-2015. http://www.cnbc.com/id/102515972)//TS

Stronger encryption in Apple's iPhones and on websites like Facebook has "petrified" the U.S. government because it has made it harder to spy on communications, Glenn Greenwald, the writer who first reported on Edward Snowden's stolen files, told CNBC. Former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden caused major shockwaves around the world in 2013 when he unveiled the surveillance body's wide ranging spying practices, which included regularly attempting to snoop of data held by major technology companies. Apple, Google, Facebook and Yahoo are some of the major companies that have been in the spotlight after Snowden's revelations. Information from the Snowden documents released earlier this month detailed how

the CIA had been trying for a decade to crack the security in Apple's products. And last year, Yahoo revealed that

it was threatened with a $250,000 per day fine if it didn't hand over data to the NSA. The tech giants have been taking major steps to make sure their communications are safe from spying, a move Greenwald – who won a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting on the topic – said was motivated by the fear of losing customers rather than care for data privacy. "I don't… (Think) they suddenly care about privacy," Greenwald said. "If…you're a Facebook executive or an Apple executive, you're extremely worried that the next generation of users…are going to be vulnerable to the pitch from Brazilian, and Korean and German social media companies where they advertise and say don't use Facebook and Google because they'll give your data to the NSA." Snowden is due to address CeBIT later today. Glenn Greenwald, the man who helped Snowden publish the documents,

said that Silicon Valley companies have bolstered the encryption on their products, thereby making it harder for governments to eavesdrop. "They (Apple)

are now starting to put serious encryption technologies in their new iPhones in their new releases and this has really petrified governments around the world," Greenwald told CNBC in an interview at tech fair CeBIT in Germany.

NSA surveillance is key to preventing cyber terrorism.Weise ‘2015. (Elizabath, “Experts: NSA efforts part of the battle in cyber-proxy war,” USA Today, 6-7-2015. http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/06/04/nsa-warantless-surveillance-cybersecurity-china/28493013/)//TS

SAN FRANCISCO — The United States is engaged in a proxy war with its enemies, a war where cyberspace is the battlefield, cyber experts say. Because of that, the National Security Agency's expansion of warrantless surveillance of Americans' international Internet traffic is necessary, said Tom Kellermann, chief cybersecurity officer with Trend Micro, a Texas-based computer security company. "Let's be fair. The National Security Agency's role is to protect

national security. This is not about violating Americans' privacy, this is about spy hunting," Kellermann said. The revelation Thursday of NSA's broad program to scoop up Americans' Internet activities coincided with the government's disclosure that Chinese hackers had breached the computer system of the Office of Personnel

Management, potentially compromising the data of 4 million current and former federal workers. "The cyber civilization of the United States is being undermined, not just by criminal hackers but also by nation-states that have literally burrowed into our companies, our cities and our networks," Kellerman said. The type of proactive surveillance the NSA was conducting is crucial, according to Jasper Graham, vice president for

cybertechnology and analytics with Darktrace, a Washington, D.C.-based cyber-security firm. "Sometimes hunting is the only way you can catch people. Otherwise you're always in response mode, waiting for something to strike you," said Graham, who worked as a technical director at NSA for 15 years. Black-and-white distinction between criminal hackers and the intelligence wings of other countries can be difficult to make. It's common in some nations for hackers to be allowed to operate with impunity as long as they don't hack anything within their own country, experts say. They're also expected to share information they come across that might be useful to their nation, and to be "patriotic" and aid the state when called upon, Kellerman said. Intrusions often have multiple targets and happen on multiple levels. Graham offered a hypothetical example: If a government wanted information about specific types of employees at the Defense Department, it could hire or encourage a hacking group to attack a financial institution or health care system in the Washington, D. C., area. That would get them personal information about hundreds of thousands of individuals, some of whom may work at the Defense Department. "They're hiding one attack in the noise of another, and everybody writes it off as cyber-crime," Graham said. That's where looking at hacking activity broadly can pay off, Graham said. "You don't know until you work your way up the food chain if they're working independently or they're a small hacking group working with a government." For Herbert Lin, a Stanford University cyber-policy expert, whether the NSA program was an effective strategy for detecting and stopping hacking by foreign governments is the wrong question. "The question is really if the NSA program was helpful enough that it is worth the expense and the cost," Lin said. "Personally I wish we didn't have to do it, but I think it's an understandable response" given the current threat environment, he said. Other experts have their doubts about whether the NSA program is helpful. "One need only open up a newspaper" to see that it's not working, said Amit Yoran, CEO of the computer security company RSA. The needs of the intelligence and law enforcement communities are often at odds with what businesses want and need, he said. "Intelligence wants to monitor, to learn about the threat and how they work. Law enforcement wants to collect information so they can prosecute," Yoran said. Victims of hacks

want to rush in and clean up their system. "So there's a very powerful divide," he said. In the end, he said, "if you were serious about protecting the United States from these external cyber threats, then absolutely this is the sort of thing you'd consider doing." While Yoran doesn't think the potential ethical issues represent "a serious compromise," he knows that others might come to different conclusions if they don't trust the U.S. government to do what's right. "If you fundamentally don't trust, you fundamentally don't trust. I can't

prove a negative," he said. For privacy advocate Marc Rotenberg, with the Electronic Privacy Information Center in

Washington D.C., trust and oversight form the crux of the matter. "The cost of government secrecy will always be the lack of public trust," he said. "In the absence of meaningful oversight, the NSA will push its surveillance authority beyond what the law allows."

Cyber warfare is a self-fulfilling prophecyValeriano and Manus ‘15 -- Brandon Valeriano has a Ph.D. from Vanderbilt University in Political Science and Ryan C. Maness has a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois in Chicago. (Brandon and Ryan C., “Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System” 5/26/15. Oxford University Press, Pg.20-21) //AHS

We now live in a digital era in whitch the speed, interconnectedness, and level of computer interaction between states and individuals is growing at an exponential rate. Choucri (2012: 13) suggests that “cyberspace has created new conditions for which there are no clear precedents.” As with most new things, this new reality brings fear since the infrastructure we depend on is thought to be

fragile and too complex. We depend so much on digital communications that it stands to reason that we are also vulnerable to threats that originate from this realm. As Bowden’s quote makes clear, the fragility of what we most depend on is a source of vulnerability for some. Rid (2013: vii) even suggests that we are addicted to the Internet, and

this is a source of concern as our habit is therefore fragile. The fragility, addiction, and dependency we have on the Internet signals weakness for some. Weaknesses offer are exploited by those

who seek to gain, especially in a situation of historical enmity. Yet, these ideas are assumptions; there is a perception of fragility and of dependency that might not match the reality of the situation. If the perceived weakness and fragility become the dominant frame, there is a potential for the fear

invoked to translate to the securitization notion of forthcoming conflict, exploiting this weakness. We argue throughout that the opposite might be true, that the Internet and cyber interactions are more stable than most believe and therefore this domain can be a source of cooperation. Cyberspace will become the domain of conflict only if we let the fear process take hold and dominate the discourse; the perception of fear then becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The CNBC network in the United States produced a documentary on cyber warfare that documents the typical securitized discourse in this arena. Their introductory statement is a typical example of the hyperbolic statements associated with cyber conflict. “In the United States, we are Internet dependent. Our financial system, power grids, telecommunications, water supplies, flight controls and military communications are all online – making them vulnerable to countless cyber incidents by cyber criminals. The goal could be a 10-minute blackout, a breach of national security, a stock trading glitch or the theft of millions of dollars worth of intellectual

property.” In short, everything from our money to our water is vulnerable to infiltration. The question is to what extent these extreme warning and fears are warranted. How vulnerable is any given country to cyber malice, and what evidence do we have for cyber conflict in the last decade? Should this fear be the basis for reorganization in military structures and doctrine?

Empirical outliers have been overhyped in cyber security discourseValeriano and Manus ‘15 -- Brandon Valeriano has a Ph.D. from Vanderbilt University in Political Science and Ryan C. Maness has a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois in Chicago. (Brandon and Ryan C., “Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System” 5/26/15. Oxford University Press. Pg.137) //AHS

Throughout this volume we have made the case that cyber conflicts thus far are over-hyped and that states practice a large degree of restraint in using them. We find that the rate of conflict is not indicative of a revolution in military affairs, but rather is a continuation of espionage and nuisances otherwise common in international affairs. The next question is, if we take a closer look at the process, content, and meaning of what might be known as the

prominent cyber conflicts, then what more do we learn? Do our quantitative conclusions hold up in the context of what might be called the outliers, or the black swans of the cyber

security discourse? We need to support our data investigations with the story of cyber conflicts in order to

reinforce the points asserted in previous chapters. Here we demonstrate that even the most popular and well-known cyber incidents are not changing the shape of the battlefield; they are a new technology, like any other that we have seen in the past. Throughout history, militaries and governments have adapted to and utilized new technologies in the battlefield as well as for diplomacy, but rarely have the changed the shape of international affairs. It seems that cyber conflict falls into this

category in that the technology alone by no means changes the shape of relationships. We go even further with our weekly events-based data investigation to suggest that, by and large, the response to cyber incidents, when the do happen, does not indicate that governments are disturbed or severely troubled by the incidents (see Chapter

5). Some tactics provoke reactions, but mainly cyber actions have been assimilated as a normal process of international life, a claim widely divergent from the tone of the general cyber security debate.

Cyber-attacks are just hype – “digital Pearl Harbor” or “cyber 9/11” have yet to materialize despite decades of warningGartzke and Lindsay 6/22/15 (Eric Gartzke is an associate professor at UC San Diego in the in the Department of Political Science and Jon Lindsay is an assistant adjunct professor at UC San Diego and an Oxford Martin Associate with the Oxford Global Cyber Security Capacity Center. (Eric and Jon R., “Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace,”6-22-2015. Taylor and Francis group. Pg323-324. Security Studies Vol 24, Issue 2. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636412.2015.1038188)//AHS

Where Are All the Attacks? If geographic, technological, or organizational conditions make conquest feasible at low cost or risk in comparison with the effort of defending the same objectives, then aggressors should be more tempted to launch an attack, the security dilemma and negative spirals should be more intense, and greater uncertainty and secrecy should lead to more miscalculation and war.21 According to a prominent body of international relations theory, high levels of offense dominance, in general, should be tied to a heightened risk of war.22 The deficiencies of traditional protective

strategies as summarized above should thus make cyber war the sum of all fears, as many have predicted. Indeed, the US Department of Defense gets attacked ten million times a day; a US university receives a hundred thousand Chinese attacks per day; and one firm measures three thousand distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks per day worldwide.23 In reality, however, most of these so-called attacks are just routine probes by automated networks of compromised computers (botnets) run by profit-seeking criminals or spy bureaucracies—a far cry from terrorism or military assault. The most alarming scenarios of a “digital Pearl Harbor” or “cyber 9/11” have yet to materialize despite decades of warning. The Stuxnet worm caused limited and temporary disruption of Iran’s nuclear program in the late 2000s, the only known historical case of infrastructure damage via deliberate cyber attack, but this operation seems to reveal more about the strategic limitations of cyber war than its potency.24 The cyber revolution should presumably provide rivals with potent new tools of influence, yet actual cyber disputes from 2001 to 2011 remain restrained and

regionalized, not disruptive and global.25 Computer espionage and nuisance cybercrime thrive, to be sure, but they are neither as prevalent nor as costly as they might be, leading skeptics to describe US losses as “a rounding error” in a fifteen trillion dollar economy.26 It is possible in principle that the same tools used for computer-network exploitation may one day be leveraged for more destructive strikes. Yet even if the nontrivial operational challenges of cyber war can be

overcome, proponents of the cyber-revolution thesis have yet to articulate convincing strategic motives for why a state or non-state actor might actually use cyber capabilities effectively.27 A considerable shortage of evidence in the study of cyber conflict is thus a source both of concern and relief.

Low risk of cyberterrorism - interconnectedness now proves – Aff not necessary to solve – our ev postdatesLindsay 15 (Jon R. Lindsay holds a PhD in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and an MS in computer science and BS in symbolic systems from Stanford University. He is an officer in the U.S. naval reserve with seventeen years of experience including assignments in Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East., Tai Ming Cheung director of the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, is a long-time analyst of Chinese and East Asian defense and national security affairs with particular expertise on the political economy of science, technology, and innovation and their impact on national security matters. Dr. Cheung was based in Asia from the mid-1980s to 2002 covering political, economic and strategic developments in greater China., Derek S. Reveron is a professor of national security affairs and the EMC Informationist Chair at the U.S. Naval War College. He specializes in strategy development, non-state security challenges, and U.S. defense policy. China and Cybersecurity, 4/1/15, Google Books, pg343)PA

Yet government remedies also can introduce problems. Unity of commands in an American principle of warfare, but actual coordination of different organizations and agencies has proven to be extremely difficult, not least because cybersecurity is more about economic incentives than warfare. China’s fragmented authoritarian system has fared little better and potentially worse in cyber policy integration, as discussed in the introduction. Furthermore, innovation in the commercial information technology sector moves far more rapidly than the pace of policymaking in any state. The opportunities for making mischief

online emerge faster than government regulators can adjust on desirability of doing so. The profusion of cyber threats might appear to support technologist interpretations of cyber space as an autonomous domain with its own deterministic logic. The interpretation overlooks a broad international consensus that the continuing buildout of the Internet economy is a good thing for commerce and development, consistent with liberalist expectations. Cyberspace is a man-made construct, after all, and connection to it is voluntary. Disconnection remains unattractive as long as the benefits of being online continue to be so great and the risks comparatively

minor. Liberalist expect the repeated interaction and deep interference of cyberspace to act as a restraint on more severe forms of cyber harms: states stand to gain much from much from their Internet interdependence and much to lose from conflict. The fact that the Internet exists at all, a fabric of international interconnection, means that liberalist views should be taken seriously. However, there are limits to this implicit liberal consensus, and explicit normative framework for international cyberspace may be beyond them.

Bilateral Talks

Pakistan/Proliferation Scenario

No Indo-Pak war - deterrence preventsGanguly 2008, Professor of Political at Indiana University, (Sumit “Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” International Security, Volume 33, Number 2, 11/21/8, Muse AS)

As the outcomes of the 1999 and 2001–02 crises show, nuclear deterrence is robust in South Asia. Both

crises were contained at levels considerably short of full-scale war. That said, as Paul Kapur has argued, Pakistan's acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability may well have emboldened its leadership, secure in the belief that India had no good options to respond. India, in turn, has been grappling with an effort to forge a new military doctrine and strategy to enable it to respond to Pakistani needling while containing the possibilities of conflict escalation, especially to the nuclear level.78 Whether Indian military planners [End Page 65] can fashion such a calibrated strategy to cope with Pakistani probes remains an open question. This article's analysis of the 1999 and 2001–02 crises does suggest,

however, that nuclear deterrence in South Asia is far from parlous, contrary to what the critics have suggested. Three specific forms of evidence can be adduced to argue the case for the strength of nuclear deterrence. First, there is a serious problem of conflation in the arguments of both Hoyt and Kapur. Undeniably, Pakistan's willingness to provoke India has increased commensurate with its steady acquisition of a nuclear arsenal. This period from the late 1980s to the late 1990s, however, also coincided with two parallel developments that equipped Pakistan with the motives, opportunities, and means to meddle in India's internal affairs—particularly in Jammu and Kashmir. The most important change that occurred was the end of the conflict with the Soviet Union, which freed up military resources for use in a new jihad in Kashmir. This jihad, in turn, was made possible by the emergence of an indigenous uprising within the state as a result of Indian political malfeasance.79 Once the jihadis were organized, trained, armed, and unleashed, it is far from clear whether Pakistan could control the behavior and actions of every resulting jihadist organization.80 Consequently, although the number of attacks on India did multiply during the 1990s, it is difficult to establish a firm causal connection between the growth of

Pakistani boldness and its gradual acquisition of a full-fledged nuclear weapons capability. Second, India did respond with considerable force once its military planners realized the full scope and extent of the intrusions across the Line of Control. Despite the vigor of this response, India did exhibit restraint. For example, Indian pilots were under strict instructions not to cross the Line of Control in pursuit of their bombing objectives.81 They adhered to these guidelines even though they left them more vulnerable to Pakistani ground fire.82 The Indian military exercised such restraint to avoid provoking Pakistani fears of a wider attack into Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and then into Pakistan itself. Indian restraint was also evident at another level. During the last war in [End Page 66] Kashmir in 1965, within a week of its onset, the Indian Army horizontally escalated with an attack into Pakistani Punjab. In fact, in the Punjab, Indian forces successfully breached the international border and reached the outskirts of the regional capital, Lahore. The Indian military resorted to this strategy under conditions that were not especially propitious for the country. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister, had died in late 1964. His successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was a relatively unknown politician of uncertain stature and standing, and the Indian military was still recovering from the trauma of the 1962 border war with the People's Republic of China.83 Finally, because of its role in the Cold War, the Pakistani military was armed with more sophisticated, U.S.-supplied weaponry, including the F-86 Sabre and the F-104 Starfighter aircraft. India, on the other hand, had few supersonic aircraft in its inventory, barring a small number of Soviet-supplied MiG-21s and the indigenously built HF-24.84 Furthermore, the Indian military remained concerned that China might open a second front along the Himalayan border. Such concerns were not entirely chimerical, because a Sino-Pakistani entente was under way. Despite these limitations, the Indian political leadership responded to Pakistani aggression with vigor and granted the Indian military the necessary authority to expand the scope of the war. In marked contrast to the politico-military context of 1965, in 1999 India had a self-confident (if belligerent) political leadership and a substantially more powerful military apparatus. Moreover, the country had overcome most of its Nehruvian inhibitions about the use of force to resolve disputes.85 Furthermore, unlike in 1965, India had at least two reserve strike corps in the Punjab in a state of military readiness and poised to attack across the border if given the political nod.86 Despite these significant differences and advantages, the Indian political leadership chose to scrupulously limit the scope of the conflict to the Kargil region. As K. Subrahmanyam, a prominent Indian defense analyst and political

commentator, wrote in 1993: [End Page 67] The awareness on both sides of a nuclear capability that can enable either country to assemble nuclear weapons at short notice induces mutual caution. This caution is already evident on the part of India. In 1965, when Pakistan carried out

its "Operation Gibraltar" and sent in infiltrators, India sent its army across the cease-fire line

to destroy the assembly points of the infiltrators. That escalated into a full-scale war. In 1990, when Pakistan once again carried out a massive infiltration of terrorists trained in Pakistan, India tried to deal with the problem on Indian territory and did not send its army into Pakistan-

occupied Kashmir.87 Subrahmanyam's argument takes on additional significance in light of the overt acquisition of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan.

Tactical proliferation solves conflict Pillalamarri, 3/24/15 - an assistant editor at the National Interest (Akhilesh, “Confirmed: Pakistan is Building ‘Battlefield Nukes’ to Deter India,” The Buzz 3/24/15, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/confirmed-pakistan-building-battlefield-nukes-deter-india-12474 //JDAs the world remains focused on preventing a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, South Asia’s dangerous nuclear rivalry—

between India and Pakistan—grows ever more deadly. General Khalid Kidwai, a top advisor to the Pakistani government,

said this week that Pakistan needed short-range tactical nuclear weapons, also known as “battlefield nukes” to deter nuclear archrival India. Kidwai said that “having tactical weapons would make war less likely,” at a conference on nuclear security organized by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. Kidwai administered Pakistan’s nuclear and missile weapons program for fifteen years. Pakistan’s tactical weapon development includes the Nasr Missile, which has a range of around 37 miles (60 kilometers) and reflects concerns in Pakistan that “India’s larger military could still wage a conventional war against the country, thinking Pakistan would not risk retaliation with a bigger nuclear weapon.”Pakistan especially fears and aims to neutralize India’s “Cold Start” doctrine, a type of blitzkrieg that aims to advance fast enough into Pakistan to seize key installations before a retaliatory nuclear strike

US-China Scenario

China won’t accept US-centric stakeholder model – based in human rights agendaLindsay 15 (Jon R. Lindsay holds a PhD in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and an MS in computer science and BS in symbolic systems from Stanford University. He is an officer in the U.S. naval reserve with seventeen years of experience including assignments in Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East., Tai Ming Cheung director of the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, is a long-time analyst of Chinese and East Asian defense and national security affairs with particular expertise on the political economy of science, technology, and innovation and their impact on national security matters. Dr. Cheung was based in Asia from the mid-1980s to 2002 covering political, economic and strategic developments in greater China., Derek S. Reveron is a professor of national security affairs and the EMC Informationist Chair at the U.S. Naval War College. He specializes in strategy development, non-state security challenges, and U.S. defense policy. China and Cybersecurity, 4/1/15, Google Books, pg343)PA

The perceived severity of the threats above has generated numerous calls for improved international cooperation on cybersecurity. Jason Healey, for example, sees a

“flurry of organized and unorganized violence” in the cyber domain but anticipates new norms and regimes will keep cyberspace “generally as stable as the air, land, space, and maritime domains”, containing localized conflict from disrupting the international system. It is notable that the Chinese authors in this volume appear more optimistic about the potential for the international cooperation than many of the Western authors. Li Yuxiao and Xu Lu write that “a China-U.S. cybersecurity communication mechanism is important to improve mutual trust and enhance research and defense capabilities” and recommend working toward “a set of common rules for the network society in order to promote the process of global informatization.” Senior Colonel Ye similarly writes that “we have to reject the logic that there must be fierce hostilities between the traditional, established superpowers and rising powers,” and instead recognize that “mutual respect, mutual understanding and cooperation between nations should be the foundation of Asia-Pacific and world security, including

cybersecurity. International cooperation on cybersecurity is desirable, but there are certain obstacles. Any notion of a cyber arms control treaty or the establishment of cyber norms must be reconciled with actual cyber activities and government interests in promoting or tolerating them. Sarah McKune points out the

cyber exploitation of ethnic minorities and Internet censorship by the Chinese state stand in stark contrast to cosmopolitan visions of an open Internet with string normative protection for human rights. The US Department of State “Internet freedom” agenda “works to advance Internet freedom as an aspect of universal rights of freedom of expression and the free flow of information. As part of the initiative, the US government and activists from non-governmental organizations develop and deploy technologies that dissidents can use to subvert controls on Internet content. This essentially means hacking the “Great Firewall.” China perceives this to be provocative interference in its domestic affairs and an attack on its information security architecture. China, together with Russia, would prefer to shift governance of the Internet to the United Nations with the stronger norms of Internet Sovereignty and noninterference; Europe and the United States prefer to maintain the current “multistakeholder” arrangement while strengthening norms of openness and human rights. While there may be agreement that international norms are desirable, there is sharp

disagreement on the content of those norms . The Obama administration’s decision to transfer the internet Assigned Named Authority (IANA) function from the Department of Commerce of the international community may be a sign of China’s and Russia’s effective diplomacy or at least a sign that the United States recognizes the damage done to its international reputation. The challenge of international policy coordination is exacerbated by intra-states

disorganization and disconnects between public and private actors. As Fred Cate writes, “The threats are too

broad, the actors too numerous, to knowledge levels too unequal, the risks too easy to avoid internalizing, the free-rider problem too prevalent, and the stakes too great to believe that markets alone will be adequate to create the right incentives or out-comes.”

China doesn’t want US-centric internet governance -- US constitutional imperativesSubmarainan 8-5-13 B.Sc. in Applied Sciences, 1980, Madras University, India; P.G. Honors Dip. in Management, 1984, XLRI, India; M.B.A., 1990 and Ph.D., 1992, Rutgers University) is a ISP Fellow at the Yale Law School, and the Gabriel Ferrucci Professor of Computer Information Systems at the School of Business, Quinnipiac University, Connecticut. . He published The book Computer Security, Privacy and Politics: Current Issues, Challenges and Solutions Ed. Subramanian, was published in 2008 by IRM Press. Internet Governence: A Developing Country’s perspective http://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1223&context=ciima AS )

However, the Multistakeholder forums, policies and procedures have not assuaged some of the fears and concerns of other countries that still fear control of the Internet by the U.S. government. Over the years, there have been numerous calls for separating ICANN from its connection to the U.S. Department of Commerce. In addition, as more and more nations join the

Internet, these calls have only increased. Some governments such as China and Russia fear that the U.S. constitutional imperative to protect free expression at all costs could impinge on their own sovereignty and security. Civil society has increasingly asked for equal status in policy decision making, as in many forums they do not yet have those rights. In the discussion that follows, I turn the focus of Internet governance to India, considered by many analysts to be a rapidly developing economy.

Lack of trust between China and the US means no cooperationLindsay 15 (01 April 2015 Jon R. Lindsay holds a PhD in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and an MS in computer science and BS in symbolic systems from Stanford University. He is an officer in the U.S. naval reserve with seventeen years of experience including assignments in Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East., Tai Ming Cheung director of the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, is a long-time analyst of Chinese and East Asian defense and national security affairs with particular expertise on the political economy of science, technology, and innovation and their impact on national security matters. Dr. Cheung was based in Asia from the mid-1980s to 2002 covering political, economic and strategic developments in greater China., Derek S. Reveron is a professor of national security affairs and the EMC Informationist Chair at the U.S. Naval War College. He specializes in strategy development, non-state security challenges, and U.S. defense policy. China and Cybersecurity (Google Books) pg343)PAAmerican espionage against China, to include Chinese information technology companies, is unlikely to abate just because of public indignation in Chinese media or diplomatic protest without more serious consequences. Likewise, the cybersercurity firm Mandiant notes that “recent observations of China-based APT activity indicate that the PRC has no intention of

abandoning its cyber campaigns, despite the Obama administration’s specific warning that China’s continued cyber espionage ‘was going to be [a] very difficult problem in the economic relationship’ between the two countries”. This situation highlights a major

obstacle to the establishment of international norms. It is hard to establish an agreement over activities that the parties do not admit conducting. It is hard to enforce compliance with an agreement when the proscribed activity is intentionally designed to be undetectable. Many governments have the technical means and expertise to conduct covert operations online and have thus far shown little restraint in doing so both the incentives espionage and the inability of liberal norms and institutions to contain it.

No SCS escalation – interdependence solvesHong ‘13 senior research fellow at the East Asian Institute (EAI), National University of Singapore. Before joining EAI, he was professor at the Research School of South East Asian Studies, Xiamen University, China, teaching International Political

Economy, Big Power Relations, and ASEAN Economy. (Zhao, “THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE AND CHINAASEAN RELATIONS” 6/12/13, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2012.760785 AS)

However, at this stage there is no reason to regard military confrontation as likely or inevitable. Economically, China and ASEAN countries have become increasingly interdependent, as China is currently the second largest trade partner of ASEAN, and ASEAN is the third largest trade partner of China. In the light of increasing economic ties and mutual desire for regional peace and stability, China and ASEAN-related countries are likely to make every effort to stabilise their bilateral relations. President Aquino stated during his state visit to China in

August 2011 that China-Philippines relations will not be affected by the dispute over the South China Sea, reiterating the need “to deal with the disputes through peaceful dialogue, and to continue to maintain regional peace, security and stability, creating a favorable environment for economic growth”.43 And it is

important to note that some procedural progress was made in 2011. In November 2011, China made a goodwill

gesture of providing US$ 475 million to establish the China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund, and there are several working groups now in place. Indeed, the

expansion of economic ties and the growth of common interests have laid the foundation for partial settlement or management of the territorial disputes.

Activism

General

Data localization won’t prevent coalition building- people will find a way to communicateColdewey 11. (“People, Not Things, Are The Tools Of Revolution” Feb 11, 2011 by Devin Coldewey- a Seattle-based writer and photographer. He has written for TechCrunch since 2007 and is currently a contributor at NBC News. http://techcrunch.com/2011/02/11/tools-of-revolution/)//LP

Warmest congratulations to the Egyptian people, whose truly grassroots revolution has reminded the world what political action is supposed to look like. Although the work is far from done, and reconstituting a government by

the people and for the people is perhaps the more difficult phase, it is right that they, and the world, should take a moment to reflect on a job well done. Some are using that moment to praise the social media tools used by some of the protesters, and the role the internet played in fueling the revolution. While it’s plain that these things were part of the process, I think the mindset of the online world creates a risk of overstating their importance, and elevating something useful, even powerful, to the status of essential. The people of Egypt made use of what means they had available, just as every oppressed people has in history. Twitter and Facebook are indeed useful tools, but they are not tools of revolution — at least, no more than Paul Revere’s horse was. People are the tools of revolution, whether their dissent is spread by whisper, by letter, by Facebook, or by some means we haven’t yet imagined. What we, and the Egyptians, should justly be proud of, is not just those qualities which set Egypt’s revolution apart from the last hundred, but those which are fundamental to all of them. Malcom Gladwell has become the whipping boy of the internet for having suggested however long ago it was that the social web is something that breeds weak connections and requires only a minimum of participation. He was right then, and he’s right now; he wrote a short post the other day defying the gloating masses (sensibly, but haughtily), and concluded with

something commentators of the Egyptian revolution should take to heart: “People with a grievance will always find ways to communicate with each other. How they choose to do it is less interesting, in the end, than why they were driven to do it in the first place.” It’s one thing to give credit where credit is due and admire the rapidity and resilience of internet-based communication. The new uses to which the younger generation is putting the internet are very

interesting and point to shifts in the way people are choosing to share information. It’s another thing to ascribe to these things powers they don’t have, powers that rest in the people who use them.

It sounds like quibbling, but it’s an important distinction. Facebook greased the gears, but it isn’t the gears, and never will be. The revolution has been brewing for decades, and these same protesters have been in the streets countless times, after organizing by phone, by word of mouth, or simply as a shared reaction to some fresh enormity.

Democratic Peace Theory Wrong

Democratic peace theory false- competing interestsLarison 12. (DANIEL LARISON- published in the New York Times Book Review, Dallas Morning News, Orthodox Life, Front Porch Republic, The American Scene, and Culture11, and is a columnist for The Week. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Chicago. April 17, 2012. “Democratic Peace Theory Is False” http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/democratic-peace-theory-is-false/)//LPFabio Rojas invokes democratic peace theory in his comment on Rachel Maddow’s new book, Drift: The Unmooring of American Military Power (via Wilkinson): “The idea is simple – for whatever reason, democracies almost never fight each other. Of course, democracies go to war against non-democracies. But for some reason, democracies just don’t fight each other. What’s the policy implication of all this? First, the sorts of rules that Maddow proposes are useless. People will just ignore the rules when they want to when they want war. Second, you have to reduce the population of non-democracies. Thus, if the Federal government wants to protect the United States by preventing war, the best, and cheapest, way to do it is to provide support and assistance for indigenous movements for democracy and tolerance. Once people have a genuine democracy at work, they just don’t want to fight with each other. They just don’t.” Rojas’ claim depends entirely on the meaning of “genuine democracy.” Even though there are numerous examples of wars between states with universal male suffrage and elected governments (including that little dust-up known as WWI), the states in question probably don’t qualify as “genuine”

democracies and so can’t be used as counter-examples. Regardless, democratic peace theory draws broad conclusions from a short period in modern history with very few cases before the 20th century. The core of democratic peace theory as I understand it is that democratic governments are more accountable to their populations, and because the people will bear the costs of the war they are going to be less willing to support a war policy. This supposedly keeps democratic states from waging wars against one another because of the built-in electoral and institutional

checks on government power. One small problem with this is that it is rubbish. Democracies in antiquity fought against one another. Political equality and voting do not abolish conflicts of interest between competing states. Democratic peace theory doesn’t account for the effects of nationalist and imperialist ideologies on the way democratic nations think about war. Democratic nations that have professional armies to do the fighting for

them are often enthusiastic about overseas wars. The Conservative-Unionist government that waged the South African War (against two states with elected governments, I might add) enjoyed great popular support and won a huge majority in the “Khaki” election that followed. As long as it goes well and doesn’t have too many costs, war can be quite popular, and even if the war is costly it may still be popular if it is fought for nationalist reasons that appeal to a majority of the public. If the public is whipped into thinking that there is an intolerable foreign threat or if they believe that their country can gain something at relatively low cost by going to war, the type of government they have really is irrelevant. Unless a democratic public believes that a military conflict will go badly for their military, they may be ready to

welcome the outbreak of a war that they expect to win. Setting aside the flaws and failures of U.S.-led democracy promotion for a moment, the idea that reducing the number of non-democracies makes war less likely is just fantasy. Clashing interests between states aren’t going away, and the more democratic states there are in the world the more likely it is that two or more of them will eventually fight one another.

Middle East

Plan can’t solve – outside influence not needed and alt causes to effective transitions KHOURI 2011 (“THE LONG REVOLT” BY RAMI G. KHOURI. Wilson Quarterly, SUMMER 2011. http://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/summer-2011-a-changing-middle-east/the-long-revolt/)//LP

Even as they are experiencing these momentous changes, Arab countries must deal with four enormous and simultaneous challenges: maintaining security, rekindling economic growth, creating legitimate and participatory governance systems, and preventing mass discontent sparked by unfulfilled expectations from pushing countries back toward autocratic rule. The liberated Arab lands that are able to slowly establish more democratic political governance systems will each take on a different tone and color as they create their own formulas from the possibilities before them: tribal values, pan-Arab sentiment,

narrow nationalism, corporate globalism, Islamist influences, and roles for the military. Arab democracies will look very different from Western ones, and the world should have the patience and composure to let the people of this region find their own sustainable balances between religiosity and secularism, state-centered and pan-Arab nationalism, and traditional and modern forms of governance.

US democracy promotion in the Middle East cause terrorism and instability- no popular supportHarsanyi 15 (David Harsanyi- a Senior Editor at The Federalist FEBRUARY 19, 2015 “Obama Is Wrong. Democracy Is The Last Thing The Middle East Needs Right Now” http://thefederalist.com/2015/02/19/obama-is-wrong-democracy-is-the-last-thing-the-middle-east-needs-right-now/)//LPPresident Barack Obama gave a speech at White House’s “Countering Violent Extremism” summit yesterday crammed with

predictable feel-good ideas for combating the imaginary root causes of Islamic extremism. And in the midst of arguing that radicalism was principally driven by anger over colonialism, illiteracy, and unemployment, Obama proposed an idea that we should have been abandoned trillions of dollars and many years ago: more democracy. Here’s how the president laid it out in the Los Angeles Times: Efforts to counter violent extremism will only succeed if citizens can address legitimate grievances

through the democratic process and express themselves through strong civil societies. First of all, does Obama really believe that extremists have “legitimate grievances?” Are the disaffected youth recruited from the slums of Paris (but, curiously, not from the slums of Rio or Beijing) concerned that France doesn’t offer a strong enough civil society? Are the radicals beheading Christians in North Africa ticked off over a lack of women’s rights in Yemen? Are extremists who target Jews and free-speech enthusiasts in Copenhagen worried about the health of democratic institutions in

Europe? No, it’s the grievances themselves that are the root of the problem. In most Arab countries, the authoritarian leadership is in some ways more liberal than the majority of the citizenry. As bad as these regimes are – and we coddle and enable many of them – almost every time the democratic process has been tried in the Islamic world, it’s produced more extremism and factional violence. So which nation does the president propose would benefit most from more democracy? Pakistan? Iraq? Saudi Arabia? Jordan? How would Christians and Alawites fare in a democratic Syria, do you think? Perhaps as well as minorities do in a democratic Libya, a place Obama argued Americans had to intervene militarily or the “democratic impulses

that are dawning across the region would be eclipsed by the darkest form of dictatorship.” Turns out that democratic impulses can also lead to darkness. There is no Gadhafi regime, but there is anarchy, a fertile recruiting ground for terrorists and a country where Copts can be executed without too many hassles and American consulates can be sacked without any repercussion. All of it enabled, in part, by the president’s unauthorized war (and Congress’ implicit approval of that war) that was meant to help facilitate democracy. At the same time,

the administration punishes the Egyptian government for putting an end to the extremism empowered by democratic impulses. It is Egypt’s al-Sisi – no great friend of liberty, granted

– who’s spoken out most forcefully about the future of Islam. Yet the administration has withheld aid from that government until it can “certify that Egypt is taking steps toward democracy.” As if insuring a larger role for the Muslim Brotherhood was in the U.S.’s – or the world’s – best interests. To put our confused priorities in perspective, the United States condemned the Egyptians for bombing ISIS targets in Libya over the summer, complaining that “outside interference in Libya exacerbates

current divisions and undermines Libya’s democratic transition.” (Incredulous italics mine) Egypt is not only dealing with ISIS in democratic Libya, it is dealing with terrorism originating from democratic Gaza, where Palestinians were offered autonomy and a chance to build a strong civil society, but put Hamas in charge instead. In the West Bank, where the moderates of the PLO run the show, Mahmoud Abbas can’t even hold elections because the will of the people is too extreme for Fatah. In Turkey and in Pakistan, the military is counterbalance to the democratic impulses that would allow theocrats to become members of

NATO or nuclear powers. Democracy can’t work now. Three reasons why: 1. In a open political environment, extremists will always be willing to resort to violence to grab power. 2. Institutions tasked with protecting society from that extremism will no longer be “democratic” once they react. 3. The populace doesn’t have any real desire for a secular democracy, anyway. According to Pew Research Center polling, given a choice between a leader with a strong hand or a democratic system of government, most Muslims choose democracy. For us, democracy is shorthand for all the things we like about liberalism, but overwhelming percentages of Muslims believe that Islamic law should be the official law of their own nations, which, as we’ve seen, does not “coexist” with our notions of self-determination. With apologies to the president, this knotty situation does not exist because Americans aren’t sensitive enough. But I’m sympathetic to Michael Gerson’s contention that presidents don’t have the freedom to be honest, constrained by sensitivities and realities of the world. He writes: Most of those urging Obama to assert that Islam is somehow especially flawed among the great faiths have never been closer to power than a fuse box. There is no possible circumstance in which a president could say such a thing. It would cause a global firestorm, immediately alienating Muslim allies and proxies whom we depend on to help fight the Islamic State and other enemies. The problem is that the president goes far beyond niceties. For starters, I’m not sure anyone has ever implored him to say Islam is inherently flawed or doomed. But shouldn’t we non-politicians be more sympathetic to M.G. Oprea’s argument that, among

other things, referring to Islamist terrorists merely as “violent extremists” constitutes a dangerous attempt to hide from reality? The administration claims it doesn’t want to confer ISIS –a group that Graeme Wood says derives its philosophy “from coherent and even learned interpretations of Islam” – the credibility of

being called “Islamic.” This fantasy forces the administration to concoct offensive rationalizations and preposterous moral equivalencies that drives disjointed, ineffective policies. Much like our Middle East “democracy” fantasy ends up bolstering the power and reach of the very same extremists we claim to want to stop.

Democratic internet promotion is destabilizing- it’s a values-promoting agendaMead 4/9 (WALTER RUSSELL MEAD - Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. The American Interest, Volume 10, Number 5. April 9, 2015 “The Paradox of American Democracy Promotion” http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/04/09/the-paradox-of-american-democracy-promotion/)//LPAmerica is and always has been by nature a revolutionary force in world affairs. This is not primarily or only because our

moral values compel us to become the avatars of a global transformation. It is rather because the way American society works is profoundly destabilizing to the rest of the world. When Al Gore “invented the internet” he did as much to destabilize the Middle East as George W. Bush did when he invaded Iraq. More seriously—and with apologies to the former Vice President—the internet started out as a DARPA project to facilitate the secure sharing of classified information. No one in DARPA, the Defense Department, or anywhere else in America was thinking about how to flatten hierarchies or challenge the social status quo everywhere in the world once the technology went commercial. The concern was about how to communicate effectively, how a company could use a corporate website to its competitive advantage, and so on. But the internet turned out to be a profoundly revolutionary force in politics around the world, and it poses huge problems to cultures and governments with foundations different from our own. Technology is not and has never been socially or politically neutral; it embodies and usually transmits the attitudes, economic endowments, moral priorities, and even the aesthetics of the societies that create it. It is very hard to simply adopt the machine and not the less tangible biases that go with it.In the same way, Hollywood movies have helped to create a situation in which many young people, for instance, no longer think they should marry whomever their parents tell them to marry. There are all kinds of ways in which the American presence in the world has been and remains culturally

subversive. In the 19th century we were seen on the Continent as a dangerous nation. The United States wasn’t sending armies out into the world to overthrow other regimes, but the mere existence of a successful, stable, large, powerful, and economically effective democratic society was a terrible example from the perspective of Europe’s rulers and religious traditionalists, who argued that their hierarchical positions were necessary to the effective governance of society as a whole. The United States was a living, thriving reproach to the political legitimacy of autocracies abroad. Inevitably, therefore, the friends of stability and authority around the world tended increasingly to be as anti-American as they were formerly anti-British, and for similar reasons. The British, of course, did send military forces out into the world, but their real disruptive power derived from the revolutionary impact of a wider and eventually more market-based global trading system that rewarded efficiency and creativity and punished institutionalized privilege and all related arguments from authority. Forces that wanted to see social change in their countries tended to be pro-American. We still see this pattern today. The United States is revolutionary by being as well as by acting.The United States is revolutionary by being as well as by acting. Any foreign policy that doesn’t take this into account will run into trouble. Consider Google and other major Silicon Valley companies, whose business models depend on a relatively open internet, with freedom of association and freedom of communication. In important ways the

boundaries of Chinese, Iranian, or Russian power are the boundaries that limit where their business model can reach. For commercial reasons alone, much of American business is pushing the U.S. government toward the promotion of a liberal model for internet governance and of freedom of communication in ways that are parallel or equivalent to a values-promoting foreign policy. The government of a country with global trading interests like the United States must prioritize questions like contract law in foreign relations; the contracts that American companies have entered into abroad

must be enforceable in transparent and honest courts of law. All kinds of people who do not think of themselves as democratic reformers in the history of American foreign policy have been consistently pushing all kinds of reform agendas around the globe that are self-interested in motivation but expansively liberal in consequence. There is every reason to believe that this kind of commercially based liberal policy will endure, and, with the information revolution shifting the world’s economic center of gravity away from the production and exchange of physical commodities toward the production and exchange of design and ideas, the importance of liberal values to American commerce is likely to grow.

Democratic movements are suppressed- Sectarianism Miranda 4/23 (Alba Benito Miranda- Intern at the Elcano Royal Institute. International Relations and Translation & Interpreting (Comillas Pontifical University).  23/04/2015 “Sectarianism in Bahrain and the New Middle East Cold War” http://www.blog.rielcano.org/en/sectarianism-in-bahrain-and-the-new-middle-east-cold-war/)//LP

The current Middle East seems to be on the verge of collapse and the revival of the Sunni-Shia divide appears to be the main culprit. The Arab Spring uprisings have altered the existing balance of power and accentuated the sectarian differences in the region. In this context, some states have lost no time in exploiting religious differences to their advantage,

and in using sectarianism as a political weapon to pursue political and geostrategic goals. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia have taken the lead in this power politics game, turning the Gulf region into the battlefield of what has been referred to as the “new Middle East cold war.” Similarly to regional hegemons in the Cold War, and in the Arab Cold War of the 1950s and 1960s, Saudi Arabia and Iran have not engaged in direct confrontation with each other, but have used neighbouring

countries as battlefields to settle their rivalries. Given the multicultural, sectarian and transnational identities in the Gulf, the exploitation of the Sunni-Shia divide has become a key tool in the foreign policies of some states. The repression of the 2011 uprising in Manama’s Pearl Roundabout is particularly illustrative, since it involved the use of a sectarian discourse by the governments of both the Al-Khalifa and the Al-

Saud. Although democratic and cross-sectarian in nature, Bahrain’s Arab Spring was immediately depicted as sectarian and portrayed as part of an Iranian plot to overthrow the Al-Khalifa regime and threaten the balance of power in the Gulf. It was perceived both as an external and internal threat to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states due to the risk of contagion and spillover. Shia-led calls for reforms challenged not only the sovereignty of the autocratic leaders, but also Sunni hegemony in the region, since they empowered both Iran and the Shia communities in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia was the most affected state, given its animosity towards Iran and the outbreak of Shia unrests in its oil-rich Eastern Province. In order to suppress Bahrain’s February 2011 uprising, Saudi Arabia led the military intervention of the Joint Peninsula Shield Force within a month of the outburst of the protests. It was the first time that the GCC intervened militarily in one of its member states to suppress an internal revolt, as its founding treaty only considers intervention in the case of a foreign threat. Sectarianism made possible the externalization of the threat posed by the Pearl Roundabout uprising,

as it was used by the GCC states as a weapon for self-defence. By picturing the revolts as sectarian, Manama and Riyadh delegitimized and silenced Bahraini’s political demands, hence safeguarding the sovereignty of their regimes. And by accusing Iran of participating in the revolts, they triggered a quick response and a joint pre-emptive action by the GCC, thus protecting Saudi and Sunni hegemony in the Arabian Peninsula. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran have taken advantage of this sectarian discourse to preserve their power in the region. Given the strong ties between Manama and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia has promoted the use of sectarianism in Bahrain (a close ally) in order to protect its own internal political and economic stability (especially in the Eastern Province) and its hegemony in the Arabian Peninsula. Iran has also benefitted from this portrait of the Bahraini uprising. Even though there is no evidence of direct Iranian meddling in the unrest, Iran has made no efforts to deny these claims. In fact, it has strongly criticized Saudi military intervention and has provided media coverage favourable to the protestors. It has done so motivated

by the possibility of increasing Shia leverage in the region. In this cold war context, sectarianism has become a powerful political weapon used not only in Bahrain but also in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Since rivalries between Saudi Arabia and Iran are played out within the political arena of multicultural neighbouring countries, the exploitation of the Sunni-Shia divide has emerged as much more than a soft power foreign policy tool. However, sectarianism has proven to be a double-edged sword and its overuse is giving rise to important security concerns, as identity is easier to exacerbate than to control. Given the existing transnational identities in the Gulf and the role of sectarian sensitivities in the region, Saudi Arabia and Iran should be more careful when using sectarianism as a means to justify their pursuit of realpolitik interests, since the over-empowerment of identity may end up blurring state boundaries and changing the perception of security threats in the Middle East.

Can’t solve democratic transition- requires experienced leadershipJoffe 6/1 (Prof George Joffe - a Research Fellow at the Centre and Visiting Professor of Geography at Kings College, London University. He specialises in the Middle East and North Africa and is currently engaged in a project studying connections between migrant communities and trans/national violence in Europe. He is also a lecturer on the Centre's M.Phil. in International Relations. 01 June 2015. “Resentment, anger and violence” https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/guest-writers/18957-resentment-anger-and-violence)//LPThere are, perhaps, two other lessons to be drawn from the Algerian experience and the events of 2011. Firstly,

democratic transition is a difficult and lengthy process and that cultural authenticity and moral authority are not, in themselves, guarantors of success. Thus, an-Nahda in Tunisia was able, eventually, to operate effectively within a nascent democratic environment because its leadership had spent two decades in exile observing how democratic systems, despite their imperfections, actually worked. It understood the compromises that formal empowerment by an electorate still required, both in its own understanding of the political process and in its relations with coalition partners and even its political opposition. Those were lessons that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt either ignored or of which it was unaware, and it was this that stimulated the Tamarrud movement which the Egyptian army command adroitly exploited to remove it from power.

China

China’s human rights improving already – China’s National Human Rights Action Plan PRC 15 (June 08, 2015 “Progress in China's Human Rights in 2014” http://en.people.cn/n/2015/0608/c90785-8903658.html)//LP

The basic rights of the Chinese people became better protected, and China's constitutional principle of "respecting and safeguarding human rights" was implemented in a better way. In 2014, China made steady progress in comprehensively completing the building of a moderately prosperous society. By the end of the year, among all the 29 countable or measurable indicators for economic and social development set forth in the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015), 12 had been over-fulfilled, three had been nearly

fulfilled and 11 had made smooth progress, accounting for 90 percent of the total. The mid-stage assessment of China's National Human Rights Action Plan (2012-2015) was carried out in December 2014, and the result showed that most of the targets set in the plan had been reached, and a larger part of the quantitative indices had been half or even more achieved. In the same year China's efforts for law-based governance reached a new take-off stage. The Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC approved the Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on Certain Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Advancing the Law-Based Governance of China, drawing up a clear blueprint for

building a socialist law-based country with Chinese characteristics. The fundamental purposes of the blueprint are to protect civic rights, to defend human dignity and to put basic human rights into practice.

PRC improving -- women’s rights provesLi 2000. (“Women ’s Movement and Change of Women ’ s Status in China” Journal of International Women’s Studies: Vol. 1 Issue 1. January 2000. Yuhui Li. http://vc.bridgew.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1626&context=jiws)This study examines history of women’s movement and gender stratification in urban areas in contemporary China.

Undeniably, there have been many changes in the PRC that have significantly reduced the gender inequality in China compared with the past in the thousands of years of Chinese history. Many of the changes were institutionalized from the top and were fairly effective. The central government has been directly involved in designing many policies and implementing them to protect women. Women’s labor force participation was for some time brought to almost the saturated level. There has been significant increase in the level of general public’s awareness over the issue of gender inequality. Gender gap has become smaller in the areas of educational achievement, labor force participation and occupational distribution.

Women’s Movements

Internet activism won’t succeed on a large scale- opposition and internal fightsCarmon 15 (IRIN CARMON - a national reporter at MSNBC, covering gender and politics. FEBRUARY 17, 2015 “What Women Need” http://prospect.org/article/what-women-need)//LPSomething on the surface, if not in the structures of things, has shifted in recent years. Until a few years ago, even sympathetic celebrities and politicians cringed at anything feminist or even tangentially insistent on women’s rights. Perhaps things needed to get worse—with right-wingers talking about “legitimate rape” and everything suggested by it—before they could

get better, particularly for the female voters courted by the parties. The Internet also allowed a critical mass of feminists to come out of hiding and speak on their own terms, among them Girls creator

Lena Dunham, whom Swift credited as her feminist mentor. These are mostly symbolic victories, though

they matter, too, and feminists have been starved for them. Whether the groundswell can be channeled into something more sustainable and profound is another question. Not only is the opposition fierce, there are also deep fractures among those who call themselves feminists. “Divisions across age, race, class and ideology have complicated efforts to establish common priorities,” writes Deborah L. Rhode in What Women Want.

Can’t solve- free internet is still misogynisticVagianos 14 (Alanna Vagianos- an Associate Editor for HuffPost Women. She graduated from Elon University in North Carolina. 10/03/2014 “This Is What It's Like To Be A Woman Online” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/19/what-its-like-to-be-a-woman-online-buzzfeed_n_5849052.html)//LP

Being a woman on the Internet is no easy feat. Anyone who's ventured onto the World Wide Web has likely witnessed -- or been on the receiving end of -- comments thrown at a woman simply because, well, she's female. In a video titled "What It's Like To Be A Woman Online," Buzzfeed interviewed nine women who are visible and active on social media about their experiences on the Internet. The comments they've received run the range from horrifying and offensive to downright weird. Whether left in the comments

section of an article or fired off as direct tweets, the responses the women featured in the video received online all share a general theme of misogyny. From outrageous comments on appearance such as “Ugly Jewish whore” and “For your age, you’re looking great,” to mansplaining, rarely can a woman publish a few

words on the Internet without receiving unsolicited, irrelevant commentary from the world's biggest peanut gallery. Hearing women read idiotic commentary aloud brings some humor to a rather depressing reality, but the abuse women receive online everyday cuts much deeper than the few tweets and comments highlighted in the three-minute clip. Women routinely receive death threats, rape threats and even bomb threats when they have a public presence online. And the fact that we have come to view this behavior as somewhat "inevitable" is terrifying. No woman should ever have to live by the rule: "Block if [the commenter] get scary, ignore if it's just annoying."

No widespread empowerment even with free internet- lack of infrastructure, illiteracyUN 2005 (Women2000 and Beyond. “Gender equality and empowerment of women through ICT” September 2005. UN Division for the Advancement of Women, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/w2000-09.05-ict-e.pdf)//LP

“The so-called digital divide is actually several gaps in one. There is a technological divide—great gaps in infrastructure. There is a content divide. A lot of web-based information is simply not relevant to the real needs of people. And nearly 70 per cent of the world’s websites are in English, at times crowding out local voices and views. There is a gender divide, with women and girls enjoying less access to information technology than men and boys. This can be true of rich and poor countries alike”. United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan Statement to the World Summit on the Information

Society, Geneva, 10 December 2003. While the potential of ICT for stimulating economic growth, socioeconomic

development and effective governance is well recognized, the benefits of ICT have been unevenly

distributed within and between countries. The term “digital divide” refers to the differences in resources and capabilities to access and effectively utilize ICT for development that exist within and between countries, regions, sectors and socio-economic groups. The digital divide is often characterized by low levels of access to technologies. Poverty, illiteracy, lack of computer literacy and language barriers are among the factors impeding access to ICT infrastructure, especially in developing countries. Internet usage figures collected by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) in 2003 illustrate this gap in access. For

instance, in 2003, the United States reported 5,558 Internet users per 10,000 persons, compared with 690 users per 10,000 persons in Asia and 156 users per 10,000 persons in Africa.

No definitive case studies ICT’s benefits on Womens’ movementsBonder 02. (Gloria Bonder- an Argentine researcher and gender activist. Founded the Center for Women's Studies (CEM) and coordinated the International Working Group on Women and ICT field of the United Nations. UN meeting on “Information and communication technologies and their impact on and use as an instrument for the advancement and empowerment of women.” 11 to 14 November 2002. “From access to appropriation: Women and ICT policies in Latin American and the Caribbean.” http://www.mujeresenred.net/zonaTIC/IMG/pdf/GBonder.pdf)//LPAccess to information, to knowledge and the interaction between cultures and social groups have never been so within the

reach of humanity, nor as valued as in the last decades. The continuous innovation and global spreading of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) appear like a fundamental resource in order to reach these goals and inaugurate a change of era

known as Information Society or Knowledge Society. However, in its current phase of development, we must clearly differentiate the potentialities (informative, educational, cultural, political, economic,

etc.) offered by these technologies, from their manifestations and actual impact on the various contexts and social groups. This type of analysis is still at a beginning stage in the LAC Region.

Therefore, the understanding of the role currently played by these technologies in our societies is usually based on impressions, “good wishes” and, in the best of cases, on some partial studies.

Economy

Econ Decline Won’t Cause War

Econ Decline Doesn’t Cause WarFerguson ‘6 “Niall Ferguson, a Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. ‘The Next War of the World, 2006’, ” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2006-09-01/next-war-world

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist

regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.Many trace responsibility for the butchery to extreme ideologies. The Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm calls the years between 1914 and 1991 "an era of religious wars" but argues that "the most militant and bloodthirsty religions were secular ideologies." At the other end of the political spectrum, the conservative historian Paul Johnson blames the violence on "the rise of moral relativism, the decline of personal responsibility [and] the repudiation of Judeo-Christian values." But the rise of new ideologies or the decline of old values cannot be regarded as causes of violence in their own

right. Extreme belief systems, such as anti-Semitism, have existed for most of modern history, but

only at certain times and in certain places have they been widely embraced and translated into violence.And as tempting as it is to blame tyrants such as Hitler, Stalin, and Mao for the century's bloodletting, to do so is to repeat the error on which Leo Tolstoy heaped so much scorn in War and Peace. Megalomaniacs may order men to invade Russia, but why do the men obey? Some historians have attempted to answer the novelist's question by indicting the modern nation-state. The nation-state does indeed possess unprecedented capabilities for mobilizing masses of people, but those

means could just as easily be harnessed, and have been, to peaceful ends.Others seek the cause of conflict in the internal political arrangements of states. It has become fashionable among political scientists to posit a causal link between democracy and peace, extrapolating from the observation that democracies tend not to go to war with one another. The corollary, of course, is that dictatorships generally are more bellicose. By that logic, the rise of democracy during the twentieth century should have made the world more peaceful. Democratization may well have reduced the incidence of war between states. But waves of democratization in the 1920s, 1960s, and 1980s seem to have multiplied the number of civil wars. Some of those (such as the conflicts in Afghanistan, Burundi, China, Korea, Mexico, Mozambique, Nigeria, Russia, Rwanda, and Vietnam) were among the deadliest conflicts of the century. Horrendous numbers of fatalities were also caused by genocidal or "politicidal" campaigns waged against civilian populations, such as those carried out by the Young Turks against the Armenians and the Greeks during World War I, the Soviet government from the 1920s until the 1950s, and the Nazis between 1933 and 1945 -- to say nothing of those perpetrated by the communist tyrannies of Mao in China and Pol Pot in Cambodia. Indeed, such civil strife has been the most common form of conflict during the past 50 years. Of the 24 armed conflicts recorded as "ongoing" by the University of Maryland's Ted Robert Gurr and George Mason University's Monty Marshall in early 2005, nearly all were civil wars.

AFF Answers

FYI’s About Aff

FYI- 702 procedures (read to understand 702 restriction)Donohue 15 (Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 38.1 (Winter 2015): 117-265. Laura K, Professor of Law A.B., Dartmouth; M.A., University of Ulster, Northern Ireland; Ph.D., Cambridge University; J.D., Stanford, http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqrl/docview/1658465073/341393F9D9AC4223PQ/2?accountid=14667) // AW

FISA Section 702 empowers the Attorney General (AG) and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) jointly to authorize, for up to one year, "the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information."64 Five limitations apply. Acquisition may not intentionally (a) target a person known to be located in the United States;65 (b) target an individual reasonably believed to be located outside the United States, if the actual purpose is to target an individual reasonably believed to be located in domestic bounds;66 (c) target a U.S. person reasonably believed to be outside domestic bounds;67 or (d) obtain wholly domestic communications.68 In addition, (e), all acquisition must be conducted consistent with the Fourth Amendment.69¶ Procedurally, five steps must be followed for acquisition to commence. First, the AG and DNI must adopt targeting and minimization procedures consistent with the statutory requirements.70 Second, the two officials must provide FISC with a written certification and any supporting affidavits, attesting that there are procedures in place reasonably designed to ensure that the acquisition is limited to targeting individuals outside of the United States and to prevent the intentional acquisition of domestic communications, and that the minimization procedures meet the requirements of the statute.71 They must guarantee that guidelines have been adopted to ensure compliance with the statutory limitations.72 They also must attest that "a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain foreign intelligence information."73 Third, the targeting and minimization procedures must be provided to the Congressional intelligence committees, as well as the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives.74¶ FISC is limited in the role it can play with regard to reviewing the certification, as well as the targeting and minimization procedures. As long as the certification elements are present, the targeting procedures are reasonably designed to ensure that acquisition targets persons are reasonably believed to be outside the United States and do not knowingly intercept domestic communications, the minimization procedures are statutorily consistent, and the procedures are consistent with the Fourth Amendment, "the Court shall enter an order approving the certification and the use, or continued use ..." of an acquisition.75¶ The FAA created numerous reporting requirements. At least twice a year, the Attorney General and DNI must assess compliance with the targeting and minimization procedures and submit the assessments to FISC, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), and the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary.76 The inspectors general of DOJ and the IC agency using Section 702 authorities are authorized to review compliance with the targeting and minimization procedures, and required to review (a) the number of intelligence reports containing U.S. persons' identities disseminated to other agencies; and (b) the number of targets later determined to be located in the United States.77 The IG reports are provided to the AG, the DNI, and the same Congressional committees receiving the AG and DNI targeting and minimization reports.78 In addition, the head of each IC agency obtaining information under Section 702 must annually review the programs to ascertain whether foreign information has been, or will be, obtained from the acquisition.79 The annual review must also consider the number of intelligence reports disseminated to other agencies containing references to U.S. persons, the number of targets later ascertained to be located within the United States, and a description of any procedures approved by the DNI relevant to the acquisition, the adequacy of the minimization procedures.80 This review must then be provided to FISC, the Attorney General, the DNI, the Congressional intelligence committees, and the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate.81 Finally, every six months, the Attorney General must inform the intelligence and judiciary committees of any certifications submitted consistent with Section 702, the reasons for exercising the authority, any directives issued in conjunction with the acquisition, a description of the judicial review during the reporting period of the certifications as well as targeting and minimization procedures (including copies of orders or pleadings submitted in connection with such reviews that contain a significant legal interpretation of the law), any actions taken to challenge or enforce a directive issued, any compliance reviews, and a description of any incidents of noncompliance.

FYI- IC Procedures Office of the Press Secretary (The White House, “Presidential Policy Directive -- Signals Intelligence Activities,” January 17, 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-directive-signals-intelligence-activities) // AW

The IC has long recognized that effective oversight is necessary to ensure that we are protecting our national security in a manner consistent with our interests and values. Accordingly, the policies and procedures of IC elements, and departments and agencies containing IC elements, shall include appropriate measures to facilitate oversight over the implementation of safeguards protecting personal information, to include periodic auditing against the standards required by this section.¶ The policies and procedures shall also recognize and facilitate the performance of oversight by the Inspectors General of IC elements, and departments and agencies containing IC elements, and other relevant oversight entities, as appropriate and consistent with their responsibilities. When a significant compliance issue occurs involving personal information of any

person, regardless of nationality, collected as a result of signals intelligence activities, the issue shall, in addition to any existing reporting requirements, be reported promptly to the DNI, who shall determine what, if any, corrective actions are necessary. If the issue involves a non-United States person, the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the head of the notifying department or agency, shall determine whether steps should be taken to notify the relevant foreign government, consistent with the protection of sources and methods and of U.S. personnel.

Topicality

Domestic

Domestic refers to only internal affairs of a countryWild 06 (SUSAN ELLIS WILD has been a practicing attorney since 1982, when she graduated with honors from George Washington University Law School. Webster's New World Law Dictionary p. 128 accessed 06/24/15)PA

Domestic adj. pertaining to the internal affairs of products of a country; relation to matters of the family.

Domestic is of your country Merriam-webster (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/domestic)PA

domestic : of, relating to, or made in your own country : relating to or involving someone's home or family : relating to the work (such as cooking and cleaning) that is done in a person's home

Domestic relates to a homeBLACK, M. A. 1991 (HENRY CAMPBELL was the founder of Black's Law Dictionary, the definitive legal dictionary first published in 1891. He was also the editor of The Constitutional Review from 1917. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 6th edition p.484 accessed 06/24/15) PA

Domestic, adj. Pertaining, belonging, or relating to a home, a domicile, or to the place of birth, origin, cre- ation, or transaction

Curtail

Empirically, “curtail” means a decrease in surveillance measuresUnited States v. United States District Court (No. 70-153) 1972 https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/407/297 LPIn that month Attorney General Tom Clark advised President Truman of the necessity of using wiretaps "in cases vitally affecting the domestic security." In May 1940 President Roosevelt had authorized Attorney General Jackson to utilize wiretapping in matters "involving the defense of the nation," but it is questionable whether this language was meant to apply to solely domestic subversion. The nature and extent of wiretapping apparently varied under different administrations and

Attorneys General, but, except for the sharp curtailment under Attorney General Ramsey Clark in the latter

years of the Johnson administration, electronic surveillance has been used both against organized crime and in domestic security cases at least since the 1946 memorandum from Clark to Truman.

Contextually, “curtail” means a decrease in surveillanceHealy 03 -- senior editor at the Cato Institute (Gene, “Beware of Total Information Awareness,” 1/20/03, http://truthseek.info/pdf/bewareoftotalinformationawareness190820061008.pdf LP

The Army's domestic surveillance activities were substantially curtailed after the end of World War I. But throughout the 20th Century, in periods of domestic unrest and foreign conflict, army surveillance ratcheted up again, most notably in the 1960s.

Curtail is to limitMerriam-webster (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/curtail)PA

Curtail : to reduce or limit (something)

Curtail is to cut short Dictionary.com (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/curtail)PA

verb (used with object) to cut short; cut off a part of; abridge; reduce; diminish.

Curtail is to cut offBLACK, M. A. 1991 (HENRY CAMPBELL was the founder of Black's Law Dictionary, the definitive legal dictionary first published in 1891. He was also the editor of The Constitutional Review from 1917. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 6th edition p.383 accessed 06/24/15) PA

Curtail. To cut off the end or any part of; hence to shorten, abridge, diminish, lessen, or reduce; and term has no such meaning as abolish. State v. Edwards, 207 La. 506, 21 So.2d 624, 625.

Empirically, “curtail” means to regulateFriman and Andreas ‘99 (H. Richard Friman - associate professor of political science at Marquette University. Peter Andreas

- academy scholar at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. The Illicit Global Economy and State Power. Google Books p. 76)

Indeed, the link between decisions to liberalize capital controls and regulatory initiatives to curtail illicit transactions in the new liberal environment has often been very close. In the European Community, for example,

initiatives to curtail tax evasion and money laundering began to be pursued at the very same time that member countries had agreed to abolish capital controls.

702 doesn’t authorize domestic surveillanceClapper and Holder ‘12. (James Clapper and Eric Holder, DNI and AG. 2/8/2012. A letter too Speaker Boehner and Leaders Reid, Pelosi, and McConnell. http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ola/legacy/2012/11/08/02-08-12-fisa-

reauthorization.pdf)//LP One provision. section 702, authorizes surveillance directed at non-U.S. persons located overseas who are of foreign intelligence importance. At the same time, it provides a comprehensive regime of oversight by

all three branches of Government to protect the privacy and civil liberties of U.S . persons. Under section 702, the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence may authorize annually,

with the approval of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), intelligence collection targeting categories of non-U.S. persons abroad, without the need for a court order for each individual target. Within this framework, no acquisition may intentionally target a U.S. person. here or abroad. or any other person known to be in the United States. The law requires special procedures designed to ensure that all such acquisitions target only non-U.S. persons outside the United States_ and to protect the privacy of U.S. persons whose nonpublic information may be incidentally acquired. The Department of Justice and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence conduct extensive oversight reviews of section 702 activities at least once every sixty days, and Title VII requires us to report to the Congress on implementation and compliance twice a year.

A2: Legitimacy K

Reputation matters – its embedded in crisis analysis Yarhi-Milo ‘2010. Assistant professor of politics and Internet affairs. (Keren, “Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics,” August. Princeton. http://www.polisci.upenn.edu/~weisiger/reputation.pdf)//TS

Does reputation for resolve matter? Our findings provide strong evidence that it does. While studies by reputation critics are correct to argue that realist variables like power and interests play an important role in states’ behavior during crises, past actions do have significant consequences. Countries that have backed down are substantially more likely to face subsequent challenges. We argue that the discrepancy between our results and those advanced by reputation critics may stem from their focus on crisis decision-making, where information gleaned from past action will already have been incorporated into broader estimates of interests and hence is less likely to be referenced directly, as well as from their failure to recognize that reputation acts through estimates of an opponent’s interests. At the same time, our results do not provide unequivocal support in favor of the strong version of reputation associated with Thomas Schelling. Rather, we observe that the effects of past actions remain, but are weaker, when the subsequent interaction less closely resembles the dispute in which the country in question earned its reputation. Thus, we find that past actions have a less substantive effect on the probability of a new dispute when the inferences are drawn by observers who were not involved in the previous dispute. Further, we find that lessons from territorial disputes are much more strongly associated with subsequent territorial challenges than are lessons from non-territorial disputes. At the same time, however, we find that reputation for resolve is not leader-specific, indicating that leader turnover in a country with a bad reputation should not significantly lower the 29 probability that such a country will be challenged again. Important questions about reputation remain. We find that reputation for resolve exists and is fairly general, but that leaves unanswered questions about the generality of reputation for other traits like honesty and reliability. Separately, while we find little change in reputation after leadership turnover, further research would be needed to definitively establish the degree to which reputations affix to leaders or to states. It is not implausible that both the generality of reputation and the degree to which inferences are drawn

about specific leaders or about states in general would vary by regime type or over time. Our results confirm what leaders already intuitively suspect: reputation for resolve is worth having in international politics. While we certainly do not mean to imply that backing down is always the wrong thing to do, leaders who contemplate doing so should be aware of the associated costs.

Legitimacy is real – evaluations of credibility are factored into self-interestsYarhi-Milo ‘2010. Assistant professor of politics and Internet affairs. (Keren, “Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics,” August. Princeton. http://www.polisci.upenn.edu/~weisiger/reputation.pdf)//TS

The explanations and evidence that reputation critics provide have serious limitations.6 Press argues that power and interest are more important than reputation for resolve. Yet past actions matter in formal models of reputation by affecting uninformed players’ estimates of opponents’ interests (Alt, Calvert, and Humes 1988, Nalebuff 1991). A country that backs down in a crisis is deemed to have a relatively low valuation for the political issue at stake or a relatively high subjective cost of fighting. To the extent that lessons about an actor’s resolve from one crisis carry over to another, then, they do so in the form of statements about that actor’s interests. Once this lesson is learned, however, there is no guarantee that leaders will refer back to the prior incident that led them to conclude that their opponent was resolved, instead merely observing that it has high interests in the political stake. In short,

juxtaposing reputation to a realist power and interests story is inappropriate if estimates of interests depend in part on past actions. Press (2005, 21) briefly

acknowledges this possibility, observing that a situation in which “a decision maker uses an adversary’s history of keeping commitments to assess the adversary’s interests or military power, and hence

credibility,” would be evidence that reputations matter. In practice, however, his empirical work focuses on whether or

not leaders justify predictions about adversary behavior based on actions in past crises, while paying much less attention to

the indirect route identified here in which past actions affect beliefs about interests, which in turn

affect predictions about future behavior. Game theoretic models of reputation formation indicate, however, that this indirect path in fact should be the primary route by which past actions should influence current behavior, and hence by which reputations should operate.

Legitimacy’s created through reviewing past actions – deterrence proves countries that information to determine reactions Yarhi-Milo ‘2010. Assistant professor of politics and Internet affairs. (Keren, “Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics,” August. Princeton. http://www.polisci.upenn.edu/~weisiger/reputation.pdf)//TS

Moreover, there is the problem, noted most prominently by Fearon (1994, 2002), that within crises leaders are likely to focus primarily on new information, such as that gleaned from crisis negotiations or military mobilization, rather than the

information that was available prior to the crisis. Past actions are by definition observable prior to a specific crisis. As such, we should expect their influence on opponents’ perceptions to be most readily visible prior to the crisis as well.7 In the context of a significant crisis, leaders certainly debate the level of an opponent’s resolve (i.e. interests), taking into account all the available information. By the time that they do so, however,

information gleaned from past actions – reputation – will have been folded into the general assessment of interests, alongside other pertinent sources of information such as what has

been learned from the opponent’s crisis behavior in the current crisis. Thus, while it would not be inconsistent with

our argument for leaders to reference past action in the context of an ongoing crisis, it would not be surprising if such references did not appear. The place to look for the effect of past actions on future expectations is at the level of general deterrence.

Good reputation reduces conflict risks --- loss of reputation reduces negotiating powerYarhi-Milo ‘2010. Assistant professor of politics and Internet affairs. (Keren, “Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics,” August. Princeton. http://www.polisci.upenn.edu/~weisiger/reputation.pdf)//TS

What then are the implications of these arguments for international politics? The clearest prediction concerns general

deterrence: countries that have earned a bad reputation will be more likely to be challenged, while those who have earned a good reputation will be less likely to face challenges. More precisely, a bad reputation leads observers to believe that they can convince the country in question to make more significant political concessions than they otherwise would have been willing to make. This inference has two effects: countries that would have initiated a crisis anyway now ask for more than they otherwise would have, and

countries that would not have initiated a dispute now believe that it is worthwhile to do so. A similar relationship applies in reverse for countries with a good reputation, who are less attractive targets, meaning that some who would have started a dispute anyway demand less from them, while others who would have made a demand now opt not to do so. While statistically testing predictions about the size of demands (especially relative to an unobservable counterfactual in which the target had behaved differently in the past) is not possible, predictions about the frequency of challenges are more straightforward to examine.