TORTS Principles & Defenses Involving Torts_ Full Text 27

EN BANCG.R. No. L-3422 June 13, 1952HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC.,petitioner,vs.GUILLERMO BALANDAN, ANSELMA ANILA and THE COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.Quisumbing, Sycip, Quisumbing and Salazar for petitioner.Antonio M. Moncado for respondents.BENGZON,J.:This is an appeal bycertiorari, from a decision of the Court of Appeals requiring Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. to pay Guillermo Balandan and his wife, damages in the sum of P2,000 for the death of their son Mario.It appears that the petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. "was the owner of an ice-plant factory in the City of San Pablo, Laguna, in whose premises were installed two tanks full of water, nine feet deep, for cooling purposes of its engine. While the factory compound was surrounded with fence, the tanks themselves were not provided with any kind of fence or top covers. The edges of the tanks were barely a foot high from the surface of the ground. Through the wide gate entrance, which is continually open, motor vehicles hauling ice and persons buying said commodity passed, and any one could easily enter the said factory, as he pleased. There was no guard assigned on the gate. At about noon of April 16, 1948, plaintiff's son, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 8 years old, while playing with and in company of other boys of his age entered the factory premises through the gate, to take a bath in one of said tanks; and while thus bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later, already a cadaver, having been died of "asphyxia secondary to drowning."The Court of Appeals, and the Court of First Instance of Laguna, took the view that the petitioner maintained an attractive nuisance (the tanks), and neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid accidents to persons entering its premises. It applied the doctrine of attractive nuisance, of American origin, recognized in this Jurisdiction inTaylor vs. Manila Electric16 Phil., 8.The doctrine may be stated, in short, as follows: One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. (See65 C.J.S., p. 455.)The principle reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children (65 C.J.S., p. 458).Now, is a swimming pool or water tank an instrumentality or appliance likely to attract the little children in play? In other words is the body of water an attractive nuisance?The great majority of American decisions say no.The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location.There are numerous cases in which the attractive nuisance doctrine has not been held not to be applicable to ponds or reservoirs, pools of water, streams, canals, dams, ditches, culverts, drains, cesspools or sewer pools, . . . (65 C.J.S., p. 476 et seg. citing decisions of California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Iowa, Louisiana, Miss., Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Nebraska, Wisconsin.)In fairness to the Court of Appeals it should be stated that the above volume of Corpus Juris Secundum was published in 1950, whereas its decision was promulgated on September 30, 1949.The reason why a swimming pool or pond or reservoir of water is not considered an attractive nuisance was lucidly explained by the Indiana Appellate Court as follows:Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger, . . . (he) is not liable because of having created an "attractive nuisance." Anderson vs. Reith-Riley Const. Co., N. E., 2nd, 184, 185; 112 Ind. App., 170.Therefore, as petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance, the question whether the petitioner had taken reasonable precautions becomes immaterial. And the other issue submitted by petitioner that the parents of the boy were guilty of contributory negligence precluding recovery, because they left for Manila on that unlucky day leaving their son under the care of no responsible individual needs no further discussion.The appealed decision is reversed and the Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. is absolved from liability. No costs.Feria, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, and Bautista Angelo, JJ.,concur.

FIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 92087 May 8, 1992SOFIA FERNANDO, in her behalf and as the legal guardian of her minor children, namely: ALBERTO & ROBERTO, all surnamed FERNANDO, ANITA GARCIA, NICOLAS LIAGOSO, ROSALIA BERTULANO, in her behalf and as the legal guardian of her minor children, namely: EDUARDO, ROLANDO, DANIEL, AND JOCELYN, all surnamed BERTULANO, PRIMITIVA FAJARDO in her behalf and as legal guardian of her minor children, namely: GILBERT, GLEN, JOCELYN AND JOSELITO, all surnamed FAJARDO, and EMETERIA LIAGOSO, in her behalf and as guardianad litem, of her minor grandchildren, namely: NOEL, WILLIAM, GENEVIEVE and GERRY, all surnamed LIAGOSO,petitioners,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND CITY OF DAVAO,respondents.MEDIALDEA,J.:This is a petition for review oncertioraripraying that the amended decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 11, 1990 in CA-G.R. No. C.V. 04846, entitled "Sofia Fernando, etc., et al. v. The City of Davao," be reversed and that its original decision dated January 31, 1986 be reinstated subject to the modification sought by the ``````petitioners in their motion for partial reconsideration dated March 6, 1986.The antecedent facts are briefly narrated by the trial court, as follows:From the evidence presented we see the following facts: On November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao. An invitation to bid was issued to Aurelio Bertulano, Lito Catarsa, Feliciano Bascon, Federico Bolo and Antonio Suer, Jr. Bascon won the bid. On November 26, 1975 Bascon was notified and he signed the purchase order. However, before such date, specifically onNovember 22, 1975, bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank. The bodies were removed by a fireman. One body, that of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but he expired there. The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned that the five victims entered the septic tank without clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master. In fact, the septic tank was found to be almost empty and the victims were presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying. Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office autopsied the bodies and in his reports, put the cause of death of all five victims as "asphyxia" caused by the diminution of oxygen supply in the body working below normal conditions. The lungs of the five victims burst, swelled in hemmorrhagic areas and this was due to their intake of toxic gas, which, in this case, was sulfide gas produced from the waste matter inside the septic tank. (p. 177, Records)On August 28, 1984, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this case is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED. (Records, p. 181)From the said decision, the petitioners appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals). On January 3, 1986, the appellate court issued a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, in view of the facts fully established and in the liberal interpretation of what the Constitution and the law intended to protect the plight of the poor and the needy, the ignorant and theindigent more entitled to social justice for having, in the unforgettable words of Magsaysay, "less in life," We hereby reverse and set aside the appealed judgment and render another one:1. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs Dionisio Fernando, Sofia Fernando and her minor children the following sums of money:a) Compensatory damages for his death P30,000.00b) Moral damages P20,000.002. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs David Garcia and Anita Garcia the following sums of money:a) Compensatory damages for his death P30,000.00b) Moral damages P20,000.003. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff Rosalia Bertulano (sic) and her minor children the following sums of moneya) Compensatory damages for his death P30,000.00b) Moral damages P20,000.004. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff Primitiva Fajardo and her minor children the following sums of money:a) Compensatory damages for his death P30,000.00b) Moral damages P20,000.005. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs Norma Liagoso, Nicolas Liagoso and Emeteria Liagoso and her minor grandchildren the following sums of money:a) Compensatory damages for his death P30,000.00b) Moral damages P20,000.00The death compensation is fixed at P30,000.00 in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court starting withPeople vs.De la Fuente,Nos. L-63251-52, December 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 518 reiterated in the recent case ofPeople vs.Nepomuceno, No. L-41412, May 27, 1985. Attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00 for the handling of the case for the 5 victims is also awarded.No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 33-34)Both parties filed their separate motions for reconsideration. On January 11, 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered an Amended Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, finding merit in the motion for reconsideration of the defendant-appellee Davao City, the same is hereby GRANTED. The decision of this Court dated January 31, 1986 is reversed and set aside and another one is hereby rendered dismissing the case. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25)Hence, this petition raising the following issues for resolution:1. Is the respondent Davao City guilty of negligence in the case at bar?2. If so, is such negligence the immediate and proximate cause of deaths of the victims hereof? (p. 72,Rollo)Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury (Corliss v. Manila Railroad Company, L-21291, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 674, 680). Under the law, a person who by his omission causes damage to another, there being negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done (Article 2176, New Civil Code). As to what would constitute a negligent act in a given situation, the case ofPicart v.Smith(37 Phil. 809, 813) provides Us the answer, to wit:The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows:Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreetpater familiasof the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculation cannot here be of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm.Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this:Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences. (emphasis supplied)To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of another, a claimant must establish the relation between the omission and the damage. He must prove under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code that the defendant's negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred (Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186). Proof of such relation of cause and effect is not an arduous one if the claimant did not in any way contribute to the negligence of the defendant. However, where the resulting injury was the product of the negligence of both parties, there exists a difficulty to discern which acts shall be considered the proximate cause of the accident. InTaylor v.Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. (16 Phil. 8, 29-30), this Court set a guideline for a judicious assessment of the situation:Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident.The test is simple.Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt. For instance, the cause of the accident under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This produced the event giving occasion for damages that is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was an element of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly through his act or omission of duty, that would have been one of the determining causes of the event or accident, for which he would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence. (emphasis Ours)Applying all these established doctrines in the case at bar and after a careful scrutiny of the records, We find no compelling reason to grant the petition. We affirm.Petitioners fault the city government of Davao for failing to clean a septic tank for the period of 19 years resulting in an accumulation of hydrogen sulfide gas which killed the laborers. They contend that such failure was compounded by the fact that there was no warning sign of the existing danger and no efforts exerted by the public respondent to neutralize or render harmless the effects of the toxic gas. They submit that the public respondent's gross negligence was the proximate cause of the fatal incident.We do not subscribe to this view. While it may be true that the public respondent has been remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic tank annually, such negligence was not a continuing one. Upon learning from the report of the market master about the need to clean the septic tank of the public toilet in Agdao Public Market, the public respondent immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such service. Thereafter, it awarded the bid to the lowest bidder, Mr. Feliciano Bascon (TSN, May 24, 1983, pp. 22-25). The public respondent, therefore, lost no time in taking up remedial measures to meet the situation. It is likewise an undisputed fact that despite the public respondent's failure to re-empty the septic tank since 1956, people in the market have been using the public toilet for their personal necessities but have remained unscathed. The testimonies of Messrs. Danilo Garcia and David Secoja (plaintiffs'-petitioners' witnesses) on this point are relevant, to wit:Atty. Mojica, counsel for defendant Davao City:xxx xxx xxxThe place where you live is right along the Agdao creek, is that correct?DANILO GARCIA:A Yes, sir.Q And to be able to go to the market place, where you claim you have a stall,, you have to pass on the septic tank?A Yes, sir.Q Day in and day out, you pass on top of the septic tank?A Yes, sir.Q Is it not a fact that everybody living along the creek passes on top of this septic tank as they go out from the place and return to their place of residence, is that correct?Andthis septic tank, rather the whole of the septic tank, is covered by lead. . .?A Yes, sir.there is cover.Q And there were three (3) of these lead covering the septic tank?A Yes, sir.Q And this has always been closed?A Yes, sir. (TSN, November 26, 1979, pp. 21-23, emphasis supplied)ATTY. JOVER, counsel for the plaintiffs:Q You said you are residing at Davao City, is it not?DAVID SEJOYA:A Yes, sir.Q How long have you been a resident of Agdao?A Since 1953.Q Where specifically in Agdao are you residing?A At the Public Market.Q Which part of the Agdao Public Market is your house located?A Inside the market in front of the fish section.Q Do you know where the Agdao septic tank is located?A Yes, sir.Q How far is that septic tank located from your house?A Around thirty (30) meters.Q Have you ever had a chance to use that septic tank (public toilet)?A Yes, sir.Q How many times, if you could remember?A Many times, maybe more than 1,000 times.Q Prior to November 22, 1975, have you ever used that septic tank (public toilet)?A Yes, sir.Q How many times have you gone to that septic tank (public toilet) prior to that date, November 22, 1975?A Almost 1,000 times. (TSN, February 9, 1983, pp. 1-2)The absence of any accident was due to the public respondent's compliance with the sanitary and plumbing specifications in constructing the toilet and the septic tank (TSN, November 4, 1983, p. 51). Hence, the toxic gas from the waste matter could not have leaked out because the septic tank was air-tight (TSN,ibid, p. 49). The only indication that the septic tank in the case at bar was full and needed emptying was when water came out from it (TSN, September 13, 1983, p. 41). Yet, even when the septic tank was full, there was no report of any casualty of gas poisoning despite the presence of people living near it or passing on top of it or using the public toilet for their personal necessities.Petitioners made a lot of fuss over the lack of any ventilation pipe in the toilet to emphasize the negligence of the city government and presented witnesses to attest on this lack. However, this strategy backfired on their faces. Their witnesses were not expert witnesses. On the other hand, Engineer Demetrio Alindada of the city government testified and demonstrated by drawings how the safety requirements like emission of gases in the construction of both toilet and septic tank have been complied with. He stated that the ventilation pipe need not be constructed outside the building as it could also be embodied in the hollow blocks as is usually done in residential buildings (TSN, November 4, 1983, pp. 50-51). The petitioners submitted no competent evidence to corroborate their oral testimonies or rebut the testimony given by Engr. Alindada.We also do not agree with the petitioner's submission that warning signs of noxious gas should have been put up in the toilet in addition to the signs of "MEN" and "WOMEN" already in place in that area. Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisancesper seas defined in Article 694 of the New Civil Code which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public. While the construction of these public facilities demands utmost compliance with safety and sanitary requirements, the putting up of warning signs is not one of those requirements. The testimony of Engr. Alindada on this matter is elucidative:ATTY. ALBAY:Q Mr. Witness, you mentioned the several aspects of the approval of the building permit which include the plans of an architect, senitary engineer and electrical plans. All of these still pass your approval as building official, is that correct?DEMETRIO ALINDADA:A Yes.Q So there is the sanitary plan submitted to and will not be approved by you unless the same is in conformance with the provisions of the building code or sanitary requirements?A Yes, for private building constructions.Q How about public buildings?A For public buildings, they are exempted for payment of building permits but still they have to have a building permit.Q But just the same, including the sanitary plans, it require your approval?A Yes, it requires also.Q Therefore, under the National Building Code, you are empowered not to approve sanitary plans if they are not in conformity with the sanitary requirements?A Yes.Q Now, in private or public buildings, do you see any warning signs in the vicinity of septic tanks?A There is no warning sign.Q In residential buildings do you see any warning sign?A There is none.ATTY. AMPIG:We submit that the matter is irrelevant and immaterial, Your Honor.ATTY. ALBAY:But that is in consonance with their cross-examination, your Honor.COURT:Anyway it is already answered.ATTY. ALBAY:Q These warning signs, are these required under the preparation of the plans?A It is not required.Q I will just reiterate, Mr. Witness. In residences, for example like the residence of Atty. Ampig or the residence of the honorable Judge, would you say that the same principle of the septic tank, from the water closet to the vault, is being followed?A Yes.ATTY. ALBAY:That will be all, Your Honor. (TSN, December 6, 1983, pp. 62-63)In view of this factual milieu, it would appear that an accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes its covers. The accident in the case at bar occurred because the victims on their own and without authority from the public respondent opened the septic tank. Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident. InCulion Ice, Fish and Elect.Co., v.Phil.Motors Corporation(55 Phil. 129, 133), We held that when a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill,he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do(emphasis Ours). The fatal accident in this case would not have happened but for the victims' negligence. Thus, the appellate court was correct to observe that:. . . Could the victims have died if they did not open the septic tank which they were not in the first place authorized to open? Who between the passive object (septic tank) and the active subject (the victims herein) who, having no authority therefore, arrogated unto themselves, the task of opening the septic tank which caused their own deaths should be responsible for such deaths. How could the septic tank which has been in existence since the 1950's be the proximate cause of an accident that occurred only on November 22, 1975? The stubborn fact remains that since 1956 up to occurrence of the accident in 1975 no injury nor death was caused by the septic tank. The only reasonable conclusion that could be drawn from the above is that the victims' death was caused by their own negligence in opening the septic tank. . . . (Rollo, p. 23)Petitioners further contend that the failure of the market master to supervise the area where the septic tank is located is a reflection of the negligence of the public respondent.We do not think so. The market master knew that work on the septic tank was still forthcoming. It must be remembered that the bidding had just been conducted. Although the winning bidder was already known, the award to him was still to be made by the Committee on Awards. Upon the other hand, the accident which befell the victims who are not in any way connected with the winning bidder happened before the award could be given. Considering that the case was yet no award to commence work on the septic tank, the duty of the market master or his security guards to supervise the work could not have started (TSN, September 13, 1983, p. 40). Also, the victims could not have been seen working in the area because the septic tank was hidden by a garbage storage which is more or less ten (10) meters away from the comfort room itself (TSN,ibid, pp. 38-39). The surreptitious way in which the victims did their job without clearance from the market master or any of the security guards goes against their good faith. Even their relatives or family members did not know of their plan to clean the septic tank.Finally, petitioners' insistence on the applicability of Article 24 of the New Civil Code cannot be sustained. Said law states:Art. 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.We approve of the appellate court's ruling that "(w)hile one of the victims was invited to bid for said project, he did not win the bid, therefore, there is a total absence of contractual relations between the victims and the City Government of Davao City that could give rise to any contractual obligation, much less, any liability on the part of Davao City." (Rollo, p. 24) The accident was indeed tragic and We empathize with the petitioners. However, the herein circumstances lead Us to no other conclusion than that the proximate and immediate cause of the death of the victims was due to their own negligence. Consequently, the petitioners cannot demand damages from the public respondent.ACCORDINGLY, the amended decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 11, 1990 is AFFIRMED. No costs.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., C

THIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. L-68102 July 16, 1992GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE,petitioners,vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA MANALO,respondents.G.R. No. L-68103 July 16, 1992CARMEN DAYRIT KOH, LETICIA KOH, JULIETA KOH TUQUERO, ARACELI KOH MCKEE, ANTONIO KOH and ELIZABETH KOH TURLA,petitioners,vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA MANALO,respondents.DAVIDE,JR., J.:Petitioners urge this Court to review and reverse the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41, promulgated on 3 April 1984, which set aside its previous Decision dated 29 November 1983 reversing the Decision of the trial court which dismissed petitioners' complaints in Civil Case No. 4477 and Civil Case No. 4478 of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pampanga entitled "Carmen Dayrit Koh, Leticia Koh, Julieta Koh Tuquero, Araceli Koh McKee and Elizabeth Koh Turla vs. Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo," and "George McKee and Araceli Koh McKee vs. Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo," respectively, and granted the private respondents' counterclaim for moral damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.The said civil cases for damages based onquasi-delictwere filed as a result of a vehicular accident which led to the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc and caused physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and petitioner Araceli Koh McKee.Petitioners in G.R. No. 68102, parents of the minors George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and the deceased Kim Koh McKee, were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4478, while petitioner Carmen Dayrit Koh and her co-petitioners in G.R. No. 68103, who are the wife and children, respectively, of the late Jose Koh, were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4477. Upon the other hand, private respondents are the owners of the cargo truck which figured in the mishap; a certain Ruben Galang was the driver of the truck at the time of the accident.The antecedent facts are not disputed.Between nine and ten o'clock in the morning of 8 January 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck, Loadstar, with Plate No. RF912-T Philippines '76 owned by private respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car bearing Plate No. S2-850 Pampanga '76 driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.Jose Koh was the father of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee, the mother of minors George, Christopher and Kim Koh McKee. Loida Bondoc, on the other hand, was the baby sitter of one and a half year old Kim. At the time of the collision, Kim was seated on the lap of Loida Bondoc who was at the front passenger's seat of the car while Araceli and her two (2) sons were seated at the car's back seat.Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with two hundred (200) cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando. When the northbound car was about (10) meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, two (2) boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge.The incident was immediately reported to the police station in Angeles City; consequently, a team of police officers was forthwith dispatched to conduct an on the spot investigation. In the sketch1prepared by the investigating officers, the bridge is described to be sixty (60) "footsteps" long and fourteen (14) "footsteps" wide seven (7) "footsteps" from the center line to the inner edge of the side walk on both sides.2Pulong Pulo Bridge, which spans a dry brook, is made of concrete with soft shoulders and concrete railings on both sides about three (3) feet high.The sketch of the investigating officer discloses that the right rear portion of the cargo truck was two (2) "footsteps" from the edge of the right sidewalk, while its left front portion was touching the center line of the bridge, with the smashed front side of the car resting on its front bumper. The truck was about sixteen (16) "footsteps" away from the northern end of the bridge while the car was about thirty-six (36) "footsteps" from the opposite end. Skid marks produced by the right front tire of the truck measured nine (9) "footsteps", while skid marks produced by the left front tire measured five (5) "footsteps." The two (2) rear tires of the truck, however, produced no skid marks.In his statement to the investigating police officers immediately after the accident, Galang admitted that he was traveling at thirty (30) miles (48 kilometers) per hour.As a consequence of the collision, two (2) cases, Civil Case No. 4477 and No. 4478, were filed on 31 January 1977 before the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga and were raffled to Branch III and Branch V of the said court, respectively. In the first, herein petitioners in G.R. No. 68103 prayed for the award of P12,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Jose Koh, P150,000.00 as moral damages, P60,000.00 as exemplary damages, P10,000.00 for litigation expenses, P6,000.00 for burial expenses, P3,650.00 for the burial lot and P9,500.00 for the tomb, plus attorney's fees.3In the second case, petitioners in G.R. No. 68102 prayed for the following: (a) in connection with the death of Kim McKee, the sum of P12,000.00 as death benefit, P3,150.00 for funeral services, P3,650.00 for the cemetery lot, P3,000.00 for the tomb, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P2,000.00 as miscellaneous damages; (b) in the case of Araceli Koh McKee, in connection with the serious physical injuries suffered, the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P12,000.00 for loss of earnings, P5,000.00 for the hospitalization expenses up to the date of the filing of the complaint; and (c) with respect to George McKee, Jr., in connection with the serious physical injuries suffered, the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and the following medical expenses: P3,400 payable to the Medical Center, P3,500.00 payable to the St. Francis Medical Center, P5,175.00 payable to the Clark Air Base Hospital, and miscellaneous expenses amounting to P5,000.00. They also sought an award of attorney's fees amounting to 25% of the total award plus traveling and hotel expenses, with costs.4On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben Galang with the crime of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to Property" was filed with the trial court. It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3751 and was raffled to Branch V of the court, the same Branch where Civil Case No. 4478 was assigned.5In their Answer with Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 4477, private respondents asserted that it was the Ford Escort car which "invaded and bumped (sic) the lane of the truck driven by Ruben Galang and, as counterclaim, prayed for the award of P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, P20,000.00 as actual and liquidated damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as business losses.6In Civil Case No. 4478, private respondents first filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of pendency of another action (Civil Case No. 4477) and failure to implead an indispensable party, Ruben Galang, the truck driver; they also filed a motion to consolidate the case with Civil Case No. 4477 pending before Branch III of the same court, which was opposed by the plaintiffs.7Both motions were denied by Branch V, then presided over by Judge Ignacio Capulong. Thereupon, private respondents filed their Answer with Counter-claim8wherein they alleged that Jose Koh was the person "at fault having approached the lane of the truck driven by Ruben Galang, . . . which was on the right lane going towards Manila and at a moderate speed observing all traffic rules and regulations applicable under the circumstances then prevailing;" in their counterclaim, they prayed for an award of damages as may be determined by the court after due hearing, and the sums of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation.Petitioners filed their Answers to the Counterclaims in both cases.To expedite the proceedings, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4478 filed on 27 March 1978 a motion to adopt the testimonies of witnesses taken during the hearing of Criminal Case No. 3751, which private respondents opposed and which the court denied.9Petitioners subsequently moved to reconsider the order denying the motion for consolidation,10which Judge Capulong granted in the Order of 5 September 1978; he then directed that Civil Case No. 4478 be consolidated with Civil Case No. 4477 in Branch III of the court then presided over by Judge Mario Castaeda, Jr.Left then with Branch V of the trial court was Criminal Case No. 3751.In the civil cases, the plaintiffs presented as witnesses Araceli Koh McKee, Fernando Nuag, Col. Robert Fitzgerald, Primitivo Parel, Eugenio Tanhueco, Carmen Koh and Antonio Koh,11and offered several documentary exhibits. Upon the other hand, private respondents presented as witnesses Ruben Galang, Zenaida Soliman, Jaime Tayag and Roman Dayrit.12In the criminal case, the prosecution presented as witnesses Mrs. Araceli McKee, Salud Samia, Pfc. Fernando Nuag, Dr. Ramon Panlilio, Dr. Robert Fitzgerald, Dr. Roberto Yuson, Dr. Hector, Ulanday, Pfc. Benigno de Leon, Marina Bolos, Primitivo Parel, Rogelio Pineda, Benito Caraan and Eugenio Tanhueco, and offered several documentary exhibits.13Upon the other hand, the defense presented the accused Ruben Galang, Luciano Punzalan, Zenaida Soliman and Roman Dayrit, and offered documentary exhibits.14On 1 October 1980, Judge Capulong rendered a decision against the accused Ruben Galang in the aforesaid criminal case. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Ruben Galang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the information and after applying the provisions of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code and indeterminate sentence law, this Court, imposes upon said accused Ruben Galang the penalty of six (6) months ofarresto mayoras minimum to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day ofprision correccionalas maximum; the accused is further sentenced to pay and indemnify the heirs of Loida Bondoc the amount of P12,000.00 as indemnity for her death; to reimburse the heirs of Loida Bondoc the amount of P2,000.00 representing the funeral expenses; to pay the heirs of Loida Bondoc the amount of P20,000.00 representing her loss of income; to indemnify and pay the heirs of the deceased Jose Koh the value of the car in the amount of P53,910.95, and to pay the costs.15The aforecited decision was promulgated only on 17 November 1980; on the same day, counsel for petitioners filed with Branch III of the court where the two (2) civil cases were pending a manifestation to that effect and attached thereto a copy of the decision.16Upon the other hand, Judge Mario Castaeda, Jr. dismissed the two (2) civil cases on 12 November 1980 and awarded the private respondents moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees.17The dispositive portion of the said decision reads as follows:WHEREFORE, finding the preponderance of evidence to be in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs, these cases are hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against the plaintiffs. The defendants had proven their counter-claim, thru evidences (sic) presented and unrebutted. Hence, they are hereby awarded moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 plus attorney's fee of P15,000.00 and litigation expenses for (sic) P2,000.00. The actual damages claimed for (sic) by the defendants is (sic) hereby dismissing for lack of proof to that effect (sic).18A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail to the petitioners on 28 November 1980 and was received on 2 December 1980.19Accused Ruben Galang appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. Blg. 24764-CR and was assigned to the court's Third Division. Plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 likewise separately appealed the 12 November 1980 decision to the appellate court. The appeals were docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 69041-R and C.A.-G.R. No. 69040-R, respectively, and were assigned to the Fourth Civil Cases Division.On 4 October 1982, the respondent Court promulgated its decision20in C.A.-G.R. Blg. 24764-CR affirming the conviction of Galang.21The dispositive portion of the decision reads:DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na paksa ng naritong paghahabol ay Aming pinagtitibay sa kanyang kabuuan. Ang naghahabol pa rin ang pinagbabayad ng gugol ng paghahabol.A motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the respondent Court in itsKapasiyahanpromulgated on 25 November 1982.22A petition for its review23was filed with this Court; said petition was subsequently denied. A motion for its reconsideration was denied with finality in the Resolution of 20 April 1983.24On 29 November 1983, respondent Court, by then known as the Intermediate Appellate Court, promulgated its consolidated decision in A.C.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040 and 69041,25the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from it hereby reversed and set aside and another one is rendered, ordering defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants as follows:For the death of Jose Koh:P 50,000.00 as moral damagesP 12,000.00 as death indemnityP 16,000.00 for the lot and tomb (Exhs. U and U-1)P 4,000.00 expenses for holding a wake (p. 9, tsn April 19, 1979)P 950.00 for the casket (Exh. M)P 375.00 for the vault services (Exhs. V and V-1)For the death of Kim Koh McKee:P 50,000.00 as moral damagesP 12,000.00 as death indemnityP 1,000.00 for the purchase of the burial lot (Exh. M)P 950.00 for funeral services (Exh. M-1)P 375.00 for vault services (Exhs. V and V-1)For the physical injuries suffered by George Koh McKee:P 25,000.00 as moral damagesP 672.00 for Clark Field Hospital (Exh. E)P 4,384.00 paid to Angeles Medical Clinic (Exhs. D, D-1 andD-2)P 1,555.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. B and B-1)For the physical injuries suffered by Araceli Koh McKee:P 25,000.00 as moral damagesP 1,055.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. G andG-1)P 75.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. G-2 and G-3)P 428.00 to Carmelite General Hospital (Exh. F)P 114.20 to Muoz Clinic (Exh. MM)For the physical injuries suffered by Christopher Koh McKee:P 10,000.00 as moral damagesP 1,231.10 to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. L and L-1)P 321.95 to F.C.E.A. Hospital (Exhs. G and D-1)In addition, We award P10,000.00 as counsel (sic) fees in Civil Case No. 4477 and another P10,000.00; as counsel (sic) fees in Civil Case No. 4478.No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.26The decision is anchored principally on the respondent Court's findings that it was Ruben Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which caused the accident. The appellate court further said that the law presumes negligence on the part of the defendants (private respondents), as employers of Galang, in the selection and supervision of the latter; it was further asserted that these defendants did not allege in their Answers the defense of having exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising the said employee.27This conclusion of reckless imprudence is based on the followingfindings of fact:In the face of these diametrically opposed judicial positions, the determinative issue in this appeal is posited in the fourth assigned error as follows:IVTHE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THE (sic) DRIVER OF THE TRUCK STOPPED HIS TRUCK BLEW HIS HORN SWITCHED ON HIS HEADLIGHTS AND COULD NOT SWERVE TO THE RIGHT.Supportive of plaintiffs' version, principal witness Araceli Koh McKee testified thus:Q What happened after that, as you approached the bridge?A When we were approaching the bridge, two (2) boys tried to cross the right lane on the right side of the highway going to San Fernando. My father, who is (sic) the driver of the car tried to avoid the two (2) boys who were crossing, he blew his horn and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the two (2) boys. We noticed the truck, he switched on the headlights to warn the truck driver, to slow down to give us the right of way to come back to our right lane.Q Did the truck slow down?A No, sir, it did not, just (sic) continued on its way.Q What happened after that?A After avoiding the two (2) boys, the car tried to go back to the right lane since the truck is (sic) coming, my father stepped on the brakes and all what (sic) I heard is the sound of impact (sic), sir. (tsn, pp. 5-6, July 22, 1977); or (Exhibit "O" in these Civil Cases).xxx xxx xxxQ Mrs. how did you know that the truck driven by the herein accused, Ruben Galang did not reduce its speed before the actual impact of collision (sic) as you narrated in this Exhibit "1," how did you know (sic)?A It just kept on coming, sir. If only he reduced his speed, we could have got (sic) back to our right lane on side (sic) of the highway, sir. (tsn. pp. 33-34 July 22, 1977) or (Exhibit "O" in these Civil Cases) (pp. 30-31, Appellants' Brief).Plaintiffs' version was successfully corroborated to Our satisfaction by the following facts and circumstances:1. An impartial eye-witness to the mishap, Eugenio Tanhueco, declared that the truck stopped only when it had already collided with the car:xxx xxx xxxTanhueco repeated the same testimony during the hearing in the criminal case:xxx xxx xxxTanhueco could (sic) not be tagged as an accommodation witness because he was one of the first to arrive at the scene of the accident. As a matter of fact, he brought one of the injured passengers to the hospital.We are not prepared to accord faith and credit to defendants' witnesses, Zenaida Soliman, a passenger of the truck, and Roman Dayrit, who supposedly lived across the street.Regarding Soliman, experience has shown that in the ordinary course of events people usually take the side of the person with whom they are associated at the time of the accident, because, as a general rule, they do not wish to be identified with the person who was at fault. Thus an imaginary bond is unconsciously created among the several persons within the same group (People vs. Vivencio, CA-G.R. No. 00310-CR, Jan. 31, 1962).With respect to Dayrit, We can not help suspecting (sic) that he is an accommodation witness. He did not go to the succor of the injured persons. He said he wanted to call the police authorities about the mishap, but his phone had no dial tone. Be this (sic) as it may, the trial court in the criminal case acted correctly in refusing to believe Dayrit.2. Exhibit 2, the statement of Galang, does not include the claim that Galang stopped his truck at a safe distance from the car, according to plaintiffs (p. 25, Appellants' Brief). This contention of appellants was completely passedsub-silencioor was not refuted by appellees in their brief. Exhibit 2 is one of the exhibits not included in the record. According to the Table of Contents submitted by the court below, said Exhibit 2 was not submitted by defendants-appellees. In this light, it is not far-fetched to surmise that Galang's claim that he stopped was an eleventh-hour desperate attempt to exculpate himself from imprisonment and damages.3. Galang divulged that he stopped after seeing the car about 10 meters away:ATTY. SOTTO:Q Do I understand from your testimony that inspite of the fact that you admitted that the road is straight and you may be able to (sic) see 500-1000 meters away from you any vehicle, you first saw that car only about ten (10) meters away from you for the first time?xxx xxx xxxA I noticed it, sir, that it was about ten (10) meters away.ATTY. SOTTO:Q So, for clarification, you clarify and state under your oath that you have (sic) not noticed it before that ten (10) meters? (Tsn. 3 to 5, Sept. 18, 1979). (p. 16, Appellants' Brief)Galang's testimony substantiate (sic) Tanhueco's statement that Galang stopped only because of the impact. At ten (10) meters away, with the truck running at 30 miles per hour, as revealed in Galang's affidavit (Exh. 2; p. 25, Appellants' brief), it is well-nigh impossible to avoid a collision on a bridge.5. Galang's truck stopped because of the collision, and not because he waited for Jose Koh to return to his proper lane. The police investigator, Pfc. Fernando L. Nuag, stated that he found skid marks under the truck but there were not (sic) skid marks behind the truck (pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 3, 1978). The presence of skid marks show (sic) that the truck was speeding. Since the skid marks were found under the truck and none were found at the rear of the truck, the reasonable conclusion is that the skid marks under the truck were caused by the truck's front wheels when the trucks (sic) suddenly stopped seconds before the mishap in an endeavor to avoid the same. But, as aforesaid, Galang saw the car at barely 10 meters away, a very short distance to avoid a collision, and in his futile endeavor to avoid the collision he abruptly stepped on his brakes but the smashup happened just the same.For the inattentiveness or reckless imprudence of Galang, the law presumes negligence on the part of the defendants in the selection of their driver or in the supervision over him. Appellees did not allege such defense of having exercised the duties of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees in their answers. They did not even adduce evidence that they did in fact have methods of selection and programs of supervision. The inattentiveness or negligence of Galang was the proximate cause of the mishap. If Galang's attention was on the highway, he would have sighted the car earlier or at a very safe distance than (sic) 10 meters. He proceeded to cross the bridge, and tried to stop when a collision was already inevitable, because at the time that he entered the bridge his attention was not riveted to the road in front of him.On the question of damages, the claims of appellants were amply proven, but the items must be reduced.28A motion for reconsideration alleging improper appreciation of the facts was subsequently filed by private respondents on the basis of which the respondent Court, in its Resolution of 3 April 1984,29reconsidered and set aside its 29 November 1983 decision and affirmedin totothe trial court's judgment of 12 November 1980. A motion to reconsider this Resolution was denied by the respondent Court on 4 July 1984.30Hence, this petition.Petitioners allege that respondent Court:I. . . COMMITTED A VERY SERIOUS AND GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT TOTALLY REVERSED ITS DECISION BY MERELY BASING IT FROM (sic) A MERE "PRESUMPTION," TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DRIVER'S ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS, WHO EXCLUSIVELY COMMITTED THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT (sic), FURTHER, IT ALSO DISREGARDED THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AND FOUND IN THE RECORDS; THEREFORE, RESPONDENT COURT'S RESOLUTIONS (ANNEXES A and B, PETITION) ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, PURELY BASED ON SPECULATIONS, CONJECTURES AND WITHOUT SURE FOUNDATION IN THE EVIDENCE.II. . . GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED WHEN IN EFFECT IT DISREGARDED A DOCTRINE LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT BY STATING AMONG OTHERS, "IT CANNOT CATEGORICALLY ADOPT THE FINDINGS OF GUILT IN THE CRIMINAL CASE WHERE THE DRIVER OF THE TRUCK INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT WAS INDICTED.III. . . PATENTLY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND MADE A MISLEADING PRONOUNCEMENT, WHEN IT HELD: "IT IS THUS INCUMBENT UPON THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS (APPELLEES WRONGLY MENTIONED IN THE RESOLUTION) TO PROVE THEIR ALLEGATIONS THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DRIVER.IV. . . COMMITTED ANOTHER GRIEVIOUS (sic) ERROR; COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND CITED ANOTHER CASE WHICH IS CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO THESE CASES.V. . . COMMITTED A PATENT ERROR AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ADOPTING THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN THE RECORDS, SPECIALLY THEY (sic) ARE CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED FACTS AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS MADE BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DRIVER.VI. . . EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED DAMAGES TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHEN SAID AWARD IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE, IN THE RECORDS, AND SAID AWARD IS NOT ALLOWED BY LAW AND THE CONSISTENT DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.VII. . . EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT ERRONEOUSLY SET ASIDE ITS DECISION AWARDING DAMAGES TO PETITIONERS WHICH IS CLEARLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE, THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE RELATIVE TO THE AWARD OF DAMAGES.31In the Resolution of 12 September 1984, We required private respondents to Comment on the petition.32After the said Comment33was filed, petitioners submitted a Reply34thereto; this Court then gave due course to the instant petitions and required petitioners to file their Brief,35which they accordingly complied with.There is merit in the petition. Before We take on the main task of dissecting the arguments and counter-arguments, some observations on the procedural vicissitudes of these cases are in order.Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478, which were for the recovery of civil liability arising from aquasi-delictunder Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, were filed ahead of Criminal Case No. 3751. Civil Case No. 4478 was eventually consolidated with Civil Case No. 4477 for joint trial in Branch III of the trial court. The records do not indicate any attempt on the part of the parties, and it may therefore be reasonably concluded that none was made, to consolidate Criminal Case No. 3751 with the civil cases, orvice-versa. The parties may have then believed, and understandably so, since by then no specific provision of law or ruling of this Court expressly allowed such a consolidation, that an independent civil action, authorized under Article 33 in relation to Article 2177 of the Civil Code, such as the civil cases in this case, cannot be consolidated with the criminal case. Indeed, such consolidation could have been farthest from their minds as Article 33 itself expressly provides that the "civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." Be that as it may, there was then no legal impediment against such consolidation. Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to avoid a multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested dockets to simplify the work of the trial court, or in short, attain justice with the least expense to the parties litigants,36would have easily sustained a consolidation, thereby preventing the unseeming, if no ludicrous, spectacle of two (2) judges appreciating, according to their respective orientation, perception and perhaps even prejudice, the same factsdifferently,and thereafter renderingconflictingdecisions. Such was what happened in this case. It should not, hopefully, happen anymore. In the recent case ofCojuangco vs. Court or Appeals,37this Court held that the present provisions of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court allow a consolidation of an independent civil action for the recovery of civil liability authorized under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of the Civil Code with the criminal action subject, however, to the condition that no final judgment has been rendered in that criminal case.Let it be stressed, however, that the judgment in Criminal Case No. 3751 finding Galang guilty of reckless imprudence, although already final by virtue of the denial by no less than this Court of his last attempt to set aside the respondent Court's affirmance of the verdict of conviction, has no relevance or importance to this case.As We held inDionisio vs. Alvendia,38the responsibility arising from fault or negligence in aquasi-delictis entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. And, as more concretely stated in the concurring opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, "in the case of independent civil actions under the new Civil Code, the result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction, would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action."39InSalta vs. De Veyra and PNB vs. Purisima,40this Court stated:. . . It seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that the civil actions mentioned in Article 33, permitted in the same manner to be filed separately from the criminal case, may proceed similarlyregardless of the result of the criminal case.Indeed, when the law has allowed a civil case related to a criminal case, to be filed separately and to proceed independently even during the pendency of the latter case, the intention is patent to make the court's disposition of the criminal case of no effect whatsoever on the separate civil case. This must be so because the offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a nature, unlike other offenses not mentioned, that they may be made the subject of a separate civil action because of the distinct separability of their respective juridical cause or basis of action . . . .What remains to be the most important consideration as to why the decision in the criminal case should not be considered in this appeal is the fact that private respondents were not parties therein. It would have been entirely different if the petitioners' cause of action was for damages arising from adelict,in which case private respondents' liability could only be subsidiary pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any collusion, the judgment of conviction in the criminal case against Galang would have been conclusive in the civil cases for the subsidiary liability of the private respondents.41And now to the merits of the petition.It is readily apparent from the pleadings that the principal issue raised in this petition is whether or not respondent Court's findings in its challenged resolution are supported by evidence or are based on mere speculations, conjectures and presumptions.The principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier of facts. Therefore, in an appeal bycertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are, as a rule, binding on this Court.42The foregoing rule, however, is not without exceptions. Findings of facts of the trial courts and the Court of Appeals may be set aside when such findings are not supported by the evidence or when the trial court failed to consider the material facts which would have led to a conclusion different from what was stated in its judgment.43The same is true where the appellate court's conclusions are grounded entirely on conjectures, speculations and surmises44or where the conclusions of the lower courts are based on a misapprehension of facts.45It is at once obvious to this Court that the instant case qualifies as one of the aforementioned exceptions as the findings and conclusions of the trial court and the respondent Court in its challenged resolution are not supported by the evidence, are based on an misapprehension of facts and the inferences made therefrom are manifestly mistaken. The respondent Court's decision of 29 November 1983 makes the correct findings of fact.In the assailed resolution, the respondent Court held that the fact that the car improperly invaded the lane of the truck and that the collision occurred in said lane gave rise to the presumption that the driver of the car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis of this presumed negligence, the appellate court immediately concluded that it was Jose Koh's negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car swerved into the truck's lane because as it approached the southern end of the bridge, two (2) boys darted across the road from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car. As testified to by petitioner Araceli Koh McKee:Q What happened after that, as you approached the bridge?A When we were approaching the bridge, two (2) boys tried to cross the right lane on the right side of the highway going to San Fernando. My father, who is (sic) the driver of the car tried to avoid the two (2) boys who were crossing, he blew his horn and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the two (2) boys. We noticed the truck, he switched on the headlights to warn the truck driver, to slow down to give us the right of way to come back to our right lane.Q Did the truck slow down?A No sir, it did not, just (sic) continued on its way.Q What happened after that?A After avoiding the two (2) boys, the car tried to go back to the right lane since the truck is (sic) coming, my father stepped on the brakes and all what (sic) I heard is the sound of impact (sic), sir.46Her credibility and testimony remained intact even during cross examination. Jose Koh's entry into the lane of the truck was necessary in order to avoid what was, in his mind at that time, a greater peril death or injury to the two (2) boys. Such act can hardly be classified as negligent.Negligence was defined and described by this Court inLayugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,47thus:. . . Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 930), or as Judge Cooley defines it, "(T)he failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." (Cooley on Torts, Fourth Edition, vol. 3, 265)In Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil 809, 813), decided more than seventy years ago but still a sound rule, (W)e held:The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that(reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?)If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreetpaterfamiliasof the Romanlaw. . . .InCorliss vs. Manila Railroad Company,48We held:. . . Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances. (citing Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co., 35 Pac. 549 (1894).On the basis of the foregoing definition, the test of negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and could very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car. Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence."49Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into the lane of the car, We find that Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the given situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the above test, therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of negligence.In any case, assuming,arguendothat Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. Proximate cause has been defined as:. . . that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.50Applying the above definition, although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car. The truck driver's negligence becomes more apparent in view of the fact that the road is 7.50 meters wide while the car measures 1.598 meters and the truck, 2.286 meters, in width. This would mean that both car and truck could pass side by side with a clearance of 3.661 meters to spare.51Furthermore, the bridge has a level sidewalk which could have partially accommodated the truck. Any reasonable man finding himself in the given situation would have tried to avoid the car instead of meeting it head-on.The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge52is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. We cannot give credence to private respondents' claim that there was an error in the translation by the investigating officer of the truck driver's response in Pampango as to whether the speed cited was in kilometers per hour or miles per hour. The law presumes that official duty has been regularly performed;53unless there is proof to the contrary, this presumption holds. In the instant case, private respondents' claim is based on mere conjecture.The truck driver's negligence was likewise duly established through the earlier quoted testimony of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee which was duly corroborated by the testimony of Eugenio Tanhueco, an impartial eyewitness to the mishap.Araceli Koh McKee testified further, thus:xxx xxx xxxQ Mrs. how did you know that the truck driven by the herein accused, Ruben Galang did not reduce its speed before the actual impact of collision as you narrated in this Exhibit "1," how did you know?A It just kept on coming, sir. If only he reduced his speed, we could have got (sic) back to our right lane on side (sic) of the highway, sir. (tsn, pp. 33-34, July 22, 1977) or (Exhibit; "O" in these Civil Cases) (pp. 30-31, Appellants' Brief)54while Eugenio Tanhueco testified thus:Q When you saw the truck, how was it moving?A It was moving 50 to 60 kilometers per hour, sir.Q Immediately after you saw this truck, do you know what happened?A I saw the truck and a car collided (sic), sir, and I went to the place to help the victims. (tsn. 28, April 19, 1979)xxx xxx xxxQ From the time you saw the truck to the time of the impact, will you tell us if the said truck ever stopped?A I saw it stopped (sic) when it has (sic) already collided with the car and it was already motionless. (tsn. 31, April 19, 1979; Emphasis Supplied). (p. 27, Appellants' Brief).55Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver's subsequentnegligence in failing to take the proper measures and degree of care necessary to avoid the collision which was the proximate cause of the resulting accident.Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof.56InBustamante vs. Court of Appeals,57We held:The respondent court adopted the doctrine of "last clear chance." The doctrine, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. In other words, the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery (sic). As the doctrine is usually stated, a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. (Sangco, Torts and Damages, 4th Ed., 1986, p. 165).The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiff's peril, or according to some authorities, should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due care, had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident (57 Am. Jur., 2d, pp. 798-799).InPantranco North Express, Inc., vs. Baesa,58We ruled:The doctrine of last clear chance was defined by this Court in the case of Ong v. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 397 (1958), in this wise:The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence.The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918); Glan People's Lumber and Hardware, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, Cecilia Alferez Vda. de Calibo, et al., G.R. No. 70493, May, 18, 1989]. The subsequent negligence of the defendant in failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes the immediate or proximate cause of the accident which intervenes between the accident and the more remote negligence of the plaintiff, thus making the defendant liable to the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith,supra].Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim (sic) for damages.Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule, as We now rule, that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the truck driver, the private respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is onlyjuris tantum,notjuris et de jure.59Theironly possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Article 2180 reads as follows:The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.xxx xxx xxxEmployers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.xxx xxx xxxThe responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the selection and supervision of employees.60The answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose this defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it.The respondent Court was then correct in its Decision of 29 November 1983 in reversing the decision of the trial court which dismissed Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478. Its assailed Resolution of 3 April 1984 finds no sufficient legal and factual moorings.In the light of recent decisions of this Court,61the indemnity for death must, however, be increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the respondent Court of 3 April 1984 is SET ASIDE while its Decision of 29 November 1983 in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41 is REINSTATED, subject to the modification that the indemnity for death is increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh McKee.Costs against private respondents.SO ORDERED.THIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. L-44264 September 19, 1988HEDY GAN y YU,petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.Pacis, Baluyot, Reyes & De Leon for petitioner.The Solicitor General for respondents.FERNAN,C.J.:Petitioner Hedy Gan was convicted of the crime of Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence in Criminal Case No. 10201 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXII presided by Judge Federico C. Alikpala. She was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day ofarresto mayoras minimum and two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day ofprision correccionalas maximum and was made to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P12,000.00 without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. On appeal, the trial court's decision was modified and petitioner was convicted only of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence. Still unsatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals,1petitioner has come to this Court for a complete reversal of the judgment below.The facts of the case as found by the appellate court are as follows:In the morning of July 4, 1972 at about 8:00 o'clock, the accused Hedy Gan was driving a Toyota car along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. While in front of house no. 694 of North Bay Boulevard, there were two vehicles, a truck and a jeepney parked on one side of the road, one following the other about two to three meters from each other. As the car driven by the accused approached the place where the two vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle coming from the opposite direction, followed by another which tried to overtake and bypass the one in front of it and thereby encroached the lane of the car driven by the accused. To avoid a head-on collision with the oncoming vehicle, the defendant swerved to the right and as a consequence, the front bumper of the Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man who was about to cross the boulevard from south to north, pinning him against the rear of the parked jeepney. The force of the impact caused the parked jeepney to move forward hitting the rear of the parts truck ahead of it. The pedestrian was injured, the Toyota Sedan was damaged on its front, the jeep suffered damages on its rear and front paints, and the truck sustained scratches at the wooden portion of its rear. The body of the old man who was later Identified as Isidoro Casino was immediately brought to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital but was (pronounced) dead on arrival.2An information for Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence was filed against petitioner in view of the above incident. She entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and the case was set for trial.Meanwhile, petitioner sought and was granted a re-investigation by the City Fiscal, as a result of which the trial fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case against petitioner during the resumption of hearing on September 7, 1972. The grounds cited therefor were lack of interest on the part of the complaining witness to prosecute the case as evidenced by an affidavit of desistance submitted to the trial court and lack of eyewitness to sustain the charge.The motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal was never resolved. The Court instead ordered the prosecution to present its evidence. After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.On December 22, 1972, the trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the of- offense charged.Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 14472-CR. On May 3, 1976, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:Wherefore, as modified, the accused Hedy Gan is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide thru simple imprudence and, pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, she is hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of three (3) months and eleven (11) days ofarresto mayorand to indemnify the heirs of Isidoro Casino in the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos (Pl2,000.00) without, however, any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.3Petitioner now appeals to this Court on the following assignments of errors:IThe Court of Appeals erred in holding that when the petitioner saw a car travelling directly towards her, she should have stepped on the brakes immediately or in swerving her vehicle to the right should have also stepped on the brakes or lessened her speed, to avoid the death of a pedestrian.IIThe Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner of the crime of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence.IIIThe Court of Appeals erred in adjudging the petitioner liable to indemnify the deceased in the sum of P12,000.00.4We reverse.The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty oil the doer to take precaution against its mischievous results and the failure to do so constitutes negligence.5A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency rule. "Under that rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence."6Applying the above test to the case at bar, we find the petitioner not guilty of the crime of Simple Imprudence resulting in Homicide.The appellate court in finding the petitioner guilty said:The accused should have stepped on the brakes when she saw the car going in the opposite direction followed by another which overtook the first by passing towards its left. She should not only have swerved the car she was driving to the right but should have also tried to stop or lessen her speed so that she would not bump into the pedestrian who was crossing at the time but also the jeepney which was then parked along the street.7The course of action suggested by the appellate court would seem reasonable were it not for the fact that such suggestion did not take into account the amount of time afforded petitioner to react to the situation she was in. For it is undeniable that the suggested course of action presupposes sufficient time for appellant to analyze the situation confronting her and to ponder on which of the different courses of action would result in the least possible harm to herself and to others.Due to the lack of eyewitnesses, no evidence was presented by the prosecution with respect to the relative distances of petitioner to the parked jeepney and the oncoming overtaking vehicle that would tend to prove that petitioner did have sufficient time to reflect on the consequences of her instant decision to swerve her car to the light without stepping on her brakes. In fact, the evidence presented by the prosecution on this point is the petitioner's statement to the police8stating::And masasabi ko lang ho umiwas ho ako sa isang sasakyan nabiglangnagovertake sa sasakyan na aking kasalubong kung kaya ay aking kinabig sa kanan ang akin kotse subalit siya namanbiglangpagtawid ng tao o victim athindi ko na ho naiwasan at ako ay wala ng magawa. Iyan ho ang buong pangyayari nang nasabing aksidente.9(Emphasis supplied)The prosecution having presented this exhibit as its own evidence, we cannot but deem its veracity to have been admitted by it. Thus, under the circumstances narrated by petitioner, we find that the appellate court is asking too much from a mere mortal like the petitioner who in the blink of an eye had to exercise her best judgment to extricate herself from a difficult and dangerous situation caused by the driver of the overtaking vehicle. Petitioner certainly could not be expected to act with all the coolness of a person under normal conditions.10The danger confronting petitioner was real and imminent, threatening her very existence. She had no opportunity for rational thinking but only enough time to heed the very powerfull instinct of self-preservation.Also, the respondent court itself pronounced that the petitioner was driving her car within the legal limits. We therefore rule that the "emergency rule" enunciated above applies with full force to the case at bar and consequently absolve petitioner from any criminal negligence in connection with the incident under consideration.We further set aside the award of damages to the heirs of the victim, who by executing a release of the claim due them, had effectively and clearly waived their right thereto.WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered acquitting petitioner HEDY GAN y YU of the crime of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence. She is no longer liable for the P12,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by the appellate court to the heirs of the victim.SO ORDERED.Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.IRST DIVISONG.R. No. 115024 February 7, 1996MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL, INC.,respondents.x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-xG.R. No. 117944 February 7, 1996RICHARD LI,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES VALENZUELA,respondents.D E C I S I O NKAPUNAN,J.:These two petitions for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court stem from an action to recover damages by petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for injuries sustained by her in a vehicular accident in the early morning of June 24, 1990. The facts found by the trial court are succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals below:This is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for serious physical injuries sustained in a vehicular accident.Plaintiff's version of the accident is as follows: At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No. FFU 542 from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza Street, Araneta Avenue. She was travelling along Aurora Blvd. with a companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the direction of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that car's condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body. She was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found to have a "traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee)". She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The expenses for the hospital confinement (P120,000.00) and the cost of the artificial leg (P27,000.00) were paid by defendants from the car insurance.In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral damages in the amount of P1 million, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and other medical and related expenses amounting to a total of P180,000.00, including loss of expected earnings.Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He was on his way home, travelling at 55 kph; considering that it was raining, visibility was affected and the road was wet. Traffic was light. He testified that he was driving along the inner portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. towards the direction of Araneta Avenue, when he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, San Juan, with a car coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with "full bright lights". Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not see because it was midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning device, and the area was poorly lighted. He alleged in his defense that the left rear portion of plaintiff's car was protruding as it was then "at a standstill diagonally" on the outer portion of the right lane towards Araneta Avenue (par. 18, Answer). He confirmed the testimony of plaintiff's witness that after being bumped the car of the plaintiff swerved to the right and hit another car parked on the sidewalk. Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff was reckless or negligent, as she was not a licensed driver.The police investigator, Pfc. Felic Ramos, who prepared the vehicular accident report and the sketch of the three cars involved in the accident, testified that the plaintiff's car was "near the sidewalk"; this witness did not remember whether the hazard lights of plaintiff's car were on, and d