President’s Letter - oakland.edu · Oakland University Model United Nations March 9-10, 2018 ......

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United Nations Security Council 2018 President’s Letter Oakland University Model United Nations March 9-10, 2018 Greetings delegates, and let me be the first of many to welcome you to Oakland University Model UN’s Third Annual High School Conference! It is my pleasure to serve as chair of this contemporary Security Council 2018. I have been participating in Model UN at the collegiate level for three years as a delegate, and have also chaired several high school conferences. Having been on both sides of the dias, I am quite excited to listen to the productive and substantive debate in which you are sure to engage. Additionally, I look forward to how each delegation will approach each complex, pressing international issue. In 2018 the Security Council will be addressing numerous international issues of immense importance. The primary issues that we anticipate discussing are the situation in Yemen and the Rohingya in Myanmar. However, the SC may discuss other issues as well, including as part of a crisis scenario. For this reason, some brief background on the situation in Syria and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are also included in this guide. Hopefully they pique your interest as they have mine. While I am relaxed when it comes to chairing, I have three expectations for each delegate, both in preparation and during the conference. First, you need to research and know your country’s policy and position concerning every topic. Whether this is your first or fourth Model UN conference, you should be knowledgeable about the topics and your country’s policies. These background guides are just the beginning of your research, so use the available resources to gain further and specific insight into each issue. The Security Council (SC) website, as well as the UN website, contains excellent information, including a database of SC documents since the creation of the UN. Please learn how to use these resources and use them to your advantage. My second expectation is that everyone is knowledgeable and comfortable with the Rules of Procedure, including special procedures for the SC (e.g. use of directives which allow you to take unilateral action and the ability to invite unrepresented delegations to speak and answer questions). It is always disappointing to see a potentially strong delegate restricted by a lacking knowledge of the rules. While mistakes are inevitable (I myself am not immune), and they are completely understandable, please make every attempt to know the rules and how to properly utilize them. If you suddenly feel as though you don’t understand something during committee, by all means ask! By simply raising your placard with a Point of Information or passing up a note to the chair, your Model UN experience will be much more enjoyable. My final expectation is that every delegate

Transcript of President’s Letter - oakland.edu · Oakland University Model United Nations March 9-10, 2018 ......

United Nations Security Council 2018

President’s Letter

Oakland University Model United Nations

March 9-10, 2018

Greetings delegates, and let me be the first of many to welcome you to Oakland University

Model UN’s Third Annual High School Conference! It is my pleasure to serve as chair of this

contemporary Security Council 2018. I have been participating in Model UN at the collegiate level

for three years as a delegate, and have also chaired several high school conferences. Having been

on both sides of the dias, I am quite excited to listen to the productive and substantive debate in

which you are sure to engage. Additionally, I look forward to how each delegation will approach

each complex, pressing international issue. In 2018 the Security Council will be addressing

numerous international issues of immense importance. The primary issues that we anticipate

discussing are the situation in Yemen and the Rohingya in Myanmar. However, the SC may discuss

other issues as well, including as part of a crisis scenario. For this reason, some brief background

on the situation in Syria and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are also included in this

guide. Hopefully they pique your interest as they have mine.

While I am relaxed when it comes to chairing, I have three expectations for each delegate,

both in preparation and during the conference. First, you need to research and know your country’s

policy and position concerning every topic. Whether this is your first or fourth Model UN

conference, you should be knowledgeable about the topics and your country’s policies. These

background guides are just the beginning of your research, so use the available resources to gain

further and specific insight into each issue. The Security Council (SC) website, as well as the UN

website, contains excellent information, including a database of SC documents since the creation

of the UN. Please learn how to use these resources and use them to your advantage. My second

expectation is that everyone is knowledgeable and comfortable with the Rules of Procedure,

including special procedures for the SC (e.g. use of directives which allow you to take unilateral

action and the ability to invite unrepresented delegations to speak and answer questions). It is

always disappointing to see a potentially strong delegate restricted by a lacking knowledge of the

rules. While mistakes are inevitable (I myself am not immune), and they are completely

understandable, please make every attempt to know the rules and how to properly utilize them. If

you suddenly feel as though you don’t understand something during committee, by all means ask!

By simply raising your placard with a Point of Information or passing up a note to the chair, your

Model UN experience will be much more enjoyable. My final expectation is that every delegate

speaks during the conference. The Speaker’s List in particular provides a wonderful opportunity

for delegates to prepare some remarks and utilize the rules of procedure in their interests, such as

using various forms of yields. This SC will be run by you and your fellow delegates. I do not speak

about the topics, you do. The responsibility of keeping debate progressing falls on your shoulders,

not mine. I only serve to facilitate debate and maintain order.

Model United Nations is an excellent opportunity to learn about our increasingly globalized

world and understand how international issues are resolved among vastly different cultures. In

addition, this contemporary Security Council allows you step into the role of world leaders and

confront the greatest issues of peace and security in our world today. This is your chance to practice

public speaking, decision making, negotiation, and compromise. My hope is that after the

conference you reflect on Model UN as an exciting educational experience. With that said, I look

forward to seeing you in March!

More information about each committee, rules of procedure, and policies for the

conference can be found at the conference website,

https://oakland.edu/polisci/opportunities/model-un-conference

www.oumun.org

The Situation in Yemen

Yemen, the poorest country in the Middle East, has long suffered problems such as civil

wars, tribalism, jihadist violence, corruption, repression, appalling poverty, and environmental

problems. In 2017, however, Yemen emerged as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, mainly the

result of fighting between Houthi rebels (backed by Iran) and government forces backed a Saudi-

led coalition. At least 10,000 people, mostly civilians, have been killed as a result of some 15,000

airstrikes conducted by Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies.1 More seriously, the UN estimates that

75% of the country’s 28 million people are in need of some kind of humanitarian aid. Mounting

rubbish, failed sewerage, and wrecked water supplies have led to the worst cholera outbreak in

recent history. Three million people have been displaced from their homes. The country is on the

brink of famine. Medical supplies and fuel are in short supply. All of this has been compounded

in November 2017 by a Saudi blockade of Yemen’s ports, which was in retaliation for a missile

1 See “Shaken up,” The Economist, December 9, 2017 (https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-

africa/21732137-former-dictator-fought-houthis-and-then-allied-them-his-final-break) and “The Yemen Crucible,”

The New York Times, December 28, 2017 (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/27/opinion/the-yemen-

crucible.html?_r=0).

allegedly lobbed by the rebels at the Saudi capital. The blockade has stopped the entry of many

basic necessities and threatens to make an already disastrous situation truly catastrophic. The US,

which has supported Saudi Arabia and fears growing Iranian influence in Yemen, has called on

the blockade to be lifted. Saudi Arabia said in December 2017 that it would temporarily open the

main port at Hudaydah, but this is, at best, a stop-gap measure.2 Much more needs to be done to

both put an end to the fighting, reconcile the warring parties and deliver aid to the population.

The main line of division in Yemen is between forces loyal to the exiled President Abd

Rabbu Mansour Hadi (who came to power in 2011) and rebels who adhere to Zaidi Shia (a form

of a Shia Islam), known as Houthis3. The Houthis adhere to Zaidism, which has a long history

among many tribes in northern Yemen. The Houthis have generally been underrepresented and

marginalized in Yemen, which has been dominated by the Muslim Sunni majority (65% of the

population). The Houthis have engaged in several armed uprisings against the government,

including one from 2004-2010. They currently occupy the capital, Sanaa. The minority Houthis

are unrecognized by the majority Sunnis and the international community, both of whom support

President Hadi, who fled the capital in 2014 and has set up his government in the port city of Aden.

The conflict is further complicated in that both groups are opposed by al-Qaeda in the Arabian

Peninsula (AQAP) - one of the most technologically advanced and organized sects of al-Qaeda,

which is in de facto control of parts of the country4 - and by the Islamic State, which also has a

presence in Yemen.5

Many in the international community point to the problem of Iranian support for the Shia

Houthis and Saudi support for the Hadi-loyal Sunnis, broadening the scope of this civil conflict

into a regional religious clash. The United States, with Hadi’s support, has conducted drone strikes

against both AQAP and the Houthis. In 2017, in the first military action of the Trump

administration, a US drone struck al-Qaeda targets in Yemen, killing over a dozen al-Qaeda

fighters but also numerous civilians.6 Saudi Arabia, however, has been the most important backer

of Hadi’s government. It leads a coalition - comprised of several Gulf states, Egypt, Morocco,

Jordan, and Sudan that maintains a naval blockade and continues a series of near-daily air strikes,

some of which have produced large-scale civilian casualties and international approbation. Indeed,

in August 2017 the UN specifically singled out Saudi Arabia for 38 attacks on schools and

2 See “The Yemen Crucible” (above) as well as “US Seeks End to Blockade on Yemen,” The New York Times,

December 6, 2017, at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/06/world/middleeast/trump-yemen-saudi-blockade.html. 3 United Nations Special Adviser Jamal Benomar in “At Security Council, UN envoy says Yemen on 'rapid

downward spiral' as tensions rise,” UN News Centre,

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50403#.VZa7hhNViko. 4 http://www.ibtimes.com/al-qaeda-winning-hearts-minds-over-isis-yemen-social-services-2346835 5 https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/15/world/middleeast/islamic-state-gains-strength-in-yemen-rivaling-al-

qaeda.html?_r=0 6 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/donald-trump-us-military-attack-yemen-civilians-women-

children-dead-a7553121.html

hospitals in 2016 in a report on children and armed conflict.7 Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia continues

to receive support from several major powers, including the US and the UK.

Persistent conflict between these groups not only endanger international security but has

created a humanitarian nightmare and created chaotic conditions that may favor the emergence of

terrorist groups. As fighting has engulfed the country, the United Nations has called for more

humanitarian assistance. Aid agencies warn of a “looming catastrophe”, specifically in long-

suffering urban areas. Much of the country’s urban infrastructure has been destroyed, including

over half the country’s meager health care facilities. The country is beset by a massive cholera

outbreak.8 Unfortunately, however, this is a conflict that has received relatively little attention, as

the international community has been more concerned with the situation in Syria and North Korea.

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon has observed, “Yemen’s very existence hangs in

the balance, while parties bicker, Yemen burns…it is a ticking time bomb.” 9

Background10

The united Republic of Yemen was established in 1990 when North Yemen and South

Yemen (the latter of which adopted a Marxist ideology), which had been engaged in two decades

of sporadic conflict, unified, with Ali Abdullah Saleh, North Yemen’s ruler, becoming Yemen’s

leader. He would rule until 2011, when he was toppled after a wave of protests during the “Arab

Spring”. Under Saleh, Yemen remained beset by regional, ethnic, and religious divisions, and it

has faced numerous crises, including a short civil war in 1994. In 2000, Saudi Arabia and Yemen

agreed to delineate their border. Fighting in the northwest between the government and the

Houthis, a Zaydi Shia Muslim minority, continued intermittently from 2004 to 2010.

Poverty, unemployment, tribal rivalry, corruption, political repression, and lack of basic

education and sanitation prevented the proliferation of a sustainably peaceful and successful state.

Yemen is approximately 65% Sunni Muslim and 35% Shia Muslim. Just over a third of the

population is urban. Just over half have accessed to improved sanitation and drinking water. 11

Most Yemenis live in small villages in the Asir Mountains (in the western part of the country) and

rely on agriculture for their livelihood. Over 60% of its population is under 24, which presents

enormous challenges in terms of economic vitality and creating jobs for its burgeoning population.

Many male youths are therefore drawn to extremist or militant groups for the sake of having a job

(youth unemployment officially is at 35%) and some opportunity at upward mobility. For Yemeni

women, gender equality is poor, reflected in lower literacy and unemployment, as well as political

engagement, among women.

7 Report of the Secretary General, s/2017/821, August 24, 2017, see also

http://www.edition.cnn.com/2017/10/05/middleeast/saudi-arabia-yemen/index.html 8 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/07/world/middleeast/yemen-cholera-outbreak-war.html 9 https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/world/middleeast/yemen-cease-fire-talks-geneva-houthis.html 10 A premier recent source for this issue is a Briefing Yemen feature in The Economist from December 2, 2017,

available at https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21731820-report-conflict-zone-world-ignores-how-yemen-

became-most-wretched-place. 11 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html

The Current Conflict

From 2009-2011, the stirrings of revolution appeared. Public rallies in Sana'a against

President Saleh - inspired by similar demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt - slowly built

momentum starting in late January 2011. By the following month, some protests had resulted in

violence, and the demonstrations had spread to other major cities. By March the opposition had

hardened its demands and was unifying behind calls for Saleh's immediate ouster. In April 2011,

the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), in an attempt to mediate the crisis in Yemen, proposed the

GGC Initiative, an agreement in which the president would step down in exchange for immunity

from prosecution. Saleh's refusal to sign an agreement led to further violence. The UN Security

Council passed Resolution 2014 in October 2011 calling for an end to the violence and completing

a power transfer deal. In November 2011, Saleh signed the GCC Initiative to step down and to

transfer some of his powers to Vice President Abd Rabuh Mansur Hadi. Following Hadi's

uncontested election victory in February 2012, Saleh formally transferred his powers. In

accordance with the GCC initiative, Yemen launched a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) in

March 2013 to discuss key constitutional, political, and social issues. Hadi concluded the NDC in

January 2014 and planned to begin implementing subsequent steps in the transition process,

including constitutional drafting, a constitutional referendum, and national elections.

The Houthis, perceiving their grievances were not addressed in the NDC, joined forces

with Saleh, who wished to return to power, and expanded their influence in northwestern Yemen,

culminating in a major offensive against military units and rival tribes and enabling their forces to

overrun the capital, Sanaa, in September 2014. In January 2015, the Houthis surrounded the

presidential palace, Hadi's residence, and key government facilities, prompting Hadi and the

cabinet to submit their resignations. Hadi fled to the southern port city of Aden in February 2015

and rescinded his resignation, claiming that he is he legal ruler of Yemen. He subsequently escaped

to Oman and then moved to Saudi Arabia and asked the GCC to intervene militarily in Yemen to

protect his government from the Houthis. In March 2015 Saudi Arabia assembled a coalition of

Arab militaries and began airstrikes against the Houthis and Houthi-affiliated forces. Ground

fighting between Houthi-aligned forces and resistance groups backed by the Saudi-led coalition

continued through 2016. The UN brokered a cessation of hostilities (COH) that reduced airstrikes

and fighting across the country for several months in mid-2016. Meanwhile, UN-backed peace

talks in Kuwait broke down in August 2016 without agreement. The conflict escalated, and

subsequent attempts to declare a COH or resume peace talks have failed. As of the end of 2017

(see map), the Houthis remain in control of most of western Yemen, but Hadi’s forces control

Aden and the sparsely-populated south, with some areas de facto controlled by Al-Qaeda and other

extremist groups

UN Actions/Documents

The UN Security Council has been actively involved in this crisis, trying to broker ceasefire

and provide humanitarian assistance. It has published numerous reports and resolutions.12 Among

the notable UN documents and actions: Security Council Resolution 2140 (2014), in addition to

calling on parties to respect previous partnership agreements, established a “Committee” within

the UN Security Council as well as a Panel of Experts to identify groups and individuals that will

be subject to international sanctions including travel bans. The UN also called to international

donors to provide humanitarian assistance to the country, while also condemning human rights

abuses in the country and the growing presence of AQAP and other terror groups.

During the first three months of 2015, in the immediate aftermath of Houthi gains and the

resignation of Hadi, the Security Council issued several official condemnations in the form of

resolutions and a Security Council Presidential Statement on acts of Houthi violence on the part

of the Houthis on the Aden International Airport and the Presidential Palace amongst other

locations. On 24 March, President Hadi sent the Council a letter “inviting all willing countries to

provide support to deter the Houthi advance in the south” under a Chapter VII mandate. While a

text was circulated, no action was taken by the end of March, at which point the Government of

Saudi Arabia announced the commencement of multilateral airstrikes against the Houthis.

12 The key resources are available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/yemen/

Security Council Resolution 2216 (April 2015) demanded the Houthis quit fighting and

withdraw from the capital and called for an arms embargo on any weapons going to parties in

Yemen. It also called upon inspection of borders and ships to enforce this embargo. Both Saleh

(aligned with the Houthis in opposition to Hadi) and the Houthi leader were singled out as

individuals whose actions threaten the peace and stability of Yemen. As with all resolutions, it also

called for implementation of previous political agreements which could be the framework for a

settlement.

More specifically, it refers to the Peace and National Partnership Agreement13(2014),

which, among other things, calls for a “federal democratic Yemeni state based on the rule of law,

equal citizenship, human rights and good governance; resolved to the unity, sovereignty,

independence and territorial integrity of Yemen; committed to responding to the peoples’ demand

for peaceful change, economic, financial and administrative reforms, and to achieving economic

welfare; dedicated to furthering the higher national interest through a spirit of partnership and

consensus in diagnosis, solutions, and implementation; and committed to stabilizing the country

and realizing a bright promising democratic future.”

In April 2016, a statement by the President of the Security Council welcomed the

establishment of a temporary ceasefire and the beginning of peace talks in Kuwait, and it called

on Yemeni parties to establish a roadmap that could lead to a permanent ceasefire and outline a

political settlement (S/PRST/2016/5).

In August 2016, the High Commissioner for Human Rights on Yemen, created by the UN’s

Human Rights Council, again called for the creation of an international, independent body to

investigate alleged violations in Yemen (A/HRC/33/38).

The Panel of Experts produced a report in January 2017 (S/2017/81) which is

comprehensive in assessing the situation. It notes that there is a de facto military stalemate, but

that the combined Houthi/Saleh force have taken steps to solidify control over the capital and

create “facts on the ground” that give them a stronger claim to be the legitimate government in

Yemen. The report notes the rise of terrorist groups and the various humanitarian problems, and

in general presents a very bleak assessment of conditions and options for international actors.

By 2017, hope for a settlement has deteriorated amidst continuing violence and

involvement by outside actors. Resolution 2342 (February 2017) simply re-affirmed many of the

previous UN resolutions, including the sanction regime. It also “Reaffirms the need for the full and

timely implementation of the political transition following the comprehensive National Dialogue

Conference, in line with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and Implementation Mechanism,

and in accordance with resolutions 2014 (2011), 2051 (2012), 2140 (2014), 2201 (2015), 2204

(2015) 2216 (2015), and 2266 (2016) and with regard to the expectations of the Yemeni people.”

Recent Developments

By the end of 2017, new developments have both made the situation more difficult but, at

the same time, generated more international attention on Yemen and pressure to solve the conflict.

13 http://peacemaker.un.org/yemen-national-partnership-2014

In November, Saudi Arabia claimed that it shot down a Houthi-fired missile aimed at the airport

in the Saudi capital, and in December another missile was fired at a Saudi royal palace.14 In both

cases, Saudi Arabia claimed they shot down the missiles with an American-supplied air defence

system, although this has been disputed. Saudi Arabia also claimed—and the US has supported

this claim—that the missiles were supplied to the Houthis by Iran, although some dispute this

charge15 Critics of the US and Saudi position note that Saudi attacks on Yemeni civilians have, to

date, been far more destructive, and that the new Saudi blockade on Yemen is likely to lead to

even more death and suffering. Meanwhile, on December 4 former president Saleh was killed by

his Houthi allies after Saleh’s militias had begun fighting Houthi forces in Sanaa and Saleh himself

called for dialogue with the Saudi led forces. His death may open up a new front in the war, one

between the Houthis and Saleh’s tribal loyalists, and it was also an embarrassment for Saudi

Arabia. Indeed, despite having military superiority over the Houthi forces, the Saudi-led coalition

has yet to defeat them. Militarily, the situation remains a stalemate, and risks becoming part of a

larger war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, one that might draw in other powers as well.

Issues for the Security Council

Although the conflict in Yemen is rooted in long-term socio-economic problems and lack

of effective political institutions, the immediate task of the Security Council is to focus on actions

that will end the fighting. Sending in more aid, even if it could reach the population, is at best a

temporary solution, as continued fighting threatens both aid deliveries and makes the humanitarian

crisis worse. At present, there are no UN peacekeepers on the ground, in part because there is no

peace to keep and because their safety cannot be assured. Getting the two sides to a negotiating

table would be a good idea, but as long as each side believes it can win militarily, this may be

difficult to do. Furthermore, whether any short truce or ceasefire—which certainly would be

useful—would hold is difficult to say, as conditions on the ground are very chaotic and it is unclear

if the various local warlords can be controlled.

The international community has, for the most part, supported Hadi’s claims to he be

legitimate leader of Yemen, but, given his actions (including his resignation from power in 2014),

this claim can easily be debated. The UN could should to be more even-handed in its approach and

consider some of the Houthi claims to power, but this might be difficult given the US presence on

the Security Council. Focus on limiting the involvement of outside actors, including the Saudis,

might be the most productive course of action, which might require creation of and enforcement

of an arms embargo and perhaps sanctions on neighboring countries. Given the porous border

between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, as well as the lack of any force to patrol the coastline, an

effective sanctions regime, even if passed, may be difficult to enforce. While it might be tempting

for some to remain uninvolved, the international community should be aware of the consequences

of failed states in a volatile part of the world, and it does not wish for the conflict to spread or get

worse, creating more humanitarian problems.

14 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42412729 15 See “The Yemen Crucible”, cited above.

Questions to Consider:

1. The UN has declared outside assistance to armed groups in Yemen to be impermissible. How

can this be enforced?

2. Is there something the international community could do to encourage negotiations among the

groups in Yemen?

3. Is the UN implicitly/supporting Hadi, thereby taking a side in this conflict? Is this a sound

policy, or can the UN be more evenhanded?

4. Should the UN send in peacekeepers or a military force to help provide order and assistance to

at least part of the country?

5. If efforts to resolve the conflict go nowhere, what, at minimum might be done to prevent Yemen

from becoming a base for terrorist operations?

Rohingya in Myanmar

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/C6nZuYjWsAAdG0l.jpg

Background

The Rohingya people are considered “the world’s most persecuted minority.”16 They are

a majority Muslim ethnic group who live mainly in the Buddhist country of Myanmar, most of

whom live in the western coastal state, Rakhine. After Myanmar gained independence from

Great Britain in 1948, Myanmar passed the Union Citizenship Act, which allowed ethnicities to

gain official citizenship. While the Rohingya were not included as one of the ethnicities, the act

allowed families living in Myanmar for two generations to apply for identity cards. During this

period, the Rohingya could gain identity cards and several served in parliament. This changed

following a military coup in 1962, requiring all citizens to have national registration cards, which

the Rohingya were unable to obtain. The Rohingya became officially stateless in 1982 when

Myanmar passed a new citizenship law, which again did not recognize the ethnic group. Under

the 1982 law, to obtain basic citizen status the person had to prove their family lived in Myanmar

prior to 1948 and was fluent in one of the official national languages. The Rohingya lacked this

needed paperwork because it was either unavailable or denied to them. After this law, more

restrictions were placed on the Rohingya, such as the prevention of entering certain professional

fields. Since the 1970s, the Rohingya have been persecuted and forced to flee to neighboring

countries for refuge from reported rape, torture, arson, and murder. Reports of human rights

16 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/08/rohingya-muslims-170831065142812.html

abuses increased after nine border police were killed in October 2016. The Government of

Myanmar blamed this attack on an armed Rohingya group.

In light of these events, neighboring Bangladesh has seen an enormous increase in its

Rohingya population, which are relocating from Myanmar into their country. In 2017,

Bangladesh decided to continue with a controversial plan to relocate these refugees to a remote

island is reportedly prone to flooding and being uninhabitable.17 The Prime Minister of

Bangladesh has also caused controversy with the Myanmarian government, not only for allowing

Rohingya refugees into Bangladesh, but for referring to the events in Myanmar as a genocide.18

Over 700,000 refugees have entered Bangladesh, leading Bangladeshi leaders to call the situation

an international problem. This has resulted in a call for Myanmar leaders, including de facto

leader Aung San Suu Kyi, to be taken to court and face trial for genocide.

Even more recently, Sheikh Hasina, prime ministers of Bangladesh, has called on the

United Nations and the international community to pressure Myanmar to allow the return of

Rohingya refugees.19

The Current Conflict:

17 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/bangladesh-pushes-rohingya-island-plan-170131050223171.html 18 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/bangladesh-fm-violence-rohingya-genocide-170911023429604.html 19http://www.aljazeera.com/video/news/2017/09/bangladesh-pm-urges-myanmar-rohingya-refugees-

170912154912867.html

Massive human rights abuses were outlined in the United Nations Human Rights report

published in February 2017.20 According to the report, of the 204 people individually

interviewed, the majority reported witnessing killings, with half reporting having family

members killed. More than half of the women interviewed experience rape or sexual violence in

the Rakhine State, inflicted on them by government forces. In the report regarding Rohingya

children in the Rakhine State, it recounts incidents involving a five-year-old and eight-month-old

being killed. There has also been confirmation of deliberate house fires with Rohingya families

stuck inside. The Myanmar government has denied access to United Nations officials

investigating human rights in the country.21 Special rapporteur Yanghee Lee said in a statement,

“This declaration of non-cooperation with my mandate can only be viewed as a strong indication

that there must be something terribly awful happening in Rakhine, as well as the rest of the

country.”22 The government’s decision to deny access came a day after authorities stated they

found ten bodies buried in a mass grave in Rakhine, which the army is reportedly investigating.

After this official denial, Aung San Suu Kyi said in July that a UN investigation would simply

aggravate the problems in the Rakhine state.23 Myanmar officials have told the UN that the

country has a right to protect itself against what they call terrorist activities, including those

conducted by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army. 24

UN Actions:

The United Nations Human Rights Council has been heavily involved in releasing

official documents on the crisis in Myanmar.25 The Security Council has been called upon by the

international community, specifically Bangladesh and Western Countries, to pass a resolution

condemning the human rights abuses in the region.26

The Human Rights Council in June 2016, outlining human rights violations against the

Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar. The document discusses how, under legal framework, the

Myanmar government has violated the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on

the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the Convention on the

Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Furthermore, the government has neglected Article 2 of the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which stipulates that all states are required to protect the

human rights of all. The body also reminds Myanmar that under the Geneva Conventions,

individuals can be found guilty under the realm of international criminal law for crimes against

humanity and war crimes. The document calls for the international community to build

20 http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/MM/FlashReport3Feb2017.pdf 21 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/yanghee-lee-denied-access-rohingya-villages-170115074431631.html 22 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=58320#.WlOGlSOZNhA 23 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/myanmar-probe-aggravate-rakhine-tension-170718084110899.html 24 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/myanmar-arakan-rohingya-salvation-army-170912060700394.html 25 The key resources are available at:

http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session32/Pages/ListReports.aspx 26 Documents pertaining specifically to the Security Council can be found at:

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/myanmar/

foundations for the rule of law in Myanmar, following the idea of equal respect for all human’s

rights, give a timeframe of when the Rohingya will be welcomed back to their state, and set up

preventative measures to avoid any similar conflicts in the future.27

The President of the Security Council on November 6, 2017 regarding the crisis in

Myanmar. The document states that the Security Council condemns the violence taking place in

the Rakhine State, including human rights violations and abuses, including the attacks by the

Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army for its attacks on Myanmar security forces. The Security

Council recognizes that Myanmar is a sovereign state and reaffirmed its support for territorial

integrity and political independence. However, the statement stresses its support for the

continuation of the pursuit of accountable government institutions in their transition to a

democratic government. The document commends the Bangladeshi government for taking in

refugees during this time and the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the

Governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh on the situation in the Rakhine State.28

Issues for the Security Council:

The Security Council has urged the Myanmar government to halt the excessive use of

military force in the Rakhine state. The goal of this committee should be to find a solution to the

refugee crisis as it is currently having a destabilizing impact on the region, specifically in areas

such as Bangladesh. Including, but not limited to, if they should be able to stay in Bangladesh or

should be allowed to return to their original state in Myanmar. Also there should be focus on the

humanitarian crisis that continues to exist along with the human rights violations. A final

solution should include how the Myanmar government should treat the Rohingya after these

atrocities, such as should they be recognized as an official ethnic group in the state and be given

proper citizenship?

Questions to Consider:

1. What is your country’s opinion of the situation in Myanmar? Have they done any

concrete action to assist in the situation?

2. It is said that the UN must create a strongly worded resolution on the human rights crisis.

How can the international community work together to stop the ongoing violations within

Myanmar?

3. Bangladesh has taken in Rohingya refugees while stating that eventually Myanmar must

allow them back into their state. What actors should take part in creating this road map

and what should be the time frame?

27http://undocs.org/A/HRC/32/18 28 http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/statements/2017.shtml

4. According to the Conventions in Geneva, the individuals committing human rights

crimes can be individually prosecuted. How should the international community address

this in this situation specifically?

5. Some states have begun to place sanctions against Myanmar. Are sanctions a way to

pressure the government to conform to international standards?

6. What are steps the international community can do to provide humanitarian aid to the

Rohingya population?

The Situation in Syria

The ongoing civil conflict in Syria is entering its eighth year of conflict with many issues

remaining unresolved in the country. While the ground campaign against the so-called Islamic

State, otherwise known as ISIS or ISIL, has been successful in taking back their territorial

possessions in Syria and Iraq, the group’s extremist network continues to pose a threat to both

regional and international security.29 The most promising development towards peace is the

current ceasefire, which has been endorsed by Russia, Iran, and Turkey. These countries have

contributed a number of police and military forces to enforce a number of de-escalation zones,

mostly located within opposition-held territory.30 The success of these zones is evident in eastern

Ghouta, where Russian military police have facilitated the distribution of humanitarian aid to

55,000 people in Douma and Barzeh. Nevertheless, the humanitarian situation in Syria continues

to worsen as hundreds of thousands are not directly receiving aid and millions have been forced

to flee abroad, inciting one of the largest refugee crises in modern times.

The Assad regime continues to comply with UN mandated actions to restrict the

production/possession of chemical weapons. These actions are outlined in Security Council

Resolutions 2118 and 2235, which limits the Syrian government from possessing chemical

29 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/isis-is-near-defeat-in-iraq-now-comes-the-hard-

part/2017/09/13/68b1f742-8d9e-11e7-9c53-6a169beb0953_story.html?utm_term=.fab319b1b0c1 30 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/22/world/europe/russia-turkey-iran-syria-war-peace-talks.html

weapons and bars any actor from using them in the conflict.31 All this considered, the UN

Security Council must decide what role it will play in the coming peace process and, specifically,

how it will work within the context of the current ceasefire, guaranteed by Russia, Iran, and

Turkey. The Council has previously stated, and reaffirmed, that the path forward should be

Syrian-led and that negotiations between the government and opposition should accompany the

ceasefire. This was made clear in Resolution 2254 and their endorsement of the Geneva

Communique of 2012.32

Questions to Consider:

1. What role could UN peacekeeping forces play in the resolution of the conflict in Syria?

Specifically, what role could they play in the established de-escalation zones?

2. What actions should the UN Security Council take to facilitate the peace process and

postwar settlement in Syria? Should the Assad regime be internationally condemned for its

human rights abuses?

3. With the so-called Islamic State almost defeated on the ground in Syria, what can the

Security Council do to ensure that the group does not resurge in the region?

4. How can the UN work with the three Guarantors: Russia, Iran, and Turkey, to create a

long-term peace in Syria? What actions can be taken to strengthen the current ceasefire?

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Headlines today are dominated by stories of increased tensions between North Korea, or

DPRK, and the United States.33 Since Kim Jong-Un took power in the Democratic People’s

Republic, they have become increasingly antagonistic and increased the intensity of their nuclear

weapons program. Compound this with the “fire and fury” rhetoric of the current administration

in the United States, nearly 30,000 US troops on the border, tens of millions of Koreans in range

of artillery fire, and the result is a volatile conflict which, if not properly handled, could result in

a devastating loss of life. In September of 2016, North Korea conducted its most powerful

nuclear test to date and claims to have the capacity to hit the continental United States with an

intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) mounted with a nuclear warhead.

31 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2118(2013)

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2235(2015) 32 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2254(2015)

http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf 33 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/02/us/politics/trump-tweet-north-

korea.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FNorth%20Korea&action=click&contentCollection=world&region=str

eam&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=collection

These tests have continued over the year despite international condemnation and repeated

calls from the UN for North Korea to halt its testing. The Security Council responded to this last

test with Resolution 2375, and a debilitating set of sanctions which banned the purchase of North

Korean textiles, sale of gasoline to North Korea, and limited hiring of North Korean workers.34

The US also sought an oil embargo, but China prevented this, claiming it would cause the

collapse of the regime and a massive refugee crisis.35 North Korea responded with a missile

launch over Japan, and the Council issued a press statement condemning it in another round of

escalation. The situation has always been relatively bombastic, but it is at risk of getting out of

control.

Issues to consider are the troop presence and the US missile defence system in South

Korea, both of which increase Kim’s paranoia of an impending invasion. The US and South

Korea routinely conduct joint military operations on the peninsula, which has been cited as a

point of contention for the Kim regime. There are those who believe that extraordinary pressure

and pushing the DPRK to the brink of collapse will bring about denuclearization, but others

believe this will result in deadly conflict, an unprecedented refugee crisis, and the potential for

nuclear weapons to fall into the hands of non-state actors. Whatever the proposed solution, it is

unlikely North Korea will overturn its nuclear program in a fashion similar to Iran, and effort to

de-escalate tensions are of the utmost importance.

Questions to consider:

1. What options does the Security Council have to bring North Korea back to the

negotiating table? What can be done, aside from sanctions, to re-establish dialogue?

2. How can the Security Council work with North Korea’s neighbours, China, South Korea,

and Japan, to ensure stability on the Korean peninsula and prevent the outbreak of

conflict?

3. What should the goals of the Security Council be? Denuclearization? De-escalation? AN

end to missile testing? Accession to relative nuclear test ban and non-proliferation

treaties?

34 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2371(2017)

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2375(2017) 35 https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-china-isnt-ready-to-put-pressure-on-north-korea

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship