President Museveni's Address to Parliament on Oil in Uganda

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Address to Parliament

by

H.E. Yoweri Kaguta MuseveniPresident of the Republic of Uganda

On Oil

Parliament - 10th February 2012

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H.E. the Vice President,

Rt. Hon. Speaker,

Rt. Hon. Prime Minister,

Hon. Leader of the Opposition,

Hon. Ministers,

Hon. Members of Parliament,

Ladies and Gentlemen

I greet all of you and I congratulate you all upon entering

the New Year.

On the 6th of February, while in Kasese during Tarehe Sita

celebrations, I made two points:

i. The NRM/NRA fought a resistance war and won it

without a reliable source of arms; and

ii. The NRM inherited a Government with ruined

economy and without money but within a short time

repaired that economy.

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It may be those qualities of ability to build great things

with scarce resources that moved the Alurs to give me

the nickname of Jalukunga the one who nurtures things

to maturity. Even the Bakiga had given me the praise

name of Ruhemba-Ogwenjura the one who successfully

makes fire using wet firewood. This praise is not just for

me as a person but for the whole NRM.

During the phase of the armed struggle, we moved at a

much faster pace. We had a lot of problems lack of

arms, lack of food, lack of drugs, lack of clothes,

indiscipline within the forces, etc., but we solved those

problems systematically until we won victory in 1986.

That phase of the resistance was building on the

foundation of the earlier phase of 1971-1979. The 1971-

1979 phase was also building on the foundation of the

earlier phases of the peoples struggles in Uganda such

as Kabalega and Mwanga resistances, Bataka Movement,

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Nyangire Movement, Musaazis struggles of 1940s, the

Student Movement in the 1960s, etc.

Actions in the armed struggle phase were faster because

we had tight rules in the form of the Code of Conduct and

the Operational Code. Our strategy was correct and it

was supported by appropriate institutions and tight rules.

When we captured power in 1986, we had to share power

with new civilian forces in the form of the expanded

National Resistance Council (NRC). Using the closed

sessions of the NRC, we would develop prior harmonized

positions and come to the Legislative Chamber when

everything had been agreed. We were, therefore, able to

move a bit fast, acrimonious debates in the NRC

notwithstanding. We were able to deal with many

controversial issues such as the chasing ofmafuta mingis

out of the Asian houses, liberalizing the control of foreign

exchange away from the monopoly of the Bank of

Uganda, liberalizing the buying of coffee and cotton away

from the monopoly of Coffee the Marketing Board (CMB)

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and the Lint Marketing Board (LMB), reduction of the civil

servants, reduction of the army, the restoration of

traditional leaders, etc. Infrastructure was tackled with

the increase of electricity generation from 60 MW to 380

MW, the repairing of the major roads, etc.

With the introduction of the 1995 Constitution, however,

decision making process slowed down and indiscipline in

the political class increased. This led to a number of

strategic mistakes, one of them being the sabotage of the

electricity development programme by delaying Bujagali.

These mistakes cost our country dearly. Between 2005

and today, the country has squandered 1,500 billion

shillings (1.5 trillion shillings) on subsidizing electricity.

This does not include the cost to industry through the

need to buy standby diesel generators which are always

very costly. Through external interference, there was

also a delay in the equipping and professionalization of

the UPDF by insisting on a smaller budget as a condition

for external financial support. This caused the prolonging

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of the suffering of our people in Northern Uganda on

account of Konys terrorism and the continued damage

by the Karimojong cattle-rustlers within Karamoja and

also in the neighbouring districts.

We, therefore, got into a situation where the NRM was

forced to make mistakes on two strategic issues by

internal indiscipline and external pressure. This was in

the area of electricity and security as already pointed out.

In 2001, I could no longer tolerate the sabotage to

national security caused by the under-funding of the

army. I called an emergency Cabinet meeting in Gulu.

We decided to cut 23% from the budget of each Ministry

to cure this mistake. Using the savings, we bought

helicopter gunships and other equipments that should

have been bought in 1991 when we reduced the Army

from 100,000 to 40,000 but which were not bought

because of external pressures. By 2003, we had started

turning the tide against the terrorists. The battle of

Apopong in Teso, in August 2003, was the turning point.

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That was the end of Kony terrorism. That strategic

mistake was finally cured.

The strategic mistake on electricity took longer to cure. It

was only in 2006, soon after the elections, when I

proposed the setting up of the Energy Fund, using our

own money, that we began addressing that mistake.

Previously, we had relied on endless begging from

outside for funds to build the dams. The begging itself

was further complicated by the internal sabotage by the

indisciplined political elements whom the external

benefactors were only too eager to listen to. By setting

up the Energy Fund, we were now able to build these

dams ourselves if it was necessary although we

continued to welcome external financing, if available.

The usual games did not take long to manifest

themselves. Some old man claimed to be the

personification of the Bujagali spiritand the spirit was

objecting to the building of the dam. Some of the

lenders started procrastinating using frivolous excuses

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they must consult civil society, etc. Who is civil

society? These are some individuals in the employ of

foreign NGOs. How can these be civil society? I

understand civil society to mean people who are living by

their own means not employed by Government. This

means industrialists, farmers, hotel-owners as well as

workers in the private sector, etc. Why should people

working for foreign governments that fund the NGOs be

regarded as civil society? Fortunately, by this time, a

contractor had already been selected. We, therefore,

released US$ 75 million to them from the Energy Fund as

bridge financing to start building the dam straight away.

If they would not start, we would kick them out and build

the dam ourselves using our own money. That is how

Bujagali started on schedule this time.

The first turbine has now been commissioned. All the

turbines will be ready by July 2012. With Bujagali, we

shall not have load-shedding for the next three (3) years

because the deficit of 135 MW at peak hours (between

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6.00 pm and 11.00 pm) will be more than covered by the

250 MW Bujagali will produce. The Energy Fund has not

only helped us to kick-start Bujagali on time. Using the

Energy Fund money, we have contributed to the following

projects:

A. Construction of evacuation and distribution lines for the following

small hydropower projects:

1. Mpanga Small Hydropower Station 18MW (Mpanga-Kamwenge-

Kahunge-Nkingo)

2. Mpanga Small Hydropower Station 18MW (the construction of the

33/132 kV, 2x20 MVA sub-station and switching station)

3. Buseruka Small Hydropower Station 9MW (Buseruka-Hoima line)

B. Construction of priority rural electrification projects :

1. Sironko-Nakapiripirit-Amudat

2. Katakwi-Moroto with T-offs to Matany and Lorengedwat

3. Ngora-Kobwin

4. Lwala-Kaberamaido-Kobululu-Amolatar and Kelle Port

5. Lwala-Otuboi-Acinip

6. Lwala-Dokolo

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7. Kitgum-Palabek

8. Lira-Apala

9. Lira-Aloi

10. Ibanda-Kabujogera-Kamwenge

11. Muhanga-Kamwezi

12. Kakumiro-Birembo-Nalweyo

13. Bukwiri-Kyankwanzi

14. Kayunga-Busaana

Therefore, today, we are emerging from the two strategic

mistakes imposed on us by external forces and theindisciplined elements with the political class delaying

the equipping of the Army and the delaying the the

development of electricity.

When you had the oil debate here in this Parliament on

the 10th and 11th of October 2011, you were about to

involve us in a new strategic mistake delaying the

conclusion of the oil agreements which had been

discussed by very competent people for a very long time.

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However, when the NRM Caucus met in Kyankwanzi after

it rectified this position and, later on, the Rt. Hon.

Speaker Rebecca Kadaga clarified to me that the

resolutions you passed did not affect the old agreements

or on-going negotiations. Let me, again, take you

through the oil story: I first got involved with the

Mwitanzigye (L. Albert) oil on 10th of February 1986.

Some two White men from Shell BP came to see me at

the old State House, Entebbe. They told me that there

were signs that there was petroleum in the Mwitazingye

(L. Albert) area and that the previous Government had

been about to conclude an exploration agreement with

Shell BP. They now wanted to conclude the agreement

with us. I told them to go away so that I consult with the

concerned departments. I would call them back after a

few days. I called people from the Ministry of Minerals,

led by Mrs. Janet Opio who was the Permanent Secretary

of the Ministry of Natural Resources. The team included

the late Saul Mboijana who was the Ag. Commissioner of

Geological Survey and Mines Department and

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Kabagambe-Kaliisa who was the Oil Project Coordinator. I

asked them whether they knew anything about

petroleum. They said they did not. Later I asked the

Ministry of Finance and Planning if anybody in Uganda

knew anything about oil. They said: Yes, there was an

expert on oil in the Bank of Uganda (BOU), they said. I

called the expert from the BOU. The expert was a

Ghanaian whose expertise was on account that he was

the one that would handle the import papers for

petroleum products into Uganda. You cannot imagine the

disappointment and consternation I had. I called back

the Shell people and told them that I could not proceed

with the agreement because I had nobody on my side

that knew anything about petroleum. I called the people

in the Ministry of Minerals and told them to recruit

graduates of chemistry, physics, geology and send them

for Masters Studies in Petroleum.

Once I had taken those strategic decisions and given the

turbulent times Uganda and the Region were going

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through, I forgot about the issue until later when the

students had come back and we had formed the

Petroleum Unit in the Ministry of Minerals. At some

stage, a group known as Petrofina from Belgium was

negotiating with us and the Government of Mobutu in

Congo about that oil. I even went to Gbadolite to see

Mobutu in Congo about that oil. However, Petrofina was

crippled by the riots in Kinshasa in 1991 because their

equipment was looted. At this time, I looked for Shell BP

because I now had my people who had come back with

qualifications in petroleum studies. Shell BP was no

longer interested. It seems that with the opening up of

the Soviet Bloc, they had huge oil fields in those areas

and were no longer interested. That would not have been

a problem; the problem was that they told me a lie - that

they were sure there would be no oil in that area. Why

were you anxious to come in 1986? I could not get an

answer from them.

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The following companies came in:

Licensee Date Issued Area

1. Fina Exploration B.V March 1991 Entire Graben

2. Uganda General Works and Engineering Co. Feb 1995 Albert Basin

3. Heritage Oil and Gas Ltd. Jan 1997 EA 3

4. Hardman Resources (U) Ltd. Jan 1997 EA 2

5. Hardman Resources (U) Ltd. Oct 2001 EA 2

6. Heritage Oil & Gas Ltd. and Energy Africa July 2004 EA 1

7. Heritage Oil & Gas Ltd. and Energy Africa Sept 2004 EA 3A

8. Neptune Petroleum (U) Ltd. Sept 2005 EA 5

9. Dominion (U) Ltd. July 2007 EA 4B

We, therefore, must salute our scientists who did all this

work. The first well sank by Heritage in Semliki in the

year 2003 was a disappointment. It contained a lot of

carbon dioxide. The Europeans of Heritage panicked. I

even, myself, I almost panicked. Our scientists were

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resolute and insisted that there was oil. Even now, they

insist that there may be oil even in that Semliki well,

carbon dioxide notwithstanding.

The first productive well was struck on the 6th of January

2006 by Hardman Resources at Mpuuta Oil Field in Hoima

district. Since that time, out of 64 wells drilled, 58 have

found oil which is a 90% success rate. It is estimated that

having explored in only 40% of the potential area, we

have confirmed 2.5 billion barrels. Exploration in all the

other areas will be done when licenses are awarded

through competitive bidding once the Petroleum

Resource Management legislation is enacted.

When the first successful well produced oil, discussions

started on the way forward. There were attempts to tell

me that Uganda should quickly agree to a Pipeline for

export of crude oil. I asked: How about a Refinery to

produce petrol for our use, diesel, kerosene, HFO and

other bye-products? Some people tried to tell me that

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Refineries do not make money. My question then was:

Why do those who build Refineries build them? Are they

Mother Theresas working for philanthropy? They could

not answer this. When I visited Iran, in May 2009, I asked

the President there whether they had Refineries and

why? He said they had nine (9) and they were building

another seven (7)!! Yet here we were being discouraged

from building even one!! Unbelievable! Eventually, our

people hired a group known as Foster Wheeler which said

that the Refinery project is very profitable in Uganda and

it has an NPV of US$ 3.2 billion at 10% discount rate and

an IRR of 33%.

Foster Wheeler also found that a Pipeline for exporting

crude oil alone, would have an NPV of US$ zero at 10%

discount rate and an IRR of 10%. In other words, a

Pipeline would be much less profitable than a Refinery

partly because our crude oil is waxy and needs to be

heated all the way to Mombasa.

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Right from the exploration period, our officials had

reached agreements with the oil companies concerning

what are called Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs).

The logic here is that the host country either does not

have the money or, if she has the money, she is not

willing to risk it in drilling to confirm the existence of the

oil which may not be there or may be there in small

quantities that are not economic. Remember, our

scientists had said the oil may be there by the use of

aero-magnetic survey, gravity survey and seismology but

they had not drilled to confirm their suspicion. The oil

companies specialize in this aspect of the business. They

put forward their money to drill the wells for the better or

for the worse as they say in Christian marriages. If the oil

is found, they share in the oil until they recover what they

put in and, thereafter, they continue to take a smaller

share in recognition for their initial investment. In our

case the PSAs our people signed go as follows in

summary:

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i. An agreed exploration work programme and a

budget to execute the work. In other words, the

government obligates oil companies to drill a

number of wells or carry out surveys over a

specified area and within a defined timeframe.

This helps to monitor the exploration work and

monitor expenditure.

ii. An obligation to return part of the licensed area

(called relinquishment) on renewal of the

exploration period.

iii. Government is entitled to a Royalty on gross

production.

iv. Government is also entitled to a participating

interest or share of the National Oil Company

which is paid for initially by the licensed oil

companies.

v. An allowance for companies to recover the verified

investment cost which recovery is caped at not

more than 60% of gross oil production after

deduction of royalties. This means that the costs

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to be recovered by the oil companies have to be

verified as bona fide expenditure. Secondly, unlike

other businesses where companies recover their

costs from all revenues generated up to 100%, in

the oil business the companies are allowed to

recover up to 60% annually in order to allow for

some of the oil to remain for government to take a

share early. The oil that remains after recovery of

costs is called profit oil.

vi. Production sharing of profit oil for both

government and the oil companies.

vii. Taxation of the licensees profit oil.

Before the recovery of their costs, the oil companies will

be taking 74 barrels out of every 100 barrels produced.

After the recovery of their costs, the oil companies will

take 42 barrels out of every 100 barrels produced. This is

just sharing the barrels produced. It does not include

taxes which are at 30% of barrels taken by the

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companies and does not include royalties which are

between 5% and 12.5% of the gross production before

cost recovery. It also does not include equity by the state

oil company which would also earn dividends of 15%out

of the joint venture with international oil companies. If

you include the tax, the royalties and the dividends and

assuming we are producing at 200,000 barrels per day,

the total government share will be equivalent to 152,326

barrels out of every 200,000 barrels produced which is

76.2%. These agreements were signed before there was

certainty that there was, indeed, oil. Our people could

not have attracted those oil companies without these

types of agreements. Now that it is confirmed that we

have the oil, we shall be able to negotiate for higher

government shares from the beginning. Indeed, these

were the agreements of 2001. The later ones are much

better.

The benefits I have enumerated above do not include the

capital gains tax i.e. the tax of 30% the government

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levies on companies when they sell their shareholding as

Heritage sold to Tullow two years ago. You remember

the oil companies tried to play games on that but we told

them that that tax was not negotiable. They paid us US$

430 million in taxes, which we put in this years budget

for building Karuma dam. The Banyankore say:

Ekihambo kirakutambire kikubanza obutuutu the

pumpkin plant that will save you from hunger starts by

giving you the small pumpkin fruits; then, you know that

it will give you even the bigger ones. We are now able to

move on building Karuma dam fast without the circus we

normally go through of begging money from outside.

In the legislative proposals that the government is

sending to you, we shall propose that oil money should

never be squandered on consumption. Oil is a finite

resource which will dry out tomorrow. It must be used to

create durable capacity. Oil money should not be used

for importing cars, perfumes, travel, etc. It should only

be used for developing cheap electricity from hydro

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sources, solar sources, wind sources, the biomass and

nuclear energy in their order of urgency and affordability.

First to be developed will be all the all the hydro sites

along the Nile and its tributaries. This should give us

about 4,000 MW (Ayago, Karuma, Murchison, Ararang,

Isimba, the many mini-hydros on other Nile system

Rivers, etc). We must research in the solar and the wind

potential. We develop the energy from the biomass and

electricity from HFO, gas and some crude oil in the short-

run. In the long run, we are going to develop nuclear

energy using our abundant uranium which I have refused

to export. Nobody will export uranium from Uganda as

long as I am the President of this country. Why should we

donate fuel to light the neighbours house while our own

is in darkness (kizikiza, omwirima)? What sort of wisdom

is this? We are training our scientists in nuclear energy

for peaceful purposes already.

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The second area I propose for the use of the oil money is

in the area of transport infrastructure especially the

railway and some of the roads.

The third area for which we should use our oil money

should be in the area of scientific innovation and

research. This money should be used to build the

infrastructure for scientific research in government

universities and research centres such as UIRI, NARO, etc.

The oil money should also be used to give capital to our

scientists to commercialize their innovations. Some

aspects of irrigation could also benefit from the oil fund

especially the strategic irrigation schemes around Mount

Rwenzori, Mountain Elgon, the Kigezi Bufumbira hills,

the Agoro hills and in the areas around the Nile River that

can easily be irrigated without using too much pumping.

With cheaper energy sources, we may be able to irrigate

more distant parts that are not near the rivers such as

Karamoja.

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With the four strategic factors in place now i.e. security in

the whole country, enough electricity, an educated

population and the signing of the oil agreements, the

NRM has regained the strategic initiative more or less

like in December, 1985, when we, finally, had the

manpower and the weapons to capture Kampala and

defeat the reactionary regimes. We now have the

security, the electricity, the educated human resource

and the money to transform Uganda our long time-held

wish.

I, therefore, call on the NRM leaders and supporters and

all the other well intentioned Ugandans to work together

and take advantage of this new constellation of factors.

You all can be pioneers (historicals) at this new threshold

of transforming Uganda into a middle income country inthe next few years.

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Lately, we have been having controversy on two issues of

the so-called stabilization clause and whether we should

automatically build both a Refinery and a Pipeline of

crude. The stabilization clause aims at compensating oil

companies if the Government, through tax measures,

causes a substantial loss of economic benefits to oil

companies. We had no problem with that except we had

to be precise about the definition of the words: loss of

economic benefits. The oil companies wanted to keep

those words vague. We refused. We insisted that the

words loss of economic benefits must be scientifically

defined. We wanted the use of NPV as the yardstick for

that definition. The oil companies refused. Hence, there

was a stand-off until the oil companies relented and we

used the NPV as the yardstick for defining the loss of

economic benefits. I wish to advise the House that the

two licenses which were issued to Tullow was to

compensate for the time lost (2 years), while discussing

the tax issues as well as the oil and gas

Commercialization Strategy and Plan with the Company.

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The licenses are for periods of six months and one year

maximum. On the issue of having both the pipeline and

the Refinery, the companies, in the end, accepted our

formulation which insisted on going for the Pipeline in

addition to the Refinery if the economics are right in

other words, we must be sure about the amount of

money the Pipeline companies are going to deduct from

the price of oil per barrel and the other economic benefits

the Government would forego would have to be

computed. The main overt argument by oil companies

for a crude pipeline is the fear that there may not be

enough market for refined products (petrol, diesel,

kerosene, HFO, PVC) within Uganda and within the

Region!!

However, the real interest of oil companies in exportingcrude oil are, obviously, the bye-products and the jobs,

that go with them as well as the reluctance to invest in

local refining, preferring to use refineries abroad that are

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already built. This is a good agreement as a start. It

gives a reasonable share to the Government; it avoids the

mistakes one finds in other oil producing countries such

as the flaring of gas which means destroying that great

resource that can be used for generating electricity,

making the urea fertilizer and making steel; we have

insisted on a local Refinery; we have a tightly defined

stabilization clause; and the Pipeline will be built if the

economics are right. Future agreements are going to be

more favourable and the ones signed after 2004 are more

favourable than the ones of 2001 which I have described

here.

Continuing to procrastinate, on the other hand, would not

have been good for the country. First of all, we are losing

time. We need the oil money to develop ourinfrastructure. Secondly, we do not want our partners,

the investors, to think that we are unreliable partners.

The longer the delays went on, the more money the oil

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companies were losing by, for instance, having

employees whom they had to pay and yet work was not

starting. If you give somebody conditions and he fulfills

them, then, you must fulfill yours. You should not cause

the NRM Government to be paralyzed in that area or,

indeed, in any other area. The people involved in this

area are very capable people. Many of them are, indeed,

the pioneers of this very industry.

There is also another factor. The Chinese Minister who

visited me recently raised one point which all of us should

bear in mind. He pointed out that in 20 years time oil and

coal prices are likely to go down because at that time,

cleaner sources of energy will have been perfected.

What are these cleaner sources of energy? They are:-

solar energy, wind energy, nuclear energy, etc. Hepointed out that each day the world receives from the

sun an amount of energy that is 50 times the amount of

electricity generated in the whole world for one year.

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Another scientist had told me of this sometime ago. We,

therefore, need to be aware of all these factors so that

we do not, again, miss this window of opportunity.

There was one aspect of the oil business that I had notbothered with. These are what they call auxiliary

services: Cooking, transporting and guarding other than

by the Police etc. This aspect came up during our

discussion in Kyankwanzi. These aspects are being

addressed in the proposed legislations.

More important is the training of oil scientists and

technicians in the country. At the beginning of the

programme of exploration in 1986, as I told you, we

trained our initial batch of scientists at Imperial College

London, the university of Aberdeen as well as in India,

Norway and USA. We also trained technicians in different

places. We are now training our technicians at Kigumba.

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The director, Dr. Kwesiga, was looking for 20 billions

shillings to ensure that it is well equipped. I will ensure

that they will get this money. The universities are also

starting petroleum courses. Every aspect is, therefore,

being looked at.

A renown Petroleum Consultancy Company called IHS

Energy based in Cambridge Massachusetts in USA

regularly publishes rankings of the Petroleum Fiscal

regimes worldwide. In the publication of 2010, out of 114

countries analyzed, Uganda features with 76 points out of

114 points in terms of having fiscal terms (Royalty, cost

recovery, State participation, production sharing and

Income Tax) that are favourable to the country. Ghana

had a ranking of 58 points and Trinidad and Tobago 68

points. Only countries like Malaysia, Iran, Nigeria, Qatar,Algeria, UAE-Abu Dhabi, Venezuela, Egypt, Bahrain, Syria

and Iraq had much better rating (above 90) because they

are mature oil producing countries.

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The systematic fight against corruption will continue in a

scientific way. There are four positions that will help us

to get rid of corruption. These are: the Permanent

Secretary in the Ministries, the Chief Administrative

Officer (CAO) in a District, the Town Clerk in a city or

town and the Sub-county Chief in a sub-county.

Constitutionally, these are the people that control money,

contracts and personnel. On the 26th of January, in

Kapchorwa, I said that we needed 2,000 Musisis in the

whole of Uganda and that would be the end of corruption.

The politicians should be examples to the civil servants

by not involving themselves in corrupt schemes even

when it is the duty of Accounting Officers to manage

money.

I cannot end this address by not cautioning you about the

environment. I have flown over Eastern Uganda a

number of times recently. Whenever I do so, I get

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worried about two things: the cutting of trees and the

drying of swamps for the growing of swamp rice. Early in

the next financial year, I want to call a conference on this

issue. The cutting of trees carelessly means, among

many hazards, that there are no wind breaks. The wind,

if not slowed down by trees, becomes so strong that it

dries plants much faster and I think, it also interferes with

the pollination of plants and crops and, therefore, lowers

yields or harvests. Transpiration, on the other hand, is a

process when water is sucked from the soil and put in the

atmosphere by plants. Swamp grasses do this a lot. That

is why West Nile has more rain than Karamoja although

they are on the same latitude.

Apparently, it is because of the swamps of Southern

Sudan and the forest in Congo. To destroy these swamps

for the growing of swamp rice or growing Irish potatoes

as they do in Kabale and a few other districts is very

short-sighted and should be discussed before it is too

late.

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It is irresponsible to pretend to talk about Mabira when

real dangerous damage is going on all over the country

and on a massive scale. Why cant all the families plant

hedges around their farms using mulberry trees which

can also be fed to silk-worms to produce silk or plant

colleandra which can be used as animal fodder and also a

nitrogen fixer so that they act as wind-breaks. Let us

discuss this issue before it is too late.

I thank you very much.

President Museveni's Address to Parliament on Oil in Uganda

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Transcript of President Museveni's Address to Parliament on Oil in Uganda