President Clinton China and the National Interest

November 1997 • U.S. Department of State Dispatch 1

Remarks at the Voice of America, Washington, DC.

President Clinton

China and the National InterestOctober 24, 1997

Thank you very much, Ambassador Platt.I thank the Asia Society and the U.S.-ChinaEducation Foundation for bringing us togethertoday. I thank Senator Baucus and Congress-men Dreier, Matsui, and Roemer for being here;Secretary Albright, Ambassador Barshefsky,National Security Adviser Berger, the otherdistinguished officials from the State Depart-ment; and I thank especially the members of thediplomatic corps who are here, and the stu-dents. And, especially, let me thank two of myfavorite people—Joe Duffy and EvelynLieberman—for the work of the Voice ofAmerica and the USIA—all that they do topromote the free flow of ideas around theworld.

Next week, when President Jiang Zemincomes to Washington, it will be the first statevisit by a Chinese leader to the United Statesfor more than a decade. The visit gives us theopportunity and the responsibility to chart acourse for the future that is more positiveand more stable and, hopefully, more produc-tive than our relations have been for the lastfew years.

China is a great country with a rich andproud history and a strong future. It will, forgood or ill, play a very large role in shapingthe 21st century in which the children in thisaudience today—children all across ourcountry, all across China, and, indeed, allacross the world—will live.

At the dawn of the new century, Chinastands at a crossroads. The direction Chinatakes toward cooperation or conflict willprofoundly affect Asia, America, and the worldfor decades. The emergence of a China as apower that is stable, open, and nonaggressive;that embraces free markets, political pluralism,and the rule of law; that works with us to builda secure international order—that kind ofChina, rather than a China turned inward andconfrontational, is deeply in the interests of theAmerican people.

Of course, China will choose its owndestiny. Yet by working with China andexpanding areas of cooperation, dealing

forthrightly with our differences, we canadvance fundamental American interests andvalues.

First , the United States has a profoundinterest in promoting a peaceful, prosperous,and stable world. Our task will be much easierif China is a part of that process—not onlyplaying by the rules of international behavior,but helping to write and enforce them.

China is a permanent member of theUnited Nations Security Council. Its supportwas crucial for peacekeeping efforts in Cambo-dia and building international mandates toreverse Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait andrestore democracy to Haiti. As a neighbor ofIndia and Pakistan, China will influencewhether these great democracies move towardresponsible cooperation both with each otherand with China.

From the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea,China’s need for a reliable and efficient supplyof energy to fuel its growth can make it aforce for stability in these strategically criticalregions. Next week, President Jiang and I willdiscuss our visions of the future and thekind of strategic relationship we must have topromote cooperation, not conflict.

Second , the United States has a profoundinterest in peace and stability in Asia. Threetimes this century, Americans have fought anddied in Asian wars—37,000 Americans stillpatrol the Cold War’s last frontier, on theKorean DMZ. Territorial disputes that couldflair in the crises affecting America require us tomaintain a strong American security presencein Asia. We want China to be a powerful forcefor security and cooperation there.

China has helped us convince North Koreato freeze and ultimately end its dangerousnuclear program. Just imagine how much moredangerous that volatile peninsula would betoday if North Korea, reeling from food short-ages, with a million soldiers encamped 27 milesfrom Seoul, had continued this nuclear pro-gram.

China also agreed to take part in the four-party peace talks that President Kim and Iproposed with North Korea, the only realistic

2 U.S. Department of State Dispatch • November 1997

avenue to a lasting peace. And China is playingan increasingly constructive role in SoutheastAsia by working with us and the members ofASEAN to advance our shared interests ineconomic and political security.

Next week I’ll discuss with President Jiangthe steps we can take together to advance thepeace process in Korea. We’ll look at ways tostrengthen our military to military contacts,decreasing the chances of miscalculation, andbroadening America’s contacts with the nextgeneration of China’s military leaders. And Iwill reiterate to President Jiang America’scontinuing support for our one-China policy,which has allowed democracy to flourish inTaiwan, and Taiwan’s relationship with thePRC to grow more stable and to prosper. TheTaiwan question can only be settled by theChinese themselves, peacefully.

Third , the United States has a profoundinterest in keeping weapons of mass destruc-tion and other sophisticated weapons out ofunstable regions and away from rogue statesand terrorists. In the 21st century, many of thethreats to our security will come not from greatpower conflict, but from states that defy theinternational community and violent groupsseeking to undermine peace, stability, anddemocracy. China is already a nuclear powerwith increasingly sophisticated industrial andtechnological capabilities. We need its help toprevent dangerous weapons from falling intothe wrong hands.

For years, China stood outside the majorinternational arms control regimes. Over thepast decade, it has made important andwelcome decisions to join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical WeaponsConvention, the Biological Weapons Conven-tion, and to respect key provisions of theMissile Technology Control Regime. Lastyear at the United Nations, I was proud to bethe first world leader to sign the Comprehen-sive Test Ban Treaty. China’s Foreign Ministerwas the second leader to do so.

China has lived up to its pledge not toassist unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in thirdcountries, and it is developing a system ofexport controls to prevent the transfer or sale oftechnology for weapons of mass destruction.

But China still maintains some troublingweapons supply relationships. At the summit, Iwill discuss with President Jiang further stepswe hope China will take to end or limit some ofthese supply relationships and to strengthenand broaden its export control system. And Iwill make the case to him that these steps are—first and foremost—in China’s interest, becausethe spread of dangerous weapons and technol-ogy would increase instability near China’sown borders.

Fourth , the United States has a profoundinterest in fighting drug-trafficking andinternational organized crime. Increasingly,smugglers and criminals are taking advantageof China’s vast territory and its borders with15 nations to move drugs and weapons, aliens,and the proceeds of illegal activities from onepoint in Asia to another, or from Asia toEurope.

China and the United States already arecooperating closely on alien smuggling, andChina has taken a tough line against narco-trafficking—a threat to its children as well asour own. Next week, I will propose to PresidentJiang that our law enforcement communitiesintensify their efforts together.

Fifth , the United States has a profoundinterest in making global trade and investmentas free, fair, and open as possible. Over the pastfive years, trade has produced more than one-third of America’s economic growth. If we areto continue generating good jobs and higherincomes in our country, when we are just 4% ofthe world’s population, we must continue tosell more to the other 96%. One of the best waysto do that is to bring China more fully into theworld’s trading system. With a quarter of theworld’s population and its fastest-growingeconomy, China could and should be a magnetfor our goods and services.

Even though American exports to Chinanow are at an all-time high, so, too, is our tradedeficit. In part, this is due to the strength ofthe American economy and to the fact thatmany products we used to buy in other Asiancountries now are manufactured in China.But, clearly, an important part of the problemremains lack of access to China’s markets.

We strongly support China’s admissioninto the World Trade Organization. But in turn,China must dramatically improve access forforeign goods and services. We should be ableto compete fully and fairly in China’s market-place, just as China competes in our own.

Tearing down trade barriers also is goodfor China and for the growth of China’sneighbors and, therefore, for the stability andfuture of Asia. Next week, President Jiang and Iwill discuss steps China must take to join theWTO and assume its rightful place in the worldeconomy.

Finally , the United States has a profoundinterest in ensuring that today’s progress doesnot come at tomorrow’s expense. Greenhousegas emissions are leading to climate change.China is the fastest-growing contributor togreenhouse gas emissions, and we are thebiggest greenhouse gas emitter. Soon, however,China will overtake the United States andbecome the largest contributor. Already,pollution has made respiratory disease the


number one health problem for China’s people.Last March, when he visited China, VicePresident Gore launched a joint forum with theChinese on the environment and developmentso that we can work with China to pursuegrowth and protect the environment at thesame time.

China has taken some important steps todeal with its need for more energy and cleanerair. Next week, President Jiang and I will talkabout the next steps China can take to combatclimate change. It is a global problem that musthave a global solution that cannot come withoutChina’s participation, as well. We also will talkabout what American companies and technol-ogy can do to support China in its efforts toreduce air pollution and increase clean energyproduction.

Progress in each of these areas will drawChina into the institutions and arrangementsthat are setting the ground rules for the21st century: the security partnerships; the opentrade arrangements; the arms control regime;the multinational coalitions against terrorism,crime, and drugs; the commitments to preservethe environment and to uphold human rights.This is our best hope, to secure our owninterests and values and to advance China’s inthe historic transformation that began 25 yearsago, when China reopened to the world.

As we all know, the transformation alreadyhas produced truly impressive results. Twenty-five years ago, China stood apart from andclosed to the international community. Now,China is a member of more than 1,000 interna-tional organizations—from the InternationalCivil Aviation Organization to the InternationalFund for Agricultural Development. It hasmoved from the 22d-largest trading nation tothe 11th. It is projected to become the second-largest trader, after the United States, by 2020.And today, 40,000 young Chinese are studyinghere in the United States, with hundreds ofthousands more living and learning in Europe,Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

China’s economic transformation has beeneven more radical. Market reforms havespurred more than two decades of unprec-edented growth, and the decision at the recentlyended 15th Party Congress to sell off most all ofChina’s big, state-owned industries promises tokeep China moving toward a market economy.

The number of people living in poverty hasdropped from 250 million to 58 million, even asChina’s population has increased by nearly350 million. Per capita income in the cities hasjumped 550% in just the past decade.

As China has opened its economy, itspeople have enjoyed greater freedom ofmovement and choice of employment; better

schools and housing. Today, most Chineseenjoy a higher standard of living than at anytime in China’s modern history. But as Chinahas opened economically, political reform haslagged behind.

Frustration in the West turned into con-demnation after the terrible events inTiananmen Square. Now, nearly a decade later,one of the great questions before the commu-nity of democracies is how to pursue the broadand complex range of our interests with Chinawhile urging and supporting China to movepolitically as well as economically into the 21stcentury. The great question for China is how topreserve stability, promotegrowth, and increase its in-fluence in the world, whilemaking room for the debateand the dissent that are a partof the fabric of all truly freeand vibrant societies. The an-swer to those questions mustbegin with an understandingof the crossroads China hasreached.

As China discards its oldeconomic order, the scope andsweep of change has re-kindled historic fears of chaosand disintegration. In return,Chinese leaders have workedhard to mobilize support, le-gitimize power, and hold thecountry together, which they see is essential torestoring the greatness of their nation and itsrightful influence in the world. In the process,however, they have stifled political dissentto a degree and in ways that we believe arefundamentally wrong, even as freedom fromwant, freedom of movement, and local electionshave increased.

This approach has caused problems withinChina and in its relationship to the UnitedStates. Chinese leaders believe it is necessary tohold the nation together, to keep it growing, tokeep moving toward its destiny. But it willbecome increasingly difficult to maintain theclosed political system in an ever-more openeconomy and society.

China’s economic growth has made it moreand more dependent on the outside world forinvestment, markets, and energy. Last year itwas the second-largest recipient of foreigndirect investment in the world. These linkagesbring with them powerful forces for change.Computers and the Internet, fax machines andphotocopiers, modems and satellites all in-crease the exposure to people, ideas, and theworld beyond China’s borders. The effect isonly just beginning to be felt.

"Today, most Chineseenjoy a higher standard

of living than at anytime in China's modern

history. But as China hasopened economically,political reform has

lagged behind."


Today, more than a billion Chinese haveaccess to television, up from just 10 million twodecades ago. Satellite dishes dot the landscape.They receive dozens of outside channels,including Chinese language services of CNN,Star TV, and Worldnet. Talk radio is increas-ingly popular and relatively unregulated inChina’s 1,000 radio stations. And 70% ofChina’s students regularly listen to the Voiceof America.

China’s 2,200 newspapers, up from just 42three decades ago, and more than 7,000 maga-zines and journals are more open in content. Adecade ago, there were 50,000 mobile phones inChina; now there are more than 7 million. TheInternet already has 150,000 accounts in China,with more than a million expected to be on-lineby the year 2000. The more ideas and informa-tion spread, the more people will expect tothink for themselves, express their own opin-ions, and participate. And the more thathappens, the harder it will be for their govern-ment to stand in their way.

Indeed, greater openness is profoundly inChina’s own interest. If welcomed, it will speedeconomic growth, enhance the world influenceof China, and stabilize society. Without thefull freedom to think, question, to create, Chinawill be at a distinct disadvantage, competingwith fully open societies in the information agewhere the greatest source of national wealth iswhat resides in the human mind.

China’s creative potential is truly stagger-ing. The largest population in the world is notyet among its top 15 patent powers. In an erawhere these human resources are what reallymatters, a country that holds its people backcannot achieve its full potential.

Our belief that, over time, growing interde-pendence would have a liberalizing effect inChina does not mean in the meantime weshould or we can ignore abuses in China ofhuman rights or religious freedom. Nordoes it mean that there is nothing we can do tospeed the process of liberalization.

Americans share a fundamental convictionthat people everywhere have the right to betreated with dignity, to give voice to theiropinion, to choose their own leaders, to wor-ship as they please. From Poland to SouthAfrica, from Haiti to the Philippines, thedemocratic saga of the last decade proves thatthese are not American rights or Western rightsor developed world rights, they are the birth-rights of every human being enshrined in theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights.

Those who fight for human rights andagainst religious persecution, at the risk of theirjobs, their freedom, even their lives, findstrength through knowledge that they are not

alone, that the community of democraciesstands with them. The United States, therefore,must and will continue to stand up for humanrights, to speak out against their abuse in Chinaor anywhere else in the world. To do otherwisewould run counter to everything we stand foras Americans.

Over the past year, our State Department’sannual human rights report again pulled nopunches on China. We cosponsored a resolu-tion critical of China’s human rights record inGeneva, even though many of our allies hadabandoned the effort. We continue to speakagainst the arrest of dissidents and for aresumed dialogue with the Dalai Lama, onbehalf of the people and the distinct cultureand unique identity of the people of Tibet—not their political independence, but theiruniqueness.

We established Radio Free Asia. We areworking with Congress to expand its broadcastand to support civil society and the rule of lawprograms in China. We continue to pursue theproblem of prison labor, and we regularly raisehuman rights in all our high-level meetingswith the Chinese.

We do this in the hope of a dialogue. Andin dialogue we must also admit that we inAmerica are not blameless in our social fabric:Our crime rate is too high; too many of ourchildren are still killed with guns; too many ofour streets are still riddled with drugs. Wehave things to learn from other societies aswell—and problems we have to solve. And ifwe expect other people to listen to us about theproblems they have, we must be prepared tolisten to them about the problems we have.

This pragmatic policy of engagement, ofexpanding our areas of cooperation with Chinawhile confronting our differences openly andrespectfully—this is the best way to advanceour fundamental interests and our values andto promote a more open and free China.

I know there are those who disagree. Theyinsist that China’s interests and America’s areinexorably in conflict. They do not believethe Chinese system will continue to evolve in away that elevates not only human materialcondition but the human spirit. They, therefore,believe we should be working harder to containor even to confront China before it becomeseven stronger.

I believe this view is wrong. Isolation ofChina is unworkable, counterproductive, andpotentially dangerous. Military, political, andeconomic measures to do such a thing wouldfind little support among our allies around theworld and, more importantly, even amongChinese themselves working for greater liberty.Isolation would encourage the Chinese to


become hostile and to adopt policies of conflictwith our own interests and values. It willeliminate, not facilitate, cooperation onweapons proliferation. It would hinder, nothelp, our efforts to foster stability in Asia. Itwould exacerbate, not ameliorate, the plight ofdissidents. It would close off, not open up, oneof the world’s most important markets. Itwould make China less, not more, likely to playby the rules of international conduct and to be apart of an emerging international consensus.

As always, America must be prepared tolive and flourish in a world in which we are atodds with China. But that is not the world wewant. Our objective is not containment andconflict; it is cooperation. We will far betterserve our interests and our principles if wework with a China that shares that objectivewith us.

Thirty years ago, President Richard Nixon,then a citizen campaigning for the job I nowhold, called for a strategic change in ourpolicy toward China. Taking the long view, hesaid, we simply cannot afford to leave Chinaforever outside the family of nations. There isno place on this small planet for a billion of itspotentially most able people to live in angryisolation.

Almost two decades ago, President Carternormalized relations with China, recognizingthe wisdom of that statement. And over the

past two-and-a-half decades, as China hasemerged from isolation, tensions with the Westhave decreased; cooperation has increased;prosperity has spread to more of China’speople. The progress was a result of China’sdecision to play a more constructive role in theworld and to open its economy. It was sup-ported by a farsighted America policy thatmade clear to China we welcome its emergenceas a great nation.

Now America must stay on that course ofengagement. By working with China andmaking our differences clear where necessary,we can advance our interests and our valuesand China’s historic transformation into anation whose greatness is defined as much byits future as its past.

Change may not come as quickly as wewould like, but, as our interests are long-term,so must our policies be. We have an opportu-nity to build a new century in which Chinatakes its rightful place as a full and strongpartner in the community of nations, workingwith the United States to advance peace andprosperity, freedom and security for both ourpeople and for all the world. We have to takethat chance.

Thank you very much. ■


Secretary Albright

Fast-Track Trade NegotiatingAuthority: Essential for AmericaOctober 23, 1997

Remarks at a joint appearance with Treasury Secretary Robert Rubinat the Chamber of Commerce, Washington, DC.

Thank you, Mr. Donohue, and goodafternoon to all of you. I am very pleased to behere along with Secretary Rubin to discusswhat I consider to be the single-most importantforeign policy decision Congress will make thisyear. That decision is whether to approve theAdministration’s request for renewal oftraditional fast-track trade negotiating author-ity for the President.

This vote will signal to a watchful worldwhether America is approaching the end of thecentury with well-deserved confidence andpride or whether our deeper wish is to shrinkfrom the center stage of world affairs.

This afternoon I would like to explain whyI feel so strongly about this issue. I also want tomention at the outset that those of us who favorfast track must realize that we face a deter-mined opposition, inspired by high-mindedgoals, going all out to make its case. If we’re toprevail—as we must for the good of ourcountry—we must respond seriously to theserious concerns of our critics, and we, too,must go all out to win.

Since taking office, I have stressed mybelief that the United States has a historicopportunity to help bring the world closertogether around basic principles of democracy,open markets, law, and a commitment to peace.If we seize this opportunity, we can ensurethat our economy will continue to grow, ourworkers will have access to better jobs, and ourleadership will be felt wherever U.S. interestsare engaged. We will also fuel an expandingglobal economy and give more countries a stakein the international system, thereby denyingnourishment to the forces of extremist violencethat feed on depravation across our planet.

As Secretary Rubin will explain in greaterdetail [Visit the Treasury Department’s web siteat www.ustreas.gov], the Administration’sefforts to promote the cause of open trade andopen economies has done much to fuel theremarkable period of sustained economic

growth we have enjoyed these past five years.But if we’re to continue up this ladder, Con-gress must say yes to fast track.

There are many opposed to this step. Theyargue that free trade creates a bidding war inwhich foreign countries compete by loweringlabor and environmental standards, therebyluring U.S. factories and jobs offshore. But thetruth is that we already have free trade. Unfor-tunately, that freedom tends to run one way.On the average, U.S. tariffs are far lower thanthose of other countries. This means that whenwe reach a free trade agreement, the othercountry has to cut tariffs by more than we do.That’s not only free trade; that’s fair trade, andthat’s good for America.

Another flaw in the rationale of fast trackopponents is that voting down fast track won’taccomplish anything for American workers. Itwon’t result in higher labor standards overseas;it won’t result in higher environmental stan-dards. These are issues that can only be dealtwith through international cooperation andnegotiation.

The best course for our nation is not tocurse globalization but to shape it. Because wehave the world’s most competitive economyand its most productive work force, we’rebetter positioned than any other nation to do so.

Both the proponents and opponents of fasttrack want a strong American economy thatcreates good jobs and rising standards of livingfor our people. But we, who support fast track,do not believe that continued economic growthwill just happen. We believe it must be helpedalong by trade agreements that lower tariffsand create access to new markets.

Opponents of fast track appear to suggestthat we will be better off if we leave the busi-ness of negotiating trade agreements to others.But it’s hard to see how. As others forgeagreements and expand trade, we will facebarriers, including higher tariffs, that ourcompetitors do not. That’s like trying to run the


bases in the World Series with the field tilteduphill against us. I will switch to footballanalyses next week.

I was disturbed, as I believe all Americansshould be, to learn of a senior European officialboasting recently about Europe’s expandedtrade with South America, and saying that, “Weare stomping all over” America’s “backyard.”That is unacceptable, but it is what happenswhen the United States engages in unilateraldisarmament on trade.

The authority for a President to negotiatetariff reductions goes back as far as FranklinRoosevelt’s first term when his administrationsought to reduce the damage caused by theSmoot-Hawley Act. Fast track, itself, has beenavailable and used to America’s economicbenefit by every president for the past twodecades.

But the current debate is about more thandollars and cents. Fast track is a foreign policyimperative. It is indispensable to U.S. economicleadership, and that leadership is indispensableto U.S. influence around the globe. Americanprestige and power are not divisible. If wewant our views and interests respected, wecannot sit on the sideline with a towel over ourheads while others make the trade and invest-ment plays that will determine the economicstandings of the 21st century.

In many capitals, if we have nothing to sayon trade, we will find it harder to have produc-tive discussions on other issues of directimportance to American interests. This wasbrought home to me yet again during my tripswith the President to South and CentralAmerica and the Caribbean. Here our initiativeson trade are a vital part of a larger process ofcooperation that includes the fight againstnarcotics trafficking, crime, pollution, illegalimmigration, and other threats to the well-beingof our citizens.

We should not forget that for decadesduring the Cold War, we Americans spread thegospel of competition, free enterprise, and openmarkets. Today, people and governmentsalmost everywhere are converting to that faith.This trend is paying off in the emergence oflarge, educated middle classes in many devel-oping nations, leading in turn to new pressurefor decent wages, environmental protection,and greater democracy. But make no mistake:People around the world will be watching thefast track debate closely to see whether Ameri-cans will continue to practice what we have solong preached.

As we plan for the future, we cannotsimply assume that the current democratictrends will continue. If we fail to approve fasttrack, we will embolden opponents of economicreform throughout the world. We will send themessage that market freedom is to be fearedand avoided. Rejection of fast track could set inmotion a chain reaction of protectionism thatwould endanger our economic future and haltthe spread of political freedom.

If Congress approves fast track, ourcompetitive economy and skilled work forceshould ensure that the prosperity we haveenjoyed in recent years will be sustained. But ifCongress votes fast track down, we will suffer amajor setback to our economic future and adamaging and self-inflicted blow to Americaninfluence. That is why I have joined everyliving former Secretary of State in askingCongress to be true to America’s own philoso-phy—to approve fast track and to pave the wayfor continued prosperity at home and leader-ship abroad.

For more than half a century, the UnitedStates has played the leading role within theinternational system. Not as sole arbiter of rightand wrong—for that is a responsibility widelyshared—but as pathfinder, as the nation able toshow the way when others cannot. Our prede-cessors had the foresight to forge alliances suchas NATO, institutions such as the World Bank,and initiatives such as the Marshall Plan todefend freedom and build prosperity. And theydid so on a bipartisan basis.

Today, under President Clinton, we areconstructing a new framework to address thechallenges of our time, based on principles thatwill endure for all time. This Saturday, on thefar side of midnight, those who yearn for daysgone by will celebrate the only real opportunitythey have this year to turn back the clock. Therest of us will use the extra hour of daylightsaving time which it provides to prepare—whether through sleep or study—for the future.

The United States is not a slow tracksociety. We have a responsibility in our time,as our predecessors had in theirs, not to beprisoners of history, but to shape history—tolook ahead; to harness, not hide from the windsof change; and to use every means at ourdisposal to build a better world for our childrenand for generations to come.

Thank you very much. ■


Secretary Albright

American Foreign Policy and theSearch for Religious FreedomOctober 23, 1997

Remarks at the Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University,Washington, DC.

Thank you very much, Dean Dobranski, forthat introduction. And President Larson, thankyou very much for that present. I have to openthe Marine Marathon this weekend, and now Iknow what I can wear. Faculty, students, guests, and friends:Good afternoon. It is a pleasure to join withyou in observing the centennial of CatholicUniversity’s Columbus School of Law. Duringthe past few years, it seems we have celebratedthe 50th anniversary of everything from D-Dayto the founding of the United Nations to theMarshall Plan. So it’s nice to know that there’ssomething—besides myself—that is more than50 years old. It is also nice to know that in ayear when the fighting Irish are having theirtroubles, the fighting Cardinals are 7-0. Obviously, much has changed since the firsthalf-dozen students took their initial classeshere: In 1897, gold had just been discovered inthe Yukon; the first subway in the UnitedStates was being completed in Boston; WilliamMcKinley was the President; and the UnitedStates Secretary of State had a beard. It was also a time when the prevailing moodin our country and around the world was oneof anticipation and hope. Our grandparents andtheir parents looked out upon a world beingbrought closer together by such amazinginventions as the motor car, the telephone, andthe electric light.

Diplomats gathered at The Hague wereexpanding the scope of international humani-tarian law. And editorial writers were lookingahead to the new century and predicting anera of unprecedented peace and good will.There followed two world wars, severalattempted genocides, the Holocaust, and thebloodiest 100 years in human history. Today, we, too, are about to begin a newcentury. We, too, live in a hopeful era ofrelative peace and startling technologicalchange. And as we look to the future, weknow that we, too, will be tested by the clash

between what is the best and worst in humancharacter; between our most selfish andaggressive instincts and what Abraham Lincolnreferred to as the better angels of our nature. This contest will be engaged on many fronts,and it will have many elements. Today, I’d liketo focus on one that has been increasingly in thenews lately and that I believe will continue toplay a significant role in U.S. foreign policy andin the affairs of the world. That is the ceaselessquest for religious freedom and tolerance. In the United States, we believe in theseparation of church and state. Our Constitu-tion reflects the fear of religious persecutionthat prompted many in the 17th and 18thcenturies to set sail for American shores. Butthis principle has never blinded us to religion’simpact on secular events, whether for theworse, as when intolerance contributes toconflict and strife; or for the better, as whenfaith serves as a source of moral inspirationand healing. There are many examples of the latter inrecent years, thanks to leaders of many faithsfrom many lands, including the efforts of theEcumenical Patriarch Bartholomew on behalf ofthe environment and inter-ethnic understand-ing; the eloquence of Archbishop Tutu inhelping to consign apartheid to the dustbin ofhistory; the inspiring and culturally transcend-ing ministry of Mother Teresa; and mostdramatically, the historic contributions made byPope John Paul II to the cause of freedom. As a native of central Europe, and as aprofessor who has lectured on the region, I willnever forget the impact of the Pope’s visit to hisnative Poland while the nation was still behindthe Iron Curtain and under martial law. Thosevisits were arranged by the church and not thestate. And the outpouring of enthusiasmastonished the government, which had as-sumed that years of dictatorship had causedreligious faith to erode. They were wrong; forrarely has a message so important found such a


receptive audience. And never has a peoplebeen made aware so suddenly of their owninner feelings and collective strength. His Holiness argued that if people are tofulfill their responsibility to live according tomoral principles, they must first have the rightand ability to do so. In this spirit, he spoke withcarefully chosen words of the need for solidar-ity with workers and among all human beings.In this spirit, he challenged the dogmas of thecommunist system, which denied to millionsthe right to speak freely and to participate inshaping the social and political systems of theirsocieties. In this spirit, he challenged theartificial division that Stalin had imposed byreasserting the fundamental unity of Europefrom the Atlantic to the Urals. And in this way,he helped unleash a tidal wave of intellectualrenewal and personal courage that helped bringdown the Berlin Wall and transform the face ofthe world. Now as we strive to shape this new era, itis an important part of American policy topromote greater freedom of religion and toencourage reconciliation among religiousgroups. We take this stand because it is consis-tent with our values, and because it is one ofthe reasons people around the world havechosen at critical times in this century to standwith us. We believe that nations are stronger,and the lives of their people richer, whencitizens have the freedom to choose, proclaim,and exercise their religious identity. We have also learned that the denial ofreligious freedom or threats to it can cause fear,flight, fighting, and even all-out war. So wehave developed a focus in our policy on regionswhere religious divisions have combined withother factors to engender violence or endangerpeace. To implement our policy, we havepublicly identified the promotion of religiousfreedom as a foreign policy priority.

First , I have instructed U.S. diplomats toprovide frequent and thorough reports on thestatus of religious freedom in the countries towhich they are accredited.

Second , we have intensified the spotlightgiven to religious freedom in the reports weissue annually on human rights practicesaround the world.

Third , we are modifying our procedures forreviewing requests for political asylum toensure that those fleeing religious persecutionare treated fairly.

Fourth , we promote religious freedomthrough our foreign broadcasting, by sponsor-ing programs and exchanges that foster under-standing, and through our work in interna-tional organizations such as the UN HumanRights Commission and the Organization forSecurity and Cooperation in Europe.

Fifth , we often raise issues related toreligious freedom with foreign governmentsand their representatives. That was the case,for example, earlier this year when I discussedrestrictions on religious activity in Vietnamand, more recently, when President Clintonraised with President Yeltsin our seriousconcerns about Russia’s new law on religion.Next week, during the U.S.-China summit, wewill be stressing to President Jiang Zemin theimportance of respecting the religious heritageof the people of Tibet and of ensuring thatChina’s growing Christian community isallowed to worship freely, without harassmentor intimidation. Finally , we reinforced our commitment toreligious tolerance last winter when mypredecessor, Warren Christopher, establishedan Advisory Committee on Religious FreedomAbroad. The committee includes distinguish-ed scholars, activists, and religious leadersrepresenting the major spiritual traditions inthe United States. Its purpose is to help directattention to the problem of religious persecu-tion abroad and to provide advice on how toachieve reconciliation in areas now sundered byreligious enmity. In February, I chaired the firstmeeting of the committee, and I look forwardto its recommendations and observations laterthis year.

As we proceed with our efforts to promotereligious freedom, we should be mindful of onedanger, which is the possibility that—as wepursue the right goal—we may choose thewrong means. For example, legislation has beenintroduced in Congress that would create aWhite House office for religious persecutionmonitoring that would automatically imposesanctions against countries where religiousfreedoms are not fully observed. Although well-intentioned, this bill wouldcreate an artificial hierarchy among humanrights with the right to be free from torture andmurder shoved along with others into secondplace. It would also establish a new and un-needed bureaucracy and deprive U.S. officialsof the flexibility required to protect the overallforeign policy interests of the United States. I have said many times—for I believe it inmy heart and have experienced it in my life—that the United States is the greatest and mostgenerous nation on the face of the earth. Buteven the most patriotic among us must admitthat neither morality, nor religious freedom,nor respect for human rights, were inventedhere—nor are they perfectly practiced here. It is in our interest, and it is essential to ourown identity, for America to promote religiousfreedom and human rights. But if we are to beeffective in defending the values we cherish, we


"We must recognizethat our relations

with the world are notfully encompassedby any single issueor set of issues. Andwe must do all we

can to ensurethat the world's

attention is focused onthe principles we

embrace, notdiverted by the

methods we use."

must also take into account the perspectivesand values of others. We must recognize thatour relations with the world are not fullyencompassed by any single issue or set ofissues. And we must do all we can to ensurethat the world’s attention is focused on theprinciples we embrace, not diverted by themethods we use. Perhaps the clearest intersection betweenAmerican interests and the principle of reli-gious tolerance occurs in regions where ethnicand religious differences contribute to divisionand the risk of violence. Here, the United Statesworks to persuade parties of their mutual stake

in learning to get alongand their mutual responsi-bility for doing so. Forexample, PresidentClinton has been person-ally involved in encourag-ing multi-party talksaimed at achieving adurable settlement to thedispute in NorthernIreland. Those talks resumedrecently, following acease-fire declaration bythe IRA, which shareswith Unionist paramilitarygroups the responsibilityfor maintaining a climateof nonviolence. We arevery proud of the role thatformer Senator GeorgeMitchell has played inestablishing the frame-work for discussion. Andwe will continue tosupport ecumenicalinitiatives aimed atbridging differencesbetween the Catholic and

Protestant communities—and at addressinglong-standing problems of economic inequityand discrimination. In Bosnia, we are working to promotereconciliation in a land that has literally beentorn apart by conflict among three communitiesof differing ethnicity and religious faith. To thatend, we have reinvigorated our commitment tothe implementation of the Dayton peaceaccords. And although many serious obstaclesremain, we have made significant progress inrecent months. For example, municipal elec-tions have been held, and it is clear from theresults that many Bosnians do not want, andwill not accept, a country permanently frozenalong ethnic lines. They want to go home and,in fact, the return of refugees and displacedpersons has increased.

In addition, the cause of justice received aboost earlier this month when 10 personsindicted for war crimes surrendered to thetribunal in The Hague. The cause of securityhas benefited from the destruction of thousandsof heavy weapons. The cause of truth has beenserved by a substantial increase in independenttelevision and radio broadcasting. The cause ofprosperity is gaining ground in those communi-ties that are implementing the Dayton accords.And the goal of reconciliation is being ad-vanced by the emergence of a new leader of theBosnian Serbs, who appears to understand thatimplementing Dayton is the key to a decentfuture for her people. Many Americans, when they think ofSarajevo, may remember the Olympics heldthere in 1984. But the Sarajevo of that time wasalso the ecumenical city—host to mosques,churches—both Catholic and Orthodox—andsynagogues, as well. So when cynics suggestthat the people of Bosnia cannot live together, Ican only say but they did, they have, they must,and they will again. In building peace, momentum matters. So Iwas encouraged by the Pope’s visit in April toSarajevo where he delivered a passionate pleafor reconciliation and inter-ethnic healing. I waspleased by the decision in June of the leaders ofthe faith communities in Bosnia to create a jointcouncil to promote respect for human rightsand to issue a Statement of Shared MoralCommitment. And I welcome the addressearlier this month by the new Archbishop ofZagreb, who expressed warmth toward theleaders of other faiths in his country and citedthe need for, and I quote, “The people of spiritwho will bring understanding, negotiations,and peace to an excessively radicalized andtense public life.” Community and religious leaders play avital role in Bosnia and throughout the Balkans;for the ethnic hatred that splintered that regionwas not a natural phenomenon. It was notsomething in the water or a virus carriedthrough the air; rather, it was injected into theinformational bloodstream. It was taught,published, broadcast, and yes, even preachedover and over again. And the fears arousedwere manipulated by ruthless leaders for thepurpose of enhancing their own position,power, and wealth. The physical and psycho-logical wounds that resulted from the devasta-tion of Bosnia were deep and will take time andtreatment to heal. The United States has made acommitment, which we should keep, to assistand persist in that healing process. There are some who see in the rivalries thatexist in the Balkans and elsewhere—in theMiddle East, the Gulf, Africa, and Asia—thepotential for a vast clash of civilizations, in


which differences not only of spiritual traditionbut of culture, history, and ideology divide theworld into bitter contending camps. The UnitedStates has a different view. We are the defender of no one faith, but therespecter of all and of the right of all to pro-claim and exercise faith. We are friends withnations in which the predominant religion isBuddhist, and others where it is Christian orHindu or Islamic or Jewish. We are, ourselves, anation of all these faiths and more, and of thosewithout religious faith and of those withinwhom such faith and doubt engage in constantstruggle. In our policy toward other nations, we donot act or judge on the basis of religion orcultural tradition, but on behavior, on compli-ance with international norms. And whenthose norms are not observed, we express ouropposition to the acts in question, not to thereligion of those involved. For this reason, we reject stereotypes; for weknow that actions in violation of internationalstandards, including extremist violence andterror, are not the province of any particularreligion, culture, or part of the world. In recent years, we have seen bloody acts ofterrorism committed by Hindu separatists inSri Lanka and Kurdish separatists in Turkey.We have seen a Jewish man who had beenraised in the United States murder 29 Arabswhile they were at prayer in a Hebron mosque.We have seen a Japanese cult release poisongas in the Tokyo subway. We have seen Islamicsuicide bombers destroy the lives of peopleriding on buses or shopping in the streets ofJerusalem. We have seen extremists engaged ina grisly campaign of terror against their co-religionists in Algeria. And we have heardSerbian leaders justify the campaign of ethniccleansing and mass rape inflicted upon Mus-lims in Bosnia as a defense, in their words, of“Christian Europe.” Clearly, the central conflict in the worldtoday is not between the adherents of onereligion or culture and another; rather, it isbetween those of all cultures and faiths whobelieve in law, want peace, and embracetolerance and those driven, whether by ambi-tion, desperation, or hate to commit acts ofaggression and terror. The great divide now isnot between east and west or north and south,but between those imprisoned by history andthose determined to shape history.

Almost half a century ago, the nations of theworld enshrined in the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights the principle that every personhas the right to freedom of thought, conscience,and religion. To those who argue that theUniversal Declaration reflects Western valuesalone, I would point to the first Afro-AsianSolidarity Conference held in Indonesia morethan four decades ago. There, the representa-tives of 29 nations from China to Saudi Arabiaand from Sudan and Libya to Iran and Iraqcited the Universal Declaration as “a commonstandard of achievement for all peoples and allnations.” And countries on every continentreaffirmed the Declaration just four years ago atthe Vienna Conference on Human Rights. Today, our great opportunity in the after-math of Cold War and the divisions is to bringthe world closer together around sharedprinciples of democracy, open markets, law,human rights, and a commitment to peace. For almost as many years as I have beenalive, the United States has played the leadingrole within the international system; not as solearbiter of right and wrong, for that is a respon-sibility widely shared, but as pathfinder—as thenation able to show the way when otherscannot. Now, we have reached a point inhistory when no nation need be left out of theglobal system, and every nation that seeks toparticipate and is willing to do all it can to aiditself will have our help in finding the rightpath. In that effort, religious freedom and toler-ance are among the great principles we strive todefend. By so doing, we maintain the vigor ofour own freedoms; we serve our interest in aworld where civilizations cooperate andcommunicate instead of clash and collide; andwe honor not one, but all of the great spiritualtraditions that lend meaning to our time here onearth. By teaching the rule of law and broadeningthe horizons of a new generation of leaders, thisgreat school of law and this fine CatholicUniversity are contributing to the goals offreedom and tolerance upon which our futuredepends. For that, I congratulate you. I wishyou another 100 years, at least, of prosperityand progress. And for the invitation to speaktoday, I thank you very much. ■


Secretary Albright

NATO Expansion: A SharedAnd Sensible InvestmentOctober 21, 1997

Statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee,Washington, DC.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:I am very pleased to come before you today,together with Secretary Cohen, to urge yoursupport for the admission of the Czech Repub-lic, Hungary, and Poland to NATO.

This initiative is the culmination of yearsof hard work—by the United States, by NATO,and by the new democracies that wish to joinour alliance. All 16 NATO leaders have ap-proved it. Many Members of Congress haveurged it.

Now the process of advice and consent hasbegun, and the fate of NATO enlargement is inyour hands. Our friends in Europe and aroundthe world are watching you; for they know thatthe United States is unique in the power ourconstitutional system grants to the Senate overforeign policy, especially over treaties.

I welcome this, because I know that thecommitment NATO enlargement entails willonly be meaningful if the American people andtheir representatives understand and accept it.That is why I am glad, Mr. Chairman, that youhave begun these hearings at such an earlystage in the process and why I am happy thatyou will be joined in your examination by theForeign Relations, Budget, and Armed ServicesCommittees; by the NATO Observers’ Group;and by the House of Representatives.

I am hopeful that with your support, andafter the full national debate to which thesehearings will contribute, the Senate willembrace the addition of new members toNATO. I also know that before you decide, theAdministration must continue to address manyquestions.

As appropriators, you will be highlyfocused, and rightly so, on the issue of costs.And as appropriators, I know you believe thatthe cost of any public initiative must be justifiedby its benefits. I want to explain today howAmerica will benefit from the investment weask you to make and why I believe the costswill be reasonable and equitably shared.

Let me begin by asking you to recall thesituation America faced in the world during thefirst year of this decade. The Cold War hadended. Our nation would no longer face asingle, overriding threat concentrated along awell-defined frontier in Europe. Many peoplewondered—and I know this is one of yourconcerns, Mr. Chairman—whether we neededto continue paying such close attention toEurope and NATO in the face of new chal-lenges and opportunities in Asia. But we didnot lose sight of our interests across the Atlan-tic. Two world wars in this century alreadytaught us that when Europe and America standapart, we always pay a terrible price. What ismore, we recognized that the triumph offreedom in Europe did not mean we could takeits security for granted.

Before long, we saw Russia, with our help,build the foundations of a modern marketdemocracy, but we knew and still know that itssuccess is not assured. We saw war andgenocide spread across the former Yugoslavia;only our leadership of a NATO coalition put anend to that horror. On Europe’s horizon, wesaw rogue states develop dangerous weaponsthat might have our allies within their rangeand in their sights. We knew enough fromhistory and human experience to know that agrave threat, if allowed to arise, would arise.

In that first year of the post-Cold War era,another event proved the importance of ourtransatlantic partnership. American troopswere sent to the Gulf to lead a coalition againsta tyrant’s aggression. And with us stoodsoldiers, sailors, and aviators from virtually allour NATO allies—joined, I might add, by menand women from some of the brand newdemocracies of central Europe. We werereminded then that when we are faced withnew challenges, it helps to have old friends atour side.


If a serious challenge were to develop inAsia or elsewhere, Mr. Chairman, the last thingwe would need is instability in Europe—andthe first thing we would want is for ourEuropean allies and partners to stand with us.Indeed, whatever challenges the future maybring, it will be in our interest to have avigorous and larger alliance with those Euro-pean democracies that share our values andour determination to defend them. It is thatconviction we ask you to embrace today.

We recognize that NATO expansioninvolves a solemn expansion of Americanresponsibilities in Europe. As Americans wetake our commitments seriously, and we do notextend them lightly. Any major extension ofAmerican commitments must advance ourfundamental national interests. Let me explainspecifically why welcoming the Czech Repub-lic, Hungary, and Poland into NATO meets thattest.

First, a larger NATO will make us safer byexpanding the area in Europe where warssimply do not happen. This is the productiveparadox at NATO’s heart. By making clear thatwe will fight, if necessary, to defend our allies,we make it less likely that our troops will everbe called upon to do so. Now you may say that no part of Europefaces any immediate threat of armed attacktoday. That is true for the first time in all ofEuropean history—in part because the existenceof NATO has helped deter such a threat. Andthe purpose of NATO enlargement is to keep itthat way. It is also fair to ask if our interest inpreventing war in central Europe is vitalenough to justify a security commitment. Someimply it is not. But let us not deceive ourselves. The United States is a European power. Ifwe have an interest in the lands west of theOder River, then we surely have an interest inthe fate of the 200 million people who live inthe nations between the Baltic and Black Seas.We waged the Cold War in part because thesenations were held captive. We fought WorldWar II in part because they had been invaded.We know that half a continent cannot be secureif the other half is in turmoil.

Now that the nations of central Europe arefree, we want them to succeed, and we wantthem to be safe. For if there were a major threatto the security of their region, if we were towake up one morning to the sight of cities beingshelled and borders being overrun, I am certainwe would choose to act, enlargement or noenlargement. Expanding NATO now is simplythe surest way to prevent that kind of threatfrom arising and, thus, the need to make thatkind of choice.

Mr. Chairman, the second reason whyenlargement passes the test of national interestis that it will make NATO stronger and morecohesive. The Poles, Hungarians, and Czechsare passionately committed to NATO and fullyaccept its principles of shared responsibility.Experience has taught them to believe in astrong American leadership role in Europe.Their forces have already risked their livesalongside ours from the Gulf War to Bosnia.Recently, Czech soldiers joined our British alliesin securing a police station from heavily armedBosnian Serb extremists.

When the President went to the Madridsummit in July, he insisted that NATO inviteonly the strongest candidates to join now. Wesettled on three nations that will make atangible military contribution to the alliance,three nations that have been our dependablepartners ever since they won their freedom—from the fight against nuclear proliferation, toour effort to reform the UN, to our support forhuman rights—three nations that will be goodallies.

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republicdo not look at NATO as a one-way street ofreassurance. They are asking to assume theobligations of mature democratic statehood andto start taking responsibility for the freedomand security of others. That is an offer weshould not refuse.

Mr. Chairman, the third reason why alarger NATO serves our interests is that thevery promise of it gives the nations of centraland eastern Europe an incentive to solve theirown problems. To align themselves withNATO, aspiring countries have strengthenedtheir democratic institutions. They have madesure that soldiers answer to civilians, not theother way around. They have signed 10 majoraccords that taken together resolve virtuallyevery potential ethnic and border dispute in theregion.

I know that some of you have been con-cerned that a larger NATO might involve us inborder and ethnic conflicts such as the one inBosnia. On the contrary. The decision to expandthe alliance has encouraged the resolution ofexactly the kind of disputes that might have ledto future Bosnias. In fact, the three states wehave invited to join NATO have resolved everypotential problem of this type.

I have been a student of central Europeanhistory, and I have lived some of it myself.When I see Romanians and Hungariansbuilding a genuine friendship after centuriesof enmity; when I see Poles, Ukrainians, andLithuanians forming joint military units afteryears of suspicion; when I see Czechs and


“In short, . . . a largerNATO will make

America safer, NATOstronger, and Europe

more peaceful andunited. That is thestrategic rationale.

But I would bedisingenuous if I didnot tell you I see a

moral imperative as well.Indeed, there is nocontradiction here

between realism andidealism, betweenpragmatism and

principle, betweensecurity and justice."

Germans overcoming decades of mistrust;when I see central Europeans confident enoughto improve their political and economic tieswith Russia; I know something remarkable ishappening.

NATO is doing for Europe’s east preciselywhat it did for Europe’s west after World WarII. It is helping to vanquish old hatreds, topromote integration and to create a secureenvironment for economic prosperity.

This is another reminder that the contin-gencies we do not want our troops to face, suchas ethnic conflict, border skirmishes, and socialunrest are far more easily avoided with NATO

enlargement thanwithout it. And if suchcontingencies were toarise, let me remind youthat NATO operates byconsensus, and that theNATO Treaty preservesa role for our judgmentand constitutionalprocess in deciding howto respond.

In short, Mr. Chair-man, a larger NATOwill make Americasafer, NATO stronger,and Europe morepeaceful and united.That is the strategicrationale. But I wouldbe disingenuous if I didnot tell you I see a moralimperative as well.Indeed, there is nocontradiction herebetween realism andidealism, betweenpragmatism andprinciple, betweensecurity and justice.

NATO defines acommunity of interestamong the free nationsof North America andEurope that bothpreceded and outlasted

the Cold War. America has long stood for theproposition that this Atlantic communityshould not be artificially divided and that itsnations should be free to shape their destiny.We should also think about what wouldhappen if we were to turn new applicantsaway. That would mean freezing NATO at itsCold War membership and preserving the oldIron Curtain as its eastern frontier. It wouldmean locking out a whole group of otherwise

qualified democracies simply because theywere once, against their will, members of theWarsaw Pact.

Why would America choose to be alliedwith Europe’s old democracies forever but itsnew democracies never? There is no acceptableanswer to that question. Instead, it wouldprobably be said that we blocked the aspira-tions of our would-be allies because Russiaobjected. And that, in turn, could cause confi-dence to crumble in central Europe, leading to asearch for security by other means, includingarms buildups and competition among neigh-bors. This would be the price—the very highprice—of not enlarging NATO.

We have chosen a better way. We havechosen to look at the landscape of the newEurope and to ask a simple question: Which ofthese nations that are so clearly important toour security are ready and able to contribute toour security? The answer to that question isbefore the Senate, awaiting your affirmation.

Mr. Chairman, I know I do not need to tellyou that our security has never come without aprice. So let me address the very real costs thatthis initiative will entail.

Last February, at the behest of Congressand before we had decided which nations toinvite to membership, the Administration madea preliminary estimate of the total costs of alarger NATO. We projected how much ournew allies would need to spend to adapt andmodernize their militaries, the investments ourold allies would need to make to extendsecurity commitments eastward, as well as thedirect costs related to enlargement, includingthose that would be covered by NATO’s threecommon funded budgets.

Since then, we have settled on threecandidates, and we are gaining a much clearerunderstanding of the capabilities they willbring to the alliance. NATO staff are nowassessing the resource implications of enlarge-ment for NATO’s common funded budgets—civil, military, and infrastructure. That assess-ment will be submitted to us and the otherNATO ministers for approval at the Decemberministerial meeting of the North AtlanticCouncil. This process is important because theconclusions it reaches about the commonlyfunded cost of enlargement will represent morethan just another estimate. They will representa commitment.

NATO is also engaged in an intensive effortto determine the level of forces our current andfuture allies will need to put at the disposal ofthe alliance to meet their new commitments.The NATO cost study will not place a price tagon these military improvements, which are


national responsibilities. But the requirementsit defines will be part of NATO’s next round offorce planning, which will begin next spring.I can assure you that we will continue to ap-proach this process with several basic prin-ciples in mind.

The first and most important principle isthat the amount we and our allies pay for alarger NATO must be a function of concretemilitary requirements. Our discussion in thesehearings, and our consultations with our allies,should focus on defining the level of militarycapability we want our old and new allies tohave in this changed security environment, andthen making sure that they commit to that level.This may seem counterintuitive, Mr. Chair-man, but it now appears, as we examine theassets and infrastructure our new allies bringto NATO, that the commonly funded cost ofintegrating their armed forces will turn out tobe lower than we estimated in February.

Either way, the deciding factor will bebang, not buck. If we can integrate thesenations into the alliance, maintain NATO’scapabilities, and acquire the new ones we needat a lower cost than we expected, that will begood news. But we must also be wary of falseeconomies and spend no less than we need tokeep NATO strong. We will not shortchangeNATO’s effectiveness or its necessary invest-ments in military readiness. Even as we workto ensure this initiative does not cost too much,we will also be careful that it does not end upcosting too little.

A second principle is that costs withinNATO’s common funded budget must beequitably shared. The United States pays about25% of these costs. That will not change. Ourallies pay roughly three-fourths of NATO’scosts today. And that will still be the case in alarger alliance, as old and new allies will pay75% of the common funded costs.

A third principle is that each ally, old andnew, must do its share at home to meet itsmilitary obligations to NATO and to preservethe credibility of NATO’s security guarantees.NATO’s members contribute in many differentways—from the United States, with ourunequaled military arsenal, to Iceland, whichprovides bases, but no army. Still, NATO is acollective defense alliance. We need to knowthat at moments of crisis, each member will beable to deliver on its commitment to helpdefend new allies.

Mr. Chairman, the President, SecretaryCohen, and I have been making these pointsloud and clear to our current and future allies.Our message has been received. As a result, Iam confident that the costs of a larger alliance

will be real, but affordable, and that NATOwill emerge from this process with its militarycapabilities as strong and credible as ever. Letme explain why I feel so confident, with respectto our new and old allies alike.

First of all, I know many of you are worriedthat Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republicmay not be able to pull their weight in NATO.As we all know, just 10 years ago they weremembers of the Warsaw Pact. Their militariesare not as advanced as those of most NATOallies.

I know that you, Mr. Chairman, have ex-pressed concern that we will have to fund amassive program of assistance to help thesecountries meet their new obligations, just as weused the Marshall Plan and military assistanceto help our original NATO allies a half-centuryago. I can assure you this will not be necessary.These countries do not face the kind of threatour allies faced in the 1950s. They have time toachieve a mature military capability. Aftertaking a hard look at what they already bring tothe table, we have no doubt they are on theirway to meeting that goal.

What is more, these are not ruined nationsrecovering from the devastation of a hot war. Ifyou go to Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw youwill see some of the most vibrant economies inEurope. These economies have grown by anannual average of 4% in the last three years,and that trend is likely to continue for sometime. Each of these nations is a member of theOECD, which admits only the most-advancedindustrial economies. Each has graduated—or is about to graduate—from our SEED aidprogram, because they just don’t need thatkind of help anymore.

In fact, Poland now funds its own militaryassistance program to support its neighbors,Ukraine and Lithuania. It has expanded itsglobal responsibilities by joining KEDO, whichfunds the dismantlement of North Korea’snuclear weapons program. All three of thesenations have paid their own way to send troopsto Bosnia and to other trouble spots in Africa,Latin America, and Asia. All three havepledged to increase the percentage of GDP theyspend on their armed forces. And we have seenclear signs that all three have the political willto carry out that commitment.

Poland already has the most advancedarmed forces in the region. The Polish Govern-ment recently unveiled a 15-year defense plan,which includes substantial resources for furthermodernization. There was no controversywhatsoever on this issue during Poland’s recentelection campaign.


The Czech Government has pledged toincrease defense spending by .1% of GDP ayear for the next three years. It recentlyunveiled a new budget that completelyfulfills that commitment, and it did so afterthis summer’s costly flooding disaster. As aresult, Czech defense spending will rise by17% next year—about the equivalent of aone-year, $40-billion increase in America’sdefense budget. The Czech Republic still hasmuch work to do, but it is clearly committedto getting the job done.

Hungary has also committed to increasedefense spending by .1% of GDP a year overthe next five years. And while Hungary maynot yet be in NATO, NATO is already inHungary. More than 100,000 American troopshave passed through NATO bases in thatcountry on their way in or out of Bosnia. TheHungarian Parliament approved NATO’srequest to use Hungarian territory within 72hours of being asked. Without hesitation,Hungary has fulfilled its responsibilities asthe supply lifeline for the largest and mostcomplex deployment in NATO’s history.

Some people have argued that these newdemocracies should not be asked to bearadditional military burdens at a time whenthey are still undergoing difficult economictransformations. But these nations plan tospend roughly 2% of GDP on defense, afigure in line with the defense burdenshouldered by many NATO countries, andone that their dynamic economies can readilysustain without neglecting other priorities.They will be modernizing their armed forcesin any case, and they understand that in thelong run, it will be cheaper to do so withinNATO than outside it. NATO’s prospectivemembers know they will not have to fend forthemselves if peace is threatened in theirregion. This gives them a reason to avoidmortgaging their future on the arms market.In fact, it has already given them the confi-dence to support new limits on conventionalarms in central Europe.

Ultimately, only the people of thesecountries can decide what is best for theirfuture. Today, in all three, solid publicmajorities and every mainstream partysupport membership in NATO. They aretelling us they see no contradiction betweensecurity and prosperity, and we should notsubstitute our judgment for theirs.

Mr. Chairman and Members, I know thatmany of you are equally concerned, if notmore so, about the willingness of our oldallies to meet their commitments to a largerNATO. Many of our west European allies

are facing economic difficulties of their own.Many are reducing public spending so they canparticipate in a single European currency.

Fiscal constraints are well known to thiscommittee. But when the 16 allied leadersgathered in Madrid in July, they made a commit-ment. They stated clearly in their final communi-que that a larger NATO would carry costs, thatthose costs would be manageable, and that theywould be met.

I am confident that our allies will pay theirfair share of the commonly funded costs ofenlargement because we are going to determinethose costs together. NATO’s history gives usample reason to believe that once we set a long-term goal together, we will meet it together.

As for our allies’ national defense spending,that is something that we obviously cannotcontrol. But they understand the need to ensurethat their armed forces can meet the new commit-ments NATO is taking on. What is more, some ofthe costs we expect our allies to incur would needto be faced even if NATO were not growing, sincethey would in any case have to adapt their powerprojection capabilities to meet new challenges.Enlargement simply underscores the issue. So Ibelieve that over time they can and will take thenecessary steps.

I am confident that our allies are not going tobe free riders on American leadership in centraland eastern Europe because, frankly, up to thispoint they have not been. The west Europeancountries have committed over $80 billion tosupport the central European democraciesthrough the end of the decade. The EuropeanUnion has invited five central European coun-tries, including two that are not being consideredfor NATO membership, to begin the process ofjoining its ranks. America’s efforts on behalf ofdemocracy and peace in the world are unparal-leled, but in this region our European allies aremaking substantial contributions.

Our European allies’ commitment to thecause of a larger, stronger NATO is as deep asours, and that is no surprise. They need thisalliance. They provide the majority of its groundtroops. Over the course of history, they haveprovided the battlefield. They have the greatestpossible stake in seeing our initiative succeed.

Mr. Chairman, those are my reasons forconfidence. I base my assessment on my experi-ence as Secretary of State in dealing with ourcurrent and future allies in Europe, as well as onthe experience of a lifetime before that. I base iton my best judgment of what the immediatefuture may bring. But you know, there is onepiece of equipment that I do not have at the StateDepartment, although I hope one day the Appro-priations Committee will fund it—and that is a


“The effect of NATOenlargement is to state

plainly in advancewhat we would in anycase wish to do if thesecurity of central

Europe were threatened.In this way, it is

more likely that wewill be able to detersuch a threat from

ever arising. And ourfriends in the region will

gain the confidenceand the time they

need to build strong,stable, prosperous

democracies."

crystal ball. None of us can know preciselywhat challenges we will be facing in Europe10 or 20 or 50 years down the road.

As you know, President Clinton haspledged that the process of enlargement willcontinue after 1999. A new round of enlarge-ment will carry cost implications that we cannotpredict today. I can assure you, however, thatthe Senate would still have to ratify the admis-sion of any additional members. Any new costswould have to be approved by the entireCongress.

I understand that for the Congress, ourexperience in Bosnia introduces anotherelement of uncertainty. I acknowledge that ourmission in that country has cost more than theAdministration originally estimated. But Ihonestly believe that the circumstances ofNATO enlargement are different.

It is intrinsically difficult to predict thecost of an overseas military deployment in apotentially hostile setting. It is virtually impos-sible to plan for every contingency. Once ourtroops are on the ground, we have a moralobligation to give them the support they need,even if it exceeds our original expectations. Thecosts of NATO enlargement, on the other hand,are more straightforward; they are budgeted inadvance, and we have a veto. We do not runour alliance on supplemental appropriations.

I know history offers other reasons todoubt our ability to predict future costs. Youhave reminded us, Mr. Chairman, that whenNATO was created, Secretary of State Achesonwas asked by Senator Hickenlooper of Iowa if itwould require the permanent stationing ofAmerican troops in Europe. He replied it wouldnot. Today, you understandably fear thathistory will repeat itself.

If you were to ask me today whether ourcontinuing commitment to NATO requires thecontinued stationing of U.S. troops in Europe,my answer would be yes. We made thatdecision decades ago and reaffirmed it after theCold War. If you were to ask me if our commit-ment to a larger NATO will require expandingour military presence across the Atlantic, myanswer would be that in the current andforeseeable security environment in Europe,we simply see no need and nor do our futureallies.

But I agree that this story is instructive. Ithelps us remember that when we decided tokeep our troops in Europe in the 1950s, it wasnot just to meet a formal obligation. We did sobecause there were new signs of communistexpansion in the world, because we were

concerned about the survival of democracy inEurope and because it was in our nationalinterest to meet that threat.

I do not believe we will face such a threatin Europe in the foreseeable future. If I amproven wrong and we are called upon to sendtroops to defend our new allies, the cost ofdefending a larger NATO would obviouslygrow. But then, if such a dire threat were toarise, the cost of our entire defense budgetwould grow, whether we enlarge NATO or not.If I am wrong about our allies’ willingness topay their share of the costs, that, too, is a prob-lem we would face with or without enlarge-ment. For if our interestin the fate of Europe’snewly free nations wereput at risk, we would notstand idly by, whetherwe had a formal treatycommitment to defendPoland, Hungary, andthe Czech Republic ornot.

The effect of NATOenlargement is to stateplainly in advance whatwe would in any casewish to do if the securityof central Europe werethreatened. In this way,it is more likely that wewill be able to deter sucha threat from ever aris-ing. And our friends inthe region will gain theconfidence and the timethey need to buildstrong, stable, prosper-ous democracies.

That is why I ammore comfortable facingan uncertain future witha larger, stronger NATOthan I would be wereNATO to stand still. Ibelieve, as PresidentVaclav Havel so crisplyput it when he came toWashington earlier this month, that “even themost costly preventive security is cheaper thanthe cheapest war.”

So as you consider the cost issue, Mr.Chairman, I ask you to consider that there is aneven more fundamental issue at stake. It is thevalue of military alliances to America’s securityand the importance of our partnership withEurope.


Here is the strongest, most successful, mostdependable alliance America has ever had.Here are three democracies that wish to sharethe responsibilities of that alliance. Here arethree nations that I believe will help us bear thecost of defending freedom, in Europe andbeyond, because they know the cost of losingfreedom.

In the conduct of foreign policy, we areoften preoccupied with crisis. We spend muchof our time managing disagreements withnations that do not see the world exactly as wedo. In a world where attention to what is wrongoften drowns out attention to what is right, wemust take care not to forget our friends. Wemust not take for granted those upon whom wecan rely.

Mr. Chairman, the first commandment offoreign policy is much the same as the firstcommandment of politics: Secure your base.Indeed, across the whole scope of humanactivity—from the life of the family and theneighborhood to the politics of our nation andthe world—when we want to get somethingdone, we start by banding together with thosewho are closest to us in values and outlook.

That is why we cultivate our partnershipwith Europe. That is why we seek to extendthat partnership to those newly free nationsthat have always been our allies in spirit, if notin fact. We do so not just to advance ourinterests across the Atlantic, but because weneed dependable democratic allies to advanceour interests in every part of the world. ■


Deputy Secretary Talbott

Bridging the Foreign Policy GapOctober 20, 1997

Address to the Conference on Public Opinion and Foreign Policyheld in Washington, DC, sponsored by the Center for Internationaland Security Studies of the University of Maryland.

Thank you, Mac [Destler], both for thatintroduction and for the efforts that you, Steve,and Clay have made to probe the complexitiesof American thinking about the world and theUnited States’ role in it.

For the last several years, the conduct ofAmerican foreign policy has had to contendwith the adversity of conventional wisdom. TheAmerican people, it was often and loudly said,are indifferent to world affairs; they arepreoccupied with problems here at home; theyare eager to disengage from long-standingglobal commitments and reject new ones.

In part, this perception is rooted in ourhistory, going back at least to George Washing-ton’s farewell address and his warning againstforeign entanglements. Without doubt, thereis, in the American body politic, a nerve ofisolationism. It tends to twitch especially afterwars, whether hot or cold. This happened mostfamously and disastrously after World War I,when that nerve went into a nearly 20-yearspasm. In the immediate aftermath of thecollapse of the Berlin Wall and the shredding ofthe Iron Curtain, there were voices saying, ineffect, that America had slain the only beastworthy of its global exertions; they advocatedprotectionist trade practices and isolationistdiplomacy, or what might be called anti-diplomacy.

For whom did these voices speak? Did acritical mass of public opinion in this countryreally want to see the American eagle behavelike an ostrich? There was a lot of pessimism onthat score. Why? In part, I think, it was becausemany of us assumed—incorrectly, I believe—that the nation would have trouble making thetransition from an era in which the mainpurpose of American foreign policy could beexpressed, literally, on a bumper sticker—“Contain Communism” or “Deter SovietAggression”—to one in which it takes at least aparagraph to explain the purpose of Americanforeign policy.

The more we thought about how thatparagraph should read, the more we worriedthat it would lose readers—and support—out

in the heartland. After all, it would have toinclude if not the term then at least the conceptof globalization, the idea that in an increasinglyinterdependent world, what happens therematters here, almost no matter where “there” is.Throw in the rising importance of economicsand commerce; the need to address cross-border threats such as terrorism and environ-mental degradation; and the imperative ofdeepening and broadening the community ofnations that share a commitment to democracy,rule of law, and civil society, and before youknow it, the paragraph would stretch for a pageor more. That was worrisome to the manyexperts who thought that public support for anAmerican mission abroad was inverselyproportional to the number of words it takes toexpress the mission statement.

Well, that’s not necessarily the case. Tothink that the rationale for American engage-ment needs to be “dumbed down” for the sakeof public comprehension and backing is, Ibelieve, to underestimate and patronize ourfellow citizens.

In fact, in this respect as in others, thecountry may actually be out in front of thegovernment. We in Washington tend to bepreoccupied with chapter-headings for historyas it unfolds and with neat, fancy-soundingparadigms. For example, here it is 7 years afterthe dissolution of the U.S.S.R. and the WarsawPact and we are still in the habit of talkingabout this as the “post-Cold War world.” Butthe American people are, to their credit, moreimpatient for what lies ahead than nostalgic forwhat lies behind. Many of them may have, intheir own minds, adjusted already to what myfriend and colleague Sandy Berger has calledthe end of the end of the Cold War. In otherwords, they may be ready for a post-bumper-sticker foreign policy.

I hope so. And I suspect so, because in theireveryday lives, Americans ought to be able tosee, feel, experience, and often profit from thepractical realities that define globalization.More and more Americans are invested in theworld, both figuratively and literally—through


“Globalization, ofcourse, is a mixed bag:It can be a dangerous

two-way street; itentails plenty of bad

news, plenty ofvulnerabilities and

inequities, and plentyof ambiguity."

mutual funds, pension plans, common stocks,and their own companies’ dependence onexports. Growth in American businesses largeand small is increasingly driven by interna-tional trade. More Americans than ever aretraveling, working, and studying overseas. Ourschools are now comparing the performance oftheir students—and, I should add, the perfor-mance of their teachers—against internationalnorms. Colleges and universities are expandingtheir course offerings in area studies andforeign languages.

And globalization is a two-way street. Evenas the United States exports Disney and MTV

to the rest of the world,we are importing andassimilating a great dealfrom other popularcultures. Americanmoviegoers are buyingmore tickets to see foreignfilms, and Americanrecord buyers have putmusic with roots inMexico, Haiti, and evenIceland at the top of thecharts. And Americansfrom all walks of life arelinked through the Inter-net to the burgeoningpopulation of cyber-space—more than 30 mil-lion people in over 100countries, who are in

touch with each other literally at the speed oflight.

Globalization, of course, is a mixed bag: Itcan be a dangerous two-way street; it entailsplenty of bad news, plenty of vulnerabilitiesand inequities, and plenty of ambiguity.

Americans understand that, too. There is, inthe current debate over fast track, a growingfear of losing jobs to other nations and ofdownward pressure on American wages fromforeign competition. There is, in the debate overNATO enlargement and Bosnia, a fear of ourbeing sucked into quarrels in faraway countriesbetween people about whom we know nothing.

Meanwhile, communities across the countryare struggling to absorb new immigrants,including a significant number who are hereillegally. Both our cities and our suburbs arefighting the flow of drugs from countries suchas Colombia and Burma, and we all feel moreexposed to the scourges of terrorism andinternational organized crime than we did evena decade ago.

Yet despite the downside of globalization,withdrawing from the world or erectingbarriers against it is not an option. There is no

substitute for or alternative to Americanleadership in addressing the problems andcapitalizing on the opportunities that comewith globalization. In short, the purpose ofAmerican foreign policy is to make sure that weuse our brains, heart, guts, muscle, and walletto bend the phenomenon of global interdepen-dence to our national and international advan-tage.

I’d like to think that the report that is beingreleased as part of today’s conference is correctin confirming that many Americans recognizeand welcome that proposition. However, thereport also makes clear that there are still quitea few misconceptions out there in the countryabout what we’re doing in Washington atplaces like the State Department—especially inwhat might be called the listening area of talkradio. Whether it’s merely misinformation oroutright disinformation, it impedes publiccomprehension of the world and support forAmerican foreign policy.

For example, many people in your survey,like others, believe that we spend as much as15%-20% of the federal budget on our foreignassistance programs, and they believe some-thing closer to 5%-10% would be more appro-priate. In a way, that’s heartening, since in fact,roughly 1% of the budget covers all our foreign-affairs spending, from assistance programs tothe cost of keeping our consulates and embas-sies around the world open for business. That’sless than one-tenth of what we spend on ourarmed forces. Yet in a very real sense, it helpsbuy national security. Bill Perry used to say,when he was at the Pentagon, that he regardedAmerican diplomacy as America’s first line ofdefense. Coming from the Secretary of Defense,that’s a pretty powerful endorsement of theforeign affairs account.

Similar myths and misimpressions roil andcloud the current debate over the UnitedNations. The UN, like virtually any institutionthat has been around for half a century, is inneed of reform. But that doesn’t mean theUnited States no longer needs the UN. Quitethe contrary. In this more complicated, post-bumper-sticker world of ours, we need the UNmore than ever, not least because it is a bar-gain—it allows us to leverage U.S. influenceand resources. A relatively few Americandollars or a relatively few American troops canbring many times more money and if necessarymany times more force to bear on a problem.

Precisely this advantage of the UN reso-nates with a theme that runs throughout thereport. Steve, Mac, and Clay have concludedthat the American public, while still fundamen-tally internationalist in outlook, is deeplyapprehensive about any suggestion that the


United States should serve as a “world police-man” or as an all-purpose global trouble-shooter.

Here again, I can only hope that publicunderstanding of the facts will go a long waytoward fostering public support for the rightpolicies—and the right international institu-tions. Having strong multilateral mechanismsfor peacekeeping is crucial if we are to mini-mize the expense and risk that will come withunilateralism. It’s precisely because we don’taspire to being the Lone Ranger that we’vedevoted so much attention in recent years, fromthe Gulf War to Haiti to Bosnia, to assemblingposses—also known as “coalitions of thewilling.”

Leadership sometimes means we must bewilling to make tough decisions and act alone.But it also means that in an interdependentworld, it will much more often be possible—and certainly desirable—to pursue our interestsin concert with others.

Anticipating a point that I suspect JessicaMathews will make this afternoon, since shehas made it powerfully in Foreign Affairs, avigorous and adaptive American foreign policyalso means working more with so-called “non-state actors,” such as multinational corpora-tions, private voluntary humanitarian organiza-tions, and think tanks.

We in the U.S. Government often regardthese institutions as our natural partners—notalways, but often. The same can be said of theUN and international financial institutions suchas the World Bank and IMF, and of regionalgroupings such as the OAS and the ASEANRegional Forum. We must remain on thelookout for situations in which they haveobjectives that are compatible with ours andresources that can complement ours.

It was this predisposition for diplomaticjoint ventures and coalition-building thatallowed us to respond effectively in recentyears to crises in the Gulf, the Balkans, theCaribbean, and the Korean Peninsula; it’s beenhow we’ve worked to build support for theChemical Weapons Convention and the WorldTrade Organization. In these and many othercases, American leadership has often made thecritical difference between stalemate andprogress.

I have no doubt it will also make thedifference in ensuring that we are able toadvance our national interest in the 21stcentury—which, by the way, begins in exactly2 years, 2 months, 11 days, and just over 12hours. So it’s a good thing we’re wasting notime to get ready for it, including in ourunderstanding of public opinion. ■


TREATY ACTIONS

MULTILATERAL

Chemical WeaponsConvention on the prohibition of the develop-ment, production, stockpiling, and use ofchemical weapons and on their destruction,with annexes. Done at Paris Jan. 13, 1993.Entered into force Apr. 29, 1997.Ratifications: Brunei Darussalam, July 28, 1997;Burkina Faso, July 8, 1997; Ghana, July 9, 1997;Guyana, Sept. 12, 1997; Jordan, Oct. 29, 1997,Pakistan, Oct. 28, 1997, Qatar, Sept. 3, 1997;Russian Federation, Nov. 5, 1997.

ChildrenConvention on the protection of children andcooperation in respect of intercountry adop-tion. Done at The Hague May 29, 1993. Enteredinto force May 1, 1995.1

Signature: Denmark, July 2, 1997.Ratifications: Denmark July 2, 1997; Norway,Sept. 25, 1997.2

BILATERAL

EgyptResults package grant agreement for small andemerging business support, with annexes.Signed at Cairo Sept. 29, 1997. Entered intoforce Sept. 29, 1997.

HaitiMemorandum of cooperation concerning theprovision of civil aviation assistance. Signedat Port au Prince Aug. 27 and Sept. 3, 1997.Entered into force Sept. 3, 1997.

IrelandAgreement relating to the employment ofdependents of official government employees.Effected by exchange of notes at WashingtonSept. 17, 1996 and Aug. 1, 1997. Entered intoforce Aug. 1, 1997.

JordanAgreement amending the grant agreement forthe strategic objective of improving waterresources management, with annex. Signed atAmman Aug. 26, 1997. Entered into forceAug. 26, 1997.

Agreement amending the grant agreement ofJune 26, 1997, for the increased economicopportunities for Jordanians strategic objective,with annex. Signed at Amman Aug. 26, 1997.Entered into force Aug. 26, 1997.

MacedoniaAgreement on the consolidation of the debt ofthe borrower, with attachment. Effected byexchange of letters at Skopje Sept. 17, 1997.Enters into force upon an exchange of notesconfirming that all necessary domestic legalrequirements have been fulfilled.

MalawiAgreement regarding the provision of com-modities, services, and associated militaryeducation and training to assist Malawianforces participating in the African CrisisResponse Initiative. Effected by exchange ofnotes at Lilongwe July 28 and Aug. 27, 1997.Entered into force Aug. 27, 1997.

NicaraguaAgreement amending the agreement of May 13,1992, regarding the consolidation and resched-uling or refinancing of certain debts owed to,guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. Govern-ment and its agencies. Effected by exchange ofnotes at Managua July 21 and Sept. 26, 1997.Entered into force Sept. 26, 1997.

SenegalAgreement regarding the provision of com-modities, services, and associated militaryeducation and training to assist Senegaleseforces participating in the African CrisisResponse Initiative. Effected by exchange ofnotes at Dakar July 24 and Aug. 29, 1997.Entered into force Aug. 29, 1997.

SpainImplementing arrangement on cooperation inresearch on radiological evaluations. Signed atMadrid Sept. 15, 1997. Entered into forceSept. 15, 1997.

VenezuelaAgreement for scientific and technologicalcooperation, with annexes. Signed at CaracasOct. 12, 1997. Entered into force on date on


which parties notify each other that they havecomplied with the constitutional and statutoryrequirements necessary for entry into force.

ZambiaAgreement regarding the consolidation,reduction, and rescheduling of certain debtsowed to, guaranteed by, or insured by theUnited States Government and its agency,

with annexes. Signed at Lusaka Sept. 26,1997. Enters into force following signatureand receipt by Zambia of written notice fromthe U.S. that all necessary domestic legalrequirements have been fulfilled.

________1 Not in force for the U.S.

2 With declaration(s). ■

President Clinton China and the National Interest

Documents

Transcript of President Clinton China and the National Interest