Pres ubb independent report

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UPPER BIG BRANCH MINE EXPLOSION Technical analysis (Saqib Ahmad Saki)

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Transcript of Pres ubb independent report

Page 1: Pres ubb independent report

UPPER BIG BRANCH MINE EXPLOSIONTechnical analysis (Saqib Ahmad Saki)

Page 2: Pres ubb independent report

Type of Explosion

‣Report concludes that explosion occurred by ignition of an explosive accumulation of methane on face by spark from shearer and ignited coal dust carried the explosion throughout more than two miles of the mine.

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Methane

Airborne Dust

Oxygen

Ignition

Explosion

Venti

latio

n

Poisonous gas

Suppression

Injuries / Fatalities

3

Venti

latio

n

Venti

latio

nW

ater

Sp

ray

Rock

Dus

t Mon

itorin

g

Resc

ueVe

ntila

tion

Oxy

gen

mas

k

Wor

ker

trac

king

Mai

nten

ance

Bow-Tie Diagram

Roof

Su

ppor

t

Roof

Su

ppor

t

Supp

ress

ion

syst

em

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Root Causes

FUEL

HEAT

SPARK FROM CONT. MINER

Water nozzles not working

Poor maintenance for shearer

Cutting limestone

METHANE

Insufficient ventilation

Non-engineered ventilation system

Wrong selection and poor maintenance of airlock diverter gates

Restriction by water build up

Lack of monitoring system

Roof support

AIRBORNE DUST

Insufficient rock dusting

Continuous malfunctioning of rock duster

Poor maintenance

Limited workforce

No clear procedure

No priority Frequent

clogging of system

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Cultural effectsPoor Engineering

•Engineers in head-quarter have no

information about mine ventilation

system•Site responsible

ventilation engineer has limited experience

•No engineering design

Production Oriented

•Reports in every 30 min. about production

figures•Nasty notes from CEO after lower production

Discouraging workers from complaint

•Threatening workers •No appreciation for good safety practice

Lack of measurement on air quality

•Fireboss was not opening gas

measurement device. However, he was recording some

number•Gas measurement devices were bridged on continuous miner

Citations were treated in good manner

• there were several citation by MSHA related to major

failures. Management only considered cost.

• MSHA did not choose the way of stopping

operation

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Opposing Viewpoint MSHA Massey

‣ What was the gas composition methane / Natural gas

‣Instrumentation working and correct place/ Does not working in a wrong place

‣How the fire propagate‣Rock dust

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Union Report “The only logical explanation for an explosion to travel seven miles underground is that it had to have been propagated by a continuing supply of highly explosive fuel,” the report stated. “The only available fuel supported by the evidence that is sufficient to propagate an explosion of this magnitude is float coal dust.”

“Given the overall poor condition of the mine in general, it is not believable that management personnel did not know that these conditions posed a substantial and immediate hazard to the miners and could possibly escalate into a catastrophic event,”

“Massey’s knowledge of the hazardous conditions is confirmed by the practice at the mine of keeping two sets of record books. One set was for Massey’s eyes only, that documented the actual conditions, and the other an official record which concealed the truth.”

While the union criticized both state and federal agencies, stating that it was “unconscionable” that the UBB mine was allowed to be operated in such a reckless manner, the report left MSHA chief and former UMWA safety director Joe Main unmentioned.

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Union Report comments and updateGary May, who was a superintendent at the Upper Big Branch Mine in West Virginia when a 2010 explosion killed 29 workers, was sentenced to 21 months in prison. He’d confessed that between 2008 and 2010 he and other officials regularly alerted miners when Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) inspectors were coming so that they could conceal – rather than correct – known safety violations. May also admitted that he ordered subordinates to falsify records and disable a methane monitor to make the mine appear safer.Massey also further endangered workers by waging a war on organized labor. Because unions fight to uphold workers’ rights, Massy, like other large mining companies, spent decades trying to reduce unionized work forces, either by closing unionized mines or by intimidating workers who tried to organize.