Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination: Theoretical and ...

1Prejudice, Stereotyping andDiscrimination: Theoretical

and Empirical Overview

John F. Dovidio, Mi les Hewstone,Peter Gl ick, and Victor ia M. Esses

ABSTRACT

This chapter has two main objectives: to review influential ideas and findings in the literature and tooutline the organization and content of the volume. The first part of the chapter lays a conceptual andempirical foundation for other chapters in the volume. Specifically, the chapter defines and distinguishesthe key concepts of prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination, highlighting how bias can occur atindividual, institutional, and cultural levels. We also review different theoretical perspectives on thesephenomena, including individual differences, social cognition, functional relations between groups, andidentity concerns. We offer a broad overview of the field, charting how this area has developed overprevious decades and identify emerging trends and future directions. The second part of the chapterfocuses specifically on the coverage of the area in the present volume. It explains the organization of thebook and presents a brief synopsis of the chapters in the volume.

Throughout psychology’s history, researchershave evinced strong interest in understandingprejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination(Brewer & Brown, 1998; Dovidio, 2001;Duckitt, 1992; Fiske, 1998), as well as the phe-nomenon of intergroup bias more generally(Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). Inter-group bias generally refers to the systematictendency to evaluate one’s own membershipgroup (the ingroup) or its members morefavorably than a non-membership group (theoutgroup) or its members. These topics have a

long history in the disciplines of anthropologyand sociology (e.g., Sumner, 1906). However,social psychologists, building on the solidfoundations of Gordon Allport’s (1954) mas-terly volume, The Nature of Prejudice, havedeveloped a systematic and more nuancedanalysis of bias and its associated phenom-ena. Interest in prejudice, stereotyping, anddiscrimination is currently shared by allieddisciplines such as sociology and politicalscience, and emerging disciplines such as neu-roscience. The practical implications of this

4 OVERVIEW OF THE TOPIC

large body of research are widely recognizedin the law (Baldus, Woodworth, & Pulaski,1990; Vidmar, 2003), medicine (Institute ofMedicine, 2003), business (e.g., Brief, Dietz,Cohen, et al., 2000), the media, and education(e.g., Ben-Ari & Rich, 1997; Hagendoorn &Nekuee, 1999).

In recent years, research on prejudice andstereotyping has rapidly expanded in bothquantity and perspective. With respect toquantity, even when the term ‘discrimination’is omitted because of its alternative meaningin perception and learning, a PsychInfo searchfor entries with prejudice, stereotypes, orstereotyping in the title reveals a geometricprogression, roughly doubling or triplingfrom each decade to the next, from only29 works in the 1930s to 1,829 from2000 through 2008. Of course, scientificinformation has accelerated generally. Thus,we examined the percentage of articles inwhich prejudice, stereotypes, or stereotypingappeared in the abstract, relative to the totalnumber of articles published, in four leadinggeneral-interest journals in social psychology:Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,and European Journal of Social Psychology.Figure 1.1 presents the overall trend from1965 to the present. From 1965 through 1984,1–2 percent of the articles in these journalsexamined prejudice or stereotypes. Beginningin 1985, interest jumped; in recent years,

almost 10 percent of the articles publishedin these mainstream journals study thesephenomena. Moreover, as Figure 1.2 shows,the trend was similar across journals.

Approaches to understanding prejudice,stereotyping, and discrimination have alsosignificantly broadened. Early theoristsfocused on individual differences, andassociated prejudice with psychopathology(e.g., Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson,et al., 1950). In the 1970s and 1980s, thecognitive revolution in psychology generatedinterest in how cognitive processes lead tostereotyping and prejudice (e.g., Fiske &Taylor, 1984); simultaneously Europeanresearchers focused on how group processesand social identities affect bias (e.g.,Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Both perspectivesemphasized how normal psychologicaland social processes foster and maintainprejudice and stereotyping. The expansionhas continued in recent years, with newperspectives on how specific emotions,nonconscious processes, and fundamentalneural processes contribute to biases.In addition to ‘drilling down’ into thenonconscious mind and brain processes, thefield has expanded upwards to consider howsocial structure creates and justifies biases,which permeate social institutions, such asthe legal and health-care systems. In sum,the study of prejudice, stereotyping, anddiscrimination represents a well-establishedarea incorporating traditional and emerging

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Figure 1.1 Percent of articles in four leading social psychology journals that use the termprejudice, stereotypes, or stereotyping in the abstract (data aggregated across journals).

PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING AND DISCRIMINATION 5

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Figure 1.2 Percent of articles in four leading social psychology journals (Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology – JPSP, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin – PSPB,Journal of Experimental Social Psychology – JESP, and European Journal of Social Psychology– EJSP) that use the term prejudice, stereotypes, or stereotyping in the abstract.

(often multi-disciplinary) perspectives thathave consistently attracted significant empir-ical and theoretical attention.

This volume provides a comprehensivesummary of the state of research on preju-dice, stereotyping, and discrimination. Eachchapter reviews the history of a specifictopic, critically analyses what the fieldunderstands and does not yet know, andidentifies promising avenues for further study.As a whole, the volume considers the causesand consequences of bias toward a range ofsocial groups, theoretical perspectives, andapplications, summarizing current knowledgewithin a single volume that can serve as a keyresource for students and scholars.

This introductory chapter lays the foun-dations for the volume by defining anddistinguishing key concepts, identifying basicunderlying processes, outlining past research,and anticipating future directions, whileexplaining the general organization and con-tent of the book.

KEY CONCEPTS

The current volume focuses on three formsof social bias toward a group and its mem-bers: (a) prejudice, an attitude reflecting anoverall evaluation of a group; (b) stereotypes,

associations, and attributions of specific char-acteristics to a group; and (c) discrimination,biased behavior toward, and treatment of, agroup or its members. Conceptualizations ofeach of these aspects of bias have evolvedover time. For example, recent researchdistinguishing between implicit and explicitcognition has greatly affected how theoristsdefine prejudice and stereotypes. Likewise,concepts of discrimination have gone froma tight focus on individuals engaging inbiased treatment to how institutional policiesand cultural processes perpetuate disparitiesbetween groups. We briefly review thedevelopment of each of these central conceptsbelow.

Prejudice

Prejudice is typically conceptualized as anattitude that, like other attitudes, has a cog-nitive component (e.g., beliefs about a targetgroup), an affective component (e.g., dislike),and a conative component (e.g., a behavioralpredisposition to behave negatively towardthe target group). In his seminal volume, TheNature of Prejudice, Allport (1954) definedprejudice as ‘an antipathy based on faultyand inflexible generalization. It may be felt orexpressed. It may be directed toward a groupas a whole, or toward an individual because he


[sic] is a member of that group’ (p. 9). Mostresearchers have continued to define prejudiceas a negative attitude (i.e., an antipathy).

Psychologists have assumed that, like otherattitudes, prejudice subjectively organizespeople’s environment and orients them toobjects and people within it. Prejudice alsoserves other psychological functions, suchas enhancing self-esteem (Fein & Spencer,1997) and providing material advantages(Sherif & Sherif, 1969). However, whereaspsychologists have focused on prejudice as anintrapsychic process (an attitude held by anindividual), sociologists have emphasized itsgroup-based functions. Sociological theoriesemphasize large-scale social and structuraldynamics in intergroup relations, especiallyrace relations (Blauner, 1972; Bonacich,1972). Sociological theories consider thedynamics of group relations in economic- andclass-based terms – often to the exclusion ofindividual influences (see Bobo, 1999).

Despite divergent views, both psycho-logical and sociological approaches haveconverged to recognize the importance ofhow groups and collective identities affectintergroup relations (see Bobo, 1999; Bobo &Tuan, 2006). Blumer (1958a, 1958b, 1965a,1965b), for instance, offered a sociologicallybased approach focusing on defense of groupposition, in which group competition is centralto the development and maintenance of socialbiases. With respect to race relations, Blumer(1958a) wrote, ‘Race prejudice is a defensivereaction to such challenging of the sense ofgroup position … As such, race prejudiceis a protective device. It functions, howevershortsightedly, to preserve the integrity andposition of the dominant group’ (p. 5).From a psychological orientation, in theirclassic Robbers Cave study, Sherif, Harvey,White, et al. (1961) similarly proposed thatthe functional relations between groups arecritical in determining intergroup attitudes.Specifically, they argued that competitionbetween groups produces prejudice anddiscrimination, whereas intergroup interde-pendence and cooperative interaction thatleads to successful outcomes reduces inter-group bias (see also Bobo, 1988; Bobo &

Hutchings, 1996; Campbell, 1965; Sherif,1966).

Recent definitions of prejudice bridge theindividual-level emphasis of psychology andthe group-level focus of sociology by concen-trating on the dynamic nature of prejudice.Eagly and Diekman (2005), for example,view prejudice as a mechanism that maintainsstatus and role differences between groups.But, they also emphasize how individuals’reactions contribute to this process. Peoplewho deviate from their group’s traditional rolearouse negative reactions; others who exhibitbehaviors that reinforce the status quo elicitpositive responses. Consistent with this view,prejudice toward women has both ‘hostile’and ‘benevolent’ components (Glick & Fiske,1996). Hostile sexism punishes women whodeviate from a traditional subordinate role(‘Most women fail to appreciate fully allthat men do for them’), whereas benevolentsexism celebrates women’s supportive, butstill subordinate, position (‘Women shouldbe cherished and protected by men’). Thisperspective reveals that current prejudicesdo not always include only an easilyidentifiable negative view about the targetgroup, but may also include more subtle,but patronizing and also pernicious ‘positive’views.

Because prejudice represents an individual-level psychological bias, members of tra-ditionally disadvantaged groups can alsohold prejudices toward advantaged groupsand their members. Although some researchshows that minority-group members some-times accept cultural ideologies that justifydifferences in group position based on thepositive qualities of the advantaged group(Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Sidanius &Pratto, 1999), there is considerable evidencethat minority-group members also harborprejudice toward majority group members.However, much of this prejudice is reactive,reflecting an anticipation of being discrim-inated against by majority group members(Johnson & Lecci, 2003; Monteith & Spicer,2000).

These complexities, and others consideredthroughout the current volume, make it


difficult to formulate a single, overarchingdefinition of prejudice. Nevertheless, wesuggest the following definition, based onextensive social-psychological research of thesort reviewed in this volume: Prejudice isan individual-level attitude (whether subjec-tively positive or negative) toward groupsand their members that creates or main-tains hierarchical status relations betweengroups.

Stereotypes

By most historical accounts, Lippmann (1922)introduced the term ‘stereotype’ to referto the typical picture that comes to mindwhen thinking about a particular socialgroup. Whereas early research conceptualizedstereotyping as a rather inflexible and faultythought process, more recent research empha-sizes the functional and dynamic aspects ofstereotypes as simplifying a complex environ-ment. Stereotypes are cognitive schemas usedby social perceivers to process informationabout others (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996).Stereotypes not only reflect beliefs about thetraits characterizing typical group membersbut also contain information about otherqualities such as social roles, the degree towhich members of the group share specificqualities (i.e., within-group homogeneity orvariability), and influence emotional reactionsto group members. Stereotypes imply a sub-stantial amount of information about peoplebeyond their immediately apparent surfacequalities and generate expectations aboutgroup members’ anticipated behavior in newsituations (to this extent they can, ironically,be seen as ‘enriching’; Oakes & Turner, 1990).Yet, of course, stereotypes also constrain. Ingeneral, stereotypes produce a readiness toperceive behaviors or characteristics that areconsistent with the stereotype. At the earlieststages of perceptual processing, stereotype-consistent characteristics are attended to mostquickly. For instance, because cultural stereo-types associate Black people with violentcrime in the United States, White peopleare quicker to recognize objects associatedwith crime (e.g., a gun) when primed with a

Black person than a White person (e.g., Payne,2001).

Recent work also explores how social struc-ture affects the specific content of stereotypes.Stereotypes can not only promote discrimi-nation by systematically influencing percep-tions, interpretations, and judgments, but theyalso arise from and are reinforced by discrim-ination, justifying disparities between groups.In particular, people infer the characteristics ofgroups based on the social roles they occupy(Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; Eagly & Diekman,2005; Jost & Banaji, 1994).As a consequence,people view members of groups with lowersocioeconomic status (even if caused bydiscrimination) as less competent and/or lessmotivated than high-status group members.Moreover, minority group members are alsosocialized to adopt ‘system-justifying ideolo-gies,’ including stereotypic beliefs about theirown group, that rationalize the group’s socialposition (Jost, Banaji, Nosek, et al., 2004).

Although some components of groupstereotypes relate to unique aspects of inter-group history (e.g., enslavement of Blackpeople in the United States, middle-manroles performed by Jews who were excludedfrom other forms of employment since theMiddleAges in Europe), systematic principlesshape the broader content of stereotypes.The Stereotype Content Model (Fiske, Cuddy,Glick, et al. 2002) proposes two fundamentaldimensions of stereotypes: warmth (associ-ated with ‘cooperative’ groups and denied to‘competitive’ groups) and competence (asso-ciated with high-status groups and denied tolow-status groups). Groups with stereotypesthat are similarly high or low on each ofthe two dimensions of warmth and compe-tence arouse similar emotions. Stereotypicallywarm and competent groups (e.g., the ingroup,close allies) elicit pride and admiration;stereotypically warm but incompetent groups(e.g., housewives, the elderly) produce pityand sympathy; stereotypically cold but com-petent groups (e.g., Asians, Jews) elicit envyand jealousy; and stereotypically cold andincompetent groups (e.g., welfare recipients,poor people) generate disgust, anger, andresentment. This powerful approach helps to


explain why two quite distinct ethno-religiousgroups (e.g., the Chinese in Southeast Asiancountries such as Malaysia and Indonesia,and Jews in Europe) are stereotyped invery similar ways (see Bonacich, 1973;Hewstone & Ward, 1985).

Cultural stereotypes tend to perseverefor both cognitive and social reasons.Cognitively, people often discount stereotype-discrepant behaviors, attributing them tosituational factors, while making dispositional(and stereotype-reinforcing) attributions forstereotype-consistent behaviors (Hewstone,1990; Pettigrew, 1979). Socially, peoplebehave in ways that elicit stereotype-confirming reactions, creating self-fulfillingprophecies. Biased expectancies influencehow perceivers behave, causing targets,often without full awareness, to conform toperceivers’ expectations (e.g., von Baeyer,Sherk, & Zanna, 1981). In addition, languageplays an important role in the transmissionof stereotypes. When communicating, peoplefocus on the traits viewed as the most informa-tive. Because stereotypical traits are distinc-tive to a group, people are more likely to usethem in social discourse than traits perceivedas unrelated to group membership. Stereotyp-ical traits are generally high on communica-bility (viewed as interesting and informative),contributing to persistent use (Schaller, Con-way, & Tanchuk, 2002). A further insight ofsocial-psychological research on stereotypesis that the traits that tend to form their coreare characterized not only by high central ten-dency (e.g., the British are very cold), but alsoby low variability (e.g., most British occupythe ‘cold’ end of a warm–cold continuum; seeFord & Stangor, 1992; Judd & Park, 1993).

Whereas psychological research on stereo-types has traditionally focused on the per-ceiver, work in sociology, stimulated byGoffman’s (1963) classic book, Stigma: Noteson the Management of Spoiled Identity,has emphasized the experience of targetsof stereotypes. As psychology has increas-ingly turned to understanding the effectson targets, two influential directions haveemerged: tokenism and stereotype threat.Kanter (1977a, 1977b) provided a pioneering

sociological analysis of the consequencesof group proportions such as skewed sexratios which, at the extremes, involve verysmall numbers of the minority group, evena sole individual. When people are tokens,one of relatively few members of their groupin a social context, they feel particularlyvulnerable to being stereotyped by others.This occurs especially when the individualis the only member of their group (solostatus) in the situation. Tokens or solosexperience high levels of self-consciousnessand threat, which reduces their ability to thinkand act effectively (Lord & Saenz, 1985;Sekaquaptewa & Thompson, 2003).

More recent research has identified thephenomenon of stereotype threat that occurswhen members of a stereotyped group becomeaware of negative stereotypes about them,even when (a) a person holding the stereotypeis not present and (b) they personally do notendorse the stereotype. Thus, making groupmembership salient can impair performanceby producing anxiety and cognitive preoc-cupation with a negative stereotype (Steele,1997).

In sum, stereotypes represent a set ofqualities perceived to reflect the essence of agroup. Stereotypes systematically affect howpeople perceive, process information about,and respond to, group members. They aretransmitted through socialization, the media,and language and discourse. For the presentvolume, we define stereotypes as associationsand beliefs about the characteristics andattributes of a group and its members thatshape how people think about and respond tothe group.

Discrimination

In the context of intergroup relations, dis-crimination has a pejorative meaning. Itimplies more than simply distinguishingamong social objects, but refers also toinappropriate and potentially unfair treatmentof individuals due to group membership.Discrimination may involve actively negativebehavior toward a member of a group or,more subtly, less positive responses than those


toward an ingroup member in comparablecircumstances. According to Allport (1954),discrimination involves denying ‘individualsor groups of people equality of treatmentwhich they may wish’ (p. 51). Jones (1972)defined discrimination as ‘those actionsdesigned to maintain own-group characteris-tics and favored position at the expense of thecomparison group’ (p. 4).

Discrimination is generally understood asbiased behavior, which includes not onlyactions that directly harm or disadvantageanother group, but those that unfairly favorone’s own group (creating a relative disadvan-tage for other groups). Allport (1954) arguedthat ingroup favoritism plays a fundamentalrole in intergroup relations, taking psycho-logical precedence over outgroup antipathy.He noted that ‘in-groups are psychologicallyprimary. We live in them, and sometimes,for them’ (p. 42), and proposed that ‘there isgood reason to believe that this love-prejudiceis far more basic to human life than is …hate-prejudice. When a person is defendinga categorical value of his own, he may doso at the expense of other people’s interestsor safety. Hate prejudice springs from areciprocal love prejudice underneath’ (p. 25).

In the 50 years since Allport’s observation,a substantial body of research has confirmedthat intergroup bias in evaluations (attitudes)and resource allocations (discrimination)often involves ingroup favoritism in theabsence of overtly negative responses tooutgroups (Brewer, 1979, 1999; Otten &Mummendey, 2000).

Even though much of the traditionalresearch on bias has not made the distinctionbetween ingroup favoritism and outgroupderogation a central focus, the distinction iscrucial, and each of them requires method-ological concision and has distinct practicalconsequences. Methodologically, to separatethe two components of ingroup favoritismand outgroup derogation we need to includean independent assessment of ingroup andoutgroup evaluations, and a control condition.Practically, the bias uncovered in muchsocial-psychological research predominantlytakes the mild form of ingroup favoritism,

rather than outgroup derogation (see Brewer,1999, 2001). This raises the question ofwhen ingroup favoritism gives way to dero-gation, hostility, and antagonism against out-groups (e.g., Brewer, 2001, Mummendey &Otten, 2001).

A number of analyses argue that theconstraints normally in place that limitintergroup bias to ingroup favoritism arelifted when outgroups are associated withstronger emotions (Brewer, 2001, Doosje,Branscombe, Spears, et al., 1998; Mackie &Smith, 1998; Mummendey & Otten, 2001).There is ample scope for these emotions inthe arousal that often characterizes intergroupencounters, which can be translated intoemotions such as fear, hatred, or disgust(Smith, 1993; Stephan & Stephan, 2000), andemotions experienced in specific encounterswith groups can be an important cause ofpeople’s overall reactions to groups (e.g.,Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993). As part ofa shift from exclusive concern with cognitionin intergroup bias, Smith (1993) differentiatedmilder emotions (e.g., disgust) from strongeremotions (e.g., contempt, anger) most likelyto be aroused in an intergroup context,and linked specific emotions, perceptionsof the outgroup, and action tendencies (seeMackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). Thus anoutgroup that violates ingroup norms mayelicit disgust and avoidance; an outgroup seenas benefiting unjustly (e.g., from governmentprograms) may elicit resentment and actionsaimed at reducing benefits; and an outgroupseen as threatening may elicit fear andhostile actions. Thus, weaker emotions implyonly mild forms of discrimination, suchas avoidance, but stronger emotions implystronger forms, such as movement againstthe outgroup, and these latter emotionscould be used to justify outgroup harmthat extends beyond ingroup benefit (Brewer,2001). This is not, however, to imply thatpro-ingroup biases need not concern us.They can perpetuate unfair discriminationby advantaging dominant ingroups, oftenwith less personal awareness and recogni-tion by others, making them as perniciousas discrimination based on anti-outgroup


orientations (Gaertner, Dovidio, Banker,et al., 1997).

For the present volume, we define dis-crimination by an individual as behavior thatcreates, maintains, or reinforces advantage forsome groups and their members over othergroups and their members.

Explicit and implicit bias

Whereas discrimination can occur toward aspecific member of a group or the group as awhole, stereotypes and prejudice are intrapsy-chic phenomena. That is, they occur withinan individual and may vary not only in theirtransparency to others but also in the level ofawareness of the person who harbors stereo-types and prejudice. Traditionally, stereotypesand prejudice have been conceived as explicitresponses – beliefs and attitudes peopleknow they hold, subject to deliberate (oftenstrategic) control in their expression (Fazio,Jackson, Dunton, et al., 1995). In contrastto these explicit, conscious, and deliberativeprocesses, implicit prejudices and stereotypesinvolve a lack of awareness and unintentionalactivation. The mere presence of the attitudeobject may activate the associated stereotypeand attitude automatically and without theperceiver noticing.

Although implicit attitudes and stereotypemeasures are now commonly used (Fazio &Olson, 2003), researchers continue to debatetheir psychological meaning. Some contendthat implicit measures of bias primarilyrepresent overlearned and ‘habitual’ culturalassociations rather than attitudes (Karpinski &Hilton, 2001). Others argue that implicit andexplicit measures assess a single attitudemeasured at different points in the process ofexpression, with social desirability concernsmore strongly shaping overt expressions(Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, et al., 1995). Andstill others consider implicit and explicitmeasures to reflect different components ofa system of dual attitudes, with implicitresponses often representing ‘older’ attitudesand stereotypes that have been ‘overwritten’by newer, explicit forms of bias or incom-pletely replaced by individuals who strivefor egalitarian beliefs (Wilson, Lindsey, &

Schooler, 2000), or reflecting different aspectsof attitudes, such as affective and cognitivecomponents (Rudman, 2004). Nevertheless,there is consensus that implicit manifestationsof attitudes and stereotypes exist and reliablypredict some behaviors, often independentlyfrom explicit attitudes and stereotypes. Wepurposefully avoided reference to intention-ality or personal endorsement in our workingdefinitions of prejudice and stereotypes toaccommodate implicit biases.

Institutional and culturaldiscrimination

Although psychologists have historicallyfocused on the individual-level processes inintergroup relations, newer research informedby approaches from sociology, Black psy-chology, and cultural psychology illuminatehow, independent of individual efforts ororientation, institutional and cultural forcesmaintain and promote intergroup bias and dis-parities. Institutional discrimination, whichmay originally stem from individuals’ preju-dices and stereotypes, refers to the existenceof institutional policies (e.g., poll taxes,immigration policies) that unfairly restrict theopportunities of particular groups of people.These laws and policies foster ideologiesthat justify current practices. Historically,for example, White Americans developedracial ideologies to justify laws that enabledtwo forms of economic exploitation: slaveryof Black people and the seizure of landsfrom native peoples. Similarly, until relativelyrecently, immigration policies in many partsof the world favored White immigrants overimmigrants of racial minorities.

Although individual prejudice and stereo-types may produce actions, such as politicalsupport for laws and policies that leadto institutional discrimination, institutionaldiscrimination can operate independentlyfrom individual discrimination. Institutionaldiscrimination does not require the activesupport of individuals, their intention todiscriminate, or awareness that institutionalpractices have discriminatory effects. Indeed,people often do not recognize the existenceof institutional discrimination because laws


(typically assumed to be right and moral)and long-standing or ritualized practices seem‘normal.’ Furthermore, ideologies – whetherexplicitly prejudicial or obscuring prejudice(e.g., by suggesting that if discriminatoryeffects are unintended, there is no ‘problem’) –justify the ‘way things are done.’ The mediaand public discourse also often direct attentionaway from potential institutional biases.

Because institutional discrimination is notnecessarily intentional or dependent on theovert efforts of individuals, it often must beinferred from disparate outcomes betweengroups traced back to differential policies,even those that might appear to be unrelated togroup membership. These effects may appeareconomically (e.g., in loan policies aftercontrolling for differences in qualifying con-ditions), educationally (e.g., in admission andfinancial aid policies), in employment (e.g.,height requirement for employment as a policeofficer), in the media (e.g., exaggerating theassociation of minority groups with violenceor poverty), in the criminal justice system(e.g., group differences in incarceration ratesfor similar crimes), and in mental and physicalhealth (e.g., social stress or lesser care) (seeFeagin, 2006; Institute of Medicine, 2003;Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Whereas institutional discrimination isassociated with formal laws and policies,cultural discrimination is deeply embeddedin the fiber of a culture’s history, standards,and normative ways of behaving. Culturaldiscrimination occurs when one group exertsthe power to define values for a society.It involves not only privileging the culture,heritage, and values of the dominant group,but also imposing this culture on other lessdominant groups. As a consequence, every-day activities implicitly communicate group-based bias, passing it to new generations.We thus define cultural discrimination asbeliefs about the superiority of a dominantgroup’s cultural heritage over those of othergroups, and the expression of such beliefs inindividual actions or institutional policies.

Under some circumstances, members of aminority group may adopt system-justifyingideologies propagated by the dominantcultural group that distract attention from

group-based disparities and inequities. Thus,members of a disadvantaged group maydevelop a ‘false consciousness’ in which theynot only comply with but also endorse culturalvalues that systematically disadvantage them.For example, an exclusive emphasis on indi-vidually oriented meritocracy may obscurecultural and institutional discrimination andlead to an over-reliance on individual ratherthan collective action to address discrimi-nation. Thus, the unique power of culturaldiscrimination resides in its power to shapehow members of different groups interpretand react to group disparities, fosteringcompliance to the status quo without explicitintentions, awareness, or active support forthese group-based disparities.

Each form of bias – prejudice, stereotypes,and discrimination – can occur at the indi-vidual, institutional, and cultural levels. Fur-thermore, these biases are often perpetuatedby habitual practices and even formal laws,and justified by ideologies (some of whichmay obscure the existence of discrimination).In the next section, we consider the social-psychological assumption that, despite allof the various forms bias may take, somebasic and fundamental processes generallyfoster and reinforce stereotypes, prejudice,and discrimination.

BASIC PROCESSES IN PREJUDICE,STEREOTYPING, ANDDISCRIMINATION

Summarizing the extensive research onsocial biases with a limited number ofthemes, Haslam and Dovidio (2010) identifiedbasic factors that foster and maintain bias:(a) personality and individual differences,(b) group conflict, (c) social categorization,and (d) social identity. We review each below.

Personality and individualdifferences

Responding to the Nazi’s rise to power inGermany and the subsequent horrors of theHolocaust, psychologists initially focused on


understanding ‘What type of person wouldharbor the kinds of prejudices and stereotypesthat would lead to genocide?’ Given itsprominence in psychological thought at thetime, many of the answers relied on Freudianpsychodynamic theory (see Allport, 1954).These approaches proposed that (a) theaccumulation of psychic energy, due tofrustration and guilt inevitably produced bysociety’s restrictions on instinctual drives forsex and aggression, power intergroup bias andhostility; and (b) an individual’s expression ofprejudice has an important cathartic functionin releasing pent-up energy and restoring theindividual to a state of equilibrium.

Other approaches adopted elements of psy-chodynamic theory with critical variations.In their Frustration–Aggression Hypothesis,Dollard, Doob, Miller, et al. (1939) presenteda drive-reduction model that included Freud’sproposition that drives sought discharge inbehavior, but characterized aggression as aresponse to circumstances that interfered withgoal-directed activity, not as an innate drive.Dollard et al. in their account of scapegoating,further hypothesized that aggression is oftendisplaced onto an innocent target if the truesource of frustration is powerful and poten-tially threatening (see Glick, 2005). Hovlandand Sears (1940) argued that historically therelationship between economic downturns (asource of frustration) and the lynchings ofBlack people (1882–1930) in southern statesin the United States provided support forthis account of scapegoating (see also Green,Glaser, & Rich, 1998).

Both of these accounts of scapegoatinghave been challenged recently. Using theStereotype Content Model perspective, Glick(2005) argued that successful minorities,stereotyped as competent but cold competitors(not as weak and vulnerable) are most likelyto be scapegoated. Only envied minoritiesare viewed as having both the ability(competence) and intent (coldness) to havedeliberately caused widespread misfortunes(e.g., the Nazis blamed the ‘worldwide Jewishconspiracy’ for causing Germany’s collapse,citing the Jews’ relative success in banking,industry, the media, and government). This

model, then, focuses on collective attributionsrather than Freudian psychodynamics.

The most influential work within the psy-choanalytic tradition was Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, et al.’s (1950)research, represented in their classic vol-ume, The Authoritarian Personality. Theseresearchers conducted extensive qualitativeand quantitative work on the psychologicalsubstrates of anti-Semitism and susceptibil-ity to fascistic propaganda. Adorno et al.identified patterns of cognition differentiatingprejudiced (authoritarian) individuals fromothers who were more tolerant or open-minded. Specifically, prejudiced individualsexhibited intolerance of ambiguity, rigidity,concreteness (poor abstract reasoning), andover-generalization. Such individuals werethus portrayed as seeing the social world inblack-and-white terms – evincing strong anddisdainful rejection of others perceived asinferior to themselves and their ingroup.

The origins of the authoritarian personalitywere also traced to individuals’ childhoodexperiences, specifically to hierarchical rela-tions with punitive parents. In contrast, liber-als (non-authoritarians) were believed to bethe product of a more egalitarian upbringingthat fostered more cognitive flexibility andrejection of stereotypic representations ofothers (see Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, et al.,2003). In response to subsequent methodolog-ical and conceptual challenges, ideas aboutauthoritarianism evolved to emphasize therole of social norms and standards, ratherthan Freudian dynamics. The most currentconceptualization, Right-WingAuthoritarian-ism (Altemeyer, 1996, 1998), focuses onworldviews, and predicts negative attitudestoward a variety of groups, particularly thosesocially rejected by society (e.g., Altemeyer,1996; Esses, Haddock, Zanna, et al., 1993).

Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius &Pratto, 1999) represents another recentapproach to social biases, containing afocus on individual differences, which hassimilarly eschewed psychodynamic theory.This theory focuses on individual differencesin whether people view intergroup relationsas a competition in which it is appropriate for


some groups to dominate others. People whoscore high in Social Dominance Orientationendorsing items such as, ‘Some groups ofpeople are simply inferior to other groups’and ‘Sometimes other groups must be keptin their place,’ show more prejudice anddiscrimination toward a range of outgroups.

Social Dominance Theory, while includingan individual differences approach, focuseson an enduring theme in the study of socialbiases – the degree of competition betweengroups. This concern has been an abidingtheme in understanding intergroup bias.

Group conflict

The early representation of prejudice asreflecting a dysfunctional personality washighly influential, not least because it fitwith lay theories that viewed social biasesas abnormal, a form of social pathology.However, a number of researchers arguedinstead that social biases are not restrictedto a small group of people and represent agroup-level phenomenon, and thus developedtheories focusing on the functional relationsbetween groups.

Theories based on functional relationsoften point to competition and consequentperceived threat as fundamental causes ofintergroup prejudice and conflict. RealisticGroup Conflict Theory (Campbell, 1965;Sherif, 1966) posits that perceived groupcompetition for resources leads to effortsto reduce the access of other groups toresources. Classic field work by MuzaferSherif and his colleagues (Sherif, Harvey,White, et al., 1961) examined intergroupconflict at a boys’ camp adjacent to RobbersCave State Park in Oklahoma (United States).In this study, twenty-two 12-year-old boysattending summer camp were randomlyassigned to two groups (who subsequentlynamed themselves Eagles and Rattlers). Whenthe groups engaged in a series of competitiveactivities (a tug-of-war and baseball, andtouch football games), intergroup bias andconflict quickly developed. Group membersregularly exchanged verbal insults (e.g.,‘sissies,’ ‘stinkers,’ and ‘cheaters’), and each

group conducted raids on the other’s cabin,resulting in property destruction and theft.The investigators then altered the functionalrelations between the groups by introducinga set of superordinate goals (goals that couldnot successfully be achieved without the fullcooperation of both groups). Achieving thesegoals together led to more harmonious rela-tions and large reductions in intergroup bias.

Sherif, Harvey, White, et al. (1961)proposed that functional relations betweengroups strongly influence intergroup attitudes.When groups are competitively interdepen-dent, the success of one group is contingenton the failure of the other. Thus, eachgroup’s attempt to obtain favorable outcomesfor itself is also realistically perceived tofrustrate the goals of the other group. Sucha win-lose, zero-sum competitive relationbetween groups initiates mutually negativefeelings and stereotypes toward the membersof the other group. In contrast, cooperativelyinterdependent relations between groups (i.e.,needing each other to achieve common goals)reduce bias (e.g., Blanchard, Adelman, &Cook, 1975).

Functional relations do not have to involveexplicit competition to generate biases. In theabsence of any direct evidence, people typi-cally presume that members of other groupswill act competitively and hinder the attain-ment of one’s goals (Fiske & Ruscher, 1993;Insko, Schopler, Gaertner, et al., 2001). Inaddition, individual differences in intergroupperceptions (e.g., Social Dominance Orien-tation) can moderate responses regardless ofthe actual functional relations between groups(Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, et al., 2001a). It wasalso recognized that social biases can serveless tangible or symbolic collective functionssuch as garnering prestige or social status,in addition to instrumental objectives suchas obtaining economic advantage (Allport1954; Blumer, 1958a). Indeed, it has beensuggested that symbolic, psychological fac-tors are typically more important sourcesof intergroup bias than is competition fortangible resources (Esses, Jackson, Dovidio,et al., 2005). Thus, additional themes in thestudy of social bias have focused on the


psychological consequences of seeing othersand oneself in terms of group membership.

Social categorization

A further critical step toward recognitionof prejudice as an aspect of normal ratherthan diseased minds was taken by Allport(1954).Allport’s answer to the question, ‘Whydo human beings slip so easily into ethnicprejudice?’ was that ‘They do so because[its] two essential ingredients – erroneousgeneralization and hostility – are naturaland common capacities of the human mind’(p. 17). Central to the first point, Allportrecognized that prejudice relies on people’spropensity to categorize, reacting to otherpeople based on their group membership,rather than as individuals. He observed thatthe ‘human mind must think with the aid ofcategories,’ and ‘Once formed categories arethe basis for normal prejudgment. We cannotpossibly avoid this process. Orderly livingdepends upon it’ (p. 20).

Tajfel (1969), in his highly influentialpaper on the ‘Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice,’elaborated on the role social categorizationplays in intergroup biases. Like Allport, Tajfelrejected the idea that prejudice and stereo-typing must be irrational and pathological.Instead, he argued that these social biasesreflect the importance of people’s groupmemberships and their attempts to understandfeatures of the social world (in particular, theactions of other groups) that impinge upontheir groups. This analysis opened the doorto a ‘cognitive revolution’ that informed thegreater part of social psychological researchinto prejudice and stereotyping during the1970s and 1980s. This approach paved theway for viewing prejudice as an aspect ofgeneral social cognition.

Since then, a large body of research hasdemonstrated that social categorization pro-foundly influences social perception, affect,cognition, and behavior. Perceptually, whenperceivers categorize people or objects intogroups, they gloss over differences betweenmembers of the same category (Tajfel, 1969),treating members of the same group as

‘all alike,’ while between-group differencesbecome exaggerated (Abrams, 1985; Turner,1985). Emotionally, people spontaneouslyexperience more positive affect toward mem-bers of their ingroup than toward membersof outgroups (Otten & Moskowitz, 2000),particularly toward ingroup members who aremost prototypical of their group (Hogg &Hains, 1996). Cognitively, people retain moreand more detailed information for ingroupthan for outgroup members (Park & Rothbart,1982), better remember ways in whichingroup members are similar to and outgroupmembers are dissimilar to the self (Wilder,1981), and remember less positive informa-tion about outgroup members (Howard &Rothbart, 1980).

In terms of behavioral outcomes, peoplehelp ingroup members more than outgroupmembers (Dovidio, Gaertner, Validzic, et al.,1997), and work harder for groups identi-fied as ingroups than outgroups (Worchel,Rothgerber, Day, et al., 1998). When ingroup–outgroup social categorizations, rather thanpersonal identities, are salient, people behavein a greedier and less trustworthy way towardmembers of other groups than when theyrespond to others as individuals (Insko,Schopler, Gaertner, et al., 2001). Thus,although functional relations between groupscan further influence the degree to which dis-crimination is manifested (Campbell, 1965;Sherif, 1966), the process of social categoriza-tion itself provides the basis for social biasesto develop and persist.

Social identity

While Tajfel’s ideas spawned social cognitiveapproaches to stereotyping and prejudice,his own work developed in a somewhatdifferent direction based on the results ofhis minimal group studies. In the early1970s, Tajfel showed that artificial groupscreated in the lab, devoid of naturalisticmeaning and a history of functional relations,nevertheless showed at least mild formsof prejudice and discrimination. This workinspired Social Identity Theory (Tajfel &Turner, 1979), which characterizes social bias


as a context-specific response to the positionof one’s group within a particular system ofintergroup relations.

Both Social Identity Theory (Tajfel &Turner, 1979) and the related Self-Categorization Theory (Turner, 1985;see also Onorato & Turner, 2001) emphasizethe distinction between personal and socialidentities (see Spears, 2001). When personalidentity (the self perceived as an individual) issalient, a person’s individual needs, standards,beliefs, and motives primarily determinebehavior. In contrast, when social identity(the self perceived as a member of a group) issalient, ‘people come to perceive themselvesas more interchangeable exemplars of asocial category than as unique personalitiesdefined by their individual differences fromothers’ (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, et al., 1987:50). Under these conditions, collective needs,goals, and standards are primary.

This perspective also proposes that aperson defines or categorizes the self alonga continuum that ranges from seeing the selfas a separate individual with personal motives,goals, and achievements to viewing the self asan embodiment of a social collective or group.At the individual level, one’s personal welfareand goals are most salient and important. Atthe group level, the goals and achievementsof the group are merged with one’s own(see Brown & Turner, 1981), and the group’swelfare is paramount. At one extreme, selfinterest is fully represented by the first-person pronoun ‘I’ and, at the other extreme,group interest is fully represented by thecollective pronoun ‘We.’ Intergroup relationsbegin when people think about themselves,and others, as group members rather than asdistinct individuals.

Illustrating the dynamics of this distinction,Verkuyten and Hagendoorn (1998) foundthat when individual identity was primed,individual differences in authoritarianismstrongly predicted Dutch students’ prejudicetoward Turkish migrants. In contrast, whensocial identity (i.e., national identity) wasmade salient, ingroup stereotypes and stan-dards primarily predicted prejudiced attitudes.Thus, whether personal or collective identity

is more salient critically shapes how a personperceives, interprets, evaluates, and respondsto situations and to others.

In summary, whereas the section on KeyConcepts emphasized distinctions betweenvarious forms of social biases, this sectionconsidered common elements that produceprejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination.Prejudice, stereotypes, and discriminationare complex, multi-determined processes.Therefore, basic factors related to individualdifferences, group conflict, social categoriza-tion, and social identity should not be viewedas competing but rather as complementaryexplanations, which can combine and operatein different ways under different conditions.

In discussing key concepts and underlyingprocesses, we have illustrated how appro-aches to understanding prejudice, stereotypes,and discrimination have evolved such thatdifferent facets of social bias and differentinfluences have been emphasized at differenttimes. The history of research on bias isexplored in more detail in Duckitt’s chapterin this volume (Chapter 2). In the nextsection, however, we offer our own historicalperspective, looking forward as much as back.

THE PAST AND THE FUTURE

Building on Duckitt’s (1992) insightful histor-ical analysis, Dovidio (2001) identified threegeneral ‘waves’ of scholarship, reflectingdifferent assumptions and paradigms, in thesocial psychological study of social biases.The first wave, from the 1920s throughthe 1950s, portrayed social biases as psy-chopathology, with prejudice conceived asa kind of social cancer. Research duringthis wave focused first on measuring anddescribing the problem and monitoring anychanges (e.g., Gilbert, 1951; Katz & Braly,1933), and then on understanding the source ofthe problem (e.g., in family relations, feelingsof personal inadequacies, and psychodynamicprocesses; Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, E.,Levinson, et al., 1950). If the problem wasconfined to certain ‘diseased’ individuals(much as a cancer begins with diseased


cells), prejudice might be localized andremoved or treated, containing the problemand preserving the health of society as awhole. Thus, researchers concentrated onidentifying, through personality and attitudetests such as the authoritarian personalityscale, prejudiced individuals so that remedialefforts could be focused on this subset ofthe population. This approach also directedattention toward a traditional, conservative,and not highly educated segment of thepopulation – a group comfortably (for theresearchers themselves) unlike the academicsstudying prejudice.

The second wave of theorizing and researchbegan with an opposite assumption: prejudiceis rooted in normal rather than abnormalprocesses. Thus, the focus turned to hownormal processes, such as socialization intoprevailing norms, supports and transmits prej-udice. This approach revealed that changinggeneral social norms, not simply targetinginterventions toward a subset of ‘abnormal’individuals, is necessary for combating prej-udice. The typical focus of social psychologyin North America on the individual in asocial context was complemented by twoother approaches in the 1970s. On the onehand, at a more macro level, Tajfel’s work(Tajfel & Turner, 1979) persuasively demon-strated the important role of social identity,as well as individual identity, in producingprejudice. Evidence that assigning people totemporary groups based on arbitrary criteriawas sufficient to produce ingroup-favoringprejudices (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1970),and, when other factors (e.g., competition)were added, outgroup hostility reinforced theemerging conception of prejudice as a normalmechanism.

On the other hand, at a more microlevel, the development of new theories andinstrumentation for investigating social cog-nition further emphasized the normality and,some argued, the inevitability of prejudice.Prejudice, stereotyping, and discriminationwere conceived as outcomes of normal cog-nitive processes associated with simplifyingand storing the overwhelming quantity andcomplexity of information people encounter

daily (see Hamilton, 1981). To the extentthat social categorization was hypothesizedto be a critical element in this process(Hamilton & Trolier, 1986), this cognitive,intra-individual perspective complementedTajfel’s motivational, group-level approach inreinforcing the normality of prejudice.

Together, these orientations helped to divertthe focus away from the question, ‘Whois prejudiced?’ – the answer seemed tobe ‘everyone.’ If prejudice reflects normalcognitive processes and group life, not justpersonal needs and motivations, bias shouldbe the norm. Researchers therefore turned toexamining bias among the ‘well-intentioned’and to the apparent inconsistencies betweenself-reported attitudes, which suggested thatthe vast majority of Westerners were non-prejudiced, and the continued evidence of dis-parities and discrimination (e.g., Gaertner &Dovidio, 1986). The key question thereforebecame, ‘Is anyone truly not prejudiced?’Theories of racial ambivalence (Katz, 1981;Katz, Wackenhut, & Hass, 1986) and ofsubtle and unintentional types of biases,such as symbolic racism (Sears, 1988; Sears,Henry, & Kosterman, 2000), modern racism(McConahay, 1986), and aversive racism(Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Kovel, 1970)emerged during this period. These theoriesall proposed that changing social norms inthe United States (after the Civil Rightsera) had driven racism ‘underground,’ eitherbecause of people’s genuine desire to beegalitarian or a simple realization that overtracism would elicit social disapproval. Whilethe theories disagree on whether racism hasmerely become covert or individuals are trulyconflicted about their attitudes, all agree thata lifetime of exposure to negative stereotypesfuels the persistence of prejudiced attitudesthat are not readily apparent.

The third wave of research on prejudice,beginning in the mid-1990s and characteriz-ing much current research, emphasizes themultidimensional aspect of prejudice andtakes advantage of new technologies to studyprocesses that earlier theorists hypothesizedbut had no way to measure. For example,aversive racism, modern racism, and symbolic


racism – distinctly different theories aboutcontemporary racial prejudice – all assumedwidespread unconscious negative feelings andbeliefs by White people toward Black people.However, it was not until the 1990s that newconceptual perspectives (e.g., Greenwald &Banaji, 1995) and technologies (e.g., responselatency procedures; Dovidio & Fazio, 1992;Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998)emerged, allowing researchers to measureimplicit (i.e., automatic and unconscious)attitudes and beliefs. These new technolo-gies permit the assessment of individualdifferences in implicit, as well as explicit,racial attitudes and may thus help distinguishtraditional racists, aversive or modern racists,and the truly non-prejudiced White people.These methods also open doors for developingways to combat subtle forms of prejudice.The adaptation of fMRI procedures to studybrain processes involved in social phenomenapromises further links to cognitive neuropsy-chological processes and a more compre-hensive, interdisciplinary, and multidimen-sional understanding of prejudice (Phelps,O’ Connor, Cunningham, et al., 2000).

Besides addressing the multidimensionalintrapersonal processes associated with preju-dice and racism, the current wave of researchmore explicitly considers the interpersonaland intergroup context. That is, whereas pre-vious research focused largely on perceivers’attitudes and how these attitudes biased theirevaluations, decisions, and behavior, third-wave work considers how targets respond andadapt, and how prejudice unfolds in interac-tions between perceivers and targets. Targetsare no longer viewed as passive victimsof bias, an assumption implicit in Allport’s(1954) question, ‘What would happen to yourpersonality if you heard it said over and overagain that you are lazy and had inferior blood?’(p. 42) and explicit in his answer: ‘Groupoppression may destroy the integrity of theego entirely, and reverse its normal pride,and create a groveling self-image’ (p. 152).Current work demonstrates that minoritiesto some extent internalize social biases andimplicit stereotypes (Johnson, Trawalter, &Dovidio, 2000), which can become activated

(even in the absence of interaction withWhites), with detrimental consequences (e.g.,on academic tests) (Steele, 1997). However,the consequences of stigmatization are nowunderstood to be more dynamic and complexthan Allport and his contemporaries assumed(see Crocker & Major, 1989; Miller & Myers,1998).

What, then, lies ahead? Each chapter in thisvolume specifically addresses this question.Here, we consider the broad picture andsuggest eight general trends, ranging from theintra-individual (in fact, the intra-cranial) tothe societal. The first trend is a more elabo-rated conception of the neuroscience of bias,which can help distinguish the underpinningsof different types of bias. Whereas socialpsychology operationalizes ingroup-outgrouprelations in a variety of different ways(e.g., sex, race, age, weight), neurosciencepoints to fundamental differences in variousforms of categorization. Racial categorizationrelates to structures that have evolved forsensitivity to novelty or threat (amygdala)and neural systems that track coalitionsand alliances (Cosmides, Tooby, & Kurzban,2003), but sex and age are encoded in otherregions of the brain (frontocentral regions).Thus, although racism and sexism mayshare some similar behavioral dynamics andsocial consequences, social neuroscience datasuggest fundamental differences in perceptionand encoding. Such different neural under-pinnings may have critical implications forcognitive, affective, and behavioral reactions(Amodio & Devine, 2006;Amodio, Devine, &Harmon-Jones, 2007).

A second emerging trend is closer attentionto understanding how interpersonal inter-actions relate to larger-scale social biases.As Shelton and Richeson (2006; see alsoShelton, Dovidio, Hebl, et al., 2009) haveargued, interpersonal interactions betweenmembers of different groups represent crit-ical encounters. Such encounters not onlyreflect contemporary group relations butalso produce impressions and outcomesthat can reinforce or diminish further bias.Interpersonal interactions between membersof different groups are highly susceptible


to communication problems and misunder-standings. They are fraught with anxietyover how one is being perceived, makingthem highly cognitively demanding both formajority group members, who often strive tobehave in an unbiased manner (Dovidio &Gaertner, 2004; Shelton & Richeson, 2005),and for minority group members, who arevigilant for cues of bias (Shelton, Richeson,Salvatore, et al., 2005). These demands canarouse intergroup anxiety and its behavioralmanifestations (Stephan & Stephan, 1985).Because many signals of anxiety are alsocues for dislike, expectations of rejectionby members of another group (Shelton &Richeson, 2005) can lead to misattributionsto unfriendliness that exacerbate interpersonaland, ultimately, intergroup tensions (Pearson,West, Dovidio, et al., 2008).Thus, understand-ing how and why intergroup misunderstand-ings develop during interpersonal interactionscan complement structural and intergroupapproaches aimed at alleviating intergroupconflict and achieving stable harmoniousintergroup relations.

A third recent trend that is likely to broadenfuture research is the internationalizationof psychology and the resultant focus ongroups other than Whites and Blacks inthe United States. As a result of thesebroadening horizons, research is increasinglyexamining such relations as those betweenimmigrants and members of host nations (e.g.,Esses, Dovidio, & Dion, 2001b), betweenCatholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland(e.g., Paolini, Hewstone, Cairns, et al.,2004), between groups identified on the basisof religious affiliation (e.g., Hunsberger &Jackson, 2005), between homosexuals andheterosexuals (Gabriel, Banse, & Hug, 2007),and between ethnic groups other thanWhites and Blacks (e.g., Zick, Pettigrew, &Wagner, 2008). In addition to examiningthe applicability of theories developed toexplain relations between Whites and Blacks(e.g., Bell & Esses, 1997), these expansionsprovide new understandings of the basisof prejudice, and point to new foci forintervention (e.g., Nickerson & Louis, 2008).The continent of Europe, for example, is

replete with examples of interactions betweenmembers of different ethnic and religiousgroups coming together in differing circum-stances with different norms, and againstthe backdrop of different legal and politicalsystems.

A fourth focus likely to generate consider-able future research is a variation on an oldertheme. SinceAllport’s pioneering work, socialpsychology has focused on how to reducebias in the most effective, generalizable, andenduring way. For over 50 years, intergroupcontact theory (Allport, 1954; Williams, 1947;see also Dovidio, Gaertner, & Kawakami,2003; Pettigrew, 1998) has represented oneof psychology’s most effective strategiesfor reducing bias and improving intergrouprelations. This framework proposes the con-ditions under which intergroup contact canameliorate intergroup prejudice and conflict.Much of the research on this topic has beendevoted to establishing that intergroup contactdoes indeed reduce bias and to evaluatingthe relative importance of the conditionsspecified in Contact Theory (see Pettigrew &Tropp, 2006). In recent years, however,work has moved beyond specifying theconditions that reduce bias to understandingthe underlying processes (e.g., changes insocial categorization) by which they work (seePettigrew, 1998). A number of empirically-supported category-based alternatives havebeen proposed that involve de-emphasizinggroup membership and establishing personal-ized relations (Brewer & Miller, 1984; Miller,2002; Wilder, 1986), recategorizing groupswithin a common group identity (Gaertner &Dovidio, 2000), or maintaining distinct groupidentities but within the context of positiveinterdependence between groups (Brown &Hewstone, 2005). Future research will likelyexamine more closely the implications ofvarious mediating processes for better under-standing the conditions under which contactis more effective (e.g., for mild intergrouptensions versus open hostility) and howvarious types of contact and their result-ing cognitive representations may operatesequentially, in a complementary fashion, toreduce bias.


More generally, future research is likelyto investigate the effectiveness of otherstrategies for reducing bias. For example,because of world events, recent attention hasturned to considering whether multicultur-alism is effective for promoting intergroupharmony within a nation (e.g., Correll, Park, &Smith, 2008). Similarly, social cognitiveassociative training has been harnessed forreducing the application of stereotypes (e.g.,Kawakami, Dovidio, & van Kamp, 2007).These strategies take advantage of knowledgeof the sources of prejudice to developstrategies for counteracting such effects.Thus, as knowledge and understanding ofthe neurological and other bases of prejudiceaccrues, so too should new strategies bedeveloped and evaluated that target suchprocesses.

Two key aspects of this future work onbias reduction constitute independent themesin their own right; they can be illustrated withreference to intergroup contact, but are by nomeans exclusive to it. A fifth recent trend isshift from a static to a dynamic approach.At one level this is seen in the relationalapproach taken to intergroup interactions byRicheson, Shelton and their colleagues (seeShelton & Richeson, 2006). How one personperceives and interprets an interaction partnerhas a direct impact on how that partnerinterprets and responds. Thus how behaviorunfolds over time becomes a critical focus. Atanother level, static, cross-sectional analysesof intergroup relations are no longer seen assufficient to understand what are, essentially,dynamic phenomena. To give one example,more than 70 percent of the research onintergroup contact reported in a meta-analysisby Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) involvedrespondents retrospectively reporting prior orcurrent levels of contact. This reliance oncross-sectional, correlational studies needs tobe gradually replaced with more complexlongitudinal studies (e.g., Binder, Zagefka,Brown, et al., 2009; Levin, van Laar, &Sidanius, 2003).

A sixth, also methodological, focus, barelyin its infancy, is for social psychology to com-plement its long-held expertise in laboratory

research with adventurous excursions outsidethe lab, where members of different groupslive, work, cooperate and sometimes fightwith each other. In one example, Pettigrew(2008) recently called for a greater focus onthe multi-level nature of intergroup contactwhere, for example, members of differentgroups may inhabit different neighborhoods,but come together in common classrooms,in different schools. Pettigrew and Tropp’s(2006) meta-analysis of intergroup contactincluded no multi-level studies, yet theseare crucial for practical applications (seePettigrew, 2006).

Integrating the traditional social psycholog-ical emphasis on intra-individual and interper-sonal processes with macro institutional andsocietal factors that have been the provinceof sociology and political science represents aseventh fertile area for future research. Recentsocial phenomena, such as unprecedentedrates of international immigration and the pur-ported clash of eastern and western cultures,highlight the importance of multi-disciplinaryapproaches to social problems. The com-plexity of these issues speaks to the needto adopt truly multidisciplinary approachesthat incorporate the different perspectivesand methods of fields such as economics,political science, sociology, psychology, andanthropology (Esses, Semenya, Stelzl, et al.,2006). Initiatives in this area will likelyrequire greater investment in field research,studying actual groups in extended conflict,than has been the case in recent years inpsychology.

A final future direction we would liketo see unfold is a greater input fromsocial psychological research on prejudice,stereotyping, and discrimination to relevantpolicy. The findings reviewed in the chaptersin this volume have important and multipleimplications for government policy, rangingfrom increasing the educational aspirations ofminority youth, to providing equal access tohealth care irrespective of ethnic group, topromoting effective interventions to improvesocial harmony. A case in point is the burningquestion of whether residential diversity isassociated with reduced levels of trust, as


claimed by political scientist Robert Putnam(2007), and what to do about it. Ensuingdebate, drawn from multiple disciplines, hasfailed to reach agreement on the reliability ofthe findings (see, for example, Briggs, 2008;Dawkins, 2008; Lancee & Dronkers, 2008).One reason why Putnam’s main pessimisticfinding should be considered premature is thatit largely neglects to measure actual face-to-face contacts between members of differentgroups, as opposed to merely living in thesame neighbourhood. This is a conflation ofopportunity for contact and actual contact.Social psychologists have long appreciatedthat living in a street or neighbourhoodpeopled by members of different ethnicgroups does not constitute contact until andunless there is actual face-to-face interactionbetween them (see Hewstone, Tausch, Voci,et al., 2008; see also Hooghe, Reeskens,Stolle, et al., 2009; Stolle, Soroka, & Johnston,2008). Yet perhaps it was easy to overlooksocial psychology’s contribution because solittle of it dealt with the complexities ofdiversity and intergroup interaction outsidethe laboratory, or at least the campus,and in the community, and because socialpsychologists have sometimes been ratherreluctant to press home the policy impact oftheir research. We hope that our disciplinewill be more effective in the future, and thata volume such as this one will help, as willthe recent founding of social psychologicaljournal outlets with an explicit focus on policy(e.g., Social Issues and Policy Review).

The purpose of the current volume isto provide a comprehensive summary oftheory and research on prejudice, stereotyp-ing, and discrimination that establishes asolid foundation for identifying and pursuingnew work on intergroup bias. The scopeof the volume is broad, and it adopts amulti-level perspective. Still, we acknowl-edge the coverage is far from exhaustive.Nevertheless, the chapters in this volumeillustrate the landscape of social psycho-logical work on intergroup bias, drawingon the expertise of international scholarswho have made significant contributions tothis area.

ORGANIZATION AND OVERVIEWOF THE VOLUME

The current volume is organized into sixdiscrete sections. The first section, whichcontains the present chapter, represents anoverview of the topic. The present chapterintroduced basic concepts that will be referredto across the chapters, summarized the majorconceptual approaches in this area, and iden-tified promising directions for further study.The next chapter, Historical Overview by JohnDuckitt, describes historical developments,conceptual and empirical, in the study ofprejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination.Duckitt emphasizes the interplay betweensociety and science. He proposes that theseparadigmatic transitions did not simply rep-resent a systematic evolution of knowledge,but rather reflected responses to specificsocial and historical circumstances. ThenCorrell, Judd, Park, and Wittenbrink in theirchapter, Measuring Stereotypes, Prejudice,and Discrimination, review the methodolog-ical challenges and tools associated withresearch in this area. Beyond describingdifferent techniques for studying bias, theauthors argue that measurement itself hasfundamentally affected theories of the natureand origins of prejudice, stereotypes, and dis-crimination. These three chapters combinedthus not only review basic issues for studyingprejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination,but also they illustrate the importance ofsocial context for theory and research inthis area.

The second main section of this volumeis Basic Processes and Causes of Prejudice,Stereotyping, and Discrimination. This is thelargest section of the volume and includes 12chapters that explore the origins of differentforms of bias. The section begins with achapter on processes at the most microlevel, neural processes, and ends with macroprocesses, the influence of mass media.

In the first chapter of the second section,Social Cognitive Neural Processes, Quadflieg,Mason, and Macrae describe the latestfindings from studies on intergroup biasin social cognitive neuroscience, considered


in light of current theoretical models ofperson perception, social cognition, andsocial categorization. Next, Schaller, Conway,and Peavy, in their chapter EvolutionaryProcesses, identify two kinds of evolutionaryprocesses contributing to bias, one genetic andthe other social that relate to how knowledgeis selectively transmitted between individuals.Killen, Richardson, and Kelly then discuss, inDevelopmental Perspectives, how intergroupattitudes emerge, change, and are manifestedthroughout development.

The next three chapters in the sectionexamine cognitive, affective, and motiva-tional processes in prejudice, stereotyping,and discrimination. In their chapter, Cog-nitive Processes, Fiske and Russell reviewsocial cognitive perspectives on prejudice,stereotyping, and discrimination, focusingon underlying thought processes that createand maintain bias. Smith and Mackie followwith a chapter on Affective Processes. Theauthors explore ways that incidental affect,affect arising from an interaction, and affectexperienced when they think of themselvesas a member of a social group influencescognitive processes and behavioral reactions.Yzerbyt attempts to integrate research oncognitive and affective processes in bias in hischapter; he analyses bias from the perspectiveof fundamental integrity concerns to know andto control, to be connected with others, and tohave value.

The volume then moves from intrapersonalprocesses to a focus on the individual.The chapter, Individual Differences, by SonHing and Zanna, identifies ideological anddispositional influences that shape the degreeto which different people harbor intergroupbiases. Abrams and Hogg consider theroles of identity, personal and collective,in their chapter, Social Identity and Self-Categorization. From the perspective of socialidentity theory, the authors explain how pre-judice, stereotypes, and discrimination ariseand are maintained. The next two chapters,Group Realities by Leyens and Demoulin andIntergroup Competition by Esses, Jackson,and Bennet-AbuAyyash, demonstrate howgroups influence the way individuals perceive

each other and develop social relations thatboth create and justify intergroup bias. Thechapter, Social Structure, by Diekman, Eagly,and Johnston examines prejudice as resultingfrom social cognitive elements, such asattitudes and stereotypes, and social structuralelements, such as roles and contexts, andthey offer an integrative perspective, therole congruity model of prejudice. In thefinal chapter of the section, Mass Media,Mutz and Goldman consider how the waysdifferent groups are portrayed in the mediacan influence intergroup attitudes and beliefs.They outline the contributions and limitationsof past work on this topic, and point tothe most promising theoretical frameworksfor studying media influence on outgroupattitudes. Thus, this section spans differentlevels of analysis for understanding prejudice,stereotyping, and discrimination.

The third section of the volume isExpression of Prejudice, Stereotyping, andDiscrimination. This section explores howbias is expressed sometimes subtly but othertimes blatantly in attitudes, interpersonalinteractions, and intergroup relations. Thechapter,Attitudes and Intergroup Relations byMaio, Haddock, Manstead, and Spears, whichbegins this section, reviews research on thecontent, structure, and function of attitudesin general and their relationship to intergroupbiases. Richeson and Shelton focus on the roleof prejudice in interpersonal interaction. Theyconsider how the reciprocal ways stigmatizedand non-stigmatized individuals influenceeach other in interactions shape intergroupperceptions and outcomes. Dancygier andGreen focus on one extreme outcome, HateCrime. They explore motivational influencesand contextual factors (including political,historical-cultural, sociological, and eco-nomic circumstances) that elicit hate crimes.The next four chapters in the section discussfour different forms of intergroup bias. Thefirst three explore well-known ‘-isms’; Glickand Rudman focus on sexism; Dovidio,Gaertner, and Kawakami discuss racism;Hebl, Law, and King consider heterosexism.In the following chapter Wagner, Christ, andHeitmeyer examine anti-immigration bias.


Although far from exhaustive, these fourchapters provide ‘case studies’ illustratingboth common elements and unique aspects ofdiscrimination toward different groups.

The fourth section of the volume isSocial Impact of Prejudice, Stereotyping, andDiscrimination. Quinn, Kallen, and Spencer,in their chapter, Stereotype Threat, reviewthe general evidence on stereotype threat,discuss potential underlying processes, andconsider the role of varying group identities instereotype threat outcomes.The chapter, Inter-nalized Devaluation and Situational Threatby Crocker and Garcia examines researchand theory on the idea that prejudice anddiscrimination lower the self-esteem of peoplewith stigmatized identities and these authorsidentify moderating factors. They view thestigmatized as caught between protecting self-esteem at the cost of learning, relationships,and/or motivation versus sustaining learning,motivation, and relationships at the cost ofself-esteem. Major and Townsend’s chapter,Coping with Bias, attempts to strike a balancebetween acknowledging the negative impactof prejudice, stereotyping, and discriminationon the lives of the stigmatized and recog-nizing the multiple strengths and resiliencethat stigmatized individuals and groups alsodisplay.

The next five chapters in the sectionconsider the impact of prejudice, stereotyping,and discrimination institutionally, organiza-tionally, and socially. Henry describes thedynamics of Institutional Bias generally.Smith, Brief, and Collela study the operationof intergroup bias in organizations, whereasSchmukler, Rasquiza, Dimmit, and Crosbyexamine bias in public policy. The impact ofintergroup bias on a key area of society, healthcare, and outcomes, is reviewed by Penner,Albrecht, Orom, Coleman, and Underwood.

The fifth section of the volume is Com-bating Bias. It contains seven chapters thatpresent a range of perspectives, conceptualand practical, for controlling and eliminatingprejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination.Monteith, Arthur, and Flynn, in their chapteron Self-Regulation, discuss motivationalfactors influencing regulatory inclinations

and explain how suppression of prejudi-cial biases often backfires. In the chapter,Multiple Identities, Crisp provides a reviewand integration of research into how therecognition and use of multiple identities inperson perception can encourage reductionsin intergroup biases. Gaertner, Dovidio, andHoulette explore how social categorization,which often produces intergroup bias, canbe redirected through recategorization toreduce bias. Tausch and Hewstone present anoverview of the vast literature on intergroupcontact, highlighting recent developments inthe field, and identifying moderating factorsand mediating mechanisms.

Ellemers and van Laar consider individualmobility, while Wright discusses collectiveaction. Specifically, Ellemers and van Laarargue that individual mobility beliefs andbehaviors tend to reinforce rather than chal-lenge group-based inequality. Wright, in hischapter, CollectiveAction and Social Change,describes four psychological processes thatunderpin collective action: collective identity,perceived boundary permeability, feelings oflegitimacy/injustice, and collective control(instability/agency). He concludes the chapterby contrasting the psychology of collectiveaction with that of prejudice reduction.

The final ‘Commentary’ section of thisvolume features a capstone chapter, writtenby the senior scholar in this field whobrings over five decades of experience to thistask. This chapter, Looking to the Future,by Thomas Pettigrew identifies conceptualthreads that run through the chapters of thisvolume and discusses a series of pressingconcerns for future work, including theneed for more integrative, multi-level, andcontextually sensitive analysis.

Taken together, the chapters in this volumeprovide a broad overview of classic andcurrent research and theory on prejudice,stereotyping, and discrimination. Each ofthe chapters is integrative and reflective.Moreover, and most importantly, they arecollectively generative. The chapters offercritical analysis and insights that revealgaps in what we know about intergroupbias and they highlight promising directions


for future work. They map the extensiveknowledge base on this important issue andprovide a blueprint for researchers to pursueindividually and collectively, not only tobetter understand the phenomena of prejudice,stereotyping, and discrimination but alsoto develop new techniques for eliminatingintergroup bias.

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