Practical Methods for Process Safety Management

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CSChE Conference 2006 Sherbrooke, Quebec, Canada Practical Methods for Process Practical Methods for Process Safety Management Safety Management Putting Process Safety Management Putting Process Safety Management At The Heart Of Our Lives At The Heart Of Our Lives Canadian Chemical Engineering Canadian Chemical Engineering Conference 2006 Conference 2006 Sherbrooke, Quebec, Canada Sherbrooke, Quebec, Canada October 18, 2006 October 18, 2006

Transcript of Practical Methods for Process Safety Management

Page 1: Practical Methods for Process Safety Management

CSChE Conference 2006Sherbrooke, Quebec, Canada

Practical Methods for Process Practical Methods for Process Safety ManagementSafety Management

Putting Process Safety ManagementPutting Process Safety Management““At The Heart Of Our LivesAt The Heart Of Our Lives””

Canadian Chemical EngineeringCanadian Chemical EngineeringConference 2006Conference 2006

Sherbrooke, Quebec, CanadaSherbrooke, Quebec, CanadaOctober 18, 2006October 18, 2006

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QuoteQuote

““Concern for man himself and his safety must Concern for man himself and his safety must always form the chief interest of all technical always form the chief interest of all technical endeavors. Never forget this in the midst of endeavors. Never forget this in the midst of your diagrams and equationsyour diagrams and equations””

~Albert Einstein~Albert EinsteinQuote taken from Quote taken from ““Five Past Midnight in BhopalFive Past Midnight in Bhopal””

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IntroductionIntroductionStandard OverviewStandard OverviewDefining Risk and Risk ReductionDefining Risk and Risk Reduction

Determining if an SIS is requiredDetermining if an SIS is required

Proof TestingProof TestingLong Term MaintenanceLong Term Maintenance

Discussion/QuestionsDiscussion/Questions

AgendaAgenda

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Sam Kozma,Sam Kozma, C.E.T., CFSEC.E.T., CFSE

Certified Functional Safety ExpertCertified Functional Safety Expert

Certified Functional Safety Expert (CFSE) with Certified Functional Safety Expert (CFSE) with TTÜÜV AccreditationV AccreditationInstrument and Controls for over 18 years, Instrument and Controls for over 18 years, specializing in SIS, SIL & IEC/ISAspecializing in SIS, SIL & IEC/ISAExperience with many systems including Experience with many systems including Siemens, HIMA, and HoneywellSiemens, HIMA, and HoneywellMember:Member:

Task Force on Functional SafetyTask Force on Functional SafetyCanadian National Committee (IEC/SC65A)Canadian National Committee (IEC/SC65A)

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What are the IEC/ISA What are the IEC/ISA Standards?Standards?

A performance based project execution A performance based project execution methodmethod

Uses a Uses a ““LifecycleLifecycle”” from from ““cradle to gravecradle to grave””Sets targets based on your own risk tolerancesSets targets based on your own risk tolerancesQuantitative analysis to measure successQuantitative analysis to measure successNonNon--prescriptive prescriptive -- Tailor to your own specific needsTailor to your own specific needs

Primary objectives to protect humans and the Primary objectives to protect humans and the environmentenvironment

Also Successful in Asset Protection, Corporate Image, Also Successful in Asset Protection, Corporate Image, etc.etc.

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What are the IEC/ISA What are the IEC/ISA Standards?Standards?

Developed to help prevent incidentsDeveloped to help prevent incidentsFlixboroughFlixboroughSevesoSevesoBhopalBhopalTexas CityTexas City

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How Many Standards Are How Many Standards Are There?There?

IEC 61513Nuclear

IEC 62061Machine Safety

ISA 84Process Industry

IEC 61511Process Industry

IEC 61508

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Where Does it all Start?Where Does it all Start?

ManagementManagementTop down approach:Top down approach:

Management supportManagement supportProcedures and policies shall reflect the Procedures and policies shall reflect the implementation on all projectsimplementation on all projectsDevelop a Safety Management PlanDevelop a Safety Management Plan

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Primary ObjectivePrimary Objective

Inherently Safer DesignsInherently Safer Designs

A good design process will use a Safety A good design process will use a Safety Instrumented System (SIS) as a Instrumented System (SIS) as a last resortlast resort to to lower the likelihood of an occurrence.lower the likelihood of an occurrence.

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IntroductionIntroductionStandard OverviewStandard OverviewDefining Risk and Risk ReductionDefining Risk and Risk Reduction

Determining if an SIS is requiredDetermining if an SIS is required

Proof TestingProof TestingLong Term MaintenanceLong Term Maintenance

Discussion/QuestionsDiscussion/Questions

AgendaAgenda

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Conceptual Design& Overall Scope

Definition

Process HazardAssessment

SIL Determination& Assessment

SafetyRequirementsSpecification

Stage 1SRS Assessment

External RiskReduction:

Protection/Mitigation

Other SafetyRelatedSystems

Overall PlanningInstallation &

CommissioningPlanning

SafetyValidationPlanning

Operations &Maintenance

Planning

AN

ALY

SIS

PHA

SERE

ALI

ZATIO

N P

HASE

OPE

RATIO

NA

L PH

ASE

SIS IntegrationSIS

ValidationPlanning

SIS Operations& Maintenance

Procedures

SIS Design&

DevelopmentStage 2 - SIS Validation

Overall Installation& Commissioning

Stage 3PSSR - Required

OverallMaintenance

& RepairStage 4

Regular PeriodicAssessment

To AppropriateLifecycle Step

OverallModification

& Retrofit

Decommissioning

Stage 5Validate

Modification

IEC PSM IEC PSM LifecycleLifecycle

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ApplicationApplication

Process ExampleProcess ExampleHigh Pressure HazardHigh Pressure HazardUndersized FlareUndersized Flare

InletSeparator

PIC100

PIT100

PY100

From Field

DownstreamProcessing

DownstreamProcessing

DownstreamProcessing

Flare

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Process Hazard Process Hazard AssessmentAssessment

PHA (HAZOP)PHA (HAZOP)Potential Failure: PICPotential Failure: PIC--100100Result: Overpressure, possible explosion and fire, toxic gas relResult: Overpressure, possible explosion and fire, toxic gas releaseeaseRecommendation: Review vessel design, independent alarms, SIL Recommendation: Review vessel design, independent alarms, SIL analysisanalysis

Inlet Area Node: Inlet SeparatorDev.

1.2.1

Cause

Failure of InletPressureController PIC-100

1.2 More Pressure

Consequence

- Increasing pressurewill cause stress onInlet Sep., causingrupture, explosionand resulting fire.- Risk to personnel.- Risk to Environment(Toxic Gas)

Safeguards

Pressure Releif Valveon Inlet Sep.

Recommendations

- Review vessel design.- Investigate possibleindependent alarms.- Conduct SIL analysis todetermine if HIPPS isrequired.

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What is SIL?What is SIL?

SIL SIL –– SSafety afety IIntegrity ntegrity LLevelevel

IEC 61511 Defines SIL as follows:IEC 61511 Defines SIL as follows:Discrete level (one out of four) for specifying the Discrete level (one out of four) for specifying the safety integrity requirements of the safety safety integrity requirements of the safety instrumented functions to be allocated to the SIS. instrumented functions to be allocated to the SIS. Safety integrity level 4 has the highest level of safety Safety integrity level 4 has the highest level of safety integrity; safety integrity level 1 has the lowest.integrity; safety integrity level 1 has the lowest.

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What Does That Mean?What Does That Mean?

Determine Determine riskrisk and measure it against and measure it against your risk tolerance. your risk tolerance. Risk:Risk:

the measure of the the measure of the consequenceconsequence and and frequencyfrequency of an unwanted incident.of an unwanted incident.

The gap is the The gap is the intolerable riskintolerable risk..Apply Layers of Protection to reduce the Apply Layers of Protection to reduce the exposure to risk.exposure to risk.Remaining gap requires an SIS.Remaining gap requires an SIS.

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RISK

Frequency

RiskRisk

The measure of the The measure of the consequenceconsequence andandfrequencyfrequency of anof anunwanted incidentunwanted incident

= RISK= RISKCon

sequ

ence

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SafetySystem

Reducing The GapReducing The Gap

Tolerable RiskTolerable RiskProtective LayersProtective Layers

DesignDesignRelief ValvesRelief ValvesProceduresProcedures

MitigationMitigationFire and Gas SystemsFire and Gas SystemsEvacuation ProceduresEvacuation Procedures

Safety Instrumented Safety Instrumented SystemsSystems

MitigationLayers

ProtectionLayers

TolerableRisk

ProcessRisk

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Layers Of ProtectionLayers Of Protection

PROCESS

BPCS

PROC

ESS

ALAR

MSOPERATOR

SUPERVISION

MECHANICAL PROTECTIONSYSTEMS

OPERATOR

INTERVENTIONOPERATING

PROCEDURES

PROCESS ALA

RMS W

ITH

EXECUTIVE ACTIO

N

SAFE

TY IN

STRU

MEN

TED

PRO

TEC

TIO

N SY

STEM

S

COM

MUN

ITY

EMER

GEN

CY R

ESPO

NSE

FIRE AND GAS

SYSTEMS

MECHANICAL MITIGATIONSYSTEMS

OPE

RATO

RSU

PERV

ISIO

N

PLANT EMERGENCYRESPONSE

SAFETY INSTRUMENTED

MITIGATION SYSTEM

S

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ApplicationApplication

Process ExampleProcess ExampleHigh Integrity Pressure High Integrity Pressure Protection System (HIPPS)Protection System (HIPPS)

InletSeparator

PIC100

PIT100

PY100

From Field

DownstreamProcessing

DownstreamProcessing

DownstreamProcessing

Flare

XY101A

XY101B

PIT101A

PIT101B

SIF-101SIL 3

1oo2 Valves(Each with 1002 SOV)

1oo2 PITs

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IntroductionIntroductionStandard OverviewStandard OverviewDefining Risk and Risk ReductionDefining Risk and Risk Reduction

Determining if an SIS is requiredDetermining if an SIS is required

Proof TestingProof TestingLong Term MaintenanceLong Term Maintenance

Discussion/QuestionsDiscussion/Questions

AgendaAgenda

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Proof TestingProof Testing

Testing and maintaining an SIS is critical to Testing and maintaining an SIS is critical to meeting risk reduction targets throughout the meeting risk reduction targets throughout the entire lifecycle.entire lifecycle.

Impact of Testing on SILImpact of Testing on SILProbability of Failure on Demand (PFD) Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) increasesincreases over over time without functional proof testing and can result in time without functional proof testing and can result in a a decliningdeclining SIL rating of your SIF thus leaving the SIL rating of your SIF thus leaving the process at process at riskrisk..

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Impact of Testing on SILImpact of Testing on SILSIL 2 DeviceSIL 2 Device80% Test 80% Test coveragecoverageYearly Test Yearly Test IntervalInterval10 Year Mission 10 Year Mission TimeTime

SIL 1

SIL 2

2 4 6 8 10

0.005(RRF=200)

0.01(RRF=100)

0.015(RRF=67)

0.02(RRF=50)

0.025(RRF=40)

0.03(RRF=33)

0.035(RRF=28)

0.04(RRF=25)

PFD

YEARS

PFDavg (w/Testing)PFDavg = 0.007

RRF = 143

PFD (w/Testing)

PFDavg (No Testing)PFDavg = 0.02

RRF = 50

PFD (No Testing)

LEGEND

PFD without Proof TestingPFDavg without Proof TestingPFD with Yearly Test IntervalPFDavg with yearly Test Interval

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MaintenanceMaintenance

Breakdown vs. PreventativeBreakdown vs. PreventativeFollow manufacturerFollow manufacturer’’s recommendationss recommendationsProcedures and intervals should be included in Procedures and intervals should be included in the Safety Requirements Specification (SRS)the Safety Requirements Specification (SRS)Replace/refurbish to Replace/refurbish to ““as newas new”” condition before condition before ““wearwear--outout””Audit to measure if goals are being metAudit to measure if goals are being metRegular PHA (HAZOP, FMEA, etc.)Regular PHA (HAZOP, FMEA, etc.)

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CSChE Conference 2006Sherbrooke, Quebec, Canada

Thank you!Thank you!

QuestionsQuestions

Contact Information:Contact Information:Sam Kozma, Sam Kozma, C.E.T., CFSEC.E.T., CFSE

Phone: (403) 333Phone: (403) 333--81188118Fax: (403 637Fax: (403 637--28702870

Email: Email: [email protected]@spectraldesign.casign.caWebsite: www.spectraldesign.caWebsite: www.spectraldesign.ca