PR-5A User Requirements

User Requirements for Collision Management Systems

ASPASA

Open cut / Surface Quarrying

Operations (Rev 1.0)

Rev 1.0 CMS User Requirements – ASPASA 30-Jun-2017

of 72

1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................................... 5

2 PREPARATION ........................................................................................................................................................ 6

2.1 INCIDENT REVIEW ....................................................................................................................................................... 6 2.2 CONTROL EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW .................................................................................................................................. 7 2.3 CMS STRATEGY .......................................................................................................................................................... 9 2.4 SITE RISK ASSESSMENT .............................................................................................................................................. 10

3 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS .............................................................................................................................. 11

4 PROJECT MANAGEMENT ...................................................................................................................................... 13

4.1 SITE CONDITIONS ...................................................................................................................................................... 13 4.2 ASSESSMENT CRITERIA ............................................................................................................................................... 13 4.3 EVALUATION OF PDS TECHNOLOGIES ........................................................................................................................... 15 4.4 EVALUATION OF OEM TECHNOLOGIES .......................................................................................................................... 16 4.5 PROJECT EXECUTION ................................................................................................................................................. 17 4.6 DOCUMENTATION ..................................................................................................................................................... 18

5 PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS .......................................................................................................................... 21

5.1 STOPPING DISTANCES ................................................................................................................................................ 21 5.2 INTERACTION SCENARIOS............................................................................................................................................ 24 5.3 RISK REDUCTION....................................................................................................................................................... 27

5.3.1 ADTs ............................................................................................................................................................. 27 5.3.2 Front End Loaders ........................................................................................................................................ 29 5.3.3 LDVs ............................................................................................................................................................. 31

6 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................................................................. 33

6.1 INSTALLATIONS ......................................................................................................................................................... 33 6.1.1 General ......................................................................................................................................................... 33 6.1.2 Installation ................................................................................................................................................... 33 6.1.3 Ergonomics................................................................................................................................................... 34 6.1.4 Fault Finding ................................................................................................................................................ 35 6.1.5 Maintenance, calibration and test ............................................................................................................... 35 6.1.6 Emergency override action .......................................................................................................................... 36 6.1.7 Technical Criteria ......................................................................................................................................... 37

6.2 ANALYTICS ............................................................................................................................................................... 38 6.2.1 Data logging ................................................................................................................................................ 38 6.2.2 Reporting ..................................................................................................................................................... 39

6.3 MACHINE INNER FIELD ............................................................................................................................................... 40 6.3.1 Propel Inhibit Zone ....................................................................................................................................... 40 6.3.2 Object Detection Zone .................................................................................................................................. 40 6.3.3 Technical Criteria ......................................................................................................................................... 41

6.4 MACHINE OUTER FIELD.............................................................................................................................................. 42 6.4.1 Machine Alert Zone ...................................................................................................................................... 42 6.4.2 Machine Alarm Zone .................................................................................................................................... 43 6.4.3 Slow Down Advisory Zone ............................................................................................................................ 43 6.4.4 Stop Advisory Zone ....................................................................................................................................... 44 6.4.5 Slow Down Intervention Zone ...................................................................................................................... 44 6.4.6 Stop Intervention Zone ................................................................................................................................. 45 6.4.7 Speed Management Zone ............................................................................................................................ 46 6.4.8 Fields for articulated equipment .................................................................................................................. 46 6.4.9 Fields for towed equipment ......................................................................................................................... 46 6.4.10 Technical Criteria ......................................................................................................................................... 46

6.5 MACHINE INTERFACE ................................................................................................................................................. 47

APPENDIX A LAYERS OF PROTECTION.................................................................................................................... 48

APPENDIX B TECHNOLOGY PROFILES .................................................................................................................... 49

B.1 TARGET PROFILE (EXAMPLE) ....................................................................................................................................... 51

APPENDIX C TEST CASES ........................................................................................................................................ 54


of 72

C.1 SCENARIO CROSS-REFERENCE ...................................................................................................................................... 54 C.2 TEST CONFIGURATIONS .............................................................................................................................................. 55

C.2.1 sTC0 – No Go Area ....................................................................................................................................... 55 C.2.2 sTC1 – Crossing (90°) .................................................................................................................................... 55 C.2.3 sTC2 – Crossing (45⁰/135⁰) .......................................................................................................................... 56 C.2.4 sTC3 – Head-Head (Straight) ........................................................................................................................ 56 C.2.5 sTC4 – Head-Tail (Straight) .......................................................................................................................... 56 C.2.6 sTC5 – Head-Tail (Curved) ............................................................................................................................ 57 C.2.7 sTC6 – Passing (Straight) .............................................................................................................................. 57 C.2.8 sTC7 – Passing (Curved) ............................................................................................................................... 57 C.2.9 sTC8 – Take-off (Object) ............................................................................................................................... 58 C.2.10 sTC9 – Take-off (Person) .............................................................................................................................. 58 C.2.11 sTC10 – Approach (Person) .......................................................................................................................... 58

C.3 TEST SETUPS ............................................................................................................................................................ 59 C.3.1 sTC0 – No Go Area ....................................................................................................................................... 59 C.3.2 sTC1 – Crossing (90°) .................................................................................................................................... 59 C.3.3 sTC2 – Crossing (45⁰/135⁰) .......................................................................................................................... 61 C.3.4 sTC3 – Head-Head (Straight) ........................................................................................................................ 61 C.3.5 sTC4 – Head-Tail (Straight) .......................................................................................................................... 61 C.3.6 sTC5 – Head-Tail (Curved) ............................................................................................................................ 63 C.3.7 sTC6 – Passing (Straight) .............................................................................................................................. 63 C.3.8 sTC7 – Passing (Curved) ............................................................................................................................... 65 C.3.9 sTC8 – Take-off (Object) ............................................................................................................................... 65 C.3.10 sTC9 – Take-off (Person) ............................................................................................................................. 66

APPENDIX D LEGISLATION, CODES AND STANDARDS ............................................................................................ 67

D.1 INTERNATIONAL ........................................................................................................................................................ 67 D.1.1 ISO ................................................................................................................................................................ 67 D.1.2 IEC ................................................................................................................................................................ 67 D.1.3 EN ................................................................................................................................................................. 68 D.1.4 SAE ............................................................................................................................................................... 68

D.2 AUSTRALIA .............................................................................................................................................................. 69 D.2.1 National ....................................................................................................................................................... 69 D.2.2 Queensland .................................................................................................................................................. 70 D.2.3 New South Wales ......................................................................................................................................... 70

D.3 SOUTH AFRICA ......................................................................................................................................................... 71


of 72

Terms and Definitions

EMESRT Earth Moving Equipment Safety Round Table (www.emerst.org)

DP-5 Design Philosophy 5 (DP-5) – Machine operation and controls (www.emerst.org)

PR-5A Performance Requirement 5A (PR-5A) – Vehicle Interaction Systems (part of DP-5)

PR-5B Performance Requirement 5B (PR-5B) – Loss of Control (part of DP-5)

Control Levels 1-9 A hierarchy of nine (9) levels of preventative risk reduction measures arranged by time frame (long term to immediately prior to a hazardous interaction)

CMS Collision Management System / Strategy – The overall combination of preventative controls (Levels 1-9), mitigation, recovery and supporting controls implemented by a site to reduce exposure to hazardous vehicle interactions. Note: no distinction is made in this document between a System (current implementation) and a Strategy (future / planned implementation).

ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable - The level of risk between tolerable and intolerable levels that can be achieved without expenditure of a disproportionate cost in relation to the benefit gained.

vehicle Any item of mobile equipment

interaction A potentially hazardous encounter between mobile equipment and stationary plant (e.g. crusher, lighting tower), person(s), an object, an obstacle or a void

interactor A participant in the interaction – either mobile equipment, stationary plant (e.g. crusher, lighting tower), person(s), an object, obstacle or void

local object The mobile equipment interactor in the best position to avoid the hazardous interaction – usually the interactor with the highest level of energy.

remote object The other interactor in the hazardous interaction.

SAT Safety Adherence Technology (MDG 2007 term) – a technology that monitors equipment usage & performance, providing: an automated action that maintains operation with safe limits, data for post-event analysis and support for training of operators (e.g. maximum speed limiter/governor, vehicle start interlock based on licence credentials, camera/video recorder, data logger, seat belt alarm).

PAT Proximity Awareness Technology (MDG 2007 term) – a technology providing the operator of mobile equipment or a person on foot with controls at Level 7 providing increased levels of perception and comprehension of other objects in the immediate area that can present a hazard.

PDT Proximity Detection Technology (MDG 2007 term) – a technology capable of automatically recognising potentially hazardous interactions with other vehicles, person(s) or objects in the environment, and providing suitable controls up to Level 8 to alert, alarm or advise the operator of mobile equipment or person on foot with sufficient time to avoid the interaction.

CAT Collision Avoidance Technology (MDG 2007 term) – a technology capable of automatically slowing down or stopping mobile equipment to avoid a hazardous interaction with another vehicle, a person or objects in the environment using suitable controls up to Level 9

PDS Proximity Detection System – A PAT, PDT or CAT fitted to mobile equipment, carried by a person or placed in a location to demarcate a hazard, implemented as part of the CMS

base machine A mobile equipment interactor

OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer – Manufacturer of a base machine

CMS solution A base machine fitted with a PDS operating at Control Level 7-9

OEM-PDS interface The connection between the PDS and the OEM base machine that implements the communication protocol defined in ISO 21815 Collision awareness and avoidance - Part 2 – On-board communication interface

TRL Technology Readiness Level (see: http://esto.nasa.gov/files/trl_definitions.pdf)

http://www.emerst.org/

http://www.emerst.org/


of 72

1 INTRODUCTION

This document is a guide to the preparation of User Requirements for Proximity Detection Systems and OEM machines intended to be used as part of a Collision Management System to reduce the exposure to hazardous vehicle interactions in open cut and surface mining operations.

It addresses the general requirements for the supply, installation, integration and commissioning of PDS / OEM collision management solutions.

The relationship of this guide to the hierarchy of documents under EMESRT Design Philosophy DP-5 is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Hierarchy of documents under EMESRT Design Philosophy DP-5

This guide sets outs:

a) Functional Requirements – Objectives of the system to address vehicle interaction risk

b) Performance Requirements – Agreed parameters that will be used as the basis for verification of system operation

c) Technical Requirements – Specific details of the system, including how it is intended to be used, the environment it will operate in, and verification of how well it is working

d) Technology Profile – Classification scheme used by the end user to define specific needs relating to PDS and OEM operation, verification and support, and for PDS Suppliers & OEM’s to demonstrate capability.

e) Test Cases – Description of configurations and experimental setups for verifying the performance of a CMS solution.

This document has been developed using the ‘Guide to Preparation of User Requirements for open cut / surface Mining Operations’ (Rev 1.0) compiled by EMESRT (www.emesrt.org) from industry sources.

http://www.emesrt.org/


of 72

2 PREPARATION

2.1 INCIDENT REVIEW

The starting point to identify potential interaction hazards for mobile equipment should be a review of incident data available for the site, group of similar sites or industry data. Refer to the www.emesrt.org website for links to industry reference material that can be utilised.

Based on the results of the incident review the site should develop the list of equipment that is in scope for these user requirements using the format shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Equipment List - ASPASA

ID Name Object Code Qty.

1 Front end loader SME_SEC

2 ADT SME_PRI

3 LDV SME_SDV

4 Excavator SCE_PCE

5 Rear tipper truck SME_RTV

6 Client truck SME_RTV

7 Forklift SME_SEC

8 Water Truck SME_SEC

9 Sales Truck SME_RTV

10 Side tipper truck SME_RTV

11 TLB SME_SEC

12 Mixer Truck SME_RTV

13 Bobcat SME_SEC

14 Service Truck SME_SEC

15 Drill Rig SME_SEC

16 Road Truck SME_RTV

17 Tractor SME_SEC

18 Mobile Crane SCE_PCE

19 Lowbed Truck SME_RTV

Notes:

(1) All mobile equipment that can be involved in hazardous interactions in the operating area should be listed.

(2) The scope of this guide includes all manually operated mobile equipment, including manually operated equipment used in Autonomous Operating Zones (AOZs) where vehicle interaction risk is not addressed by existing controls.



of 72

2.2 CONTROL EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW

Once the current exposure to interaction hazards has been established the site should define their existing Collision Management System, using a process that includes the following steps:

a) Identify current controls with reference to Control Levels 1-9 shown in Figure 2;

b) Assess the effectiveness of existing controls;

The controls in the Collision Management System work together to provide multiple layers of protection as a barrier between an initiating cause – such as a mobile equipment operator not seeing another vehicle, or a person on foot, and the hazardous interaction (“unwanted event”). The relationship between these controls and the terms used in MDG 2007 are shown in Figure 15 in Appendix A. Suitable supporting and mitigating controls should also be implemented to maintain the effectiveness of the CMS.

Figure 2: Control Levels (1-9)

Note: The Collision Management System should incorporate robust methods of monitoring and verification to check that controls are in place and are working as intended at each control level (1-9) to prevent an unwanted event.

For each item of equipment where there is an exposure to interaction risk (from section 2.1) the flowchart shown in Figure 3 can be used to assess whether existing controls at Levels 1-6 are sufficient to address the risks. If the risks can be managed adequately at Control Levels 1-6 then it may not be necessary to fit PDS to these types of equipment.

Note that all types of equipment can participate in a hazardous interaction as either the local object or the remote object. Equipment can either pose a hazard to other equipment, or be ‘at risk’ due to the movement of another machine. PDS may be required on both types of machines – in the first case to warn the operator or the automatically slow down or stop – e.g. a haul truck, and in the second case to protect the machine at risk – e.g. a light vehicle.


of 72

Figure 3: Control identification and optimisation

Based on the risk assessment, the site should identify items of equipment with residual risks that are not adequately addressed by existing Collision Management System or cannot be addressed by improvement in existing controls.


of 72

2.3 CMS STRATEGY

The design of the Collision Management System is guided by the Collision Management Strategy using the format shown in Table 2. This strategy is developed initially from the incident review (section 2.1) and control effectiveness review (section 2.2).

Table 2: Collision Management Strategy

Interactor Unwanted Event / Strategy

Interactor Object Code

Person Equipment Environment Loss of Control

PUE1 PUE2 PUE3 PUE4

ADT SME_PRI Level 1-7 Level 1-7 Level 1-7 Level 1-6

L7-Radar L7-Radar L7-Radar L8-SpdLim

L9-Inhibit L7-Prox L9-Inhibit L9-SpdLim

- L8-Prox - -

- L9-Slow - -

- L9-Stop - -

Front end loader SME_SEC Level 1-7 Level 1-7 Level 1-7 Level 1-6

L7-R.Radar L7-R.Radar L7-R.Radar -

L9-R.Inhibit L9-Stop L9-R.Inhibit -

LDV SME_SDV Level 1-6 Level 1-6 Level 1-6 Level 1-6

- L7-Prox - -

Mini-bus SME_SDV Level 1-6 Level 1-6 Level 1-6 Level 1-6

- L7-Prox - -

Person PER Level 1-6 Level 1-6 Level 1-6 Level 1-6

Water Truck SME_SEC Level 1-6 Level 1-6 Level 1-6 Level 1-6

L7-Radar L7-Radar L7-Radar L8-SpdLim

L9-Inhibit L7-Prox L9-Inhibit L9-SpdLim

- L8-Prox - -

- L9-Slow - -

- L9-Stop - -

Key to table:

Level x-y : Refer to Control Levels 1-9 (see Figure 2) Existing controls

L7:Prox : Alert / Alarm to operator (Level 7) Pilot / Trial

L8:Prox : Advisory to operator (Level 8)

L9:Slow : Slow-down of equipment by retard/brake (Level 9)

L9:Stop Stop equipment by applying brakes (Level 9)

Notes:

a) Refer to EMESRT Performance Requirements 5A (www.emesrt.org)

b) The strategy for Loss of Control should be addressed using the PR-5B User Requirements Guide (under development, see: www.emesrt.org).

c) Some equipment that is infrequently used in the operating areas of the site could be escorted by other equipment fitted with PDS;

d) Some types of equipment may not require PDS if there is no significant risk of a hazardous interaction

The CMS Strategy describes the high level requirements for PDS at Control Levels 7-9. Often the CMS Strategy will be completed at a corporate level (i.e. a group of similar types of operations) which is then used as guidance for each operating site to develop their own strategy based on a risk assessment taking into account site-specific conditions.




of 72

2.4 SITE RISK ASSESSMENT

Each operating site should conduct a risk assessment considering their existing controls, incorporating the following steps:

a) Identify the interaction risks associated with operation of mobile equipment;

b) Consider what else could happen on site that has not already been identified in section 2.1;

c) Identify potential improvements to their existing controls;

d) Confirm or adapt the Collision Management Strategy for each operating site.


of 72

3 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

The functional requirements of the CMS solution should be defined using Table 3 as a guide. The Notes column can be used by the end user to clarify the requirements, or by the OEM or PDS supplier to indicate capability of the CMS solution.

Table 3: Functional Requirements (example)

Item Requirement Notes

3.1 The CMS solution should minimise occurrences of potentially hazardous PUE1 interactions involving equipment and people on-foot by providing a warning (Level 7) to mobile equipment operators of personnel in the surrounding area, taking into account the reaction times(2) and braking performance of the equipment (see section 5.1)

For: ADTs, Front End Loaders

3.2 The CMS solution should minimise the potential for personnel on-foot to be exposed to potentially hazardous PUE1 interactions by providing a warning to the person via an appropriate combination of visual, audio or voice alerts / alarms (Level 7), that mobile equipment is operating nearby (or is about to move), taking into account the reaction times(2) and braking performance of each item of equipment. The performance requirements of these alerts / alarms are defined in section 5.

Not Required

3.3 The CMS solution should minimise occurrences of potentially hazardous PUE2 equipment-to-equipment interactions by providing warning to mobile equipment operators via an appropriate combination of visual, audio or voice alerts / alarms (Level 7) of other equipment and stationary plant in the surrounding area, taking into account the reaction times(2) and braking performance of each item of equipment. The performance requirements of these alerts / alarms are defined in section 5.

For: ADTs, Front End Loaders, LDVs

3.4 The CMS solution should minimise occurrences of potentially hazardous PUE4 loss of control interactions by providing warning to mobile equipment operators when speed limits for the area or operating conditions have been exceeded (Level 7) or are likely to be exceeded (Level 8), taking into account the reaction times(2) and braking performance of each item of equipment

For: ADTs only

3.5 If a potentially hazardous situation escalates where there is an increased risk of injury to personnel or damage to equipment, the CMS solution should automatically advise the mobile equipment operator of specific corrective action to avoid the hazardous interaction (Level 8) taking into account the reaction times(2) and braking performance of each item of equipment

For: ADTs only

3.6 On an occurrence that a potentially hazardous interaction has escalated to a higher level where a hazardous interaction is imminent or that injury or damage is likely, the CMS solution should initiate an automatic slow down or stop intervention executed by the base machine (Level 9) to avoid the interaction, taking into account the reaction times(2) – operator delay excluded, and braking performance of the base machine. This automatic intervention should not increase the level of risk or introduce new uncontrolled hazards.

For: ADTs, Front End Loaders (reverse only)

3.7 A CMS solution providing Level 9 intervention control should implement the OEM-PDS interface defined in ISO 21815 Part 2 (in preparation)

In-scope

3.8 A means should be provided for the operator to temporarily suspend an automatic intervention initiated by the CMS solution, with normal functionality resumed by one or more of:

• Manual release by the mobile equipment operator (e.g. manual override button, tapping brakes with foot);

• Escalation of the hazard detected by the CMS solution;

• The PDS detecting a new hazard;

• Removal of one or more machines in a lock-down state;

In-scope


of 72


• The base machine entering a pre-determined state defined by risk assessment in consultation with the OEM (e.g. machine stationary)

• An alternative release mechanism determined by risk assessment

3.9 The PDS and OEM components of the CMS solution should continuously monitor health of the system and allow for appropriate action to be taken in the event of a fault.

In-scope (ask what supplier offers)

3.10 The PDS and OEM components of the CMS solution should provide a permanent auditable record of potentially hazardous interactions (including near-misses) for review and improvement.

In-scope

3.11 The CMS solution should be capable of being retrofitted to existing mobile equipment

In-scope

3.12 All PDS solutions should be demonstrated to the appropriate level according to TRL (Technology Readiness Level).

In-scope (ask supplier where they are)

3.13 The impact of the CMS solution on reliability, maintainability and operability of machines should be quantified together with the impact on production.

In-scope

NOTE:

(1) The CMS Strategy should be used to determine the functional requirements necessary for the site. For example, if the CMS Strategy does not require Level 7-9 controls for PUE1-Equipment to personnel, the functional requirements associated with detection of people may not apply.

(2) Reaction time includes the delay of the PDS to detect the hazardous situation, the delay of the operator to respond to the PDS signal(s), the delay in activating the base machine control function (e.g. application of brakes). See Table 5 for a guide.


of 72

4 PROJECT MANAGEMENT

This section identifies the requirements for technology development or procurement, commissioning and installation based on the CMS Strategy (see section 2.3).

4.1 SITE CONDITIONS

Outline of operating conditions at the site.


1 Ambient Conditions:

a) Ambient temperature range;

b) Climate / seasonal factors;

c) Other conditions such as fog, dust

2 Electrical Power Supply:

a) Available mains power (e.g. 110 / 240 VAC 50 / 60 Hz (excluding power supplies on mobile equipment)

b) Power quality and continuity of supply

3 Geography / mine layout:

a) Elevation / pit depth;

b) Mining method – e.g. truck/shovel operation;

4.2 ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

The maturity of OEM and PDS technologies can vary widely. A guide to the typical development phases of a technology from concept to commercialization is shown in Figure 4 to assist with identification of stage gates in project management. End users engaging with OEMs and PDS suppliers offering CMS solutions at maturity levels less than TRL 7 can expect lengthy implementation timeframes.

Figure 4: Technology Readiness Level Assessment Stage Gates


of 72

The Technical Evaluation of OEM and PDS supplier should consider the technology readiness of the CMS solution being offered:

a) Concept: TRL 1-3

b) Research: Lab scale tests completed TRL 4-5

c) Development: 1-Machine in controlled environment (reference site) TRL 6

d) Development: Multiple machines in production test environment (reference site) TRL 6

Note: In South Africa, a Technical File should be available from the PDS supplier after completing development to TRL 6. OEM’s should produce a Technical File for Level 9 CMS solutions.

e) Demonstration: Multiple machines in production environment (reference site) TRL 7

f) Commercial: Full production (reference site) TRL 8-9


of 72

4.3 EVALUATION OF PDS TECHNOLOGIES

The PDS component of the CMS solution should be evaluated for all machines listed in the CMS Strategy where Level 7-9 intervention controls have been specified.

The format shown in Figure 5 should be used as a guide for assessing the capability of each PDS technology up to the highest TRL reached by the PDS supplier in order to determine the level of risk that is being addressed by the solution. Evaluations should be completed separately for:

a) Operator Awareness (Level 7);

b) Advisory Controls (Level 8);

c) Intervention Controls (Level 9)

Figure 5: PDS technology assessment template (example)

Note: The assessment should take into account the relative weightings of each scenario-PUE-speed range based on the exposure to interaction risk at the site. For example, sites that have effective controls in place to limit speed to less than 30 km/h should have a very low exposure to hazardous interactions in the 30-55+ km/h speed range. These ratings are site-specific and should developed through the process in described in section 2.1.


of 72

4.4 EVALUATION OF OEM TECHNOLOGIES

The OEM component of the CMS solution should be evaluated for all machines listed in the CMS Strategy where Level 9 intervention controls have been specified.

The format shown in Figure 6 should be used as a guide for assessing the capability of each base machine up to the highest TRL reached by the OEM in order to determine the level of risk that is being addressed by the solution. Evaluations should be completed separately for:

a) intelligent machines (with the OEM-PDS interface described in section 6.5), and

b) non-intelligent machines (with no data interface) - generally mechanically controlled machines with an interface implemented using hydraulic, mechanical or electrical actuators.

To complete the table the OEM should indicate which actions have been implemented (yes/no) at each speed range for each of the TRL stages. The ratings are site-specific and should developed through the process in described in section 2.1 and indicate what portion of the risk exposure is addressed by each action – speed range combination.

Figure 6: OEM technology assessment template (example)

Note: The OEM assessment should take into account the relative weightings of each speed range based on the exposure to interaction risk at the site. For example, sites that have effective controls in place to limit speed to less than 30 km/h should have a very low exposure to hazardous interactions in the 30-55+ km/h speed range.


of 72

4.5 PROJECT EXECUTION

The following table provides a general outline of the project execution phases that typically occur.


1 Stakeholder Engagement in the following stages:

a) Incident / data review

b) Risk assessment

c) Collision Management Strategy

d) Develop User Requirements

e) Signoff on scope of supply

Note: The stakeholders include the end user (i.e. mining operation), OEM and PDS Supplier.

2 Engagement:

a) PDS supplier response to User Requirements enquiry

b) PDS supplier / OEM briefing session

c) PDS supplier selection, considering:

• TRL (from section 2.5);

• Scenario Requirements (Table 8)

• Performance Requirements (section 5)

• Technical Requirements (section 6)

d) OEM engagement

Note: The CMS solution requires input of both the PDS supplier and OEM

3 Pre-installation:

a) Procurement of PDS and OEM ancillary equipment (dates)

b) Installation drawings / schematics

c) Design risk assessment by PDS supplier

d) Design risk assessments by OEM

e) OEM approvals for installation – e.g. location of sensors on machine, cable routes, power take-off & isolation point, earthing & grounding practices.

f) Certification and assurance – where required for compliance with local regulations

g) Operational risk assessment (attended by both the PDS supplier and OEM)

h) Exclusions signed off by end user (e.g. scenarios, speeds) that will not be addressed by CMS solution

Note: The design risk assessments should reference appropriate safety standards.

4 Installation:

a) Workforce engagement

b) Installation work orders

5 Commissioning:

a) Change Management Plan

b) Workforce training:

• Production

• Maintenance and support

c) Acceptance testing

• Single machine

• Multiple machines


of 72

d) Handover

6 Completion:

a) Finalise support arrangements

b) Practical completion

c) Close-out report

4.6 DOCUMENTATION

Examples of documentation required prior to the implementation phase for the installation, operation and maintenance of the CMS solution are shown in Table 4. Specific responsibilities of the OEM and PDS supplier should be clarified during the pre-installation phase (see section 4.5, item 3).

Table 4: Documentation – Minimum Requirements (example)


1 Equipment Approvals:

a) The PDS supplier should provide all details required to the relevant statutory bodies to gain certification of the equipment for use in relevant jurisdiction, including:

o EMC compatibility, test and marking standard(s)

o Use of radio frequency transmitters (e.g. class license, licensed frequency band) per national radio frequency spectrum licensing

o Electrical approvals (e.g. CE)

b) Any other certification required under legislation

2 Calculations:

a) All mechanical and electrical calculations results necessary to support safety compliance of equipment

b) Calculation of stopping distances implemented in PDS logic linked to Level 7-9 requirements confirmed by base machine OEM.

3 Standards:

a) Full listing of standards and procedures to be used in the configuration, manufacture, QA and testing, including (where applicable):

o International, National, and Regional standards and guidelines

o Supplier "In-house" quality documentation

b) Listing to include Standard / Procedure number, revision/date, title and scope of application

c) The PDS supplier and OEM should identify any other applicable standard in addition to those noted in Appendix D.

4 Data sheets:

a) Completed Equipment Data Sheets including bill of materials

5 Performance data for CMS solution:

a) Reliability, availability, performance per the technology profiles (see Appendix B)

6 Mechanical arrangement drawings of components used in the CMS solution and installation locations:

a) General arrangement of physical components;

b) Weights and dimensions, including brackets, conduits and enclosures

c) External arrangements, switches, cable glands, etc.

d) Environmental protection level of all enclosures and external components (e.g. antennas, display units) per the technology profiles (see Appendix B)

e) Proposed mounting locations (to be confirmed prior to surface trials)

f) Mechanical guarding / protection (if required);


of 72


7 Electrical arrangement drawings of CMS solution:

a) Electrical system overview;

b) Protective devices to be provided by end user;

c) Power requirements (voltage, power)

d) Isolation points

8 Electrical system diagrams for the CMS solution:

a) Electrical schematics

b) Equipment single line and block diagrams

c) Protection scheme diagram - showing all major components with ratings and protective devices

9 Cabling diagrams for the CMS solution:

a) Cabling layouts

b) Termination diagrams

c) Cable schedules as per the requirements of specification

10 Control system diagrams for the CMS solution:

a) Microcontroller/PLC I/O diagrams for machine interfaces

b) System block diagrams

c) Logic diagrams

d) Data communications and network diagrams

11 Control system details:

a) An overview of the control system operation and functions

b) A list of all parameters settable by the end user

c) A list of all parameters settable by the PDS supplier

d) A list of all field devices / transducers / sensors and functions

e) Details of all displays

f) Details of access security levels

g) Details of change management systems compliance

h) Details on software upgrade methods

i) Provide details of any automation features

j) Details of fault tolerance available

12 Diagnostics systems details:

a) Details of diagnostic features available

b) Equipment for testing available

c) Examples of screen displays

d) Fault table details and example

e) Factory Acceptance Test (FAT) program

f) Proposed testing and verification devices for CMS solution

g) Civil installations to be provided by site (e.g. testing station foundation / footings / steelworks)

h) Recharging facilities for hand-held / portable devices;

13 Communications system details:

a) Communication system overview

b) Communication network and block diagrams

c) Spectrum plan (frequencies required / used by system);

d) RF emissions (frequency, modulation, power)

e) Completed ‘radio’ specifications per the technology profiles (section 0)


of 72


14 Systems integration plan:

a) Proposed configuration of personnel devices (if offered)

b) Method and components for interfacing into Ethernet / Wireless LAN site infrastructure

c) Identify site infrastructure that will be required for operation of the system (e.g. wireless communications, fibre optic links, electrical power reticulation)

15 Electrical protection:

a) A list of all protective devices and the recommended protection settings

16 Safety features:

a) Compliance to Safety of Machinery Standard (ISO 13849 & 14121)

b) Emergency stop functions

c) Audible,& visual alarms, voice annunciation

d) Features added to comply with local mobile equipment regulations

e) Details of any control system safety-related features, for example:

o Safety Integrity Level (SIL) audit report per IEC 61508 or IEC 62061– if SIL assessment has not been completed the PDS supplier is to indicate their plan to complete a SIL assessment

o Functional Safety Documentation per ISO13849, ISO 19014 or related standards.

f) Other safety features (provide details) necessary to conduct a risk assessment on the product and operation jointly between the end user, the OEM and the PDS supplier

17 Software documentation including functional specification

18 Outstanding certification details:

a) Provide listing of all items still to be certified prior to use and the current status for the certification

b) Provide the PDS supplier and OEM’s proposed plan for obtaining any outstanding certification

19 Equipment monitoring strategy plan

20 Maintenance strategy document

21 Operational strategy document

22 Exclusions of the CMS solution, including:

a) Speed limitations,

b) Scenario restrictions,

c) Equipment restrictions

23 User Requirements agreed by all stakeholders

24 Design risk assessment completed by PDS supplier, and OEM (for Level 9) for input into operational risk assessment coordinated by end user (see section 4.5, item 3)

25 A technical file detailing performance limitations and design risks passed to the end user as an outcome of the design risk assessments and operational risk assessment (see section 4.5, item 3)

26 Confirmed test protocols to be used for acceptance testing

27 Quality Management Plan

28 Stage Gate closeout reports


of 72

5 PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS

5.1 STOPPING DISTANCES

The Proximity Detection System should make adequate allowance for the safe stopping distances of surface mobile equipment under the full range of operating conditions (speed grade and coefficient of friction). The following equation defined by AASHTO1 can be used as a guide:

𝑑𝑏 =𝑣𝑜2 − 𝑣𝑓

2

2𝑔𝜀(𝑈𝑚𝑖𝑛 cos 𝜃 + sin 𝜃)+ 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑟

where: 𝑑𝑏 = stopping distance under full brake application (metres)

𝑣𝑜 = initial velocity (m/s)

𝑣𝑓 = final velocity (0 m/s; stopped)

𝑡𝑟 = reaction time (seconds)

𝑔 = acceleration due to gravity (9.82 m/s2)

𝜀 = braking efficiency 𝜃 = slope = tan−1 ∅, where ∅ =grade (fractional number expressed as a %)

𝑈𝑚𝑖𝑛 = coefficient of friction of roadway

Braking efficiency (ε) is an empirical factor that has been introduced to provide agreement between the ISO 3450 stopping distance envelope2 and the stopping distance calculated by the AASHTO formula.

Unless stipulated otherwise, the total reaction time (tr) should be defined by both the OEM and PDS supplier to suit site conditions using the format shown in Table 5 as a guide.

Note that:

• ‘Alert’ and ‘Alarm’ provide operator awareness (Level 7).

• ‘Stop 8’ provides a ‘stop’ advisory signal (Level 8) to the operator which incorporates a 1.0 second operator lag before brakes are applied.

• ‘Stop 9’ refers to a ‘stop’ intervention signal (Level 9) provided directly to the machine without operator lag.

Table 5: Reaction times (example)

Zone

PD

S L

ag

Opera

tor

Lag

Machin

e L

ag

Tota

l R

eaction

Tim

e (

t r)

Unit

Control Levels

Level 7

Level 8

Level 9

Alert 0.5 3.0 1.0 4.5 s √ √ √

Alarm 0.5 2.0 1.0 3.5 s √ √ √

Stop 8 0.5 1.0 1.0 2.5 s √ √

Stop 9 0.5 0.0 1.0 1.5 s √

The stopping distance and time curves for wheeled or high-speed rubber-tracked machines with a test mass of >32 tonnes are shown in Figure 7. Note that the test mass for most machines includes the rated payload (wheel loaders are tested with loads). Stopping curves for unloaded machines can vary.

Note: The stopping distances calculated using this stopping distance formula above should only be used as a guide for the configuration of the PDS. Actual stopping distances should be confirmed on-site over the full range of operating conditions and approved by all stakeholders prior to implementation.

1 Stopping distance formula based on the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) guidelines, usually applied with a driver perception time of 1.5 s, and reaction time of 1.0 s, corresponding to Stop 8 in Table 5.

2 ISO 3450 empirical formula: 𝐷 =𝑣2

48−2.6∅ for machines with mass > 32 tonnes, where ∅ = grade (% entered

directly), 𝑣 = speed in km/h, and dry hard-packed road conditions taken as 𝑈𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0.68


of 72

Figure 7: Stopping distance and curves (wheeled machines > 32 tonnes with rated load)


of 72

Table 6: Stopping Distances (wheeled machines with mass > 32 tonnes) - example

Speed Distance to Dead Stop(3) (metres)

Zone Road Condition

km

/h

m/s

(1) Dry road (Umin=0.68) Watered road (Umin=0.45) Slippery road (Umin=0.24)

Grade(2) Grade(2) Grade(2)

+10% 0% -10% +10% 0% -10% +10% 0% -10%

<3

<1

Alert 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5

Alarm 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4

Stop 8 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3

Stop 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2

3-1

0

1-3

Alert 16 16 17 16 17 18 17 19 24

Alarm 13 13 14 13 14 15 14 16 21

Stop 8 10 10 11 11 11 13 12 13 18

Stop 9 6 6 7 6 7 8 7 9 14

10-3

0

3-8

Alert 65 69 75 70 77 88 79 96 139

Alarm 57 61 67 62 68 80 71 88 131

Stop 8 49 53 58 53 60 72 63 80 122

Stop 9 - - - - - - - - -

30-5

5

8-1

5

Alert 163 176 195 177 201 240 209 267 410

Alarm 147 161 180 162 186 224 194 252 395

Stop 8 132 145 165 147 170 209 179 236 380

Stop 9 - - - - - - - - -

Notes:

(1) approximate conversion to m/s

(2) grade includes rolling resistance (typically 2%), +ve is up-ramp, -ve is down-ramp

(3) specified for maximum speed in range

(4) Stakeholders should reach agreement on the maximum speed that brakes could safety be engaged to slow down the machine and bring the machine to a safe stop.

(5) The requirements for slowing down and stopping underground equipment below 3 km/h can be met by simple technologies with limited detection range. The complexity of slowing down and stopping equipment at speeds greater than 3 km/h should be considered carefully before selection of proximity detection technologies, particularly for haul trucks.

(6) At slow speeds there could be an option of stopping equipment directly without an initial slow down phase.

(7) One of the limiting factors for the distances shown in the table is the range of the inner and outer fields of the proximity detection technology (see sections 6.3 and 6.4). Such limitations of the technology should be identified in the exclusions (see section 4.5, item 3).


of 72

5.2 INTERACTION SCENARIOS

The combinations of scenario, speed (forward & reverse) and control level where there is significant risk should be compiled for all items of equipment listed in the CMS Strategy (section 2.3) using Table 7 as a guide. A separate table is required for each item of equipment with significant risk. The reference scenarios are shown in Figure 11.

Table 7: Scenario Requirements – ADT

Scenario PUE

Speed Range (km/h)

Notes

Reverse MI Forward 30-5

5+

10-3

0

3-1

0

0-3

0

0-3

3-1

0

10-3

0

30-5

5+

L1-Head-on PUE2 7 7 7 7 9 9 9 9 8 slow down only >10 km/h

L2-Reverse-on PUE2 7 7 9 9 9 7 7 7 7

L3-Backup PUE2 7 7 9 9 9 7 7 7 7

L4-Dovetailing PUE2 7 7 7 7 9 9 9 9 8 slow down only >10 km/h

L5-Passing Head-on PUE2 7 7 7 7 - 8 8 8 8 minimise false positives

L6-Passing Reverse-on PUE2 8 8 8 8 - 7 7 7 7 minimise false positives

L7-Overtaking PUE2 7 7 7 7 - 8 8 8 8 minimise false positives

L8-Blind Approach PUE2 7 7 7 7 9 9 9 9 8 slow down only >10 km/h

T1-Merge PUE2 7 7 7 7 9 9 9 9 8 slow down only >10 km/h

T2-Crossover PUE2 7 7 7 7 9 9 9 9 8 slow down only >10 km/h

T3-Junction PUE2 7 7 7 7 9 9 9 9 8 slow down only >10 km/h

T4-Intersection PUE2 7 7 7 7 9 9 9 9 8 slow down only >10 km/h

O1- Obstacle PUE3 7 7 9 9 9 9 9 7 7 e.g. geofence or radar

P1-Person (direct) PUE1 7 7 9 9 9 9 9 7 7 e.g. radar

P3-Person (indirect) PUE1 - - - - - - - - -

V1-Void PUE3 7 7 7 9 9 9 7 7 7 e.g. geofence

V4-Loss of Control* PUE4 - - - 9 9 9 9 9 8 speed control only, slow down >10 km/h

V6-Congested Area PUE2 7 7 7 9 9 9 8 8 8 e.g. geofence & radar

C1-Curving Dovetail PUE2 7 7 7 7 9 9 9 9 8

C2-Curving Head-on PUE2 7 7 7 7 9 9 9 9 8

C3-Curving Reverse-on PUE2 7 7 9 9 9 7 7 7 7 slow down only >10 km/h

R1-Swing PUE2 - - - - - - - - -

R2-Drop PUE1 - - - - - - - - -

R2-Drop PUE2 - - - - - - - - -

P4-Access & Egress PUE1 - - - - - - - - -

Key to Table:

a) PUE1 = Equipment to Person Interaction;

b) PUE2 = Equipment to Equipment Interaction;

c) PUE3 = Equipment to Environment Interaction (specifically obstacles and no-go areas);

d) PUE4 = Uncontrolled Equipment / Attachment

e) Refer to Figure 2 for definitions of control levels 1-9


of 72

Notes:

1) Some scenarios – e.g. ‘L5-Passing Head-on’ and ‘L6-Passing Reverse-on’ could require alerts, alarms, advisory signals and interventions to be supressed if the risk of collision is negligible (e.g. passing at a safe distance).

2) ‘V4-Loss of Control’ exposures that can be addressed by speed control of a machine relative to fixed hazards (e.g. ramps, speed limited areas) is considered a Level 9 control. Other potential causes for Loss of Control are considered in PR-5B.

Table 8: Scenario Requirements – Front End Loader

Scenario PUE

Speed Range (km/h)

Notes

Reverse MI Forward

30-5

5+

10-3

0

3-1

0

0-3

0

0-3

3-1

0

10-3

0

30-5

5+

L1-Head-on PUE2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

L2-Reverse-on PUE2 7 7 9 9 9 7 7 7 7 e.g. radar

L3-Backup PUE2 7 7 9 9 9 7 7 7 7 e.g. radar

L4-Dovetailing PUE2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

L5-Passing Head-on PUE2 - - - - - - - - -

L6-Passing Reverse-on PUE2 - - - - - - - - -

L7-Overtaking PUE2 - - - - - - - - -

L8-Blind Approach PUE2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

T1-Merge PUE2 - - - - - - - - -

T2-Crossover PUE2 - - - - - - - - -

T3-Junction PUE2 - - - - - - - - -

T4-Intersection PUE2 - - - - - - - - -

O1- Obstacle PUE3 - 7 9 9 9 7 7 7 - e.g. geofence or radar

P1-Person (direct) PUE1 - 7 9 9 9 7 7 7 - e.g. radar


V1-Void PUE3 - - - - - - - - -

V4-Loss of Control* PUE4 - - - - - - - - -

V6-Congested Area PUE2 7 7 9 9 9 7 7 7 7 e.g. radar

C1-Curving Dovetail PUE2 - - - - - - - - -

C2-Curving Head-on PUE2 - - - - - - - - -

C3-Curving Reverse-on PUE2 - - - - - - - - -

R1-Swing PUE2 - - - - - - - - -

R2-Drop PUE1 - - - - - - - - -

R2-Drop PUE2 - - - - - - - - -


Key to Table:







of 72

Notes:



Table 9: Scenario Requirements - LDV

Scenario PUE

Speed Range (km/h)

Notes

Reverse MI Forward

30-5

5+

10-3

0

3-1

0

0-3

0

0-3

3-1

0

10-3

0

30-5

5+

L1-Head-on PUE2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

L2-Reverse-on PUE2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

L3-Backup PUE2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

L4-Dovetailing PUE2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

L5-Passing Head-on PUE2 - - - - - - - - -

L6-Passing Reverse-on PUE2 - - - - - - - - -

L7-Overtaking PUE2 - - - - - - - - -

L8-Blind Approach PUE2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

T1-Merge PUE2 - - - - - - - - -

T2-Crossover PUE2 - - - - - - - - -

T3-Junction PUE2 - - - - - - - - -

T4-Intersection PUE2 - 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 -

O1- Obstacle PUE3 - - - - - - - - -

P1-Person (direct) PUE1 - - - - - - - - -


V1-Void PUE3 - - - - - - - - -

V4-Loss of Control* PUE4 - - - - - - - - -

V6-Congested Area PUE2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

C1-Curving Dovetail PUE2 - - - - - - - - -

C2-Curving Head-on PUE2 - - - - - - - - -

C3-Curving Reverse-on PUE2 - - - - - - - - -

R1-Swing PUE2 - - - - - - - - -

R2-Drop PUE1 - - - - - - - - -

R2-Drop PUE2 - - - - - - - - -


Key to Table:







of 72

Notes:



5.3 RISK REDUCTION

5.3.1 ADTs

The exposure by weighted risk for ADTs based on site and industry data is shown below in Table 10. Refer to the scope defined in Table 7 to assess the reduction in exposure if the CMS Strategy (see section 2.3 is fully implemented).

Table 10: Site & Industry Exposure (by Weighted Risk) – ADTs

Level 1-6

Work Area Controls

Level 7 Awareness

Level 8 Advisory

Level 9 Avoidance

Scenario PUE Speed (km/h) WR % WR % WR % WR %

L1-Head-on PUE2 Fwd : 3-10 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

L2-Reverse-on PUE2 Rev : 0-3 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3%

L3-Backup PUE2 Rev : 3-10 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3%

L6-Passing Reverse-on PUE2 Rev : 0-3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -

V1-Void PUE3 Rev : 0-3 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%

V4-Loss of Control PUE4 Rev : 3-10 4.0% - - -

V4-Loss of Control PUE4 Rev : 0-3 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%

V4-Loss of Control PUE4 Fwd : 10-30 13.4% 13.4% 13.4% 13.4%

V4-Loss of Control PUE4 Fwd : 30-55+ 44.8% 44.8% 44.8% -

V6-Congested Area PUE2 Rev : 0-3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

O1-Obstacle PUE3 Rev : 3-10 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%


O1-Obstacle PUE3 Fwd : 0-3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

O1-Obstacle PUE3 Fwd : 3-10 9.1% 9.1% 9.1% 9.1%

O1-Obstacle PUE3 Fwd : 10-30 0.4% 0.4% - -

P1-Person (direct) PUE1 Rev : 3-10 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%

P1-Person (direct) PUE1 Stationary 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%

P1-Person (direct) PUE1 Fwd : 3-10 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%

T1-Merge PUE2 Fwd : 3-10 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

T3-Junction PUE2 Fwd : 3-10 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3%

100.0% 96.0% 95.6% 50.7%

The total exposures for ADTs are summarised in Figure 8. These exposures are the % of risk that could be addressed by the CMS solution. Any combinations (of Scenario, PUE, and Speed) not listed in Table 10, were not identified as contributing risk exposure in the incident analysis.


of 72

Figure 8: Risk Reduction – ADTs

The expected risk reduction defined in this section can be used as a basis for evaluation of alternative CMS solutions to meet site requirements.


of 72

5.3.2 Front End Loaders

The exposure by weighted risk for front end loaders based on site and industry data is shown below in Table 10. Refer to the scope defined in Table 8 to assess the reduction in exposure if the CMS Strategy (see section 2.3 is fully implemented).

Table 11: Site & Industry Exposure (by Weighted Risk) – Front End Loaders

Level 1-6

Work Area Controls

Level 7 Awareness

Level 8 Advisory

Level 9 Avoidance




L4-Dovetailing PUE2 Fwd : 0-3 0.1% 0.1% - -

V1-Void PUE3 Fwd : 3-10 5.9% - - -


V4-Loss of Control PUE4 Fwd : 0-3 6.6% - - -








P1-Person (direct) PUE1 Stationary 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%

P1-Person (direct) PUE1 Fwd : 0-3 6.6% 6.6% - -

R1-Swing PUE2 Rev : 0-3 1.2% - - -

R2-Drop PUE1 Stationary 1.8% - - -

R2-Drop PUE2 Rev : 0-3 0.6% - - -

R2-Drop PUE2 Fwd : 0-3 2.0% - - -

R2-Drop PUE2 Fwd : 3-10 0.1% - - -

100.0% 64.8% 41.5% 41.5%

The total exposures for Front End Loaders are summarised in Figure 9. These exposures are the % of risk that could be addressed by the CMS solution. Any combinations (of Scenario, PUE, and Speed) not listed in Table 11, were not identified as contributing risk exposure in the incident analysis.


of 72

Figure 9: Risk Reduction – Front End Loaders



of 72

5.3.3 LDVs

The exposure by weighted risk for LDVs based on site and industry data is shown below in Table 12. Refer to the scope defined in Table 9 to assess the reduction in exposure if the CMS Strategy (see section 2.3 is fully implemented).

Table 12: Site & Industry Exposure (by Weighted Risk) – LDVs

Level 1-6

Work Area Controls

Level 7 Awareness

Level 8 Advisory

Level 9 Avoidance


V1-Void PUE3 Fwd : 10-30 9.0% - - -




V4-Loss of Control PUE4 Fwd : 30-55+ 21.0% - - -

O1-Obstacle PUE3 Rev : 3-10 0.1% - - -

O1-Obstacle PUE3 Rev : 0-3 3.2% - - -

O1-Obstacle PUE3 Fwd : 0-3 0.0% - - -

P1-Person (direct) PUE1 Rev : 3-10 29.9% - - -

T4-Intersection PUE2 Fwd : 10-30 9.0% 9.0% - -

100.0% 9.0% 0.0% 0.0%

The total exposures for LDVs are summarised in Figure 10. These exposures are the % of risk that could be addressed by the CMS solution. Any combinations (of Scenario, PUE, and Speed) not listed in Table 12, were not identified as contributing risk exposure in the incident analysis.

Figure 10: Risk Reduction – LDVs



of 72

Figure 11: Interaction Scenarios – Open cut / Surface

Note that the scenarios in Figure 11 should be read with reference to PR-5A scenario descriptions and scenario codes (see www.emesrt.org).



of 72

6 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS

In the following sections, the term ‘should’ indicates a requirement to be considered as part of the User Requirements. In many cases, ‘should’ may be replaced with ‘shall’ if deemed appropriate by the site.

6.1 INSTALLATIONS

6.1.1 General


1 General:

a) The PDS should warn operators when other vehicles are in close proximity to the machine.

b) If required by the CMS strategy the PDS should warn operators when pedestrians on-foot are in close proximity to the machine.

c) The operator display should indicate the alert, alarm or advisory message with the highest priority when multiple warnings are received.

d) The PDS should implement appropriate logic to determine priority of warnings – e.g. based on distance, higher priority for people on foot than other equipment

2 Fail to safe Operation:

a) The CMS solution should incorporate measures to prevent entering an unsafe condition and fail to a safe state in the event of any malfunction;

b) The CMS solution should default to an error state when any component, connection or interface that governs functionality fails as detected by the self-diagnostic capability;

c) The PDS or OEM diagnostics built into the CMS solution should provide a suitable warning signal to the operator if an error condition is detected.

d) The CMS solution should default to an error state when any of the following minimum conditions occur:

o There is no power on the system;

o If the connected antennas are not functional;

o If any system faults are detected;

o A communication error is detected;

o Any component failure that could impact the safe operation of the system.

e) For CMS solutions providing Level 9 intervention control the system must react in an appropriate manner defined in the operational risk assessment (see section 4.5, item 3) when not healthy.

6.1.2 Installation


1 General

a) An installation standard for the CMS solution should be defined per machine type by the OEM and PDS supplier.

b) The PDS supplier should ensure that all PDS components are correctly installed on the machine, considering:

o suitable positioning to prevent damage during normal operation of the machine.

o mounting locations of equipment should follow the installation standard for each machine type;

o suitable positioning of PDS components to provide accessibility for operation, inspection, maintenance or repairs.


of 72


o cables are routed and protected to prevent damage caused by impact or friction, preferably following the original machine design routes.

o individual cores numbered, and cables labelled appropriately at termination points.

o cables are properly supported to relieve strain or stress on components.

o cables and equipment are protected against damage caused by impact or friction.

o glands used on the system are rated to IP 65 or higher to prevent water cannot ingress into any enclosure through either the cable or externally.

o glands of a single construction with no loose components that could be left out during installation.

6.1.3 Ergonomics


1 The operator display used by the PDS should take into account:

a) the operator’s visibility is not obstructed or restricted due to improper positioning of equipment;

b) ergonomics of the operator cabin is not compromised due to improper positioning of components;

c) warning or diagnostic display units are positioned so that the operator is always made aware of an alarm regardless of direction of travel or driving position. Multiple display units could be installed to meet this requirement.

d) display units are positioned in the operator’s field of vision to allow alerts, alarms or advisory messages to be seen by the operator.

e) display functions effectively in day or night conditions;

f) display functions effectively independent of the number of vehicles or personnel around the machine;

g) display identifies every vehicle individually around the machine and reacts to the most critical condition;

h) display the standby battery power availability (if an independent battery power supply has been specified);

i) display shows real time clock (for verification of correct date and time);

j) display shows compass direction (if available);

k) display shows satellite count and signal quality (if GNSS is used);

l) clearly indicates the nearest object;

m) display uses suitably-scaled icons for different vehicles

2 If the CMS Strategy (section 2.3) requires personnel detection for the machine the PDS should in addition to 6.1.3.1 provide the following:

a) display uses suitably-scaled icons for people;

b) display identifies every person individually around the machine and reacts to the most critical condition.


of 72

6.1.4 Fault Finding


1 General:

a) The CMS solution should have the capability of detecting a fault and visually display information to assist maintenance personnel to locate a fault and complete repairs without prolonged downtime on the machine.

b) The CMS solution should have the capability of detecting all typical faults including, but not limited to, cable damage, communication failure, power loss and loose connections on terminals.

2 Fault finding Alerts:

a) The CMS solution should perform the necessary health checks of the system and alert the operator to take appropriate action,

b) The CMS solution should provide suitable information to assist with fast and effective fault finding.

c) All system faults should be logged by the CMS solution, with the following system alarms displayed individually on the machine PDS display unit:

• System power fault.

• Any antenna fault.

• Power Supply / Low Voltage fault.

• Communication faults

• Loss of GPS signal

• Loss of sensor signal (e.g. radar)

6.1.5 Maintenance, calibration and test

Item Description Notes

1 Maintenance Mode Function:

a) The CMS solution should provide suitable functionality to enable maintenance of mobile equipment (e.g. provision of a bypass mode)

b) When maintenance has been activated on a specific machine the CMS solution could remain active (e.g. battery backup for 24 hrs)

c) If the CMS solution has failed to an error state a risk assessment should be conducted to identify the specific conditions when maintenance is allowed.

2 Calibration Mode:

a) The calibration function of the PDS fields should:

o be able to detect when calibration (verification) is taking place

o log the date and time when the calibration mode was activated


of 72

3 Test Functions:

a) The CMS solution should include a test facility to verify the fields, vehicle to vehicle detection vehicle to person detection (if applicable) and intervention functions are operational.

b) The machine test facility should verify proper operation of the following:

o Slow Down Mode – Test slow down function by slowing the machine down when near the simulated vehicle or person (as applicable)

o Stop Mode – Test stop mode by stopping the machine when near the simulated vehicle

o Pass / fail indication to the operator whether the tests passed or failed

c) Where practical, a test station should be installed with a boom gate interlocking function to prevent machines with defective a CMS solution from entering operational areas

6.1.6 Emergency override action


1 Emergency Override Function (if required)

a) The CMS solution should have an emergency override function that can be activated to disable PDS when specific emergency conditions arise.

b) A risk assessment should be conducted to determine the specific conditions when the emergency override is activated. The override function should only be active for sufficient time to allow the machine to be moved in the case of an emergency.

c) The CMS solution should have the following minimum functionality for the emergency override function:

o a relatively simple emergency override activation;

o a timed override of the emergency override function;

o logging of the unique ID of the tag/key that activated the emergency override function (if available)

o log the date, time and duration of the emergency override

d) This function should only be used in certain identified situations and prevented from accidental or inadvertent activation during normal operating conditions. This function should not be utilised as an operational tool.


of 72

6.1.7 Technical Criteria


1 System: Safety Integrity The maximum number of hazardous failures over a specific operating period, or the maximum frequency of hazardous failures for continuous demand PDS

2 Maturity: MTBF The Mean Time Between Failure of the PDS components in normal service (includes cable damage etc. from normal mining activity, but excludes deliberate damage or major disturbance

3 Maturity: MTTR The Mean Time To Repair faults with the PDS once notified (including cables) and return the equipment into service

4 Maturity: Availability Impact The total expected downtime due to PDS expressed as a reduction in machine availability

5 Support: Service Support Where and how is the PDS system supported

6 Maturity: Sensor Verification How does the system detect if there is a failure in any of its sensors

7 Maturity: System Verification How does the system detect if there is a failure in any of its components or subsystems

8 Maturity: Sensor Cabling Sensor cabling should be robust, resilient to faults and easy to diagnose from a central point

9 Maturity: Interface Cabling Interface cabling should be simple, robust and easy to diagnose (from the PDS side)

10 Radio: Link Integrity What level of interference can the PDS withstand in any of its radio links

11 Radio: Co-Channel RFI What level of interference is generated in other services that could potentially use the same spectrum (in addition to the class or licence limitations that apply in ICASA radio frequency spectrum regulations No. 34172 and subsequent revisions)

12 Radio: Cross-Channel RFI What level of interference is generated in other services that could potentially use adjacent spectrum (in addition to the class or licence limitations that apply in ICASA radio frequency spectrum regulations No. 34172 and subsequent revisions)

13 Dependency: GNSS & Augmentation The availability of the combined GNSS and augmentation systems should exceed 99.5% averaged over 24 hour period for each PDS installation on each item of surface mobile equipment. The supplier should provide continuous GNSS availably data logged at a minimum of 1 second intervals for at least two machines operating in all accessible operations areas over a period of not less than 72 hours, including: #satellites, HDOP, signal strength, and any other measure of signal quality and position confidence interval


of 72

6.2 ANALYTICS

6.2.1 Data logging


1 General:

a) The CMS solution should be equipped with a data logging system and a software package to facilitate the reporting of all logged data.

b) A basic level of data logging should be implemented on non-intelligent machines which have limited sensing capabilities.

c) All relevant data should be logged on machine that have implemented the OEM-PDS interface (see section 6.5).

2 Data Logging:

a) The PDS and OEM components of the CMS solution on each machine should have a data logger that records all relevant information, including:

o System health status;

o All operator alarms (PDS only);

o All intervention actions;

o All machine interface signals, and

o Sufficient non-volatile storage to store a minimum of 7 days of data before overwriting.

b) The PDS should have the capability to download data via the following interfaces (in order of preference):

o Wi-Fi Interface;

o Local Area Network (e.g. Ethernet);

o Personal Area Network (e.g. Bluetooth)

o USB/Serial Interface;

o Removable storage

c) When a vehicle encounters a hazardous interaction with another vehicle or person the following events should be recorded:

o Vehicle ID, type and position (of remote object)

o Person ID (if vehicle-to-person detection has been specified in the CMS Strategy – see section 2.3)

o Battery voltage (portable equipment only)

o Alert Zone entry & exit date and time (see section 6.4.1)

o Alarm Zone entry & exit date and time (see section 6.4.2)

o Slow Down Advisory Zone entry & exit date and time (see section 6.4.3)

o Stop Advisory Zone entry & exit date and time (see section 6.4.4)

o Slow Down Intervention Zone entry & exit date and time (see section 6.4.5)

o Stop Intervention Zone entry & exit date and time (see section 6.4.6)

d) When the maintenance or emergency override function is activated the following tag data should be recorded:

o Vehicle ID, and type (identity of person performing function)

o Battery voltage (portable equipment only)

o Override activation time and date

o Override de-activation time and date

e) All system alarms, system modes and system overrides should be logged. As a minimum, the following system alarms should be recorded:

o Any antenna fault

o Display unit fault

o Communication faults


of 72

o Interface connection faults

o System power fault.

o Power Supply / Low Voltage fault.

o Calibration mode activation

6.2.2 Reporting


1 PDS Reporting:

a) The PDS supplier should provide a software package that will take all information from the different machines’ data loggers and compile it into a useable real time report

b) The reporting system should have a web based interface

c) The reporting system should make use of a suitable database with reporting functions (e.g. Microsoft SQL and Microsoft reporting services)

d) The reporting system should be a virtual machine hosted on the operation’s production host server

2 OEM Reporting:

a) The OEM should provide a means to collect information from the different machines’ data loggers and compile it into a useable real time report

3 PDS and OEM Data Presentation:

a) Reports should be configurable by the end user

b) Detailed event log should be available for all machines

c) Summary reports of warning, hazard and emergency stop around a specific machine, machine type or total fleet

d) Reports should be available for daily interactions per operational site

e) Reports should be available for system availability and downtime, including all system statuses and faults.

f) Reports should have the ability to be filtered according to the machine feedback signals

g) Detailed pre-shift check records.

h) Detailed periodic test records

i) Daily report on the summary of all near misses per machine type, failures and test results


of 72

6.3 MACHINE INNER FIELD

The inner field consists of four (4) sectors extending in the immediate vicinity of the machine and is intended primarily for 360-degree detection of vehicles and personnel near the machine. Generally implemented using radar & cameras with an operating range of up to 60 metres. Different thresholds are defined for proximity of vehicles and personnel within the inner field for the zones.

Figure 12: Machine Inner Field (example)

The following sections define the required behaviour of the PDS for each zone in the inner field.

6.3.1 Propel Inhibit Zone


1 a) The Propel Inhibit Zone is used to prevent the machine from moving in either the forward or reverse direction if an object or person is directly in front or behind surface mobile equipment when ground speed = 0 ZERO.

b) The typical extent of the propel inhibit zone is 10 metres (based on pulsed radar detection) in front and to the rear of the machine. The side field typically extends in a cone to the front and back of the machine.

c) The operator should receive an alert through an annunciator that varies in colour depending on the reducing distance. There could also be an audio notification that increases in frequency as the distance shortens.

d) The Propel Inhibit Zone should have the capability to be individually adjustable for the different surface mobile equipment.

In-scope

6.3.2 Object Detection Zone


1 a) The Object Detection Zone is used to provide an alert to the operator that an object or person in front or behind the machine in the path of travel. The typical size of the object detection zone is up to 60 metres in front of the machine and 10 metres behind the machine.

b) The operator should receive an alert through an annunciator that is selectable between audio beeping and voice prompts.

In-scope


of 72


A measure of the amount of variation in the response of the system due to error in measurements relied on by the PDS decision logic.


1 Remote Object: Localisation The shape of the region that surrounding the machine where persons or equipment can be detected without blind spots or areas of impaired performance

In-scope

2 Local Object: Perception The active volume surrounding the Local Object where Remote Object can be detected

In-scope

3 Remote Object: Closing Speed The range of relative speeds between the vehicle and another vehicle over which the PDS system can operate reliable

In-scope

4 Performance: Nuisance Alarms Maximum rate of nuisance alarms across all interaction scenarios defined by the end user taking into account normal operations where alarms are not expected to be generated, taking into account the impact on the integrity of the machine components plus the impact on production

In-scope

5 Performance: Response Time The maximum elapsed time from when another PDS device in proximity of the machine satisfying the PDS decision logic after which an Alert, Alarm or Stop signal is generated

In-scope

6 Performance: Late Alarms The expected rate at which an Alert, Alarm or Stop signal occurs after the Response Time has elapsed

In-scope

7 Performance: Missed alarms The expected rate at which no Alert, Alarm or Stop signal is generated at all after the Response Time has elapsed

In-scope

Test procedures should be developed to confirm actual repeatability performance taking into account the interaction scenarios, the types of equipment, direction, speed and distance for each measure to a confidence interval of >90%.


of 72

6.4 MACHINE OUTER FIELD

The Outer Field consists of overlapping areas in the immediate vicinity of the machine and is intended primarily for detection of other vehicles. This field is generally implemented using GNSS technologies and vehicle-to-vehicle radio links with an operating range of up to 500 metres. Different thresholds are defined for proximity of vehicles within the outer field for each zone. The Zones are defined within the PDS Outer Field are shown in Figure 13:

Figure 13: Outer Field Zones (example)

6.4.1 Machine Alert Zone


1 When the PDS logic detects a potentially hazardous equipment-to-equipment or equipment-to-person interaction (as specified in the CMS Strategy – see section 2.3) and enters into the Machine Alert zone (Level 7):

a) the PDS should warn the operator of the presence of other machines or people via a Vehicle to Vehicle / Person Alert

b) the Vehicle to Vehicle / Person Alert could be provided by one or more of:

• audio notification,

• visual notification,

• voice notification

c) the Vehicle to Vehicle / Person Alert should accommodate the various types of mobile equipment and interaction scenarios required by the CMS Strategy and meet the performance requirements defined in section 5

In-scope


of 72

6.4.2 Machine Alarm Zone


1 When the PDS logic detects a potentially hazardous equipment-to-equipment or equipment-to-person interaction (as specified in the CMS Strategy – see section 2.3) and enters into the Machine Alarm Zone (Level 7):

a) the PDS should warn the operator of the presence of other machines or people via a Vehicle to Vehicle / Person Alarm;

b) The Vehicle to Vehicle / Person Alarm could be provided by one or more of:

• Audio notification,

• Visual notification,

• Voice notification

c) the Vehicle to Vehicle / Person Alarm should accommodate the various types of mobile equipment and interaction scenarios required by the CMS Strategy and meet the performance requirements defined in section 5.

In-scope

6.4.3 Slow Down Advisory Zone


1 When the PDS logic detects a potentially hazardous equipment-to-equipment or equipment-to-person interaction (as specified in the CMS Strategy – see section 2.3) and enters into the Slow Down Advisory Zone (Level 8):

a) the PDS should warn the operator of the presence of other machines or people via a Vehicle to Vehicle / Person Slow Down Advisory (Level 8);

b) The Vehicle to Vehicle / Person Slow Down advisory should be unambiguously recognisable by the operator as an advisory to slow down the machine, and could be provided by one or more of:

• Audio notification


c) The Vehicle to Vehicle / Person Slow Down advisory should accommodate the various types of mobile equipment and interaction scenarios required by the CMS Strategy and meet the performance requirements defined in section 5.

d) For some machines the Stop Advisory Zone (section 0) may be activated below a specified maximum speed without activation of the Slow Down Advisory Zone

In-scope


of 72

6.4.4 Stop Advisory Zone


1 When the PDS logic detects a potentially hazardous equipment-to-equipment or equipment-to-person interaction (as specified in the CMS Strategy – see section 2.3) and enters into the Stop Advisory Zone (Level 8):

a) the PDS should warn the operator of the presence of other machines or people via a Vehicle to Vehicle / Person Stop advisory (Level 8);

b) The Vehicle to Vehicle / Person Stop advisory should be unambiguously recognisable by the operator as an advisory to stop the machine, and could be provided by one or more of:



c) The Vehicle to Vehicle / Person Stop advisory should accommodate the various types of mobile equipment and interaction scenarios required by the CMS Strategy and meet the performance requirements defined in section 5.

In-scope

6.4.5 Slow Down Intervention Zone


1 When the PDS logic detects a potentially hazardous equipment-to-equipment or equipment-to-person interaction (as specified in the CMS Strategy – see section 2.3) and enters into the Slow Down Intervention Zone (Level 9):

a) The PDS should automatically send a signal using the OEM-PDS interface to slow down the base machine via a Vehicle to Vehicle / Person Slow Down Intervention.

b) The base machine should respond by:

• Applying retarder or brakes to slow down the machine (in response to a slow down intervention), or

c) The Vehicle to Vehicle / Person Slow Down intervention should accommodate the various types of mobile equipment and interaction scenarios required by the CMS Strategy and meet the performance requirements defined in section 5.

d) PDS should activate the slow down output signal as soon as a vehicle enters the Slow Down or Stop intervention zone, and keep the output activated for as long as any vehicle is within that field.

e) The PDS Slow Down zone size should be determined by the braking characteristics of the base machine specified by the OEM.

f) The PDS supplier should ensure that the fields are setup correctly in conjunction with the OEM.

g) The PDS Machine Slow Down zone and corresponding output signals should not be affected by the number of vehicles around a machine. The system should be able to identify every vehicle individually and react on the most critical condition.

h) The system should function as normal in day and night conditions

In-scope


of 72

6.4.6 Stop Intervention Zone


1 When the PDS logic detects a potentially hazardous equipment-to-equipment or equipment-to-person interaction (as specified in the CMS Strategy – see section 2.3) and enters into the Stop Intervention Zone (Level 9):

a) The PDS should automatically send a signal via the OEM-PDS interface to stop the base machine via a Vehicle to Vehicle / Person Stop Intervention.

b) The base machine should respond by:

• Slowing down the machine to a safe speed where brakes may be applied;

• Applying brakes to bring the machine to a stop (in response to a stop intervention)

c) The Vehicle to Vehicle / Person Stop intervention should accommodate the various types of mobile equipment and interaction scenarios required by the CMS Strategy and meet the performance requirements defined in section 5.

d) PDS should activate the stop output signal as soon as a vehicle enters the Stop intervention zone, and keep the output activated for as long as any vehicle is within that field.

e) The PDS Stop zone size should be determined by the braking characteristics of the base machine specified by the OEM.

f) The PDS supplier should ensure that the fields are setup correctly in conjunction with the OEM.

g) The PDS Machine Stop zone and corresponding output signals should not be affected by the number of vehicles or people around a machine. The system should be able to identify every vehicle or person individually and react on the most critical condition.

h) The system should function as normal in day and night conditions

In-scope


of 72

6.4.7 Speed Management Zone


1 When the PDS logic detects a potentially hazardous over-speed condition that may result in loss of control of the machine:

a) The PDS should warn the operator by means of an Alert / Alarm (Level 7) or Advisory (Level 8) consisting of one or more of:

• Visual notification,


• Voice notification (to reduce speed)

b) The PDS could send an automatic slow down intervention signal via the OEM-PDS interface to the base machine.

c) The base machine could respond by:

Applying retarder or brakes to slow down the machine (in response to the slow down signal),

In-scope

6.4.8 Fields for articulated equipment

The shape and configuration of the outer field should address all articulation angles of mobile equipment.

6.4.9 Fields for towed equipment

The shape and configuration of the outer field should account for machines or equipment being towed.



1 Remote Object: Object Identification

The identify of personnel and equipment in proximity of the machine should be accurately and uniquely identified by factory-defined permanent ID

2 Remote Object: Filter

What information is used to predict that a hazardous interaction will occur when in close proximity with a person or another machine?

3 Remote Object: Tracking

What is the measure used to establish that a person or another machine in close proximity has entered or is about to enter a define zone around the machine?

4 Remote Object: Selectivity

What criteria are used to exclude persons or machines from the decision logic to reduce false positive Alarm/Alert/Stop signals

5 Performance: Inner Field Error

The absolute error of the measurement of distance between a reference point on the machine and the true position of the person or machine in close proximity

6 Performance: Outer Field Error

The absolute error of the measurement of distance between a reference point on the machine and the true position of the person or machine in the general area of the machine (e.g. if used as part of machine disable logic to establish whether a person is nearby or far away from the machine)

7 Dependency: Electrical Infrastructure

What level of immunity does the PDS have to radiated and direct electrical interference from electrical infrastructure measured according to EN 300 330-1 and 2

8 Dependency: Physical Infrastructure

What level of physical obstruction can the PDS tolerate in the path between the machine and any person or other machine in close proximity


of 72

6.5 MACHINE INTERFACE

For Collision Management Systems specifying a CMS solution with Intervention Control (Level 9) the J1939 interface defined in ISO 21815 Collision awareness and voidance – Part 2 - On-board communication interface (see section D.1.1 in Appendix D). This OEM-PDS interface should be implemented to allow the PDS to access slow down and stop functions on the base machine.

Figure 14: Interface between PDS and OEM machine

The type of connector is specified in ISO 21815-2.


of 72

APPENDIX A LAYERS OF PROTECTION

The relationship between Control Levels 1-9 (see Figure 2) and the terms used in MDG 2007 (see section D.2.3 in Appendix D) is depicted in Figure 15. Overall, these controls provide multiple layers of protection to prevent the unwanted event of a hazardous equipment interaction from occurring.

Figure 15: Layers of Protection

The activation of controls within these layers of protection can result in the following types of actions:

• Management Action – Mine management / engineering adjusting mine design, equipment design or configuration, placement of barriers, changing operating procedures, training of operators, fitness of operators for duty, supervision, monitoring & verification activities (Control Levels 1-6);

• Supervisor Action – Front line supervisors addressing potential issues observed in the work environment (Control Levels 4-6);

• Operator Action – Equipment operators identifying hazards in their work place (Control Levels 4-8);

• Machine Action – Automatic response of an engineered control to intervene in machine operation – e.g. slow down or stop (Control Levels 4,5,6,9).

Note: MDG 2007 defines the term Controlled Work Area (CWA). Work Area Controls (WAC) are the corresponding controls in place for safe operation


of 72

APPENDIX B TECHNOLOGY PROFILES

A technology profile is used to indicate the required capability of a CMS solution to implement the requirements outlined in this user guide.

Refer to the User Requirements Development Tool that accompanies this guide for a detailed description of the technology profile.

The following definitions are applicable to this section:

Category – An aspect of a CMS solution linked to user requirements – where each category contains five (5) possible capability levels that range from a minimum functionality to a foreseeable maximum functionality level, for example:

Classification – The collection of categories that describes the user requirements of the CMS solution

Response – An indication of the target capability level – set by the end user, or the actual (current or future) capability level – provided by the supplier, for a specific category in the classification using the following convention:

End User

(target)

Supplier/OEM

(current capability)

Supplier/OEM

(future capability)

Responsibility – An indication by the end user on the target response where the accountability lies for each category using the following color-coded convention:

(target)

PDS Responsibility

(target)

(PDS+OEM)

(target)

OEM Responsibility

Profile – A collection of responses to every category in the classification that representing either the target specifications of the CMS solution (comprised of electronic, software and hardware components), or the actual capability of a CMS solution offered to the end user.

Target Profile – A Profile completed by the end user indicating the target requirements of the CMS solution

Actual Profile – A Profile completed by the supplier indicating the current and future capability of the CMS solution

The CMS technology is defined using a profile comprised of the following elements:

a) Categories (column headings) – A specific aspect within the Proximity Classification (see Appendix A) that forms part of the User Requirements for the CMS technology

b) Category Groups (row headings) – Collections of similar categories

c) Response – A collection of five (5) possible choices representing the requirement level or capability of the CMS technology for each category (under each column heading)

The general arrangement of a technology profile is shown in Figure 16.


of 72

Figure 16: Technology Profile (pro forma)

The technology profile is used to compare user requirements with the capability of a specific CMS solution according to the classification described in section 3.

Generally, a site will require several target technology profiles to prepare the user requirements taking account of:

1) The types of mobile and stationary equipment;

2) The required level of control – typically up to level 7, 8 or 9 for each type of machine;

3) The requirement for portable devices, including the types of devices that personnel will need to carry or wear

Actual technology profiles should be completed by the PDS supplier and OEM for each type of equipment.

The responses of the PDS supplier and OEM to each category in each technology profile should be verified by the end user.


of 72

B.1 TARGET PROFILES

The target profiles of a Level 9, Level 8 and Level 7 CMS solutions are shown in Figure 17, Figure 18, and Figure 19.

Figure 17: Technology Profile – Primary Equipment (Level 9)

0 6 7 8 9 8+ 6 6 6 7+ 8+ 9 9

Control

PDS Joint PDS PDS PDS PDS Joint PDS PDS PDS

Local Object

PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS

6 6 -7 6

Remote

Object

PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS

-8 -8 -8 -8 7+ -8 -8 -8

System

PDS OEM PDS Joint Joint Joint OEM Joint

-7 -7 8+ -9

Dependency

Joint Joint Joint PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS

0 0 -7 -8

Radio

Radio #1

Radio #2

Radio #3

Radio #4

0 -7 8+ 0 -7 0 -7

Performance

PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS 3rd 3rd

6 -9 -8 -9 -8 -8

Maturity

PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS

Analytics

PDS PDS PDS PDS

Support

PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS

0 0

Ratings

PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS Joint

6+ 6+

6+ 6+ 6+ 6+ 7+ -9 -8-7 6+ -9

6+ 6+ 6+6+6+ 6+ 6+ 6+ 6+ 6+

6+

Safety Integrity

Outer Field

RangeHeading

Z Offset

Range

Closing

Speed

9 9 -9 6 7+

Operator

Identification

6+

Machine

IntegrationOEM Interface PDS Interface

Interface

Topology

System

Control

LocalisationInner Field

Range

6+

Power QualityElectrical

Infrastructure

Physical

Infrastructure

RF

Transmission

7+

6+

Direction Speed Zone Control Perception

6+6+6+

Position

Power Source

-8 -9

-9

6+ 6+ -7 8+ 6+ 6+ -7 8+ 9 8+ 8+ 7+ 7+ 7+

6+-9

Visibility Level

Radio

FrequencyRadio Link Radio Path RF Modulation

Ambient

Lighting

Ambient

Noise

Filter TrackingObject

Identification

Machine

Interlocks

Machine

Response

Time

Machine

Separation

9 9 9

-9 -7 -8

Power

Availability

-8 -9 -9 -9 -9

GNSS &

Augmentation

Link Integrity

Position

Accuracy

Speed

Accuracy

Inner Field

Error

Outer Field

ErrorZ Offset Error

Nuisance

Alarms

Response

Time

Missed

AlarmsLate Alarms

RF PowerRF Path

RangeRF Data Rate

RF Data

Latency

Co-Channel

RFI

Cross-

Channel RFI

Positioning &

Augmentation

System

VerificationMTTR

Sensor

Cabling

Interface

Cabling

Data TransferData

Processing

Data

Reporting

Diagnostic

Tools

Video

Coverage

Video

Capability

Video

Sensitivity

MTBFAvailability

ImpactMTTI

Equipment in

Service

Accumulated

Service

Sensor

Calibration

Sensor

Verification

-9

6+ 6+ 6+ 6+

6+

SparesService

Support

Technical

Support

Installation

Support

Configuration

Strategy

Upgrade

Strategy

Repair

Strategy

Training

Support

Sensor

Fusion

6+ 6+ 6+ 6+ 6+ 6+ 6+ 6+

Shock Temperature VibrationPower

ConsumptionAltitude Depth

Exterior

Ingress

Interior

Ingress

Hazardous

AreasHumidity

6+6

Human

InteractionEase of Use

7+6

Display

Integration

7+ 7+ 7+ 7+

7+

-9

7+ 7+ 7+ 8+ 7+ 7+ 7+

Selectivity

7+ 8+

-9-8

-8

Audio

OverloadingControl Scope

Installation

ScopeInteroperation

Audio

Notification

Visual

Notification

Voice

Notification

6+

OEM

PDS

Joint

Responsibility


of 72

Figure 18: Technology Profile – Primary Equipment (Level 8)

0 6 7 8 9 8+ 6 6 6 7+ 8+ 9 9

Control

OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM

Local Object

OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM

6 6 -7 6

Remote

Object

OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM

-8 -8 -8 -8 7+ -8 -8 -8

System

OTM OEM OTM Joint OTM Joint OTM OEM Joint

-7 -7 8+ -9

Dependency

Joint Joint OEM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM

0 0 -7 -8

Radio

Radio #1 OTM OTM OTM




0 -7 8+ 0 -7 0 -7

Performance

OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM

6 -9 -8 -9 -8 -8

Maturity

OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM Joint

Analytics

OTM OTM OTM OTM

Support

OTM OTM OTM Joint OTM OTM OTM OTM

0 0

Ratings

OTMOTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM

6+ 6+ 6+6+6+ 6+ 6+ 6+ 6+ 6+

6+ 6+

6+ 6+ 6+ 6+ 7+ -9 -8-7 6+ -9

6+

Safety Integrity

Outer Field

RangeHeading

Z Offset

Range

Closing

Speed

9 9 -9 6 7+

Operator

Identification

6+

Machine


Interface

Topology

System

Control


Range

6+


Infrastructure

Physical

Infrastructure

RF

Transmission

7+

6+


6+6+6+

Position

Power Source

-8 -9

-9

6+ 6+ -7 8+ 6+ 6+ -7 8+ 9 8+ 8+ 7+ 7+ 7+

6+-9

Visibility Level

Radio


Ambient

Lighting

Ambient

Noise


Identification

Machine

Interlocks

Machine

Response

Time

Machine

Separation

9 9 9

-9 -7 -8

Power

Availability

-8 -9 -9 -9 -9

GNSS &

Augmentation

Link Integrity

Position

Accuracy

Speed

Accuracy

Inner Field

Error

Outer Field

ErrorZ Offset Error

Nuisance

Alarms

Response

Time

Missed

AlarmsLate Alarms

RF PowerRF Path

RangeRF Data Rate

RF Data

Latency

Co-Channel

RFI

Cross-

Channel RFI

Positioning &

Augmentation

System

VerificationMTTR

Sensor

Cabling

Interface

Cabling

Data TransferData

Processing

Data

Reporting

Diagnostic

Tools

Video

Coverage

Video

Capability

Video

Sensitivity

MTBFAvailability

ImpactMTTI

Equipment in

Service

Accumulated

Service

Sensor

Calibration

Sensor

Verification

-9

6+ 6+ 6+ 6+

6+

SparesService

Support

Technical

Support

Installation

Support

Configuration

Strategy

Upgrade

Strategy

Repair

Strategy

Training

Support

Sensor

Fusion

6+ 6+ 6+ 6+ 6+ 6+ 6+ 6+



Exterior

Ingress

Interior

Ingress

Hazardous

AreasHumidity

-8

Audio


Installation

ScopeInteroperation

Audio

Notification

Visual

Notification

Voice

Notification

6+ 6+6

Human


7+6

Display

Integration

7+ 7+ 7+ 7+

7+

-9

7+ 7+ 7+ 8+ 7+ 7+ 7+

Selectivity

7+ 8+

-9-8

OEM

PDS

Joint

Responsibility


of 72

Figure 19: Technology Profile (Level 7)

0 6 7 8 9 8+ 6 6 6 7+ 8+ 9 9

Control


Local Object

PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS

6 6 -7 6

Remote

Object


-8 -8 -8 -8 7+ -8 -8 -8

System

PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS Joint PDS PDS

-7 -7 8+ -9

Dependency

Joint Joint Joint PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS

0 0 -7 -8

Radio

Radio #1:V2X PDS PDS PDS

Radio #2:WiFi PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS

Radio #3 PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS

Radio #4 PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS

0 -7 8+ 0 -7 0 -7

Performance

PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS

6 -9 -8 -9 -8 -8

Maturity


Analytics

PDS PDS PDS PDS

Support

PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS

0 0

Ratings

PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS PDS Joint

7+

-9

7+ 7+ 7+ 8+ 7+ 7+ 7+

Selectivity

7+ 8+

-9-8

-8

Audio


Installation

ScopeInteroperation

Audio

Notification

Visual

Notification

Voice

Notification

6+ 6+6

Human


7+6

Display

Integration

7+ 7+ 7+ 7+



Exterior

Ingress

Interior

Ingress

Hazardous

AreasHumidity

SparesService

Support

Technical

Support

Installation

Support

Configuration

Strategy

Upgrade

Strategy

Repair

Strategy

Training

Support

Sensor

Fusion

6+ 6+ 6+ 6+ 6+ 6+ 6+ 6+

System

VerificationMTTR

Sensor

Cabling

Interface

Cabling

Data TransferData

Processing

Data

Reporting

Diagnostic

Tools

Video

Coverage

Video

Capability

Video

Sensitivity

MTBFAvailability

ImpactMTTI

Equipment in

Service

Accumulated

Service

Sensor

Calibration

Sensor

Verification

-9

6+ 6+ 6+ 6+

6+

Power

Availability

-8 -9 -9 -9 -9

GNSS &

Augmentation

Link Integrity

Position

Accuracy

Speed

Accuracy

Inner Field

Error

Outer Field

ErrorZ Offset Error

Nuisance

Alarms

Response

Time

Missed

AlarmsLate Alarms

RF PowerRF Path

RangeRF Data Rate

RF Data

Latency

Co-Channel

RFI

Cross-

Channel RFI

Positioning &

Augmentation

Ambient

Lighting

Ambient

Noise


Identification

Machine

Interlocks

Machine

Response

Time

Machine

Separation

9 9 9

-9 -7 -8 -8 -9

-9

6+ 6+ -7 8+ 6+ 6+ -7 8+ 9 8+ 8+ 7+ 7+ 7+

6+-9

Visibility Level

Radio


6+

Machine


Interface

Topology

System

Control


Range

6+


Infrastructure

Physical

Infrastructure

RF

Transmission

7+

6+


6+6+6+

Position

Power Source

6+

Safety Integrity

Outer Field

RangeHeading

Z Offset

Range

Closing

Speed

9 9 -9 6 7+

Operator

Identification

6+ 6+ 6+6+6+ 6+ 6+ 6+ 6+ 6+

6+ 6+

6+ 6+ 6+ 6+ 7+ -9 -8-7 6+ -9

OEM

PDS

Joint

Responsibility


of 72

APPENDIX C TEST CASES

The Test Configurations and Test Setups in the following sections should be used to evaluate the functionality and performance of the CMS solution. Note that the CMS solution should be tested as a complete system and not just as a PDS or an OEM solution independently.

These tests should be conducted to assess the capability of the CMS solution to fulfil all required functions with an adequate performance level. The tests outlined in this section are designed to exercise all major functions in the CMS solution but are not guaranteed to cover all requirements defined elsewhere in this document or specified by relevant standards, regulations and codes of practice.

C.1 SCENARIO CROSS-REFERENCE

The following table is a cross-reference between the interaction scenarios defined in Figure 11 and the test configurations defined in the following sections.

Table 13: Cross-reference between scenarios and test configurations

P1-P

ers

on (

direct)

P3-P

ers

on (

indirect)

P4-A

ccess &

Egre

ss

L1-H

ead-o

n

L2-R

evers

e-o

n

L3-B

ackup

L4-D

oveta

ilin

g

L5-P

assin

g H

ead

-on

L6-P

assin

g R

evers

e-o

n

L7-O

vert

akin

g

L8-B

lind A

ppro

ach

C1-C

urv

ing H

ead

-on

C2-C

urv

ing D

oveta

il

C3-C

urv

ing R

evers

e-o

n

T1-M

erg

e

T2-C

rossover

T3-J

unctio

n

T4-I

nte

rsectio

n

R1-S

win

g

R2-D

rop

O1-O

bsta

cle

V1-V

oid

V4-L

oss o

f C

ontr

ol

V6-C

ongeste

d A

rea

Test Configuration Scenario

sTC0 No Go Area X X X X X X X X X X

sTC1 Crossing (90⁰) - X X

sTC2 Crossing (45⁰/135⁰) - X X

sTC3 Head-Head (Straight) - X X X X X X X X X X

sTC4 Head-Tail (Straight) - X X X X X X X

sTC5 Head-Tail (Curved) - X X X X X

sTC6 Passing (Straight) - X X X X

sTC7 Passing (Curved) - X X X X X

sTC8 Take-off (Object) - X X X X X X

sTC9 Take-off (Person) X X X X

sTC10 Approach (Person) X X - X

These test configurations are designed to exercise the basic interaction elements for each scenario and reduce the amount of testing required to a manageable set.


of 72

C.2 TEST CONFIGURATIONS

The generic test configurations are outlined in the following sections. Each configuration may be refined during the testing program. Values are indicative only.

Note: tables will be completed before draft is finalized.

C.2.1 sTC0 – No Go Area

To be tested on PDS capable of detecting equipment – void interactions.

Test Case

Test Variables Signal Onset – D [metres]*

𝑣𝐿𝑂

[km/h]

Remote Object~

Guard

Gmin

[m]

Level 7 Level 8 Level 9

Alert Alarm Slow Stop Slow Stop

0.1 0+

No-go Area

1 30

0.2 3 1 30

0.3 10 3 30

0.4 30 10 30

0.5 0+

Restricted Speed Area

1 30

0.6 3 1 30

0.7 10 3 30

0.8 30 10 30

0.9 0+

Restricted Function Area

1 30

0.10 3 1 30

0.11 10 3 30

0.12 30 10 30

C.2.2 sTC1 – Crossing (90°)

To be tested on PDS capable of detecting equipment – equipment interactions.

Test Case


𝑣𝐿𝑂 [km/h]

𝑣𝑅𝑂 [km/h]

|𝑣𝐿𝑂-𝑣𝑅𝑂| [km/h]

Guard G

min [m]



1.1 0+ 0 0+ 10 30

1.2 3 0 3 10

1.3 10 0 10 10

1.4 30 0 30 30

1.5 0 10 10 10

1.6 3 10 10 10

1.7 10 10 14 30

1.8 30 10 32 30

1.9 0 30 30 30

1.10 3 30 30 30

1.11 10 30 32 50

1.12 30 30 42 50

sTC0

sTC1


of 72

C.2.3 sTC2 – Crossing (45⁰/135⁰)

To be tested on PDS capable of detecting equipment – equipment interactions

Test Case


𝑣𝐿𝑂 [km/h]

𝑣𝑅𝑂 [km/h]

Guard G

min [m]



2.1 0+ 0 10 30

2.2 3 0 10

2.3 10 0 10

2.4 30 0 30

2.5 0+ 10 10

2.6 3 10 10

2.7 10 10 30

2.8 30 10 30

2.9 0+ 30 30

2.10 3 30 30

2.11 10 30 50

2.12 30 30 50

C.2.4 sTC3 – Head-Head (Straight)


Test Case


𝑣𝐿𝑂 [km/h]

𝑣𝑅𝑂 [km/h]

𝑣𝐿𝑂-𝑣𝑅𝑂 [km/h]

Guard G

min [m]



3.1 0+ 0 0+ 10 30 10 - - - -

3.2 3 0 3 10

3.3 10 0 10 20

3.4 30 0 30 50

3.5 3 3 6 20

3.6 10 3 13 20

3.7 30 3 33 50

3.8 10 10 20 30

3.9 30 10 40 50

3.10 30 30 60 100

C.2.5 sTC4 – Head-Tail (Straight)


Test Case


𝑣𝐿𝑂 [km/h]

𝑣𝑅𝑂 [km/h]

𝑣𝐿𝑂-𝑣𝑅𝑂 [km/h]

LO Direction

Guard G

min [m]



4.1 0+ 0 0+ FWD 10 30 10 - - - -

4.2 3 0 3 FWD 10

4.3 10 0 10 FWD 20

4.4 30 0 30 FWD 30

4.5 3+ 3 0+ FWD 10

4.6 10 3 7 FWD 20

4.7 30 3 27 FWD 30

4.8 10+ 10 0+ FWD 20

4.9 30 10 20 FWD 50

4.10 30+ 30 0+ FWD 50

4.11 0+ 0 0+ REV 10

4.12 3 0 3 REV 10

4.13 10 0 10 REV 10

4.14 3+ 3 0+ REV 10

4.15 10 3 7 REV 10

4.16 10+ 10 0+ REV 10

sTC2

sTC3

sTC4


of 72

C.2.6 sTC5 – Head-Tail (Curved)


Test Case


𝑣𝐿𝑂

[km/h]

𝑣𝑅𝑂

[km/h]

𝑣𝐿𝑂-𝑣𝑅𝑂

[km/h]

Curvature

1/R [m-1

]



5.1 0+ 0 0 0 30 10 - - - -

5.2 3 0 3 0

5.3 10 0 10 0

5.4 30 0 30 0

5.5 3+ 3 0+ 0

5.6 10 3 7 0

5.7 30 3 27 0

5.8 10+ 10 0+ 0

5.9 30 10 20 0

5.10 30+ 30 0+ 0

C.2.7 sTC6 – Passing (Straight)


Test Case


𝑣𝐿𝑂

[km/h]

𝑣𝑅𝑂

[km/h]


[km/h]

Offset

X [m]



6.1 0+ 0 0 0 30 10 - - - -

6.2 3 0 3 0

6.3 10 0 10 0

6.4 30 0 30 0

6.5 3+ 3 0+ 0

6.6 10 3 7 0

6.7 30 3 27 0

6.8 10+ 10 0+ 0

6.9 30 10 20 0

6.10 30+ 30 0+ 0

C.2.8 sTC7 – Passing (Curved)


Test Case


𝑣𝐿𝑂

[km/h]

𝑣𝑅𝑂

[km/h]


[km/h]

Offset

X [m]

Curvature

1/R [m-1

]



7.1 0+ 0 0 0 30 10 - - - -

7.2 3 0 3 0

7.3 10 0 10 0

7.4 30 0 30 0

7.5 3+ 3 0+ 0

7.6 10 3 7 0

7.7 30 3 27 0

7.8 10+ 10 0+ 0

7.9 30 10 20 0

7.10 30+ 30 0+ 0

sTC5

sTC6

sTC7


of 72

C.2.9 sTC8 – Take-off (Object)

To be tested on PDS capable of detecting equipment – object interactions.

Test Case


LO Direction RO Position Level 7 Level 8 Level 9


8.1 0-FWD Front 30 20 - 15 - 10

8.2 0 Front 30 - - - - -

8.3 0-REV Front 30 - - - - -

8.4 0-FWD Left 30 - - - - -

8.5 0 Left 30 - - - - -

8.6 0-REV Left 30 - - - - -

8.7 0-FWD Right 30 - - - - -

8.8 0 Right 30 - - - - -

8.9 0-REV Right 30 - - - - -

8.10 0-FWD Rear 30 - - - - -

8.11 0 Rear 30 - - - - -

8.12 0-REV Rear 30 20 - 15 - 10

C.2.10 sTC9 – Take-off (Person)

To be tested on PDS capable of detecting equipment – personnel interactions.

Test Case


LO Direction

RO Position



9.1 0-FWD Front 30 20 - 15 - 10

9.2 0 Front 30 - - - - -

9.3 0-REV Front 30 - - - - -

9.4 0-FWD Left 30 - - - - -

9.5 0 Left 30 - - - - -

9.6 0-REV Left 30 - - - - -

9.7 0-FWD Right 30 - - - - -

9.8 0 Right 30 - - - - -

9.9 0-REV Right 30 - - - - -

9.10 0-FWD Rear 30 - - - - -

9.11 0 Rear 30 - - - - -

9.12 0-REV Rear 30 20 - 15 - 10

C.2.11 sTC10 – Approach (Person)

To be tested on PDS capable of detecting equipment – personnel interactions.

Test Case


𝑣𝐿𝑂

[km/h]

RO Direction

Guard

Gmin

[m]



10.1 0+ FWD 1 30 10 - - - -

10.2 3 FWD 1

10.3 10 FWD 3

10.4 30 FWD 10

10.5 0+ REV 1

10.6 3 REV 1

10.7 10 REV 3

10.8 30 REV 10

sTC8

sTC9

sTC10


of 72

C.3 TEST SETUPS

C.3.1 sTC0 – No Go Area

To be developed.

C.3.2 sTC1 – Crossing (90°)

The general arrangement for this test is shown in Figure 20.

Figure 20: Test Setup for sTC1

Test Procedure:

1) Move Remote Object (RO) to first position (0 metres)

2) Initiate test sequence with Local Object (LO) at Y=+50 metres and at test speed (3 km/h)

3) LO moves towards/through intersection and stops on Alert signal

4) Position of LO recorded in Table 14 (use spreadsheet, select table with correct LO Speed)

5) Repeat steps 3-4 for activation of Alarm/Stop8/Stop9 signals

6) LO moves through intersection repeating steps 3-5 for deactivation of signals (as LO moves away from RO)

7) Repeat steps 1-6 two more times to establish variability (only for LO Speed = 3 km/h)

8) Repeat steps 1-7 for other RO positions (X = 5, 10, 15 metres)

9) Repeat steps 1-8 for LO at higher speeds (10 km/h, 30 km/h)

Test Parameters:

Local Object: <insert make, model, asset number>

Remote Object: <insert make, model, asset number>

Road Conditions: <dry gravel, dry soil, wet, ice>

Road Grade: <-10% to +10%>

Date: dd-mmm-yyyy

Time: hh:mm:ss


of 72

Table 14: sTC1 Results Table


of 72

C.3.3 sTC2 – Crossing (45⁰/135⁰)

To be developed.

C.3.4 sTC3 – Head-Head (Straight)

To be developed.

C.3.5 sTC4 – Head-Tail (Straight)


Figure 21: Test setup for sTC4

Test Procedure:

1) Position RO at safe location on haul road (initially stationary)

2) Initiate test sequence with LO at +150 metres and slowly close in on RO

3) Maintain relative position to RO on Alert signal

4) Measure distance between LO and RO and record in Table 15 (use correct RO speed)

5) Repeat steps 3-4 for activation of Alarm/Stop8/Stop9 signal

6) Repeat steps 3-5 for deactivation of each signal as LO pulls back from RO

7) Repeat steps 1-6 two more times to establish variability (RO speed 0 km/h only)

8) Repeat steps 1-7 for other RO speeds (3, 10, 30 km/h)

Test Parameters:





Road Curvature: <specify approx radius for 2nd series of tests - step 9>

Date: dd-mmm-yyyy

Time: hh:mm:ss


of 72



of 72

C.3.6 sTC5 – Head-Tail (Curved)

To be developed.

C.3.7 sTC6 – Passing (Straight)



Test Procedure:

1) Position RO at safe location on haul road with right side on centreline of road

2) Initiate test sequence with LO at +150 metres and slowly close in towards RO (approaching)

3) Measure relative position (Y) between LO and RO on Alert signal

4) Record distance between RO and LO in Table 16 (use spreadsheet)

5) Repeat steps 3-4 for deactivation of Alert signal as LO passes RO (receding)

6) Repeat steps 2-5 for activation & deactivation of Alarm/Stop8/Stop9 signal

7) Repeat steps 1-6 two more times to establish variability (RO speed = 3 km/h only)

8) Repeat steps 1-7 for other LO offsets from centreline of road (10, 20, 30 metres)

9) Repeat steps 1-8 for RO at higher speed (10 km/h, 30 km/h)

Test Parameters:





LO Speed: <specify constant speed for testing, e.g. 10 km/h>

Date: dd-mmm-yyyy

Time: hh:mm:ss


of 72



of 72

C.3.8 sTC7 – Passing (Curved)

To be developed.

C.3.9 sTC8 – Take-off (Object)



Test Procedure:

1) Position LO at safe location on roadway with forward gear selected (brakes applied)

2) Initiate test sequence with RO directly on centreline of LO (X=0)

3) More RO to +50 metres in front of LO or move or to next position in Table 17

4) Measure relative position (Y) between LO and RO on Alert signal

5) Repeat steps 2-4 for activation of Alarm/Stop8/Stop9 signal

6) Select park position on LO and repeat steps 2-5

7) Select reverse gear on LO and repeat steps 2-5

8) Repeat steps 1-7 for RO behind LO

9) Repeat steps 1-8 two more times to establish variability (RO offset = 0 metres only)

10) Repeat steps 1-8 for other RO offsets from centreline of LO (-20,-10,+10,+20 metres)

Test Parameters:





Date: dd-mmm-yyyy

Time: hh:mm:ss


of 72


C.3.10 sTC9 – Take-off (Person)

To be developed.


of 72

APPENDIX D LEGISLATION, CODES AND STANDARDS

The standards and regulations listed in this section are related to the design, supply, installation and maintenance of collision management systems. Always check for the latest version of the documents.

The applicable standards, regulations and guidelines should be reviewed as part of the pre-installation planning, implementation and operation of the collision management system components.

D.1 INTERNATIONAL

D.1.1 ISO

Item Reference Description Notes

1 ISO 9001

Quality Management Systems – Requirements

2 ISO 5006:2006 Earthmoving Machinery – Operators Field of View – Test Method and Performance Criteria

3 ISO 3450 Earth-moving machinery – Braking systems of rubber-tyred machines – Systems and performance requirements and test procedures

4 ISO 7919 Mechanical Vibration – Evaluation of machine vibration by measurements on rotating shafts

5 ISO 10816 Mechanical Vibration – Evaluation of machine vibration by measurements on non-rotating parts

6 ISO 12100 Safety of Machinery – Basic Concepts, General Principles

7 ISO 13766:2006 Earthmoving Machinery – Electromagnetic Compatibility

8 ISO 13849 Safety of Machinery – Safety-related Parts of Control Systems

9 ISO 14121 Safety of Machinery – Principles of Risk Assessment

10 ISO 16001:2008 Earthmoving Machinery – Hazard Detection Systems and Visual Aids – Performance Requirements and Tests

11 ISO/CD 19014 Earth-moving machinery – Functional Safety

12 ISO 21815 Collision awareness and avoidance (in preparation)

13 ISO 31000 Risk management

D.1.2 IEC


1 IEC 61508 Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems

2 IEC 62061 Safety of Machinery – Functional Safety of safety-related electrical, electronic and programmable electronic control systems


of 72

D.1.3 EN


1 EN 300 220-1 Electromagnetic compatibility and Radio spectrum Matters (ERM); Short Range Devices (SRD); Radio equipment to be used in the 25 MHz to 1 000 MHz frequency range with power levels ranging up to 500 mW; Part 1: Technical characteristics and test methods

2 EN 300 220-2 Electromagnetic compatibility and Radio spectrum Matters (ERM); Short Range Devices (SRD); Radio equipment to be used in the 25 MHz to 1 000 MHz frequency range with power levels ranging up to 500 mW; Part 2: Harmonized EN covering essential requirements under article 3.2 of the R&TTE Directive

3 EN 300 330-1 Electromagnetic compatibility and Radio spectrum Matters (ERM); Short Range Devices (SRD); Radio equipment in the frequency range 9 kHz to 25 MHz and inductive loop systems in the frequency range 9 kHz to 30 MHz – Part 1: Technical characteristics and test methods

4 EN 300 330-2 Electromagnetic compatibility and Radio spectrum Matters (ERM); Short Range Devices (SRD); Radio equipment in the frequency range 9 kHz to 25 MHz and inductive loop systems in the frequency range 9 kHz to 30 MHz; Part 2: Harmonized EN covering the essential requirements of article 3.2 of the R&TTE Directive

5 EN 301 489-1 Electromagnetic compatibility and Radio spectrum Matters (ERM); Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) standard for radio equipment and services; Part 1: Common technical requirements

6 EN 301 489-3 Electromagnetic compatibility and Radio spectrum Matters (ERM); Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) standard for radio equipment and services; Part 3: Specific conditions for Short-Range Devices (SRD) operating on frequencies between 9 kHz and 40 GHz

7 ERC 70-03 ERC Recommendation 70-03 Relating to the Use of Short Range Devices (SRD)

D.1.4 SAE


1 SAE J1455 Joint SAE Technology and Maintenance Council Recommended Environmental Practices for Electronic Equipment Design (Heavy Duty Trucks)

2 SAE J1113 Electromagnetic Compatibility Measurement Procedures and Limits for Vehicle Components (Except Aircraft) – 60 Hz to 18 GHz


of 72

D.2 AUSTRALIA

D.2.1 National


1 Australian Radio communications Act 1992

2 ACMA Radio communications (Low Interference Potential) Class Licence 2000

3 AS 1000 International System of Units (S.I.) and its applications

4 AS 1147 Electrical equipment for coal mines - Insulating materials – Materials for insulating power conducting components

5 AS/NZS 1972 Electrical Cables – Underground coal mines – Other than reeling and trailing

6 AS/NZS 2081 Electrical equipment for coal and shale mines – Electrical protection devices

7 AS/NZS 2290 Electrical equipment for coal mines – Introduction and maintenance

8 AS/NZS 2381 Electrical equipment for explosive gas atmospheres – Selection, installation and maintenance

9 AS 2958.1 Earth-moving machinery – Safety, Part 1: Wheeled machines – Brakes

10 AS/NZS 3000 Electrical Installations (Wiring Rules)

11 AS 3007 Electrical installations – Surface mines and associated processing plants

12 AS/NZS 3008 Electrical installations – Selection of cables

13 AS/NZS 3800 Electrical equipment for explosive atmospheres – Repair and overhaul

14 AS/NZS 3835 Earth potential rise – Protection of telecommunications network users, personnel and plant

15 AS 4024.1 Safety of Machinery (Set of Standards)

16 AS 4240:2009 Remote Control Systems for Mining Equipment

17 AS 4360:2004 Risk Management

18 AS 4871 Electrical equipment for mines and quarries

19 AS/NZS 5070 Siting and operation of radio communications facilities

20 AS/NZS 9001 Quality management systems – Requirements

21 AS 18000 Information Technology – Radio frequency identification for item management

22 AS/NZS 24702 Telecommunications installations – Generic cabling – Industrial premises

23 AS 60204.1 Safety of machinery – Electrical equipment of machines Part 1: General requirements

24 AS 60529 Classification of degree of protection for enclosures of electrical equipment

25 AS/NZS 61000 Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC)

26 AS 61508 Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems

27 AS 62061 Safety of Machinery – Functional safety of safety-related electrical, electronic and programmable electronic control systems

28 AS 2670.1 Evaluation of human exposure to whole-body vibration – Part 1: General requirements

29 ARPANSA rps3 Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency - Radiation Protection Series No.3 - Maximum Exposure Levels to Radiofrequency Fields — 3 kHz to 300 GHz, published 20 March 2002


of 72

D.2.2 Queensland


1 The Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999, the Coal Mining Safety and Health Regulation 2001 and any other regulations and statutory instruments issued under that Act;

2 Recognised Standard 01, Underground Electrical Equipment and Electrical Installations, Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999;

3 Queensland Electrical Safety Act 2002

4 Queensland Electrical Safety Regulation 2002

D.2.3 New South Wales


1 The Work Health and Safety Act 2011

2 The Work Health and Safety Regulation 2011

3 The Coal Mine Health and Safety Act 2002 (The CMHS Act 2002)

4 The Coal Mine Health and Safety Regulation 2006

5 Minerals Industry Safety Handbook – July 2002

6 Mine Safety Management Plan Workbook

7 MDG 15 Guideline for Mobile and Transportable Equipment in Mines

8 MDG 1009 Managing road and vehicle operating areas in underground coal mines (draft)

9 MDG 1010 Risk Management Handbook for the Mining Industry, NSW Primary Industries – Minerals and Petroleum

10 MDG 1014 Guideline to reviewing a Risk Assessment of Mine Equipment and Operations, NSW Primary Industries – Minerals and Petroleum

11 MDG 2007 Guideline for the selection and implementation of collision management systems for mining

12 MDG 5001 Guidelines For The Design Of Remote Control Systems For Mining Equipment

13 MDG 5002 Guideline For The Use Of Remote Controlled Mining Equipment

14 MDG 5004 A Study of the Risky Positioning Behaviour of Operators of Remote Control Mining Equipment, NSW Primary Industries – Minerals and Petroleum


of 72

D.3 SOUTH AFRICA

No Reference Description Notes

1 MHSA Act Mine Health and Safety Act, 1996 (Act No. 29 of 1996)

2 TMM Regulation GOVERNMENT GAZETTE NO: 38493 - NOTICE NO: 125 - TMM Regulations – Issued 27th Feb 2015

3 TMM COP Guideline Trackless Mobile Machinery.pdf - Mine Health ...

4 G-30753 Notice 215 of 2008 Government Gazette no. 30753, 7 February 2008. Notice of intention to make regulations in respect of technical standards for electronic communications equipment.

5 G-31264 Notice 890 of 2008, Government Gazette no. 31264, 22 July 2008. Draft South African table of frequency allocations (SAFTA)

6 G-26584 Notice 1442 of 2004, Government Gazette no. 26584, 15th July 2004. South African table of frequency allocations (SAFTA)

7 G-30955 Notice 432 of 2008, Government Gazette no. 30955, 7th April 2008. Columns A, B and C of the table are applicable.

8 SANS 61000-4-2

(IEC 61000-4-2)

Electrostatic immunity test 15 kV air discharge & 8kV contact discharge (Criterion B – self recovery)

9 SANS 61000-4-3

(IEC 61000-4-3)

Radiated radio-frequency electromagnetic field immunity test. 80 MHz - 6 GHz 10 V/m (Criterion A – full functionality)

10 SANS 61000-4-4

(IEC 61000-4-4)

Electrical fast transient/burst immunity test: 4 kV on the power supply port and on the control lines connected to mains power and 2 kV on/off, signal and data ports. (Criterion B – self recovery)

11 SANS 61000-4-5

(IEC 61000-4-5)

Surge immunity test (applicable where mains powering is used) Line to line 2 kV and line to earth 4 kV (Criterion B self- recovery).

12 SANS 61000-4-6

(IEC 61000-4-6)

Immunity to conducted disturbances, induced by radio-frequency fields 150 kHz - 80 MHz 10V (Criterion A – full functionality).

13 SANS 61000-4-8

(IEC 61000-4-8)

(IEC 61000-4-8) Power frequency magnetic field immunity test.

14 SANS 61000-4-9

(IEC 61000-4-9)

Pulsed magnetic field immunity test 300 A/m (Criterion A – full functionality)

15 SANS 61000-4-11

(IEC 61000-4-11)

Voltage dips, short interruptions and voltage variations immunity tests (Applicable where power is mains derived):

a) Voltage dips: 30% voltage reduction during 10 ms

b) Voltage dips: 60% voltage reduction during 100 ms

c) Voltage reductions: >95% voltage reduction during 5000 ms. (Criterion B – self recovery).

16 SANS 211

(CISPR-11)

Industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) radio-frequency equipment - Electromagnetic disturbance characteristics - Limits and methods of measurement, excluding SANS 211 SANS 224 telecommunications equipment

Operating in the ISM bands mandated by ITU-R

http://www.acts.co.za/mine-health-and-safety-act-1996/index.html

http://www.mhsc.org.za/sites/default/files/Guideline%20Trackless%20Mobile%20Machinery.pdf

http://www.mhsc.org.za/sites/default/files/Guideline%20Trackless%20Mobile%20Machinery.pdf


of 72

17 SANS 215

(CISPR-15)

Limits and methods of measurement of radio disturbance characteristics of electrical lighting and similar equipment

18 SANS 222

(CISPR 22)

Information technology equipment - Radio disturbance characteristics - Limits and methods of measurement

PR-5A User Requirements

Documents

Transcript of PR-5A User Requirements