POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION SOLUTIONS FOR FUTURE TRANSMISSION NETWORKS THE MIGRATE PROJECT 21st November, Tres Cantos

INDEX

1. PEIG: IMPACT ON PROTECTION ALGORITHMS

2. PRESENT PROTECTION SCHEMES IN TRANSITION AND HIGH PEIG PENETRATION SCENEARIOS

3. FUTURE PROTECTION SCHEMES: NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND APPROACHES IN PROTECTION

ALGORITHMS

1. PEIG: IMPACT ON PROTECTION ALGORITHMS

- Short circuit current contribution from Power Electronic

Interfaced Generation systems (PEIG) differs from classical

Synchronous Generation:

- The Short Circuit Current contribution is fixed by Power

Electronic Control Strategies and the type of converter.

- Grid Codes stablish the requirements to PEIG to be connected to

the Grid:

Protection of Future Power Systems. Challenges of the future! 3

Capability of PE-based

components to stay connected

in short periods after a

fault inception in the grid

Capability of

injection/comsume of reactive

power to reduce voltage dip

I2 INJECTION?

1. PEIG: IMPACT ON PROTECTION ALGORITHMS

Protection of Future Power Systems. Challenges of the future! 4

Source: CIRCE, MIGRATE D4.3 presentation

TYPE IV, PV, AND HVDC: Short Circuit

Current Contribution fully fixed by

Power Electronic control.

Source: “Negative sequence current injection by power electronics based generators and its impact on faulted phase selection algorithms of dist ance protection” presented in Western Protective Relay Conference October 2018, Spokane , US.

1. PEIG: IMPACT ON PROTECTION ALGORITHMS

Protection of Future Power Systems. Challenges of the future! 5

• Distance protection (21) is the most affected protection function in

transition and high pnetration scenarios of Type IV PV and HVDC

systems:

o Waveform currents are distorted during transition period and

differs from classical synchronous generator shortcircuit current

contribution.

o The control strategy of suppression of Negative Sequence Current

Injection (I2) makes that PEIG fed any type of fault in a balanced

way in the short circuit steady state.

o Consequences:

- Negative Impact on Direcionality Algorithms

- Negative impact on Faulty Phase Selection Algorithms :

- Superimposed currents.

- Angle between I2/I0

- Impedance phase loops.

- Negative impact on Impedance Phasor Estimation after fault

inception.

o Better performance expected with Negative Sequence Current

Injection (I2)

1. PEIG: IMPACT ON PROTECTION ALGORITHMS

Protection of Future Power Systems. Challenges of the future! 6

Short circuit contribution affected by Power Electronic Control:

o Great influence of Crowbar Control Strategy : (Example of Phase to

Phase Fault)

o Consequences on Distance Protection Funtion (21):

- Negative Impact on Fault Detection

- Negative Impact on Directionality

- Negative impact on Impedance Phasor Estimation.

2. PRESENT PROTECTION SCHEMES IN TRANSITION AND HIGH PENETRATION SCENEARIOS

Protection of Future Power Systems. Challenges of the future! 7

o SUMMARIZING THE PROBLEMS…..

DISTANCE PROTECTION IS THE MOST AFFECTED PROTECTION FUNCTIONS IN TRANSITION

AND HIGH PEIG PENETRATION SCENARIO.

FREQUENCY ISSUES RUNNING LOW INERTIA SYSTEMS ARE ALSO EXPECTED

PROBLEMS EXPECTED WITH DIRECTIONALITY DECLARATION AS PHASOR FREQUENCY DIFFERENCE OF

POLARIZING MEMORY VOLTAGE AND CURRENT PHASORS CAN LEAD WRONG DIRECTIONALITY DECLARATION

o SCENARIOS:

STRONG

SYNCHRONO

US BASED

GENERATIO

N GRID

FULL CONVERTER

DFIG

PV SYSTEM

FULL CONVERTER

DFIG

PV SYSTEM

WEAK

SYNCHRON

OUS BASE

GENERATI

ON GRID

FULL CONVERTER

PV SYSTEM

DFIG

TRANSITION SCENARIO HIGH PEIG PENETRATION SCENARIO

MIX

2. PRESENT PROTECTION SCHEMES IN TRANSITION AND HIGH PENETRATION SCENEARIOS

Protection of Future Power Systems. Challenges of the future! 8

STRONG

SYNCHRONO

US BASED

GENERATIO

N GRID

FULL CONVERTER

DFIG

PV SYSTEM

SYNCHRONOUS

GENERATION BASED NODE BB FAULT

LINE FAULT

PEIG BB FAULT

PROTECTION

SYSTEM

87L 21 67N

87L 21 67N

PRESENT PROTECTION SYSTEM SCHEMES :

OPTION 1 :

2x PROTECTION (PRIMARY

AND BACKUP)

2x OPTICAL FIBER

COMMUNICATION

21-TP SCHEEME

67N

87L 21 67N

OPTION 2:

2x PROTECTION (PRIMARY

AND BACKUP)

1x OPTICAL FIBER

COMMUNICATION

1X CARRIER WAVE

COMMUNICATION

FAULT PERFORMANCE OPTION 1 IN N-1 COMMENT OPTION 1 PERFORMANCE OPTION 2 IN N-1 COMMENT OPTION 2

LINE FAULT (N-1 = 1 x OPTICAL FIBER FAILLURE)

GOOD 87L EXPECTED TO WORK PROPERLY GOOD 21 – TP EXPECTED TO WORK PROPERLY IMPLEMETING WEAK

INFEED SCHEEME.

SGB NODE BB FAULT (N-1 = SGB NODE BBP FAILLURE)

GOOD PROTECTION SYSTEM OF FEEDERS CONNECTED TO SG GRID FAIL SYSTEM PROTECTION OF PEIG

Z2 PROTECTION SYSTEM OF SG GRIDS EXPECTED TO WORK PROPERLY

Z2/Z_REV PEIG DELAYED TRIPS OR MISSED TRIPS

GOOD PROTECTION SYSTEM OF FEEDERS CONNECTED TO SG GRID FAIL SYSTEM PROTECTION OF PEIG

Z2 FEEDERS SG GRIDS EXPECTED TO WORK PROPERLY

Z2/Z_REV PEIG DELAYED TRIPS OR MISSED TRIPS

PHASE PEIG BB FAULT (N-1 = PEIG NODE BBP FAILLURE )

GOOD Z2/Z_REV PROTECTION SYSTEM PEIG EXPECTED TO WORK PROPERLY

GOOD Z2/Z_REV PROTECTION SYSTEM PEIG EXPECTED TO WORK PROPERLY

TRANSITION SCENARIO

SGB NODE

PEIG NODE

TRANSITION SCENARIO PROTECTION SYSTEM PERFORMANCE:

2. PRESENT PROTECTION SCHEMES IN TRANSITION AND HIGH PENETRATION SCENEARIOS

Protection of Future Power Systems. Challenges of the future! 9

WEAK

SYNCHRONOUS

BASED

GENERATION

GRID

FULL CONVERTER

DFIG

PV SYSTEM

SGB NODE AND PEIG

BB FAULT

LINE FAULT

PEIG BB FAULT

PROTECTION

SYSTEM

87L 21 67N

87L 21 67N

PRESENT PROTECTION SYSTEM SCHEMES :

OPTION 1 :

2x PROTECTION (PRIMARY

AND BACKUP)

2x OPTICAL FIBER

COMMUNICATION

21-TP SCHEEME

67N

87L 21 67N OPTION 2:

2x PROTECTION

(PRIMARY AND BACKUP)

1x OPTICAL FIBER

COMMUNICATION

1X CARRIER WAVE

COMMUNICATION

FAULT PERFORMANCE OPTION 1 IN N-1 COMMENT OPTION 1 PERFORMANCE OPTION 2 IN N-1 COMMENT OPTION 2

PHASE LINE FAULT (N-1 = 1 x OPTICAL FIBER FAILLURE)

GOOD 87L EXPECTED TO WORK PROPERLY POTENTIAL FAIL 21 – TP COULD MALOPERATE , BOTH ENDS POTENTIAL WEAK INFEED AND

HIGH PEIG FEEDED

PHASE SG BB FAULT (N-1 = SGB NODE BBP FAILLURE)

POTENTIAL FAIL PROTECTION SYSTEM FEEDERS CONNECTED TO

PEIG + SGB NODE FAIL PEIG PROTECTION SYSTEM

PERFORMANCE DEPENDING ON GENERATION MIX OF SG AND PEIG Z2/Z_REV PEIG DELAYED TRIPS OR

MISSED TRIPS

POTENTIAL FAIL FEEDERS CONNECTED TO PEIG + SGB NODE

FAIL PEIG PROTECTION SYSTEM

PERFORMANCE DEPENDING ON GENERATION MIX OF SG AND PEIG Z2/Z_REV PEIG DELAYED TRIPS OR

MISSED TRIPS

PHASE PEIG BB FAULT (N-1 = PEIG NODE BBP FAILLURE )

POTENTIAL FAIL PROTECTION SYSTEM FEEDERS CONNECTED TO

PEIG + SGB NODE FAIL PEIG PROTECTION SYSTEM

PERFORMANCE DEPENDING ON GENERATION MIX OF SG AND PEIG Z2/Z_REV PEIG DELAYED TRIPS OR

MISSED TRIPS

POTENTIAL FAIL FEEDERS CONNECTED TO PEIG + SGB NODE

FAIL PEIG PROTECTION SYSTEM

PERFORMANCE DEPENDING ON GENERATION MIX OF SG AND PEIG Z2/Z_REV PEIG DELAYED TRIPS OR

MISSED TRIPS

HIGH PEIG PENETRATION SCENARIO

SGB AND PEIG

NODE PEIG NODE

FULL CONVERTER

DFIG

PV SYSTEM MIX

HIGH PEIG PENETRATION SCENARIO PROTECTION SYSTEM PERFORMANCE:

2. PRESENT PROTECTION SCHEMES IN TRANSITION AND HIGH PEIG PENETRATION SCENEARIOS

Protection of Future Power Systems. Challenges of the future! 10

• CONCLUSSIONS:

IN TRANSITION SCENARIO, PRESENT PROTECTION SCHEEMES ARE STILL RELIABLE:

PROBLEMS TO DETECT BUSBAR FAULTS IN N-1 FROM PEIG PROTECTION SYSTEMS, BUT DOES NOT

REPRESENT TRANSMISSION SYSTEM STABILITY RISKS.

IN HIGH PEIG PENETRATION SCENARIO, NEED FOR HIGHER LEVEL OF PROTECTION EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS:

PROBLEMS TO DETECT LINE FAULTS IN N-1

PROBLEMS TO DETECT BUSBAR FAULTS IN N-1, REPRESENTING TRANSMISSION SYSTEM STABILITY

RISKS FOR REMAINING SYNCHRONOUS GENERATION CONNECTED TO THE GRID RECOMMENDED 2 X 87B

FURTHER STUDIES MUST BE CARRIED OUT TO CHECK THE PERFORMANCE OF HIGH PEIG PENETRATION GRIDS:

NON HOMOGENEOUS GRID CODE IMPLEMENTATION ON PEIG I2 SHORT CIRCUIT CURRENTS LEVEL AND

IT’S IMPACT ON ALGORITHM ELEMENTS BASED ON I2

LOWER SHORTCIRCUIT CURRENTS EXPECTED IMPACT ON PROTECTION ALGORITHMS

OPTION 1 :

2x PROTECTION (PRIMARY AND BACKUP)

2x OPTICAL FIBER COMMUNICATION

3. FUTURE PROTECTION SCHEMES: NEW

TECHNOLOGIES AND APPROACHES IN PROTECTION

ALGORITHMS

Protection of Future Power Systems. Challenges of the future! 11

• ARE TRANSITION AND HIGH PEIG SCENARIOS REALISTIC?

• POWER ELECTRONICS INTRODUCES UNCERTAINTY IN PROTECTION ALGORITHMS

PERFORMANCE, SO THERE WILL BE A NEED OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND

APPROACHES TO PRESENT PROTECTION ALGORITHMS :

IMPROVEMENTS IN PHASOR BASED (FREQUENCY DOMAIN) ALGORITHMS IS IT POSSIBLE?

SUPPORT FROM DELTA QUANTITIES?

TRAVELLING WAVES ALGORITHM (TIME DOMAIN) STATE OF THE ART? PROBLEMS?

OTHER TECHNOLOGIES WAMS ? COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS? TIME SYNCHRONIZATION

AND TIME DISTRIBUTION BECAMES CRITICAL

Source: www.lainformacion.com

MIGRATE WP4. ROUNDTABLE 1: SHORT-CIRCUIT BEHAVIOR OF POWER ELECTRONICS BASED GENERATORS VS SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

M. Popov and J. Chavez

Madrid, November 20-21, 2019

ROUNDTABLE 1. DFIG SYSTEM

20th-21th November 2019, Madrid WP4: Dissemination event. Roundtable 1 13

DC

DC AC

AC

DFIG

Interconnection

Transformer

Filter Crowbar

DC Chopper

is

ir

+

-

GSC Control

RSC Control

ROUNDTABLE 1. DFIG CONTROLS

CROWBAR AND CHOPPER PROTECTION

– CHOPPER

+ Voltage limit

– CROWBAR

+ Current limit, Time action, Impedance.

CONVERTERS: GRID FOLLOWING CONTROL

– GSC CONTROL STRATEGIES

+ Positive

– DC voltage,

– Reactive power supply.

+ Negative

– 2 minimization

– RSC CONTROL STRATEGIES

+ Positive

– Reactive power support,

– MPPT.

+ Negative

– 2 minimization

20th-21th November 2019, Madrid WP4: Dissemination event. Roundtable 1 14

U(pu)

t(ms)

0 140-150140-250 450 2500-10000

HVDC-linkPE based unit

1500-3000

0-0.3

0.25-0.85

0.85-0.9

1

HVDCPE

DI/IN

DU/UN-10% 10%-50%

-100%

Reactive current static:k=(DI/IN)/(DU/UN)

Bus 10

Bus 11

DC

DC AC

AC

TR2H DFIG

[1] L. Xiu, “Coordinated control of DFIG’s Rotor and Grid Side Converters During Network Unbalance” IEEE Trans. Power Electronics, Vol 23, No 3, 2008.

ROUNDTABLE 1. DFIG CONTROL

20th-21th November 2019, Madrid WP4: Dissemination event. Roundtable 1 15

–POSITIVE FRAME:

+ GSC reference:

– 𝐼𝑔𝑑+∗ by DC voltage regulator

– 𝐼𝑔𝑞+∗ by Grid Code at PCC

+ RSC reference: – 𝐼𝑟𝑑

+∗ by the Grid Code at PCC

– 𝐼𝑟𝑞+∗ by optimal power reference calculation

–NEGATIEVE FRAME:

+ GSC reference: – Stator and GSC active power harmonics

components equals.

– 𝐼𝑔𝑑−∗ Zero active power pulsation (𝑃𝑔𝑐𝑜𝑠2= 𝑃𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑠2)

– 𝐼𝑔𝑑−∗ Zero active power pulsation (𝑃𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑛2= 𝑃𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑛2)

+ RSC reference: – Harmonics components of active power set to

zero

– 𝐼𝑟𝑑−∗ Torque oscillation minimization (𝑃𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑠2= 0)

– 𝐼𝑟𝑞−∗ Torque oscillation minimization(𝑃𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑛2 = 0)

ROUNDTABLE 1. SIGNALS DURING A FAULT

LN FAULT LL FAULT LLL FAULT

20th-21th November 2019, Madrid WP4: Dissemination event. Roundtable 1 16

CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR TYPE-4 WT AND PV SYSTEMS DURING SHORT CIRCUITS

CIRCE

Eduardo Martínez Carrasco et al.

emartinez@fcirce.es

November 20th – Madrid

MODELLING WT AND PV CONTROL SYSTEMS

18

CIRCE – MIGRATE WP4 workshop - November 20th 2019 - Madrid

FAULT APPEARS REACTIVE POWER

SUPPORT

ACTIVE AND REACTIVE POWER

CALCULATION

WHAT HAPPENS WITH NEGATIVE SEQUENCE CURRENT?

DC/AC

= =

Source: Power System Analysis. Grainger & Stevenson

𝑉𝑎(2)= 𝑍2 · 𝐼𝑎

(2)

MODELLING WT AND PV CONTROL SYSTEMS

19

CIRCE – MIGRATE WP4 workshop - November 20th 2019 - Madrid

EXTERNAL GRID

COMPARISON WITH SYNCHRONOUS GENERATION BASED ON SUPERIMPOSED QUANTITIES

20

CIRCE – MIGRATE WP4 workshop - November 20th 2019 - Madrid

SYNCHRONOUS GENERATOR TYPE 4 WIND TURBINE

Phase to phase

fault (AB)

Scalar Products: 𝑺𝑷𝑨𝑩,

𝑺𝑷𝑩𝑪, 𝑺𝑷𝑪𝑨

Phase to ground

fault (AG)

Scalar Products: 𝑺𝑷𝑨𝑩,

𝑺𝑷𝑩𝑪, 𝑺𝑷𝑪𝑨

SCALAR PRODUCT

DEFINITION

𝑆𝑃𝐴𝐵 = ∆𝑉𝐴𝐵 · ∆𝐼𝐴𝐵

DeltaA DeltaB DeltaC

t/s0,00 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,04 0,05 0,06 0,07 0,08 0,09 0,10 0,11

-600

-400

-200

0

Fault type ∆𝑻𝑨𝑩 ∆𝑻𝑩𝑪 ∆𝑻𝑪𝑨

𝑨𝑮 ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 NC1

𝑩𝑮 NC ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

𝑪𝑮 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴 NC ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

𝑨𝑩,𝑨𝑩𝑮 ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 NC

𝑩𝑪,𝑩𝑪𝑮 NC ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

𝑪𝑨,𝑪𝑨𝑮 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴 NC ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

1 NC: Not Considered

Fault type ∆𝑻𝑨𝑩 ∆𝑻𝑩𝑪 ∆𝑻𝑪𝑨

𝑨𝑮 ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 NC1

𝑩𝑮 NC ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

𝑪𝑮 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴 NC ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

𝑨𝑩,𝑨𝑩𝑮 ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 NC

𝑩𝑪,𝑩𝑪𝑮 NC ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

𝑪𝑨,𝑪𝑨𝑮 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴 NC ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

1 NC: Not Considered

Fault type ∆𝑻𝑨𝑩 ∆𝑻𝑩𝑪 ∆𝑻𝑪𝑨

𝑨𝑮 ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 NC1

𝑩𝑮 NC ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

𝑪𝑮 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴 NC ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

𝑨𝑩,𝑨𝑩𝑮 ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 NC

𝑩𝑪,𝑩𝑪𝑮 NC ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

𝑪𝑨,𝑪𝑨𝑮 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴 NC ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

1 NC: Not Considered

DeltaA DeltaB DeltaC

t/s0,00 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,04 0,05 0,06 0,07 0,08 0,09 0,10 0,11

-150

-100

-50

0

50

Fault type ∆𝑻𝑨𝑩 ∆𝑻𝑩𝑪 ∆𝑻𝑪𝑨

𝑨𝑮 ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 NC1

𝑩𝑮 NC ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

𝑪𝑮 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴 NC ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

𝑨𝑩,𝑨𝑩𝑮 ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 NC

𝑩𝑪,𝑩𝑪𝑮 NC ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

𝑪𝑨,𝑪𝑨𝑮 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴 NC ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

1 NC: Not Considered

Fault type ∆𝑻𝑨𝑩 ∆𝑻𝑩𝑪 ∆𝑻𝑪𝑨

𝑨𝑮 ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 NC1

𝑩𝑮 NC ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

𝑪𝑮 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴 NC ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

𝑨𝑩,𝑨𝑩𝑮 ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 NC

𝑩𝑪,𝑩𝑪𝑮 NC ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

𝑪𝑨,𝑪𝑨𝑮 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴 NC ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

1 NC: Not Considered

Fault type ∆𝑻𝑨𝑩 ∆𝑻𝑩𝑪 ∆𝑻𝑪𝑨

𝑨𝑮 ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 NC1

𝑩𝑮 NC ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

𝑪𝑮 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴 NC ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

𝑨𝑩,𝑨𝑩𝑮 ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 NC

𝑩𝑪,𝑩𝑪𝑮 NC ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

𝑪𝑨,𝑪𝑨𝑮 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴 NC ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

1 NC: Not Considered

DeltaA DeltaB DeltaC

t/s0,00 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,04 0,05 0,06 0,07 0,08 0,09 0,10 0,11

-2000

-1000

0

Fault type ∆𝑻𝑨𝑩 ∆𝑻𝑩𝑪 ∆𝑻𝑪𝑨

𝑨𝑮 ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 NC1

𝑩𝑮 NC ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

𝑪𝑮 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴 NC ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

𝑨𝑩,𝑨𝑩𝑮 ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 NC

𝑩𝑪,𝑩𝑪𝑮 NC ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

𝑪𝑨,𝑪𝑨𝑮 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴 NC ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

1 NC: Not Considered

Fault type ∆𝑻𝑨𝑩 ∆𝑻𝑩𝑪 ∆𝑻𝑪𝑨

𝑨𝑮 ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 NC1

𝑩𝑮 NC ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

𝑪𝑮 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴 NC ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

𝑨𝑩,𝑨𝑩𝑮 ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 NC

𝑩𝑪,𝑩𝑪𝑮 NC ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

𝑪𝑨,𝑪𝑨𝑮 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴 NC ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

1 NC: Not Considered

Fault type ∆𝑻𝑨𝑩 ∆𝑻𝑩𝑪 ∆𝑻𝑪𝑨

𝑨𝑮 ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 NC1

𝑩𝑮 NC ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

𝑪𝑮 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴 NC ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

𝑨𝑩,𝑨𝑩𝑮 ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 NC

𝑩𝑪,𝑩𝑪𝑮 NC ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

𝑪𝑨,𝑪𝑨𝑮 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴 NC ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

1 NC: Not Considered

DeltaA DeltaB DeltaC

t/s0,02 0,03 0,04 0,05 0,06 0,07 0,08 0,09 0,10 0,11 0,12

-300

-200

-100

0

100

200

Fault type ∆𝑻𝑨𝑩 ∆𝑻𝑩𝑪 ∆𝑻𝑪𝑨

𝑨𝑮 ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 NC1

𝑩𝑮 NC ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

𝑪𝑮 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴 NC ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

𝑨𝑩,𝑨𝑩𝑮 ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 NC

𝑩𝑪,𝑩𝑪𝑮 NC ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

𝑪𝑨,𝑪𝑨𝑮 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴 NC ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

1 NC: Not Considered

Fault type ∆𝑻𝑨𝑩 ∆𝑻𝑩𝑪 ∆𝑻𝑪𝑨

𝑨𝑮 ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 NC1

𝑩𝑮 NC ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

𝑪𝑮 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴 NC ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

𝑨𝑩,𝑨𝑩𝑮 ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 NC

𝑩𝑪,𝑩𝑪𝑮 NC ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

𝑪𝑨,𝑪𝑨𝑮 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴 NC ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

1 NC: Not Considered

Fault type ∆𝑻𝑨𝑩 ∆𝑻𝑩𝑪 ∆𝑻𝑪𝑨

𝑨𝑮 ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 NC1

𝑩𝑮 NC ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

𝑪𝑮 < 0.1 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴 NC ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

𝑨𝑩,𝑨𝑩𝑮 ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐴𝐵 NC

𝑩𝑪,𝑩𝑪𝑮 NC ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐵𝐶

𝑪𝑨,𝑪𝑨𝑮 > 0.25 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

< 0.75 · ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴 NC ∆𝑇𝐶𝐴

1 NC: Not Considered

𝑆𝑃𝐴𝐵 𝑆𝑃𝐵 𝑆𝑃 𝐴 𝑆𝑃𝐴𝐵 𝑆𝑃𝐵 𝑆𝑃 𝐴

𝑆𝑃𝐴𝐵 𝑆𝑃𝐵 𝑆𝑃 𝐴 𝑆𝑃𝐴𝐵 𝑆𝑃𝐵 𝑆𝑃 𝐴

MIGRATE WP4. ROUNDTABLE 2: IMPACT OF PE BASED GENERATORS IN PRESENT SHORT CIRCUIT PROTECTION SYSTEMS

M. Popov and J. Chavez

Madrid, November 20-21, 2019

ROUNDTABLE 2: SHORT CIRCUIT TRANSMISSION LINES

– Faults at Line 4-6, 5-7 and 5-4

– The Benchmark model developed reproduces potential problems for protections due to

high level of penetration of power electronics

+ Control systems of renewables acts over the fault current.

20th-21th November 2019, Madrid WP4: Dissemination event. Roundtable 2 22

TRM

ROUNDTABLE 2: HARDWARE

IN LOOP

20th-21th November 2019, Madrid WP4: Dissemination event. Roundtable 2 23

ROUNDTABLE 2: HIL TESTS

20th-21th November 2019, Madrid WP4: Dissemination event. Roundtable 2 24

ROUNDTABLE 2: IMPEDANCE

TRAJECTORY AND RMS CURRENT

20th-21th November 2019, Madrid WP4: Dissemination event. Roundtable 2 25

R/Ohm(secondary)

X/O

hm

(seco

ndary)

-2 -1 0 1 2

0.00

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50 Z1 Z2

Z L12

R/Ohm(secondary) -2 -1 0 1 2

X/O

hm

(seco

nd

ary)

0.00

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

Z

Z

2 Z L

12

R/Ohm(secondary) -2 -1 0 1 2

0.00 X

/Ohm

(seco

nd

ary)

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50 Z1 Z2

Z L12

LL FAULT at 70% TL 0Ω SG 40MW DFIG 40MW DFIG 200MW

EFFECTS OF TYPE-4 WT AND PV SYSTEMS ON DISTANCE PROTECTION BEHAVIOR

CIRCE

Samuel Borroy Vicente et al. (sborroy@fcirce.es)

November 20th – Madrid

TESTING AND ANALYSIS: METHODOLOGY AND TOOLS

27

CIRCE – MIGRATE WP4 workshop - November 20th 2019 - Madrid

Manuf. A

Manuf. B

Manuf. C

Manuf. D

Each test is automatically performed,

recorded and evaluated according to

the obtained tripping times

Detailed oscillography analysis

Benchmark network

Accurate PE models

Scenarios & case studies

Faults characteristics & locations

IEC-60255:121 Standard for distance protection automated in RTDS

Developed tools: RTDS scripts

Conclusions

RESULTS

Statistics of obtained results for scenario 100% renewable

28

CIRCE – MIGRATE WP4 workshop - November 20th 2019 - Madrid

Distance protection: results for scenario 100% renewable (fault contribution

from wind turbine type 4 / PV)

% of faults resulting in missed trip % of faults resulting in delayed trip or overreach

0,00%

5,00%

10,00%

15,00%

20,00%

SLG LL LLG LLL

Fabricante A

0,00%

5,00%

10,00%

15,00%

20,00%

SLG LL LLG LLL

Fabricante B

0,00%

5,00%

10,00%

15,00%

20,00%

SLG LL LLG LLL

Fabricante C

0,00%

5,00%

10,00%

15,00%

20,00%

SLG LL LLG LLL

Fabricante D

0,00%

5,00%

10,00%

15,00%

20,00%

SLG LL LLG LLL

Fabricante A

0,00%

5,00%

10,00%

15,00%

20,00%

SLG LL LLG LLL

Fabricante B

0,00%

5,00%

10,00%

15,00%

20,00%

SLG LL LLG LLL

Fabricante C

0,00%

5,00%

10,00%

15,00%

20,00%

SLG LL LLG LLL

Fabricante D

Manufacturer A: 53.33% Manufacturer B: 38.33%

Manufacturer C: 35.00% Manufacturer D: 38.33%

Manufacturer A: 20.00% Manufacturer B: 30.83%

Manufacturer C: 25.00% Manufacturer D: 31.67%

ANALYSYS AND CONCLUSIONS

Detailed analysis of distance protection behavior

29

CIRCE – MIGRATE WP4 workshop - November 20th 2019 - Madrid

Distance protection

performance for type 4 wind

turbine contribution. Line to line

fault (A-B fault)

+ and – seq. Transition Only seq. +

I

V

Z

Reverse directionality

Fault selection phase A

Fault selection phase B

Fault selection phase C

Fault selection ground

o Directionality declaration

o Faulted phase identification

o Impedance calculation

Main issues found:

IMPACT ON THE IMPEDANCE AND PHASE SELECTION November 2019

PRESENTATION

1. Power network model studied

2. Phase to ground fault

3. Phase to phase fault

4. Weak infeed

5. Conclusion

‒ Lines 5-7, 4-5 and 4-6 to be tested

32

1.- POWER NETWORK MODEL

NOV 2019

New common phase to ground fault:

Because of the connection of the PE through a power

transformer a single phase to ground fault creates faults on

all phases:

Example of a A phase to ground fault that leads to the

increase of the same 3 phase sinusoidal currents (as well as

in the neutral path).

33

2.- NEW COMMON FAULT SIGNATURES

NOV 2019

New phase to phase fault:

The PE controller impacts the

signature of the faulty current

Example of an AB fault seen as

AB until the PE control impacts

the current flow (8 to 10 ms

response time) and then is

wrongly seen as a AN fault if

currents are used.

34

3.- NEW FAULT SIGNATURES

NOV 2019

Weak infeeds:

For weak infeeds, the distance

protection impedance calculation

can be wrong (outside the

characteristic) in case of resistive

fault.

Example of a 1 Ω AB fault at 5% of

a 35km line from a 100MW power

plant.

35

4.- NEW FAULT SIGNATURES

NOV 2019

Conclusions:

New Algorithms are needed, either:

+ Improved algorithm based on current (and voltage)

+ New algorithm based on voltage

– Undervoltage faulty phase selection

The undervoltage faulty phase selection is based on the

measurement of the three phase voltages.

The algorithm replaces the existing faulty phase

selection based on currents for lines up to around 250 km.

Weak infeed protection needs to be run in parallel of the

distance protection for weak infeed lines.

36

5.- NEW FAULT DETECTION

NOV 2019

MIGRATE WP4. ROUNDTABLE 3:

NEW PROTECTION ENHANCEMENTS AND TECHNOLOGIES FOR A FUTURE SCENARIO WITH HIGH SHARES OF RENEWABLES

M. Popov and J. Chavez

Madrid, November 20-21, 2019

HYBRID RELAY BASED S-TRANSFORM

20th-21th November 2019, Madrid WP4: Dissemination event. Roundtable 3 38

CASE 1: DFIG-40MW, STRONG GRID.

FAULT: LL, 70%, 0Ω, 0°

20th-21th November 2019, Madrid WP4: Dissemination event. Roundtable 3 39

GSVSC1

GSVSC 2Sk=10 GW

X/R=3

Bus 13

Bus 1 Bus 2 Bus 3 Bus 4

Bus 5Bus 6

Bus 7 Bus 8

Bus 9

Bus 10

Bus 11

Bus 12

HVDC

DC

DC

DCAC

DC

DC AC

AC

DC

DC

ACAC

TR1H

TR3H

TR2H DFIG

PV

Load 1Load 2

FC

400 kV33 kV

14.5 kV13.8 kV0.69 kV0.48 kV

PERFORMANCE COMPARISON

Priority Variables

1 Number of lines 2 2 Scenarios 6 3 Generation Level 2 4 Point of the line 6 5 Type of fault 4 6 Fault Resistance 2 7 Repetition 3

TOTAL NUMBER OF CASES 3456

20th-21th November 2019, Madrid WP4: Dissemination event. Roundtable 3 40

0 fault 1 fault

RelayD SG

RelayD RW

RelayHybrid

RW

Error 0,00 34,09 0,00

Delay 4,55 25,00 2,27

Ok 95,45 50,00 97,73

0,0020,0040,0060,0080,00

100,00

%

RelaySG

RelayRW

HybridRW

Error 13,64 36,36 11,36

Delay 15,91 34,09 9,09

Ok 70,45 29,55 79,55

0,0020,0040,0060,0080,00

100,00

%

Presenter: Prof Vladimir Terzija

Research team: G. Liu, M. Sun, S. Azizi and V. Terzija

The University of Manchester

Madrid, 20-21 November 2019

Fast UFLS is vital in low inertia systems (extra decision variables)

Application of COI’s frequency to improving UFLS performance

Need of communication (latencies)

Motor loads not considered

An innovative technique for local estimation of COI’s ROCOF

UFLS with known system inertia (one-stage UFLS)

Generalized UFLS with unknown system inertia (two-stage UFLS)

PROPOSED COMMUNICATION-FREE UFLS FOR SYSTEMS WITH VOLATILE INERTIA

D D D2 COI

COI COI COI

d fH D f P

dt

UFLS RELAY MODELLING

43

Maximum available load to be shed in

the system

Maximum available load to be shed in

the system

One-stage UFLS used when system inertia is known

Two-stage UFLS used when system inertia is unknown

TRADE-OFF BETWEEN LOAD SHEDDING SIZE AND FREQUENCY NADIR

44

Proposed communication-free UFLS schemes can deliver higher nadir with less load shedding

Overshedding will be avoided at all cost (economic, frequency overshoot).

Due to fast event estimation, the scheme immediately sheds an appropriate amount of load:

Case 1 (β=0.83), same amount of load shed as conventional provides much higher nadir.

Case 2 (β=0.45), much less amount of load shed can deliver the same nadir.

Effective factor β=(load shedding amount) ÷ (estimated disturbance size)

PROPOSAL OF AN ENHANCED DISTANCE PROTECTION

CIRCE

Eduardo Martínez Carrasco et al.

emartinez@fcirce.es

November 21st – Madrid

INNOVATION

FOCUS IS ON FAULTED PHASE SELECTION. DESIGNING THE ALGORITHM

46

CIRCE – MIGRATE WP4 workshop - November 21s t 2019 - Madrid

ALGORITHM DEVELOPED BY CIRCE

Va, Vb, Vc

Ia, Ib, Ic

PHASOR ESTIMATION

I1, I2, I0

WAVEFORM

SAM

PLI

NG

FR

EQ

UE

NC

Y

CRITERION 3: MODIFIED

SUPERIMPOSED QUANTITIES

ADAPTIVE WINDOW

CRITERIA 1 (I1 vs I2) AND

CRITERIA 2 (I2 vs I0)

CRITERIACOMBINATION

FAULTED PHASE SELECTION

DIRECTIONALITY

Multicriteria algorithm

Adaptive window

S1) Bus7A S1) Bus7B S1) Bus7C

t/s0,000 0,025 0,050 0,075 0,100 0,125 0,150 0,175 0,200

U/kV

-400

-200

0

I5275A I5275B I5275C

t/s0,000 0,025 0,050 0,075 0,100 0,125 0,150 0,175 0,200

I/kA

-101

DeltaA_ini DeltaB_ini DeltaC_ini

t/s0,000 0,025 0,050 0,075 0,100 0,125 0,150 0,175 0,200

-200

-100

0

Criteria 1 and 2 are considered valid during this “adaptive window”

VALID CRITERIA APPLICATION

𝑆𝑃 𝐴𝑆𝑃𝐴𝐵 𝑆𝑃𝐵

METHODOLOGY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION

47

CIRCE – MIGRATE WP4 workshop - November 21s t 2019 - Madrid

INPUTS FROM P544 - Voltage and current waveforms

- Fast Fourier Transform - Positive, negative and zero

sequence currents

OUTPUTS TO P544 - Faulted phase selector loops

- Directionality - Adaptive window activation

PROGRAMMING THE COMPLETE ALGORITHM

IN C-LANGUAGE

CODING THE ALGORITHM IN P544 COMMERCIAL RELAY

FIRMWARE UPDATE SENT BACK TO

CIRCE

DESING, TESTING AND DEBUGGING

IN RTDS

DELIVERY TO

SCHNEIDER

DEBUG PROCESS

AND FINAL VERSION

CIRCE – MIGRATE WP4 workshop - November 21s t 2019 - Madrid

FIRMWARE UPDATE AND TESTING

Validation of the model with renewables based on MIGRATE tests

Validation with comercial

standard IEC: 60255-121 Functional tests for distance protection Application for a patent

to the European Patent Office of The Hague

VA VB VC

t/s-0,01 0,00 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,04 0,05 0,06 0,07 0,08 0,09 0,10

U/kV

-400

-200

0

200

IA IB IC

t/s-0,01 0,00 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,04 0,05 0,06 0,07 0,08 0,09 0,10

I/kA

-1,0

0,0

t/s-0,01 0,00 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,04 0,05 0,06 0,07 0,08 0,09 0,10

Fault ReverseFault Forward

Sel Window ValidPhase Select NPhase Select CPhase Select BPhase Select A

Zone2 CA ElementZone2 BC ElementZone2 AB ElementZone2 CN ElementZone2 BN ElementZone2 AN ElementZone1 CA ElementZone1 BC ElementZone1 AB ElementZone1 CN ElementZone1 BN ElementZone1 AN Element

Zone 2 N StartZone 2 C StartZone 2 B StartZone 2 A StartZone 1 N StartZone 1 C StartZone 1 B StartZone 1 A StartZone 2 N TripZone 2 C TripZone 2 B TripZone 2 A Trip

Zone 2 TripZone 1 N TripZone 1 C TripZone 1 B TripZone 1 A Trip

Zone 1 TripAny Trip

CIRCE – MIGRATE WP4 workshop - November 21s t 2019 - Madrid

FIRMWARE UPDATE AND TESTING

FINAL IMPLEMENTED FIRMWARE – Z5 VERSION

NEW DISTANCE ALGORITHMS November 2019

PRESENTATION

1. Power network model studied

2. Circe University algorithm

3. Undervoltage algorithm

‒ Lines 5-7, 4-5 and 4-6 to be tested

‒ Current signature is no longer reliable for phase selection

52

1.- POWER NETWORK MODEL

NOV 2019

Two directions have been studied.

1. An improved algorithm based on current (and voltage)

2. An algorithm based on voltage only

‒ The Circé algorithm:

‒ Fault detection based on an adaptive window applied to:

‒ Criterion 1. Positive vs Negative sequence currents

‒ Criterion 2. Negative vs zero sequence currents

‒ Plus:

‒ Criterion 3: Adaptation of superimposed quantities

theory

‒ Directionality

‒ It has been integrated into the distance protection in

MiCOM P54x and successfully tested (on line 5-7, 4-6 and

4-5 TBC)

53

2.- NEW ALGORITHMS

NOV 2019

Two directions have been studied.

1. An improved algorithm based on current (and voltage)

2. An algorithm based on voltage only

‒ The Schneider Electric algorithm:

‒ The U< algorithm faulty phase selection has replaced the

current based algorithm for lines up to around 250 km.

‒ The thresholds depend only on the line characteristic.

‒ It has been integrated into the distance protection in

MiCOM P54x

‒ It has been successfully tested on line 5-7, 4-6 and 4-5

with different lengths

54

3.- NEW ALGORITHMS

NOV 2019

Conclusions:

The distance protection algorithms based on conventional

generator faulty current signature can be updated with new

Algorithms.

Either:

+ Improved algorithm based on current (and voltage) or

+ Undervoltage faulty phase selection algorithm based on

voltage only

Note: Weak infeed protection needs to be run in parallel of

the distance protection for weak infeed lines.

55

4.- DISTANCE PROTECTION

NOV 2019

The information, documentation and figures in this presentation are written

by the MIGRATE project consortium under EC grant agreement No 691800

and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission.

The European Commission is not liable for any use that may be made of

the information contained herein.