Postclosure Nuclear Safety Design BasesPostclosure Nuclear Safety Design Bases . Prepared for: U.S....
Transcript of Postclosure Nuclear Safety Design BasesPostclosure Nuclear Safety Design Bases . Prepared for: U.S....
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DOC.20080226.0002
QA: QA
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February 2008
Postclosure Nuclear Safety Design Bases
Prepared for: U.S. Department of Energy Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Office of Repository Development 1551 Hillshire Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89134-6321
Prepared by: Sandia National Laboratories OCRWM Lead Laboratory for Repository Systems 1180 Town Center Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89144
Under Contract Number DE-AC04-94AL85000
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DISCLAIMER
This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neitherthe United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, nor any of their contractors,subcontractors or their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability orresponsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or any third party’s use or the results of such use of any information,apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights.Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the UnitedStates Government or any agency thereof or its contractors or subcontractors. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof.
DISCLAIMER
This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, nor any of their contractors, subcontractors or their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or any third party’s use or the results of such use of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof or its contractors or subcontractors. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof.
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February 2008
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The development of this document reflects much insightful and thorough input from several sources, especially from people mentioned on the signature page which include contributors, checkers, reviewers, and the document preparation staff. All of their efforts are most appreciated.
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Page v1. Tolal Pages: 412
POnied Narre
Roger J. Henning
James Kam {Le.ld Checker}
Scientific Analysis/CalculationSignature Page/Change History
Compjete only applicable items.
John Devers
.. ."li;~'~~~V~~~hJ1·····-·--rK~;h~~KI;O~t.i~.~.~.••••...
6 QCSJLead ,-"b QA He"cwer
5 Cheder
4. Originator
3. 01 (Including RlNisioo No. and AddendUm No.)
ANL-WIS·MD-000024 REV 01
9. Remarks
Contributors: Robert MacKinnon. Ralph Wagner, Steve Goodin and Richard Snell.
Additional Contributors: ClifTHo, David Sassani, David Sevougian. Frank Hansen, James Blink. JamesIlouseworth, Kathy Turnham. Laura Price, Lorenzo Salgado. Patrick Brady, Ming Zhu, James Cunnane. and NeilBrown.
Additional Checkers: David Stahl, Emma Thomas. Kenneth Rehfeldt, Russell Jarek, Stephanie Kuzio, StevenAlcorn, Cliff Howard. John W. Kelly, Charles Haukwa. Dwayne Kicker. Jeffrey Gromny.Reviewers: Robert Andrews, David Franklin, Erncslllardin, t'rank Hansen, J. S. Whitcran, Jack Bailey, JamesLinhart, Ming Zhu, Neil Brown, Prasad Nair. Robert H. Spencer. Rob Howard, Robert Gllrren, Terry Crump, AlanRoss. Daniel Levin, and Danny Howard.
Document-Preparation Slaff: Anita Walker. Bonnie Gabaldon. Connie Beglinger, Danette Nurse, Madbu·Shrivastava. Valerie Kelly, faith Puffer. and Caroline Parks.
Ch.ng. History................... . .•........•
10. Re.,ostOn ~anc!.!'
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CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................. iii
ACRONYMS............................................................................................................................... xiii
1. PURPOSE.............................................................................................................................. 1-1
2. QUALITY ASSURANCE..................................................................................................... 2-1
3. USE OF SOFTWARE ........................................................................................................... 3-1
4. INPUTS.................................................................................................................................. 4-1
4.1 DIRECT INPUTS......................................................................................................... 4-1
4.2 CRITERIA.................................................................................................................... 4-9 4.3 CODES, STANDARDS, AND REGULATIONS...................................................... 4-10
5. ASSUMPTIONS.................................................................................................................... 5-1
6. SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS DISCUSSION............................................................................. 6-1
6.1 BARRIER ANALYSIS ................................................................................................ 6-4
6.1.1 Definitions ........................................................................................................ 6-5
6.1.2 Identification of Barriers................................................................................. 6-10
6.1.3 Identification of Features ................................................................................ 6-16
6.1.4 Description of Processes and Events .............................................................. 6-19
6.1.5 Methodology for Important to Barrier Capability/Important to Waste
Isolation Evaluation ........................................................................................ 6-28
6.1.6 Core and Control Parameter Characteristics................................................... 6-30
6.1.7 Integration of the Performance Confirmation Program.................................. 6-35
6.1.8 Methodology for Postclosure Change Evaluation .......................................... 6-36
6.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND DEMONSTRATION OF MULTIPLE
BARRIERS................................................................................................................. 6-37
6.2.1 Identification of Barriers................................................................................. 6-40
6.2.2 Barrier Capability Description........................................................................ 6-51
6.2.3 Technical Bases for Barrier Capability......................................................... 6-100
6.2.4 Summary....................................................................................................... 6-108
6.3 NON-BARRIER-SPECIFIC FEATURES EVENTS AND PROCESSES .............. 6-110
7. CONCLUSIONS.................................................................................................................... 7-1
8. INPUTS AND REFERENCES............................................................................................ 7-42
8.1 DOCUMENTS CITED................................................................................................. 8-1
8.2 CODES, STANDARDS, REGULATIONS, AND PROCEDURES............................ 8-8
8.3 PRODUCT OUTPUT................................................................................................... 8-9
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APPENDIX A �ITBC EVALUATION AND PARAMETER DESCRIPTION FOR THE
BARRIERS...................................................................................................... A-1
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FIGURES
Page
6-1. Relationship between FEPs; Core Parameter Characteristics; Control Parameter Characteristics; and Design-Related Systems, Structures, and Components .................. 6-8
6-2. Relationship between ITS, ITWI, ITBC and Control Parameter Characteristics
and Core Parameter Characteristics and Their Controlling or Monitoring Mechanisms ..................................................................................................................... 6-9
6-3. Schematic Illustration of the Multiple Barrier Repository System................................ 6-14
6-4. Schematic of ITBC/ITWI Process with Ties to Performance Confirmation
Activities ........................................................................................................................ 6-15
6-5. Schematic of the Upper Natural Barrier ........................................................................ 6-44
6-6. Schematic of the Engineered Barrier System ................................................................ 6-46
6-7. Schematic of the Lower Natural Barrier........................................................................ 6-50
6-8. Unsaturated Zone below the Repository Horizon.......................................................... 6-52
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TABLES
Page
4-1. Source of Inputs ............................................................................................................... 4-2
4-2. Cross Reference for Information Categories in 10 CFR Part 63 ................................... 4-10
6-1. Source of Indirect Inputs.................................................................................................. 6-1 6-2. Features/Components for Each of the Three Barriers.................................................... 6-16
6-3. Mapping of Processes and Events to Features/Components of the Three Barriers ....... 6-18
6-4. Relationship among TSPA Model Components, Submodels, and
Abstraction/Process Model(s)/Analysis(es)................................................................... 6-22
6-5. Core Parameter Characteristics...................................................................................... 6-31
6-6. Control Parameter Characteristics ................................................................................. 6-33
6-7. NUREG-1804 and 10 CFR Part 63 Crosswalk Table.................................................... 6-39
6-8. Non-Barrier-Specific Features and Events .................................................................. 6-110
7-1. ITWI Features / Components Supporting Each of the Three Barriers............................. 7-5
7-2. ITBC Features / Components and ITBC Parameter Characteristics of Upper
Natural Barrier ............................................................................................................... 7-10 7-3. ITBC Features / Components and ITBC Parameter Characteristics of Engineered
Barrier System ............................................................................................................... 7-12 7-4. ITBC Features / Components and ITBC Parameter Characteristics of Lower
Natural Barrier ............................................................................................................... 7-26 7-5. Summary of Classification of Control Parameter Characteristics by Engineering
Subsystem Categorization1 ............................................................................................ 7-29
A-1. ITBC Analysis of Upper Natural Barrier FEPs .............................................................. A-1
A-2. ITBC Analyses of Engineered Barrier System FEPs.................................................... A-30
A-3. ITBC Analysis of Lower Natural Barrier FEPs.......................................................... A-168
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ACRONYMS
BSC Bechtel SAIC Co. LLC
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
DOE U.S. Department of Energy
EBS Engineered Barrier System
FEPs features, events, and processes
HLW high-level (radioactive) waste
ITBC important to barrier capability ITWI important to waste isolation
LNB Lower Natural Barrier
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PGV peak ground velocity PoNSDB Postclosure Nuclear Safety Design Basis
RMEI reasonably maximally exposed individual
SSC structure, system, and component SNF spent nuclear fuel SNL Sandia National Laboratories
TSPA total system performance assessment TWP technical work plan
UNB Upper Natural Barrier
YMP Yucca Mountain Project
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1. PURPOSE
This report, the Postclosure Nuclear Safety Design Basis (PoNSDB) has been prepared to meet regulatory requirements of the 10 CFR 63.113(a) and 63.115 [DIRS 180319]), and to provide a risk-informed analysis of the postclosure technical basis for multiple barriers. Specifically, 10 CFR 63.113(a) [DIRS 180319] provides requirements for multiple barriers as part of performance objectives for the geologic repository after permanent closure; and 10 CFR 63.115 [DIRS 180319] provides requirements for the identification of, description of, and technical basis for the multiple barriers.
This document provides extensive lists of features of the barriers and rationale as to why these barriers are important to waste isolation (ITWI) and why the features important to barrier capability (ITBC) may support such an ITWI classification (if that feature/component contributes significantly to barrier capability relative to the other features/components of the barrier). It also describes some features that are ITBC that are not significant enough to support that feature being classified as ITWI. The methodology for the identification of ITBC core and control parameter characteristics and ITWI barrier features/components is described in this document. The process starts with the examination of features, events, and processes (FEPs) and their screening justifications. As the FEPs form the basis of technical support for the TSPA, this approach is efficient and comprehensive for this purpose. The description of the FEPs and screening justifications suggest a division of the repository system into barriers, and barriers into features/components. Parameter characteristics associated with each FEP relative to the features/components of each barrier are identified. The FEP screening justification supports the further identification of parameter characteristics that are ITBC relative to each barrier feature/component. Finally, if the features/components are associated with at least one ITBC parameter characteristic, and that feature/component contributes significantly to the barrier capability relative to the other features/components of the barrier, then that feature/component is ITWI. All barriers are ITWI and are associated with one or more ITWI feature/components.
This document identifies features/components of barriers that are important to waste isolation as well as features/components and parameter characteristics that are important to barrier capability (definitions developed specifically for use in this report are contained in Section 6.1.1). Capability as used in this document is not synonymous with performance. Performance, as defined in this report, is the realization of a capability as modeled in the Total System Performance Assessment (TSPA). Capability is broadly used to refer to the ability or potential of a feature/component to contribute to a function of a barrier. The identification of a parameter characteristic as contributing to the capability of a barrier’s feature/component is not intended to suggest any importance of the capability or to suggest that the feature/component is important to waste isolation. The importance of the capability is instead identified through its ITBC status, and the importance of the barrier and its features/components are identified through their ITWI status. While the features/components of all ITWI barriers and their associated ITBC parameter characteristics are considered in the Performance Assessment, some capabilities and features/components may not necessarily be fully realized in the TSPA because some reasonable conservative assumptions are invoked during TSPA implementation or because a capability may be masked by the performance of another capability. Features of the engineered system are identified as structure, system, and component (SSC) in design. For this report, the term features/components will be used to maintain uniformity of terminology between the barriers,
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some of which are natural. Parameter characteristics are aspects of the barrier feature/component that contribute to the feature/component capability, and support the technical basis of the TSPA. Parameter characteristics are categorized into two groups. The first group, ‘core parameter characteristics,’ contains those characteristics that are not controlled or manipulated by design, construction, or operations and contribute to barrier capability. The second group, ‘control parameter characteristics,’ contains those characteristics that are able to be manipulated, controlled, and monitored by design, construction, or operations and contribute to barrier capability. A core and control parameter characteristic is further specified to be ITBC if it 1) prevents or substantially reduces the rate of movement of water from the repository to the accessible environment; 2) prevents the release or substantially reduces the release rate of radionuclides from the waste; 3) prevents or substantially reduces the rate of movement of radionuclides from the repository to the accessible environment, or 4) prevents or substantially reduces the consequences of disruptive events (e.g. criticality).
The major activities documented in this report are two: (1) conduct the barrier analysis, and (2) develop core parameter characteristics and analyze control parameter characteristics. For natural and engineered barriers that are ITWI, the tasks associated with these two activities:
1. Describe the three ITWI barriers (Upper Natural Barrier (UNB), the Engineered Barrier System (EBS), and the Lower Natural Barrier (LNB)).
2. Evaluate barrier capability, including assessment of the technical bases, and evaluation of ITBC parameter characteristics and supporting the ITWI determination.
This report serves as a companion document to Nuclear Safety Design Bases for License Application (BSC 2005 [DIRS 175546]). A second report, Postclosure Modeling and Analyses Design Parameters (BSC 2008 [DIRS 183627]), complements this report because of its emphasis on derived requirements and interface control parameters related to postclosure design components. This scientific analysis was conducted consistent with the Technical Work Plan for: Postclosure Nuclear Safety Design Bases (SNL 2007 [DIRS 182648]) except as noted in Section 2.
This analysis is intended to identify and document technical interfaces between postclosure analyses and repository design regarding the safety classification of systems, structures and components, and the design bases for SSCs classified as important to waste isolation.
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2. QUALITY ASSURANCE
The analysis documented herein is subject to the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Quality Assurance Program as documented in the relevant technical work plan (TWP) TWP-WIS-MD-000015 (SNL 2007 [DIRS 182648], Section 8.1). This work constitutes an analysis report, therefore, the document was prepared in accordance with SCI-PRO-005, Scientific Analyses and Calculations. Approved quality assurance procedures and guidance documents were used to conduct and document the activities described in this report as outlined in the TWP (SNL 2007 [DIRS 182648], Section 4.1). The TWP (SNL 2007 [DIRS 182648], Section 8.4) also identifies applicable controls for the electronic management of data during the analysis and documentation activities. There are three deviations from the TWP. The first deviation is that a methodology for determination of features, events, and processes that are important to performance is now covered in an addendum to the Performance Confirmation Plan (SNL 2008 [DIRS 184797], Appendix A). The methodology (specifically important to dose, and significance to uncertainty) as originally intended in the TWP (SNL 2007 [DIRS 182648]) for this product is now covered in that document (SNL 2008 [DIRS 184797], Appendix A). The second deviation is that, the TWP stated: “Finally, the PoNSDB document will identify performance confirmation activities, as applicable, for FEPs that are ITBC.” That information is now better presented in the Performance Confirmation Plan (SNL 2008 [DIRS 184797], Appendix A) and is not presented in this document. The third deviation is that, because changes are so extensive in this revision, all comments from November 2006 LP 7.5Q OCRWM review of ANL-WIS-MD-000024 were not directly addressed. Technical issues were considered and resolved. Editorial comments were overcome by completely new text and could not be mapped directly to the new text.
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3. USE OF SOFTWARE
No software required to be qualified in accordance with IM-PRO-003, Software Management was used in developing this report. Standard functions of Microsoft Excel 2000 commercial-offthe-shelf software were used, but only for organizational purposes.
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4. INPUTS
This report uses the information and decisions developed in other reports as references and utilizes professional judgment. This work does not involve separate modeling or analyses using previously developed models and, as such, this report does not require model validation.
All direct inputs (data, parameters, and other information) used in this scientific analysis are identified in Section 4.1. Direct inputs used in this analysis report were obtained from controlled source documents and other sources in accordance with SCI-PRO-004, Managing Technical Product Inputs. NUREG-1804 (NRC 2003 [DIRS 163274]) lists some specific acceptance criteria that are addressed in this report which are identified in Section 4.2.
4.1 DIRECT INPUTS
Direct inputs used in the analyses are listed in Table 4-1. Indirect inputs are described in Section 6. These sources are appropriate for this analysis because they are dedicated to the technical understanding of processes and/or events that act on the features comprising the three barriers (UNB, EBS, and LNB) considered in this analysis. This type of input is directly applicable to the analysis discussed in Section 6 and Appendix A.
All data used from external sources and non-conclusion sections of direct input sources have either been qualified for intended use in Features, Events, and Processes for the Total System Performance Assessment: Analyses (SNL 2008 [DIRS 183041]) or other Analysis/Model Reports, as cited. The only use in this report is to analyze barrier capabilities, not to present any new information.
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Tabl
e 4-
1.
Sou
rce
of In
puts
Cita
tion
Sour
ce T
itle
Spec
ifica
lly U
sed
From
Spec
ifica
llyU
sed
In (t
his
AM
R)
Inpu
t Des
crip
tion
NA
C 5
34, 2
006
[DIR
S 1
5187
3]
NA
C (N
evad
aA
dmin
istra
tive
Cod
e) 5
34
NA
C 5
34.4
371
Tabl
e A
-1
Exi
stin
g op
en s
ite in
vest
igat
ion
bore
hole
s ar
e ex
pect
ed to
be
back
fille
d an
d pl
ugge
d to
the
uppe
r 10
ft w
ith c
emen
t acc
ordi
ng to
NA
C 5
34.4
371
BS
C 2
004
[DIR
S 1
6610
7]
Drif
t Deg
rada
tion
Ana
lysi
s S
ectio
ns 6
.3, 6
.3.1
.2,
6.4.
2.2,
6.3
.1.2
, and
6.
4.2.
2
Tabl
e A
-2
Ther
mal
-hyd
rolo
gic
effe
cts
from
drif
t col
laps
e in
duce
d by
a s
eism
ic e
vent
in
clud
e an
incr
ease
in th
e te
mpe
ratu
re a
nd a
n in
crea
se in
the
prob
abili
ty a
nd
mag
nitu
de o
f see
page
BS
C 2
004
[DIR
S 1
6998
7]
CS
NF
Was
te F
orm
D
egra
datio
n: S
umm
ary
Abs
tract
ion
Sec
tions
6.1
, 6.2
,6.
2.1,
6.3
.1
Tabl
e A
-2
FEP
not
onl
y en
com
pass
es th
e st
ruct
ure
and
com
posi
tion
of th
e C
SN
F, it
als
o ad
dres
ses
alte
ratio
n, d
egra
datio
n, a
nd d
isso
lutio
n of
the
was
te fo
rm. T
hese
pr
oces
ses
can
influ
ence
the
mob
iliza
tion
of ra
dion
uclid
es
Sec
tions
6.3
.1, T
able
6-2
Tabl
e A
-2
Rel
ease
from
the
gap
and
grai
n bo
unda
ries
is a
sm
all f
ract
ion
of th
e to
tal
inve
ntor
y B
SC
200
4 [D
IRS
169
988]
D
efen
se H
LW G
lass
D
egra
datio
n M
odel
S
ectio
n 6.
9 Ta
ble
A-2
D
iffer
ence
s in
was
te in
vent
ory
of th
e di
ffere
nt w
aste
form
s ha
ve b
een
incl
uded
in
the
eval
uatio
n of
bar
rier c
apab
ility
BS
C 2
004
[DIR
S 1
7003
5]
Con
cept
ual M
odel
and
N
umer
ical
App
roac
hes
for
Uns
atur
ated
Zon
e Fl
owan
d Tr
ansp
ort
Sec
tions
6.2
.5 a
nd6.
3.6.
3 Ta
ble
A-3
D
ispe
rsiv
e pr
oces
ses
tend
to b
e in
effe
ctiv
e in
the
unsa
tura
ted
zone
in
spre
adin
g sh
ort-t
erm
tran
sien
t rel
ease
s fro
m th
e E
BS
Cra
ig, R
.W. 2
001
[DIR
S 1
7141
1]
Exc
avat
ion-
Indu
ced
Frac
ture
Stu
dy
p. 1
6 Ta
ble
A-2
Th
e ex
tent
of e
xcav
atio
n da
mag
e in
repo
sito
ry d
rifts
will
not
affe
ct m
echa
nica
l re
spon
se
BS
C 2
004
[DIR
S 1
7176
4]
See
page
Cal
ibra
tion
Mod
el a
nd S
eepa
ge
Test
ing
Dat
a
Sec
tions
6.3
.2,
6.3.
3.2,
and
6.6
.3.1
Ta
ble
A-1
K
ey p
aram
eter
s af
fect
ing
flow
div
ersi
on, a
nd th
e as
soci
ated
par
amet
er
unce
rtain
ties,
are
incl
uded
in th
e pe
rform
ance
ass
essm
ent
BS
C 2
005
[DIR
S 1
7223
2]
Drif
t-Sca
le C
oupl
ed
Pro
cess
es (D
ST
and
TH
See
page
) Mod
els
Sec
tions
6.1
.1,
6.2.
4,
8.1
Tabl
e A
-1
Effe
cts
of re
satu
ratio
n of
hos
t roc
k ar
ound
em
plac
emen
t drif
ts d
ue to
was
te
cool
ing
are
only
sig
nific
ant f
or fi
rst s
ever
al h
undr
ed to
a fe
w 1
,000
yea
rs, a
nd
are
insi
gnifi
cant
ove
r the
per
iod
of g
eolo
gic
stab
ility
BS
C 2
004
[DIR
S 1
7245
3]
DS
NF
and
Oth
er W
aste
Fo
rm D
egra
datio
n A
bstra
ctio
n
Sec
tion
6.3
Tabl
e A
-2
An
uppe
r-bo
und
mod
el is
use
d in
TS
PA
to m
odel
deg
rada
tion
of a
ll of
the
DS
NF
fuel
type
s ot
her t
han
Nav
al S
NF
SN
L 20
08 [D
IRS
173
869]
S
cree
ning
Ana
lysi
s of
C
ritic
ality
Fea
ture
s,
Eve
nts,
and
Pro
cess
es fo
rLi
cens
e A
pplic
atio
n
Sec
tion
6.3
Tabl
e A
-2
Con
ditio
ns re
quire
d to
lead
to in
-pac
kage
crit
ical
ity a
re n
ot li
kely
to o
ccur
and
th
e pa
ram
eter
cha
ract
eris
tics
asso
ciat
ed w
ith In
-Pac
kage
Crit
ical
ity (d
egra
ded
conf
igur
atio
n) d
o no
t sub
stan
tially
effe
ct th
e re
leas
e of
radi
onuc
lides
or i
mpa
ct
the
barr
ier c
apab
ility
Sec
tion
6.3
Tabl
e A
-2
Effe
cts
of ra
dioa
ctiv
e ga
ses
in th
e E
BS
wer
e an
alyz
ed a
nd w
ere
foun
d to
be
inco
nseq
uent
ial t
o re
posi
tory
per
form
ance
S
ectio
ns 6
.4, 6
.5 a
nd6.
6 Ta
ble
A-2
C
ondi
tions
requ
ired
to le
ad to
nea
r-fie
ld c
ritic
ality
are
not
like
ly to
occ
ur, a
nd
the
para
met
er c
hara
cter
istic
s as
soci
ated
with
this
pro
cess
and
feat
ure
do n
ot
subs
tant
ially
effe
ct th
e re
leas
e of
radi
onuc
lides
or i
mpa
ct th
e ba
rrie
r
ANL-WIS-MD-000024 REV 01 4-2 February 2008
-
Postclosure Nuclear Safety Design Bases
Tabl
e 4-
1.
Sou
rce
of In
puts
(Con
tinue
d)
Cita
tion
Sour
ce T
itle
Spec
ifica
lly U
sed
From
Spec
ifica
llyU
sed
In (t
his
AM
R)
Inpu
t Des
crip
tion
SN
L 20
07 [D
IRS
176
828]
S
eism
ic C
onse
quen
ce
Abs
tract
ion
Sec
tions
6.1
1.1.
3 an
d6.
11.2
Ta
ble
A-2
Li
thop
hysa
l hos
t roc
k is
exp
ecte
d to
col
laps
e in
to th
e em
plac
emen
t drif
ts fo
r un
likel
y pe
ak g
roun
d ve
loci
ties
abov
e 2
m/s
Sec
tion
6.11
.4
Tabl
e A
-2
It is
not
exp
ecte
d th
at fa
ults
will
sig
nific
antly
affe
ct th
e de
grad
atio
n of
the
EB
S,
at a
nnua
l rec
urre
nce
inte
rval
s of
abo
ut 1
0�7
per y
ear a
nd le
ssS
ectio
n 6.
11.5
Ta
ble
A-2
P
oten
tial d
amag
e to
was
te p
acka
ges
and
drip
shi
elds
from
dis
plac
emen
t on
thes
e fa
ults
is in
clud
ed in
the
TSP
A M
odel
Sec
tion
6.7
Tabl
e A
-2
Bar
rier c
apab
ility
of C
SN
F cl
addi
ng is
not
impo
rtant
bec
ause
cla
ddin
g ca
n be
da
mag
ed b
y se
ism
ic a
ctiv
ity th
at d
oes
not d
amag
e th
e w
aste
pac
kage
Sec
tions
6.7
.3.1
,6.
7.3.
2, 6
.8, a
nd 6
.8.5
Tab
le A
-2
Axi
al s
epar
atio
n of
adj
acen
t drip
shi
elds
is e
xclu
ded
from
the
TSP
A m
odel
be
caus
e a
kine
mat
ic s
tudy
indi
cate
s th
at s
mal
l sta
tic lo
ads
from
rubb
le o
r fri
ctio
nal l
oads
bet
wee
n E
BS
com
pone
nts
are
suffi
cien
t to
elim
inat
e ax
ial
sepa
ratio
n of
drip
shi
elds
S
ectio
ns 6
.1.2
, 6.1
.3
Tabl
e A
-2
Cha
nges
con
figur
atio
n of
EB
S c
ompo
nent
s w
ithin
the
empl
acem
ent d
rifts
SN
L 20
07 [D
IRS
177
391]
S
atur
ated
Zon
e S
ite-S
cale
Flow
Mod
el
Sec
tion
6.6.
4.1
Tabl
e A
-3
Clim
ate
chan
ge a
lters
the
flux
thro
ugh
the
satu
rate
d zo
ne b
y in
crea
sing
the
regi
onal
rech
arge
and
cau
sing
the
wat
er ta
ble
to ri
seS
NL
2007
[DIR
S 1
7739
6]
Rad
ionu
clid
e Tr
ansp
ort
Mod
els
Und
er A
mbi
ent
Con
ditio
ns
Sec
tions
6.7
.5 a
nd6.
8.1.
2 Ta
ble
A-3
Fa
ults
are
impo
rtant
to u
nsat
urat
ed z
one
trans
port
beca
use
they
pro
vide
fast
pa
thw
ays
for r
adio
nucl
ide
trans
port
to th
e w
ater
tabl
e S
ectio
ns 6
.1.1
and
6.1.
2 Ta
ble
A-3
Fr
actu
re-r
elat
ed tr
ansp
ort p
roce
sses
/pro
perti
es in
clud
e fra
ctur
e pe
rmea
bilit
y,
poro
sity
, fre
quen
cy, a
ctiv
e fra
ctur
e m
odel
, mat
rix d
iffus
ion
coef
ficie
nt, s
orpt
ion,
an
d co
lloid
filtr
atio
nS
NL
2007
[DIR
S 1
7740
7]
EB
S R
adio
nucl
ide
Tran
spor
t Abs
tract
ion
Sec
tion
6.2.
1.1
Tabl
e A
-1
Dis
cuss
ion
of tw
o-ph
ase
buoy
ant f
low
incl
uded
in m
odel
s of
ther
mal
see
page
an
d th
erm
al h
ydro
logy
Sec
tion
5, 6
Ta
ble
A-2
S
eepa
ge o
r con
dens
atio
n pr
oces
ses
are
sign
ifica
nt m
ode
of re
leas
e th
at
subs
tant
ially
impa
cts
the
trans
port
of ra
dion
uclid
esS
ectio
n 6.
3.1.
1 Ta
ble
A-2
A
dvec
tive
rele
ases
are
mor
e si
gnifi
cant
from
a s
yste
m p
erfo
rman
ce
pers
pect
ive
beca
use
rele
ases
occ
ur in
to th
e fra
ctur
es o
f the
uns
atur
ated
zon
e be
low
the
repo
sito
ry, w
hile
diff
usiv
e re
leas
es a
re re
leas
ed to
the
slow
ertra
nspo
rt in
the
mat
rix o
f the
uns
atur
ated
feat
ures
Sec
tion
6.3.
1.2
Tabl
e A
-2
Col
loid
s an
d as
soci
ated
radi
onuc
lides
are
imm
obili
zed,
and
true
col
loid
s m
aydi
ssol
ve b
ecom
ing
subj
ect t
o aq
ueou
s tra
nspo
rt if
cond
ition
s ar
e no
t sta
ble
Sec
tion
6.3.
1.2
Tabl
e A
-2
The
proc
ess
of d
ecay
and
ingr
owth
of r
adio
nucl
ides
is in
clud
ed in
the
TSP
A
Sec
tion
6.3.
2.4
Tabl
e A
-2
Ther
mal
env
ironm
ent h
as a
dire
ct e
ffect
on
tem
pera
ture
and
hum
idity
in th
e em
plac
emen
t drif
ts, w
hich
con
trol t
he c
orro
sion
env
ironm
ent,
and
the
cond
ition
s fo
r rad
ionu
clid
e m
obili
zatio
n an
d re
leas
eS
ectio
n 6.
3.3
Tabl
e A
-2
Flow
div
ersi
on, w
hen
com
bine
d w
ith th
e la
ck o
f adv
ectio
n th
roug
h th
e w
aste
pa
ckag
e, re
sults
in o
nly
the
pote
ntia
l for
diff
usiv
e re
leas
es fr
om th
e w
aste
form
an
d w
aste
pac
kage
if th
e w
aste
pac
kage
has
deg
rade
d fe
atur
esS
ectio
n 6.
3.4
Tabl
e A
-2
Diff
usiv
e tra
nspo
rt is
con
serv
ativ
ely
spec
ified
to o
ccur
thro
ugh
a co
ntin
uous
w
ater
film
on
the
surfa
ces
of th
e E
BS
feat
ures
ANL-WIS-MD-000024 REV 01 4-3 February 2008
-
Postclosure Nuclear Safety Design Bases
Tabl
e 4-
1.
Sou
rce
of In
puts
(Con
tinue
d)
Cita
tion
Sour
ce T
itle
Spec
ifica
lly U
sed
From
Spec
ifica
llyU
sed
In (t
his
AM
R)
Inpu
t Des
crip
tion
SN
L 20
07 [D
IRS
177
407]
(C
ontin
ued)
E
BS
Rad
ionu
clid
eTr
ansp
ort A
bstra
ctio
n (C
ontin
ued)
Sec
tion
6.3.
4,Ta
ble
6.6-
1 Ta
ble
A-2
D
iffus
ion
of c
ollo
ids
is n
ot a
sig
nific
ant m
ode
of re
leas
e
Sec
tion
6.3.
4.4
Tabl
e A
-2
If dr
ip s
hiel
d an
d w
aste
pac
kage
are
not
bre
ache
d, a
dvec
tive
trans
port
of
collo
ids
thro
ugh
the
inve
rt is
mor
e si
gnifi
cant
than
diff
usiv
eS
ectio
n 6.
5.2.
6 Ta
ble
A-2
P
artit
ioni
ng o
f rel
ease
d ra
dion
uclid
es fr
om th
e E
BS
to th
e LN
B is
sen
sitiv
e to
ad
vect
ive
flow
, but
is re
lativ
ely
inse
nsiti
ve to
hyd
rolo
gic
prop
ertie
s of
the
inve
rtS
ectio
n 6.
5.2.
6, T
able
6.
4-1
Tabl
e A
-2
Uns
atur
ated
flow
occ
urs
thro
ugh
the
inve
rt as
a re
sult
of s
eepa
ge o
r drif
t-wal
l co
nden
satio
n, im
bibi
tion
from
the
host
rock
, or c
apill
ary
cond
ensa
tion,
and
af
fect
s th
e re
leas
e of
radi
onuc
lides
from
the
EB
S to
the
LNB
feat
ures
Sec
tions
5, 6
Ta
ble
A-2
U
nsat
urat
ed fl
ow h
as b
een
incl
uded
in th
e ab
stra
ctio
ns fo
r flo
w a
nd tr
ansp
ort
thro
ugh
the
EB
S fe
atur
esS
ectio
ns 6
.1.1
, Tab
le6.
3-2
Tabl
e A
-2
Onl
y th
e sm
alle
st o
f col
loid
al p
artic
les,
toge
ther
with
any
ass
ocia
ted
radi
onuc
lides
, may
be
trans
porte
d si
gnifi
cant
ly b
y di
ffusi
on in
the
EB
S.
Adv
ectio
n is
a m
ore
sign
ifica
nt m
etho
d of
tran
spor
t in
the
inve
rtS
ectio
ns 6
.3.1
.1,
6.3.
1.2
Tabl
e A
-2
If dr
ip s
hiel
d an
d w
aste
pac
kage
are
not
bre
ache
d, a
dvec
tive
rele
ases
are
m
ore
sign
ifica
nt th
an d
iffus
ive
from
a s
yste
m p
erfo
rman
ce p
ersp
ectiv
eS
ectio
ns 6
.4.1
, 6.6
.1
Tabl
e A
-2
Rel
ease
pul
ses
caus
ed b
y ba
thtu
b be
havi
or o
f the
was
te p
acka
ge h
ave
been
an
alyz
ed
SN
L 20
07 [D
IRS
177
412]
E
ngin
eere
d B
arrie
r S
yste
m: P
hysi
cal a
nd
Che
mic
al E
nviro
nmen
t
Sec
tions
6.8
, 6.8
.4,
6.13
, 6.1
3.4,
6.1
4,
and
6.15
Tabl
e A
-2
Che
mic
al c
hara
cter
istic
s of
wat
er in
the
drift
affe
ct th
e lik
elih
ood
of p
oten
tial
degr
adat
ion,
det
erio
ratio
n, a
nd a
ltera
tion
of th
e ot
her E
BS
com
pone
nts,
as
wel
l as
affe
ctin
g th
e tra
nspo
rt ch
arac
teris
tics
of a
ny ra
dion
uclid
es re
leas
ed fr
om th
e w
aste
pac
kage
to th
e in
vert
SN
L 20
07 [D
IRS
177
418]
D
isso
lved
Con
cent
ratio
n Li
mits
of E
lem
ents
with
R
adio
activ
e Is
otop
es
Sec
tion
8.1
Tabl
e A
-2
Unc
erta
inty
in th
ese
solu
bilit
ies
and
the
effe
cts
of w
aste
pac
kage
inte
rnal
ch
emis
try v
aria
bilit
y an
d un
certa
inty
hav
e be
en in
clud
ed in
the
mod
els
of w
aste
fo
rm re
leas
e S
NL
2007
[DIR
S 1
7742
3]
Was
te F
orm
and
In-D
rift
Col
loid
s-A
ssoc
iate
d R
adio
nucl
ide
Con
cent
ratio
ns
Sec
tions
4.1
.2, 6
.3.1
,6.
5.1,
6.6
.8, 6
.3.9
Ta
ble
A-2
C
orro
sion
pro
duct
col
loid
s in
clud
ed in
the
collo
id m
odel
s en
viro
nmen
t
Sec
tion
6.6.
8 Ta
ble
A-2
C
ollo
id s
tabi
lity
in th
e in
vert
is a
func
tion
of th
e aq
ueou
s ch
emic
al c
ondi
tions
Ta
ble
4-2;
Sec
tions
6.
3.2.
2, 7
.0
Tabl
e A
-2
Co-
prec
ipita
tion
of c
ollo
ids
due
to th
e de
grad
atio
n of
HLW
gla
ss w
aste
form
s ha
s be
en in
clud
ed in
the
asse
ssm
ent o
f tot
al c
ollo
idal
rele
ase
from
the
codi
spos
al w
aste
pac
kage
s en
viro
nmen
tS
NL
2007
[DIR
S 1
7743
0]
Dik
e/D
rift I
nter
actio
ns
Sec
tion
6.7
Tabl
e A
-2
Follo
win
g an
unl
ikel
y m
agm
a in
trusi
on in
to th
e re
posi
tory
, it i
s po
ssib
le th
at th
e w
ater
che
mis
try in
the
empl
acem
ent d
rifts
will
be
alte
red
by b
asal
t-wat
er
inte
ract
ions
ANL-WIS-MD-000024 REV 01 4-4 February 2008
-
Postclosure Nuclear Safety Design Bases
Tabl
e 4-
1.
Sou
rce
of In
puts
(Con
tinue
d)
Cita
tion
Sour
ce T
itle
Spec
ifica
lly U
sed
From
Spec
ifica
llyU
sed
In (t
his
AM
R)
Inpu
t Des
crip
tion
SN
L 20
07 [D
IRS
177
432]
N
umbe
r of W
aste
P
acka
ges
Hit
by Ig
neou
s E
vent
s
Sec
tion
6 Ta
ble
A-2
P
oten
tial c
onse
quen
ce o
f an
erup
tive
cond
uit,
to th
e su
rface
inte
rsec
ting
the
repo
sito
ry is
that
was
te p
acka
ges
entra
ined
with
in a
con
duit
may
be
brea
ched
, re
leas
ing
radi
onuc
lides
in a
n er
uptin
g as
h pl
ume
whe
re th
ey c
an b
e di
sper
sed
dow
nwin
d to
the
reas
onab
ly m
axim
ally
exp
osed
indi
vidu
al
Sec
tion
7.2
Tabl
e A
-3
Dis
cuss
ion
of p
ossi
bilit
y of
an
erup
tive
cond
uit i
nter
sect
ing
the
repo
sito
ry a
nd
exte
ndin
g to
sur
face
70 F
R 5
3313
[DIR
S 1
7839
4]
70 F
R 5
3313
. Im
plem
enta
tion
of a
Dos
e S
tand
ard
Afte
r 10,
000
Year
s. In
tern
et A
cces
sibl
e
10 C
FR 6
3.30
5(b)
Ta
ble
A-1
Fu
ture
cha
nges
in a
gric
ultu
ral a
nd in
dust
rial a
ctiv
ities
are
exc
lude
d ba
sed
on
regu
lato
ry re
quire
men
ts
SN
L 20
07 [D
IRS
178
519]
G
ener
al C
orro
sion
and
Lo
caliz
ed C
orro
sion
of
Was
te P
acka
ge O
uter
Bar
rier
Sec
tion
1 Ta
ble
A-2
S
tain
less
ste
el in
ner s
hell
of w
aste
pac
kage
has
bee
n co
nser
vativ
ely
mod
eled
to
pro
vide
no
dela
y of
pen
etra
tion
of w
aste
pac
kage
onc
e w
aste
pac
kage
Allo
y22
out
er b
arrie
r has
bee
n br
each
edS
ectio
n 6.
4.4
Tabl
e A
-2
Pos
sibi
lity
of lo
caliz
ed c
orro
sion
als
o re
quire
s pa
rticu
lar a
ntec
eden
t ge
oche
mic
al c
ondi
tions
that
are
gen
eral
ly n
ot p
rese
nt
Sec
tion
6.4
Tabl
e A
-2
Unc
erta
inty
in th
ese
corr
osio
n10
CFR
63.
200
7[D
IRS
180
319]
10
CFR
63
10 C
FR63
.51(
a)(3
)(i�
iii),
10
CFR
63.
72(a
), an
d 10
C
FR 6
3.72
(b)(1
�11)
Tabl
e A
-1
To p
recl
ude
any
pote
ntia
l del
eter
ious
effe
cts,
con
stru
ctio
n an
d op
erat
iona
l m
anag
emen
t, an
d ad
min
istra
tive
cont
rols
will
be
deve
lope
d
SN
L 20
07 [D
IRS
180
472]
In
itial
Rad
ionu
clid
eIn
vent
orie
s S
ectio
n 6
Tabl
e A
-2
With
in th
e w
aste
pac
kage
, rad
ioac
tive
deca
y an
d in
grow
th c
ontri
bute
to th
e w
aste
inve
ntor
y, w
hich
def
ines
the
amou
nt o
f diff
eren
t rad
ionu
clid
es p
rese
nt in
di
ffere
nt w
aste
form
sS
ectio
n 6.
1 Ta
ble
A-2
O
ther
radi
onuc
lides
hav
e m
oder
ate
half-
lives
and
dec
ay to
pro
duct
s th
at m
aybe
rele
ased
from
the
was
teS
ectio
n 6.
1 Ta
ble
A-2
W
aste
inve
ntor
y de
fines
the
amou
nt o
f diff
eren
t rad
ionu
clid
es p
rese
nt in
di
ffere
nt w
aste
form
sS
ectio
n 6.
1.10
Ta
ble
A-2
A
ny c
hang
e to
inve
ntor
y w
ill b
e m
anag
ed b
y th
e ch
ange
eva
luat
ion
proc
ess
Sec
tion
6.3
Tabl
e A
-2
The
proc
ess
of d
ecay
and
ingr
owth
of r
adio
nucl
ides
is in
clud
ed in
the
TSP
A
Sec
tions
6.4
, 6.6
.2an
d 6.
6 Ta
ble
A-2
D
iffer
ence
s in
was
te in
vent
ory
of th
e di
ffere
nt w
aste
form
s ha
ve b
een
incl
uded
in
the
eval
uatio
n of
bar
rier c
apab
ility
SN
L 20
07 [D
IRS
180
778]
G
ener
al C
orro
sion
and
Lo
caliz
ed C
orro
sion
of t
heD
rip S
hiel
d
Sec
tion
6 Ta
ble
A-2
G
ener
al c
orro
sion
rate
s of
tita
nium
in th
e ra
nge
of li
kely
env
ironm
enta
l co
nditi
ons
are
low
dur
ing
the
regu
lato
ry p
erio
d. T
his
proc
ess
has
been
in
clud
ed in
mod
els
of d
rip s
hiel
d de
grad
atio
n
ANL-WIS-MD-000024 REV 01 4-5 February 2008
-
Postclosure Nuclear Safety Design Bases
Tabl
e 4-
1.
Sou
rce
of In
puts
(Con
tinue
d)
Cita
tion
Sour
ce T
itle
Spec
ifica
lly U
sed
From
Spec
ifica
llyU
sed
In (t
his
AM
R)
Inpu
t Des
crip
tion
SN
L 20
08 [D
IRS
184
748]
P
artic
le T
rack
ing
Mod
elan
d A
bstra
ctio
n of
Tr
ansp
ort P
roce
sses
Sec
tion
6.8.
2.2
Tabl
e A
-2
The
proc
ess
of d
ecay
and
ingr
owth
of r
adio
nucl
ides
Sec
tion
D.2
Ta
ble
A-2
O
ther
radi
onuc
lides
hav
e m
oder
ate
half-
lives
and
dec
ay to
pro
duct
s th
at m
aybe
rele
ased
from
the
was
teS
ectio
n 8.
2.2
Tabl
e A
-3
Pro
cess
es a
re in
clud
ed in
the
UZ
Tran
spor
t Abs
tract
ion
Mod
el
Sec
tions
6.5
.12,
6.5.
13 a
nd 6
.6.2
Ta
ble
A-3
S
mal
l fra
ctio
n of
the
collo
ids
are
cons
erva
tivel
y m
odel
ed to
be
unre
tard
ed in
th
e un
satu
rate
d zo
ne. S
orpt
ion
of c
ollo
idal
tran
spor
t of r
adio
nucl
ides
is
incl
uded
in th
e U
Z Tr
ansp
ort A
bstra
ctio
n M
odel
SN
L 20
07 [D
IRS
181
244]
A
bstra
ctio
n of
Drif
t S
eepa
ge
Sec
tions
6.1
[a] a
nd 6
12
[a]
Tabl
e A
-1
Unc
erta
inty
in fl
ow fo
cusi
ng h
as b
een
incl
uded
in th
e as
sess
men
t of t
he
likel
ihoo
d an
d m
agni
tude
of s
eepa
ge in
to th
e em
plac
emen
t drif
tsS
ectio
n 6.
4.3.
3 Ta
ble
A-1
E
ffect
s of
resa
tura
tion
of th
e ho
st ro
ck a
roun
d th
e em
plac
emen
t drif
ts d
ue to
w
aste
coo
ling
are
depe
nden
t on
loca
tion
of th
e re
posi
tory
Sec
tion
6.5
Tabl
e A
-1
Effe
cts
of d
ryou
t of t
he h
ost r
ock
arou
nd th
e em
plac
emen
t drif
ts d
ue to
was
te
heat
dep
ends
on
loca
tion
of th
e re
posi
tory
Sec
tions
6.6
, 6.6
.5.2
,an
d 6.
7 Ta
ble
A-1
R
epre
sent
ativ
enes
s of
the
seep
age
para
met
er d
istri
butio
ns u
sed
in P
A w
ithin
re
posi
tory
hos
t roc
k is
con
side
red
impo
rtant
to c
apab
ility
of u
pper
nat
ural
ba
rrie
r S
ectio
n 6.
4 Ta
ble
A-2
Th
erm
al-h
ydro
logi
c ef
fect
s fro
m d
rift c
olla
pse
indu
ced
by a
sei
smic
eve
nt
incl
ude
an in
crea
se in
the
tem
pera
ture
and
an
incr
ease
in th
e pr
obab
ility
and
m
agni
tude
of s
eepa
geS
NL2
008
[DIR
S 1
8443
3]
Mul
tisca
leTh
erm
ohyd
rolo
gic
Mod
el
Sec
tion
6.2.
1[a]
Ta
ble
A-2
Te
mpe
ratu
re re
sulti
ng fr
om h
eat g
ener
atio
n al
so a
ffect
s th
e in
itiat
ion
of w
aste
fo
rm a
ltera
tion
and
radi
onuc
lide
trans
port
proc
esse
s de
pend
ent o
n th
e pr
esen
ce o
f an
aque
ous
film
Sec
tion
6.2[
a]
Tabl
e A
-2
Non
unifo
rm h
eat h
as b
een
cons
ider
ed in
the
mod
els
of in
-drif
t the
rmal
hy
drol
ogy
Sec
tion
6.3.
17[a
] Ta
ble
A-2
Th
erm
al-h
ydro
logi
c ef
fect
s fro
m d
rift c
olla
pse
indu
ced
by a
sei
smic
eve
nt
incl
ude
an in
crea
se in
the
tem
pera
ture
and
an
incr
ease
in th
e pr
obab
ility
and
m
agni
tude
of s
eepa
geS
ectio
ns 6
.2.1
5[a]
,6.
2.17
[a]
Tabl
e A
-2
Pre
clos
ure
vent
ilatio
n re
mov
es h
eat a
nd m
oist
ure
from
the
host
rock
dur
ing
the
vent
ilatio
n pe
riod
Sec
tion
6.3.
3 Ta
ble
A-2
E
ffect
of w
icki
ng (w
ithou
t see
page
) slig
htly
incr
ease
s th
e ad
vect
ive
flux
thro
ugh
the
inve
rt
ANL-WIS-MD-000024 REV 01 4-6 February 2008
-
Postclosure Nuclear Safety Design Bases
Tabl
e 4-
1.
Sou
rce
of In
puts
(Con
tinue
d)
Cita
tion
Sour
ce T
itle
Spec
ifica
lly U
sed
From
Spec
ifica
llyU
sed
In (t
his
AM
R)
Inpu
t Des
crip
tion
SN
L 20
07 [D
IRS
181
648]
In
-Drif
t Nat
ural
Con
vect
ion
and
Con
dens
atio
n E
xecu
tive
Sum
mar
y Ta
ble
A-2
Th
erm
al e
nviro
nmen
t has
a d
irect
effe
ct o
n te
mpe
ratu
re a
nd h
umid
ity in
the
empl
acem
ent d
rifts
, whi
ch c
ontro
l the
cor
rosi
on e
nviro
nmen
t, an
d th
e co
nditi
ons
for r
adio
nucl
ide
mob
iliza
tion
and
rele
ase
Exe
cutiv
e S
umm
ary,
Tabl
e 6.
1.2-
1,S
ectio
ns 6
.1, 6
.2, 6
.3an
d 6.
4
Tabl
e A
-2
Con
vect
ive
flow
of a
ir an
d m
oist
ure
in th
e em
plac
emen
t drif
ts h
as b
een
incl
uded
in m
odel
s of
in-d
rift t
herm
al h
ydro
logy
. How
ever
, it d
oes
not c
reat
e an
ad
ditio
nal s
ourc
e of
moi
stur
e
Sec
tion
6.2.
1 Ta
ble
A-2
Fl
ow d
iver
sion
, whe
n co
mbi
ned
with
the
lack
of a
dvec
tion
thro
ugh
the
was
te
pack
age,
resu
lts in
onl
y th
e po
tent
ial f
or d
iffus
ive
rele
ases
from
the
was
te fo
rm
and
was
te p
acka
ge if
the
was
te p
acka
ge h
as d
egra
ded
feat
ures
SN
L 20
07 [D
IRS
181
953]
S
tress
Cor
rosi
on C
rack
ing
of W
aste
Pac
kage
Out
er
Bar
rier a
nd D
rip S
hiel
d M
ater
ials
Sec
tion
6.8.
6 Ta
ble
A-2
S
tress
cra
cks
are
suffi
cien
tly s
mal
l and
tigh
t to
allo
w o
nly
the
diffu
sive
tran
spor
t of
radi
onuc
lides
thro
ugh
the
crac
ksS
ectio
n 6.
2 Ta
ble
A-2
Th
e po
tent
ial f
or a
nd re
sulta
nt c
onse
quen
ces
of e
arly
failu
re o
f the
was
te
pack
age
by m
anuf
actu
ring
defe
cts
or w
eld
flaw
s ex
ists
, and
has
bee
n co
nsid
ered
in th
e TS
PA
Nom
inal
Sce
nario
Cla
ssS
ectio
n 6.
8.6
Tabl
e A
-2
Stre
ss c
rack
s ar
e su
ffici
ently
sm
all a
nd ti
ght t
o al
low
onl
y th
e di
ffusi
ve tr
ansp
ort
of ra
dion
uclid
es th
roug
h th
e cr
acks
BS
C 2
007
[DIR
S 1
8213
1]
Bas
is o
f Des
ign
for t
he
TAD
Can
iste
r-B
ased
R
epos
itory
Des
ign
Con
cept
.
Sec
tion
8.2.
3.1.
1 Ta
ble
A-2
R
equi
rem
ents
for N
aval
was
te p
acka
ges
empl
acem
ent s
tand
off d
ista
nce
from
m
appe
d fa
ults
S
ectio
n 8.
2.3.
1.1
Tabl
e A
-2
Nav
al w
aste
pac
kage
s th
at re
quire
s an
8.2
-ft (2
.5-m
) min
imum
em
plac
emen
t st
ando
ff di
stan
ce fr
om m
appe
d fa
ults
SN
L 20
08 [D
IRS
183
041]
Fe
atur
es, E
vent
s, a
nd
Pro
cess
es fo
r the
Tot
alS
yste
m P
erfo
rman
ce
Ass
essm
ent:
Ana
lyse
s
Sec
tion
6, b
yin
divi
dual
FE
P
Tabl
e A
-1
Dis
cuss
ion
of F
EP
rela
ted
to th
e U
pper
Nat
ural
Bar
rier a
s ei
ther
an
incl
uded
or
excl
uded
scr
eeni
ng d
ecis
ion.
Sec
tion
6, b
yin
divi
dual
FE
P
Tabl
e A
-2
Dis
cuss
ion
of F
EP
rela
ted
to th
e E
ngin
eere
d B
arrie
r Sys
tem
as
eith
er a
n in
clud
ed o
r exc
lude
d sc
reen
ing
deci
sion
. S
ectio
n 6,
by
indi
vidu
al F
EP
Ta
ble
A-3
D
iscu
ssio
n of
FE
P re
late
d to
the
Low
er N
atur
al B
arrie
r as
eith
er a
n in
clud
ed o
r ex
clud
ed s
cree
ning
dec
isio
n.S
NL
2008
[DIR
S 1
8347
8]
Tota
l Sys
tem
Per
form
ance
A
sses
smen
t Mod
el/A
naly
sis
for t
he L
icen
se
App
licat
ion
Sec
tion
6.5
and
Tabl
e 6.
5-2
Tabl
e A
-2
The
prob
abili
ty o
f ign
eous
an
igne
ous
even
t com
prom
isin
g w
aste
em
plac
emen
t dr
ifts
is v
ery
smal
l
SN
L 20
08 [D
IRS
183
750]
S
atur
ated
Zon
e Fl
ow a
nd
Tran
spor
t Mod
el
Abs
tract
ion
Sec
tion
6.7.
2 Ta
ble
A-2
O
ther
radi
onuc
lides
hav
e m
oder
ate
half-
lives
and
dec
ay to
pro
duct
s th
at m
aybe
rele
ased
from
the
was
te
Sec
tions
7.4
.2, 6
.7.2
Ta
ble
A-3
R
adio
activ
e de
cay
and
ingr
owth
ANL-WIS-MD-000024 REV 01 4-7 February 2008
-
Postclosure Nuclear Safety Design Bases
Tabl
e 4-
1.
Sou
rce
of In
puts
(Con
tinue
d)
Cita
tion
Sour
ce T
itle
Spec
ifica
lly U
sed
From
Spec
ifica
llyU
sed
In (t
his
AM
R)
Inpu
t Des
crip
tion
SN
L 20
07 [D
IRS
184
614]
U
Z Fl
ow M
odel
s an
d S
ubm
odel
s S
ectio
n 7.
7.4.
2 Ta
ble
A-1
P
erch
ed-w
ater
con
ditio
ns d
o no
t pre
sent
ly e
xist
in th
e un
satu
rate
d zo
ne a
bove
th
e re
posi
tory
, and
are
not
exp
ecte
d ev
en u
nder
futu
re c
limat
e ch
ange
s S
ectio
ns 6
.1.2
, 6.
2.4,
6.1.
2; T
able
4.1
-1
Tabl
e A
-3
Frac
ture
-rel
ated
tran
spor
t pro
cess
es/p
rope
rties
incl
ude
fract
ure
perm
eabi
lity,
po
rosi
ty, f
requ
ency
, act
ive
fract
ure
mod
el, m
atrix
diff
usio
n co
effic
ient
, sor
ptio
n,
and
collo
id fi
ltrat
ion
SN
L 20
07 [D
IRS
180
506]
In
-Pac
kage
Che
mis
tryA
bstra
ctio
n S
ectio
n 6.
3.1.
3.4
Tabl
e A
-2
The
diffe
rent
cha
ract
eris
tics
of th
ese
was
te fo
rms
(in p
artic
ular
the
hygr
osco
pic
natu
re o
f the
HLW
gla
ss) h
ave
been
con
side
red
in th
e w
aste
form
alte
ratio
n m
odel
s an
d is
not
foun
d to
sub
stan
tially
impa
ct b
arrie
r cap
abili
ty o
f thi
s fe
atur
e S
ectio
n 6.
3.1.
1 Ta
ble
A-2
C
hem
istry
effe
cts
of v
oids
in th
e w
aste
pac
kage
inte
rnal
s ar
e in
clud
ed in
m
odel
s of
in-p
acka
ge c
hem
istry
Sec
tions
6.1
0.8
and
8.1
Tabl
e A
-2
The
chem
ical
cha
ract
eris
tics
of th
e w
ater
in c
onta
ct w
ith th
e w
aste
pac
kage
in
tern
als,
incl
udin
g vo
id s
pace
s, a
nd th
e w
aste
form
, affe
ct th
e de
grad
atio
n ch
arac
teris
tics
of th
e w
aste
form
, the
sol
ubili
ty o
f rad
ionu
clid
es in
the
diss
olve
d ph
ase,
and
the
stab
ility
of c
ollo
idal
par
ticle
s Ta
ble
6-1a
Ta
ble
A-2
Th
e in
-pac
kage
redo
x st
ate
is a
ssum
ed to
be
set b
y th
e ox
idat
ion
stat
e in
the
empl
acem
ent d
rifts
onc
e th
e w
aste
pac
kage
is b
reac
hed
and
ther
efor
e se
t to
0.2
Sec
tion
6.3.
1.3.
3 Ta
ble
A-2
Th
e ch
emis
try o
f the
wat
er th
at c
omes
into
con
tact
with
the
was
te fo
rm a
nd
was
te p
acka
ge in
tern
als
is a
ltere
d by
reac
tion
with
the
expo
sed
met
allic
and
w
aste
form
sur
face
s in
side
the
was
te p
acka
ge.
Res
ults
of a
naly
ses
indi
cate
th
at th
e ch
emis
try is
mor
e af
fect
ed b
y th
e ra
te a
nd a
mou
nt o
f wat
er in
tera
ctin
g w
ith th
e w
aste
pac
kage
inte
rnal
s th
an th
e ch
emis
try o
f thi
s w
ater
ANL-WIS-MD-000024 REV 01 4-8 February 2008
-
Postclosure Nuclear Safety Design Bases
4.2 CRITERIA
Technical requirements to be satisfied by this document are based on 10 CFR 63.113(a) [DIRS 180319] and 10 CFR 63.115(a)-(c) [DIRS 180319]; as shown in Table 4-2. The acceptance criteria that will be used by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to determine whether the technical requirements have been met are identified in NUREG-1804 (NRC 2003 [DIRS 163274], Section 2.2.1.1.3) and Technical Work Plan for: Postclosure Nuclear Safety Design Bases (SNL 2007 [DIRS 182648]), Section 3.4). This document meets Criterion 1. Part of Criteria 2 and 3, the quantitative analysis and technical basis, are met by the TSPA (SNL 2008 [DIRS 183478]). These acceptance criteria are included below:
� Acceptance Criterion 1—Identification of Barriers Is Adequate
Barriers relied on to achieve compliance with 10 CFR 63.113(b) [DIRS 180319], as demonstrated in the Total System Performance Assessment, are adequately identified, and are clearly linked to their capabilities. The barriers identified include at least one from the engineered system and one from the natural system.
� Acceptance Criterion 2—Description of Barrier Capability to Isolate Waste Is Acceptable
The capability of the identified barriers to prevent or substantially reduce the rate of movement of water or radionuclides from the Yucca Mountain repository to the accessible environment, or prevent the release or substantially reduce the release rate of radionuclides from the waste is adequately identified and described:
(1) The information on the time period over which each barrier performs its intended function, including any changes during the compliance period, is provided
(2) The uncertainty associated with barrier capabilities is adequately described
(3) The described capabilities are consistent with the results from the Total System Performance Assessment
(4) The described capabilities are consistent with the definition of a barrier in 10 CFR 63.2 [DIRS 180319].
� Acceptance Criterion 3—Technical Basis for Barrier Capability Is Adequately Presented
The technical bases are consistent with the technical basis for the Performance Assessment. The technical basis for assertions of barrier capability is commensurate with the importance of each barrier’s capability and their associated uncertainties.
The information presented in Table 4-2 summarizes the information category and the corresponding regulatory requirements of 10 CFR Part 63 [DIRS 180319].
ANL-WIS-MD-000024 REV 01 4-9 February 2008
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Table 4-2. Cross Reference for Information Categories in 10 CFR Part 63
Information Category 10 CFR Part 63 Reference System Description and Demonstration of Multiple Barriers 63.113(a)
63.115(a)-(c) Identification of Barriers 63.113(a)
63.115(a) Barrier Capability Description 63.113(a)
63.115(b) Technical Bases for Barrier Capability 63.115(c)
Identifying Postclosure Performance Assessment Controlling Parameters and 63.21(c)(9) Classifying ITWI Structures, Systems and Components. 63.21(c)(10)
63.21(c)(14) 63.21(c)(15)
NOTE: Meeting 10 CFR 63.115(c) [DIRS 180319] regulations also requires that the technical basis for each barrier capability shall be based on, and consistent with, the technical basis for the performance assessments used to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 63.113(b) and 10 CFR 63.113(c) [DIRS 180319], which also invoke 10 CFR 63.114 [DIRS 180319] and other requirements from Subpart L of 10 CFR Part 63 [DIRS 180319].
Postclosure Nuclear Safety Design Bases
4.3 CODES, STANDARDS, AND REGULATIONS
Other than the regulatory requirements and Yucca Mountain Review Plan acceptance criteria identified in Section 4.2, no other codes, standards, or regulations are used in this report.
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Postclosure Nuclear Safety Design Bases
5. ASSUMPTIONS
The only assumptions in this scientific analysis that are used in the ITBC evaluations of FEPs are the enabling assumptions identified in Section 6.1.
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Postclosure Nuclear Safety Design Bases
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
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Postclosure Nuclear Safety Design Bases
6. SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS DISCUSSION
This report has been prepared to meet regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 63.113(a) and 63.115 [DIRS 180319]), and to provide a risk-informed analysis of the postclosure technical basis for multiple barriers. Specifically, 10 CFR 63.113(a) [DIRS 180319] provides requirements for multiple barriers as part of performance objectives for the geologic repository after permanent closure, and 10 CFR 63.115 [DIRS 180319] provides requirements for the identification of, description of, and technical basis for the multiple barriers.
The major activities documented in this report that address, in part, the above regulations are two: conduct the barrier analysis, and develop core and control parameter characteristics. For natural and engineered barriers that are ITWI, the tasks associated with these two activities include:
1. Describing the three ITWI barriers (UNB, EBS, and LNB)
2. Evaluating barrier capability, including assessment of the technical bases, evaluation of ITBC parameter characteristics and supporting the ITWI determination.
The approach used to identify parameter characteristics that support the postclosure technical basis, the TSPA and contribute to barrier capability, begins by analyzing the FEP descriptions and screening justifications. The barrier analysis uses supporting information from FEP screening reports, which document the processes and events that are included in or excluded from performance assessment models; it also uses information from process models and model abstraction reports that describe the technical basis for implementation of processes and events in the performance assessment models. The use of information from these reports to support the barrier analysis ensures that the technical basis for barrier capability is consistent with the technical basis for the performance assessment models. Direct inputs supporting this analysis are listed in Table 4-1. Indirect inputs are listed in Table 6-1.
Table 6-1. Source of Indirect Inputs
Reference and DIRS Citation Name 10 CFR 63. 2007 [DIRS 180319] 10 CFR 63 70 FR 49014 [DIRS 177357] 40 CFR 197 70 FR 53313 [DIRS 178394] 70 FR 53313. Implementation of a Dose Standard After 10,000 Years ASME B46.1-2002. 2003 [DIRS 166013]
Surface Texture (Surface Roughness, Waviness and Lay). New York, New York: American Society of Mechanical Engineers. TIC: 257359.
ASTM B 575-99a. 1999 [DIRS 147465] Standard Specification for Low-Carbon Nickel-Molybdenum-Chromium, Low-Carbon Nickel-Chromium-Molybdenum, Low-Carbon NickelChromium-Molybdenum-Copper, Low-Carbon Nickel-ChromiumMolybdenum-Tantalum, and Low-Carbon Nickel-Chromium-Molybdenum-Tungsten Alloy Plate, Sheet, and Strip
BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107] Drift Degradation Analysis BSC 2004 [DIRS 167652] Seepage Model for PA Including Drift Collapse BSC 2004 [DIRS 168138] Estimation of Mechanical Properties of Crushed Tuff for Use as Ballast
Material in Emplacement Drifts
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Postclosure Nuclear Safety Design Bases
Table 6-1. Source of Indirect Inputs (Continued)
Reference and DIRS Citation Name BSC 2004 [DIRS 169218] Natural Analogue Synthesis Report BSC 2004 [DIRS 169987] CSNF Waste Form Degradation: Summary Abstraction BSC 2004 [DIRS 169988] Defense HLW Glass Degradation Model
BSC 2004 [DIRS 169989] Characterize Framework for Igneous Activity at Yucca Mountain, Nevada BSC 2004 [DIRS 170002] Future Climate Analysis BSC 2004 [DIRS 170035] Conceptual Model and Numerical Approaches for Unsaturated Zone Flow
and Transport BSC 2004 [DIRS 171764] Seepage Calibration Model and Seepage Tes