Positive Theory
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Transcript of Positive Theory
POSITIVE THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH
PHILOSOPHY of POSITIVE ACCOUNTING THEORY
• Teori positif dikeluarkan untuk memahami fenomena-fenomena akuntansi dengan mengamati kejadian secara empiris dan hasil pengamatan tersebut digunakan untuk membuat prediksi kejadian di masa akan datang.
Philosophy
• Tujuan teori positif adalah mengembangakan teori atau hipotesa yang menghasilkan prediksi yang valid dan bermakna untuk prediksi atau phenomena yang belum pernah diamati.
Milton Friedman:
• Tujuan teori positif adalah memprediksi dan menjelaskan praktek akuntansi
Watt & Zimmerma :
PHILOSOPHY of POSITIVE ACCOUNTING THEORY
Asumsi mengenai perilaku individu :
Para manajer, investor dan lender merupakan orang-orang yang rasional, menginginkan adanya
keuntungan dari sisi finansial
Manajer bisa memilih metode akuntansi yang secara langsung memaksimalkan kepentingan
pribadinya atau merubah kebijakan yang berkaitan dengan pendanaan dan produksi yang secara tidak langsung mensejahterakan dirinya
sendiri
Manajer memaksimalkan nilai perusahaan
STRENGTHS of POSITIVE THEORY
1• Menghasilkan hipotesis melalui pengujian empiris
2• Memberi pemahaman tentang bagaimana dunia ini
bekerja
3• Memberi pemahaman mengenai kaitan antara
akuntansi dan harga saham
4
• Berusaha memberi pemahaman mengenai kaitan antara informasi akuntansi, manajer perusahaan dan pasar serta menganalisa hubungannya
SCOPE of POSITIVE ACCOUNTING THEORY
Penelitian dampak akuntansi dan perilaku pasar modal.
Menjelaskan dan memprediksi praktek akuntansi dalam perusahaan. • Usaha untuk menjelaskan apakah perusahaan
menggunakan metode akuntansi tertentu untuk alasan oportunistik. Contohnya memindahkan kesejahteraan milik pemegang saham ke tangan manajer. Perspektif mengenai oportunistik ini sering disebut ex post.
• Mengasumsikan perusahaan memilih praktek akuntansi untuk alasan efisiensi. Sehingga kebijakan akuntansi ditempatkan sebagai ex ante untuk menurunkan biaya kontrak antara perusahaan dan pemegang saham.
Pengembangan teori akuntansi positif :
CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH and THE EFFICIENT MARKETS HYPOTHESIS
• Studi yang berusaha menentukan dampak perilisan informasi keuangan terhadap return saham
• Studi yang memikirkan efek dari perubahan kebijakan akuntansi terhadap harga saham
Penelitian pasar modal yang secara
khusus penting terhadap teori
akuntansi positif:
• – efficient markets hypothesis (EMH).
Sebagian besar penelitian
mengenai hal ini mengarah
pada satu paradigma ekonomi
CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH and THE EFFICIENT MARKETS HYPOTHESIS
Pasar efisien, asumsi:
Tidak ada biaya transaksi dalam perdagangan sekuritas
Informasi disediakan secara cuma-cuma bagi seluruh
peserta pasar
Ada perjanjian mengenai dampak informasi saat ini
terhadap harga sekarang dan pendistribusian harga pada
masa yang akan datang
CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH and THE EFFICIENT MARKETS HYPOTHESIS
Macam Inform
asiWeak
Semistrong
Strong
CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH and THE EFFICIENT MARKETS HYPOTHESIS
Sementara EMH adalah teori tentang mekanisme
harga pada pasar sekuritas,
VS
Capital market research (CMR) adalah penelitian
empiris yang menggunakan metode statistik untuk menguji
hipotesis yang berkaitan dengan perilaku pasar
modal. Kebanyakan CMR menggunakan market
model.
CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH and THE EFFICIENT MARKETS HYPOTHESIS
• Investor merupakan risk-averse• Return didistribusikan secara
normal dan para investor memilih portofolio mereka sendiri
• Investor memiliki ekspektasi yang sama
• Merupakan pasar sempurna
Asumsi dalam market model:
DAMPAK PENGUMUMAN LABA AKUNTANSI TERHADAP HARGA SAHAM
Salah satu tujuan teori akuntansi positif adalah mempelajari informasi yang dimiliki laba akuntansi terhadap harga saham.
Ball & Brown melakukan pengujian terhadap manfaat laba historical cost bagi investor.
Peningkatan laba akuntansi yang tidak diestimasi sebelumnya merupakan informasi baru bagi investor. Dalam pasar modal efisien, setiap perubahan aliran kas dari yang diharapkan akan mempengaruhi harga saham.
PENGARUH PENELITIAN INFORMASI LABA TERHADAP HARGA SAHAM ( BALL & BROWN’S)
Laba akuntansi historis
mengandung informasi yang cukup berarti.
Dari hasil penelitian
diketahui adanya informasi yang
berkelanjutan di pasar, jadi
akuntansi bukan satu-satunya
informasi mengenai
perusahaan.
Pasar secara konsisten
mengantisipasi informasi laporan
akuntansi.
KETIDAK SEIMBANGAN INFORMASI DAN BESARNYA PERUSAHAAN
Kandungan informasi pengumuman laba yang tidak diharapkan mungkin berlawanan dengan ukuran perusahaan.
Semakin kecil perusahaan, semakin banyak informasi yang terkandung pada perusahaan.
Argumentasi yang diberikan Freeman:
• Perusahaan memberikan informasi yang lebih bervariasi• Perusahaan besar mempunyai tingkat informasi yang lebih
besar yang dilakukan oleh para peneliti dan pemberitaan.Investor institusi umumnya lebih menyukai bertransaksi dengan perusahaan besar, untuk alasan likuiditas dan masalah kontrak.
BEBERAPA FAKTOR YANG MEMPENGARUHI EARNING RESPON COEFICIENT
Faktor
Risiko dan
ketidak pastian
Kualitas audit
Industri
Tingkat Bunga
Financial Leverage
Tingkat Pertumbu
han Perusaha
an
Laba permane
n dan temporer
STRATEGI PERDAGANGAN
Berdasarkan bukti
empiris ternyata
pasar dapat dipengaruhi
data akuntansi
•Perubahan informasi setelah pengumuman•Winner-losser strategies dan sikap optimis para analis keuangan.
MECHANISTIC OR BEHAVIOURAL EFFECT
Cosmetic accounting Leftwich
Two hypotheses Market reacted mechanistically to changes in
accounting numbers, regardless whether they were cosmetic or whether they had cash flow implications
Market ignored accounting changes which had no cash flow consequences
MECHANISTIC OR BEHAVIOURAL EFFECT
Manipulating accounting numbers:
MECHANISTIC OR BEHAVIOURAL EFFECT
Detecting the quality and probability of accounting management :
A POSITIVE THEORY OF ACCOUNTING DISCRETION
BACKGROUND: EARLY DEMAND FOR THEORY
Capital markets research
inconclusive
Observations of accounting policy choice•Why do managers prepare financial reports?•How are accounting policy choices made?
Information hypothesis could
not explain all observations
CONTRACTING THEORY
The firm as a legal ‘nexus’ of contractual relationships
Organising economic activity to reduce contracting costs
• management contracts• debt contracts
AGENCY THEORY
Jensen & Meckling (1976)
Contract where one party (the
principal) engages
another (the agent) to act on
their behalf
e.g. where there is a separation of management and
control. Managers have remuneration
contracts
Utility maximisation by
both parties
Agent may act on her/his own behalf (self-
interest)
Firms can be characterised as a nexus of contracts
• Between consumers of products and the suppliers of factors of production
Firms exist because they reduce contracting costs,
• Firms provide an efficient means of organising economic activity
Contracts include all types of agreements between two or more parties
AGENCY THEORY
Agency costsDue to self interest, the agent might act in his/her own interest rather than that of the
principal (moral hazard)
Agents may undertake certain Divergent Behaviours
This agency problem gives rise to Agency Costs (monitoring, bonding and residual
loss)
AGENCY THEORY
Agency costs can be categorised into:
1. Monitoring Costs – the cost of observing the agent’s behaviour
Auditing costs
2. Bonding Costs – Costs borne by the agent (e.g. manager) as a result of aligning their interests with the principal (e.g. owners)
Manager has to prepare financial reports (a cost to the manager in terms of time and effort)
AGENCY THEORY
Agency costs can be categorised into (continued):
3. Residual Loss – loss associated with not being able to fully align the interests of the principal with the agent
AGENCY THEORY
• The principal reduces the remuneration paid to the agent in anticipation of agency costs
• Cost of dysfunctional behaviour built into remuneration
Price Protection (ex ante – up front)
• The principal reduces the remuneration paid to the agent
• Remuneration based on observed agent performance
Ex post settling up (ex post – after the
fact e.g. at the end of each year)
AGENCY THEORY
MANAGER-SHAREHOLDER AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS
Managers as agents of owners can act in
own interest
The smaller
the manager
ownership in the firm the more
likely divergent behaviour
s
Manager has
incentive to
contract with firm to reduce divergent behaviour
s to reduce price
protection
Manager bear cost of owner monitorin
g
Agency
Costs of
Equity
Risk-Aversion • – limited
incentive to increase value of firm through investment in risky projects
Dividend Retention • – reduced
incentive to pay dividends or take on optimal levels of debt
Horizon Problem • – short term
focus on performance of firm
Over-consumptio
n of Perquisites
MANAGER-SHAREHOLDER AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS
Reducing the agency costs of equity Bonuses are usually tied to firm
performance in some way to motivate managers to act in the owners’ interest
Bonuses can be paid in cash and/or shares/share options
Bonuses can be tied to: 1. Accounting numbers(such as net
income, sales, return on assets) 2. Share price (market based performance
measure)
MANAGER-SHAREHOLDER AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS
SHAREHOLDER-DEBTHOLDER AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS
• Excessive dividend payments-reducing debtholder’s security
• Asset substitution-firm invests in higher risk projects (no benefit to debtholder)
• Under investment-where no incentive to invest in positive NPV projects
• Claim dilution-issuing higher priority debt
Agency
costs of
debt
Debt-holders can Price Protect via increased interest charges or reduced amounts provided
The interests of shareholders can be bonded to those of debtholders via restrictions in lending agreements (Loan Covenants)
Covenants often rely on numbers contained in financial statements
Covenants usually restrict the behaviour of managers acting on behalf of owners
SHAREHOLDER-DEBTHOLDER AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS
EX POST OPPORTUNISM VERSUSEX ANTE EFFICIENT CONTRACTING
Contracts provide incentives for agents to act against principals interest
Opportunistic perspective ex post (after contracts finalised) incomplete contracts bonus plan hypothesis debt-equity hypothesis
Efficient contracting perspective
Efficient contracting perspective
Efficient contracts
align interests of agent
with principal
Actions that
benefit agent also
benefit firm
Ex ante – before
contracts are
finalised
EX POST OPPORTUNISM VERSUSEX ANTE EFFICIENT CONTRACTING
INFORMATION PERSPECTIVE AND SIGNALLING
Holthausen
Derived from
signalling theory
Managers provide informati
on to investors to assist in their decision making
Similar to
efficient contracti
ng
Accounting
information
precedescash flows
Aligned with the information hypothesis
Managers use the accounts to signal expectations and intentions regarding the future
Incentives to signal good, neutral and bad news
INFORMATION PERSPECTIVE AND SIGNALLING
POLITICAL PROCESSES
The firm and parties interested in the firm
Political market v. capital market• Less demand for information in
political market• Less benefit from information
gathering• Heterogeneity of interests
Political costs – wealth transfers• Size hypothesis
Implications for firm behaviour• e.g. banking sector in
Australia
POLITICAL PROCESSES
EMPIRICAL TESTS
Testing the opportunistic and political cost hypothesis
Watts & Zimmerman
Zmijewski & Hagerman
provided little insight
Empirical tests – tests using contract details (Healy)
Figure 10.1: Allocation of funds to the bonus pool,based on accounting profit
EMPIRICAL TESTS
Empirical tests – tests using contract details (Healy)
Figure 10.2: Accounting accruals as a function ofbonus plan specifications
EMPIRICAL TESTS
Refining the specification of political costs• Liberty & Zimmerman• Godfrey & Jones• DeAngelo• Wong• Lemke & Page• Panchapakesan &
McKinnon• Ali & Kumar
EMPIRICAL TESTS
Tests of efficient
contracting hypotheses
interest capitalisation
voluntary consolidated financial reporting
changes in CEO
other studies
EMPIRICAL TESTS
EVALUATION OF THE THEORY
Methodological and statistical criticisms• empirical evidence weak and
inconclusive• McKee, Bell & Boatsman• Christie• Leftwich
EVALUATION OF THE THEORY
Philosophical criticisms
Tinker, Merino and Neimark
Christenson
Watts and Zimmerman