Positivism is historically associated with the nineteenth century French philosopher, Auguste Comte, who was the first thinker to use the word for a philosophical position (Beck 1979). Hispositivism turns to observation and reason as means of understanding behaviour; explanation proceeds by way of scientific description.

According to the doctrine of August comet “all genuine knowledge is based on sense experience and can be advanced only by means of observation and experiment.” Following in the empiricist tradition, it limited inquiry and belief to what can be firmly established and in thus abandoning metaphysical and speculative attempts to gain knowledge by reason alone, the movement developed what has been described as a ‘tough-minded or ientation to facts and natural phenomena’ (Beck 1979).

According to Duncan (1968) it the paradigm of human knowledge (Duncan 1968).

First, the methodological procedures of natural science may be directly applied to the social sciences Positivism here implies a particular stance concerning the social scientist as an observer of social reality. Second, the end-product of investigations by social scientists can be formulated in terms parallel to those of natural science. This means that their analyses must be expressed in laws or law-like generalizations of the same kind that have been established in relation to natural phenomena.

Positivism here involves a definite view of social scientists as analysts or interpreters of their subject matter. Positivism claims that science provides us with the clearest possible ideal of knowledge.

The assumptions and nature of science

First, there is the assumption of determinism.The second assumption is that of empiricismMouly (1978) identifies five steps in the process of empirical science:1 experience: the starting point of scientific endeavour at the most elementary level2 classification: the formal systematization ofotherwise incomprehensible masses of data3 quantification: a more sophisticated stage where precision of measurement allows more adequate analysis of phenomena by athematical means4 discovery of relationships: the identification and classification of functional relationshipsamong phenomena5 approximation to the truth: science proceeds by gradual approximation to the truth.

The third assumption underlying the work of the scientist is the principle of parsimony.The final assumption, that of generality

A word representing an idea: more accurately, a concept is the relationship between the word (or symbol) and an idea or conception. Whoever we are and whatever we do, we all make use of concepts. Concepts enable us to impose some sort of meaning on the world; through them reality is given sense, order and coherence. They are the means by which we are able to come to terms with our experience. How we perceive the world, then, is highly dependent on the repertoire of concepts we can command. The more we have, the more sense data we can pick up and the surer will be our perceptual (and cognitive) grasp of whatever is ‘out there’. If our perceptions of the world are determined by the concepts available to us, it follows that people with differing sets of concepts will tend to view the ‘same’ objective reality differently – a doctor diagnosing an illness will draw upon a vastly different range of concepts from, say, the restricted and simplistic notions of the layperson in that context.

So, you may ask, where is all this leading? Simply to this: that social scientists have likewise developed, or appropriated by giving precise meaning to, a set of concepts which enable them to shape their perceptions of the world in a particular way, to represent that slice of reality which is their special study. And collectively, these concepts form part of their wider meaning system which permits them to give accounts of that reality, accounts which are rooted and validated in the direct experience of everyday life. Thesepoints may be exemplified by the concept of socialclass. Hughes (1976) says that it offers

a rule, a grid, even though vague at times, to use in talking about certain sorts of experience that have to do with economic position, life-style, life-chances, and so on. It serves to identify aspects of experience, and by relating the concept to other concepts we are able to construct theories about experience in a particular order or sphere. (Hughes 1976: 34)

There are two important points to stress when considering scientific concepts. The first is that they do not exist independently of us: they are indeed our inventions enabling us to acquire some understanding at least of the apparent chaos of nature. The second is that they are limited in number and in this way contrast with the infinite number of phenomena they are required to explain.

A second tool of great importance to the scientist is the hypothesis. It is from this that much research proceeds, especially where cause and- effect or concomitant relationships are being investigated. The hypothesis has been

defined by Kerlinger (1970) as a conjectural statement of the relations between two or more variables, or ‘an educated guess’, though it is unlike an educated guess in that it is often the result of considerable study, reflective thinking and observation. Medawar (1972) writes of the hypothesis and its function thus:

All advances of scientific understanding, at everylevel, begin with a speculative adventure, animaginative preconception of what might be true – apreconception which always, and necessarily, goes alittle way (sometimes a long way) beyond anythingwhich we have logical or factual authority to believein. It is the invention of a possible world, or ofa tiny fraction of that world. The conjecture isthen exposed to criticism to find out whether ornot that imagined world is anything like the realone. Scientific reasoning is therefore at all levelsan interaction between two episodes of thought – adialogue between two voices, the one imaginativeand the other critical; a dialogue, if you like, betweenthe possible and the actual, between proposal anddisposal, conjecture and criticism, between whatmight be true and what is in fact the case.(Medawar 1972)

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Positivist Approach

This approach has been explicitly recognized, and advocated, as the "natural-science model" of social-science research, and has found widespread application in social science in general, and in organiza-tional research in particular (see Schutz 1973, p. 48; Behling 1980, p. 483; Schon, Drake and Miller 1984, p. 9; Burrell and Morgan 1979, p. 4; Daft 1983, p. 539; Lee 1989a, b).

Only by applying the methods of natural science, according to the positivist school of thought, will social science (including organizational research) ever be able to match the achievements of natural science in explanation, prediction, and control.

the positivist approach involves the manipulation of theoretical propositions using the rules of formal logic and the rules of hypothetico-deductive logic, so that the theoretical propositions satisfy the four requirements of falsifiability, logical consistency, relative explanatory power, and survival. Immediately following are the details to this outline.

The Rules of Formal Logic

In the positivist approach, a scientific explanation is expressed in formal proposi-tions, so that the rules of formal logic may be applied. This is important because the rules of formal logic provide a powerful means by which to relate propositions to one another, and to deduce new ones. The axiomatic systems of mathematics, like Euclid's system of geometry, provide the ideal for how this system of logic is supposed to work (Feigl 1970, Hanson 1969, Nagel and Newman 1960). For this reason, it is preferred, and sometimes even required, that scientific explanations be stated mathe-matically, since this would allow the scientist to use a well established subset of the rules of formal logic-a subset widely known as the rules of algebra. Whether or not mathematical, the rules of formal logic have two important consequences for the development of a scientific explanation. First, the process of logical deduction is able to extract consequences that are contained only implicitly in the explanation's opening premises, thereby leading to unanticipated discoveries (Barker 1969, p. 238, citing Hempel). Second, any proposition that cannot be shown to be logically connected to, or logically deducible from, the remaining propositions would be "exposed" as groundless (Hanson 1969, p. 61). In this way, the scientist can use the rules of formal logic to eliminate propositions that originate from the scientist's own "subjective" opinions, values, and biases. In the positivist approach, the origin of all deduced propositions must be found in the explanation's own 'objective" foundational premises. (2) The Rules of "Hypothetico-Deductive Logic" The rules of formal logic in general, and the rules of mathematics in particular, pertain to the task of how to relate propositions to one another. As such, these rules meet the needs of the formal logician or pure mathematician, who restricts his or her attention to the world of ideal relations-the strictly artificial world of formal propositions and the relationships between them. The scientist, however, works not only in the artificial world of propositions-propositions that are of his or her own invention-but also in the "real world" that he or she is observing. The scientist, therefore, faces not only the task of how to relate these propositions to one another (so that they are logical), but also the additional task of how to relate these propositions to the empirical reality of interest (so that the propositions are true). Therefore, in addition to the rules of formal logic (which include the rules of mathematics), the scientist needs a distinct set of procedural rules with which to relate his or her propositions to the empirical reality being investigated. A major obstacle confronting such a procedure is that scientific propositions are resistant to testing by direct observation. The reason is that scientific propositions typically posit the existence of entities, phenomena, or relationships that are not directly observable, for whatever reason. The researcher can only theorize that they exist, like protons, electrons, and photons in physics, black holes in astronomy, evolution in biology, elasticities in economics, social structures in sociology, and so forth. None of these things can be seen directly. By what procedure, then, may the scientist relate his or her propositions to empirical referents that are not directly observable? Researchers who take the positivist approach address this concern by using what is called "hypothetico-deductive logic." The main idea behind hypo-thetico-deductive logic is that theorized entities have consequences that are observ-able, even if the entities themselves are not. Hypothetico-deductive logic is a particular way of applying the logic of the syllogism. The standard syllogism (see Figure 1) involves applying a major premise,

Major premise: All man are mortalMinor Premise : Socrates is a man

Conclusion :SOCRATES IS MORTALTesting: OBSERVATION SOCRATES DIES

such as "All men are mortal," to a minor premise, such as "Socrates is a man," in order to reach a conclusion, which, in this case, would be "Socrates is mortal." In syllogistic reasoning, the conclusion can be true only if the major premise is true and, conversely, the major premise can be true only if the conclusion is true. In other words, each serves as an indicator of the truth or falsity of the other.

In hypothetico-deductive logic (see Figure 1), the major premise is a general theory, the minor premise is a set of facts (the "initial conditions") describing a situation, and the conclusion is what the theory predicts or hypothesizes to be observed in that specific situation. This means that, even if a theory is not directly verifiable because it refers to unobservable entities, it can still be tested indirectly, through the observable consequences (equivalently called "predictions" or "hypothe-ses") that are logically deducible from it. For example, the theory that "All men are mortal" can be tested through its prediction that "Socrates is mortal" by observing whether or not Socrates dies. This also means that no theory can be conclusively verified as true, since a new situation and a new prediction ("Plato is mortal") would re-open the possibility for its being disproven. A theory that is said to be "confirmed" or "corroborated" is one that has survived such a test, but remains open to being disproven in future tests. (See Copi 1986 and Popper 1968a.)

Of course, the testing of hypotheses and predictions calls for rigorous controls. This means that when the scientist tests what the theory predicts to happen, against what he or she actually observes to happen, the scientist must be able to attribute the phenomenon or relationship being observed to the factor of interest being tested, where the potentially confounding effects of the remaining factors are somehow removed or "controlled for." The controls of laboratory experiments and the controls of inferential statistics exist for this purpose.

Four Requirements for the Theoretical Propositions to Satisfy When the rules of formal logic and the rules of hypothetico-deductive logic are used to manage theoretical propositions, there are four "checks" or requirements that the propositions must satisfy, so that the researcher knows that he or she is managing the propositions properly (Popper 1968a, pp. 32-33). The first requirement is falsifiability. The presence of inaccuracies in the empirical content of theoretical propositions can be detected only through contradictory observations-observations that disconfirm a prediction and thereby falsify the theory from which the prediction follows. In this regard, Popper (1968, p. 37) takes the position that the Marxist theory of history, "in spite of the serious efforts of some of its founders and followers," eventually adopted the practice of making predictions so vague that the predictions could hardly be disconfirmed. The lack of falsifiability in the Marxist theory of history therefore had the effect of concealing any inaccuracies in it; "by this strategem they destroyed [their theory's] much advertised claim to scientific status." The now common characterization of scientific theories as falsifi-able, refutable, testable, and disconfirmable is an indication of the widespread extent to which the rules of hypothetico-deductive logic have been put into practice. The significance of the

requirement of falsifiability is magnified in the situation where the scientist must evaluate competing theories. In general, it is possible for the same observation to be consistent with several theories simultaneously. This means that the accumulation of more and more observations consistent with a particular theory does not prove that it is the true one, or, if considered alone, that it is true at all. The key, therefore, is not to accumulate observations that are consistent with a theory, but to seek observations that disconfirm or falsify a theory; the result would be a reduction in the number of theories considered viable, with the surviving one(s) thus earning the status of "confirmed" or "corroborated." Unlike the Marxist theory of history, at least in the way that Popper characterizes it (above), such theories must be formulated in a way that allows their disconfirmation or falsification. The second requirement is logical consistency. One test for logical consistency, already mentioned, is that all of a theory's propositions must be shown to be related to one another by the rules of formal logic, or be logically deducible from the same set of premises. Another test-one that the hypothetico-deductive framework empha-sizes-is that the different predictions which follow from a theory must be compatible with one another. In other words, a theory that allows predictions of contrary or mutually exclusive events is said to lack logical consistency. For instance, consider a set of theoretical propositions that explain race-based and gender-based employment discrimination in terms of the dynamics of psychological and group processes. Suppose further that the theoretical propositions, when applied to the facts and figures describing a certain organization, lead to the following three predictions about the actual salaries in the organization (where all factors but race and gender are held constant): on average, the white women earn more than the black men, the black men earn more than the black women, and the black women earn more than the white women. Clearly, the situations posed by any two of the predictions logically preclude the situation posed by the third. The methodological

result, in which all three predictions are deducible from the same theory, would be a sign that the theoretical propositions, from which the predictions follow, lack consis-tency and must be "tightened up" before they are ready for empirical testing. The third requirement is relative explanatory power. A given theory must be able to explain, or predict, the subject matter as well as any competing theory. As an example, consider two theories that purport to explain the same phenomenon. Each theory undergoes testing in the same five laboratory experiments, where each experi-ment poses a different set of empirical conditions. The predictions of the first theory are confirmed in all five laboratory experiments. The predictions of the second theory, however, are confirmed in only three of the experiments; in the remaining two experiments, the results are unfavorable or inconclusive. The second theory, in not predicting as well as the first theory, is rejected for its relative deficiency in explana-tory power. The fourth and last requirement is survival. While falsifiable, a theory must survive the actual attempts aimed at its disconfirmation through controlled empirical testing. Passing an empirical test, however, can never verify conclusively that the theory of interest is true. "It should be noted that a positive decision can only temporarily support the theory, for subsequent negative decisions may always overthrow it" (Popper 1968a, p. 33). The rules of hypothetico-deductive logic therefore necessitate the on-going testing of previously confirmed theories.

An Integrated Framework for the Positivist and Interpretive Approaches

Which approach should we take to organizational research? The positivist approach makes the claim that its methods-the methods of natural science-are the only truly scientific ones, while the interpretive approach makes the counterclaim that the study of people and their institutions calls for methods that are altogether foreign to those of natural science.

The understanding at the first level belongs to the observed human subjects. This understanding consists of the everyday common sense and everyday meanings with which the human subjects see themselves, and which give rise to the behavior that they manifest in socially constructed settings. This explanation, which is also called scientific theory, is made up of constructs that belong exclusively to the observing researcher (as opposed to the observed human subjects). The explanation consists of formal propositions that typically posit the existence of unobservable entities (like social structure). This such way involves the researcher's ability, based on the interpretive understanding, to read the behavior of the observed human subjects as rational, rather than as absurd, peculiar, pointless, irrational, surprising, or confusing. This paper will utilize Schutz's concept of "puppets" (1973, pp. 63-65) as a device for adapting the positivist understanding so that it may adequately account for this additional feature which characterizes social reality. In an important way, the theoretical propositions that positivist researcher formulates are not about people, but "puppets." The positivist researcher constructs the puppets to think and act likes the actual human subjects whom he or she is observing. In the way that the theoretical propositions are formulated, the researcher (i) endows the puppets with certain internally held values, (ii) specifies the variety of external opportunities and constraints that the puppets may encounter in their environment, and (iii) specifies the actions (the publicly observable behaviors) with which the puppets, given their internally held values, may respond to the externally encountered opportunities and constraints. The first two of the three tests of the positivist understanding encourage the researcher to verify that the predicted actions are "rational" with respect to the subjective meanings attributed to the puppets based on the interpretive understand-ing. Indeed, the construction of a positivist understanding without the aid of a careful interpretation of the subjective meanings would invite the methodological error that anthropology calls "ethnocentrism" and history calls "anachronism." In this method-ological error, the researcher mistakenly applies the subjective meanings that exist in his or her own culture or organization, instead of the subjective meanings that exist in the culture or organization of the observed human subjects, when he or she is developing a theoretical explanation for the behavior of these people. In order to avoid this methodological error, the first two tests insure that the following two sets of meanings are the same: (1) the subjective meanings that the human subjects themselves attach to their own actions, as earlier recorded by the researcher in the interpretive understanding, and (2) the subjective meanings that the positivist understanding assigns, explicitly or implicitly, to the actions of its puppets.

Article favour POPPER, POSITIVISM, AND PRACTICE RESEARCH: A RESPONSE TO MUNRO

Few contemporary phi losophers of science defend logical positivism, yet positivism itself remains the dominant philosophy, both in social work and in all other scientific fields. A simple definition of positivism is found in Rubin & Babbie (1997):

"A paradigm introduced by August Comte, which held that social behavior could be studied and understood in a rational, scien tific manner—in contrast to explanations based in religion or superstition" (p. G-6). Note that positivism does not dismiss other approaches to understanding, it merely as serts the value of one particular (e.g., scien tific) approach. We are all positivists in this broad sense.

The positivist tools of evaluation research, such as single system and group research designs, are indeed very good at this. One can determine, for example, whether clients re ceiving Azrin's Job-Finding Club Program obtain better paying and longer term employ ment more rapidly than clients receiving tra ditional job counseling (see Azrin, Flores, & Kaplan, 1975). A randomized controlled trial, with suitable outcome measures and a suffi ciently long follow-up period, can do this quite well. This is an entirely different endeavor than testing a theory, and it illustrates well the differing approaches of applied research compared to basic scientific inquiries aimed atevaluating a theory. Social work is much more akin to an applied discipline like engineering (see Guild & Guild, 1936), than to a basic science like physics. One can have a predic tion (I would not call it a theory) about whether or not a newly constructed but untested bridge spanning a gorge can bear the weight of a heavily laden train. Popper notwithstand ing, one can test this prediction rather rigor ously by driving said train across the bridge. The answer will rapidly be forthcoming. If the bridge fails, the answer is unambiguous. If the bridge holds, the answer is equally unam biguous. This is not Popper and the testing of metallurgical theory, this is applied research answering practical evaluation questions on the safety of bridges.

Munro cites the positivist's supposed reliance on "neutral" observation as a fatal philosophical and pragmatic error, since sci entists, as human beings,

always bring some preconceptions or bias to their data-gather ing endeavors. This is a straw man argument, since no one claims that such strict neutrality or observations by humans is possible. A much more accurate portrayal (Kendler, 1991) of the positivist perspective is as follows: The crucial question is not whether the scientist's behavior is free of preconcep tions, but whether his or her scientific observations can be detached from those inferences Regardless of an observer's value judgements, theoretical preconcep tions, social beliefs, or any other predis position, consensual agreement will be guaranteed if a minimal commitment to natural science methodology is main tained. (p. 140)

And (Gorenstein, 1986), It makes no sense to reject the potential scientific import of a construct simply because social values may have played some role in its formation. The question of whether a construct has any scientific import is an empirical one. It has to do with whether the construct exhibits law ful properties, (p. 589)

In several places Munro (2002) raises the bogeyman of behaviorism: "Whereas extreme behaviourists have claimed that a scientific social science cannot study the mind..." (p. 466) and "Whereas there seemed an absolute schism between social workers' intuitive prac tice wisdom and the strict version of behav iorism that avoided all reference to mental processes..." (p. 469). Although I am a strictbehaviorist in the Skinnerian tradition, I am quite at a loss as to whom Munro is referring. I know of no behavioral social worker in the past 40 years who fits her description. Skin ner wrote extensively about the mind, and explaining so-called mental phenomena has been a major and productive area of concep tual and experimental behaviorist inquiry for many decades (see Thyer, 1992). Where be haviorists diverge from many theoreticians is in trying to explain so-called mental mecha nisms in terms of a person's history of past and contemporary environmental transac tions and one's biological endowment, with out invoking non-materialistic causal agents. Indeed, for the Skinnerian behaviorist, every thing the body does is behavior-overt actions, feelings, and thoughts, regardless of their publicly observable nature. We do not believe that invoking the "mind" explains anything at all (after all, one must then account for the mind itself, which inevitably leads back to biology and person-in-environment transac tions!), but the private products of our brains (and the rest of our bodies) such as thoughts, dreams, etc., have long been a focus of behav iorist study. The pervasive confusion between Watsonian behaviorism (which did attempt to limit psychology to the study of overt ac tions) and Skinner's radical (in the sense of "complete") behaviorism, which does study the "mind," other private events, and virtu ally all other human phenomena, is no excuse for perpetuating this error in our professional journals and books. As Mary MacDonald pointed out in her chapter appearing in what has been called the first social work research textbook ever published, "Social work research begins This content downloaded from 121.52.154.147 on Thu, 11 Sep 2014 03:52:23 AM All use such as thoughts, dreams, etc., have long been a focus of behav iorist study. The pervasive confusion between Watsonian behaviorism (which did attempt to limit psychology to the study of overt ac tions) and Skinner's radical (in the sense of "complete") behaviorism, which does study the "mind," other private events, and virtu ally all other human phenomena, is no excuse for perpetuating this error in our professional journals and books. As Mary MacDonald pointed out in her chapter appearing in what has been called the first social work research textbook ever published, "Social work research begins

with practical problems, and its objective is to produce knowledge that can be put to use in planning and carrying out social work programs" (MacDonald, 1960, p. 3). For too long the applied profession of social work has followed the academic Pied Piper of preferring theory-testing research over an swering applied questions. This has been a destructive influence in terms of our building a strong evidence-based foun dation for the myriad social work services we are already providing.

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Antipositivism in Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science and Humanities

Antipositivists against Whether dead or alive, their enemy is difficult to identify on the basis of anti-positivist accounts which vary considerably one from another. Antipositivists do not have an identity either, they are a motley group with different interests, motives and backgrounds.

http://www.answers.com/Q/What_is_the_difference_between_empiricism_and_positivism

Empiricist use scientific methods to test what is observable, if you cant see it cant be tested and doesn't exist - Cartesian mind/body dualism emerges. Positivists use empirical methods but in addition to testing what is observable they use logic and reason to verify or falsify the real world out there. Logical positivists argue that science is the only true form of knowledge and that moral and value judgments cant be varified or falsified.

*** 'empiricism is a theory of knowledge which asserts that knowledge arises from experience. Empiricism is one of several competing views about how we know things, part of the branch of philosophy called epistemology, or "theory of knowledge". Empiricism emphasizes the role of experience and evidence, especially sensory perception, in the formation of ideas, while discounting the notion of innate ideas.'

*** "Positivism is the philosophy that the only authentic knowledge is knowledge that is based on actual sense experience. Such knowledge can come only from affirmation of theories through strict scientific method. Metaphysical speculation is avoided."

(1st says that knowledge comes from experience that we get from life and the other suggests that we are born with a sense of intuitive wisdom)

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Explaining the Social World: Historicism versus Positivism

THE STANDARD CRITIQUE OF POSITIVISM AND WHY IT IS WRONG

Is Positivism Only Quantitative?

One standard critique of positivism is its presumed advocacy for quantification of socio- logical inquiry, a charge repeated by York and Clark. The implication here is that positiv- ists want to translate all concepts into variables and numbers, and in so doing, positivism strips the subtlety and complexity from key concepts while ignoring their place in histor- ical context. There is often a further charge that positivists have physics envy (much like their Freudian counterparts), an envy that is not only pathological but also delusional.

For antipositivists, the social world simply does not lend itself to quantification in many instances. York and Clark do not go quite this far, but they certainly push the buttons that start this tired critique rolling. I have always found this criticism rather strange, especially because I have been one of the strongest critics of what I have called "quantamania" in sociology.

In the early decades of the last century, Franklin Giddings (1920) did indeed want to quantify everything, but most positivists I know do not quantify the variables in their theories. The concepts in their theories are, to be sure, variables, and it is perhaps possible to quantify them, but this kind of exercise is secondary to the theory itself, which states the relationships among concepts that denote key properties and processes of the social universe.

A few positivists use mathematics in their formulation of theoretical principles, but this is not the same as quantifying variables. The more important point is that, at times, quantification is possi- ble, and if possible, it is probably desirable, but quantification for its own sake violates the basic tenets of positivism. The most important tenet for positivists is to denote universal and generic properties of the social world and to formulate laws about their dynamic properties; whether these laws are stated in words or mathematics makes much less dif- ference than formulating abstract laws about the operative dynamics of some domain of the social universe. Many of the most important concepts in science have never been pre- cisely quantified-natural selection, for example-and there is every reason to suppose that such will also be the case in sociology. Indeed, the worst thing that can happen- from this positivist's perspective-is to have premature quantification (again, much like positivism's Freudian counterpart) of key concepts.

Is Positivism Simply Statistical Analysis?

When Auguste Comte (1830-1842) made his forceful advocacy for the scientific study of social organization, he wanted to call the new discipline social physics-as we all have been taught. What is often left out of this tale is the reason that he adopted the Latin- Greek hybrid: sociology. The Belgian, Adolphe Quetelet, had already applied the label "social physics" to his particular brand of statistical analysis, thus making it unavailable to Comte ([1830-1842] 1896) in his advocacy of positivism, a situation that troubled Comte greatly because he detested the label "sociology." There is a certain irony that pos- itivism is now associated with descriptive statistics-an association that would make Comte turn over in his grave for, at the time that Comte was writing, the term "physics" had not been usurped by the current discipline of this name and, instead, meant "to study the nature of" things. Thus, Comte wanted sociology to be a science that studied the nature of the social. His ideal for sociology was Newton's law of gravity rather than Quete- let's and subsequent statisticians' works. For Comte, as for all positivists, the goal is not to describe empirical reality with statistics-although there is nothing wrong with such work-but to formulate laws about the underlying dynamics of, and fundamental rela- tionships among, forces driving the social universe. Statistics is not likely to be very useful in formulating such laws.

Since positivism means to formulate abstract laws and then make deductions to empirical cases. And so, nothing could be farther from the interests of a positivist than empirical descriptions of social processes that are not guided by highly abstract theoretical principles.

Is Positivism Inductive?

A related critique-repeated by York and Clark-asserts that positivism is essentially inductive, seeking to make generalizations from descriptions (mostly statistical) of empir- ical regularities. Nothing could be farther from what positivists actually advocate and, more important, what they do. For example, take these words from Comte's ( [ 1830-1842, vol. 2:242] 1986) Positive Philosophy: "No real observation of any kind of phenomena is possible, except in so far as it is first connected, and finally interpreted, by some theory:" On the next page, Comte goes on to assert: "Hence, it is clear that, scientifically speaking, all isolated, empirical observation is idle, and even radically uncertain; that science can use only those observations which are connected, at least hypothetically, with some law." York and Clark introduce Mills' (1961) critique of "abstracted empiricism" and then paint positivists with this brush.

There is a legitimate concern that when laws are derived from empirical regularities at particular points in time and place, they do not address generic and universe processes but, instead, make time-bound events sound more univer- sal and generic than they actually are. Again, positivists would agree with Mills that abstracted empiricism is not the way to develop theory, because the goal of positivism is to formulate and then to test laws that apply to all societies in all places and at all times.

In fact, I would argue that York and Clark's advocacy for a historically informed theory- that is, generalizations about processes in particular epochs-is far more guilty of abstracted empiricism than positivism, which seeks to do just the opposite: to move away from particular cases in particular times and places, and, in so doing, to develop laws for all times and places.

Theories are often developed from a process of "abduction" (induction combined with deduction) in which the theorist moves between the abstract and generic, on the one side, and the empirical and historical, on the other. And, from this interplay of data with abstract concepts and principles, testable theories emerge. Some theories, such as Charles Darwin's formulation of the law of natural selection, emerge from an inductive process of assessing the data (whereas Alfred Wallace's similar formulation was mostly deductive, coming as a blinding insight during a nighttime fever attack from malaria); other theories are more purely deductive (as in physics, where the calculus of mathematics often points to key properties of the physical universe), and still others move back and forth, using empirical knowledge to assess abstract concepts, and vice versa. In most sciences, theories are developed by scholars who have a considerable store of knowledge of relevant empir- ical regularities but who, at the same time, are also willing to develop abstract concepts and laws that can explain these regularities. Theorizing is, therefore, never a lock-step process of induction. It always involves a creative leap from empirical cases to the more general, analytical, and abstract

Is Positivism Reductionist?

One of the frequent assaults aimed at scientists in sociology is the charge of reductionism. Sociologists appear to live in great fear that some sociological laws can be reduced to those of psychology or (gasp!) biology. These fears only underscore sociology's collective inse- curity, because all science is reductionist in this sense: the properties of the universe

studied by one science are typically built from more elemental properties studied by another science. Chemists do not become collectively paranoid that some of the elements of their universe can be explained by physics; biologists are not worried about what bio- chemistry does to their explanations (indeed, they embrace chemistry); and even psy- chologists do not fall apart when biology is introduced. For most scientists, there is a clear recognition that phenomena emerge as a result of the relations among more elemental units (whether chemical elements, biological beings, or quarks) and that, for practical purposes, it is not all devastating to have a few laws that are deducible from laws about the elements that make up these emergent phenomena. Some phenomena lend themselves to reduction; in other cases, phenomena are not so easily explained by the forces operating on their constituent elements. Thus, sociologists should not become hysterical and pre- judge the issue. Instead, the laws governing the operation of the parts of society and those explaining its emergent properties should be compared and assessed in terms of what more they add to an explanation of both parts and the wholes built from these parts. This is all that a positivist would argue, and sociologists often stake out an extreme position about the sanctity of emergent phenomena that goes against practices in other sciences. Even if a certain amount of reduction was possible, the laws on emergent properties would be the ones that most sociologists would use because reduction is often simply a process demonstrating the unity of phenomena rather than an effort to destroy a disci- pline-as sociologists often seem to assume. If sociologists were more secure, they would not panic every time ideas from other disciplines are used to supplement or expand socio- logical explanations. And the charge that positivists are reductionists would not be the equivalent to shouting "fire" in a movie theater. In sum, then, I see these four critiques leveled by York and Clark as "straw men" that deflect our energies away from more important issues that need to be discussed. York and Clark's critiques are overstated, and they do not help us understand the real epistemolog- ical differences between positivists and what I will label, for lack of a better term, histori- cists. There is, I believe, a real difference between those who seek to develop laws that explain universal forces in all times and places, and those who attempt to explain social events in their empirical and historical contexts. I am not claiming that one approach is superior to the other, only that they are different enterprises. And we should recognize this difference and avoid mudslinging contests over the difference

TOWARD A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE DEBATE OVER EPISTEMOLOGY

The strong points of York and Clark's essay revolve around several related arguments. One important argument is that many of the forces that drive empirical and historical processes are, for long periods of time, essentially constants-like gravity on earth-with the result that they will be ignored by those engaging in statistical analysis, for whom things must vary if they are ever to get on the radar screen. The conclusion is that, since positivism is about statistical analysis, it cannot explain "social gravity"-a contention that is simply wrong.

Another important argument is that empirical or historical events at any given time are typically outcomes of the unique confluence and intersection of many forces at a particular point in time. This contention is obviously true, just as the weather each day is an intersection of forces.

However, this does not make positivism or science irrelevant to understanding the flow of empirical events.

Another significant con- tention, one that others have made in a somewhat different manner (e.g., Giddens 1984), is that the constitution of reality at one point in time transforms the very nature of reality at a later point in time, thus invalidating laws that were presumed to be about the univer- sal and timeless properties of the social universe. In making this observation and then using it to mount a critique of positivism, York and Clark confuse empirical descriptions with theoretical explanations-one is time bound, whereas the other is not.

Finally, the authors make the point that phenomena can suddenly shift to a new set of values or valences, often creating entirely new types of phenomena. These sudden changes may be the result of a unique confluence of events or perhaps a consequence of slowly accumu- lating (and unrecognized) changes to some tipping point. Like the biotic universe (e.g., punctuated equilibrium, mass extinctions) or the physical world (e.g., volcanic erup- tions), the social is filled with sudden and transformative events (e.g., revolution, indus- trialization). Since other sciences seem to do just fine in explaining other realms of the universe where changes are sudden and transformative, why is this critique supposedly devastating for positivists? Now, let me backtrack and address each of these useful points of debate in more detail.

Does "Social Gravity" Obviate Science?

It is true that some of the most powerful forces driving human behavior, interaction, and organization are not easily measured in short time frames, nor are they amenable to sta- tistical analyses. They simply are too embedded in the background or do not vary signif- icantly over long historical periods. I think that this is probably the most important point in York and Clark's article, and it represents a real challenge to short-term or cross- sectional empirical analyses of social processes. However, York and Clark take an extra step by, first, portraying positivists as overly inductive, descriptive, quantitative, and sta- tistical; then, using this inaccurate portrayal of positivism, they assert that-look here!- positivism is not capable of discovering these really important social forces that do not vary for long periods of time. This conclusion is only possible with gross misrepresenta- tions of positivism.

There are subsidiary points to this general critique. Any empirical analysis of events at a particular time and place will often miss the effects of forces that constitute "social grav- ity." Therefore, it is necessary to do the equivalent of what astrophysics did-get out into space and explore the gravitational pull of bodies that vary by size and distance from each other and that, as a result, exert varying degrees of gravitational pull. Indeed, concern with gravity led to Newton's famous law and, later, to more general sets of laws formulated by Einstein. What strikes me as strange is that York and Clark appear to conclude that soci- ology cannot do the same thing: get out of our immediate universe-that is, societies of the present-and look at diverse societies at different times and places where the social equivalent of forces like gravity vary. Well, to be fair, they do suggest that sociology must be more historical and must examine events over longer periods of time to ferret out the effects of social gravity. Their portrayal of positivism, however, as not being able to do this is clearly wrong, since this is exactly what positivist theory seeks to do.

In fact, by examining the structure of societies in other times and places, early positiv- ists reasoned that it would be possible to observe the forces of the social universe and to track variations in these forces and their effects on

patterns of social organization. This is why early positivists like Comte ([1830-1842] 1896), Spencer ([1874-1896] 2002), and Durkheim ([ 1893] 1947) were evolutionists; they wanted to see the full range of variation in human societies so that they could do just the thing that York and Clark think impor- tant: discover variations in social forces that, like gravity, drive the formation of patterns in social organizations. If, however, you portray positivists as number-crunching, induc- tive grunts, it is easy to argue that positivism is not up to the task of analyzing social grav- ity

For a positivist, the goal is to generate nomothetic explanations in which general laws are used to explain par- ticular empirical and historical events, whereas for a historicist, the intent is to describe the sets and sequences of events causing a particular outcome. As to which explanation is more satisfying, this is really a matter of preferences and purposes. As a positivist, I find more satisfying to see a particular revolution, for example, as one empirical manifestation of conflict processes in general that can be explained by a few general laws on the dynam- ics of conflict as a social force. In contrast, historicists would be more satisfied with the scenario of historical events and would see the nomothetic explanation as taking the life- blood out of these events. One type of explanation is not superior to the other; they are simply two different ways to understand the social universe. There are, however, ways in which the two modes of thinking can supplement each other.

Positivistic theory thus provides clues about what classes of empirical events are the best candidates for an explanatory description of the causes of some historical outcome. A historian or ethnographer will, of course, add all the interesting empirical details that a nomothetic explanation takes out or ignores. Thus, my big point here is that we need to recognize the difference between historical and nomothetic explanations. They are different enterprises, and it does no good to crit- icize one from the perspective of the other. I could complicate this distinction by empha- sizing that there are also modeling practices among positivists that emphasize causality and historical sequences, but only among generic forces (not actual empirical cases). I call these analytical models because they are highly abstract, but they trace sequences of causal effects (including direct, indirect, and reverse causal effects) among forces that are oper- ative in all times and places. What I have previously said about abstract laws also applies to these analytical models; these models are not historical but abstract representations of causal connections among generic and universal social processes in visual space. Still, they rely upon data to get a sense of the key forces and their range of variation, and they can perhaps be useful to historians trying to sort out potential causal connections among empirical events. Do Intersections of Historical and Empirical Events Obviate

Do Intersections of Historical and Empirical Events Obviate Science?

Any time a scientist enters a naturally occurring empirical system, the buzz and flow of empirical (historical) events appears complex, and for a good reason: events intersect each other, generating many potential outcomes. Moreover, it is often difficult to measure the values of the variables in play, and particularly so when these values are conflated by interaction effects among them. For example, the weather is a complex intersection each day of many forces that often cannot be measured accurately, and indeed, the inter- sections are so complex sometimes that it is difficult to model them. Geologists cannot easily predict earthquakes because, although they know the forces involved, they are not able to accurately measure or model their intersections in specific empirical cases. Ecolo- gists in biology have the same problem; it is often difficult to map an ecosystem because there are so many forces in play that interact with each other in complex ways. Yet, none of these disciplines throws up its hands and proclaims that it cannot be a science. It is only sociologists who seem to do so.

Since sociologists cannot perform controls (for moral and practical reasons) on many phenomena of interest, we will have to live with the fact that we seek to understand empir- ical/historical events in their most robust and embedded form: naturally occurring social

systems. The respective goals of historical/causal analysis and nomothetic theorizing are to explain this complexity, but in different ways. Despite differences in their respective approaches, however, positivists and histori- cists use each other's explanations for their respective purposes. A positivist would find the empirical descriptions of the intersections among empirical events most interesting because these data would allow the positivist to load the values for the variables in abstract laws or analytical models. Reciprocally, a historicist might use the laws and ana- lytical models of positivists as guidelines for isolating the important from less important empirical events causing a historical outcome

Article

Positivism, Empiricism, and Metaphysics

BY positivism in its most general sense I mean the theory that if you want to know anything about anything you must either make an appointment with one of the sciences or else be content to be cheated. Outside the sciences there is no information. The poets may beguile you or exalt you but they cannot tell you anything. Theologians may bewilder you, philosphers may rack you, and rhetoricians may soothe you. But none of them can tell you anything. Wayfaring men, though they have no academic degrees, may sometimes tell you something; but that is because they are untutored scientists. They are the scientists in the street, and they can tell you something, not because they are in the street, but because they possess the smatter-ings of a middling science. It may be well to make a brief pause, and consider some of the things that this theory may convey.

In the first place we may ask " What is a science ? "

Is history a " science"? Is ethics ? Is aesthetics? In some cases, for example, regarding history and sociology, positivists may have to walk warily. In general, however, they have made up their minds. If your " science," so called, abjures every mood except the indicative, and makes the renunciation without reserves and with persistent determination, it is the sort of " science " that positivists call by that name. Any other sort of" science " is an impostor.

The positivistic specialist in wide generalities, one may say, might be a very good positivist. He would be a bad positivist only if he mixed his proper business with the dreams of ghost-seeing metaphysics, mistaking necromancy for philosophy. Mutato nomine he may even have sympathy and a certain admiration for some few of the philosophers of the past regarding some few of their too unguarded pursuits. He will only be more circumspect. That, in general, is what I take positivism to be and to mean. I must now attempt to examine its relations to empirlcism.

Empiricism, as I understand that theory, says something more than that EL7ELrEyL'aor " experience " is the key, and indeed, the master key, that opens all the doors that any philosopher can ever open. opens all the doors that any philosopher can ever open. That in itself would be rather an ambitious assertion, but most empiricists, as I apprehend, are more ambitious still. In their view ,7TrEtpL' actually contains and indeed actually is all that is known, and human uLrEtpL'0a isall that human beings ever will or ever can know. Being more familiar with English than with Greek I shall, for the future, speak of " experience " and only very seldom of efiLrEtLa. In the English way of speaking I take the empiricist's

assertion to be that all our knowledge is some sort of " experience " and that all that we know is also some sort of " experience ", if the word " also" has here any meaning. When I speak of " know-ledge in this connexion I am using the term in the wide and, perhaps, in the loose way in which it is often used, and not in the narrow way in which it is sometimes used. I do not mean simply " knowing for certain with invincible clarity "-supposing that there is such knowledge. I mean to include confident surmises and tenacious opinions and uncertified if stubborn beliefs. I am referring generally to cognition. In this wide sense of " knowledge " I understand empiricists to be asserting that no non-experience is strictly so much as imaginable and that there is no knowledgeable process that is not " experience ".If any philosophers and, indeed, if any other people main-tain the contrary of either of these propositions, the reason, according to all good empiricists, is that certain features of the situation may sometimes be rather obscure, and that the obscurities have seduced some negligent if intelligent people into making assertions that may seem to be but are not intelligible.

Accordingly, the fundamental question would seem to be "What is experience ? ". If that is left vague, empiricism is vague. If that be taken for granted, empiricism is something unanalysed, something that might be true but is put forward in a happy-go-lucky spirit. I do not think we need be interested in the swashbuckling type of empiricism. Therefore we have to address ourselves seriously the problem of what " experience " means.

In the ordinary usage of the English language the voice of experience is the voice of memory although, since we talk about " the experience of the race " we may add record to memory and also, perhaps, the sort of ancestral quasi-memory that may be thought to be involved in the lessons of pre-history. In the main, however, the exper-ienced man is the man, who, to use the vernacular, has been through the mill and can use his experience because he has relevant memories to draw upon. He is thus contrasted with the novice, and is credited with memory either in the sense of possessing a clear recollection or of having acquired a serviceable habit for dealing with certain types of circumstance.

Memory, however, in any of the stricter senses in which the word may be used, is always a personal affair. It is not simply retro-cognition. It is each man's retro-cog-nition of his own past. Hence, very naturally we have a strong and, I think, a justifiable inclination to say two things about " experience " strictly understood. The first is that it must be first-hand personal experience, and the second is that, in so far as it is rememberedfir st-hand experience, the gravamen of the enquiry shifts towards the original fact, towards that which is remembered, towards that in our past that we can recall but, on its original occurrence, was not a past but a present experience.

The most usual and the most robust form of empiricism asserts that the c'Eirutpta on which the theory is based must be sense-experience. Indeed a robust empiricism of this type is what is often meant by the term. It is plain, however, that there are difficulties here since we do have imaginative, noetic, and other forms of experience that appear not to be sense-experience and yet to be thoroughly authentic types of " experience."

The answer usually given is that all these other types of experience, whether they are near-sensory or, in appearance, downright non-sensory, turn out, on a sufficiently careful analysis, to be species of debilitated sensations. Even if that were true, however, it might be doubted whether the theory itself could be very robust when it is forced to support so many decrepit dependents. For die they will not. There really are such experiences.

Let us suppose, however, that the strong do all the work, supporting all the children, and hospital patients and old-age pensioners, just as will have to be done in civilized countries if the birth-rate continues to decline. In that case it is surely of the utmost moment to be able to tell by some plain independent mark who the workers are and how they are distinct from the drones. It is here that I find robust empiricism most unsatisfying. I am told that whatever else may be doubtful, sense-data at least are indubitable and so that a philosophy built upon them is built upon a rock. I am assured that verification in terms of them is honest-to-goodness verification. That is good news; but can it be confirmed ?

I allow that if I sense a pain I really do sense it, but I do not see that any important consequence follows. For if I imagine a pain I really do imagine it. The interminable popular disputes on the question whether " imaginary" pains are or are not " real " pains do not help me to make up my mind on this question and if I begin to consider the state of dreaming I am not less perplexed. A bull in a night-mare may be not less affrighting than a bull in a china shop. The fright exists in both cases. What about the bull ? Robust empiricists tell me that a real bull is a sensed bull, and that a sensed bull is a name for certain sense-data striking upon me with force and vivacity and surrounded by a specific kind of associative penumbra of causal and other indications of real presence. I still want to know how I am to distinguish the " real " bull from the dream-bull that looks so very like his " real " brother, and why I should attend so very carefully to the first and iorget the second as promptly as I can.

To be brief, I believe that the robust empiricist is asking me to make a huge assumption, and, at the same time, very unkindly, is forbidding me to investigate the assumption. He believes, like the rest of the learned world, that the only way to acquire much sound natural knowledge is to observe first and theorize later. This means, not that every sensum is to be accepted tel quel, but that certain selected observed events are the best foundation for natural theory. Negligent perceptions, fuddled perceptions, hallucinatory perceptions are either partially or wholly discredited. A long critical process is presupposed in discriminating between such perceptions. The result is held to be, if not wholly satis-factory, at any rate as nearly satisfactory as a man can legitimately hope for. Let it be so. What robust empiri-cists appear to me to do is to forget all these preparations, to forget the fineness of the boundaries between the best and the inferior in this kind, and (thinking only of the best) to applaud all sense data as if they belonged to the highly superior class of scientifically reputable observations. That is what I think is so very questionable. The case of dreams is here peculiarly interesting. Ask a robust empiricist whether he does not mean that the workers, according to his theory, must be waking sense-data and indeed must be very wide awake ? Ask him further why it should be so, and how he distinguishes the workers from the blacklegs I do not believe that he has an answer, and therefore I am skeptical about the principal premiss of his theory, not to mention any minor perplexities.

I think Ward said, that experience is the process of becoming expert by experiment. We tend to think of the experienced man as the man who has handled the stuff. On these lines, however, we should probably have to conclude that the sensory experiences of manipulation were what was central, and although there might be some reason for according a privileged position to this spccial class of sensations, the costs of the enterprise might well be prohibitive.

Let us now abandon our preamble, and simply make use of it for the purpose of examining the relations between empiricism and positivism

We have here, I think, two questions. The first is whether a consistent philosopher, being an empiricist, would have to say " I am therefore a positivist ". The second is whether a consistent philosopher, being a positivist, would have to say " I am, by inference, an empiricist ".

Suppose, however, that this was the simple truth. In that case, I think it might be reasonable to say that all sense experience is simply descriptive of sense data and abjures every mood except the indicative.

as any science tells us anything about the world it is empirical, and that this assertion is the positivistic part

Positivists accept the sciences in the belief that they and they alone describe facts and tell us " about the world ". Empiricists believe that " fact " or " the world " (at any rate quoad nos) consists of sense-experiences. If a science in pursuit of " facts " or of the " world " could dispense with everything except sense-experience it would be a purely empirical positivism. So positivism and empiricism would coincide.

The pathetic feature of this situation is that positivists are torn between faith and sight. By faith they discern that sense-observation is the only begetter of positive science. By sight they learn that no actual science is anywhere near being an instance of pure empiricism. Hence they have either to blink or to hope.

Is positivism also a metaphysics ?

I think it might be. If anyone says " I am a positivist because I believe, after what seems to me to be an adequate investigation of all serious opposing views, that descriptive statements in the indicative mood are all the genuine truth that there is, and because I believe that the positive sciences are the repositories of all such statements where they are at all precise " his positivism, I submit is a kind of metaphysics

Analytic Positivism

Roger Bishop Jones16 August 2011

Analytic PositivismPositivism is generally skeptical, but some- times dogmatic and uncompromising.

Analytic positivism aims to be a more thor-oughgoing but a constructive and graduatedskepticism. It purpose is to propose, analyseand evaluate certain proposals of a linguisticand methodological nature, and in the contextof these proposals to identify for further inves-tigations philosophical problems which may

be of interest to those of positivist inclination,or possibly of some utility outside philosophy.Analytic positivism is, rather than a body ofdoctrine presented and argued for, more in thecharacter of a conceptual framework for ana-lytic philosophy, to be considered on its prag-matic merits and adopted or rejected, or to besubjected itself to philosophical analysis. Theenterprise we are engaged in is similar to thatwhich Carnap envisaged for the adoption ofa language, though the conceptual frameworkfalls short of constituting a language, and ispresented informally.1.3.1 Graduated SkepticismPostivist philosophies typically provide con-structive skepticism. Doubts are expressedabout prior standards for the establishmentof knowledge, scienti_c and philosophical, andnew standards are enunciated. Often entiredisciplines are swept aside as meaningless, un-sound, or without application. Inevitably, thehigher the standards proposed, the larger thepart of existing philosophy and science whichfails to meet them.

1.3.2 ChoiceAn important element of analytic positivismis its emphasis on our freedom to chose. Itis characteristic of positivistic philosophy toidentify classes of questions which have no def-inite answer, typically metaphysical questions,considered meaningless. Questions may lacka su_ciently de_nite sense to be answerablewithout being metaphysical. In many suchcases an answer is contingent on clari_cation,or on the setting of appropriate context. Toarrive at a question which has a de_nite an-swer choices must be made. It is a tenet ofanalytic positivism that the general characterand detailed content of philosophy is, or sholdbe, determined by such choices. Evidently,philosophical (and other) disagreements areoften apparent rather than real, the partiesnot speaking the same language.In political, economic, and ethical matters,the emphasis is upon our freedom, within lim-

its, to chose how society shall be. In or-der to exercise that choice it is desirable toknow what those limits are, to understandhow things are, how they might be.Knowledge is a means towards such ends.Rigour in determining truth serves those ends.Philosophy may help to determine and under-pin rigorous methods, it may help to identifyand eliminate unsound method or false doc-trine.Choice is exercised not only in determiningthese higher ends, but in the pursuit of scienceand technology to facilitate their realisation.Choice percolates down to the most funda-mental philosophical foundations through themedium of language. We do not chose whatis true, but our choice of language determineswhat truths we can come to know.1.3.3 LanguageTo exercise choice in other things we must_rst exercise choice of language. It is pro-posed that the languages of science be madeprecise by their being given a formal abstractsemantics. An abstract semantics is a seman-tics couched in terms of abstract entities, andsu_ces to settle the relationship of seman-tic entailment and hence supports deductivereasoning. Where a language is intended tospeak of the real world, an abstract seman-tics is couched in terms of abstract models ofpossible worlds, and a full semantics for thelanguage depends upon supplementing the ab-stract semantics with some account of the cor-respondence between the abstract model andthe real world.1.3.4 OntologyAll things which exist are either abstract orconcrete. A concrete entity is one whose exis-tence is contingent, a constituent of the world,whose existence can only be known by obser-vation. An abstract entity is one whose exis-tence is not contingent, and can be known onlyby supposition. What we know of such enti-ties is just what is derivable from their de_n-ing characteristics. Empirical observation isimmaterial to knowledge of abstract entities.

This choice of terminology does not howeverconstitute a _nal word on ontology. Analyticpositivism eschew ontological parsimony andrejects Occam's razor. Occam's razor is apragmatic principle in default of any system-atic method for determining the consistency ofany proposed ontological scheme, since elabo-rate ontology in such a context risks incoher-ence.However, set theory now provides a frameworkfor settling the consistency of any proposedontology, and we may fall back on purely prag-matic evaluation of any ontological proposalwhich can be shown to be logically consistent.Beyond pragmatics, beyond questions aboutwhich ontologies provide the best models ofthe world, analytic positivism does not ven-ture. The question of what really exists in theworld, as opposed to what it is convenient forus to suppose exists, is beyond our reach, somuch so that we may doubt that it can begiven any de_nite meaning. A concrete ontol-ogy is what we use in expressing our modelsof the regularity of the world. Any state ofknowledge about those regularities will be ex-pressible using various distinct ontologies, andwe have not only no way of telling which is cor-rect (if they make the same predictions) butits not clear what the question means.1.3.5 Fundamental Logical PartitionsIt is a desideratum to distinguish various kindsof proposition which are logically indepen-dent.For example, empirical propositions are notentailed by analytic or logical propositions,and those of ethics are not derivable from ei-ther. The truth of such principles dependsupon the semantics of the languages in ques-tion, and these theses may not be sustainablein relation to ordinary language. These con-ditions are therefore considered as desiderata,suggestions on how language should be used.The arguments in favour of this position arepragmatic rather than theoretical.These are not the only logical divisions whichmay be useful. Philosophers have long de-

bated whether mind and matter are distinctor whether one of these is reducible or shouldbe understood in terms of the other. To manypositivists both of these substances are illegit-imate inferences from the phenomena, but toan analytic positivist the question of whetherthere is one or two kinds of substance hasno meaning. The question posed instead iswhether the use of two categories enables theconstruction of better models of reality.

2 Analyticity and Seman-tic FoundationsIn this section we attempt a de_nition of an-alyticity. Analyticity is to be de_ned as a re-lationship between sentences and languages,where the concept of a language includes bothsyntax and semantics. To give a precise de_-nition of this relationship, it is therefore nec-essary to have a clear notion of what kind ofthing a syntax and semantics are.The de_nition will be developed in stages, theinitial stages serving to motivate the later.

Analytical Philosophy

X hough we attribute to Socrates a fair number of philo- sophical theories, he pretended to have nothing to teach but only an art to practice - a mock modesty which incidentally resembles that of his enemies, the Sophists, who did not claim to possess, only to love wisdom, thereby giving a name - philosophy - to a discipline which, etymology notwithstanding, consisted until quite recent times in propounding and de- fending heavy theories regarding time, space, mind, knowl- edge, the nature of the Ultimately real, and the interconnec- tions between the True, the Good, and the Beautifulethere are no philosophical truths, only a kind of philosophical activity, so that Philosophy does not name a set of views to be held so much as something one can do, and "doing philosophy" in- deed is the way in which analytical philosophers like to char- acterize themselves, leaving only the question of what the activity consists in and what products, if any, it might have.

Deliverance from doctrinizing, which was proclaimed by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, came at a crux in the history of this puzzling discipline, and at a moment when it had begun to look as though its doctrines, rather than being the best the human mind at its best could come up with in response to questions so deep as to try its limits, instead may have been empty responses to no real questions at all.

The dominating answers were: structures of practice (Pragmatism); structures of cognition best exemplified in science (Positivism); structures of consciousness (Phenomenology); and structures of language (Analytical Philosophy). Each of these, of course, is a kind of analysis, and each, again of course, is practiced against a background of theory

In the hands of Empiricism, the Analytic of Concepts yielded a program for knowledge. If X is analyzable into Y and Z, then one can know that a is X if one knows that a is Y and Z; and one can surmise that a is X if one at least knows that a is Y and whatever is Y is usually Z.

The Sociology of PositivismAuthor(s): Frank E. HartungSource: Science & Society, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Fall, 1944), pp. 328-341Published by: Guilford PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40399649 .Accessed: 12/09/2014 02:50

Comte says that ... the first characteristic of the Positive Philosophy is that it regards all phenomena as subject to invariable natural Laws. Our business is- seeing how vain are any researches into what are called Causes, whether first or final- to pursue an accurate discovery of these Laws, with a view to reducing them to the lowest possible number. . . . Our real business is to analyze accurately the circumstances of phenomena, and to connect them by the natural relations of succession and resemblance.

Contemporary positivism subscribes fully to this view. The sec- ond principle of positivism is regarded as being as valid today as when Comte wrote: Its secondary and general aim is this: to review what had been effec ed in the sciences, in order to show that they are not radically separated, but all branches from the same trunk. . . . The only necessary unity is that of Method, which is already in great part established. As for the doctrine, it need not be one; it is enough that it should be homogeneous.*

The third principle of positivism is its position regarding those aspects of behavior which are often regarded as being subjective or mental. Comte says: The study of the Positive Philosophy offers the only rational means of studying the laws of the human mind which have hitherto been sought by unfit methods ... we have to study simply the exercise and results of the intellectual powers of the human race, which is neither more nor less than the general object of the Positive Philosophy . . . metaphysicians . . . talk of external and internal facts and say their business is with the latter. . . . The results of such a method are in pro- portion to its absurdity. This interior observation gives birth to almost as many theories as there are observers

He then goes on to comment that if psychologists have added any- thing to human knowledge, it is by abandoning the "internar* method, that is introspection; by "practicing the positive method" instead

A positivistic use of the terms "subjective" and "objective" which has provoked argument is that the subjectivity of internal facts is not an inherent property, but is merely a way of responding to them that cannot be corroborated by others. Objectivity, then, be- comes a way of responding that can be corroborated by others. From this point of view, positivism comes to have its characteristic emphasis

upon form. To the contemporary positivist, for example, "social psychology is nothing but the ecology of symbolic behavior.

There is no doubt that positivism had a definite contribution to make to nineteenth century western society. But it also offered a scientifically-phrased rationalization for combating the promises which the French Revolution made to society, and for negating the cultural development implicit in the philosophy of the French En- lightenment. It accepted the commission to uproot the "dragon- seed" sown by the Hegelian dialecticians.7 Positivistic sociology had its origin in a conservative and reactionary mission, and this function characterizes it even today. To document this view of positivistic sociology, let us consider how Comte came to use the term "positive." Comte wrote to contravene what he regarded as the "negative" philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He meant by the negative philosophy "all those individualistic ideas which had flowered during the Enlightenment and which were the driving force of the Revolution."8 He wrote in part as follows:

The negative philosophy was . . . systematized about the middle of the seventeenth century. . . . The ascendancy of the negative spirit was assisted by the good and the bad passions of men. Negative doctrine, speculative and social, is congenial with the worst parts of human nature. Vanity is pampered by the sovereignty given to every man by the right of private judgment. . . . Ambition accepts with eagerness the principle of the sovereignty of the people, which opens up a political career to all who can achieve it. Pride and envy are gratified by the proclamation of equality ... the negative philosophy [was] strengthened by powerful, moral influences, tending in their combination to insurrectionary crises. . . . The negative doctrine ... is simply a final phase of the metaphysi- cal. . . . The positive philosophy, therefore, can acknowledge no con- nection with the negative doctrine, other than that the negative opened a way and established a preparation for the positive. . . . Such is the historical estimate of the intellectual character of the critical movement.9 He then goes on to discuss moral, political, and other aspects of the negative doctrine, for which he has only words of condemna- tion. It leads to "disorganization, revolution and anarchy." Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot and the Encyclopedists are verbally flayed for the attempts to destroy all of society save the individual and the state. They would lead to "the barbarous negation of society itself" by their attacks on the institution of property. The economists under Adam Smith contributed to this "organic imbecility." Further- more, the "negative progression" threatened the entire destruction of industry ". . . by destroying the subordination of the working classes to their industrial leaders, and calling the incapable multi- tude to assist directly in the work of governmentLundberg claims that positivism meets the need of a unified scientific theory "by means of a theory and an approach which is compatible both with life as it is actually lived and with life as it is reflected upon in the academies." 1δ Let us see how this claim is met. Science is preeminently verbal for Lundberg, as we gather from his discussion of the postulates of science in his first chapter in the Foundations of Sociology. Man invents symbols to represent his sensations and responses. These symbols are the "immediate data" of all communicable knowledge and therefore "of all science." All propositions or postulates, he writes, concerning the more "ulti- mate" realities must always consist of inferences and abstractions from these symbolically-represented responses. We find, several chapters later, that "the ultimate objective of science, as science, is to discover predictable sequences and correlations between the phenomena of a selected field." How is this field to be selected? With magnificent aplomb, Lundberg assumes: Everyone agrees that the only criterion that a scientist need be con- cerned about in the development of his theories, methods, and units is their suitability for his purposes . . . data should be organized into whatever categories best serve our purpose

Democracy." As Comte is read but little these days, let us look at his remarks about these democratic principles, so that we can see how completely anti - democratic contemporary positivism is- at least so far as Lundberg is concerned. Comte develops his thesis concern- ing the necessary rejection of these democratic principles, "now that we have the positive philosophy," in the first chapter of Book Six of Positive Philosophy. Additional remarks are scattered throughout his other writings, but our references will be confined to the former. Those who believe that there is still vitality in democratic princi- ples, and who also believe the positivists* view to be the most objec- tive frame of reference, will find that chapter instructive reading. In reviewing the growth of science, Comte found that it is dear that [the] most important principle [of the metaphysical view] is the right of free inquiry, or the dogma of the unbounded liberty of conscience; involving the immediate consequences of the liberty of the press, or of any other mode of expression or communication of opinions. This is the rallying point of the revolutionary principle. ... It is a chief characteristic of the mind of this country. this dogma . . . constitutes an obstacle to reorganization . . .because the convergence of minds requires the renunciation by the greater number of their right of individual inquiry. The dogma ... of Equality ... is an immediate consequence of the liberty of conscience. . . . When the dogma of equality had achieved the overthrow of the old policies, it could not but become an obstacle to reorganization . . . [It] becomes anarchical. The second result of ... liberty of conscience is the Sovereignty of the People . . . this dogma proves its revolutionary character before our eyes . . . condemning as it does, all the superior to an arbitrary de- pendence on the multitude of the inferior, by a kind of transference to the people of the divine right which had become the opprobrium of kings.20 Comte recognized that these principles were necessary to and directly instrumental in the overthrow of the old feudal order, but he now regarded them as being obstructive. He found it a "mis- fortune" that they still remained with us. He said that they were incompatible with a positivistic system of society.

Comte expressed contempt for government by assemblies, and for parliamentary or representative institutions in any form. In his opinion, they are merely expedient and only suited to a state of transition; and even at that, nowhere but in England. The attempt to have them in France, or any continental nation, he re- garded as michievous quackery. In the positivistic reorganization of society, the complete dominion of every nation is to be handed over to the dictatorship- Com te 's own term- of four men: three bankers and the Pontiff. The three bankers who will take over the foreign, home and financial departments, respectively, will be chosen in the first instance from among the wealthy, and thereafter they will be appointed by their predecessors. The Pontiff will have the absolute and undivided control of the Spiritual Power, which is the means by which the poor will be kept in their proper place.21 Women will not count, except to minister to the needs of men, and to stand as objects of prayer. Comte wanted to base his philosophy on a system of universally recognized principles which would draw their ultimate legitimacy from "the voluntary assent by which the public will confirm them to be the result of perfectly free discussion." 22 His public, like that of contemporary positivism, turned out to be a forum of scientists who had the necessary training and knowledge. He wrote that "The scientific and aesthetic classes will hail a philosophy which will elevate them to the highest rank and rule." 23 In contemporary posi- tivism, Comte's forum of scientists turns into Lundberg's "qualified observers" whose responses are "valid." 24 We need not discuss further the rejection of democratic prin- ciples, in order to bring out this proto - fascist aspect of positivism. Lundberg, as if to emphasize his contempt for democracy, tells us that his "attachment for democracy may, in fact, be of scientific significance chiefly as indicating my unfitness to live in a changing world." »

Contemporary positivism claims that science must isolate itself and be "without patronage" from the church, political parties, or labor unions, but not, significantly, free from support from corpo- rate enterprise. Lundberg finds that scientists, as scientists, who take a stand on certain problems raised by

fascism render "a doubtful service to science." 2e He finds that fascist Italy and Nazi Germany are no different from democracies because the state of Tennessee passed a bill against the teaching of evolution, a Nobel prize for science was given to an Italian, and because "We also hear of attacks upon Einsteinian physics in Germany." 27 This view is part of the positivist formula by which social scien- tists may attain occupation immunity in any type of social organiza- tion. In this formula, we see why it is necessary for positivists to adopt the criterion of expediency in their conception of science. Lundberg, for instance, believes that physical scientists are, as a group, less likely to be disturbed in their function during periods of social upheaval because their work is recognized "as of equal im- portance under any regime."28 Continuing, he says that "The services of real social scientists would be as indispensable to Fascists as to Communists and Democrats just as are the services of physicians and physicists." Social scientists "had better work" to achieve a "corre- sponding status." He believes that some social scientists have al- ready acquired a degree of immunity from the effects of the social upheavals that so continually confront us. He "ventures to believe" that "qualified social statisticians have not been and will not be greatly disturbed in their function by any political party. Their skill consists in the ability to draw relatively valid, unbiased, and demonstrable conclusions from societal data. ... It is the possession

and exercise of such skills alone that justifies the claim of academic immunity." 29 Let us recall at this point the positivist criterion of expediency: the scientist is concerned with the truth of his theories only insofar as they serve his purpose, and he may take any point as his depar- ture, without prior concern, except that he should define its validity in terms of his end. We may point out, for example, that in this country a qualified social statistician like Leon Henderson, did not remain undisturbed "in his function" when he drew relatively valid, unbiased, and demonstrable conclusions and societal data. On the other hand, Alfred Rosenberg, of the German Nazi party, granted his starting point, draws relatively valid conclusions from societal data. He is undisturbed in his function. How can Lundberg account for the occupational fates of these two, except on the basis that some agency other than themselves defined "relatively valid, unbiased and demonstrable conclusions?" But this would destroy his position. That many scientists do not agree with the positivists in their scientific isolationism and in their claim for occupational immunity, is to be seen from the resolutions passed at the 1938 and 1939 meetings of various learned societies in this country and in England.80 In contrast to the positivists' interpretation of science, we wish to emphasize that science is not only a system of knowledge but the means by which man achieves increasing control over his environ- ment, both physical and cultural. Science is thus concerned with the achieving of freedom. Freedom in the modern world was given its philosophical and scientific statement by the early positivists, the French Enlightenment and the German critical philosophers. They provided the ideological expression to the need for freedom on the part of the entrepeneurs of the commercial and industrial revolu-

POST-POSITIVISTAPPROACHESTORESEARCHAnne B. Ryan

Using scientific method and language to investigate and write about human experience is supposed to keep the research free of the values, passions, politics and ideology of the researcher. This approach to research is called positivist, or positivist-empiricist and it is the dominant one among the general public.

Positivist researchers believe that they can reach a full understanding based on experiment and observation. Concepts and knowledge are held to be the product of straightforward experience, interpreted through rational deduction.

Positivism as a philosophy adheres to the view that only “factual” knowledge gained through

observation (the senses), including measurement, is trustworthy. In positivism studies the

role of the researcher is limited to data collection and interpretation through objective

approach and the research findings are usually observable and quantifiable.

According to the principles of positivism, it depends on quantifiable observations that lead

themselves to statistical analysis. It has been noted that “as a philosophy, positivism is in

accordance with the empiricist view that knowledge stems from human experience. It has

an atomistic, ontological view of the world as comprising discrete, observable elements and

events that interact in an observable, determined and regular manner” (Collins, 2010, p.38).

Moreover, in positivism studies the researcher is independent form the study and there are

no provisions for human interests within the study. Crowther and Lancaster (2008) inform

that as a general rule, positivist studies usually adopt deductive approach, whereas

inductive research approach is usually associated with a phenomenology philosophy.

Moreover, positivism relates to the viewpoint that researcher needs to concentrate on facts,

whereas phenomenology concentrates on the meaning and has provision for human

interest.

Researchers warn that “if you assume a positivist approach to your study, then it is your

belief that you are independent of your research and your research can be purely objective.

Independent means that you maintain minimal interaction with your research participants

when carrying out your research” (Wilson, 2010, p.10). In other words, studies with positivist

paradigm are based purely on facts and consider the world to be external and objective.

The dominance of positivist assumptions about research has at least two effects. First, it leads people to assume that if social research is done properly it will follow the model of the natural sciences and provide a clear, unambiguous road to the causes of certain social or psychological phenomena. Some assume that it can predict social trends and can even be used to control events. It was at one time assumed that positivist-empiricist modes of enquiry could produce a science of society. This assumption was in turn made possible by the assumption that there were one-to-one correspondences between social phenomena and their causes. Most people rightly treat assumptions about causes with caution, recognising that it is rarely possible to show a direct cause for some aspect of the

social world. But even when people recognise the complexity of social phenomena and the difficulty of pinning them down in a scientific way, assumptions may persist about how research should be carried out.

Second, the idea that the only way to do social research is to follow a scientific model can lead to the dismissal of research as a valuable tool in understanding the rich complexity of social life. This scientific approach which positivism espouses is rightly thought to be inadequate when it comes to learning about how people live, how they view the world, how they cope with it, how they change it, and so on.

The context for postivismEach one of us lives out our lives in the context of a worldview, which influences how we think and behave and how we organise our lives, including how we approach research. But worldviews often go unarticulated or unnoticed, and we often fail to realise that the assumptions we carry about research are related to a particular worldview or mental model. We need to uncover our worldviews and subject them to scrutiny. This is especially important for those doing research. As social researchers, we work within, not outside, broader historical, social and theoretical contexts. These contexts serve as the scaffolding for the questions we ask and how we go about answering them. The bigger scaffolding that supports positivism is a modernist worldview.

ModernismA modernist outlook is the cumulative outcome of four foundational movements in European thought – the Renaissance, The Reformation, the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment (Spretnak, 1999: Chapter Two). Within modernist ways of knowing the world, only certainty and empirical knowledge are valid, and the rational is valued over other ways of knowing, such as intuition. Positivism seeks to reduce everything to abstract and universal principles, and tends to fragment human experience rather than treat it as a complex whole. (For further reading on modernity, see Goodman, 2003; Spretnak, 1999; Tovey, 2001.)

Modernity led to a split between science and literature as different ways of understanding human experience. The natural science model came to dominate in social research. This became known as positivism or positivist-empiricism. Positivist research places faith in quantification and on the idea that using correct techniques will provide correct answers. It is also concerned to some extent with prediction and with control.

PositivismsThe foregoing review represents classical positivism and there are many variations of it. It is, therefore, more appropriate to think of positivisms. We should not forget that a modernist worldview has played a large part in the development of ideas concerning liberation, justice and freedom. Spaces exist within positivism for radical practice. Many Irish and international researchers have used positivist research approaches in the drive to create a more equal and just society. Setting up positivism and post-positivism in opposition to each other does not adequately represent the more messy on-the-ground realities of how research proceeds. Most studies in the natural sciences do not in fact proceed in a defined linear fashion, but are the product of web-like and cyclical thinking. The way they are written up however often makes it seem as if they proceeded in a linear manner. Positivist visions of science do not always reflect the actual practice of doing science (cf Mishler, 1990; Kuhn, 1962).

EpistemologyThe ideas, assumptions and beliefs associated with positivism and modernism constitute what is called an epistemological base.

Epistemology is a study of how people or systems of people know things and how they think they know things (Keeney, 1983: 13, cited in Scully, 2002: 10). It is thus concerned with the nature of knowledge, what constitutes valid knowledge, what can be known and who can be a knower.

In recent decades, increasing attention is falling on the limitations of the epistemological base of positivism. Within positivism, knowledge has been treated as follows:

l What counts is the means (methodology) by which knowledge is arrived at. These means must be objective, empirical and scientific;

l Only certain topics are worthy of enquiry, namely those that exist in the public world;

l The relationship between the self and knowledge has been largely denied – knowledge is regarded as separate from the person who constructs it. The political is separate from the personal;

l Maths, science and technical knowledge are given high status, because they are regarded as objective, separate from the person and the private world;

Knowledge is construed as being something discovered, not produced by human beings.

What has prompted a move away from positivism? Opposition to positivist epistemologies has come from feminism, post structuralism, critical psychology, anthropology, ethnography and developments in qualitative research. Critiques of positivism are implicit in other movements for social change, as well as in the knowledge of Eastern, Asian and indigenous societies, who see all events and phenomena as inter-connected. This kind of knowledge, for so long despised by the Western scientific tradition, has now been revitalised. This has come about because the movements and peoples concerned have:

l emphasised that there is no neutral knowledge;

l shown the inadequacies of dualistic, that is, either/or, or black/white thinking;

l emphasised the ethical aspects of research.

In addition, complexity science has challenged the dominance of reductionist scientific models.

Recognition that there is no neutral knowledge Critics of positivist epistemologies have insisted that divisions between objectivity and subjectivity, or public and private knowledge, or scientific and emotional knowledge, are socially constructed. Just as important, these artificial divisions, or dualistic ways of viewing the world, are used to control ideas about what knowledge is legitimate. Knowledge cannot be divorced from ontology (being) and personal experience.

Collapse of faith in dualistic thinking There has been a collapse of faith in dualistic thinking. Post-positivist values in research are not about being either subjective or objective, nor do they prefer subjectivity over objectivity. They emphasise multiplicity and complexity as hallmarks of humanity. Post-positivist approaches are interpretive and this has led to an emphasis on meaning, seeing the person, experience and knowledge as ‘multiple, relational and not bounded by reason’ (Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn and Walkerdine, 1998: xviii).

Ethical considerationsPost-positivism has also reawakened questions about the uses and purposes of research, research practice and research knowledge, which are at least as much ethical as they are technical (Schratz and Walker, 1995: 125). No longer is it good enough for the researcher to see the people s/he is researching simply as research subjects from whom information is ‘extracted’ (see Chapter Five, on the information-extraction model for collecting data). The emphasis is on good principles, adequate for working with human participants in all their complexity. Procedures, techniques and methods, while important, must always be subject to ethical scrutiny. (For more on ethics, see Chapter Five.)

Complexity scienceThis historical period is not the first in which a challenge was mounted to the reductionist approach of positivism. In the eighteenth century, ‘a few prophetic members’ (Spretnak, 1999: 21), of the western scientific tradition, such as Goethe and von Humboldt, tried to resist the reductionism and mechanistic outlook of the developing natural sciences. Later, systems theory, drawing on organic biology, gestalt psychology and theoretical ecology, studied ‘organised complexity’. But interest was withdrawn from these theories after World War Two, because their concepts could not be expressed mathematically (Capra, 1996, cited in Spretnak, 1999: 22).

However, the natural sciences themselves have today been able to take up those ideas again, facilitated by the development of fast computers (Capra, 1996, cited in Spretnak, 1999: 22). Complexity science has shown that ‘various properties of a system emerge through its dynamic

behaviour and interactions. Such properties cannot be predicted mechanistically at the outset from knowledge of the component parts’ (Capra, 1996, cited in Spretnak, 1999: 23). The most challenging themes and theoretically exciting questions are not reached by the logico-deductive scientific method. Instead they are reached by a process that resembles artistic imagination. Einstein imagined that he was riding on a moonbeam, looking at the earth, as part of his work.

Positivism: challenged but not goneMuch work in the natural sciences could now be said to be post-positivist. The ideas that the personal is political, that the subjective is a valid form of knowledge (not necessarily more valid than the objective, but of equal validity), and that all people are capable of naming their own world and constructing knowledge, represent a shift away from modernism. Nevertheless, the modernist worldview or paradigm is still strong. Positivism, although challenged, is still the dominant public model for research. Researchers can still find it difficult to get funding for post-positivist projects. The mechanistic view of the natural sciences continues to dominate the public perception of science, and in turn it affects views of what social research should be.

Weaknesses

Take up a testing role rather than a learning roleSee themselves as inevitably solving the problems they set out to investigate.aggregate data in order to arrive at an overall ‘truth’.

Quantification can be useful, because it can

■ provide a broad familiarity with cases;

■ examine patterns across many cases;

■ show that a problem is numerically significant;

■ often be used as the starting point for a qualitative study;

■ provide readily available and unambiguous information.

However, it

■ cannot look at individual cases in any detail;

■ is usually highly structured, which prevents the researcher from following up unexpected outcomes or information.

Quantitative research has positivist features when it:

■ tries to link variables (features which vary from person to person);

■ tries to test theories or hypotheses;

■ tries to predict;

■ tries to isolate and define categories before research starts and then to determine the relationships between them.

Qualitative research

■ seeks to provide an in-depth picture;

■ generally deals with smaller numbers than quantitative research;

■ tries to interpret historically or culturally significant phenomena;

■ can be used to flesh out quantitative data;

■ tries to isolate and define categories during the process of research;

■ is appropriate when the questions posed by the researcher are difficult for a respondent to answer precisely;

■ tries to illuminate aspects of people’s everyday lives;

■ values participants’ perspectives on their worlds;

■ often relies on people’s words as its primary data2.