Port Managementand OperationsThird Edition

LLOYD’SPRACTICALSHIPPINGGUIDES

Other titles in this series are:

Laytime and Demurrage in the Oil

Industry by Malcolm Edkins and Ray Dunkley(1998)

Chartering Documents 4th edition by Harvey Williams(1999)

Combined Transport Documents: AHandbook of Contracts for theCombined Transport Industry by John Richardson (2000)

Principles of Maritime Law by Susan Hodges and Chris Hill

(2002)

The Handbook of Maritime Economicsand Business by Costas Th. Grammenos (2002)

Maritime Law 6th edition by Chris Hill (2004)

ISM Code: A Practical Guide to theLegal and Insurance Implications 2nd edition By Dr Phil Anderson (2005)

Risk Management in Port Operations,Logistics and Supply-Chain Security by Khalid Bichou, Michael G. H. Belland Andrew Evans (2007)

Introduction to Marine CargoManagement by J. Mark Rowbotham (2008)

Port Managementand Operations

BY

PROFESSOR PATRICK M.ALDERTON M.Phil., Extra Master, Dip.Maths,M.C.I.T.

THIRD EDITION

Informa Law Mortimer House 37–41 Mortimer Street London W1T 3JH law.enquiries@informa.com

an Informa business

First edition 1999 Second edition 2005 Third edition 2008

© Patrick M. Alderton 2008

British Library Cataloguing in PublicationDataA catalogue record for this book is available

from the British Library

ISBN 978-1-84311-750-6

All rights reserved. No part of this publicationmay be reproduced, stored in a retrievalsystem, or transmitted, in any form or by anymeans, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,recording or otherwise, without the priorwritten permission of Informa Law.

Whilst every effort has been made to ensurethat the information contained in this book iscorrect, neither the author nor Informa Law canaccept any responsibility for any errors oromissions or for any consequences resultingtherefrom.

Text set in 10/12pt Postscript Plantin by TonyLansbury, Tonbridge, KentPrinted in Great Britain by MPG Books,Bodmin, Cornwall Printed on paper sourced from sustainablesources

Preface

The aim of this book is to give auniversal presentation of the essentialelements of ports, covering theiradministration, management, economicsand operation. As ports are among theoldest forms of transport infrastructurewhich have remained in continuous use,and have been a vital part in the socialand economic growth of regions, it is

necessary to consider, at least briefly,the historic development of ports inorder to understand many of their facets.

The purpose of this book is to give acomplete picture of the ports industry sothat those involved with ports can seetheir own specific field of interest inperspective and understand how thebasic model of the port operates withinthe maritime transport industry. Maritimetransport is a rapidly changing industryand, since the Second World War, it isnot sufficient to learn one’s business by“sitting next to Nellie”. Moderntransport professionals must be able toadapt to, and anticipate the implications

of, changes in the industry. Perhaps oneof the most important aspects of modernmanagement is the ability to managechange and it is hoped that this book willgive an insight as to how portmanagement has coped with change overthe last century. This book alsoendeavours to stress the importance ofports, a factor which is oftenoverlooked. When Gary Crook ofUNCTAD was asked for a suitable title,he suggested “Ports: The misunderstoodkey to prosperity”.

Such an approach has become anintegral part of most of the professionaland academic courses that are concerned

with shipping, ports and transport. Thestructure and content of this book arebased on the lectures given to, and theinteraction I have had with, students inLondon and at the World MaritimeUniversity in Malmö over the last 25years.

In this third edition I have taken theopportunity to update the material,include any new developments, andrespond to user comments and anycriticisms arising from the earliereditions.

I have tried to avoid the unnecessaryuse of jargon in this book and hope thatthe text will be readily understandable to

those with little knowledge of ports butyet have sufficient depth to be of interestand value to those professionallyengaged in the industry.

Where possible I have quoted actualfigures and statistics, as I have found iteasier for students to grasp the relativemerits of the size, importance and valueof a thing or concept by giving actualdata. However, students should beaware that even the highest authoritieswill not always agree on statistics, as intheir collection and selection, differentassumptions may be possible as theprecise control of the laboratory is notusually available in the actual

commercial situation.It is not anticipated that this book will

answer all the reader’s questions onports but it is hoped that it will stimulatetheir curiosity on the subject. I have alsopersonally found that disagreement on asubject can provide as valuable aneducational insight as agreement.

When discussing various aspects ofthose persons engaged in ports andshipping, I have tended to use thepronouns he and him rather than she orher. This is not meant to be sexist butmerely an attempt to save paper and toavoid being verbally tedious. Althoughthe world of ports and shipping has

tended to be a male dominated business,women do now occupy many of thehighest positions in the industry and theterms he and she can in nearly all casesbe considered interchangeable.

PATRICK M. ALDERTON March 2008

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my colleagues andfriends at the World Maritime Universityin Malmö and those at what was theLondon Guildhall University and is nowthe London Metropolitan University. Iwould also like to thank thoseprofessionally working in the industrywho have helped me, not only with databut who have exchanged views with meover coffee during the last 25 years or

so. A special acknowledgement ofgratitude is also due to those studentswho have been so helpful and usually sopatient in developing and testing, notonly the material, but also the emphasisand structure.

It would, of course, be invidious tomention any particular names from themany experienced and talented persons Ihave been fortunate enough to beassociated with during the period whilecompiling this book, but I must thankProfessor Ted Samson for his section onthe “Basic Argument” in the chapter onPort Environmental Matters.

Contents

PrefaceAcknowledgementsList of Figures

CHAPTER ONE: PORTSIntroduction—some basic points—theimportance of ports—fundamentalobservations concerning ports—themain functions and features of a port

—main facilities and services providedby a port—some definitions—differenttypes of port—information about ports—conclusion

CHAPTER TWO: PORTDEVELOPMENT

Introduction—phases of portdevelopment—growth in world trade—changes in growth—developments interminal operation

CHAPTER THREE: IMPACT OFCHANGING SHIP TECHNOLOGYON PORTS

Introduction—ship knowledge—shipdevelopments which influence port

development—effect of port time onship speed—other technicaldevelopments affecting ports

CHAPTER FOUR: PORTAPPROACHES

Sea approaches—inland transport

CHAPTER FIVE: PORTADMINISTRATION, OWNERSHIPAND MANAGEMENT

Port management: basic problems—types of port ownership andadministration—organisationsconcerning ports—boards governing aport—port management development:from a transport centre to a logistic

platform—the rise and fall of ports—competition between ports—information technology in logistics—safety

CHAPTER SIX: PORT POLICYGeneral points on maritime policy—corruption and hidden agendas—port policy—EU port and transportpolicy—relationship between port andstate (or area authority)—portownership—port and state financialassistance—port pricing

CHAPTER SEVEN: BERTHS ANDTERMINALS

Number of berths required in a port

—berth size and layout—alternativesto formal port systems—port logistics

CHAPTER EIGHT: CARGO ANDCARGO HANDLING

Basic definitions for cargo stowage onthe ship—pre-shipment planning, thestowage plan and on-board stowage—cargo positioning and stowage onthe terminal—ship stresses andstability—developments in cargohandling and terminal operation—containers—equipment—safety ofcargo operations—cargo security

CHAPTER NINE: PORT LABOURLabour development—how dockers

were employed—how dockers werepaid—unions—numbers employed—labour v technology—how labour ismanaged

CHAPTER TEN: TIME IN PORT ANDSPEED OF CARGO HANDLING

Turnaround time in days for sailingvessels 1863–1912—general cargo—containers—bulk cargoes—tankers—general operational delays—strikes—port time other than berth time—port delays (congestion)—portproductivity

CHAPTER ELEVEN: PORT COSTS,PRICES AND REVENUE

How much does a port cost?—totalport charges—average portdisbursements (non cargo handling)—cargo-handling costs—typical portrevenue and expenditure—port pricing—costs and cost centres—current portcharges—port finance and profitability

CHAPTER TWELVE: PORTENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS—SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

The organisations, Conventions andReports—the basic argument—thecauses of port environmental pollution—a policy for sustainable developmentin a port—emergency plans, personnel

and training—examples

Index

List of Figures

Figure 1: The Port of LondonFigure 2: Factors constraining port

developmentFigure 3: Growth in world seaborne

tradeFigure 4: China dry bulk imports and

exportsFigure 5: The extended Porter Diamond

applied to seaports (adapted from

Haezendonck, 2002)Figure 6: A “model” port (see Professor

J. Bird’s Major Seaports of the UK)Figure 7: Layout for a typical berth

(1850–1900)Figure 8: Typical break-bulk general

cargo terminals (1900, 1920, 1960)Figure 9: Growth in world container

tonnageFigure 10a: Container terminal, 1970Figure 10b: Container terminal, 1980Figure 10c: Container terminal, 1990Figure 11: Ship and cargo tonsFigure 12: Typical relationship between

LOA and DwtFigure 13: Growth of world GRT

Figure 14a: Growth of the average shipsize (GT) showing with a draft greaterthan 13 metres

Figure 14b: Percentage of ships versusdraft

Figure 15: Increasing size of containerships

Figure 16: Economies of scale expectedfor larger container ships with openhatches

Figure 17: Direct and better “spotting”Figure 18: Sea approachesFigure 19: Vessel traffic servicesFigure 20: Modes of distributionFigure 21: Private sector involvement in

ports

Figure 22: Constraining influences onport management

Figure 23: Optimum number of berthsrequired in a port

Figure 24: Relationship between berthoccupancy ratio and waiting ratio

Figure 25: Conventional breakbulkgeneral cargo berth

Figure 26: General layout of a containerterminal

Figure 27: Traffic pathsFigure 28: Tanker berthFigure 29: Distance from ship/shore

interface to storageFigure 30: Cross-section of a ship

inclined by external forces

Figure 31: Growth of containerisationFigure 32: London—cargo tons v

dockersFigure 33: Types of cranesFigure 34: Some of the many varieties of

cargo gear available from a specialiststevedore supplier

Figure 35: Gross average speed of cargohandling per hatch for the entire stayin port

Figure 36: Relationship between shipsize and cargo-handling speed

Figure 37: If using several cranes toload and discharge

Figure 38: Scale loading speed forRichards Bay

Figure 39: Basic data a port shouldcollect

Figure 40: Port productivityFigure 41: Development of port costsFigure 42: Shipowners’ major costs

expressed as a percentageFigure 43: Global population and oil

consumption in 2025 (estimated)Figure 44: Who pays for reception

facilities

Chapter OnePorts

Introduction—some basic points—theimportance of ports—fundamentalobservations concerning ports—themain functions and features of a port—main facilities and services providedby a port—some definitions—differenttypes of port—information about ports—conclusion

Introduction

The purpose of this introductory chapteris to introduce and stress a few basicpoints which need to be made at thebeginning. Many of these points will berepeated and amplified at later stagesthroughout the book where the analysisof the topic requires greater detail.

Throughout the book I have includedsome historical details going back to thebeginning of the last century. This isincluded not just to entertain those withhistorical interests but to try to give anunderstanding to those wishing to grasp

how and why a modern port operatesand functions. Most of the world’s majorports invested heavily in developingtheir infrastructure during the lastcentury. Much of this is still visible andin many cases this heritage still formspart of the infrastructure that the modernport manager and port operator has todeal with. There can be very few, if any,large commercial undertakings whichhave to perform in the modern worldencumbered with such a legacy from thepast and, until plastic disposable portsare developed, presumably this problemwill continue. This is why portmanagement needs to get its forecasting

right. However, it is not just thegeographical location and physicaldesign that history can explain but also,and perhaps more importantly, theZeitgeist and working culture of portlabour can in most cases be reallyunderstood only when studied in itshistorical context. Further, as stressed inthe Preface, modern transportprofessionals must be able to adapt to,and anticipate, the implications ofchanges in the industry. Perhaps one ofthe most important aspects of modernmanagement is the ability to managechange and it is hoped that this book willgive an insight as to how port

management has coped with change overthe last century. The analysis of pastperformance is the basis of virtually allforecasting and our ability to anticipatethe optimum solutions to the portdecisions required in the next centurycan be focused by insights gained fromthe last.

Some Basic Points

Seaports are areas where there arefacilities for berthing or anchoring shipsand where there is the equipment for the

transfer of goods from ship to shore orship to ship. To use more modern jargon,it is a ship/shore interface or a maritimeintermodal interface. From an historicalpoint of view the customs facility isimportant because without it nointernational commercial intercoursewas legally possible. In many olderports the most imposing piece ofarchitecture on the waterfront is theCustom House.

The major reference books on portslist between 3,500 to 9,000 ports in theworld. The reason why the figure variesis that the meaning and definition of aport can vary. At one end of the scale a

large estuarial port may contain manyterminals which may be listed asseparate ports. At the other end of thescale not every place where a smallvessel anchors to offload cargo may belisted as a port.

The Importance ofPorts

Ports should be considered as one of themost vital aspects of a national transportinfrastructure. For most trading nations

they are:

— The main transport link withtheir trading partners and thus afocal point for motorways andrailway systems.

— A major economic multiplier forthe nation’s prosperity. Not onlyis a port a gateway for trade butmost ports attract commercialinfrastructure in the form ofbanks, agencies, etc., as well asindustrial activity.

Ports should also be considered as oneof the most important aspects ofmaritime transport because they are the

location:

— Where most maritime accidentshappen. This is inevitable, as itis a focal point, usually inshallow water, where shipsconverge.

— Where cargo is damaged orstolen. Again this is inevitableas a port is a place where thecargo is handled and a placewhere valuables areconcentrated. One of the initialreasons for building encloseddocks at the beginning of the lastcentury was to reduce theft.

However, with full containerloads reducing handling in portand the increasing speed ofthroughput the significance ofthis element should be reducing.

— Where repairs are carried out.Although a port is obviously theonly place where many repairscan be attempted the moremodern practice of plannedmaintenance means thatshipowners can plan at whichport the repairs or maintenancewill be done.

— Where most costs are incurred.Although some of these costs and

delays form part of the essentialand inevitable activities of aport, others, such as documentarycosts and delays, are simply partof an historical tradition whichcould and should be changed.

— Where delays are most likely tooccur.

— Where surveys take place.— Where most shipping services

are located, e.g. agents, brokers,etc. This still seems to be thecase in spite of moderncommunication systems.

— Where industries are situated.This has greatly accelerated

since the Second World War.— Where cargoes come from.— Where customs and government

policies are implemented.

Dr Ernst Frankel, in his book PortPlanning and Development (1986),estimates that “… only 40–45% of alltransport costs in international trade arepayable for productive transportation.For general cargo the figure is probablyonly 33%.” Much of the extra cost anddelay occurs in ports (but is notnecessarily caused by ports). Asindicated, ports are places wherenumerous controls are imposed, such as

documentary controls, finance controls,import controls, etc. For obviousreasons ports have developed as areasof storage while cargo waits fordistribution, further processing oronward movement.

In Japan where there are officiallyclassified 1,100 ports and harbours (21of which are rated as major ports forinternational trading) the multiple role ofa port is well recognised as a:

— Distribution centre.— Industrial zone and energy

supply base.— Mercantile trading centre—

attracting banks, brokers andtraders.

— Urbanisation and cityredevelopment centre.

— Life activity base—this isparticularly the case for thesmaller rural ports.

— Maritime leisure base—yachtmarinas, dockside recreationfacilities, cruise ship terminal.

Note of the 21 ports rated as major portsin Japan, Yokohama, Tokyo, Kobe,Nagoya and Osaka handle the greaterpercentage of foreign containerisedtrade. Kobe was number 6 in the world

league of container ports before the greatHanshin earthquake in the early 1990sreduced its position seriously. However,by 1997 it had recovered 80% of itsprevious container throughput and by2002 was rated number around 24 in thecontainer traffic league. This is a goodexample of the effect of a naturalcatastrophe on a port and the ability ofgood management to overcome suchdisaster.

Fundamental

ObservationsConcerning Ports

— Ports tend to be large civilengineering undertakings withhuge sunk costs. They also tendto last much longer than thevehicles that use them. If ashipowner makes a mistake inthe type or size of ship he buyshe can usually recoup his lossesby selling his mistake. A portmanager will usually find it moredifficult and costly to dispose ofhis mistakes.

— A ship is an entity, whereas aport is simply a collection ofactivities. This makes it moredifficult to talk about ports ingeneral. A small ship has manytechnical and operationalfeatures in common with a largeship but it is sometimes difficultto see what a small fishing portin a developing country has incommon with, say, Rotterdam.

— Most ships and ship operatorsare international in their designand ways of working, whereasports tend to be more parochialin that they reflect their local

commercial attitudes, practices,laws and working practices. Theduties of, say, the ship’s captainare similar regardless of flag,whereas the duties of the portharbourmaster can differconsiderably between countries.

— Since the advent ofintermodalism, ports now haveto compete for cargo very muchmore than in the past—hence thegreat interest in increasing portefficiency and value-addedactivities over the last few years.(Value-added activities aredescribed by UNCTAD as

—“The term added valuesignifies value newly added orcreated in the productive processof an enterprise. Loading anddischarging are certainly value-adding activities, so are theindustrial services of a portnoted earlier. In a distributioncentre, added value can takedifferent forms such as cargo-consolidation anddeconsolidation—providing up-to-date information on theinventory and cargo movements,stuffing/unstuffing containers,crating, palletisation, shrink-

wrapping, labelling, weighing,repackaging, etc.”)

— Ports provide an economicmultiplier for a region and manyports now carry out EconomicImpact Studies to determinewhich aspects of their workshould be encouraged. It shouldalso be remembered that portsare not only “gateways” forcargo but also obvious sites forindustry, banks, agents, storagedepots and distribution centres.They have in addition been largeemployers of labour.

— Ports are also an important part

of a nation’s transportinfrastructure and must be part ofnational transport planning,which is why any nationalgovernment or local governmentwill wish to have some input intothe general port strategicplanning.

— Up to the mid-nineteenth centuryships were small and couldapproach most creeks andestuaries. Since then they havegrown steadily until the 1950s,after which ship size increasedrapidly. This increase in sizecreated problems for most ports,

particularly as regards waterdepth, the width of dockentrances and berth length. Manyterminals became obsolete.

— The increase in ship size causedchanges in trading patterns inorder to gain the advantages ofeconomies of scale. Large shipsmust trade between large ports,with ample deep water, leavingsmaller ships (feeder vessels) todistribute the cargo to smallerports. Ships used to go to thecargo—now cargo goes to theship. These large ports are nowreferred to as centre ports and

the trading pattern as hub andspoke. It is also important to notethat it is the large powerful linershipowners who ultimatelydecide whether or not a portbecomes a centre port, not theport management. The portmanagement can however createa milieu that is attractive to thebig multinational containercarriers.

The Main Functions

and Features of a Port

Civil engineering features

— Sea and land access.— Infrastructures for ships

berthing.— Road and rail network.— Industrial area management.

Administrative functions

— Control of vehicles, all modes,

entering and leaving the port.— Environmental control.— Control of dangerous cargo.— Safety and security within the

port area.— Immigration, health, customs and

commercial documentarycontrol.

Operational functions

— Pilotage, tugging and mooringactivities.

— Use of berths, sheds, etc.— Loading, discharging, storage

and distribution of cargo.

Main Facilities andServices Provided by aPort

Services andFacilities for

Ships

Services andFacilities for Cargo

Arrival anddeparture Basic

Navigation aidsand VTS

Cargo handling onship and on quay

Approach channel Transport to/fromstorage

Pilotage, tugs andmooring gangs Storage/warehousing

Locks (if tidal) Tallying, marking,weighing, surveying

BerthsSurveillance,

protection, sanitarymeasures

Administrativeformalities

Dangerous cargosegregation

Police,immigration,

customs, health

Customs anddocumentary control

Supplies, water,bunkers

Receiving anddelivery

Telephone, Additional "added

repairs, medical,waste disposal

value" services

Port state controlRepackaging,

labelling, sorting,assembling

Cargo transfer Cleaning andpreparing cargo

Opening/closingof hatches

Setting up a logisticnetwork

Breakingout/stowing

Setting up amarketing package

One of the important points to beunderlined on reading through these listsof functions, features, facilities andservices that exist within most ports, isthe breadth and variety of skills and

activities that are taking place, bearingin mind the preceding list only containsthe more important and significantfactors.

Some Definitions

Operational definitions

Port. A town with a harbour andfacilities for a ship/shore interface andcustoms facilities.

Harbour. A shelter, either natural or

artificial, for ships.Dock. An artificially constructed

shelter for shipping.Lock. In tidal waters the majority of

docks have been maintained at a fixeddepth of water by making the access tothem through a lock, which allows theship to be raised or lowered as it entersor leaves the dock.

The advantages are:

1. A constant depth of water canbe maintained.

2. Cargo handling between shipand shore is easier.

3. The ship’s mooring lines do not

need constant attention.

The disadvantages are:

1. Increase in capital cost. It isalso a constructional featuredifficult to alter if changes inship design make it too short ornarrow. This has been aproblem with many ageing portsin tidal waters.

2. Extra time and possible delaysfor the ship when arriving andleaving.

Breakwater or Mole. A long solidstructure, built on the seaward side of

the harbour, for protection against theweather, rough seas and swell.

Wharf. A structure built along theshore where vessels can berth alongside.Pier or Jetty. A structure built out fromthe shore or river bank on masonry, steelor wooden piles for berthing ships. It isnot a solid structure and should notgreatly impede the flow of tide orcurrent. However both these terms areoften used with considerable variations.

Dolphin. An isolated islet of piles ormasonry to assist in the berthing ormanoeuvring of ships.

Stevedore. A person employed inmoving the cargo on or off the ship. This

is again a term with many localvariations. For instance, in London itwas the term for one of the skilled teamwho stowed the cargo on board the shipbut after Lord Devlin’s report the manytraditional functional terms used in thisarea were abandoned in favour of theall-embracing term “docker”.

Tug. A small power-driven vesselused in ports and harbours to:

— Tow barges and otherunpowered craft betweenrequired locations within theharbour. In the early days of sailthey were among the first steam

vessels to be developed as theywere very useful in helpingsailing craft in and out of port.

— Help large vessels to manoeuvrein and out of locks and on and offtheir berths.

— Help in salvage and rescuesituations. Many will beequipped with fire fighting andpollution control equipment.

A modern harbour tug will probablyhave a bollard pull of somewherebetween 20 to 70 tons.

Legal definitions

Port means an area within whichships are loaded with and/or dischargedof cargo and includes the usual placeswhere ships wait for their turn or areordered or obliged to wait for their turnno matter the distance from that area.

If the word port is not used, but theport is (or is to be) identified by itsname, this definition shall still apply.

Safe Port (see Chapter four) means aport which, during the relevant period oftime, the ship can reach, enter, remain atand depart from without, in the absenceof some abnormal occurrence, being

exposed to danger which cannot beavoided by good navigation andseamanship.

Berth means the specific place wherethe ship is to load and/or discharge. Ifthe word berth is not used, but thespecific place is (or is to be) identifiedby its name, this definition shall stillapply.

Safe Berth means a berth which,during the relevant period of time, theship can reach, remain at and departfrom without, in the absence of someabnormal occurrence, being exposed todanger which cannot be avoided by goodnavigation and seamanship.

Different Types ofPort

Ports can be classified in two largegroups—by function and by geographictype:

By function

(A) A cargo interface

1. Hub or Centre port, also

sometimes referred to as amega port, direct-call port, huband load centre port, megahub(greater than 4mn TEUs perannum where a TEU = Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit), superhub(greater than 1 million TEUsper annum), load centre port,pivot port, etc. The variationsare almost endless but differentauthors can use them withsubtle variations. (See commentat end of section.)

In the past ports tended to be eithersimply large major ports dealing with

international trade or smaller local portsserving the needs of their own hinterlandwith mainly coastal or short-seashipping. As inland transport developedlarger ports became larger and smallerports smaller. The advent of intermodaltransport and larger ships meant achange in the economics of internationaltransport. Cargo began to move byfeeder ships or inland transport modes tolarge hub or centre ports where largefast container ships moved thecontainers to other strategically locatedhub ports around the world.

The concept of hub ports hasdeveloped since it was first introduced a

couple of decades ago. Originally thegeneral consensus seemed to be that thehub port would naturally be formed bythe largest container port in the region orthe port for which ships had the mostcargo. The idea of creating a major hubport which was neither the origin ordestination of any cargo would havebeen firmly squashed, as it was in thecase of Falmouth in the early 1980s.

However, ideas are changing, and weare now seeing hubs located at anintermediate point along a pendulumroute with zero local cargo to offer, e.g.Malta (Marsaxlokk), Freeport Bahamasand Salalah. Such ports as these tend to

be interchange ports for large vesselsrather than hub and spoke ports for largevessels and feeders.

According to an H. P. Drewry Reportin 1997, 78% of container throughput atthe Port of Singapore in 1996 consistedof trans-shipment containers, while atAlgeciras it was 90%. The same reportestimated that two-thirds of the rise atthe 20 major hub ports was not due toglobal traffic growth but caused by anincrease in trans-shipment. It was alsoestimated that between 1980 and 1990the number of trans-shipment containershad been growing at an average of 14%per annum. In 2003 it was estimated that

82% of all containers are trans-shipped.When considering the economics of

hub and spoke feeder services oneshould remember that in the late 1990sthe minimum terminal handling cost pertrans-shipment container was probablybe in the region of US$500.

As the large international linercompanies are the major decision-makers when it comes to designating ahub port, they will not want one port toachieve monopoly status in a region.One would anticipate therefore that theywill endeavour to ensure that at leasttwo ports of hub port status arecompeting in a region to safeguard their

bargaining position.

Relationship between totalcost of direct-call and feederalternatives

One of the major points of discussionconcerning ports is whether this divisionof ports into centre ports and feederports will continue indefinitely. It maybe that it is a passing phase ofdevelopment in the early stages of thegrowth of containerisation, together withunbalanced global trade at the end of the

twentieth century. If the volume of tradeis large enough, distribution via feedervessels is obviously not the optimumsolution. On the one hand, tradingbetween centre ports enables the carrierto take advantage of the economies ofscale offered by large container ships.On the other hand, there are the extracosts and potential delays caused byhaving to re-ship the containers on to asmaller feeder ship for distribution. Thevolume of traffic therefore becomes thedecisive factor. The volume in thiscontext is, for a particular port, thenumber of obtainable TEUs per week bya shipping line in relation to a specified

maritime route. Thus a shipping lineshould use feeder services as long as thetraffic at its disposal on a maritime routeis fewer than “x”TEUs per week (bothimport and export). Professor Shuo Masuggested in the early 1990s thatbetween an Asian and a European port x= 580.

A case study of a possible newhub/centre port

The town of Sines, in the south ofPortugal, is quite small but has a longhistory as a fishing port with a small

general cargo terminal. It was the birthplace of Vasco de Gama. Over the lastfew years it has taken advantage of itsdeep water to develop as a tankerterminal but its small hinterland andrelatively poor inland transportconnections had, before around 1997,made the port management of Sines notsure whether the port could make anymajor development into containerisation.However, with the increasing success ofthe new generation of hub ports onpendulum routes, the port of Sinesreassessed its potential. In June 1999, aconcession was given to PSA to run adeep-water container terminal which

opened in 2003 with 320 metres of quay.The port of Sines has:

— An excellent geographicalposition. In fact, it is virtually onthe point where the mainshipping routes to and from Asia,Africa and the Americasconverge on north-westernEurope.

— Deep water approaches andterminals.

— Room to expand.— An enthusiastic and competent

management.

Another good example of a newly

developed hub port is Gioia Tauro. It issituated in southern Italy and handled itsfirst container in August 1995. The portof Gioia Tauro did not start as acontainer terminal. In 1975, the ItalianGovernment decided to develop a steelindustry in the south of Italy with thepurpose of creating new jobs andactivities. However, the European steelcrises in 1992 destroyed any potentialsuccess for the steel industry andtherefore, for the project. The projectwas scrapped until the Contship Italiangroup, a container sea carrier andterminal operator, had the idea oftransforming the harbour into a

transhipment hub. In 1995, the(medcenter container terminal (mct)),created by Contship Italian group, beganto operate. Nowadays the terminal iscontrolled by Contship Italian group (aholding company which in turn iscontrolled by Eurokai (66.6%), Eurogate(33.4%) and Maersk Sealand (10%)).

In 1999 and after just four years in themarket, Gioia Tauro became the busiestport in the Mediterranean handling 2.3million TEUs (ContainerisationInternational Yearbook 2001). In 2005,Gioia Tauro reached 3.2 million TEUs,of which 95% was trans-shipment trafficas its local cargo is almost irrelevant.

The port entrance is 250m wide with awater depth of 20m, while the portchannel has a minimum width of 200m.The medcenter terminal provides a3,145m linear berth with a maximumdraught of 15.5m. It is equipped with themost up-to-date technologies whichallow the mooring and the efficient(un)loading of several ships of the sizeof Sovereign Maersk (8,400 TEUs) andgive a total port annual capacity of 5.5million TEUs. In the terminal adedicated rail station has operated from1999 that allows the movement ofcontainers outside the port via inland. Inthe last years a new berth has been built

with a maximum draught of 18m.The port of Sepetiba, which is

situated on the Brazilian coast betweenRio de Janeiro and Santos, was reportedin the maritime press in April 1998 tohave plans to be a major hub for the eastcoast of South America.

In February 2003 Lloyd’s Listreported a possible new $390m projectfor a new deepwater Tangier-Med. Port,while at Christmas 2004, Panamaannounced plans for a new mega port tobe developed at the Pacific end of theproposed enlarged canal.

(2) Feeder port—to feed and

distribute cargo from 1.(3) Entrepot or transit port.(4) Domestic port, i.e. a natural

outlet for surrounding hinterland.

(B) A MIDAS (MaritimeIndustrial Development Area)(also known in France asZones IndustriellesPortuaires (ZIP))

This was a term that became part of portjargon in the mid-1960s to cover the portdevelopment which had been taking

place gradually since the Second WorldWar. Industries such as petrochemicals,oil refineries, steel works saw theadvantages of locating themselves inport areas to take advantage of cheaptransport of bulk raw materials. For thisto occur there had to be deep-wateraccess, available land and demand forthe product. A MIDAS can be one ormore of the following:

(5) Large industrial zone with itsown marine transport terminal.

(6) Customs free port.(7) Oil port.

(C) Specific ship/shoreinterface

(8) Naval port.(9) Fishing port.(10) Specific Commodity Export

Port, for example (quoting 2000tonnages) Coal—Qinhuangdao(China) 83.8 million tonnes,Richards Bay (South Africa)68.9 million tonnes, Hay Point(Australia) 69.4 million tonnes,Port of Virginia (USA) 20.3million tonnes.Iron Ore—Tubarao Praia, Mole(Brazil) 68.3 million tonnes, Port

Headland (Australia) 68.5million tonnes, Dampier(Australia) 65.9 million tonnes,Saldanha Bay (South Africa) 24million tonnes, Narvik (Norway)11.8 million tonnes.

A large port such as Rotterdam can bemany of these.

By geographic type

This classification is almost endless, soonly the more important types areconsidered here.

(1) Coastal submergence—NewYork and Southampton.

(2) Ryas (submerged estuaries)—Falmouth, Rio.

(3) Tidal estuaries—Bristol,London, Antwerp.

(4) Artificial harbours—Dover.(5) Rivers (non-tidal)—Montreal.

The recognition of a geographic typemay give an insight into its operatingadvantages or disadvantages, e.g. a tidalestuarial port will probably requiremore expensive surveying and dredgingthan a closed dock system.

The port of London is a good example

of an estuarial port. Note that the portson the Medway are under a differentauthority. The Port of London alsoillustrates the process described inChapter two of how, as ports develop,their centres of operation tend to movetowards the sea. It started in Romantimes at London Bridge and would havemoved to the Maplin Sands in the 1970sif the port management had had its way.Note also the sheer size of the port andthe diversity of activities that take placewithin its boundaries.

Figure 1: The Port of London

Information aboutPorts

Most large ports will of course havetheir own web page on the internet andthere are several comprehensivereference books on world ports.However, over the last five years or soFairplay has compiled this informationon a computer disk and it is availableboth in the Fairplay World ShippingEncyclopaedia and on the disc calledWorld Ports. By being available in discform the information is not only easierand cheaper to send around the worldand be kept up to date, but the searchfacilities enable the user to easily findand select the data that is really needed.The information on each port includes a

complete port description with chartsand photographs (the latter only on theWorld Ports disc), pre-arrivalinformation for ships, navigationalconsiderations, information on berths,cargoes and port dues. It concludes witha comprehensive list of generalinformation and addresses.

There is also a Guide to Port Entrywhich is available on disc.

Conclusion

One must also remember that ports have

not developed simply as industrial andcommercial trading centres. They havealso been the points where foreigncultures and ideas have impacted on anation. Shanghai, Bombay, Rio,Liverpool and a hundred other great portcities owe much of their flamboyant pastto their maritime connections. Largemodern ships with small crews, berthedwell away from populated zones nolonger create the dynamic if racywaterfront areas so well described bymaritime authors of yore. Such traces asare now left are being preserved astourist areas, such as the Nyhaven inCopenhagen or the Reeperbahn in

Hamburg.The conclusion to this first

introductory chapter is therefore thatports as such are a very loose anddiverse concept. They are often morethan a transport interface and a focalpoint of an area’s inland transportinfrastructure as they will invariablyinvolve a large capital investment, be aregional economic multiplier and a largeemployer of labour. All of this willmake them important pawns in thepolitical arena of the area. I hope thatthis book will help to clarify the conceptof a port and give a clearerunderstanding as to its function, purpose,

operation and possible futuredevelopment.

Chapter TwoPort Development

Introduction—phases of portdevelopment—growth in world trade—changes in growth—developments interminal operation

Introduction

Ports, like most other commercialactivities, are constantly changing. Theirdesign and infrastructure change as thevehicles using them change and theirfunctions develop and alter as the tradepassing through them varies in type andquantity. Cargo-handling technology andchanges in labour requirements andculture have also seen radicaldevelopments. In order to understandports and to try to develop a generalconceptual model for ports, it isimportant to grasp the general patternand causes of these developments andthe solutions, good or bad, attempted byvarious port managers. In London these

developments have been evolving over2,000 years but other ports in other partsof the world may have gone through thesame process in just a few decades. Asalready stressed, if this process ofevolution can be analysed, then it willbe easier to forecast future changes

Phases of PortDevelopment

Figure 2: Factors constraining portdevelopment

Many factors can cause ports tochange, evolve or die:

— Changes in the inlandtransport infrastructure. For

instance, the coming of therailways tended to make largeports like London and Liverpoollarger and small ports smaller.Road transport had the oppositeeffect in the UK where the post-Second World War motorwayssaw a revival in many of thecountry’s smaller ports. Manywould argue, however, that itwas not the motorway in itselfthat attracted the shipowner tothe smaller ports, but that in thesmaller ports the labour unionswere less militant. However, thedevelopment of large container

ships has again encouraged thegrowth of large regional ports.

— Changes in trade patterns. TheUK joining the EU had a negativeeffect on Liverpool but apositive effect on Felixstowe asthe UK traded more with its EUpartners and less with the oldmembers of the Commonwealth.Port analysts need to considercarefully the effect which thecurrent trend of regional co-operation in trade and industrywill have on port growth.

— Changes in financial andlogistical thinking. London at its

peak was an enormouswarehouse for Europe. Since theSecond World War the tendencyis not to store “things” but to useports as industrial areas, such asRotterdam. More recently thetrend has been to develop“value-added activities” andbecome a sophisticatedmarketing and distributioncentre, such as, for example,Hamburg or Bremen. Studentsmight like to discuss why Londonapparently failed in thisdevelopment as compared withRotterdam.

— Length of life. Unlike ships,ports often have to last a longtime, sometimes for centuries.They therefore have to adapt andchange over the course of time.Many of the traditional Britishports were developed and builtwell over a century ago whichmeans that many are now facedwith a legacy of small antiquateddocks.

Growth in World

Trade

Figure 3: Growth in world seaborne trade

World trade has shown continuousgrowth since reliable statistics began,and Figure 3 indicates that there hasbeen a tremendous upsurge since the1950s, when a more efficient and

productive system provided bycontainerisation and bulk carriage wasevolved to meet the growing demand.

The table above, which tabulates themajor individual products that go tomake up world trade, indicates afluctuating demand over the last quarterof a century for some commodities. As

the price of crude oil increased in theearly 1980s the demand for it reducedslightly. Grain will always fluctuatedepending on the success or otherwiseof local harvests. From the above tablecoal can be seen to have shown the mostsuccessful growth.

In 1980 the percentage in generalcargo of world trade was 28%. In 2000the world trade in general cargo was981 million tonnes, of which 57.6% wascontainerised. In 2005 this was 1,200million tonnes of which 60% wascontainerised.

The phenomenal growth of theChinese economy is effecting most of the

world’s trade routes. The port trafficthrough Chinese ports has beenincreasing at around 11% a year since1998. In 2008 a reliable source reportedthat China produced 90% of the world’stoys and 60% of the apparel that isbought, while in 2007 China imported383 million tons of iron ore.

Figure 4: China dry bulk imports andexports

For the purpose of measuring worldtrade one can use the actual tonnescarried or the tonne/miles involved. Forthe purpose of gauging the impact ofworld trade on shipping activitytonne/miles is more relevant, but forassessing the global impact on ports theformer would seem more useful.

The important question for portmanagement is what of the future?Demand and personal consumption willalmost certainly increase—for example,if India and China increase their energyper capita to only half that of, say,Europe or Japan the demand in thissector will be tremendous.

However, how will this demand bemet? There are various scenarios:

— Will large bulk carriers continueto carry raw material longdistances to be processed or willit be processed nearer itssource? If so, will it effect thetype of ship and terminalrequired?

— Will goods be moved, or willthe factories and know-how be

relocated, as the Japanese havedone with their car factories?

— In 2001 it was estimated thatthere would be a 59% increasein energy requirements by 2020.

Structural changes in logistics:

— Include greater flexibility ratherthan achieving economies ofscale by spreading the fixedcosts.

— Larger product variety with ashorter life scale.

— Higher insecurity and risk.— Outsourcing of the production of

components, of transport and

warehousing.

Political factors affectingworld trade and portdevelopment

World trade may grow naturally as aconsequence of growing industrialactivity and of all the other factorswhich one can normally expect to formpart of a nation’s economicdevelopment. Such economic growth canbe stimulated and controlled by nationaland international policy measures such

as World Trade Organisation (WTO).Further, ports may be either the naturalgateway through which this growth intrade is channelled or they may bedeveloped, as Hong Kong and Shanghailargely were in the last century, to createaccess to a virtually new market. Inother words, a port may be developedby trade or vice versa.

While political factors are causingtrade to grow, the port has usually noserious problems except perhaps forcongestion if the growth is too fast andunexpected. A more serious situation iswhen political factors cause a massiveloss in trade passing through a port. For

instance, Hong Kong’s trade wasseverely hit in 1950 when the UnitedNations clamped its embargo upon tradewith communist China. It is much toHong Kong’s credit that it switched froma port-based economy and turned itselfinto one of the world’s greatmanufacturers.

Rostock on the German Baltic coasthas suffered on more than one occasionfrom political changes. Before the IronCurtain came down more than 60 yearsago it was the premier German seaportin the Baltic. While in the GDR it builtup a large international breakbulk tradeof around 20 million tons. When the Iron

Curtain was lifted in 1990 its cargothroughput dropped to 8 million tons perannum as the breakbulk cargo moved tobetter equipped and positioned Westernports. However, by 1996 its annualthroughput was up to 18 million tons, butthis time by catering for the North SouthRo/Ro trade across the Baltic. Thislatest development should continue,greatly helped by the paralleldevelopment of better road and railconnections.

There could be a possibledevelopment of regionalisation, as theEU produces more local trading infavour of international trading.

A paper produced in 2001 suggestedthat in a decade the number of hub portscould be reduced from 6,000 to 100–200.

Figure 5: The extended Porter Diamond

applied to seaports (adapted fromHaezendonck, 2002)

Porter’s Diamond is a mutuallyreinforcing system, whose determinantsare co-related in creating a competitiveadvantage of an industry. The individualdeterminants are mutually dependentbecause the effect of one of themdepends on the state of the other. Porter(1990) also named two additionaldeterminants that can influence thesuccess of a firm and complete thesystem. These are chance andgovernment.

Factor conditions are basically

factors of production: labour; land;natural resources; capital; andinfrastructure. However, the factors thatare most crucial to competitiveadvantage in most industries are notinherited but are created within a nation,like technological know-how.

Swot analysis (strengths,weaknesses, opportunitiesand threats)

A swot analysis is a useful way ofassessing the potential development

concerning a port’s competitive edgeand threats from rival ports in the area.The elements to be considered in such ananalysis will vary but such a list shouldinclude:

— Maritime accessibility, depthavailable and position on majortrade routes.

— Amount of trans-shipment cargoit can attract and storage spaceand facilities.

— Logistics that provide value-added and availablemanufacturing industries.

— Activities of transport agencies

and goods and rail distributionnetworks.

— Good well trained labour forceand efficient servicingcompanies.

— Technology and communicationsystems.

— State of internal and externalcompetition.

— Ability of port authority andpolitical administrations.

— Costs.

Some other “wildcards” thatcan effect growth

Labour—for instance, the port ofColombo having turned itself into atransit port in the early 1980s had movedup the container port league table from75th position in 1983 to 26th position in1988. However, labour unrest (whichoften follows success) in the late 1980scaused a major container line customerto pull out, and it was 1996 before theport was able to regain a similar ratingin the world port container league.

Exceptional bad weather—has alsodamaged many ports, many of whichhave been under-insured and beenunable to find the necessary capital tomake good the damage.

Changes in cargo-moving technology—for instance, in the 1970s some portsmade large capital investments interminals for the handling of LNG onlyto find a change of policy in some areasto move the commodity by pipeline

Why some ports becomemajor ports

In 1995 20 ports handled 52% of theworld’s terminal throughput. There aretwo main requirements for a port toachieve success:

1. A good natural harbour anddeep water approaches, i.e. siteconsiderations. For example,with Rotterdam, as with mostlarge river deltas, silting was amajor problem and thedirection of the channels wasconstantly changing. To try tostabilise the situation a canalwas cut in 1830. This attemptdid not succeed but in 1870 theNew Waterway wasconstructed to provide a directoutlet to the sea. This wassuccessful and formed the basisof the modern port of

Rotterdam. Amsterdam had aneven greater problem whenafter the Second World War itlost the sea altogether when theZuider Zee was reclaimed.

2. A strong traffic-generatinglocation, i.e. the port must becentral to an area and on theway to a meaningfuldestination.

The above two factors can be enhancedby human, corporate and governmentcontrivance.

Growth of the world’s leadingports

Many historians consider Bruges to havebeen the leading port in northern Europein the thirteenth century. This title passedin the fifteenth century to Antwerp untilthe Spanish invasion and the closure ofthe Scheldt in 1585. After this the mantlewas worn by Amsterdam for perhaps acentury, before being claimed byLondon, when industrial capitalismassumed more significance thanmercantile capitalism. The table belowshows how the port which could claimto be the world’s largest port has

altered. In 2001 the Port of TanjungPelepas (PTP) was the fastest growingport.

There are many different ways portsize can be compared, such as thephysical area, the length of waterfront,the value of cargo passing through the

port, number and/or tonnage of vesselscalling, etc.

However, as a crude indicator of size,the total cargo throughput of the port isthe statistic preferred by most peopleworking in the port industry. Bulkcargoes do form a very large proportionof the total in all cases, particularly withthe leading ports.

The table above indicates how thesize of the ports shown has altered. Allhave grown but some have grown moreand faster than others. In most cases thefigures could be challenged as regardstheir precision and consistency ofmethodology, and what has been

included and excluded. For instance,until recently London figures used toinclude several million tons of sludgewhich were shipped out to the North Seafor dumping. However, the trends shouldbe sufficiently accurate to allow generalconclusions to be made.

The table also shows that over the lastcentury the majority of the world’slargest ports were in the Atlantic basin,but in 1995 Singapore appeared in thestatistical tables as the world’s largestport and the latest world league tablesshow that the Pacific basin can nowclaim this honour.

Singapore’s growth in the last decade

has been truly phenomenal. However, in2005 Shanghai showed an even greaterphenomenal growth when it moved intothe lead position with an annualthroughput of 443 million metric tonswith Singapore on 423 freight tons andRotterdam on 370.6 million metric tons.In 2005 Rotterdam announced a newdevelopment called Maasvlakte2 whichwill involve a massive reclamationproject which it hopes to start in 2008.

Changes in Growth

From the table on page 19 comparingLondon and New York it can beestimated that New York finally drawswell clear of London about 1915 afterthe start of the First World War. Thissame conclusion would seem to bearrived at no matter whether one usesvalues or tonnages. This was rather sadfrom the British point of view as Londonhad long been proud of its claim to bethe world’s greatest port, so proud infact that it continued to make this claimthough the 1920s and 1930s. London did,however, continue to grow, thoughconsiderably more slowly than its rivals,and reached its zenith with regard to

tonnage in 1964 when it peaked at over60 million tons. It must be underlinedthat these tables and graphs areconsidering only the size of ports.London can still lay claim to be theworld’s premier maritime commercialcentre.

The same table shows how, in the late1960s, New York passed the largest-portbaton onto Rotterdam which hadcontinued to grow at a phenomenalspeed following the Second World War.Like London before it, New York wasproud of its leading position and in the1997 Guinness Book of Records it wasstill listed as the world’s greatest port.

Leading ports for specificcargoes

Ports can, of course, be classified bysize with reference to specific activitiesor cargoes. Miami claims, for instance,to be the biggest when it comes to cruiseshipping and in the various shippingtrades claims are made that a port is thelargest fishing port, coal export port, etc.However, within the containerisedshipping trade, league tables arepublished annually by ContainerisationInternational and these are copied intonumerous publications.

See also the section on the “Rise and

Fall of Ports” in Chapter 5.

The physical development ofa major port

This table is based on Professor Bird’ssummary given in his book MajorSeaports in the UK and its purpose is toshow the general physical stages mostports have passed through.

Era CommentsThe ships approachchosen discharge pointsas closely as possible,

1 Primitive

lying aground ifnecessary. A port growsaround this point. InLondon this point wouldhave been just below OldLondon Bridge. ProfessorBird says that this eracomes to an end whendemand causes this basicnucleus to expand orrelocate itself. Hesuggests that in Londonthis happened around ad200.

2MarginalQuayExtension

There is now a series ofpurpose-built quay wallsfor ships to berth at. InLondon this was the

system until the end of theninth century.

3MarginalQuayElaboration

Number of berthsextended by artificialembayments. In Londonthis appears to havehappened at Queenhithe in899.

4 DockElaboration

Artificial docksconstructed with tidalbasins and complicatedquay patterns. In Londonthis started in 1802 withthe opening of the WestIndia Dock. It isinteresting that very manyof the traditional portsarrived at this point about

the same time. Liverpoolwas the first in the UK in1712.

5SimpleLinealQuayage

Long straight quays indocks purpose-built forthe large steel steamships.These docks may belocated in places moresuitable for the ships. InLondon this can be seen inthe building of the RoyalDocks and Tilbury Docks.

6 SpecialisedQuayage

Quays and jetties built inspecific areas toaccommodate largetankers such as VLCCs,and specific cargoes.Specialised container and

Ro/Ro berths could beconsidered in thiscategory.

The dates given for London arementioned only for interest. Theimportant fact to recognise is the generalevolutionary process. Los Angeles, forinstance, went through the whole processin about a century and a half.

The reasons why London is chosen asan example frequently throughout thisbook are:

1. It is universally well knownand has been reasonably well

researched.2. There are many older ports,

such as Alexandria, butprobably few where thedevelopment can be traced onsuch a continuous andconsistent basis.

Developments in port location

Figure 6 (on page 22) represents asimple “model” port which shows howmany estuarial ports have developed.Originally the ships approached as farupriver as possible and were generally

forced to stop where the first bridge hadbeen built. This was usually no problemas the bridge marked a mainthoroughfare and a large trading city hadprobably developed there.

Figure 6: A “model” port (see Professor J.Bird’s Major Seaports of the UK)

In the case of London, the Romansbuilt the bridge and developed the cityof London. The ships would anchor orberth below the bridge and discharge.By the beginning of the nineteenthcentury the river had become congestedby ships and much of the cargo wasbeing stolen. (The London River Policewere the city’s first police force.) Toease congestion and increase securityvarious docks were built along the river.As ships got bigger with deeper drafts,the new docks and terminals moveddown-river to the sea. In London by the1870s Tilbury docks were built, 35miles down-river from the city. With the

advent of containerisation and fastercargo-handling, more terminal spacewas needed as well as good access toinland transport systems so old terminalswere closed and new ones constructed.In the 1970s the Port of LondonAuthority had plans to develop a newport system right at the mouth of theThames on Maplin Sands but this planhit several problems, some of themenvironmental (it would have meantdestroying an important bird sanctuary)so the plans were shelved.

Some elements of the processindicated by the model can in fact beobserved in most ports that have not

been lucky enough to be built on a virginsite within the last three decades. Dubaiis an interesting variation, as there in acreek can be seen sailing vesselsberthed and trading in a mannerseemingly untouched by the passing oftime, while almost alongside lies a newstate-of-the-art container port.

Financing port development

Since an old established port oftenowned land in the old city centre, nowvery desirable for development as highrent offices, many ports have been able

to fund their new projects by skilfullydeveloping their redundant port sites.Good land management has thereforebecome an essential managementfunction for many of the traditional portadministrations. One can see goodexamples of this in London, New York,Copenhagen, Hamburg, Antwerp, etc.,where old warehouses have beenconverted to trendy luxury hotels, officeblocks, shopping malls or apartmentareas.

A relatively new development in portfinancing and control is the growingpractice of large powerful ports, such asthe ports of Singapore and Hamburg,

investing their profits and skills in newport development in other parts of theworld. Large shipping groups have alsobeen involved in port investment.

Developments caused bychanging customs procedures

In 1803 in London a law was passedallowing ships to discharge to customswarehouses. This is a very significantdate as it meant that until this time theship was virtually the warehouse, andthe consignee had to collect the cargofrom the ship. So before this time

merchant warehouses were often outsidethe docks. Communication was verylimited, so a ship’s arrival could seldombe anticipated with any precision.Consignees had to wait until the Masternotified them that the ship had arrivedand where she was berthed. Eventowards the end of the 1800s in the UK,sailing ships had to give shippers threedays’ notice before working cargo, toallow them time to make arrangementsfor collecting or delivering the cargo.

This very significant change incustoms procedure affected the wholeconcept of port cargo-handling andterminal design. Even today in many

developing countries the customsprocedures can be the major cause oflow productivity.

Developments inTerminal Operation

The dates and modes of operation givenin the following section are onlyindications of the methods employed inmany major ports about that time. Thedescriptions are largely based onLondon, which until 1908 was really a

collection of private unregulatedterminals. Thus at any one time thepractices adopted at one terminal ordock were often quite different to thosepractised at other terminals in thevicinity. However, the importance oflocating precisely when things happenedis not so important as identifying why thechanges occurred.

The period before 1800

Prior to 1800 port operation hadremained in general unchanged forcenturies. The standard ship around

1800 was in the region of 300 tons andwas of course sail-powered. Most portswould have quays or wharves. (By 180526 miles of vaults existed in London forwine storage.)

Cargoes were usually loaded anddischarged on and off the ship by thecrew, though the Master or agent couldemploy extra labour if they needed orwished to. The cargo would be handledmanually, though tackle often seems tohave been used to lift the cargovertically out of the hold onto the ship’sdeck. John Pudney in his book LondonDocks says that towards the end of the1700s the London watermen opposed the

use of cranes. These were of coursehand-operated cranes as hydraulic andsteam cranes were still in theirtheoretical or experimental stage.

However, although this had not been adynamic period of changes for ports,efforts to improve port facilities werebeginning. For instance, in 1780 HullDock Company developed a 2-horsepower operated dredger capable ofshifting 22 tons per hour.

1800–1850

During this period the tonnage entering

the Port of London more than doubledover the previous century. The industrialrevolution was under way, and by 1840the UK had a national railway system. Inthe UK the railways were one of themajor forces in port development,making large ports larger and smallports smaller. For ports exporting coalduring this century, and the UK was oneof the world’s largest coal suppliers,their rise or fall was almost entirely inthe hands of the private railwaycompanies.

Unfortunately, the introduction of thesteamship during this introductoryperiod caused problems for the dock

designer. Gordon Jackson in his bookHistory and Archaeology of Portsmakes the point that steamers could notbe crowded into a dock. A dock for 140sailing ships would take only 35steamers. Jackson also notes that:

“The aversion to dockside warehouses thathad been growing since the 1840s became,as far as is known, universal, with newdocks favouring one and two-storey transitsheds, often with built in gantry cranes, andwith more emphasis than hitherto on openspaces for the handling of minerals andmachinery. There was a growing tendencyfor goods to be stored outside the docks.Railways and docks were increasinglyinterdependent. However, in London and

many other ports ships discharged directlyinto barges which lay alongside—somedocks had a width problem.”

The dockside warehouse did remain atmany terminals until the end of thenineteenth century and the evolution ofthe transit shed was in many placesslow.

During this period steamshipsappeared, though they could only beused for short distance and coastaltraffic because the engines wereinefficient and their coal consumptionconsiderable. However, in 1818 theSavannah was the first auxiliary ship tocross the Atlantic and by 1837 the

steamships Great Western and Sirius didestablish a regular trans-Atlanticservice. In 1850 steamers formed 41%of foreign-going ships arriving at Hull,but only 28% of those arriving atLondon. Therefore, the sailing shipswere still the predominant commerciallong-distance carrier. Anticipating theapproaching threat from the steamship,sailing ships were however improvingtheir speed and efficiency.

By 1850 the average sailing ship sizewas 210 tons and the average sizesteamship was 250 tons.

1850–1900

Figure 7: Layout for a typical berth (1850–1900)

Figure 7 above illustrates a possiblelayout for a typical berth during thisperiod. The ship discharged her cargoon to the wharf or into a barge. Thewarehouse probably had cranes fitted to

her walls to lift the cargo to the requiredfloor. Cargo movement on the wharf orin the warehouse would be by hand truckand distribution to and from warehousewould be by horse and cart or railway.

During the second half of the centurythe tonnage of ships arriving in Londonincreased by over 12 times that of thefirst half. So this was obviously a periodof rapid expansion for London. Not onlywas world trade growing fast, but therailways made London the transportfocal point of Britain and also, to usemodern jargon, it became the centre portfor Europe. This was almost certainlyhelped by its political and financial

stability compared to most of itsEuropean rivals, and its empire trade.

In 1888 the Report from the SelectCommittee on Sweating gives acomplete insight into the operationalworking of the London Docks for thatmoment in time, with employers, unionofficials and dock workers being cross-examined about the working practices ofthe moment. Most seem to takemechanisation (cranes) for granted in thedocks (though not on the smaller riverwharves) and some made wistfulcomments about how good it was 15 orso years ago before the cranes broughtunemployment and lower wages into the

docks. When asked what had made thegreatest changes in the docks, two of thesenior employers said the Suez Canal,which they blamed for increasing thecompetition from the continent, and thetelegraph which greatly facilitatedcommunication over large areas withinthe port. It was also noted that theimprovement in internationalcommunication had reduced the amountof speculative importing and storage inthe London warehouses. (Is this the firstindication of “just in time”?) Commentswere also made concerning the growthin the number of steam tugs which haddone much to even out the ship arrivals,

hitherto so dependent on the wind tomanoeuvre upriver. The growth insteamships was also noted as well as thefact that they were nearly all geared andneeded little extra equipment to workcargo. Sailing vessels on the other handwere seldom at berths with cranes andwould often need a barge with aportable steam winch and boiler.

1900–1960

By the early 1900s, the port had reacheda stage of development that is easilyrecognisable even today. From then until

the greater utilisation of dry bulkcargoes in the 1950s and the onset ofunitisation in the 1960s, its developmentwas one of gradual evolution as itadapted to increases in ship size and thesteady improvement in cargo-handlingtechnology. In 1913 a survey comparingmajor world ports rated Hamburg as thebest equipped port in the world andNew York one of the worst. In spite ofthis, New York was rated the best asregards ship turn-round times, becausethe labour force worked at high speed atall hours. This illustrates even at thispoint how labour-intensive ports wereand how labour-dependent for their

productivity. This probably remains trueand will continue to be the mostimportant factor in productivity as longas this “traditional” type of break-bulkgeneral cargo terminal remains inexistence.

In the UK, London and Liverpoolwere established as the major ports. In1913 London handled 29.3% of thenational trade and Liverpool 26%. By1920 road haulage had arrived but itwas not perhaps until after the SecondWorld War and the building of themotorways that road transport started toreverse the effect the railways had had acentury before, and in the UK made the

small ports bigger and big ports smaller.The devastation of the Second WorldWar gave many continental ports thatrare opportunity offered to portmanagement, that is “to start again”. Thisnew start combined with a new surge ingrowth in ship size, improved transportand commercial communications and asteep post-war rise in demand for rawmaterials, gave rise to a change in thebasic port function. The storage andwarehousing function decreased but theport as an area of industrial activityincreased. In Rotterdam, for instance, thesouth bank of the waterway was coveredin two swift stages to become 50

kilometres of heavy industry with accessby large bulk carriers.

To illustrate the evolution in thisperiod figures for a typical break-bulkgeneral cargo terminal for 1900, 1920and 1960 are shown for comparison.

Figure 8: Typical break-bulk general cargoterminals (1900, 1920, 1960)

In the 1960s dock transit sheds wereabout 500ft by 120ft. They originally hadlow roofs, but fork lift trucks could nowstack high easily and cheaply, thereforesheds were now built with higher roofs.

A new era for dry cargoshipping and ports

From about the mid-1960s it could beargued that ports and shipping wereentering a new phase of operation. The

“traditional” cargo ships continued inoperation but were in decline and wouldcontinue to be marginalised to the lesserports of the world with less lucrativecargoes, in the same way that sailingships had been a century earlier.

General cargo moved to containerships, and bulk cargo to bulk carriers.Both ship types grew rapidly andconsiderably in size as ports found thewater to match their draft and the cargo-handling technology to maintain a rapidturn-round in port. In addition to thesemajor new ship types, many newspecialist types emerged such as:

1965

PCCs (pure car carriers) andPCTCs (pure car and truckcarriers). These require the portto have large parking facilitiesand their large "windage" maycause berthing problems.

1970s

Introduction of barge-carryingships such as Lash and Seabees.Originally it was thought thatthese ships could manage withlittle or no terminal facilities. Infact some special terminals weredeveloped for them. Because oftheir very sophisticated barge-lifting gear there were alsooccasional labour problems inports as to who had the "right" tooperate them.

1976 First semi-submersible.

1985First fruit juice carrier. Theseships do, of course, requirespecialist terminal facilities.

The container age

Figure 9: Growth in world container tonnage

Figure 9, showing the growth in theworld container traffic, illustrates thatalthough the global growth has beenconsistently increasing the growth hasvaried in the three main trading regions.

In 2000 world container portshandling increased by 8.7% but in south-east Asia and South America the growthwould be nearer 25%. Note that some17% of container traffic is in emptycontainers. It was estimated that the costof repositioning empties in 2000 wasaround US$15 billion.

Development of unitisation

This started between the developedcountries in the late 1960s (in Australiaand USA perhaps a decade earlier) butvery often with only makeshift ships andhurriedly converted terminals. Thepioneering spirit behind thisdevelopment was a truck operator, not ashipowner.

By the mid-1970s, containers weremoving to developing countries in self-sustaining vessels and although craneswere not needed at the port, the lack offacilities for the final inland transportleg led to many problems. By 1980 thesecond generation of container vesselswas now well established and the

concept of a well-developed containerterminal became better defined.However, ships continued to grow andby the late 1980s there were the fourthgeneration ships which required largergantry cranes to reach across them. Newcontainer sizes were also introduced andall these changes required large capitalinvestment which for developingcountries meant further difficulties.

Containers brought with them otherproblems for port operators:

— The large investment necessaryto containerise a route meant thatliner shipowners had to form

themselves into larger financialunits and hence were morepowerful customers from thepoint of view of the port.

— The increase in size andcomplexity of ships meant anincrease in the cost of the ship’stime. Also the cargo was nowintermodal so the cargo started tomove to the ship rather than theship to the cargo.

— Because the cargo was nowintermodal, adjacent ports on thesame land mass could nowcompete with each other and thechoice of port was, and often

still is, in the hands of the largemultinational liner operator.

— There was a need for acomprehensive informationsystem and greater efficiency.

— A significantly smaller but bettertrained work force was needed.

— Faster customs clearance, betterdocumentation procedure and areview of much of the country’stransportation law was required.

This table shows that the above ports,though all relatively close to each other,have all developed their container trafficat different rates.

Top 10 Mediterranean ContainerPorts

Rank Port Mn. TEUs in 20061 Algeciras 3.242 Gioia Tauro 2.943 Valencia 2.604 Barcelona 2.325 Genoa 1.666 Port Said East 1.60

7 Malta Freeport 1.49

8 Ambarli 1.459 Piraeus 1.3910 La Spezia 1.12

Development of containerterminals

Figure 10a: Container terminal, 1970

Figure 10b: Container terminal, 1980

Figure 10c: Container terminal, 1990

Omitting ferry terminals which have

developed specialisms of their own,many of the earlier container terminalscontained some facilities for Ro/Roloading and discharging and many of thepackaged lumber berths were of thisnature. This type of cargo-handling wasoften referred to as STO/RO procedure.However, to give themselves world-wide flexibility, most of the ships thatnow offer this type of facility have theirown very expensive and sophisticatedramps.

By 2000 the outreach of the newcranes at the larger terminals, such asYokohama, reached 63 metres to reachacross 22 boxes, which is a possible

athwartship stow in the current largergeneration of container ships. The newgantry cranes in 2007 can now weigh2,800 tons

Bulk cargo terminals

The development in size of theseterminals is very similar to that ofcontainer vessel terminals, with thePanamax (65,000 dwt) size beingpopular in both groups. However, at thehigher end of the scale the bulk carriersare larger, with some ore carriers in theVLCC size. (See Analysis section re

bulk cargo-handling speed).Bulk cargo-loading terminals are

usually situated as near as possible tothe source or with good rail connectionto the source, and loading will be somevariation of controlled gravity fall intothe hold.

This will be fast and often very dustywhich may now bring environmentalclaims from people living nearby.Cement dust for instance can betroublesome to people living many milesaway downwind.

The discharging terminals will nowoften be part of an industrial complexsituated in the port area and the complex

will often have its own dedicatedterminal, discharge equipment andconveyor belts.

Chapter ThreeImpact of ChangingShip Technology onPorts

Introduction—ship knowledge—shipdevelopments which influence portdevelopment—effect of port time onship speed—other technical

developments affecting ports

Introduction

Although this is a book about ports thereare certain facts about ships whichanyone interested in ports must be awareof, such as tonnage which usually formsa vital part of a port’s pricing systemand terminal berth organisation. Thedriving force for change in portinfrastructure, superstructure andoperations has been the changes incertain aspects of ship technology and

changes in ship management’s attitudeand expectations.

Ship Knowledge

Tonnage

In shipping the term tonnage (ship size isusually expressed in NT, GT, DWT orLOA) can indicate many differentmeasures and anyone working in portsshould be familiar with most of them.The following gives a brief summary of

the basic terms.A tun was a barrel holding 252

gallons of wine. Remember that forhundreds of years the tun was a muchvalued container for the transport ofmany cargoes. A 100-tun vessel was onethat could carry a hundred tuns. Hencethe word ton in shipping can denote bothweight and capacity.

Figure 11: Ship and cargo tons

Before 1982 GT was known as GRTand NT as NRT. The R meantRegistered, as up to 1982 these tonnageswere given when the ship wasregistered.

Brief history

In 1849 a Royal Commission originatedthe concept that assessment of duesshould be based on the vessel’s potentialearning capacity. It was known as theMoorsom system after the secretary of

the Commission, George Moorsom, andcame into force in 1854. The idea wasthat gross tonnage would be a measureof the vessel’s volume and that nettonnage would be a measure of theship’s earning capacity. Port dues andtaxes were paid on these tonnages soship-owners looked for ways ofreducing them. Governments, toencourage safety, would also offervarious exempted spaces as aninducement to good building practices.For instance, the double bottom wasexempted from gross tonnage if it wasused only for water ballast. The precisedefinitions of measurement tonnage had

therefore become long, detailed andcomplex and varied from country tocountry.

In 1873 an International TonnageCommission met in Constantinople. Itsfindings were not followed, except bythe authorities of the newly opened SuezCanal.

In 1930 the League of Nations tried toobtain universal agreement but it was notfollowed by either the British orAmericans, although it was adopted bymost other countries.

In 1967 the Merchant Shipping(Tonnage) Regulations were passed.

In 1969 the UN Agency, The

International Maritime Organisation(IMO) held an International Conventionon Tonnage Measurement of Ships. Thisconvention at long last brought in auniversally accepted system of gross andnet tonnage on 18 July 1982.

Note: As these tonnages areindependent of the nationality of the shipthey no longer need to be linked to theregistration of the ship, so their officialtitle is Gross Tonnage (GT) instead ofGross Registered Tonnage (GRT).Likewise after 1982 NET tonnage isabbreviated to NT instead of NRT.

Ship tonnage

Loaded displacement tonnage is theactual weight of the ship and cargo.Light displacement tonnage is the actualweight of the ship. The differencebetween the loaded displacement and thelight displacement is the weight that theship can actually carry and is known asthe deadweight tonnage. Gross tonnageis, very simply, a measure of the totalenclosed volume of the ship in cubicmetres multiplied by a constant. The nettonnage is the total enclosed volumeavailable for cargo in cubic metresmultiplied by a constant.

Displacement tonnage has little or nocommercial use. The size of tankers isusually expressed in deadweighttonnage, i.e. a 250,000-ton dwt tankermeans it can carry 250,000 tons of oil,bunkers and stores at its summer draft. Itis more convenient when transportingliquids to charge for the ton weightcarried, not only because it is arelatively heavy cargo but the volume of250,000 tons of oil can appreciablychange with a ten-degree variation intemperature.

On the other hand, most general cargoships are usually full before they aredown to their marks, so a shipowner is

usually concerned with selling space andhe is more interested in the volume ofhis ship rather than the weight it cancarry. Hence one usually talks of a cargoship of, for example, 9,000 grosstonnage.

Figure 12: Typical relationship between LOAand Dwt

When considering berth allocationand assessing various dues, a vessel’slength overall is obviously an importantfactor. The above graph shows thetypical relationship that can be expectedbetween a ship’s length and her dwttonnage. Note that the length does notincrease at the same rate as the tonnage.In fact P&O’s Grand Princess, whichentered service in mid-1998 and washailed by the press as the world’s largestpassenger liner, had a GT of 109,000and a length of almost 950 feet.

Relationship between

tonnage, grt and draft

Draft for sailing ships

Due to its deeper keel the sailing vesselhad a deeper draft than the steamship, sowater depth was not the problem whensteam took over from sail, but it becamea major headache for portadministrations with the new ship typesthat were introduced in the 1960s and1970s.

The table on page 36 shows thatport’s problems with water depth camewhen ships started to exceed 20,000 dwt

and had drafts in excess of 10 metres, asfew ports in the 1950s could offerentrance channels of that depth.

Naturally enough there are designs forspecial “reduced draft” large vessels.For instance, the majority of cruiseliners, regardless of their tonnage, aredesigned with a maximum draft of lessthan 9 metres, as many of the bestterminals nearest historical sights haveonly limited depths of water. Gascarriers are also often designed so thattheir loaded draft is less than 13 metres,while naval architects designingcontainer ships are conscious of thelimited outreach of many gantry cranes,

so may reduce the breadth for largerships.

Ship Developmentswhich Influence PortDevelopment

Three major factors which haveinfluenced port development are:

(1) increase in the supply of shiptonnage;

(2) specialisation in ship types,cargo-handling features;

(3) increasing ship size.

1. Increase in the supply ofship tonnage

As already stated, the GRT gives anindication of the carrying capacity of theworld’s merchant fleet.

Figure 13: Growth of world GRT

As one would expect, the graphabove, showing the development of thesupply of ship tonnage, reflects veryclosely the graph in Chapter twoshowing the increase in world maritimetrade. What the graph does not indicateis that this increase in supply of tonnageis made up of a slow increase in the sizeof ships until the 1960s, when ship size

increased rapidly.

2. Development in ship typespecialisation and equipment

The development in power-driven vessels

In 1878 the number of steamshipsequalled the number of sailing ships butthe table above shows that it was in thelast decade of the century that steam

tonnage exceeded sail tonnage. This tellsus that it was therefore the latter part ofthe century before the large steamshipbecame the long-distance trading vessel.It was, of course, the large steamshipsthat forced ports to develop and change,as almost a century later it would be thelarge bulkers and large container shipswhich had a similar effect. It can also benoted that steamships required adifferent dock infrastructure to that ofsailing ships, just as container shipsrequire an even more radical change toterminal design.

Development in typespecialisation

The term “specialised ship” is not aprecise technical expression but rather aterm used to cover ship types built anddesigned to fit a specific or dedicatedpurpose. They may be built for a varietyof reasons, such as allowing cargo likeheavy lifts to move which would not beable to move otherwise. Alternativelythey may be introduced, like winetankers in 1946, as a way of moving thatspecific cargo more productively. Inmost cases a specialised ship type willrequire specialised terminal facilities to

handle and store the cargo. It mayrequire special additions to the dockarchitecture. In Rotterdam the large purecar and truck carriers (PCTC) with theirhigh superstructure became very difficultto manoeuvre in certain areas of the portin cross winds. To overcome thisproblem the Port of Rotterdam had todesign and build elaborate wind-breaksalong the side of a dock entrance.

The table on page 38 claims manyfirsts and I suspect that there will bereaders who will disagree over some ofthem. However, although I am naturallyconcerned with accuracy, the real pointsI want to show with the table are:

— The date when a developmentwas known to be in existenceand could be expected toimpinge on port operation.

— Those technical developmentswere not just the steel steamshipand container ship but weremany, and almost continuous.

Date Details

1800

Around this time, when encloseddocks first developed, thestandard vessel was a 300-tonsailing ship.First steamship on Clyde. In 1820Glasgow directory listed 28steamers out of Glasgow with

1812 passengers and stores to Islandsand Highlands. Steamshipsrequired new designs in dockand terminal construction.

1818 Savannah, an auxiliary steamer,crosses the Atlantic.

1858 Great Eastern launched, 692ftlong, 18,914 GRT.

1860 Steam with sail, four hatches,booms for sails as derricks.

1871

Telegraph communication to FarEast (Shanghai) 1888 Hong Konghas local telephone system. Theimportance of world-widecommunication in internationalmaritime trade is often notappreciated.

1882 Dunedin, one of the firstrefrigerated vessels for frozenmeat.

1884Some liners equipped with 1.5 toncranes at hatch corners, 20ftradius.

1885 First purpose built tanker, TheGlückauf.

1890Union purchase introduced on theW. Coast of America. (Note mast-table and cross-tree required).

1892

Gt. Lakes have specialised self-unloader Samuel Mitchell. 1916converted to self-unloadingcement carrier. Still in service in1981.

1910Steel hatch covers fitted in large

colliers and ore carriers.

1920 First Heavy Lift Vessel Belfri(3,400 dwt).

1920 Early 1920s last sailing shipdischarges in PLA.

1924 Harwich to Zeebrugge Ro/RoTrain ferry.

1949First ship with bulk sugar, theBara Haig, arrives in Londonwith 5,073 tons.

1952Flush weathertight tweendeckcovers—steel weatherdeckhatches commonplace.

1954 Lloyd's Register assign a class forore carriers.

1955 Introduction of car carriers.First purpose built international

1969 trading container ship. Sulphurtankers, phosphoric acidtankers.

1976 First semi-submersible.1985 First fruit juice carrier.

1986Hatchless design in Australia.First Bell Pioneer in service Oct.1990

It should also be observed that sometechnical developments becameuniversal almost immediately, someprogressed very slowly while others,after a fanfare of publicity, disappearedwithout trace. For instance, in the 1970smany argued that integrated tug barges

would revolutionise maritime transportand ports but little is heard of them now.

The 2000 columns in the followingtable give a complete list of cargo-carrying ships as regards their numberand their GT. The blanks in the 1965 and1980 columns merely indicate thatLloyd’s Register Annual StatisticalTables did not give so much detail inthese years. These years are, I think,worth including as they do show, for themain types, where the increases anddecreases are. General cargo ships, forinstance, remained fairly constant in the1970s. Container ships have grownconsistently throughout the period.

Oil/ore carriers and Ore, Bulk or Oilcarriers peaked around 1980 but as atype seem to be lacking popularity at themoment. In 2007 all Ro/Ro vesselsconsidered as one group.

The average age figure is interesting.For all the cargo-carrying fleet it wasaround 19 years in 2000, while for both1965 and 1980 the average age was lessthan 10 years. The world supply of shipswould seem to be getting older—probably due to the relatively lowfreight rates since 1973, leavinginsufficient margins for reinvestment. Itshould also indicate that during the nextdecade there must be either a reduction

in supply or a boom in shipbuilding.However, the considerable rise infreight rates in most of the shippingmarkets during 2004 to 2007 wouldsuggest that the latter is very probable.

3. Development in ship size

See Chapter 4 on water depth.

The above table shows that for hometrade vessels (a term that was used todesignate ships that could trade aroundUK and with Ireland and the nearcontinent) average size decreasedslightly—probably influenced by thegrowing competition from the railways.Foreign-going ships in both sail andsteam steadily increased in size. Sailing

ships are a good example of ProfessorParkinson’s Law which states that thingsonly achieve their optimum state justbefore they become obsolete.

The table on page 40 shows that depthof water was not a major issue until the1960s. In 1950 Rotterdam still had only10 metres. In 1970 there were only eightports in Europe which could accept thenew class of VLCC tankers and therewere no ports with sufficient depth ofwater on the east coast of North

America. By 1975, following a periodof energetic dredging there were 22ports in north-west Europe which couldaccept such ships. Dredging is a veryexpensive activity and the questionsfacing port managers are:

— Will ships continue to getbigger? Figure 14a, showing

average ship size since 1850,does indicate a levelling off inaverage ship size after 1980. Ifthe averages of the five largesttankers are considered for eachyear, it can be seen tanker sizepeaked around 1975. If the sameexercise is considered for drybulk carriers their size seems tohave peaked around 1985–89.

— In 2004 there were 462container ships with drafts>13m, 1,558 tankers and 1,544bulk carriers. Figure 15 (on page41) shows the increasing size ofcontainer ships, and that they are

still increasing.— If so, should one dredge the old

channel or develop a newterminal in an area which enjoysdeeper water?

Figure 14a: Growth of the average ship size(GT) showing the number of ships with adraft greater than 13 metres

Figure 14b: Percentage of ships versus draft

Ship size and containerterminal

Figure 15: Increasing size of container ships

Figure 15, showing the increasing sizeof container ships, does not indicatesteady continuous growth but suddenrises followed by long plateaux. Ifcontainer ship size continues to rise thenradical changes will be required forterminals needed to service suchvessels.

Lloyd’s List (January 2001) used theterm Ultra Large Container Ships(ULCS) of ships of 9,000–10,000 TEUcapacity. Other proposed terms are:Suezmax container ship (12,000 TEU),Malaccamax (18,000 TEU).

Lloyd’s List in January 2005 reportedthat Cosco had orders valued at $566mnfor four 10,000 TEU container ships(349m LOA, 45.6m breadth) due inservice in 2008. In 2006 the Estelle

Maersk had 170,794 gt, 158,000 dwtand could carry 12,500 TEU.

However, in 2007 a spokesperson forthe Port of Los Angeles said that LosAngeles would prefer two 6,000 boxships a week rather than one 8,000+vessel, due to the strain the latter put onthe inland distribution services.

The table above shows the numbers of

vessels in the accepted commercialsector classification. As can be seen thenumber of feeder vessels and their TEUcapacity is quite small but so is theaverage length of their round voyagecompared with the post Panamax vesselswhich will be used on the longer routes.

From the 3,000-box ship of 1972,container ship size did not increase anyfurther until 1982 when the 4,000-boxship was introduced. From there anothersize plateau was sustained until the early1990s when the 6,500-box shipappeared. R.G. McLellan analyses thisgrowth in container size in a paper in theMaritime Policy and Management

Journal, Volume 2, 1997. In this paperhe concludes that:

— One serious constraint onbuilding a 6,000+ box vesselwas the lack of an engine thatcould generate the necessary90,000 bhp capable of drivingsuch a vessel at 24.5 knots on asingle screw. However, thedevelopment of the Sulzer12RTA96C and the MAN B & W12K98MC-C reduced thisproblem.

— As ship’s beam increases,cranes must increase in size.

This involves an increase inweight and there comes a pointwhen the terminal cannot take theextra load without considerablecivil engineering expense.

— As ship draft increases, depth ofwater in ports becomes aproblem. Virtually all majorports have 10 metres but few canoffer over 15 metres.

— For large ships to maintain thesame schedules as their smallerbrethren cargo-handling speedswill have to be increased. Fromthis it follows that the terminalarea will need to be increased

and the inland distributionfacilities improved.

— Increasing the size of ships maywell also increase the peakingfactor which can be a seriouscost problem for a centre hubport.

— Large ships + expensive portfacilities means more claimsfrom pilot impact problems

In 1999 a survey amongst containershipowners indicated that a majorconstraint to increasing ship size wasterminal productivity. Large containership operators are looking for 660

container moves per hour. Other factorsinclude berth and channel draft, cranelift height-outreach and quay strength,peaking problems and turning circleavailability.

The construction of the Ceres terminalin Amsterdam, which can load/dischargecontainers from both sides and thereforeimprove port turnround time, wascompleted in 2003. However, although abold management decision by the portauthorities, the mega containershipowners had shown little interestuntil 2005 when the ships of the GrandAlliance started making some use of it.

Press reports have indicated that some

owners have designs for 10,000 TEUships. A Dutch designer has plans forMalacca-max 18,000 TEU vessel withan 18m draft. Ports with 18 metres draftare Rotterdam, Marsaxlokk, GioiaTauro, Salalah/Port Raysut, Singaporeand Hong Kong. All ports would needimproved facilities.

The Hamburg Box Ship Study and asimilar one at Erasmus University in2005 indicated that the economicadvantages of 8,000+ container ships aredoubtful.

Larger container ships—lower

unit costs

One of the effects of the increasing sizeof container ships is the reduction in unitcosts. This reduction in unit costs forcontainer carriage added to overcapacity on some routes and the effortsmade to reduce the carriage of emptycontainers means more and more bulkcargoes are being moved in containers.It is estimated that between 1980 to theyear 2000 container carriers havetrebled their market share of whatpreviously would have been consideredbulk

Figure 16: Economies of scale expected forlarger container ships

cargo. In the minor bulk trades thepercentage now moving in containers iseven greater. Containerisation has madesignificant inroads into the grain, sugar,fertiliser, scrap, steel and forestproducts trades over the last twodecades and this gain looks like

increasing.

Hatch size—perhaps the mostsignificant technicaldevelopment effecting cargohandling

As can be seen in the diagram, ship Ahas a small hatch opening and thereforeall cargo has to be dragged into thewings to be stowed and back into thehatch square for discharge. With ship B,however, the cargo can be dropped moreor less into its required place. This fact

is of course quite obvious but it was notpossible to build ships with largeopenings until notch-toughened steel wasdeveloped during the Second WorldWar. Such increases in cargo-handlingproductivity as seen in bulk carriers andcontainer ships would not have beenpossible without the “open hatch” shipconcept.

Figure 17: Direct and better “spotting” withopen hatches

Year Sail Power drivenvessel

459 Roman tradingvessel 9%

1850 Cutty Sark 10%1930 17%1940 20%1960 28% to 30%1970 open hatch 80%1975 container 90%

Hatchless vessels

The advantages for a container vesselare obvious, as there is no time lost in

either opening the hatches or in having tosecure any containers stowed on top ofthe hatches.

FastShips

There has been an idea to start aFastShip service on the transatlanticroute between Cherbourg andPhiladelphia (possible by 2010). Theships would be capable of 40 knots butwill be expensive. Annual containerliftings on this route are around 24million tons of which 3.4 million tonsare high value or time sensitive.

However, 1.8 million tonnes move byair.

Consideration is also being given toFastShip services between the USA andAsia, and Europe to Asia.

Note that in 1989 the Japanesedeveloped the design of a super linercarrying 1,000 containers at 50 knots butconsidered the operation would not beeconomically viable.

The BIMCO Annual Report 2000gave the following possible door-to-door times for the different containerservices on the Europe Atlantic Trade:

Conventional container 17–28

ship days.Fast ship 7 days.Air freight 4–6 days.Express air freight 2–3 days.

Effect of Port Time onShip Speed

As the figures in the above table simplyillustrate, the shorter the port time the

greater the impact ship speed has on thetotal voyage time and ship productivityis increased. Therefore, as port timedecreases ship’s speed should in theoryincrease. This is what happened whencontainerisation dramatically reducedport time.

This does lead to the rather curiousconclusion that the longer the time spentin port the slower the ship’s speedshould be. To a great extent this is borneout by the facts, in that coastal shipswhich spend much of their time in porthave always had relatively slowoperating speeds, whereas shipsdesigned for greater distances with

smaller port time/sea time ratios arefaster.

The same principle is of course truefor any form of transport. In fact,shipping is the mode where one must becautious in interpreting this principlebecause of the very high cost of speedfor surface vessels—where the cost ofincreasing speed is higher than in anyother mode. The trade-off between theincreasing cost of speed against theincreased revenue earned has to beconsidered and the revenue can usuallybe equated to the value of the cargocarried. This probably explains whycontainer ships go faster than tankers.

Effect of port speed on shipsize and hence port location

Faster cargo-handling has caused shipsize to increase. Arising from this,shipowners wish to reduce pilotage timeand hence look for port locations withthese benefits. The same pressures causeshipowners to look for well-placed“centre ports”.

Other TechnicalDevelopments

Affecting Ports

Effects of the computer oncommunications

Container control—there areoften discussions as to how manycontainers can reasonably behandled by a manual system andmany have argued that the figurelies between 50,000 to 100,000per annum. Some would alsoargue that containerisation as weknow it today could not have

happened beforecomputerisation.Co-ordination of the activities ofall the stakeholders involved inport activity.Security, safety andenvironmental protection.

Changes in ship managementattitudes and goals

In the days of sail an efficient shipmanager liked to have his ship leavingport full and port time was a verysecondary consideration. When

loadlines were introduced his goal wasrefined to his ships leaving port “fulland down”. That is full up and loadeddown to her load line marks. Thiscreated some intellectual confusionwhen unit loads were introduced, inparticular with regard to Ro/Ro ships. Inloading Ro/Ro ships considerablebroken stowage (wasted space) isinevitable which was anathema to themanager with the goal of “full anddown”. With such ships the manager hadto measure his efficiency in terms ofcargo moved in units of time rather thanper voyage.

With modern ships becoming such a

major capital investment and yetbecoming just one part of the totaltransport system, there is a growingtendency for ports and shipping todevelop together as part of a combinedtransport strategy.

With the introduction of ISO Code9000 (Quality Assurance) and thegrowth of management liability for pooroperating practices, general operatingculture, which in many ports often had acolourful individual air about it, willtend to become a standard universalmaterial-handling procedure.

Just in Time (JIT) requirements inmodern logistics put a greater onus on

ports with regard to their reliability andcargo throughput procedures and shouldreduce the cargo-storage requirements.

Shift of certain cargo-loadingaspects from ship to shore

In the last century during the era of thesailing ship, the crew loaded anddischarged the cargo.

With the advent of steamships, thedevelopment of a workforce ofprofessional dockers and their unions,the port labour took over fullresponsibility for the cargo transfer, but

under the close supervision of the ship’sofficers.

One of the effects of containerisationhas been to reduce port time. Thisreduction combined with smaller ships’crews who are changed frequently, hasmeant that terminal staff take over manyof the supervisory tasks of the ships’officers.

Safety

Ship safety is inevitably related to ports,as statistics show that only about 19% ofship unsafety occurs in open water. Most

safety problems occur in the portenvironment or in the port approaches.

The IMO changes in portrequirements caused bychanges in shipsrequirements

Changes in bunkers and ballast areexamples of this development. Whenships still required coal bunkers largestocks were required and usually specialberths provided. Although coal as cargocould be loaded quickly and easily,

loading coal bunkers was usually sloweras the opening to the ship’s coal bunkerspace was often small. Even after theSecond World War there were still portsin the world where coal bunkering wasperformed by a human chain carryingbaskets of coal. With oil bunkers thereare few of these problems. These cannow be supplied either from a barge or aflexible pipe can be passed aboard at thenormal cargo handling berths.

Before ships used sea water as ballastor extra weight to give the vessel herseaworthy trim and stability, shipsrequired solid ballast. For this solidballast most ports had special ballast

quays where the ballast could be loadedand discharged as required. These quayswere supervised by the ballast masterwho was an important part of the port’smanagement hierarchy and usually one ofthe first to be appointed when a new portwas being developed. However, overthe last century ships have been builtwith double bottoms and special ballasttanks to enable them to ballast with seawater. Ballasting with sea water hasobvious cost and time advantages. Lessobvious perhaps is the increased safetyfactor provided by the double bottomskin. There are, however, disadvantagessuch as dirty and polluted ballast water

being discharged. Also ballast water thathas been pumped aboard the ship on thefar side of the earth may contain micro-organisms that cause problems whendischarged into a new environment. TheIMO is still trying to get agreement fromits members on this problem.

Chapter FourPort Approaches

Sea approaches—inland transport

Sea Approaches

Activities, responsibilities and

persons involved in the seaapproaches and ship arrival

Harbour master/port captain

The International Harbour Masters’Association (IHMA) conducted aworldwide survey to identify the dutiesand functions of a harbour master. Fortyfunctions were listed and every functionwas performed by at least one of thoseharbour masters consulted. However,there were only five functions listed thateveryone who responded to the

questionnaire carried out. This exerciserevealed the range and diversity of theresponsibilities that are imposed onthose who perform the harbour-mastering role. These variations in thejob description are not only explainedby differing national traditions andstructures as large variations can existwithin one country. Factors such as thesize of the port, its specific function andhow it is owned and administered willalso make a difference.

There are, however, two basic waysin which harbour masters may beappointed:

— As an employee of the port andhopefully a member of theBoard.

— As an external appointment, asin the USA, where the harbourmasters’ (or ports captains’) roleis discharged by an officer of theUS Coast Guard.

Both systems have their merits. Someargue that in his safety regulatory rolethe harbour master can function better iffree from commercial pressures. Othersargue that for the port to optimise itsperformance the harbour master must bepart of the operational team. In practice

the choice is seldom so stark; as eachsystem has developed over the years tocope with the situation it finds itself inand hence a further reason for thevariations in the functions of harbourmasters.

On the basis of the questionnaireresponse the IHMA definition of aharbour master is:

Figure 18: Sea approaches

“a harbour master is that person who,whatever may be his local title of office,is the principal person who normallyexercises jurisdiction at a place and inways that meet the following criteria:

— That the jurisdiction isexercised over the water area ofa port or port approach,

— That in the exercise of thisjurisdiction he should possess anauthority conferred on him bynational law, regulation or rules,

— That the duties shouldencompass a legal and/or

operational responsibility for themovement of shipping, and

— That the duties should involvehim significantly in ensuring thatshipping movements within thearea of jurisdiction are carriedout safely.”

The harbourmaster’s wider role willalso usually include:

— The safety of the port and theships within the port.

— The sustainability of theenvironment encompassed by theport.

— Emergency planning and

training.

The efficient operation of the seaaccess to the port. Controlling and co-ordinating the arrival and departure ofships from the port will also usually bethe responsibility of the harbourmaster’s office. The actual physicallocation of the harbour master’s officewill usually have a commanding view ofthe port entrance and the traffic controlcentre will often be located in the samebuilding.

Vessel Traffic Services (VTS)

In November 1997 the IMO adoptedResolution A 857 (20)—Guidelines forVessel Traffic Service. In this Resolutionthe IMO defines a VTS as a trafficmonitoring service “Being implementedby a competent authority, designed toimprove safety and efficiency of vesseltraffic and to protect the environment”.The resolution goes on to say that “suchan authority may be a governmentalmaritime organisation, a single portauthority, a pilotage organisation or anycombination of these”.

Most ports of a reasonable size willhave a traffic control centre operated byexperienced and qualified mariners who

will be able to observe the movement ofall vessels within the port by enhancedradar and video presentations. They willhave continual access to updatedweather, tidal and water depthinformation. The centre will also be indirect contact with all vessels within theport by VHF radio and with the rescueservices and relevant commercialbodies, such as ship’s agents, by direct-line telephones etc. As indicated in thenext section the actual degree of controlexercised by such a centre will varyfrom country to country.

The World Vessel Traffic ServicesGuide (published jointly by IALA, IAPH

& IMPA) is now available on its owninternet website:www.worldVTSguide.org. There aresome 200 VTS operators in the UK.

Active VTS or Passive VTS

Active VTS: Within a defined area theVTS traffic controller will regulate theconduct of vessels in accordance withport or regional legislation. Vessels arerequired to conform to a predeterminedmovement programme, based on suchfactors as size and type of vessel, cargocarried, berth availability, pilotage

requirements and other vesselmovements.

Passive VTS: Here the person incharge has only the role of trafficadviser and informing vessels in the areaof current traffic movements and of anyunusual circumstances.

However, in either case wheremovements of ships with dangerouscargoes are concerned its advice maybecome mandatory by virtue of localport by-laws. Most experts seemed to beagreed, that like air traffic controllers,VTS systems will in time extend theextent and degree of their control.

Many ports are now developing what

is referred to as “silent VTS”. In thissystem the pilot takes a laptop computeron board with him and all informationrequired by him is relayed directly to hiscomputer via satellite. This avoidsrelaying information via the VHFtelephone.

The centre is also usually the controland co-ordinating centre in the event ofany accident or catastrophe occurringwithin or near the port. As it will recordall the visual and other technical dataand communications that occur within itsarea of operation, it will obviously bethe major source of information andevidence in any subsequent inquiry.

The port will also probably haveregulations which will require the ship’smaster to give his ETA so many hours ordays before arrival.

Figure 19.: Vessel traffic services

The VTS will in fact co-ordinate mostof the safety and important commercialactivities that take place in a port, i.e.those shown outside the ellipse in Figure19. The functions within the ellipseindicate those functions traditionallyassociated with the port authority.

The BIMCO Bulletin in Volume 93No. 198 identified three basic types ofVTS:

(1) Coastal VTS—which is mainlyfor surveillance purposes carriedout in sensitive areas such as theDover Straits. Many will haveship-reporting schemes.

(2) Estuarial VTS—which isprovided to ensure the safetransit of vessels in rivers andestuaries on their way to the portor a terminal, situated in thatestuary.

(3) Harbour VTS—to monitor shipsentering or leaving a port withlittle or no pilotage run-in.

Organisations concerned withthe sea approaches of a port

IAPH—International Association ofPorts and Harbours.

IHMA—International Harbour Masters’Association.EHMA—European Harbour Masters’Association.IMPA—International Marine Pilots’Association

The ship’s agent

The shipowner cannot always have anoffice in the port to which his ship tradesbut the owner will usually want a personon the spot to look after his interests.These interests will fall into two distinctcategories.

First, the owner will need a “misterfix it” or ship’s husband. Such a personwill need to know every aspect of theport, such as a good dentist for a crewmember with toothache or where andhow to get some vital repair effected. Inother words, the agent has to be able tofind an answer to all problemsconcerning the welfare and smoothrunning of the ship and crew during itsstay in port. In addition, before thevessel arrives the agent will need tonotify the port authorities, order a berth,pilot and boatmen. The stevedoringcompany will also need to be suppliedwith the vessel’s stowage plan and any

necessary documents prepared for themany interested authorities such ascustoms, immigration, health, etc. Thisservice is usually paid for by a feeassessed in most countries by anationally agreed formula.

Secondly, liner owners in particularwill need an agent and loading brokersto market their services in thatgeographical area and to deal with thehuge amounts of cargo documentationthat liner shipments generate. Even inthis modern computerised era I suspectthat there are more people involved inmoving the documents around the worldthan in moving the actual cargo. Further

documentary delays and costs may wellseriously impede a port’s productivityand competitive position. This service isusually paid for on a commission basis.

In many ports the port itself will offera ships’ agency service, though hopefullythere will be more than one agency in theport as owners prefer a choice. Forships on charter it may make goodcommercial sense for the ship to employtwo separate agents. One to look afterthe owner’s interests and the other totake care of the charterer’s interests, asthis avoids any problems that might ariseout of any “conflicts of interest”.

Development

At the beginning of the last centurybefore the telegraph was developedworldwide, the agents in the portvirtually controlled the trade out of thatparticular geographical area. Once quickand reliable communications developedthey became less involved withdecisions made with the ship’s masterand more service and informationproviders to the ship’s owners. Duringthe early part of this century theydeveloped slowly but for the most partprofitably. The 1970s, however,produced several problems for agencies.

This was a bad period for shipping ingeneral following the oil price rise in1973 and most aspects of the industrywere involved in cost cutting. Further, itwas a period of major change in theliner industry. Containerisation enabledshipping lines to streamline theiroperation. Up to the 1960s and early1970s, lines generally operated a largenumber of liner services. But by the endof the decade the lines were increasinglymerging their operations and reducingthe number of agents that they employedaround the world. Many lines also set updedicated offices in all the major portsthat they served, eliminating the need for

ship agents in all but the smallest feederports. To counter this problem manyagencies agreed to join forces and set uplarge international networks of agents.The largest of these was Multiport,which held its first meeting in Athens in1978 with agencies from Australia,Lebanon, Jordan, the UK, France,Greece, Singapore, Egypt, Germany andHolland. In 1998 Multiport representedmore than 3,000 different principals insome 98 countries and territories. In2005 Multiport was involved in around10% of world port calls. The advantageof joining forces in this manner is that itcan offer a single marketing strategy for

its members and by applying an overallquality control it can offer a quality andreliable service. The Multiportassociation gained ISO 9002certification in March 1993. However,Multiport is an affiliation of agencies butin 2004 many long standing agencieshave considered merging into a singleentity to be known as S5. It seems thatthe five Ss indicate shipping, service,systems, solutions and security.

The forwarding agent

The forwarding agent is a logistics

expert who traditionally advises thecargo owner on the best way to move thecargo from A to B and assists in thepreparation of the necessarydocumentation. Like the ship’s agenttheir development over recent years hasbeen greatly effected by the container butmany have met the challenge by settingup as NVOCC (Non Vessel OwningCommon Carriers) in their own right.From a port’s point of view they areimportant as:

— They may be the basic decisionmaker as regards whether thecargo is routed through your port

or not.— If your port has or is considering

“adding value” to the servicesyou offer through a distributioncentre, then you will almostcertainly be taking on many ofthe activities associated with theforwarding agent.

Safety at the ship/portinterface

On 23 November 1995 at the nineteenthAssembly of the IMO, Resolution A.786was adopted, which brings all matters

concerning the ship/shore interfaceunder the wing of the IMO. There were,however, a number of countries whichdid not believe that the IMO should bedealing with ports. But there is certainlogic to the IMO’s involvement as it isconcerned with safer ships and cleaneroceans, and ports are areas where shipsneed most regulation and can do thegreatest amount of damage. However,since the implementation of the ISPSCode on 1 July 2004 the role of the IMOto standardise and enforce internationalsecurity in ports can no longer bequestioned.

Port security and the ISPSCode

In order to mitigate terrorist attacks onmaritime industry, the International Shipand Port Facility Security Code (ISPSCode) was adopted by a Conference ofContracting Governments to theInternational Convention for the Safetyof Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, convenedin London from 9 to 13 December 2002.The ISPS Code came into force on 1July 2004. The speed of implementationof the Code was without precedent andmany thought it was verging on theimpossible, however 1 July came and

went without too much confusion butonly after a great deal of hard work andexpense. The final bottom lineconcerning the increased cost tomaritime transport has yet to bedetermined though it will certainly besignificant. However, in June 2005BIMCO issued clauses for charterpartiescovering ISPS issues betweenshipowners and charterers. Seewww.bimco.dk concerning theresponsibility and cost issues arising outof the implementation of the ISPS Codein the charterparty context. However, notall the aspects of the ISPS Code are newand in fact it has enabled the IMO to put

all the security issues under one set ofstandard rules and procedures.

In theory the purpose of the Code is toprovide a standardised, consistentframework for evaluating risk, enablinggovernments to offset changes in threatwith changes in vulnerability for shipsand port facilities. To quote from theIMO website:

“To begin the process, each contractinggovernment will conduct port facilitysecurity assessments. Security assessmentswill have three essential components. First,they must identify and evaluate importantassets and infrastructures that are critical tothe port facility as well as those areas orstructures that, if damaged, could cause

significant loss of life or damage to theport facility’s economy or environment.Then, the assessment must identify theactual threats to those critical assets andinfrastructure in order to prioritise securitymeasures. Finally, the assessment mustaddress vulnerability of the port facility byidentifying its weaknesses in physicalsecurity, structural integrity, protectionsystems, procedural policies,communications systems, transportationinfrastructure, utilities, and other areaswithin a port facility that may be a likelytarget. Once this assessment has beencompleted the contracting government canaccurately evaluate any possible risk.”

This risk management concept will beembodied in the Code through a number

of minimum functional securityrequirements for ships and portfacilities. For ships, these requirementswill include:

— ship security plans;— ship security officers;— company security officers; and— certain onboard equipment such

as the Ship Security Alert System(SSAS).

For port facilities, the requirements willinclude:

— port facility security plans;— port facility security officers;

— certain security equipment; and— from March 2006 – the EU

Secure Operator Project. Itspurpose is to provide a commonset of security rules for EUMember States where theoperator will have to implementa Security Management System.

(The IMO Global Integrated ShippingInformation System (GISIS) contains acountry by country search tool whichlists each port by an ID number and aUN Locator Code also gives a note oncompliance status: seehttp://www2.imo.org/ISPSCode/ISPSInformation.aspx

In addition the requirements for shipsand port facilities include:

— monitoring and controllingaccess;

— monitoring the activities ofpeople and cargo; and

— ensuring securitycommunications are readilyavailable.

Because each ship (or class of ship) andeach port facility present different risks,the method by which they will meet thespecific requirements of this Code willbe determined and eventually beapproved by the administration or

contracting government, as the case maybe.

In order to communicate the threat at aport facility or for a ship, the contractinggovernment will set the appropriatesecurity level. Security levels 1, 2 and 3correspond to normal, medium and highthreat situations, respectively. Thesecurity level creates a link between theship and the port facility, since it triggersthe implementation of appropriatesecurity measures for the ship and for theport facility. The implications andliabilities that will be involved when aport announces a security level of 2 or 3at their port will only be determined

over time as precedents are established.Will a port in a period of high risk be a“safe port”?

Ships will have to carry anInternational Ship Security Certificateindicating that they comply with therequirements of SOLAS chapter XI-2and part A of the ISPS Code. When aship is at a port or is proceeding to aport of contracting government, thecontracting government has the right,under the provisions of regulation XI-2/9, to exercise various control andcompliance measures with respect tothat ship. The ship is subject to port statecontrol inspections but such inspections

will not normally extend to examinationof the ship security plan itself except in“specific circumstances”.

Facilities for crew to enjoy much-needed shore leave in certain ports,particularly in the USA, has been adifficulty facing those responsible forensuring that possible terrorists cannotenter their country. Hopefully a wayround this problem can be found.

At the same time, the USAimplemented a number of new maritimesecurity initiatives after the 11September 2001 attacks on the WorldTrade Center and the Pentagon. Thesenew security initiatives form part of the

Maritime Transportation Security Act2002, which was designed to protectUnited States ports and the public fromacts of terrorism as well as prevent theuse of maritime trade as a way oftransporting weapons of massdestruction to the United States. UnitedStates Customs and Border Protection(CBP) are responsible for three newinitiatives: the Container SecurityInitiative (CSI); Customs-TradePartnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT); and the 24-Hour Rule.

Container Security Initiative

(CSI)

Under this programme inspectors areplaced at foreign ports enrolled in CSIto pre-screen cargo containers beingshipped to the United States. CSI hasfour core elements: using automatedinformation to identify and target high-risk containers; pre-screening containersidentified as high-risk before they arriveat US ports; using detection technologyto quickly pre-screen high-riskcontainers and using smart, tamper-proofcontainers.

24-Hour Rule

The US Customs instituted the 24-HourRule requiring information on cargodestined for the United States to besubmitted through the AutomatedManifest System (AMS) by the carrier.This rule requires detailed descriptiveinformation for all cargo; so vague cargodescriptions as commonly used in thepast, such as “Freight of All Kinds”(FAK), are no longer acceptable. “Donot load” orders are issued to thecarriers at the foreign port for cargo thatdoes not meet the 24-Hour Rule.

In order to ensure that the carriers can

meet the new 24-Hour Rulerequirements for filing detailedmanifests at least 24 hours beforeloading at a foreign port, carriers arerequiring shippers to deliver containersto the port several days before loading.Four days is typical, although therequired advance delivery time variesamong shippers.

Problems and help for developingcountries. A report by an Americanconsultant in September 2004 indicatedthat the ports in developing countrieshave difficulties with the ISPS Code dueto its cost and corruption. However, inJune 2003 the IMO established an

International Maritime Security TrustFund (IMST Fund) to give relatedassistance to developing countries.Further, by October 2004 the IMO hadset up 74 national training courses onsecurity issues. Even developedcountries can get help as in 2008 majorUS ports received a security grant ofsome US$400m.

Security levy per laden TEU in US$(As given in Lloyd’s List, February2005): HK 6.41, Shenzhen 6, Major EUTerminals 9–11, Major US Terminals 2–4.5.

In 2005 Freeport (Bahamas) haddeveloped straddle carriers that could

detect nuclear radiation.

Port state control

The major practical problem of safetyregarding ships is not the lack ofadequate legislation but the enforcementof existing legislation. Traditionally thishas been done by the flag state—but notall states have the will or the trainedstaff to enforce the legal safetyrequirements. To overcome this problemthe 1978 SOLAS Protocol extends thisenforcement to port states. In 1982 14West European nations signed the Paris

Memorandum of Understanding as a bidto operate port state enforcement in auniform manner on foreign ships. Detailsof port state inspections are kept on thecomputer centre which is located atSaint-Malo, France. Other groups are theTokyo MoU and the US Coast Guard.

In the 1994 BIMCO Review, Mr W.O’Neil, the then Secretary General ofIMO, writing on the implementation ofsafety said: “There is a two prongedapproach to ensuring this is done—byflag state control and port state control… Port state control is designed as asecondary line of defence. Whenever aship goes to a port in a foreign country it

can be inspected to check that itcomplies with IMO requirements. Inextreme cases the inspectors can orderrepairs to be carried out before the shipis permitted to sail.”

Although regional PSC authoritieshave set targets for inspecting between15 to 50% of the ships trading in theirwaters, a report by the EuropeanMaritime Safety Agency (EMSA)indicates that the number of individualships inspected has risen steadily in theperiod 2000 to 2005. The frequency ofinspection of ships has remained fairlyconstant with around a third of inspectedships inspected once and a third

inspected twice in each year. Of the23,244 individual ships inspected in atleast one of the regions, 1,098 (4.7%)were inspected at least once in all threeregions during 2005, while 7,898 (40%)were inspected in two regions. Portswhich appear to be over zealous ininspecting ships run the risk of becomingunpopular, not only to sub-standardshipowners but also those with ships ofthe highest standards. Inspections taketime and increase pressure on hardworked senior ship staff.

Dangerous cargoes

The legislation concerning dangerouscargoes is fortunately mostlyinternational in character and substance,as most countries have based theirlegislation on the IMO Dangerous GoodsCode—the IMDG Code. In additionthere are other international codes whichamplify and extend the IMDG Code. Toavoid complications which have arisenin the past, correct technical namesshould be used to describe cargo ratherthan trade names, and to reduce the riskof confusion all dangerous cargoes aregiven a UN number. The relevantinternational codes and regulations are:

— International Bulk ChemicalCode.

— Bulk Chemical Handling Code.— Gas-carrier Code.— Solas/Marpol Regulations.

Most maritime countries will have inaddition their own national legislationwhich may well be more stringent thanthe internationally agreed codes. Theremay also be local by-laws.

The IMDG Code first appeared in1965, and is now updated byamendments. Thirty-three newamendments came out in 2006 andbecame mandatory in 2008. As crude oil

and most other petroleum products aredangerous cargoes it is not surprisingthat a substantial percentage of the cargoentering a large modern port isdangerous cargo. For instance, atRotterdam around 45% of the total cargohandled comes under the heading ofdangerous cargo.

The IMO has recently revised the1995 edition of its Recommendations onthe Safe Transport of DangerousCargoes in Port Areas which forms thebasis of most port regulations. Suchindependent bodies are known asClassification Societies. There arenumerous societies but the oldest, largest

and perhaps most famous is Lloyd’sRegister. (Edward Lloyd madecomments on the state of the ship in hisoriginal circulars.)

Most ports require at least 24 hours’notice for a ship planning to enter withdangerous cargo and will requireprecise details concerning such cargo.The port may well put restrictions onwhen and how a vessel with dangerouscargo on board may enter and leave theport and will also have allocated certainareas of the port for the storage andhandling of certain goods. Certain toxiccargoes may require specialisedhandling equipment and carefully trained

labour.Containers loaded with dangerous

cargoes are allocated a specific area onthe terminal and ship’s officers maywish to ensure that the containers havebeen safely packed and give strictinstructions as regards their stowage.Containers carrying dangerous cargoesare usually carried on deck on the toplayer at the side where they can bejettisoned if necessary. The Code does,however, contain details as regardsconstraints as to where dangerouscargoes can be stowed.

Goods classified as dangerous are notallowed on passenger ships and they

must always be declared by the shipperand the packages clearly marked withthe agreed international symbols. Theymust be accompanied with a DangerousGoods Note (DGN).

The Times Law Report of 9 January1998 does indicate that the termdangerous can in certain circumstancestake on an additional significance. Thisreport concerns a parcel of infestedground nuts which eventually had to bedumped along with an adjacent parcel ofwheat. The ground nuts were held to bedangerous because it was liable to giverise to the loss of other cargoes loadedon the same vessel. Infestation can be a

big problem in ports where largequantities of food stuffs are stored forlong periods.

Safe ports/safe berths—thelegal opinion

Charterparty disputes betweenshipowners and charterers regardingsafe ports/berths are very common. Thevast majority of these disputes concernphysical damage to vessels which in turnincurs delays and extra costs. Theclassic definition of a “safe port” givenby Sellers L.J. in the case of The

Eastern City (1958): “… a port will notbe safe unless, in the relevant period oftime, the particular ship can reach it andreturn from it without, in the absence ofsome abnormal occurrence, beingexposed to danger which cannot beavoided by good navigation andseamanship …”

A good example of a safe port disputeis where a vessel runs aground in theMississippi River (as many do) incircumstances where the shoaling of theriver gives rise to a potential unsafe portclaim by shipowners where their vesselhas been ordered to, say, New Orleans.Under a time charterparty and the

charterer’s warrant in the charterparty, itis required that any port to which thevessel is ordered should be safe. When avessel goes aground in suchcircumstances the shipowner may claimagainst the charterer for damage to thevessel by grounding and also for anygeneral average expenses and delay,providing of course that the charterercannot prove negligence on the part ofthe master or pilot. Further, a good manysafe port/berth claims take placeconcerning damage to a vessel alongsidea berth. Winds blow up rapidly andbefore a vessel can get out of theberth/port she suffers damage while

ranging alongside the berth.Whilst port managers and authorities

are not involved directly in safeport/berth charterparty claims, they dobecome involved behind the scenes inmany of the disputes between ownersand charterers, for the obvious reasonthat the charterers of the vessel may havea claim against a port authority/berthowner on the basis that they may beentitled to an indemnity from the portauthority/berth owner.

Safe port—elements of safety

The elements of safety that make a safeport are:

— It is safe during the time theparticular ship will be using it.

— It must be safe for that particularship. It does not matter if it isunsafe for other ship types andships of other sizes.

— The ship must be able toapproach safely.

— The ship must be able to enjoysafety during its stay or at leastbe able to leave in safety shouldthe port be liable to becomedangerous.

— The ship must also be able tomake a safe departure.

— Abnormal occurrences will notmake a charterer liable fordamage to the ship in port if theyare unrelated to the prevailingcharacteristics of the particularport.

— A port may also be unsafebecause of danger created by apolitical situation or an existingstate of war.

Port safety following the SeaEmpress accident

The Marine Accident InvestigationReport on the Sea Empress caused manyto ponder anew on the whole aspect ofport safety and stirred the UKgovernment in 1997 to launch a reviewof the arrangements for harbour pilotageunder the Pilotage Act 1987.

The main conclusions of this reviewwere:

— A Marine Operations Code forPorts should be developed,covering all port safety functionsand not just pilotage.

— Pilotage should become fullyintegrated with other port safety

services under harbour authoritycontrol.

— Harbour authorities should usetheir powers to ensure that thereis a clear practical assignment ofresponsibility for the safety ofpiloted vessels.

— Harbour authorities should bemade more accountable for alltheir port safety functions.

— The IMO recommendations onpilot training and examinationshould be supported.

— Performance measures shouldbe developed to monitor portsafety improvements.

In January 1999 the port authorities ofMilford Haven were fined £4mfollowing a judgment on the SeaEmpress affair.

Environmental protectionprovided by the port

This may include some or all of thefollowing:

— Setting maximum speeds forsurface effect vessels in closeproximity to land. Waves fromhigh-speed ferries have

presented an increased risk ofdamage to small vessels in thevicinity and can affect thebalance between the movementsof the sediment in both directionsalong the coast. In shallow waterthe waves produced by high-speed ferries distinguishthemselves from wavesgenerated by conventionalvessels and ferries. Conventionalferries generate short periodicwaves with a period of 4–5seconds. High speed ferriestypically generate a wave patterncomprising groups of short and

long periodic waves. The longperiodic waves cannot normallybe observed near the route of thevessel due to the flatness of thewave profile, but the wavescause problems in shallow waterand along the shore: see TheImpact of High-Speed Ferrieson the External Environment, bythe Nautical Division of theDanish Maritime Authority 1996.

— Provision of a range of practicalservices such as diving, salvage,drift-wood and rubbishcollection.

— Encouragement of self-help by

groups interested in maintainingthe water frontage and foreshore.

— Enforcement of international,national and local regulations inregard to environmentalprotection.

— Assessment of the long-termimpact of all new developments,since the port is the licensingauthority for all worksundertaken in the “water” areaunder the port’s jurisdiction.

Note Awareness and Preparedness forEmergencies at Local Level (APELL)has been revised to include ports—also

Guiding Principles for EmergencyPreparedness and Response by IMO,OECD and UNEP has been revised andcontains an amendment which coversports.

Dock Regulations 1988,Relating to MarineDepartment’s operations

— Ensure that all areas areadequately lit.

— Provide a safe means of accessto/from all vessels and berths.

— Provide safe access by waterwhere necessary.

— Ensure that all vehicles are safeand suitable, and provided withcompetent and well-trainedpersonnel.

— Ensure that all lifting plant issafe, properly maintained andproperly used. Note: all lifting-plant should be tested beforebeing used for the first time andafter repair or modification andhave a thorough examination by acompetent person at least every12 months. Lifting-plant shouldbe marked with its Safe Working

Load (SWL) and a means ofidentity. Records of tests andthorough examinations of lifting-plant should be obtained andkept for at least two years.

— Ensure that precautions areobserved concerning the enteringof confined spaces.

— Provide and maintain suitableand adequate welfare amenities.

— Ensure that the correctprotective clothing is issued andworn.

Harbour patrol service

This service may be operated by the portauthority, police or customs. Its mainfunction will be to enforce security andthe various laws and regulations thatgovern all activities within the port.

Turning basins

At strategic locations throughout the portsystem there will need to be turningbasins. As a rough guide the diameter ofsuch a basin should be twice the lengthof the largest vessel anticipated to usethat area of the port.

Licensing of river works anddredging

In many ports, dredging can be one of themajor costs and in estuarial ports inparticular any new structure on the riverbanks or within the water may causeserious siltation problems. Nowadays itwould be usual to do a comprehensivehydraulic simulation study to assess theimpact of any changes.

In ports such as Rotterdam, situatedon waterways which discharge fromhighly industrialised hinterlands, thedredged silt may contain toxic materialwhich must be disposed of with caution

and in a manner that incurs furtherexpense.

The port will also probably beresponsible for enforcing all theenvironmental regulations throughout thearea over which it has responsibility.

Dredgers

Present-day dredging equipment can bedivided into two categories. The firstembraces vessels which literally scoopup the soil (mechanical dredgers), whilethe second type is equipped to dredge bysuction (hydraulic dredgers).

The bucket dredger is one of the mostcommon forms of mechanical dredger.Its basic design has remained much thesame for many years. Some 13% of alldredgers are of the bucket type, with aheavy concentration in Europe.

About 50% of bucket dredgers have abucket capacity of 200 to 400 litres andsome 20% of the fleet can be calledlarge sized, with bucket capacities of800 litres or more. The advantages ofthis type of dredger are that it can copewith a variety of soils ranging from mudto soft rock. It can also be used for theremoval of rock pieces after blasting. Itis noisy, however, and tends to block the

channel, and it is unsuitable in swellconditions.

The trailing suction hopper dredgerwas used for the first time during theconstruction of the New Waterway, thenew entrance to the Port of Rotterdam,around 1878. This type is ideal forworking on busy shipping channels. Itdoes not dredge in a fixed position butsails slowly under its own power up anddown the channel.

In August 1996 Dredging and PortConstruction gave the following data ondredger types and the approximatenumbers in service around the world:

(1) 236 cutter section and bucketwheel dredgers with dredgingdepth potential ranging from 3 to35 metres. In 2005, theD’Artagnan (38,000HP) themost powerful ocean-goingcutter section dredger in theworld was put into service. Suchdredgers can work with bothsand and rock.

(2) 213 trailing suction dredgerswith capacities between 23,425and 45 m3, some with depths toover 100 metres.

(3) 168 grab and clamshelldredgers.

(4) 80 bucket and ladder dredgerswhere the largest can dredge to adepth of 40 metres but where theaverage for this type would behalf that.

(5) 77 dipper and backhoe dredgerswhere the largest can dredge to adepth of 30.5 metres but wherethe average for this type wouldbe half that.

(6) 30 suction dredgers.

Hydrographic surveying

Many ports will also need to be able to

undertake hydrographic surveys toensure that their navigation channels areas depicted on the charts. Groundedvessels can not only greatly impede thecommercial operation of a port but mayalso be a cause of environmental dangerand a source of expensive legal actions.For instance, it is worth rememberingthat in the judgment of The Hermes case,the port authorities were held solelyresponsible for the collision, in that thenavigational leading lights had beendisplaced.

Training and licensing of

those working on the water

Pilotage

Most ports require ships over a certainsize to employ an official pilot whenentering, leaving or moving within theport, though certain classes of vessels,such as naval vessels, are exempt. In thepast many pilots, as in many UK ports,were self-employed but licensed bysome external authority such as TrinityHouse. However, over the last few yearsthe trend has been for the pilots to belicensed, trained and employed directly

by the port. Ports in the UK have onlybeen responsible for pilots since 1988.(The port of Rotterdam has around 300pilots with a similar number of back-upstaff. The port is also considering ashore-based pilotage for vessels meetingset quality criteria.)

In the majority of ports the legalposition of the pilot is that he is there togive advice to the master of the shipconcerning the navigation of the shipwithin the port—in other words, in theevent of any accident the responsibilityis the master’s. However, the outcome ofsome recent court actions that haveinvolved pilots would seem to indicate

that pilots (and their port employers) arefinding it less easy simply to walk awayfrom their mistakes. R. P. A. Douglasand G. K. Green, in their book The Lawof Harbours and Pilotage, say that theobligation of harbour authorities is nolonger to merely supply qualified pilotsbut to undertake with due care and skillthe pilotage of the vessel. These authorsalso suggest that the harbour authoritiesmay be vicariously liable for negligentnavigation by pilots. Further, the UKPilotage Act 1987 shifted theresponsibility of licensing pilots fromthe General Lighthouse Authority to theCompetent Harbour Authority.

The number of pilots in the UK in1954 was 1,800, while in 2000 thenumbers had reduced to 800. Of all thevessels using UK ports some two-thirdsof the vessels were exempted.

In 2002 IMO recommended that shipswith drafts greater than 13 metres shoulduse a pilot in the Great Belt betweenDenmark and Sweden but pilots areexpected to report if vessels are unsafe.

Tugs

A modern harbour tug will have a steadybollard pull (SBP) of around 45 tons,

whereas 25 years ago a typical harbourtug would have had a SBP of about 15tons.

Boatmen/watermen/linesmen

As a large incoming vessel isapproaching her berth there are usuallyboatmen in attendance, in small boatsfore and aft, who will assist in passingthe vessel’s first mooring lines ashore.The vessel can then gently warp herselfinto position. It is worth rememberingthat a large modern tanker may have amass in excess of 300,000 tons, and

300,000 tons, even when moving slowly,can cause a significant impact. It is notsurprising therefore that harbour masterswill spend time shopping around for thebest quality fenders or apparatus thatwill reduce the impacts of vesselsarriving and control and reduce thespeed of approach to the berth.

Barge/lighter

This is a flat-bottomed vessel with alarge hatch used for lightening a vesselat anchor and/or distributing the cargoaround the port or through rivers and

canals to inland destinations. Somepeople use the terms as interchangeable,whilst for others a barge has some formof propulsion and crew, and a dumbbarge or lighter is just a large floatingcontainer.

One of the great advantages ofRotterdam is that not only has itexcellent road and rail connections butthat it also has very good barge access toa huge inland waterway system.

Before containerisation London wasvery much a lighterage port where alarge proportion of cargo wasdischarged into lighters, even fromvessels alongside the berth. In Hong

Kong, due to a shortage of containerberths, containers are loaded anddischarged by specially designed bargeswhich are fitted with large cranescapable of handling loaded containers.

Customs, immigration andhealth officials

All ports dealing with international tradewill have a number of governmentagencies, usually in residence, whichalthough not actually part of the port mayexert a significant influence on aspectsof its operation—particularly as regards

the arrival and departure of ships.Customs and excise departments of

governments have for centuries had theauthority to say where internationallytraded cargoes could be loaded anddischarged, i.e. customs-approvedwharves, and when and how it wasallowed. Until recently the customsauthorities were often the only bodyproducing port trade statistics and thelarge imposing customs buildings whichgraced the port’s waterfront were oftenthe most dominant piece of architecture.In these buildings, which contained the“long room”, the masters of inboundships “entered” their vessels by

presenting the ship’s cargo manifest andother official documents. In some portsthese time-honoured procedures are stillfollowed but many countries have nowadopted more streamlined measures.

Immigration departments ofgovernment will often, for a variety ofreasons, have a vested interest inpreventing its own citizens from leavingor foreigners from entering. In themajority of ports, however, this problemcan usually be handled by port security.

Port health and the fluttering yellowflag whereby an arriving ship indicatedits claim to be a healthy ship and madeits request for “free pratique”, has long

been part of maritime tradition.However, now that jumbo jets transferthousands of people an hour from onecountry to the next with all the attendanthealth risks involved, many maritimeauthorities consider that in comparisonships offer relatively little risk and havereduced the degree and level ofinspection.

An “arrived” ship

A merchant vessel will not be able tocommence trading until it has satisfiedthe procedures required by the customs,

health and immigration authorities.Further, during the course of a vessel’sstay in port, the port state controlauthorities may need to check the ship’ssafety documents.

International bodies such as IMO,BIMCO and the International Chamberof Shipping have worked hard over thelast few years through their FacilitationCommittees to try to standardise andstreamline these port entry procedures.However, it is one of the jobs of thelocal agent to ensure that all thenecessary documents are prepared andready for the ship’s arrival.

Bunker supply

For a number of ports around the world,the bunker supply business is bigbusiness, employing thousands of peopleand generating many millions of dollarsof revenue, both directly and indirectly,each year. Moreover, bunker supplyfacilities are part of the total packagedelivered by a port and can thus have aninfluence on its overall competitiveposition. Two of the biggest bunkersupply centres are Singapore andRotterdam. Ports that have a substantialbunker supply operation within theirjurisdiction will inevitably become

involved in the question of bunkerquality in the event of any customercomplaints as regards this issue. Theport authorities in both Singapore andRotterdam have given the task ofenhancing the quality of bunkers a highpriority over the last few years.Singapore by pursuing a direct form ofinterventionist regulation, whileRotterdam is trying to encourage theindustry to regulate itself.

Water depth (see also Chapter3)

The changing depth of waterat Rotterdam

Date Water depth at Port ofRotterdam (in feet and metres)

1891 25 feet 7.6 metres1911 31 feet 9.4 metres1950 33 feet 10.0 metres1960 42 feet 12.8 metres1970 62 feet 18.9 metres2000 81 feet 24.8 metres

The above table shows that water depthis not a constant factor and that withmoney, determination and technology itcan be increased. However, increased

water depth at a port may not necessarilybe due to dredging. In many cases theport will move to deeper water or ratherdevelop deep-water terminals for itslarge ship customers.

In 1939 the majority of ports had nomore than 9 metres of water. Only 23major ports had depths greater than 40ft(12m) alongside the berth at all states ofthe tide. Even by 1970 finding ports withsufficient depth of water to be able toaccept loaded 200,000 ton deadweight

tankers was difficult. In 1970 (the earlydays of VLCCs) there were only eightports in Europe which could accept suchships and none on the east coast of NorthAmerica. Energetic dredging operationshave improved on this, so by 1975 therewere 22 such ports in north-westernEurope (of which nine are in the UK), 15in the Mediterranean, four in NorthAmerica, 16 in Japan, four in SouthAmerica, one in South and East Africaand one in south-east Asia. Since thisinitial surge of improvement the numberof ports with sufficient depth of waterhas increased only gradually. In fact in1995 only about 10% of major ports

have channel depths at MLWS in excessof 15 metres.

It is not only a question of findingsufficient depth of water at the port andin the port but also in getting to the port,and many of the continental shelf areasof the world present real problems forthe larger ship. This problem isaggravated at the moment by the fact thatwhen much of the world was surveyedduring the end of the nineteenth century,the maximum draft that the surveyorconceived possible was 6 fathoms or 11metres. Depths greater than this did notalways get the attention many modernmariners would have wished.

Ports in Asia which have containerberth with a water depth of 15 metresCountry Port 1998 2000Japan Kobe 2 5

Osaka 3Yokohama 3Tokyo 3

Korea Busen 4 4Kwangyang 4 4

China Hong Kong 4 432kmoffshore

Yangshan(Shanghai) ?

Malaysia Port Klang 2 2Tanjung Pelepas(PTP) 2

Singapore 6 16

Source: Lloyd’s List.

The table above indicates theperceived need of leading containerports to be able to offer water depths of15 metres at their terminals, to cater forthe new generation of container vessels.However, in 2006 the Emma Maerskentered service and she requires a depthof 16 metres.

Nor is it enough simply to havesufficient water to float the ship. In 1961the Permanent International Associationof Navigation Congresses recommendedthat the depth of water in portapproaches be at least the ship’s draft

plus 1.5–2.5 metres. Many portauthorities recommend an additional10% of draft for required water depth inport areas (sometimes referred to asUnder Keel Clearance (UKC)). In 1977,the IMO recommended that all vesselsshould have 3.5 metres UKC. One of thereasons why the IMO recommends areasonable UKC is because of “squat”.Squat is an effect in shallow waterwhereby the ship’s draft can beincreased. For a typical 15,000 dwtgeneral cargo ship this could be up to1.5 metres and for a large tanker it couldbe more. Further, in shallow water theship’s speed will be reduced and if the

shallow water is on one side of thevessel the steering may become erratic—a problem that can occur when a shipmoves out of the centre of a narrowchannel.

Tides

The moon is the major tide raising forceand because of this the spring tides (thetide with the maximum range) occursapproximately at new and full moon, andneap tides (the tide with the minimumrange) about seven days later when themoon is in quadrature. Also because of

the moon, the time from high water tohigh water is in theory about 12 hours 25minutes. However, although the moon isthe major tide producing force, its effectwill vary considerably from place toplace depending on the size of the basin,the depth of water, the latitude andnumerous other factors. The greatesttidal range in the world is at the Bay ofFundy, Newfoundland, where it exceeds15 metres. In the Mediterranean itseldom exceeds half a metre. Just toemphasise how it does vary from placeto place compare the followingEuropean ports:

Springrange

Neaprange

Avonmouth 12.2 m 6.4 mLondon Bridge 6.7 m 4.6 mSouthampton 4.0 m 1.8 mLe Havre 6.7 m 3.7 mAntwerp 5.2 m 4.0 mHook ofHolland 1.8 m 1.2 m

Note that at Southampton and Le Havre there isa prolonged stand of tide at high water.

Where there are significant tides it maybe considered necessary to buildenclosed docks, approached onlythrough locks, because apart from the

undesirability of the vessel goingaground at low water there are problemsof cargo-handling when the vessel isrising and falling 6–12 metres twice aday. Although these docks do have someadvantages in that security is easier andthat the depth can be increased bypumping in more water, they do havemany disadvantages:

(a) They are expensive to construct,maintain and modernise.

(b) There are delays in movingthrough the locks and possibly inwaiting for the necessary tidalconditions.

(c) There is the possibility ofcatastrophic delay and expense ifthe lock gate is damaged.

The size of the lock is often the factorthat limits the size of ships which canenter many of the older docks, thoughmodern ports looking ahead have builtenormous ones. The largest lock in theworld at the moment is at Le Havre,where it was completed in December1971 at a total cost of about £20 million.It takes on average about 45 minutes fora large vessel to pass through.

Inland Transport

As an alternative to seatransport

Good examples of this are the trans-continental land bridges such as theTrans Siberian Railway (TSR) or theequally long 7,000-mile EurasianContinental Bridge which has linkedLianyungang with Rotterdam since 1992.At the moment neither of these routesoffers great advantages over the seapassage but their scope for improvement

is tremendous. There are also numerousother land bridges in operation acrossEurope from north to south and acrossNorth America and a land bridge is alsoproposed linking the Red Sea to the Gulfby a fast rail link between Jeddah toDammam. Pipelines for oil and gas havealso been built and their potential forfuture development should also becarefully considered by those trying toforecast future trade flows. In 1997 therewere over 30,000 kilometres of long-distance transport pipelines world-wideincreasing at around 6–8% a year. InMay 2007 Trans Peninsula indicated itwas considering a 300km pipeline to

bypass the Malacca Straits, to becompleted in 2014.

Shoreside distribution

Figure 20: Modes of distribution

Logistics and/or intermodaltransport

Logistics is an even more refinedtransport concept and can be defined as“an optimisation process of the location,movement and storage of resourcesfrom the point of origin, through variouseconomic activities, to the finalconsumer”. Not all processes aresufficiently integrated to be optimisedover the total process from start tofinish, though the transport of the bananawould seem to be a good example of onethat is.

With the advent of containers and

other intermodal devices, liner shippingshould no longer be considered simplyas part of sea transport but as an integralpart of a logistics or systems approachto transport. The introduction ofintermodal devices, such as thecontainer, not only involves newtechnology but also the need for newlegislation, new documents, newinformation systems, and perhaps aboveall, a new way of looking at the transportproblem. The liner ship now becomesjust one of the modal carriers as thecontainer moves between modes on itshopefully uninterrupted journey fromsource to destination. Once the cargo

arrives at a port it will be moved on byother modes.

An important jargon expression thatoccurs frequently in port and logisticdiscussions is Just in Time (JIT) or analternative expression is ManufacturingResource Planning (MRP) and theJapanese refer to it as Kanban. In short,the idea is the suppliers deliver theneeded items to an assembly line ormanufacturing process “Just in Time”.The purpose of such an approach is thatit saves capital in storing expensiveitems and in the construction ofexpensive storage facilities. Aneconomist would also point out that it is

a demand-led process, as in theory theitems need only be produced to orderand not on a speculative basis.

Comparison of transportmodes, i.e. which is bestsuited for what

The above figures are not only veryapproximate but could vary dependingon a number of circumstances. They do,however, enable one to make roughcomparisons and draw generalconclusions, such as that ships are veryenergy-efficient and safe. (I have found,however, that few students are preparedto accept that aircraft are 20 times saferthan buses!) Where I have put two dates,as with rail, I am trying to indicate that atransport mutation took place about thattime and that modern high-speed blocktrains present different transportopportunities to the previous systems.

The speed column can also be

misleading; for instance, a barge isrelatively slow but it can move slowlyfor 24 hours a day whereas a truck isusually limited in the number of hours aday it can be driven.

From Duisburg to Mannheim isaround 300 kilometres and is a stretch ofthe Rhine where road and rail follow theRhine. Along this route road haulageaverages 43 kph, block trains 38 kph,freight trains 20 kph, while bargesaverage 8 kph upstream and 13 kphdownstream. However, research showswhat has been a demonstrable fact fordecades, that decision makers in favourof road transport are highly influenced

by non-price variables such as thecontrol/flexibility factor.

Some comparisons of modalcosts

Mode Commodity androute

US centsper

tonne/mile

SeaCapesize with iron

ore from Australia toRotterdam

0.067

Air Australia to Europe 12.0

Rail Coal by rail in theUSA 2.17

Source: Intercargo Annual Review 1996197.

The above table illustrates how cheapsea transport can be compared withother modes.

Modal split

— In 1913 road refers to transportby dray, and the lighter served

much the same purpose indelivering cargo from ship towarehouse.

— Liverpool in 1922: half horse-drawn, half motor vehicles.

— Competition from railwaysforced coastal services toimprove port turnaround, andalso the greater capital of thelarger coastal steamships neededhigher productivity.

— Rotterdam has good railconnections. First railway fromRotterdam to The Hague andAmsterdam built 1847. NewYork has poor rail connections

but is considering improving.Most US ports have good railconnections.

— In 1991 Hamburg moved only43% of its cargo by roadwhereas the average for Francewas 58% and Italy 63%.

— In Hamburg in 1997 three out offour containers going distancesgreater than 150km travelled bytrain.

— Modal split Thamesport 1999:rail 20%, road 74%, ship 6%.

— In the UK (and much of Europe)there is a policy to shift cargofrom road to water, e.g. to carry

containers to nearest port and tosituate freight stations at canals,rivers, etc.

— In the UK 34% of energy isconsumed by transport.

The preceding tables on modal splitshow, as one would expect, a growth inthe road mode. (The percentage roadmode for the UK was 88.9% in 2001.)The projections for the future, also asone would expect, show a decrease in

road transport and an increase in railand water transport. However, in 2005in the UK, Freightliners had 85% ofcontainer inland haulage. It is also worthnoting that sea transport per tonne milehas the lowest CO2 emission of anymode of transport.

Air transport—a fewinteresting facts and features

— 1998—the 560 major airportsaround the world handled 58.2million tons of cargo and it isanticipated by the industry thatthis sector will over the next 20years grow 2% faster than thepassenger sector.

— BA invested £250 million in theconstruction and fitting out of itsnew World Cargo Centre on thesouth side of Heathrow (300metres long × 95 metres wide). Itcan handle up to a million tons ofcargo a year.

— The carriage of fresh producehas grown at 15% a year over

the past three years and is worth£45 million annually to BA.

— 1997—20 airlines and 17freight forwarders bandedtogether to create CARGO 2000.This has replaced air way billswith electronic messages.Forwarders label all cargo withbar codes before it enters anairline network. This allowscargo to be traced immediatelyto its status in the system. Since1996 BA has offered a track andtrace service over its world-wide website.

— Much of the documentation can

be completed and bar codesobtained via the internet.

— Airlines also own, operate andco-ordinate trucking operations.BA spends £19 million annuallyin extending its flights along themotorways.

— Boeing World Air CargoForecast expects cargo traffic toincrease at an annual averageannual rate of 6.2% for next twodecades.

Chapter FivePortAdministration,Ownership andManagement

Port management: basic problems—types of port ownership andadministration—organisations

concerning ports—boards governing aport—port management development:from a transport centre to a logisticplatform—the rise and fall of ports—competition between ports—information technology in logistics—safety

Many would argue that administrationand management functions should beconsidered separately, and that portadministration should be responsible forthe regulatory functions of the port whilethe management is responsible for thecommercial operations. However, thissimple dichotomy may be simplistic and

much will depend on the type ofownership adopted and the interpretationgiven to the term “administration” whichdoes seem to vary throughout the world.

Port Management:Basic Problems

Ports last longer than ships. This is anobvious fact but a very significant one.Most of the UK ports and docks, forinstance, were designed and developedbetween one and two centuries ago when

ships were small and much docksidedistribution was done by horse and cart.

It is difficult to escape from baddecisions. In other businesses one canoften escape from the worst effects oferroneous decisions. For instance, inshipping if one were to buy the wrongsize or type of ship, one can with anyluck find a buyer for your mistake andstart again. It is obviously very muchmore difficult, if not impossible, to sella terminal or dock that is in the wrongplace or the wrong size or ofunsatisfactory design.

A port is not a coherent entity like aship, but a loose collection of trading

activities within a fairly arbitraryboundary. This makes it more difficult totheorise about it and develop universalconcepts concerning ports.

Types of PortOwnership andAdministration

Ports can be classified as to their type ofownership or administration—in fact,over the last decade this has been one ofthe most debated topics concerning port

efficiency. Before considering portownership in any detail there are one ortwo points that should be made:

Traditionally, British text booksclassified port ownership under thefollowing headings:

(1) State ownership. However, thisheading can cover everythingfrom absolute politicalsupervision to state ownership ofmajority shares.

(2) Autonomous. Public Trusts suchas London and Liverpool werebefore privatisation. Many UKports used to have this type of

administration before they wereprivatised in the late 1980s. Sucha Trust is a quasi-governmentalorganisation set up by Act ofParliament. It is non-profit-making and offers a unifiedfunctional administration over afunctionally defined area. It maysuffer from insufficiency of fundsand may be burdened withunnecessary restrictions.

(3) Municipal ownership such asRotterdam, Hamburg, Kobe andYokohama. It has as one of itsmajor advantages, complete co-operation on all the local needs

of the port. The municipality mayalso agree to subsidise the port,because by offering competitiveport charges and encouragingtrade, the overall prosperity ofthe region can be greatlyincreased. One of its majordisadvantages is a naturalunwillingness to co-operate inany national plan. The term canbe confusing because theexpression “municipal” can alterits significance in differentcountries.

(4) Private ownership ports. In1947 about 30% of UK ports

were brought into publicownership. During the 1980svarious UK ports followedFelixstowe’s example and wereprivatised. Under the 1991 PortsAct, the then Conservativegovernment outlined its intentionto privatise several Trust portswith an annual turnover in excessof £5m. The UK is one of the fewcountries to have adopted thisapproach in its extreme. In 1983Associated British Ports (ABP),consisting of 19 UK ports, wasprivatised with most employeesowning at least 1,000 shares.

Since then labour productivityhas increased by 40%.Privatisation also caused re-allocation of port property whichwas put to new use—doubling itscapital value and stimulatinglocal economies. However, apaper published in MaritimePolicy and Management bySaundry and Turnbull in 1997,indicated that the promises ofgreater competition, greatercapital investment and generalimproved commercial efficiencyhad not occurred in UK ports—at least not as a result of

privatisation.It is worth remembering that

“port privatisation” is not a newconcept. In the last century thePort of London was a chaoticjumble of private creeks,terminals and docks and the Portof London Authority wasestablished, largely by populardemand, in order to bring someform of order to the free-wheeling entrepreneurial jungle.

In many modern ports such aclassification as outlined above might beconsidered simplistic, as the ownership

might in fact consist of a combination oftwo or three of the above. One of themost common growing forms of portownership/operation is the Landlordport. In this type the state or the city ownthe land and the port’s sea approaches,and lease out the terminals to privatestevedoring firms to operate. There areseveral variations to this approach. Inthe Landlord port the landlord providesthe infrastructure (i.e. a paved terminalwith deep-water access) and the tenantprovides his own superstucture (i.e.cranes and cargo-handling equipment).

In what is often referred to as a Toolport the landlord provides both the

infrastructure and the superstructure.Where the port authority wishes toprovides all the services and facilitiesfor ships and cargo within the port it isknown as a Service port and althoughmany state-owned ports are consideringmoving away from this type of operationthey should consider that this was thetype of operation used at Singapore,until it transformed itself into a privatecompany in 1997. However, as a state-owned port Singapore was consideredby many to be one of the most efficientports in the world.

Nowadays most ports will begoverned or controlled by a Port

Authority which in the case of theLandlord port will be the landlord. Theport authority therefore is a body withjuridical status in charge of themanagement of the port according to therules defined in its constitution.

Port authority responsibilitiesPorttype Infrastructure Superstructure

Landlord Yes NoTool Yes YesService Yes Yes

Another variation might be Build,Operate and Transfer (BOT). With BOT,

the private sector is involved inbuilding, financing and operating a portfacility for a certain period of time. Theownership is transferred to the publicsector at the end of the agreement. TheBOT method gives the private sector alarge role in developing and operatingnew port capacity. This method wasused by 19% of the ports privatised. Asan instance, in India, the JawaharlalNehru Port Trust (JNPT) made a BOTcontract for construction of a 600-metrecontainer-handling quay over a 30-yearperiod.

A few developing countries have alsofavoured the method of Corporation

(13%) or Management contracts (2%).The preferred UK solution has been to

sell the land and all the infrastructureand superstructure but has few imitatorselsewhere. It is difficult to see whatadvantage is gained by this option, froma policy point of view, compared withthe landlord options, particularly as inmost cases where this has happened theports have been sold off at “bargain”prices.

Another variation might be SullomVoe Harbour, owned by the ShetlandIslands Council, which is the harbourauthority, while the SV terminal isowned by the oil industry partnership of

more than 30 participating oil companiesand operated on their behalf by BP underan evergreen contract.

Who might own what within aport

In 1992 the Editor of Port DevelopmentInternational seems to have summed upa general world-wide attitude when hewrote “for too long the inefficienciesand excesses of the dockers have beenmirrored by top-heavy administrations—over-manned, under-talented and equallyobdurate to change”. In general the trend

world-wide—in Europe, China, Africa,Asia, etc, is to decentralise directgovernment control and to place the porton a more commercial footing. In theHarris Survey of the late 1980s around80% of ports indicated that privatesector participation was increasing intheir country’s port sector.

A survey conducted by F. R. Harrisand summarised in Fairplay 21/28December 1988 looked at over 60 portsin 20 countries. Four out five of the portssurveyed replied that privateinvolvement was increasing or beingpromoted, although the forms thisparticipation took varied considerably

from country to country. The port ofAntwerp when replying to the surveymade the following very pertinentobservation: “you will no doubt agreethat it is very difficult to answer yourquestionnaire as privatisation means somany different things to so manydifferent ports.”

The reasons behind this universal urgeto privatise the ports is the anticipationthat putting the port on a commercialfooting will improve the productivityand reduce the size of public sectorfinancial commitments, though, asindicated below, considerable stateinvolvement in the port in one form or

another is inevitable.

Survey of some 30 portsworldwide comparing theownership of the activitiesinvolved

The data for the table on page 76 wastaken from ports selected from Europe,Asia, Africa and North and SouthAmerica. As the sample was small and

those filling out the questionnaire maynot always have been certain whichcategory best fitted the differentactivities for their particular port, theresults should be treated as a generalindication rather than a definitivepicture. However, the table doesillustrate the complex network ofactivities that go to make up a port andalso shows:

(a) That virtually everyconceivable type of “ownership”can co-exist within a port, e.g.private, state, municipal, etc.

(b) That who pays for the costs will

vary considerably from port toport and state to state. This is thereason for the accusations ofunfair competition which are sofrequently made and the cause ofthe problems that exist for, say,the EU authorities when trying toensure a “level playing field” forall ports within the Community.A 1997 report commissioned forthe ILO “indicated that in mostports, wet areas (63%) andquays (76%) are in publicownership without competition,while the operation of quays isfairly evenly distributed between

the public and private sector”.

Arguments for increasedprivate sector participation inthe port industry

These are, in descending order ofperceived importance, according to asurvey:

(1) Reduce size of public sectorfinancial commitments. See thefollowing example of Keelung.

(2) Improve productivity through

competition.(3) Raise funds for other public

activities.(4) Escape the problems of

bureaucracy.(5) Reduce the size of the port

labour force—hence the generallack of enthusiasm of unions toprivatisation.

Figure 21: Private sector involvement inports

Of this investment in 1998, 58% was inEast Asia and the Pacific, 27% in LatinAmerica and the Caribbean, 4% in theMiddle East and North America but only0.3% in Sub-Saharan Africa.

A few examples ofprivatisation

Port Klang (known as Port Swettenhamuntil 1972) started privatisation in 1986when the government gave a 21-yearcontract to Port Klang’s containerterminal as a private consortium. InDecember 1992 the remaining North &South Ports terminals were privatisedunder the Landlord system. Since then,repair, maintenance and administrationcosts have been halved—containertonnage increased 75% and wagesincreased 85%.

A report by the American Association

of Port Authorities shows that 30% ofthe 66 US public port authorities operateat a loss! The report says “weakincentives to operate efficiently andexposure to political interference are themain problems facing US ports”.

In 1986 the Port of Shanghai wasdecentralised and operated as amunicipal type port. Since 1994Shanghai Container Terminal has beenoperated as a joint venture between HITHong Kong and the Port of Shanghai.Between 1994 and 1997 the terminal’sthroughput doubled as did the dockerswages, the costs were reduced byaround 10%, the productivity increased

around 30% and the average ship time inport in 1997 was around 30% of theaverage for 1994.

Operation performance—before and after privatisationin Colombian ports

Indicator Before1993 1996

Average vesselwaiting time (days) 10 Virtually

no waitingWorking days peryear 280 365

Working hours per

day 16 24Bulk cargo (tons pervessel per day) 500 2,500

(minimum)General cargo (tonsper vessel per day) 750 1,700

Containers pervessel per hour(gross)

16 25

Source: Colombia General PortSuperintendent, July 1997.

OrganisationsConcerning Ports

International Association ofPorts & Harbours (IAPH)

Founded on 7 November 1955 in LosAngeles where 126 delegates from 38ports and 15 countries had gathered, theIAPH is a non-profit making andnongovernmental organisation with itsheadquarters in Tokyo, Japan. In 2000IAPH had some 230 members. Themembers include leading ports in 89countries, which accounts for almost60% of the world’s seaborne trade. Thisincludes 90% of the world’s containertraffic. In addition, over 100 ancillarymaritime businesses are represented as

Associate members.

Boards Governing aPort

In 1979 Dr Richard Goss published AComparative Study of SeaportManagement and Administration. Inthis study he observes that most portswere under the immediate control ofBoards whose members were appointedor elected.

The composition of the Board

governing a port authority will varyconsiderably from country to country andon how the port is owned. Because ofthe wide range of interests and activitiesthat make up a large and modern portthere has been a tendency, at least in thepast in the UK, for the Board to be toolarge and unwieldy. Fortunately, thetrend since the Harbours Act 1964 hasbeen to reorganise ports on principalestuaries into larger units and reduce thesize of the management boards.

The possible constitution of a boardfor a harbour authority might be:

— Representative Board. A Board

consisting of personsrepresenting interests concernedwith the operation of the port.Their appointment will probablybe for a fixed term. The problemmay be that such members havelittle knowledge of portoperations and that their primaryloyalty may well remain with theinterest that appointed them.

— Board of Experts. Here themembers of the Board may beappointed for their provenexpertise in some aspect of portoperations. If the appointee is theGovernment the appointments

may be made on politicalgrounds.

— Two-tier Boards. Where there isa large Board it could appoint asmall executive Board of five orsix persons to run the port on aday-to-day basis. The top tierBoard would only be concernedwith major matters of policy.

— Where the port is a privatecompany its Board will be thatof a private company but thereare very few of these outside theUK.

Dr Goss in his Study also makes the

point that some Board meetings werepublic: “At some of these, notably in theUSA, it is illegal for three or moreBoard members to meet to discuss portmatters without the public having anopportunity to attend …”.

Port ManagementDevelopment: from aTransport Centre to aLogistic Platform*

First generation port

Up to 1960 a port was merely the cargointerface location between land and seatransport and can usually be recognisedby the following features:

— It is usually isolated from thetransport and trade activities,and sees its function in terms ofcargo transfer from ship to shore.It may have an EDI system butthis may well be incompatiblewith port users’ systems.

— It considers itself an“independent kingdom” with

little or no co-operation withlocal authorities.

— The different port activities areisolated from each other.

— It is usually either a breakbulkor bulk port.

Second generation port

This port developed as a transport,industrial and commercial servicecentre. It can be recognised by thefollowing features:

— It undertakes and offers

industrial and commercialservices to its users which arenot directly connected with theirloading/discharging activity.

— Port policies and developmentstrategies are based on broaderconcepts and more sophisticatedmanagement attitudes.

— Industrial facilities are set upwithin the port area.

— It enjoys a closer relationshipwith transport and trade partnerswho have built their cargotransformation facilities in theport area. However, only bigshippers benefit.

— It develops a closer relationshipwith the locality.

— Different activities becomemore integrated within the portorganisation.

Third generation port

This emerged in the 1980s principallydue to world-wide containerisation andintermodalism combined with thegrowing requirements of internationaltrade. This port type can be recognisedby the following features:

— The port is seen as the hub of theinternational production anddistribution network.Management is proactive ratherthan reactive.

— As well as traditional activities,activities are specialised,variable and integrated.

— Port infrastructure is plannedwith equal consideration tostructure and informationprocessing facilities.

— The port adds value to theprimary product. As mentionedbefore, the term added valuesignifies value newly added or

created in the productive processof an enterprise. Loading anddischarging are certainly value-adding activities, so are theindustrial services of a portnoted earlier. In a distributioncentre, added value can takedifferent forms such as cargoconsolidation anddeconsolidation—providing up-to-date information on theinventory and cargo movements,stuffing/unstuffing containers,crating, palletisation, shrink-wrapping, labelling, weighing,repackaging, etc.

— The port works towardsenvironmental protection.

— It works to users’ conveniencerather than its own.

— It tries to simplify customs’procedures.

— Organisational structures areintegrated.

Fourth generation port

A development that appeared in the1990s and, as shown in the summary, isthe focus on globalisation, especiallyamong the large international operating

companies. This same globalisation hasseen a standardisation of informationand procedures and a greater and moresophisticated use of automation.

Summary of differences

Trend for ports to assumemore risks and liabilities

Demand for liability insurance andeffective risk management is set to grow

as port authorities and terminaloperators are increasingly held liablefor loss or damage on their premises.For the past 100 years, shippers havetaken the attitude that they ought to insuretheir own product. That attitude is nowchanging and they do not think theyshould insure a product entrusted to thecare of someone else.

This trend is partly a sign of the times,where the growth in liability can be seenin virtually all areas of commerce. Inports the trend becomes more noticeableas ports “privatise” (governmentorganisations are always difficult to sue)and commercialise, as ports may be

forced to accept liability rather than losetrade to the competition ports.

The Rise and Fall ofPorts

Throughout most of the twentieth centurythe number of UK shipping companiesdecreased and tended to centralise,moving their head offices to London.However, in the last few years we haveseen some companies move out of thehigh rent “City” offices to locations

nearer London Airport.The success and failure of ports is

indicated by some of the followingleague tables:

World leaders in 1937

Rank Port(1937)

No. ofvessels

MillionNRT

1 New York 92,032 68.62 London 59,000 61.53 Kobe 26,776 28.34 Yokohama 5,757 26.85 Rotterdam 110,406 22.46 Baltimore 56,067 21.07 Colombo 2,708 20.48 Osaka 18,999 19.6

9 Antwerp 11,125 18.710 Hamburg 16,141 18.4

The above table shows the dominance ofthe Atlantic basin in 1937.

The table above gives the 1995 and2005 figures showing the totalthroughput figures in tonnes for theworld’s largest ports. Singapore

measures its throughput in freight tonswhich I suspect is at least 10% higherthan metric tonnes, so the actual rankingis open to question. However,disregarding the differences, what bothtables show is the complete dominanceof the Far East and the Pacific.

In 2002 London was in position 37,handling 1.6 million TEUs.

The table above looks at the containerTEU movements between 1970 and2006. The figures may not be precise butradical changes can be seen to havetaken place in the late 1970s and early1980s with port leadership and trademoving away from Europe, USA and theAtlantic to the Far East and the PacificRim. One can also grasp the phenomenal

growth of ports such as Gioia Tauro,which only handled its first container in1995 but over 2.9 million TEUs in 2006.

The table above shows that competingports in the same economic region havegrown at different rates.

The table above again stresses that largeports can be large for different reasons.

A free port or zone

Dr Ernst Frankel distinguishes betweenseveral types of industrial free ports orzones but basically they are a small partof the national territory remaining underfull sovereignty of the state but placedoutside customs limits. Goods are stillsubject to other laws, for example, thoseinvolving the safety and sanitary aspectsof the goods.

The advantages of a free port is that it

reduces the time and effort required incustoms formalities and avoids havinglarge amounts of money deposited withthe customs for duty on goods that areonly in transit or being assembled in thearea before being exported as part of alarger product. In 1986 T. F. B. Helmestimated that 20% of the world’s tradewas handled in the 478 free zonessituated in more than 80 countries—compared with only 10% in 1981.Hamburg is perhaps the most famous,being established as such in 1888. In1984 six areas in the UK weredesignated as free ports.

Port management objectives

In the past, few ports seem to have hadclear and explicit managementobjectives. However, the adoption of theISM Code 9000 and the development ofquality management by ports in the early1990s, will have caused the minds ofport boards to focus on this problem andcome up with a variation of thefollowing:

1. Ways of minimising costs:

(a) minimise payments byusers in the port—

including ships’ time ata port;

(b) minimise users’ totalthrough transport costs;and

(c) minimise port costs.

2. Maximisation of benefits:

(a) they maximise benefitsto the owners of theport; and

(b) they maximise benefitsto the town, region orcountry.

The port as an economicmultiplier

Employment as economicimpact

The fact that ports have an economicimpact on a region is obvious, but thedifficult question is the scale of theimpact. To do a full Economic ImpactStudy (EIS) is time-consuming,expensive, intricate and seldom precise,so why bother to try? The main reasonsseem to be:

1. To persuade authorities tosupport their ports with moneyand favourable policies. Onecan note that ports such asAntwerp, Amsterdam and NewYork have been the pioneers ofsuch techniques, possiblybecause they have been portsthat needed such assistance.

2. To convince the moneylenders,such as the World Bank, that theinvestment is worthwhile.

3. To assist port managers tounderstand which of theiractivities contributes most towealth-generation and

maximum employment.

The techniques for doing an EIS seemto have been developed just after theSecond World War. This was a period ofreconstruction and rapid trade growth, atime when ports world-wide had tomake massive capital investments.However, possibly few developingcountries could attempt such a completeanalysis at the moment. It requires a verycomprehensive amount of statistical datafrom many sectors of the economy.

Mr R. L. M.Vleugels in one of theearliest papers on the subject, TheEconomic Impact of Ports on the

Regions they serve and the Role ofIndustrial Development, given in 1969,identifies three approaches tocalculating the impact:

1. The added value. A roughestimate of the impact of a portcan be obtained by calculatingthe added value of all theindustries, which can be listedunder the term “port-related”.For this purpose the net addedvalue could be considered to bebasically the gross profits of theenterprise and of the wages ofthe employees.

2. Input–output analysis. This islabour intensive and requires aconsiderable amount ofstatistical data, which may notbe available in many countries.

3. The collation of the statisticaldata which show or suggest therelation between port activitiesand the socio-economicprosperity of the region.

Examples

Le Havre

In the early 1990s the port of Le Havreestimated that it created:

— 7.2 billion francs value added inregional industries;

— 3.8 billion francs value added inregional transport;

— 2.3 billion francs value added inregional commercial services.

Hong Kong

The port of Hong Kong generates 20%of Hong Kong’s GDP and supports 20%of all business establishments in the

locality. In 1994 it provided employmentfor 350,000 people or 20% of its workforce.

Callao (Peru)

The port and its hinterland generates54% of the country’s GDP

Hamburg

Port-dependent jobs made by Hamburg1992

No. of

Sector persons Percentage

Port based Cargo-handling 5,637

Port based Other 40,710 28.5Trade,banking,insurance

22,290 15.6

Miscellaneous Customs,rail, etc. 6,592

Port-basedindustries 19,774 13.9

Jobsindirectlydependent onport

47,545 33.3

15% of all jobs in Hamburg were

dependent on the port.

In millions BEF1992 RotterdamAntwerp

Direct valueadded 272 192

Total value added 404 293Millions of tonneshandled 304 104

Direct valueadded per tonne 0.90 1.85

Total value addedper tonne 1.33 2.82

Source: Port of Antwerp Policy Research1995.

The value added per tonne shown in the

table above is an interesting statistic. Astudy comparing the results for leadingworld ports would make a usefulanalysis.

Competition BetweenPorts

A recent survey of the Atlantic marketindicates that the traditional approachesto explain inter-port competition,including the hinterland concept, are notparticularly helpful. The competing ports

must be viewed from the exporters’ andimporters’ perspectives as seen in thetable below.

Portselectioncriteria

Rank Port servicescriteria Rank

Number ofsailings 1 Road and rail

services 1

Inland freightrates 2 Container

facilities 2

Proximity ofport 3 Tracking

systems 3

Congestion 4 Warehousing 4Intermodallinks 5 Consolidation

services 5

Port Heavy lift

equipment 6 services 6

Port charges 7 Marshallingyards 7

Customshandling 8 Bulk facilities 8

Port security 9 Cold storagefacilities 9

Port size 10Source: Strategic Planning Research done forthe City of Rotterdam in 1989.

Although the customers form themajor decision makers as regards towhich port to use, their decision willdepend not only on the ability andwillingness of the suppliers (as shown in

the table), but also on the possibilities ofnew potential entrants into the game andthe ability to find substitutes in economicalternatives formed by other transportmodes.

Strategic Planning Research done forthe City of Rotterdam in 1989concerning the criteria for selecting aport, came to the conclusion that themost important factors in the decision toselect a port revolve round the variousaspects of cost, service and themovement of goods.

— Cost. Competitive costs and lowfreight rates.

— Service. Reliable, fast, goodcommunications, high number ofsailings and low congestion.

— Movement. Road and railaccess with good intermodallinks.

It was estimated that for some of theleading ports in 2004 the percentage oftheir TEU throughput was “transit cargo”as shown in the table on page 87.

Trans-shipment share in the Hamburg—Le Havre range of ports

Year/Port 2004Salaha (Oman) 99.6%PTP 97.0%

Algeciras 84.0%Singapore 82.0%Gioia Tauro 80.4%Colombo 71.0%Kaohsiung 52.0%Shanghai 43.0%Klang 41.0%Rotterdam 40.0%

The trans-shipment cargo doesrepresent a segment of traffic that is mostvulnerable to competition.

A report in Lloyd’s List in November1998 indicated that there was apossibility that a private company couldend up as the major shareholder

controlling a number of privatisedterminals that handled over 25% of thedeep-sea container throughput in north-west Europe. Whether this deal goesthrough or not, it is certainly apossibility that the majority of terminalscould in effect come under the control ofone multinational organisation. Such amonopoly situation would not improvecompetition.

Co-operation between ports

In October 1998 the Ports of London andHamburg reported to the press that they

had reached a joint working agreement,particularly in their marketing fields, toform a “trade bridge”. This is just oneexample of many, where ports havedecided to work together in variousareas for their mutual advantage. Socompetition between ports is certainlygrowing but so is co-operation.

Hamburg and Bremerhaven ContainerTerminals combined in 1999 withContship to fund the Eurogate venture.Also included in their influence areGioia Tauro and La Spezia where theyhave controlling shares and 16% inLiscont at Lisbon.

Global marine containerterminal operating companies

Twenty such major companies exist, fiveof which are global companies (as atApril 1999):

1. PSA Corporation operatesterminal facilities in Singapore,Dalian, Nantong, Fuzhou,Taicang, Cigadin, Aden, Genoa,Venice, Tuticorin. In 2004 theybought a 57% stake in AsiaContainer Terminal in HongKong. In 2005 they bought 20%share in Hutchison.

2. Hutchison Port Holdings (HPH)A. P. Moller owns 10% ofshares) operates terminalfacilities in Hong Kong,Shanghai, Yantian, Gaolan,Jiuzhou, Nanhai, Jiangmen,Shantou, Xiamen, Felixstowe,Thamesport, Harwich,Rotterdam, Freeport(Bahamas), Cristobal, Balboa,Yangon, Koja, Port Klang(Westport). HPH handles over10% of world container liftings(18mn TEUs 1999) and owns14% of the world’s containerterminals.

3. P&O Ports (from 1985)operates terminal facilities inSydney, Melbourne, Fremantle,Southampton, Tilbury, Lame,Genoa, Naples, Cagliari,Manila, Shekou, Bangkok,Laem, Chabang, Vostochny, PortQasim, Colombo, Nhava Sheva,Buenos Aires, Maputo. P&Oindicated in 2004 that 44% ofits assets are now in ports andsaid that ports were a morestable business than liners. In2005 it made ports the bulk ofits business. In November 2005was taken over by Dubai Ports

for $3.3 billion.4. Stevedoring Services of

America (SSA) operatesterminal facilities in Seattle,Portland, Tacoma, Oakland, SanFrancisco, Long Beach, LosAngeles, Mobile, Charleston,Savannah, Jacksonville,Manzanillo.

5. International ContainerTerminal Services Inc. (ICTSI)operates terminal facilities inManila, Buenos Aires, Rosario,Veracruz, Karachi, Dammam,Ensenada, Rosario.

RankTop Terminal

Operators 2007%

share ofteus

1 Hutchison Port Holdings(HPH) 13.8

2 APM (Danish) 11.8

3 PSA—Now has a 20%stake in HPH (April 06) 10.7

4 D. P. World 9.45 COSCO 5.06 Eurogate 2.77 Evergreen 2.18 MSC 2.09 SSA 1.710 HHLA 1.5These 10 top ports handle some 60.7%of the global container trade.

Will the US response opposing the salemake the EU and others question thestrategic dangers of foreign terminaltenants?

In 2004/5 leading global operatorshandled 70% of the EU’s containertraffic. In 2006 the EU commission saidit would take action if this growthcontinues!

InformationTechnology in

Logistics

Reduced costs of information technology(IT) hardware and increased capabilityhave stimulated growth. For example, in1983 computer memory cost $300 permegabyte but by 1996 memory only cost$0.21 per megabyte. Also,telecommunications costs overall havebeen reduced by a variety of newdevelopments.

IT within the shipping industry during1970–80 was mainly by mainframes butthere were few on ships. It was only in1981 that IBM first introduced the PC.

From 1980–90 the industry developedmini-computers and dedicatedcomputers such as loadmasters and itwas not until the 1990s that PCs werefound on ships.

Management informationsystems

As in any commercial enterprise, thepurpose of information technology is tooptimise the use of resources, thusreducing costs. Such a system willusually monitor the overall performanceof the enterprise, thus giving the

management a total picture of what ishappening as it happens, whichpreviously could not be properlycompleted in a vast complexorganisation such as a port.

Systems often found in ports

(1) Management of vesseloperation facilitates managementcontrol over vesselarrival/departure and attendantfacilities such as tugs, berths,pilots, etc.

(2) Management of cargo and

terminals:

— centralise themanagement of cargoinformation and data;

— optimise the flow andcontrol of cargo on theterminal;

— provide data andstatistics;

— produce necessarydocuments;

— simplify reportingprocedures to variousagencies;

— calculate charges and

issue invoices;— help organise labour;— assist management in

quality andenvironmental control.

Electronic data interchange(EDI)

— Predates the internet but is moreexpensive than the internet touse.

— Structured data can betransferred betweenorganisations.

— Data transmission can be madesecure.

— Audit trail can keep track oftransactions.

— Banks can be connected into thesystem with automatic billpaying.

— UK companies use EDI—57%of users see this as a key way ofimproving productivity.

Definition of EDI

The computerised electronic exchange ofinformation of structured data between

computers in various organisations in theform of standard messages.

The table below gives a sample ofinternational EDI development. It alsoshows that EDI started in the mid-1960sfor banks and finance houses, but it wasperhaps another decade before shippingand ports became involved. By the mid-1980s most major ports and shippingcompanies had systems up and runningand by 1995 many of the local andregional systems had become global asinformation was exchanged around theworld.

Development of EDI

Date Development

1968L.A. and San Francisco clearinghouses—Special Committee OnPaperless Entries: SCOPE

1975

Development of EDIFACT:Electronic Data Interchange forTransport and Commerce byUN/ECE

1982 Hamburg—DAKOSY

1983 Le Havre—Automated CustomsClearance of Goods: ADEMAR

1984 Felixstowe—FCP80

1984 Singapore—PORTNET—early1990s TRADENET

1985 Rotterdam—INTIS: InternationalTransport Information Systems

1985 P&O—DISH—Data Interchangefor Shipping: INTIS Rotterdam

for Shipping: INTIS Rotterdam

1986 Japan—SHIPNET—SEAGHAAntwerp

1987 ISO accepted UN/EDIFACTsyntax

1988 Hong Kong—TRADELINK1989 Australia—TRADEGATE1993 Bremen—BHT

1994 Gothenburg—EDIFACT—KoreaKL-NET

1995

MARTRANS—an EU project tointerconnect existing EDI PortCommunity Systems andimplementing new EDI systems innon-automated ports. Howeversince its inception the emphasishas shifted from maritimecompetitiveness to intermodal

effectiveness, from European toInternational partnership and fromEDI to the Information Highway

1997

MOSES—Modular and ScalableEDI System to provide an easyand cost effective system for smalland medium size ports

1998 OOCL launch their Internet B/Lservice

See: Maritime Policy & Management, Vol. 27,No. 2.

The internet

Most ports in the world now have their

own websites, which vary considerablyin their use and effectiveness. Many ofthese provide e-mail addresses so thosespecific customer queries can besatisfied.

The number of logistic databases thatcan be found through the many searchengines available is growing by theminute. The development of anintermodal information system based onthe internet is part of the MARTRANSproject.

Maritime e-CommerceAssociation

www.meca.org.ukinfo@meca.org.ukE-services by satellite from 2003

The use of the internet. At the end of2001 it was estimated that in a typicalliner transaction the cost to the linercompany for entering a new customerinto the system was $295 by phone, $83by e-mail, $11 via web self-service.

Conclusion

The impact of the computer on ports, asin most areas of activity, is still in its

infancy and as in the development ofmost new technologies there isconsiderable variety in the software andhardware available. Because of thisthere is no standard model as regards itsport application. Assumingtechnological development follows itsnormal course, one or two systems willprobably eventually emerge dominant.

One of the few problems caused bynot having a standardised system is thatport statistics, which for most ports arenow generated by their softwaresystems, often contain subtle butsignificant differences in the precisedetails of their calculation.

As the main motive behindmanagement and administration changesis the quest for greater efficiency,perhaps it is worth considering what thisentails. If efficiency is defined as theoptimum use of resources within anacceptable context of safety, one has areasonable starting point.

Maritime Economics & Logistics in2007 suggested that the average portefficiency in 2002 of European portauthorities was estimated to be around60%, denoting that ports could havehandled 40% more traffic with the sameresources. However, although thetechnical definition of efficiency is

simple, precise and universally agreedupon, in the commercial world conceptsof efficiency vary widely. For instance,to over invest in excess of cargo-handling equipment to satisfy theimpatience of an occasional shipownercould be seen by some as efficient whileothers might see it as a waste ofresources. To optimise one has to beable to quantify, so the first step shouldbe to define what can be quantified on acomparable basis. The comparable basisis necessary as there is no absolutemeasure of commercial efficiency, onlythat A is better than B or that A is betterthis year than last year.

Some academics consider that dataenvelopment analysis (DEA) providesan efficiency measurement to a numberof different situations where efficiencycomparisons are required, such as ports.The DEA technique is useful, theproponents suggest, in resolving themeasurement of port efficiency becausethe calculations are non-parametric, canhandle more than one output and do notrequire an explicit a prioridetermination of relationships betweenoutputs and inputs, as is required forconventional estimation of efficiencyusing production functions. The ports ofMelbourne, Rotterdam, Yokohama and

Osaka are found thus to be the mostinefficient ports in the sample, based onconstant and variable returns to scaleassumptions, mainly due to the enormousslack in their container berths, terminalarea and labour inputs. Such studies arevery useful but why is there a desire toincorporate unsuitable concepts such asefficiency when better ones, such asproductivity, all ready exist.

Much comparability at the moment formost forms of financial comparisonconcerning capital costs, differenttaxation systems, different forms of“financial assistance”, etc., makecomparing profitability a waste of time.

Similar difficulties apply to cargo-handling costs, with the extra difficultythat actual costs are a matter ofconfidential negotiation with each client.However, one can try to produce anaggregated benchmark norm.

A starting-point would therefore seemto be to identify what can be preciselymeasured with the minimum ofconfusion. Apart from perhaps port duesthere is little that can be measured on awhole-port basis. Most comparable datamust concentrate on a terminal basis (seeChapter 10).

When the Port of Rotterdamannounced a few years ago that it was

considering going paperless, do youthink that such a development wouldincrease efficiency?

Safety

IMO and port safety

— 1964 Code of Safe Practice ofSolid Bulk Cargoes.

— Adoption of the InternationalMaritime Dangerous Goods(IMDG) Code in 1965.

— 1972 CSC (Container SafetyCode) Convention.

— 1978 SOLAS Protocol extendedsafety enforcement by flag stateto include the port states. Thisenforcement was made moreuniform in 1982 when 14European states signed the ParisMemorandum.

— 1978–1984 International SafetyGuide for Oil Tankers &Terminals. Produced by ICS,OCIMF and IAPH

— 1980 the Recommendations onthe Safe Transport Handling andStorage of Dangerous Substances

in Port Areas.— 1985 IMO/ILO Guidelines for

Packing Cargo in FreightContainers or vehicles.

— 1995 Assembly resolutionA.786(19) on Strategy forShip/Port Interface (SPI). Theworking group on SPI startedwork in 1992.

— 1996 the Sub-Committee on theCarriage of Dangerous Goods(CDG) was merged with theSub-Committee on Containersand Cargo to form the new Sub-Committee on Dangerous Goods,Solid Cargoes and Containers

(DSC).

Ports marine safety UK—Port Marine Safety Code

(1) Requiring the publication ofplans, accounts and performancereports.

(2) Allow minister to removepowers from harbour authority.

(3) To allow harbour authorities toregulate navigation within theport.

(4) To amend restrictions frompilots’ exemption.

(5) To give the Secretary of Statepowers to direct harbourauthorities if they are failing inaspects of safety.

The Port Marine Safety Code representsan agreed national standard againstwhich the policies, procedures andperformance of harbour authorities maybe measured. The harbour authorities,commissioners or trustees will in mostcases be considered the corporate “dutyholder” and as such must have a planand policies encompassing the details ofthe safety code. They must ensureadequate resources exist to allow such a

plan to function.Note that in 1999 eight deaths and 695

injuries were reported in UK ports,which was four times higher than theaverage for all UK industries.

Port security

What precautions has the portimplemented against unlawful acts suchas terrorism, theft, sabotage, stowawaysand illegal immigrants, smuggling, etc.?Is security a port management problemor a matter for the local or state policeforce?

Has the port made a port vulnerabilityassessment? This should includeexamination of the following:

— Type of security force.— Physical security measures:

types of fencing, barriers,lighting, intrusion detectionsystems (IDS), etc.

— Routes of access/egress.— Communications.— Availability of additional port

security resources.— Response time/distance for

security personnel.— Proximity to urban areas.

— Geographic location.— Proximity to international

borders.— Specific local problem: what

are the port security problems?

See Chapter 4 concerning theInternational Ship and Port FacilitySecurity Code (ISPS Code).

ISO/Pas 28,000 is the managementsystem that DP World has adopted forcorporate security policies.

Environmental safety

See Chapter 12 on Port EnvironmentalMatters.

The main problems are:

— Water quality—is the qualityimproving or getting worse?

— It has been estimated that some10 billion tonnes of ballast waterare carried between distant anddissimilar ports and may containorganisms that could causeproblems at the discharge ports.The Management of WaterBallast was adopted in a newAnnex VII to Marpol 73/78 in2000. This will make the mid-

ocean ballast exchangemandatory unless the destinationport gives exemption or themaster reasonably determinesthat such an undertaking wouldjeopardise the safety of the ship.At the moment many ports andcountries have their ownrestrictive water ballast changeregulations. BIMCO has a database of the regulations for morethan 100 countries which can befound on the internet. The USAand Australia are among theforemost of nations which havedeveloped comprehensive

regulations covering thisproblem.

— Waste reception facilities—tocharge or not to charge?

— Dry bulk handling facilities toreduce dust.

— Tanker—spill response unit.— Ships’ exhaust gas emissions.

After discussions with environmentalexperts, I am of the opinion thatenvironmental safety, like profit, canonly be self-compared, e.g. is waterquality improving or worsening eachyear?

There are, however, certain aspects,

such as the percentage losses ofenvironmentally dangerous commoditieslike bulk fertiliser at a terminal, whichcould be measured and compared.

Note

* See UNCTAD Report 1990.

Chapter SixPort Policy

General points on maritime policy—corruption and hidden agendas—port policy—EU port and transportpolicy—relationship between port andstate (or area authority)—portownership—port and state financialassistance—port pricing

General Points onMaritime Policy

What is it?

“National shipping policy, an element ofoverall economic policy, expresses theattitude of the State to Shipping. Shippingpolicy can be understood as the totality ofeconomic, legal and administrativemeasures by means of which the Stateinfluences the position of its national fleet,that is, its place and role in the nationaleconomy and in international freightmarkets.… The attitude of the State to its

own merchant marine as a rule reflectsindirectly its attitude to the fleets of othercountries.

Shipping policy has then two aspects:foreign, expressing the attitude to otherfleets, and domestic, to own merchantmarine.”

Chrzanowski gives the above definitionin his book on Maritime Economics. Itis very comprehensive but its meaningcan take a wider compass. It doesconcern governments—but a governmenthas many departments. For example, theUSA has the FMC, MaritimeAdministration, US Department ofJustice, Coastguard, Customs, etc. Each

bureaucrat or official may also have hisown interpretation of a national policy.

Further, it is not only governments thatcan have policies, organisations such asIMO and UNCTAD have policies, soone could say: “Policy is a course ofaction adopted for the sake ofexpediency to achieve a certain goal oroffset a danger.”

A policy maker is therefore anadministrator trying to solve a problem.There will nearly always be a problembut ports will only turn to their nationalgovernment when they have a problem,usually a financial problem. When all isgoing well with a port and it is making a

reasonable amount of profit, the lastthing it wants is interference fromnational or international bureaucrats.

Policies can usually be separated intotwo main groups:

1. Those concerned with safety,security and the environment.These are areas best suited tointernational agreement and arerelatively simple in that somesort of agreement is usuallypossible. It would not bepolitically correct for apolitician to be seen to betaking a stand against these

issues.2. Those concerned with

commercial issues. These mayplace the politician in adilemma. On the one hand, thereare often issues concerningjustice and fair play betweenports in a country or region, onthe other hand the politician isconcerned with his or herpopularity amongst a specificgroup of voters. Policies insuch areas usually end up withcompromise solutions orworking parties are set up todelay a decision.

However, once the policy maker hasidentified the problem the solution liesin a variety of options—all with goodand bad effects.

See E. Frankel, “Hierarchical logic inshipping policy and decision-making”,Maritime Policy & Management, 1992,Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 211–221.

Policy makers must:

— know what is happening andwhy;

— collect all available data;— pursue the right goals;— consider all the implications of

the policy; and

— ensure the policy is enforceable.

How can they achieve this policy?Basically a government has one of twooptions: it can either help its ownnational industry or make things difficultfor its foreign competitors.

Helping own nationals bysubsidies or some form offinancial assistance

One of the major problems as regardssubsidies or financial aid is thateveryone has a different perception ofwhat it entails and such help can takemany forms. In the preceding table theUS Administration attributes many typesof financial aid that it sees offered by theUK Administration but the UKAdministration would stoutly deny most

of them, particularly the accusation thatit practices cabotage.

Corruption andHidden Agendas

The existence or not of corruption andhidden agendas does effect the attitudeand approach of all those dealing withauthority. Even in the “cleanestcountries” there are often hiddenagendas when it comes to a national planfor ports and other maritime issues. For

instance, on 12 January 1998 thereappeared an article in The Times whichsuggested that the flurry of interestshown in mining the seabed formanganese nodules back in the 1970swas really just a cover for the USIntelligence services trying to raise asunken Soviet submarine. Whether this istrue or not, it does illustrate how abureaucracy may have and use hiddenagendas for what it would considerperfectly valid reasons.

The table below is not a seriousanalysis of corruption but it does reflectthe perception of corruption byinternational journalists. There are many

different ways of defining corruption andmany different cultural perceptions of it.Such a table can, however, provide agood basis for discussion on corruptionand hidden agendas. It is a good exampleof an attempt to measure theimmeasurable and to quantify a problemwhich many commentators prefer toignore. Policy issues have many areassuch as this and this does give anexample of a simple methodology thatmight be tried.

Port Policy

Port policy in this context considersthose aspects of a port which, regardlessof ownership, may be considered theconcern of the central or federalgovernment. The international

agreements made by the World TradeOrganisation (WTO) and their impact ontrade and regional agreements, such asthose of the EU, can also be consideredunder the general heading of Port Policy.

Although the EU is by far the mostnotable of the world’s regional tradinggroups, it must not be forgotten that thereare many others. The North AmericanFree Trade Agreement is also verymaking a significant impact on worldtrade. It is also worth remembering thateach of these bureaucracies willdevelop their own port policies, if theyhave not done so already.

The following points should be borne

in mind:

— A port is a major nationalinterface between a country andthe outside world and as such itis a vital element in the nationaleconomy. (About 11% of GDP ofthe Netherlands is generated bythe activities of the Port ofRotterdam alone.) It is anexpensive capital investmentwith a large proportion of sunkcosts—that is, once theinvestment is made it involves along-term commitment.

— A port cannot exist in a vacuum.

It should be the focal point of anational transport system ofroads and rail, with access to anairport. It will attract industriesand become an area ofcommercial and administrativeactivity. It will also attracttourists and undesirable elementssuch as terrorists and drugsmugglers and be a constantsource of worry toenvironmentalists.

— As ports evolve they will tendto retreat from their old citycentre sites to new “out of town”locations. This means that for

older ports real estatedevelopment in high-cost citycentre sites becomes animportant and often lucrativeancillary activity anxiety.

National port planning

From an academic point of view themost complete and coherent nationaltransport plans were those produced bythe centrally planned economies, such asthose of the USSR and Eastern Europe inthe 1970s. In a modern liberaldemocracy it is possible to have plans

but much more difficult to impose them.Private enterprise can be steered bynational planners by prodding with taxesor coaxing with financial incentives butthe results are to a large extent uncertain.So far, most attempts by mostgovernments to reduce the use andgrowth of the motor car have met withfailure, in spite of plans announced at thetime of election. In many countries aswell as my own, national port planningfaces similar problems to that of themotor car mentioned above. Logically,one can argue that in very manycountries, certainly within the EU, thereare too many ports. The obvious

conclusion of such an argument is thatthere are ports that should be closed, butas a port closure would invariably meanjob losses and the running down of awhole community with the consequentunpopularity of the politiciansconcerned, such a motion as port closureseldom appears on any political agenda.

EU Port andTransport Policy

Trade handled by EU seaports:

1980 1.8 billion tonnes1993 2.3 billion tonnes2000 2.6 billion tonnes2010 3.4 billion tonnes (estimated)

In 1994, 1,164.2 million tons, or 75.4%,of the total trade between the EUmembers and third countries, and 208.3million tonnes, or 29% of the tradebetween the Member States trade, wascarried by sea. There is also some 224million tonnes of national coastwisetraffic.

Policy

In 1993 the Trans-European TransportNetwork (TEN) Policy entered intoforce. This treaty commits theCommunity to contribute to theestablishment of trans-Europeannetworks in the areas of transport,telecommunications and energyinfrastructures. One common area ofinterest seems to be to get goods off theroad and onto the railways. Suchinvestment if not carefully handled couldpromote greater advantages for someports rather than others.

The current Common Transport Policy

(CTP) basis was laid down in 1992when the Commission issued a WhitePaper addressing the general aims andframework within the Policy.

Main EU policy proposals:

1. Improvement and modernisationof port infrastructure andinclusion in the trans-Europeantransport network. TheEuropean Investment Bank(EIB) has been a majorcontributor supportinginvestment in port

infrastructure. To benefit froman EU loan or grant the projectshould cover:

(a) Improvements inaccess to the port fromland, sea or inlandwaterway.

(b) Improvement inside theport area.

2. Creation of a competitiveplaying field. There is,however, difficulty in coming toan agreement about whichforms of state aid should bepermitted, not least because

national policies differsignificantly, particularly asregards the division of costsbetween the public sector, theprivate operator and the user.

3. Advance of Research &Development for ports. Article103f of the Maastricht Treatystates that the EU objectives areto strengthen the scientific andtechnological basis ofCommunity industries such asoptimising berthing/unberthingprocedures and cargo-handlingprocedures. One of the centralEU concepts is the support of

several projects aiming at thecreation of a Europeanmaritime information highway(MARIS). Much of this work isco-ordinated through theEuropean Sea Port Organisation(ESPO) which was set up in1993. In 1994 the Federation ofEuropean Port Operators(FEPORT) was established.

4. Support in setting up anenhanced dialogue between allpartners to address relevantproblems. The most popularareas for agreement betweenports seem to lie in harmonising

pollution prevention rules andport state controlimplementation. It is interestingto note that in a research projectundertaken in 1982 the portindustries’ perception of an all-embracing European portspolicy was that it was“extremely unattractive”.

However, getting agreement among allthe interested parties involved in the EUis difficult. For instance, for years therehave been attempts to change theregulations effecting the employment ofdock labour in the EU without any

success.When the British National Ports

Council was formed in 1969, one of itsfunctions was to produce a British PortsPolicy but it had not completed thisfunction when it was abolished. Morerecently (2007) a UK TransportMinister, Alistair Darling, publiclydeclared that a port policy wasunnecessary and that the market wouldprovide resources and infrastructures asrequired.

Relationship between

Port and State (orArea Authority)

(1) The State will almost certainlyexercise control over:

(a) National transportpolicy—location ofroads, rail, bridges,tunnels, canals, etc.

(b) Location of majorindustries.

(c) Customs andimmigration.

(d) Safety requirements and

minimum conditions forworkers.

(e) Environmental andaesthetic factors.

(2) The State may probably beconcerned with:

(a) Freeport areas.(b) Port investment and

development plans.(c) Security.

(3) The State may possibly decideto be involved with:

(a) Port pricing policy.

(b) Pilotage control andpricing.

(c) Dredging andnavigational aids.

A common policy on the degree andextent to which a state exercises controlover its ports is difficult to implementbecause for one thing the UK and Japanhave perhaps an excess of portlocations, all of which cannot beallowed to develop. On the other hand,many continental countries with onlylimited access to the sea will notexperience this problem.

Regional Trading Areas, such as the

EU, with many ports may wish to have acentral policy on such issues as pricingand subsidies to avoid “unfaircompetition” between its ports.

Goals and objectives of ports

What is the port management trying toachieve—maximum profit for the port,for the locality or for the country?Perhaps it is trying to maximise cargothroughput or minimise its costs or helpwith local employment. It may beattempting to achieve a compromise ofmost of these, as all the external

constraining groups will be puttingpressure on the port management tosatisfy their needs.

A further associated problem is that,because so many groups and interestsare involved in port activities, portmanagement and administration tends tobecome too large, complex andunwieldy.

Constraining influences onport management

Figure 22: Constraining influences on portmanagement

The above figure indicates that portmanagement operates under a great manytight constraints of which a considerable

number will be mandatory. The port’srelationship with the state will ofnecessity be a close one regardless ofthe type of ownership adopted.

Port Ownership

As mentioned in Chapter 5, the Editor ofPort Development International seemsto have summed up in 1992 a generalworld-wide attitude when he wrote: “fortoo long the inefficiencies and excessesof the dockers have been mirrored bytop-heavy administrations—over-

manned, under-talented and equallyobdurate to change.”The general trendworld-wide, for instance, in Europe,China, Africa, Asia, etc., is todecentralise direct government controland to place the port on a morecommercial footing.

See the table on page 76 comparingthe ownership of the different activitieswithin ports and the arguments forincreased private sector participation inthe port industry.

Port and State

Financial Assistance

As noted several times in this book theUK ports have long been amongst themost expensive in Europe. The BritishNational Ports Council, however, backin 1969 produced a survey whichconcluded that many continentalcountries such as Germany, Belgium,Netherlands and France offer extensivesubsidies to their ports. In fact, thereport suggested that if British portsreceived the same level of financial aidas their continental competitors theycould be amongst the cheapest ports in

Europe. Note the National Ports Councilwas abolished in 1981 but the literatureand surveys this body completed wereamongst some of the best documentarywork on British ports. In the late 1980sthe British Ports Federation produced afurther document showing how itperceived its competitors in north-western Europe received considerablefinancial aid, particularly in the area ofinfrastructure developments.

State aid remains a controversialissue. A Commission Document,“General Study on State Aid in the PortSector” (DOC.VII/103/89), stated thatsupport from public authorities for port

infrastructure should not in principle beconsidered as state aid within the termsof Article 92 paragraph 1. However,recent statements by some Commissionrepresentatives indicate that there mightbe a change in attitude. For instance, itwas stated in the EC Commission in1995 in Barcelona that “The generalpremise is that ports should operate on acommercial basis. The all-inclusivecosts of port installations, includingcapital costs, in principle should berecovered through the port fees.”TheCommission also stated in 1995 that:“State Aid must not allow a port toreduce tariffs in order to undercut the

tariffs of its competitors.”The subject does, however, become

very complex, not so much because of itsnature but because of how the problem isperceived and defined by each of theparticipants. For instance, all ports innorth-west Europe will be emphatic thatthey get no subsidies but they will assureyou that their competitors do. This doesnot reflect on their honesty but rather onwhat they would perceive as a subsidy.For instance, lack of charges on acountry’s motorways might beconsidered a subsidy by a port inanother country faced with significantmotorway charges for its cargo

distribution.

“A level playing field” forport facilities as regardscompetition

A British Ports Federationview

Continental European governments aresubsidising both the operating andinvestment costs of their major ports.Thus these ports are able to keep their

port charges at an artificially low level,so causing distortions to competition,e.g.:

— The finances of the port and thecity of Hamburg are mergedtogether. The port is capitalisedand financed by the city. TheFederal Government pays for thedredging of the Lower Elbe.

— Rotterdam—local and centralgovernment have, in the past,funded all berth developmentsand the local authority, whichowns the port, financesconstruction, dredging and

maintenance of berths.

It is, however, impossible to determinethe actual level of government financialaid given to any port in virtually anycountry, due to the lack of clearunambiguous detailed data for all portactivities.

Antwerp versus Rotterdam (asreported in Lloyd’s List, 21 March1997)Antwerp authorities were reported to becomplaining to Dutch authoritiescontrolling the mouth of the Scheldtconcerning delays in licensing thenecessary dredging. At the same time

there were those within the Port ofRotterdam who were concerned aboutproblems freight trains from Rotterdamseemed to be experiencing in passingthrough Belgium.

Bremen versus Rotterdam (as reportedin Lloyd’s List, 7 April 1997)The head of Bremen’s Association ofPort Users was reported as saying: “…with unfair policies the Dutch try toachieve their goal to maintain Rotterdamas the European leading port.” Onespecific example that was citedconcerned subsidised block trains fromRotterdam into its vast European

hinterland

Rotterdam versus Amsterdam (asreported in Lloyd’s List, 24 May 1999)ECT & Rotterdam Short Sea Terminals(RST) are to lodge a complaint with theEuropean commissioners if the city ofAmsterdam goes ahead with its plan tofund a new container terminal for the UScompany Ceres

Port Pricing

Port costs are important as some 50% of

ocean transportation costs can be madeup of port costs. Ports’ pricing policy isone which national authorities usuallymonitor, as do regional authorities suchas the EU. With the advent ofintermodalism which has broughtgrowing competition between ports, theanalysis of port pricing policy hasbecome a popular study for academics.In practice, however, I suspect that themajority of ports, like supermarkets,watch their major competitors and trynot to charge more.

Different approaches to port

pricing

(1) Governed by market forces:

(a) aim to maximiserevenue, or

(b) aim to maximise users—undercut thecompetition.

Note: The extent ofutilisation is of crucialimportance to port tariffpolicy.

(2) Aim to generate economic andother benefits—e.g. encourage

movement of vital commodities.(3) Cost-based:

(a) to cover all costs—capital, dredging, etc.;

(b) to cover operating costs;(c) using a government or

other cost-based formula,i.e. Freas Formula (USA1950), Rochdale (UK1970); and

(d) as a percentage of userstotal costs.

(4) Perpetuating a historicallyinherited system, pragmaticallyadjusted as required!

Note: If the port does not cover allits costs by charges to customers— where does the balance comefrom?

Who sets the rates?

(a) The government.(b) The local area authority.(c) The port.

Note: Even in the privatised situation theport may not be allowed a free hand insetting its tariffs as most governmentsare concerned about “unfair

competition”.

Methodology

(As suggested by Dowd and Fleming inMaritime Policy and Management,1994, Vol. 21.)

Step 1: Establish the benchmark price bycalculating:

(a) the historical costs of providingthe service or facility;

(b) the imputed cost—theunreimbursed and often

unrecorded benefits provided byan outside entity (e.g. fire,police, computer, etc.);

(c) the return on investments forboth land and equipment; and

(d) the sensitivity analysis—as (a),(b) and (c) will often requireassumptions, this will indicatethe degree of accuracy required.

Step 2: External examination or realitycheck:

(a) competition;(b) important customers;(c) political pressures; and(d) goals of the port.

Step 3: Negotiation and acceptance.

Elements in the pricingsystem

1. Should there be a global chargeor an individual complex tariffsystem?

2. Consideration of the timeelement.

3. On what unit is the user charged—GT, NT, length, amount ofcargo handled, etc.?

Note: Time as a cost to the shipownershould be considered, e.g. a shipownerwith high costs will pay for fast serviceand vice versa.

Tariff structures

Port tariff nomenclature can varyconsiderably between ports bothnationally and internationally. As one ofits last creative acts before its demise,the National Ports Council published asuggestion as to how it might bestandardised.

The National Ports Council Proposed

Standard Nomenclature of Main PortCharges:

(1) Conservancy Charge—thischarge is made for the upkeep ofthe approach channel andwaterways. (On most ofcontinental Europe this charge ismet by the taxpayer.)

(2) Dock Charge—to cover thecost of locks, other entrancecharges and berth charge.

(3) Wharfage—dues paid by thecargo for passing over dockestate.

(4) Handling Charge—in most

cases this will be the largestsingle item.

(5) Storage Charge—if the cargois not collected within aspecified time.

(6) Passenger Charge.(7) Other charges for services and

facilities offered. For instance,in the UK and some othercountries, Light Dues arecharged to cover the cost ofnavigational aids and inScandinavian countries extracharges are levied for use of anice breaker.

With the advent of containers therehave been further moves to simplifythese charges. For instance, at someports, container ship operators arecharged a standard rate per container,laden or empty, which is inclusive ofdock and conservancy charges, portrates and all normal handling chargesfrom the time of receipt or dischargeuntil the time of shipment or loading toland transport. In short, the first five ofthe above charges are made as a singlecharge.

In India a Tariff Authority wasestablished in mid-April 1997 and,according to an article in Lloyd’s List in

April 1998, this body will use tariffs toattempt to divert old ships and slowercheaper cargoes to the country’s minorports.

An example of how port costs can beallocated in different countries is thepayment of dredging in the USA. Underthe 1986 Act of Congress a fee of0.125% (1993) of value is charged oncargo loaded/unloaded to fundmaintenance of dredging. In 1991 $700million was collected.

The EU in its Green Paper on SeaPorts of December 1997 says “… thatport infrastructure should be priced insuch a way that users should bear the

real costs of the port services andfacilities that they consume”.

The Green Paper identifies three typesof payment systems:

1. Those related to the provisionof services and facilities toenable a ship to enter safely anduse the port.

2. Those for specific services orsupplies rendered.

3. Rents or charges for the use ofland or equipment.

For infrastructure charges three possibleapproaches are also identified:

1. Average cost pricing (thiswould guarantee full costrecovery).

2. Charging for operating costsonly.

3. Marginal cost pricing.

Chapter SevenBerths andTerminals

Number of berths required in a port—berth size and layout—alternativesto formal port systems—port logistics

The Number of BerthsRequired in a Port

Figure 23: Optimum number of berthsrequired in a port

Ideally, the ship operator would like tosee empty berths to ensure that there are

no delays for his ship when it arrives.The port operator on the other handwould like to reduce his capital outlay,and have only one berth with a queue ofships, so that the berth is always in useand earning. From the practical point ofview, however, it will be to theadvantage of both of them to keep thetotal costs to a minimum. Hence for anygiven conditions it is theoreticallypossible to determine the optimumnumber of berths. The optimum shown inthe graph above is an optimum for thetotal costs and would only be true in asituation where the ship and the portwere part of an integrated cost structure,

as for example where an oil companyowns both ships and port. In practice, itis seldom easy to establish the givenconditions as ports suffer from the oldtransport problem of peaks—that is, oneday the port is empty and the next thereis a queue waiting. Further, as there isnow usually competition between ports,many have adopted the dictum that “theberth must wait for the ship not the shipfor the berth”.

The problem can be analysedquantitatively in different ways:

(1) The application of queuingtheory. This is a rather dated

method today. It was evolvedbetween 1910 and 1920 by theDanish statistician Erlang forqueuing problems at telephoneexchanges. The same theory canbe used wherever a queuingsituation occurs. It has severelimitations for a modern port, asit assumes ships arrive in arandom fashion, whereas in mostports liner ships arrive to fixedschedules, as do many otherships. Also, some ships oncertain trades may arrive in“waves” due to seasonal or otherdemand considerations. Queuing

theory also assumes that allberths are interchangeable and itcan only cope with individualberths—it cannot cope with along berth which might take, say,three large ships or four smallones. It assumes the queue is on afirst come, first served basis, anddoes not allow for priority orqueuing systems.

(2) Simulations are a sound methodand have few of the problemsposed by queuing theory. Thereare two types:

(a) Computer simulations.

These can be expensiveas a good one needs to betailor-made for the port.Depending on the cost,some assumptions willhave to be made.

(b) Physical manualsimulations. These havethe advantage that theyare simple, cheap andeveryone understandsthem.

(3) Analysis of arrival anddeparture data on a well-organised spreadsheet. The same

spreadsheet of data can do agreat deal more than simplyanalyse the queuing problem. Itcan also analyse many of theother significant port operationalproblems. This also has theadvantage that the software willbe available to most portmanagers and most have theability to use it.

Terminal productivitydefinitions

Berth Occupancy Ratio is the ratio

obtained by dividing the time a berth hasbeen occupied by the time a berth isavailable during a considered period oftime (a week, month or year).

I.e.: Berth Occupancy Ratio =Ts/8760 (8760 is the number of hours ina year).

Service Time (Ts) is the period oftime during which a vessel is berthed ina port whether the ship works or not.The service time will therefore includeworking and non-working periods.

Waiting Time (Wq) is the time a shipis waiting for an available berth.

Waiting Ratio = Wq/TsDwell Time is the time spent by the

container in the port. It will depend onmany factors such as status (FCL, LCL,Emptie’s, etc.), customs procedures,communications efficiency between theparties concerned, the port’s pricingpolicy on this matter, etc.

The expression Berth Utilisation mayalso be used and this will be defined as:Berth Utilisation = Ts/Possible Workingdays in Period (say 300 days per year).

Number of berths

Figure 24: Relationship between berthoccupancy ratio and waiting ratio

Figure 24 (above), based on Erlang’sideas, indicates that the waiting ratioincreases quite dramatically as thenumber of berths decreases.

For a general-purpose berth anoccupancy ratio of around 0.7 could beconsidered about right. If the ratio is too

large the port is facing the seriouspossibility of congestion. On the otherhand, if the ratio is too small themanagement could face the criticism ofover-investment.

Takel, in his book Industrial PortDevelopment, noted that in 1970 theSouth Wales ports had an average berthutilisation factor of 0.46 or 46% and thatLe Havre considered its berth utilisationfactor of 67% too high and promptlydecided to build six extra berths, whichit estimated would bring the berthutilisation factor down to around 57%.

How to reduce waiting time

Obviously, to reduce waiting time portmanagement has a choice of threeoptions:

1. Increase the number of berths.2. Increase the working time at the

berths.3. Increase the terminal cargo-

handling productivity.

As an example consider a port whichhas an annual traffic throughput of400,000 tonnes at three berths. The portworks 300 days per year and on average

handles 500 tons per ship/day. The porthas, however, a congestion or queuingproblem of keeping ships waiting—lastyear there was a waiting time of around1,400–1,500 hours. The table on page110 indicates how changing either thenumber of berths or the handling rates orthe working time can reduce the waitingtime.

Berths and Terminals

The number of berths required in aport depends of course on many factorssuch as demand, type and size of ship,etc. If the terminal is of the dedicatedtype, such as those belonging to an oilcompany or ferry service, then thedemand or ship arrival sequence canusually be anticipated with some degreeof accuracy, at least in the short term. Onthe other hand, for a common user multi-purpose berth the port management can

rely only on tentative projections andhas to make allowances for the cyclicalnature of the demand. To make thisallowance it would be normal, havingdetermined what the average demandwould be, to increase it by a “peakingfactor” of say 20%–30%.

Although the factors involved arefairly obvious, the sensitivity of theresults to these factors are not alwaysappreciated. For instance, using eitherqueuing theory or simulations, theprevious table shows that, for example,in a terminal with three berths which hada waiting time of 58 days, this waitingtime could be reduced to eight days with

four berths or zero delays with fiveberths.

However, new berths and thenecessary superstructure do not comecheaply, and management should analyseall the possible options in the search forthe optimum solution. For instance, inthe above example the three-berthterminal could have reduced the waitingtime by increasing its cargo-handlingproductivity. Increasing its daily cargo-handling rate by around 50% wouldhave had a similar effect on waiting timeas constructing two new berths.

Land productivity at leadingcontainer terminals

Recent research has indicated that landproductivity, that is the number ofcontainers stowed per hectare on theterminal, varies in different regions.Typical figures for many Asian portsshow a storage capacity of 230–470TEUs/ha, European ports 180–300TEUs/ha, while North American portstend to show a capacity of 160 TEUs/ha.The author of this study indicates that thevariation may be due to the availabilityand price of land, the speed of growthand the degree of port competition

leading to over-capacity. Whether a highor low figure is a good thing isdebatable and much will depend on theeconomics of the container terminaloperation in the different regions. A highfigure means that less land is requiredbut almost certainly also means thatcontainers must be stacked higher. Highstacking of containers will probablymean more unproductive lifting andmoving of containers, as when trucksappear at the terminal to pick up theimport containers. Therefore, one wouldexpect high land productivity whenlabour is cheap and land is expensive.

Quantity of equipment

To ensure the smooth operation of aterminal the amount and number ofequipment may be critical. For example,consider the cycle time for lorries at acontainer terminal arriving to pick up animport container.

Note that for the conditions on thismodel terminal, having only 15 straddlecarriers produced chaos, whereashaving more than 20 made little

difference to the smooth running of theterminal. The improvement inproductivity is not a linear improvementthat gradually increases with the amountof equipment but that there are criticalpoints below which smooth efficientoperation becomes almost impossible.

Public user v privatededicated terminals

If demand for terminals is uncorrelated itwill probably be in everyone’s interestfor the port to develop well equippedpublic user terminals rather than a string

of under-utilised private dedicatedterminals.

Berth Size and Layout

Figure 25: Conventional breakbulk generalcargo berth

As mentioned in Chapter 2, 1960’s docktransit sheds were about 500ft × 120ft,and were now built with high roofs toaccommodate fork lift trucks whichcould stack high, easily and cheaply.

In 1922 a typical long pier system(1,000ft long) might have had transitsheds partly owned by city and partlyprivate. The sheds were 120ft wide and900ft long, with two floors—upper forincoming, lower for outgoing. Note:London and Liverpool had more spacefor cranes due to their dock system. TheNew York piers were too narrow forcranes and the port also had water depthproblems. It had to dredge a 40-ft

channel in 1922 to cope with new largeliners. New York had no railway systemlike other US ports.

In 1924 Albert Dock had transit sheds120ft wide, 300–350ft long, doublestorey and single storey. It also hadspecial cold stores for meat cargoeswith mechanical lowering conveyors.

Figure 26: General layout of a containerterminal

When considering the basic layout ofa container terminal the operationalproblems have to be considered,therefore the actual layout of a terminalwill depend on the equipment used. Forinstance, on a container terminal, thelayout and optimum shape and sizewould depend on whether a yard had agantry crane system, a straddle carriersystem, a front-end loader system ortractor/chassis system was used.

Figure 27: Traffic paths

As each type of system has its ownmanoeuvring and stackingcharacteristics, the number of containersallowable in a row and the minimumdistance between the rows becomescritical. The preceding sketch shows the

basic layout patterns for the mostpopular types of systems.

Estimating land required forcontainer stacking area

AnnualThroughput Ty

DailyRequirement Dr Dr = Ty/365

Dwell Time Dt Expressed in daysor fractions of days

Peaking factor Pf An allowance forpeak conditions.Often assumed to

be 0.75.TEU ground areas= 15.25 m2

Stacking Area TGS Twenty-feet groundslots

StackingHeight Sh

TGS = (15.25 × Dr× Dt)/Pf/ShGlobal Yard Area/Total TGS Area = eTotal Container Stacking Area in m2 =Total TGS Area × eApproximatee factors for: StraddleCarriers

e =1.8

Transtainer e =1.3

FrontLoaders

e =3.9

ReachStacker

e =2.3

The optimum solution for a specific portwill depend on how the specificvariables for that port constrain the finalchoice, for instance, is there landavailable? For many ports it is less thanideal. Then again, has a large unskilledlabour force with a long traditionalworking culture been inherited, or isthere an opportunity to open up a newterminal and select the workforce?

Container shuffling

An inevitable expense incurred by themost efficient terminal is the necessity ofhaving to shuffle the containers withinthe stacks. Statistical analysis wouldindicate that a typical terminal couldexpect to shuffle 21% of the containersin the discharging (import) stacks, 9% ofthe containers in the loading (export)stacks and some 17% of the containersin the transit stacks.

Type of berth

Ro/Ro berth

This is usually one of the simplest typesof berths to construct. Apart from theloading ramp which may need to bereasonably sophisticated if the berthexperiences a significant tidal range,little expensive civil engineering isrequired because the loading weight perunit area is usually quite low. Further,there are usually few constraints ondesign other than those one would expectto find in a car park. As a car park itsposition does not of necessity have to beadjacent to the ship (though it very oftenis because if port labour is being used to

drive the cargo aboard, it reduces thelogistical problem of uniting driverswith their Ro/Ro cargo).

Many Ro/Ro berths will have alinkspan to unite the ship and berth.These are similar to mobile bridgesconnecting the quay to the ship. Theirlength must be sufficient to avoid thesteep slopes, which are incompatiblewith freight traffic. A slope of 13 to 14%is considered the maximum for roadvehicles and 3 to 4% for railwayvehicles. The main part of the linkspanis a pontoon on which a superstructuremay be built containing access lanes andramps. It may also be fitted with

automooring devices, which act on thebollards on the vessel thus eliminatingmooring ropes. The linkspan inGothenburg is also fitted with bunkerfacilities and water tanks with pumps. Italso has facilities for the collection ofsewage and bilge waste.

Passenger berth

A passenger berth needs virtually thesame requirements as an airport, i.e.tickets and information, toilets,cafeterias, shops, disabled access,security. If it is international, there will

need to be customs and immigrationfacilities. Also, as at an airport, thereshould be a covered and easy form ofaccess from the terminal on to thevehicle.

Cruise ship terminals

The leading cruise ship port at themoment is generally considered to beMiami, which reflects the importance ofthe USA home market to cruising and therelative nearness of the Caribbean.

The following table gives anindication of cruise port usage and

restrictions in the Baltic Region.

PortNo. ofvisits1995

Max.draft Restrictions

Copenhagen 240 10.0 NoneBergen 170 11.5 NoneTallin 150 9.0 270m lengthHelsinki 135 10.0 280m lengthSouthampton 128 12.0 NoneStockholm 125 9.4 300m lengthStPetersburg 120 9.0 None

Visby 120 8.0 None

Amsterdam 90 9.7 400m length,locks

Tilbury 71 10.0 None

Source: Seatrade Review, March 1995.

A Floating Cruise Terminal forLondon opened in 2004. It can handle600 passengers per hour.

In 2007 Peter Wild pointed out that aport that cannot handle the large cruiseships will lose out.

Dry bulk carrier berth

Large bulkers require deep water, largepowerful cranes and conveyor belts forstacking the cargo. A large flat stackingarea is required. Facilities for barge

trans-shipment are also often a feature.Dust is nearly always a problem withdry bulk cargo and where there arestrong prevailing winds this may giverise to environmental pollution.

Ship/shore liaison at bulkcarrier terminals

In 1998 the results of an internationalsurvey covering 1,000 reports fromships and terminals were published. Thereports covered 222 terminals in 46different countries. Many of the reportscontained adverse comments on some

aspects of loading and discharging. Bothships and terminals experiencedproblems. For example, a commoncomplaint from the ships was “loaded ustoo fast and we had to leave with ourballast on board”, while many terminalsreported “poor communications with theship, lack of interest from the crew whowere often asleep during the cargowork”. It was also noted that a numberof ships did not seem to use cargo plansat all, they would simply arrive at theterminal and say “We want 50,000 tons;fill her up”!

Most of the problems reported byships and terminals related to the

breakdown of communications andmutual understanding. Some 30% of shipreports considered the terminal interfaceunsatisfactory and that frequently therewas no terminal representative on sitewith authority to accept responsibility ortake decisions. On the other hand, aprincipal factor reported by loadingterminals was the slow discharge ofship’s ballast, which is not surprisingconsidering the numbers of ageingbulkers still trading.

Recommendations

— The IMO Draft Code of Practicefor the Safe Loading andUnloading of Bulk Carriers, asapproved by the 20th Assembly,should be complied with by bothship and terminal.

— Cargo loading rate never toexceed the agreed figure and anydeviation from this figure to beagreed in writing and appendedto the agreed loading plan.

— Terminals should sign andaccept the IMO approvedship/shore checklist.

The table above illustrates that majordry bulk terminals deal mainly with coaland iron ore, though many of them doalso handle other bulks. Also asexpected, with the exception ofRotterdam and Amsterdam, these highcapacity specialised terminals areexport terminals.

Tanker berth

Figure 28: Tanker berth

Tanker berths are often built on to jetties,as modern large tankers need deep

water. In most cases they do need to bejetties and not solid piers, which wouldin most cases encourage siltation. Thisdoes, however, make them relativelyfragile structures, so great care andpatience is necessary when berthing.When some of the jetties at MilfordHaven were built they were over 3,000ftlong. The 1970 cost for such a jetty wasover £5 million.

The connection of the ship’s pipelinesto the shore pipelines is obviously aweak link in the oil transfer and theyhave to be flexible enough to allow forship movement at the berth.

Because of the economies of using

large tankers, capacious storage spacenear the berth is necessary. At a loadingberth the shore tanks are usually higherthan the ship so that the oil can flow intothe tanker under the force of gravity.This is safer than pumping, as it avoidsthe risk of a build-up in pressure shouldthe tanker close a valve and impede theflow of oil.

To avoid any secondary transport ofcrude oil, the position of a tankerterminal and a refinery is usually acommon project.

Associated with an oil terminal onewould expect oil-reception facilities andenvironmental protection equipment

against oil spills such as “booms”, etc.The Oil Companies International

Marine Forum (OCIMF) lays downclear guidelines concerning safety andgood operating practices for tankerterminals.

Comprehensive information on all theworld’s tanker terminals is available ondisc compiled by Fairplay. Thiscontains all the up-to-the-minute datarequired by tanker brokers and tankeroperators such as berth length and depthof water alongside, tidal rise, BCM(bow to centre of manifolds), receptionfacilities, etc.

Figure 29: Distance from ship/shoreinterface to storage

General cargo and containers need tobe handled on and off the ship from anarea alongside the ship, whereas oilcould be pumped to or from the ship bypipeline to a tank which could, ifnecessary, be placed miles away.

Berth maintenance

It is axiomatic that the higher the degreeof sophistication of the equipment andautomation on the berth, the greater willbe the necessity of achieving a high levelof maintenance. Safety and maintenanceare obviously linked, and in cases ofport ownership, such as landlord ports,where the landlord is responsible for theinfrastructure and the terminal operatorfor the superstructure, there have beenknown to be fringe areas where theresponsibility for maintenance was notclear. In the early days of straddlecarriers they tended to incorporate a

great deal of hydraulics. These hydraulicparts needed a very high level ofmaintenance and in spite of this coveredmuch of the terminal with oil, whichconsiderably reduced safety levels inwet weather. Then there is the questionof who pays when the superstructuredamages the infrastructure. Further, intimes of cost-cutting, routinemaintenance tends to be one of the firstcosts to be cut.

Alternatives to Formal

Port Systems

For general cargo

Possibly most ports at some stage intheir development have loaded anddischarged to ships moored at anchor orto buoys with the use of barges.Although such a method reduces theport’s capital investment in deep-waterterminals the cargo handling tends to beslow, involves extra handling and ismore prone to be more susceptible tobad weather. Further, as the cargo

handling into barges usually has to bedone by ship’s gear each lift wouldnormally be limited to around 5 tons orless. There are exceptions to this andHong Kong has shown that containers ofall weights and sizes can be easilyhandled by their purpose-built heavy liftbarges.

A modern development of this whichis in use for bulk cargoes and sometimesreferred to as logistic outsourcing is thefloating terminal. For example, asreported in Lloyd’s List in October1998, the port of Bahrain uses a self-unloading Panamax vessel, the BulkGulf, which lightens the 170,000

Capesize vessels laden with iron orepellets some 40nm out at sea. The BulkGulf is fitted with four cranes, whichguarantees fast operation and reliability.The choice between floating terminal orfloating crane tends to be dependent onthe various constraints involved, e.g.whether shallow barges are necessary,the volume of throughput, the averageweather profile, etc. Floating terminalswill usually work out more economicalwith higher volumes of cargo throughput.Another advantage of such a floatingterminal is that they do not necessarilyhave to be a capital investment but couldbe chartered in on a variety of contracts

for short or long periods.Theoretically barge-carrying ships

such as the LASH system could dispensewith much of the traditional generalcargo port set-up. In theory the shipcould steam round in circles droppingoff “floating containers” and collectingothers while passing. It has also beensuggested that heavy-lift helicopterscould load and discharge the ship whileit was steaming along the coast!

Bulk (oil)

In the post-Second World War era with

tanker size and oil demand increasing,loading and discharging offshore indeeper water developed. In the earlydays the tankers were moored fore andaft to buoys and the oil pipeline hauledoff the seabed. In 1958 the concepts ofsingle point mooring (SPM) and singlebuoy mooring (SBM) were developed.These methods allow the tanker to takethe line of least resistance to the forcesof wind, wave and current by being ableto weathervane around the mooringpoint. This was a big improvement onthe previous method as the mooring ofthe tanker was much faster and as itreduces the stresses from wind, wave

and current, making it safer over a widerrange of severe weather conditions.ELSBM means Exposed Location SBM.Such systems although a cheaper optionthan developing terminals to handlelarge tankers still cost money. It wasreported in Asia Hub on November 1998that it is proposed to establish an SPM45km west of Karachi at a cost ofUS$40 million. In early 2006 SBMannounced that it had US$1.5 billionworth of orders for its systems.

Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP)is a deep-water oil port locatedapproximately 30.4km offshore. Itconsists of three SPMs and a pumping

platform complex, which pumps the oilashore. At this “port” there are no portcharges, immigration or customs.However, bunkering, stores and crewchanges can be arranged if required.

There are now numerous SBMs andSPMs all over the world though theyprobably peaked in the early 1980s. (In1983 there were about 250. In 1998there were around 180 ports that hadSBM or SPM facilities.) Since thenmany of their functions have been takenover by floating storage terminals andfloating production, storage andoffloading units.

Floating storage terminals (FSOs)

have been in operation since 1972 andfloating production, storage andoffloading units or “floaters” (FPSOs)are now becoming increasingly popularand more versatile. One of the firstFPSOs was a tanker converted for use atShell’s Castellon field in offshore Spainin 1977. Deadweight tonnage of“floaters” ranges from 52,000 to285,000.

With the growth of offshore oil fieldsand their development there has grownup a sophisticated technology associatedwith floaters. For instance, in 1998 wewere told that in the North Sea therewere five submerged turret loading

(STL) systems in operation. In thissystem a buoy is moored to the seabed.The buoy is pulled into and secured in amating cone in the bottom of the floater,thus mooring the vessel and establishinga means of oil transfer.

In 1971 the first SBM for loading ironore in slurry form was installed atWaipip in New Zealand. It was situatedone and a half miles offshore and couldload at 1,000 tons per hour.

The Keiyo Sea Berth is a hugefloating man-made islet designed for thehandling of oil, it is 470 metres long and54 metres wide. It lies seven kilometresoffshore from Sodegaura in Chiba-ken,

north-east of Tokyo. The Keiyo SeaBerth is linked to four oil refineries andhandles 25 million kilolitres of oil peryear. More than 100 oil tankers use theSea Berth facility during the course of ayear.

Legal considerations foroffshore terminals

The legal implications for offshoreterminals, floating terminals, floatingcranes, etc., can be very complex,depending on the factors and the nationallegal system involved. Is the asset, for

example, to be operated in internationalor territorial waters? Will the equipmentbe categorised as a vessel which wouldinvolve all the expensive considerationsof registration, manning, etc.

Port Logistics

As major gateways for maritime trade,many ports are taking advantage of theirstrategic position in the logistics chainby offering numerous additional value-added services. These not only addvalue to the cargo they handle but can

also greatly increase the prosperity ofthe port. They can include not only thetraditional port storage facilities but mayalso include setting up such services asdistribution and market preparationcentres.

Distribution centres

These have been coyly nameddistriparks by some ports, to include acollection of distribution centres. Inlandclearance depots (ICDs) or containerfreight stations (CFSs) have been part ofthe transport scene since the beginning of

containerisation where they act asconsolidating or receiving stations forless than container load (LCL) shippersand consignees. Many of these CFSswere located well out of the port in anattempt to avoid restrictions required bysome dock labour unions and to be betterplaced as regards road and railconnections.

The distribution centre is, however, avastly more sophisticated concept. Apartfrom simply stripping the container thegoods may be prepared directly for thecustomer. For example, goods may becombined with others, repackaged orreassembled and prepared for different

markets or brand-named outlets. In thecase of the Port of Blyth on the eastcoast of the UK, it is estimated that onlyabout 20% of the arriving containersdrive straight out of the port, the rest gointo one or other of the port facilities forunpacking, storage, repackaging orstacking onto pallets for onwarddistribution. These distribution centrescould be in the port but owned privately,or owned by the port, or owned by theport but located outside of the port. Inmany cases if a Freeport area exists theywould be located within the Freeport toavoid capital being tied up in exciseduty.

The limitations of the potential of adistribution centre are only those of thedecision makers in charge and the abilitywith which they apply logistic theory,marketing and the latest informationtechnology to the problem. It would be amistake, and it is a mistake oftenobserved on the part of management ingeneral, for a port simply to copy theactivities adopted by some of the leadersin this development such as Bremen orRotterdam. A port must exploit theconditions, culture and practices whichexist in its own region.

Chapter EightCargo and CargoHandling

Basic definitions for cargo stowage onthe ship—pre-shipment planning, thestowage plan and on-board stowage—cargo positioning and stowage onthe terminal—ship stresses andstability—developments in cargo

handling and terminal operation—containers—equipment—safety ofcargo operations—cargo security

Basic Definitions forCargo Stowage on theShip

Estivage (Fr.) packing closely—a modeof stowage by pressing or screwingcargo into the hold by means ofmachinery (American andMediterranean).

Stevedore from the Spanish estibador—packer. The term stevedore is fairlyuniversal but its precise meaning canvary from port to port. In London it usedto mean the person employed on the shipto stow the cargo. In the UK and in someother countries the term is no longerofficially used and the term docker ispreferred as it reflects the current viewthat those engaged in cargo handlingshould be flexible and be prepared toundertake any activity on the terminal.

Stevedoring. Joseph Conrad in hisMirror of the Sea writes of hisexperience at the end of the 19th century:

“Stevedoring, which had been a skilledlabour, is fast becoming a labour withoutthe skill. The modern steamship with hermany holds is not loaded within thesailor-like meaning of the word. She isfilled up. Her cargo is not stowed in anysense; it is simply dumped in her throughsix hatchways, more or less, by twelvewinches or so, with clatter and hurry andracket and heat, in a cloud of steam anda mess of coal-dust. As long as you cankeep her propeller under water and takecare, say, not to fling down barrels of oilon top of bales of silk, or deposit an ironbridge girder of five tons or so upon abed of coffee bags, you have done about

all in the way of duty that the cry forprompt dispatch will allow you to do.”This observation is interesting as inessence one has heard the same criticismfrom every chief officer over at least thelast century reflecting on how cargo usedto be stowed.

Dunnage is anything used to protect thecargo. There are two basic types ofdunnage:

(1) Permanent dunnage, which maytake the form of battens of wood,fixed to the side of the ship toallow air to circulate and to keepthe cargo off the cool sides of the

ship, where condensation couldtake place.

The bottom of the hold mayalso be covered with wood toreduce the risk of damage to bothship and cargo from any impactas the cargo is loaded, to assistventilation and to preventcontamination from any liquidsthat drain down to the bottom ofthe hold or leak through from thebunkers in the double bottoms.

(2) Non-permanent dunnage whichfor the most part consists ofplanks of soft wood but could beanything which is used to assist

ventilation and drainage, andstop the cargo moving, chafing,etc. This dunnage must of coursebe paid for, and for cargoesrequiring large quantities it canform a sizeable expenditure.

Angle of repose is the angle between thehorizontal plane and the cone slopewhen bulk cargo is emptied in to theship’s hold. Obviously the smaller theangle of repose, the greater the tendencythe cargo has to flow. It is recommendedthat when the angle of repose is less than35 degrees the cargo needs trimming(levelling out) and perhaps precautions

need to be taken against the cargoshifting.

Stowage factor. The stowage factor ofany commodity is the number of cubicfeet (cubic metres) which a ton (tonne)of that commodity will occupy instowage. This figure should include anallowance for broken stowage, e.g.:

Commodity ft3/tonm3/tonne Angle ofrepose

Pig iron 11.31 0.36

Iron ore 11–17 0.31–0.47 30–75

Bauxite 20–32 0.56–0.89

28–55

Scrap 20–40 0.56–1.11 45

Sand 11–28 0.5–0.98 30–52

Salt 29–40 0.81–1.12 30–45

Cement 23–29 0.67–1.00 8–90

Sulphur 27–36 0.74 35–40

Coal 40–55 0.79–1.53 30–65

Water 36 1.0 0

Wheat bulk 47–49 1.31–1.37 25

Wheat bags 52–54 1.45–1.5

Urea 47 1.17–1.56 28–45

Pet. coke 48–55 1.25–1.67 33–42

Pet. coke 48–55 1.67 33–42

Cannedgoods 55–60 1.53–

1.61

Wood chips 110–160

3.07–4.46 45

Espartograss 190 4.0

Cork 200 5.571 cubic metre per tonne = 35.8 ft3 per ton. 1cubic metre per ton = 35.3 ft3 per tonne

The purpose of the preceding table ofstowage factors is to show the rangefrom the heaviest types of cargo (pigiron) to one of the lightest (cork). Waterhas been included as it is the dividing

commodity. Those heavier areconsidered deadweight cargo, that is,they put the ship down to her loadlinemarks without filling the holds. Thoselighter are sometimes classified asmeasurement cargoes, that is, they fillthe holds but the ship is not down to herloadline marks. Dead-weight cargoesusually pay on weight whilemeasurement cargoes usually pay onvolume. Broken stowage. Space whichis lost to cargo because of the shape ofthe cargo, packaging, dunnage, shape ofcompartment, pillars, etc. For example,one of the effects of palletisation is toincrease broken stowage.

Therefore, to find the space requiredby any consignment the weight of thecargo is multiplied by the stowage factoror conversely the space divided by thestowage factor will give the weight thatmight be put in that space.

However, there are other factors thathave to be considered. For example, a20-ft container has about 32 cubicmetres but the amount of pig iron youcould load into it is not 32/0.31(the SFof pig iron). This would give you ananswer of over 100 tons, which youmight physically be able to put into thecontainer, but an ISO TEU is constructedto take only 20 tons. There are various

other legal weight limits, such as axleweights for road vehicles, etc., whichwill limit, say, the amount of pig ironyou can actually put into the container, aswell as the problem of broken stowage.

Pre-ShipmentPlanning, the StowagePlan and On-BoardStowage

Traditionally this has always been the

ship’s concern but over the last coupleof decades there has been a growingtendency for the stevedores and terminaloperators to become involved. Further,since the advent of containers, mostcontainer terminals will have facilitiesand the know-how in a depot for stuffingand stripping containers to service LCLshippers. This pre-shipment planning isimportant not only for the ship stowagebut also to plan the disposition of thecargo on the terminal.

The stowage plan may well have to beflexible as some containers may be latearriving and errors will be made in themovement of containers through the

terminal. An example quoted in Lloyd’sList in August 1998 for a large containership loading in the Far East indicatedthat around 10% changes in the stowageplan were necessary, mostly in the latterstages of loading. Such last-minutechanges can cause serious problems forthe ship’s officers as the stability ofcontainer ships needs to be carefullychecked and the ballast adjusted for anychanges in top weight.

Cargo Positioning and

Stowage on theTerminal

Traditionally for the cargo ship, a fairlyuniversal operation had developed. Atthe loading berth the export cargo for theship was assembled in the transit shedwith the cargo for each hold in the shipprepared longitudinally and laterally inthe shed. The ship’s chief officer and theforeman stevedore could discuss the finetuning and the system adjusted as thecargo was loaded in 2–5 ton units overthe following days and often weeks thatthe operation took.

With containerisation the same basicproblem exists but the volumes of cargopassing through the terminal per dayhave greatly increased, say by 10 to 20times. This increase in speed andvolume requires a better regulatedsystems approach by the terminalmanagement to avoid chaos, which in thepast could be avoided by an experiencedshed foreman using his common sense.

One of the major problems facing alarge container terminal’s management isreducing unproductive and expensivecontainer moves within the terminal.This is quite complex, as for instanceexport containers have to be sorted by:

(a) the ship;(b) the port of discharge;(c) the type of container, e.g. TEU,

FEU, Reefer, etc.;(d) the weight of the container into

heavy, medium or light; and(e) dangerous cargo.

To avoid cargo arriving too early atthe terminal, say more than a week inadvance, the terminal should have a wellorganised “calling forward” routine withthe shipper and consider a pricing policythat deters too early delivery.

For import cargo, consignees must beencouraged to collect their cargo quickly

and in developing countries,documentation and currency (payment)problems often add to the logistic ones.Where space is limited containers haveto be stacked high and, with a randomarrival of consignees to collect theircontainers, this is an area whereunproductive moves and delays caneasily occur. For a large busy terminalthis control is probably only possible bya computerised system with a goodsoftware package.

Ship Stresses and

Stability

Hogging and sagging

On long ships, such as very large tankersand bulk carriers those responsible forloading the ship have to take care toavoid straining the vessel’s hull. If toomuch weight is placed amidships thevessel will sag. As the vessel cannotsubmerge her loadline mark amidshipsshe will not be able to load her fullcargo.

If excess weight is placed at the ends

of the ship and not enough in the middlethe vessel may hog. If a vessel in such acondition were loaded with a fulldeadweight cargo, her loadline marksamidships would indicate she couldcarry more cargo. In the “bad old days”it is said that this was done deliberately.

With large modern vessels thisdistortion can be metres rather thancentimetres. Apart from the obviousstrain on the hull and the problemsalready mentioned it might also increasethe draft, which is often critical for largeships getting in and out of port.

Ships are fairly flexible structures andthe bending may not do much permanent

harm. If bent severely, however, the shipmay become permanently distortedwhich is undesirable from many pointsof view.

To help ship’s officers and thoseresponsible for making the necessarycalculations to avoid this bending theymust of course be supplied with thenecessary information, gadgets andcalculators.

Any such longitudinal stresses will beaggravated by the vessel pitching whenend on to the waves.

Stability

With smaller general-cargo ships theproblem of hogging and sagging is not solikely to be serious but that of stabilitycan well be.

Ship stability can be defined as theability of the ship to return to theupright when slightly inclined.Instability can result from too much topweight or conversely too little bottomweight. For the sake of argument,consider all the weight of the ship andcargo to act at a single point G (thecentre of gravity) and the upward forceof buoyancy to act at a single point B(the centre of buoyancy). Unless thecargo shifts, the point G will be fixed as

the vessel rolls. The point B on the otherhand will move out to the side as thevessel heels over. The point where theupward force of buoyancy cuts the centreline of the ship is known as themetacentre M. M can be consideredstationary for small angles of heel.

Note the difference between heel andlist. The vessel is said to list wheninclined because of an excess of weighton one side so the centre of gravity (G)is no longer on the centre line. A vesselheels when inclined by an external forcesuch as wind and waves.

Figure 30 shows a cross-section of aship inclined by external forces.

Figure 30: Cross-section of a ship inclinedby external forces

Without going into the mechanics of thesituation, it can be seen that as long as M

is above G the vessel is stable, i.e.returns to the upright.

If the cargo was loaded or bottomweight, such as bunkers used, so that Gmoves up above M it can be seen that theship becomes unstable. Should bychance G and M coincide, the vessel’sstability is neutral and the ship just lollsover at any angle she is moved to.

The ship’s GM, known as themetacentric height, is therefore ameasure of the ship’s stability.

The completion of loading of the shipwith a safe GM is a prime considerationto the ship’s officer and othersresponsible for stowing the cargo. With

large modern container ships the loadingplan of which the stability is an elementwill often form part of the terminalservice.

An empirical formula connecting GMand the ship’s period of roll T (T is thetime it takes to roll from starboard toport and back to starboard again) is:

GM = (0.8 Beam/T)2 or T = 0.8Beam/(GM)0.5

From this it can be seen that if GM issmall the period of roll becomes largeand the vessel is said to be tender.

As GM becomes larger the period ofroll becomes smaller and the vessel is

eventually said to be stiff, that is, theperiod of roll becomes excessively fast.

With fast vicious rolling the cargo ismore likely to shift, the ship to strainherself and the crew to be thoroughlyuncomfortable. (The 1986 IUMIConference noted the dangers of deckcargoes of logs shifting if the GM wastoo large.) There is also a greaterpossibility of “isochronous’’ rolling, i.e.the ship’s rolling getting into phase withthe passing waves and resulting inincreased rolling amplitude.

For example, assume a vessel of 23metres beam with a GM of 0.08 metres,0.6 metres and 5 metres respectively.

Then:

T = (0.8 × 23)/(0.08)0.5 = 65 secondsT = (0.8 × 23)/(0.6)0.5 = 23.8 seconds(about right)T = (0.8 × 23)/(5)0.5 = 8.2 seconds (toofast)

It can be seen that in this case a GMof about 0.6 metres would be a goodlevel of stability to aim for when loadingthe cargo, as 65 seconds would indicatethat the vessel is verging on instabilityand at 8.2 seconds the “accelerations”would be dangerous.

To reduce the amplitude of rollingthere are various expensive devices such

as fins which can be projected out of theside of the ship under water. They areautomatically tilted as the sea tries topush the vessel over and the vesselremains upright. Another method is touse liquid in tanks and cause it to flowquickly from one side of the ship to theother thus cancelling out the tendency toroll caused by the sea.

Another danger to stability is “slacktanks’’, that is, if liquids are allowed tosurge from side to side across the vesselwhile it is rolling. This causes a virtualrise of G with a consequent reduction instability. In tanks designed to takeliquids, wash-plates and bulkheads are

constructed to reduce this hazard but itcan be overlooked at such times forinstance as fire fighting, when water isfree to move across the decks. This isalso one of the major problems forRo/Ro vessels should water get into thecar decks.

Developments inCargo Handling andTerminal Operation

The key stages

Element Description Changes

1 Cargo toport

Cargo to ship—towarehouse—totransit shed—tocontainer stack.

2 Cargochecked

Less handling—larger units—less

checking.

3 Cargo madeinto set

The size of the setdepended on the

amount that couldbe placed on a

hand truck in onederrick cycle. Fordecades this size

remained about 30cwt until the

introduction of the

container.

4 Set movedto ship

See 1. Even withthe container the

crane/ship transferis perhaps themost criticalfeature of the

cycle.

5 Set hoistedaboard

Perhaps the oneunchanging

element exceptwith Ro/Ro.

6

Cargomoved

horizontallyin ship

As H.A.C.increases this

decreases. Withdedicated

container tonnagethis element

disappears.

7 Cargostowage

With breakbulkcargo this is a

highly individualpacking skill

which still existsin stuffing

containers but nolonger on the ship.

Historical changes in cargo-handling

Mechanisation

The dates and modes of operation givenin the following section are merelyindications of the methods that could befound employed in many major portsabout that time. The descriptions arelargely based on London. Until 1908London was really a collection ofprivate unregulated terminals, so that atany one time the practices adopted atone terminal or dock were often quitedifferent to those practised at otherterminals in the vicinity. However, theimportance of establishing preciselywhen things happened is not soimportant as identifying why the changesoccurred.

While the barrel remained the basicunit there was less need for mechanicalhelp. Nowadays it is often forgottenwhat a splendid transport unit the barrelwas. Even the larger ones, like the tun,could be rolled easily and safely alongany flat surface by one man with perfectcontrol.

1800–1850

This period also saw the introduction ofpowered mechanical handling, with thefirst major application being in the bulkhandling of coal. In 1813 coaling

equipment (coal drops) replaced packanimals when Whitehaven introduced asystem for tipping coal from ironwagons. A similar system was adoptedin the Tyne (500–600 wagonloads a day)a few years later.

In 1846 William Armstrong in hisnative Newcastle constructed the firsthydraulic crane that actually worked.This was so successful that he formedthe Newcastle Cranage Company.Orders were received from Liverpool,Glasgow, Birkenhead and Grimsby, andby 1858 Armstrong had sold 1,200cranes and hoists. Electrically poweredcranes were slowly introduced at the

end of the century, though manyhydraulic systems were still in use acentury later.

Steam cranes were also introduced;for example, by 1850 Hartlepool hadthree powerful steam cranes inoperation.

Mechanisation was implemented onlyat the newer bigger terminals and ran inparallel with the older manual systems.For instance, the Henry MayhewTreadmill crane with six to eight mentreading could lift up to one ton 27fthigh. It had a wheel 16ft in diameter,was 8 to 9ft wide and it could manage40 cycles an hour. There were still a few

treadmill cranes in use in the Port ofLondon in 1909.

Lloyd’s List 250th AnniversarySpecial Supplement which came out on17 April 1984 had the following shortdescription of coal jumpers, “whodischarged the thousands of collierswhich brought coal from the Northeast toLondon. The coal in the ship’s holds wasshovelled into large baskets which werehauled up to a chute which dischargedinto a lighter or barge alongside. Theweight of the basket was such that to liftit the coal jumpers had to do just whattheir name described—jump, on the endof a lifting rope, on to a staging slung

alongside the ship’s hull. Only thispowerful snatch would get the heavybasket of coal topside to be swayeddown the chute. Then they clamberedback aboard to do it again … andagain.”

1850–1900 (see also Chapter2)

An observation from the Factory andWorkshop Annual Report in 1899:

“… Two characteristic methods of loadingare:

(a) By hoisting the packages of goodsdirect from the quay and depositingthem in the ship’s hold (in oneoperation) by means of cranes,which either stand on the quay orare built on to the warehouse orsheds near the quay edge.

(b) By first hauling the packages up aninclined plane or ‘stage’ from thequay edge to a temporary platform,built on the deck at the side of thehatchway and then lowering thegoods into the hold by thesteamer’s own winches. When thevessel is sufficiently low in thewater the packages may be wheeledon trucks or trolleys along planksfrom the quay to the ship, or to thetemporary platform over the

hatchway … alternatively a floatingcrane might be used …

In some docks the goods before or afterloading are conveyed into sheds calledtransit sheds.… For loading coal twosystems are in use … one is at Staiths orwhat is known as the ‘drop’ system. Herethe wagons of coal are lifted bodily andswung over the ship’s hold and then tipped.Wagons intended for this method of coalingmust be provided with hinged ends doors orbottoms … Bunkering may be done byemploying men to carry baskets of coal onboard. Otherwise baskets, tubs (sometimeswith drop bottoms) or buckets … HoistingMachinery: hand windlass (only on thesmallest sailing vessels); steam cranesfound chiefly on coasting vessels; steam

winch which may be used with a derrickpole or without it.”

Development ofmechanisation in cargohandling

This growth in demand was met withincreased dock building and increasedmechanisation. In 1855 the VictoriaDocks were opened. This was the firstdock expressly built for steamships andthe first London dock to incorporatehydraulic machinery supplied by SirWilliam Armstrong.

The following table gives anindication of when some significantchanges took place:

Year Details

1852

First steam screw collier inLondon discharged with steamwinches. By the early 1870s thepower-driven winch wasbeginning to have a considerableimpact on methods of cargohandling.

1888

Hand trucks for goods from ship toshed considered the mostunskilled of dock labour. As 30cwt (1.5 tons) was the averageamount of goods that could bemoved to or from the crane by the

hand trucks in 2 to 3 minutes (atypical crane cycle time) thisbecame the standard lift for thecrane.

1890

Union Purchase introduced on theW. Coast of America. This wasmade possible by ships includingderrick posts (king posts), masttables and cross trees.

1900 576 hydraulic quay cranes in usein London but not fully utilised.

1900Electric cranes first used inLondon Docks replacing hydrauliccranes.

Bulk cargoes, mainly coal and grain,continued to improve their mechanised

systems and their productivity, e.g.:

1859Gravity Staith for loading rail coalwagons into ships on Tyne 420tph.

1870 Mechanisation for handling grainintroduced.

1880Average loading speed for bulkwas around 1,000 tons per day fordeveloped countries.

1888Grabs mentioned for discharge ofgrain in London as alternative tograin elevator.

1890

2–4 ton grabs introduced anddischarge speeds around 500 tpdwere achieved—reducing costs toa third over shovels and tubs. By1909 Hulett unloaders with 15-ton

grabs could discharge around12,000 tons in single shift.

1899

Appendix 12 of the Factories andWorkshops Annual Report for1899 says: "cargoes of grain inbulk are often discharged directinto granaries arranged on thedocks near to the quay side. Forthis work mechanical elevators orpneumatic suction elevators byengines either in the granary orplaced temporarily on the ship'sdeck for that purpose. With suchapparatus there is very littlemanual work needed as themachine deposits the grain onmechanical conveyors in thegranaries, one or two machines

taking the place of a large staff ofporters."

Much of this new era ofmechanisation seems to have passed thesailing ships by, and they continued toload and discharge at berths making fewconcessions to the new developmentsavailable. This is illustrated by thefollowing extracts from diaries andmemoirs written during this period.

From the diary of an apprentice on asmall brigantine written in 1877 (partpublished in Port of London Magazine,Winter 1977): “The weather cleared offand it was on a hot day that we hauled

alongside (SW Dock London) to load.The bags of grain were sent down ashoot from the upper warehouse to thedeck of the vessel. I stood on the pitch,which had been made by the first bagssent down, and I received them from theman on the deck. I had a cotton hook inone hand to fix into the bags, placing myother arm round them on the pitch in sucha manner that the men in the hold couldtake them on their backs and stow themat each end.”

Henri Kummerman writing in theFairplay Centenary Issue, 19 May1983, about the period 1880: “Many ofthe sailing ships relied entirely on

manual cargo-handling, with only asimple block and tackle on the loweryard with another over the hatch, workedby a hand winch—though horses,donkeys or mules sometimes providedthe muscle power. A few of the largersailing ships were equipped with adonkey boiler on deck and one or twosteam winches which could be used notonly for cargo-handling but also forworking the anchor windlass and pumps.Nevertheless, time spent in portremained much longer than for steamship—typically 40 days versus 10 days.”

Direct benefits for cargo handlingfrom mechanisation during this period

seemed to be a matter of reducing labourcontent and costs rather than increasingproductivity. This is probably true forthe smaller ship with small hatchopenings. However, cargo-handlingspeeds during the latter part of thenineteenth century are full of paradoxesas it seemed to be a period when the“hustler” could achieve extremely highspeeds. One can, for instance, findfigures for some ships, particularly mailships, which achieved breakbulk cargo-handling load/discharge speeds rarely ifever bettered in any later period. Forexample, in evidence given to the SelectCommittee on Sweating in 1888 one ship

was described as discharging 3,400 tonsof bagged wheat in London in 22 hours,which gives 38.6 tons per hatch perhour. Another vessel, the HawardeCastle, discharged 200 tons in 14 hours(48 men), which gives 35.7 tons perhatch per hour.

1900–1970

During this period there were fewdramatic developments in cargo-handling techniques. The typical cargoship increased only slightly in size, andthe cargo-handling equipment and

techniques were refined. With the onsetof containerisation in the 1960s,considerable efforts were made toimprove the productivity of thebreakbulk general cargo handling by theuse of pallets and pre-slinging, etc., andthe introduction of hybridcrane/derricks. It remained a verylabour-intensive activity.

Many working in smaller ports aroundthe world will probably still be able torelate to the breakbulk cargo handlingfigures shown for 1964.

1970 to the present

By 1970 the split of cargo into bulkcargo and containerised cargo was wellestablished through much of the world.This not only dramatically increasedcargo-handling speeds but alsodrastically reduced port labourrequirements.

By the early 1990s we had seen the

development of virtually completelyautomated terminals, such as the ECTterminal at Rotterdam and at Thamesportat London, where the cargo istransferred from shore to ship bymachine. Bulk liquid terminals have longbeen operated by a single controller anddry bulk terminals are now alsooperated by a minimum number ofpersonnel.

Dry bulk cargoes can be handled as acontinuous process by pouring the cargointo the ship and discharged usingcontinuous unloaders, such as bucketconveyors or conveyor spirals feeding aconveyor belt system on the terminal.

Grain has been sucked out for over acentury. Slurry is a term for a mixture ofsmall solid particles in liquid (oftenseawater). Although coal had beentransported in slurry form by pipelinefor some time, its use for loading shipswith coal and iron ore did not seem tostart until the 1970s. Furtherdevelopments in handling commodities“like liquids” were also pursued as inblowing cement through pipes.Alternatively, dry bulks can bedischarged by grabs, and large moderngrabs can grab in excess of 50 tonnes abite and have a cycle time of less thanone minute. The advantage of grabs is

that they are very versatile and can beused for virtually any dry bulk cargo.Most of the continuous unloaders arecargo specific.

Benchmarking qualitystandards

One of the major developments intransporting cargo over the last fewyears has been the increasingly highspecifications required by manyshippers, particularly as regardsfoodstuffs and the precise and oftenexpensive equipment available to

measure contamination. For instance,sulphur dust blown over half a mile fromone terminal in a port to another terminalloading soya beans would have probablygone unnoticed a decade or so ago but in1996 caused the soya cargo to becondemned. This new quality analysisequipment, which can be veryexpensive, allows a new level ofbenchmarking for quality standardsrequired by ports for their cargohandling and storage.

Containers

Growth of containerisation

Figure 31: Growth of containerisation

Globally containerised cargo accountedfor around 54% of worldwide trade ingeneral cargo in 2000. It had been 48%in 1995 and 37% in 1990. Some of theleading container ports are graduallyverging onto the 100% level for

containerised general cargo.

Stuffing containers

In general the same principles ofstowage and the same problems ofcarriage exist for cargo loaded into acontainer as for cargo loaded directlyinto a ship’s hold. The advantages ofloading into a container are that it can bedone under cover in relative comfort andsafety and if there are any delays theseneed not necessarily involve the shipthat will carry them. Further, as there area variety of ships for certain types of

cargo, i.e. refrigerated cargo and fruit,so there exist a variety of containers.

All containers have security points setinto the floor, doorway and corner posts,but, in addition, the majority havearrangements of securing points in thesidewalls. The floor of the container isusually covered with wood (dunnage).

Facts concerning containers

Technically, containers are governed bythe International Standards Organisation(ISO) and the Container SafetyConvention (CSC).

In 1968 ISO defined a container as an“Article of Transport Equipment”which:

— is of permanent character;— is intermodal;— is easily handled;— is easily filled and emptied; and— has an internal volume greater

than one cubic metre.

An ISO container has therefore standardsize, standard strength and standardlifting facilities.

It is this latter point which to my mindis the really significant factor whichdifferentiates the present container

revolution from previous attempts atputting things into standard sized units.

The CSC was set up by IMO inSeptember 1977. The need for this wasprobably that by 1977 many containershad been around for several years andthat accidents were starting to happen.Container doors were falling off,bottoms falling out during lifts, etc. In1984 the CSC safety plate came intoforce. This is a plate fitted to thecontainer door, showing its initialapproval and plating and when it waslast surveyed. Under the CSC, containershave to be regularly surveyed in asimilar manner to ships.

The life expectancy of a containerdepends on many factors but on averageis about eight years. However, onaverage one of those years will be spentout of service for repairs.

The top five leasing companies controlabout 75% of the containers availablefor leasing. This is not surprising as a

container leasing company must virtuallyof necessity have a large, internationaloperation. A typical rental rate for astandard TEU in 2000 was US$0.75 perday.

Tank containers are available for thecarriage of various bulk liquid cargoes.The tanks are supported within standardISO steel frames and are equipped withhatches to allow access for cleaning.Some are fitted with heating facilitiesand may also be suitable for the carriageof hazardous cargo.

World containerAverage price for

a container in

production 2002 2001

TypeNumbers

(1,000TEUs)

Type Price inUS$

Dryfreight 2,212 TEU 1,850

Reefer&specials

160 FEU 2,960

Tank 12 FEU HC 3,150Regionaltypes 96 Reefer

TEU 14,500

The problem of empty

containers

In 1997 the ports of the world handled134 million loaded TEUs and 33 millionempty TEUs. This means that of the totalnumber of containers moved throughoutthe world some 20% were empty. Thispercentage figure has been constant forsome time and is predicted to continuewell into the future. In 2003 the globalpercentage of empty containers beingmoved across the oceans was estimatedto be 16%.

Gang size

Gang size depends on type ofcommodity, type and design of ship, typeof equipment available, local workingpractices and union agreements.

As the table on page 151 under theheading of Gang size clearly shows, thegang size working in the hatch on abreakbulk vessel has remainedremarkably constant over the last centuryand, in most countries, that issomewhere between 10 and 15 persons.It is in the reduction in the shore gangfrom around 80 men in 1880 to zero atan advanced container terminal in the1990s that one sees the most dramaticshrinkage in labour requirements.

Figure 32: London—cargo tons v dockers

This graph shows that the reduction inlabour per ton of cargo has been a fairlyconstant feature of port cargo handlingover the last century. It did not, however,occur only with the advent of containers.

Equipment

Lifting and cargo-handling equipmenthas developed its own jargon andtechnical vocabulary and although mostport managers are familiar with thebasic shipping terms, many finddifficulty conversing at the sametechnical level on lifting gear. Thefollowing section has been included tohelp those with such difficulties.

Cranes

A machine for raising and loweringheavy weights, in its usual form itconsists of a vertical post capable ofrotating on its vertical axis, a projectingarm or jib over which passes a rope orchain from which the weight issuspended, and a barrel round which thechain or rope is wound.

Crane and derrick definitions

(Based on British Standards Glossary ofterms used in materials handling.) SeeFigure 33 opposite.

In 2005 Rotterdam had 159

multipurpose cranes, 92 gantry cranes,58 bulk cranes, 25 floating cranes, 10sheerleg cranes and 47 tugs.

1991 UNCTAD/Ship/494(9)Notes on cranes

Multipurpose heavy lift cranes havecapacities ranging from 25 to 40 tons.They are usually rigged to handle heavyloads and containers with a main hook,and lighter unitised loads with anauxiliary hook. They handle bulk cargowith a grab, and sheet steel and the likewith an electro-magnet.

Figure 33: Types of cranes

Maximum reach: although 1,500-TEUcontainer ships have a beam of only31m, a small increase is desirable toenable the crane to handle 13 rows ofcontainers (Panamax beam), whichrequires a reach of 32.5m from the edgeof the wharf.

A mobile crane is specificallydesigned for port use and is differentfrom the self-propelled crane or cranemounted on a road vehicle. Mobilecranes are of great use in multipurposeterminals since they can be used to loadand unload ships and also to handle

heavy loads in the terminal cargo-handling areas. On the other hand, theirinitial and maintenance costs are twicethose of conventional cranes andpositioning takes time.

Crane requirements

In 1992 a sample containing severalmajor ports gave the following averagefigures:

(a) Berth length/number of cranes =350 metres where v/l capacity<1,500 TEUs

(b) Berth length/number of cranes =130 metres where v/l capacity>1,500 TEUs

Cost of cranes and equipmentCost in

US$ Equipment

100,000 Tug Master and three trailers(1990 UNCTAD/Ship/494(9)

600,000 12-ton crane (1990UNCTAD/Ship/494(9)

600,000 Straddle carrier (1990UNCTAD/Ship/494(9)

900,00016—20-ton crane (1990UNCTAD/Ship/494(9)

1,750,000 Multipurpose crane (1990

UNCTAD/Ship/494(9)

2,250,000 Mobile crane (1990UNCTAD/Ship/494(9)

Handling equipment developmentDate Details—lifting—transporting—stacking

1888Hand trucks for goods from ship to shed,considered the most unskilled of docklabour.

1908 Electric conveyor used to move bales ofjute from ship to transit shed.

1920 1920–1930 introduction of conveyors forcoal and bananas.

1922 Electric truck for meat cargoes.1930 Forklift trucks in use in US.

1940 Straddle carriers in use in USA.

1951 ICHCA formed.

1991 UNCTAD/Ship/494(9)Notes on equipment

Three types of trailer are used to movecontainers in a terminal.

(1) Low platform trailers which arebest suited to Ro/Ro operation.Over long distances the lowspeed due to small wheels is ahandicap, as is the need to securethe gooseneck coupling withchains. They have the advantage

of being able to be stacked whenempty.

(2) Normal height trailers—similarto those for road use but simplerand sturdier, with no suspensionor extra connections.

Figure 34: Some of the many varietiesof cargo gear available from aspecialist stevedore supplier

(3) Hydraulic lift trailers—whichhave the advantage over the othertwo types of not needing amachine to load them. Ahydraulic lift raises the cargo butcannot be used for stacking.

MachineCapacitym2/TEU TEU/hectare

Manninglevel for

FLT and SLT 60 275 Medium

RSC 30

STC and MPC 25 385

RTG and RMG 25 750 Medium

Tractor/chassis 180

FLT (Front Lift Truck): theworkhorse of the multipurpose berth asit can both lift and carry cargo. Can varyin lifting capacity from 2 to 40 tons.

SLT (Side Lift Truck): hascapabilities similar to the FLT but lessversatile. Carrier Truck: self-propelled

and capable of stacking up to threecontainers.

RSC (Reach Stacker Crane):performs similar functions to those ofFLTs and SLTs and can stack containersin blocks of four rows four containershigh.

MPC (Mobile Portal Crane): canperform the functions of an FLT, an RSCand the straddle carrier. Its purchaseprice and maintenance costs are betweenthose of an FLT and a straddle carrier.

STC (Straddle Carrier): it offers highflexibility but the purchase price andmaintenance costs are high. Also theload imposed on the pavement is heavy.

Earlier hydraulic models in the 1970swere notoriously unreliable, and the oilleaks on the pavement made the surfacevery slippery. Six STCs wereconsidered necessary to feed each ship-shore crane.

RTG and RMG (Rubber Tyre andRail Mounted Gantries): highlyspecialised pieces of equipment withhigh stacking capability. Well adapted tohighly organised operations but rarelyseen on multipurpose terminals. Lowmaintenance costs.

Stacking Density for containers bythese machines is given in m2/TEU.

TEU/Hectare: measure of land

utilisation

Equipment purchase,maintenance and control

Purchase, maintenance and control arenot separate issues. For instance, thepurchase price and maintenance costshould be considered as one cost whenconsidering the purchase of newequipment.

The new price should not be the mainargument. Rather life cycle costing or theinitial cost plus the lifetimemaintenance cost should be the figure

considered when comparing the meritsof different equipment. Experience hasshown that lifting equipment doesrequire a high level of maintenance andin the early days of straddle carriers itwas not unknown, even at sophisticatedterminals, for 50% of the vehicles to beout of action. Modern straddle carriersare considerably more reliable but ahigh standard of scheduled maintenanceis necessary.

It is fairly obvious that goodmaintenance avoids delays and thereforesaves money. It reduces accidents andthe subsequent claims and litigation. Itwill also almost certainly prolong the

life of the vehicle. To achieve a highlevel of maintenance requires a highlevel of training, which should beregarded as an investment rather than aquestionable cost. One port in adeveloping country did a cost–benefitanalysis concerning training costs in thisarea and discovered that for every dollarinvested the port saved five dollars inlost revenue.

A well-organised procedure to ensureadequate spare parts are kept in stock isimportant, as surveys of ports,particularly in developing countries,have shown that delays have toofrequently been caused by the lack of

spare parts. The delay in obtaining theparts was often not an engineeringproblem or a transport problem butpermission to spend the foreign currencyproblem.

There are also differing opinions as towho should control the equipment.Should the equipment be in the control ofthe engineers who supply it to the cargohandlers as required or should it beunder the control of the cargo handlerswho call on the service of the engineerswhen maintenance is required?

A great deal of modern cargo handlingequipment is sold with a datacommunications and diagnostic system

linking the equipment directly to themanufacturer’s service headquarters.Early warning signs can therefore beanalysed and possible faults predictedbefore they develop into cost and time-consuming breakdowns.

Safety of CargoOperations

Dockers’ safety

Up until the middle of the nineteenthcentury, safety was very much theindividual’s own problem, but about thattime public concern brought in the startof legislation which has developed intoone of modern management’s majornightmares concerning liabilitiestowards employees. The Employers’Liability Act had come in around the1850s. This introduction of liability toemployees was one of the reasons forthe introduction of P&I clubs at aroundthe same time. By the end of the centuryin London, married dockers off sickwere paid 8 shillings a week and singlemen 5 shillings a week. A case was

cited where one man seriously injuredwas given £125 compensation to set up ashop.

Safety development

Year Details

1888E & W India Docks reported onefatal accident and 104 otheraccidents.

1932

ILO Convention 32. ConventionConcerning the Protection againstAccidents of Workers Employedin Loading or Unloading Ships.

1934British Docks Regulations based

on ILO Convention 32.

1950 52 fatal and 5,970 total accidentsin UK ports.

1960 38 fatal and 7,130 total accidentsin UK ports.

1976 UK—26 reportable injuries per100.

1979ILO Convention 152. Health andSafety in Dock Work, e.g. safetyhats, high visibility clothing, etc.

1988 UK Docks Regulations—based onILO Convention 152.

1992

The Ports' Safety Organisation(PSO) was set up to carry on thehealth and safety services to theports of Britain and Ireland,formerly provided by the British

Ports' Federation. Membership:82 ports and port companies.Represents the industry indiscussions with governmentdepartments. Collates statistics.

1993 UK—six reportable injuries per100 whereas 26 per 100 in 1976.

1994UK ports have 43 full-time safetyofficers whereas in 1966 therewere only two.

1999

The IMO introducedrecommendations on safety ofpersonnel during containersecuring operations in a MSCCircular. These recommendationshave been found necessary due toa number of fatal accidentsinvolving falls from the top of

containers during securing andunsecuring operations.

2005

The annual accident rate for directbusiness in UK ports is estimatedto be 1.2% per 100 employees.The accident rate for otherbusinesses in ports is 0.5%.

The UK Safety and Health Commissionpublication Safety in Docks—DocksRegulations 1988 and Guidance, isquite a comprehensive documentcovering planning, lighting, access,emergencies, hatches, ramps and cardecks, driving, vehicles, lifting plant andits use—examination and marking,

record keeping of safety equipment,protective clothing, etc. Appendix 1 ofthe document lists over 50 separateitems of legislation relevant to healthand safety in dock operations. Thispublication is a Code of Practice whichhas been prepared following discussionsbetween the Confederation of BritishIndustry, the Trade Union Congress,other government departments and theHealth and Safety Executive.

Codes of safe practice for liftingequipment are produced by ICHCA;Lloyd’s Register of Shipping and theChain Testers’ Association.

On UK registered ships it is usual for

the chief officer to keep the ChainRegister, which is a comprehensiverecord of all tests made to the ship’slifting equipment. In some ports of theworld the stevedores’ union may wish toinspect such records before using theship’s gear.

Dangerous cargo

The IMDG Code and other codes asindicated in Chapter four do givespecific detail as to any particularrequirements needed in the handling ofdangerous cargoes.

Safety of cargo

Safety of cargo through ports is,however, seldom covered or mentionedby the ports for obvious reasons. Globalaverage statistics are produced andpublished by the major P&I clubs whichdo provide some guidance as regards anorm. For instance, the UK P&I clubshows that for the years 1987–1990 theaverage for major cargo claims (i.e.claims over US$100,000) were:

— 23% due to bad stowage;— 8% due to bad handling;— 2% due to fraud; and

— 1% failure to collect cargo.

Cargo Security

Theft

Another problem, which has alwaysfaced transport terminals, is securityfrom theft. In 1798 in the Port of Londontheft had reached epidemic proportions,so the Thames River Police wereinstituted, and they were in fact the firstpolice force in the country. P. Colquhoun

in his Treatise on the Commerce andPolice of the Thames (1800) estimatedthat of the 36,000 men working in theport, a quarter were given to plunder andpilfering: “and ever hovering in theirpunts and bum-boats were theprofessionals: 100 river pirates; 200night plunderers of barges; 200 ‘light-horsemen’—night plunderers of ships;550 receivers and 200 mudlarksscavenged greedily along the shore.”

Transport terminals where valuablegoods are stored have always beenobvious targets for criminal elements insociety and this problem is oftenreflected in the architecture of cargo

terminals. The early London Docks werebuilt adjacent to the Tower of Londonand did not look out of place with theirhigh walls and defended entrances.

With the advent of containerisationand the mass movement of high valuegoods, theft has become an even greaterproblem. At the Port of New York at thepresent time, losses are estimated to bein the region of a billion dollars a yearand as experience shows that less that50% of losses are reported, the actualfigure may well be much higher. On aworld-wide level, cargo crime in 1999cost the transport industry between$30bn–$50bn.

One of the problems in this areafacing port management is that toincrease security may well involve areduction in productivity, increaseddelays and increased costs.

If the port is a Free Port then therewill be the added problem of customssecurity.

Drug control

Lloyd’s List in April 1997 stated that theUSA called for greater international co-operation in regard to drug smuggling incontainers. The British Ports’

Association and HM Customs andExcise have a co-operation pact whichprotects against offences involving theuse of port transport and cargo-handlingfacilities.

Because of the heavy fines imposedon shipowners if drugs are discovered inany containers carried on that ship,shipowners have been known towithdraw their services entirely from theload port. If the shipowner concerned isa major international carrier the loss ofsuch a customer could be catastrophicfor the port.

Warehouse technology

Much new technology is available forwarehouse operation. Among the mostimportant developments are automaticstacking and retrieving devices,computerised cargo locator systems,narrow aisle automated pallet movers,deep shelf conveyors. This increase inproductivity in the warehouse and transitshed is of course a vital part of the totalberth cargo throughput.

Chapter NinePort Labour

Labour development—how dockerswere employed—how dockers werepaid—unions—numbers employed—labour v technology—how labour ismanaged

Labour Development

To understand the tensions that havetraditionally existed betweenmanagement and labour within mostdock systems it is necessary to see howlabour practices have developed inports. Unions have long memories,particularly in industries that draw theirlabour from a closed community andsons follow fathers into the same sphereof activities. In the late 1960s the authorremembers overhearing a bitterdiscussion among London stevedoreswhich made frequent pointed references

to the “dockers tanner” strike. I assumedfrom the conversation that this hadhappened only months previously andwas astonished to learn that this strugglehad taken place in 1889.

As most ports since, say 1800, havehad basically the same labour problems,the same general pattern of developmentcan be recognised almost universally. Itis important that management considersthis development as traditionallymanagement has not been drawn fromlabour but has entered from other areasof commerce and industry and many ofthe mistakes made by management havestemmed from their lack of

understanding of labour’s perception ofthe problem.

Around 1800

Cargoes were usually loaded anddischarged on and off the ship by thecrew, though the Master or agent couldemploy extra labour if they needed orwished to. The cargo would be handledmanually, though tackle often seems tohave been used to lift the cargovertically out of the hold onto the ship’sdeck. It is, however, interesting to notethat John Pudney in his book, London

Docks, notes that towards the end of the1700s the London watermen opposed theuse of cranes. These would of course behand-operated cranes since hydraulicand steam cranes were still in theirtheoretical or experimental stage.

However, although this had not been adynamic period of changes for ports,efforts were beginning to improve portfacilities. For instance, in 1780 the HullDock Company developed a 2-horsepower operated dredger capable ofshifting 22 tons per hour.

1800–1850

In 1802 the West India Dock was thefirst enclosed dock in London ascompared to a riverside wharf. Theseenclosed docks, which were appearingin the ports of the world, were run bycompanies which were able to bring in anew level of organisation into thedockside procedure. Many of themstarted to organise the labour so themodern idea of dockers could be said tostart around this period. In Liverpool,for instance, the dock committee tooksteps to introduce a system of masterporterage and appointment wasregularised. Before that consignees wentdown to collect their own goods.

Mechanisation was only at the newerbigger terminals and ran in parallel withthe older manual systems. This is thesame as a modern port which will havesophisticated container terminals witholder terminals still dealing withbreakbulk vessels.

1850–1900

One of the greatest problems facingemployers of labour in ports is the short-term fluctuation in demand, i.e. shiparrivals. These fluctuations were worsein the days of sail when adverse winds

could hold ships off the port for days oreven weeks. Records for fourconsecutive weeks in 1861 at Londonshow the ship arrivals to be 42, 131,209 and 21. With fluctuations like theseit is not surprising that employers soughtrefuge in casual labour. There were,however, some permanent men inLondon, and the casual employeesseemed to have been split into apreferred group who were selected first,and then the rest. There were also manyspecialised groups of porters, of whichdeal porters and corn porters seemed tohave been at the top of the heap.

In 1872 the first dockers’ union was

established in the UK, though in the earlydays only a relatively small percentageof the labour force seems to have joined.Among the union’s first improvements tothe working conditions was to put an endto the 12-hour day and to introduce theeight- or nine-hour day. However, onestill reads accounts of men workingincredibly long hours.

In 1888 the Select Committee onSweating give the followinginformation: Gang size for 5,000 GRTship is 10 per hold, with four holds therewould be 40 dockers in total on the shipbut 300 men on the quay. For mail shipsthere would be perhaps 60 dockers on

the ship, as they wanted a fasterdischarge. There was a clear distinctionbetween shipboard workers and thoseworking ashore, probably due to thedays when ships discharged at anchorinto barges. Working hours were 8 am to6 pm during the period 1 March to 31October, and from 7 am to 5 pm for therest of year. This seemed to beconsidered an eight-hour working day.Men were paid 5d (£0.02) an hour, 6d(£0.025) for overtime. For steamships,especially mail ships, the gang wouldwork 22–24 hours continuously (thesame gang).

In 1889 there was the great strike of

“the dockers’ tanner” which started on14 August and ended on 16 September.Although it was not a very long strike itwas very bitter and soured docker–management relations for over a century.Following the strike there were movesto improve labour conditions. A, B andC men were introduced (see HowDockers were Employed, on page 146),as were paid holidays, sick pay and apension at 70. (In 1911 pensions were£0.25 a week.)

In 1888 the Report from the SelectCommittee on Sweating gives acomprehensive insight into theoperational working of the London

Docks for that moment in time, withemployers, union officials and dockworkers being cross-examined asregards the working practices of themoment. Most seem to takemechanisation (cranes) for granted in thedocks (though not on the smaller riverwharves) and some made wistfulcomments about how good it was 15 orso years ago before the cranes broughtunemployment and lower wages into thedocks. Comments were also madeconcerning the growth in the number ofsteam tugs which had done much to evenout the ship arrivals, hitherto sodependent on the wind to manoeuvre

upriver. The growth in the numbers ofsteamships was also noted, as well asthe fact that they were nearly all gearedand needed little extra equipment towork cargo. Sailing vessels, on the otherhand, were seldom at berths with cranesand would often need a barge with aportable steam winch and boiler. Manywere questioned as to the numbersworking in the dock and answers variedfrom 200,000 down to about 30,000.Tillett, the union official, reckoned about100,000. The difficulty in arriving at acorrect figure is caused by casual labourwhere virtually anyone who could makeit to the call could be employed.

Different people included and excludeddifferent groups. Many, for reasons I donot understand, excluded deal and cornporters. The wages in London werereckoned to be lower than most otherports due to the over-supply of labour. InBristol, for instance, the average weeklywage was reckoned to be 13s comparedto 7s in London. However, it wassuggested that, 16 years before, theaverage weekly wage was 25s.

Labour developmentsbetween 1900 and 1920

Date Details

1912 London Dock Strike, 10 weeks—ended 24th July

1919Until 1920 Saturday was a normalworking day—now a half-day.ILO formed.

1920 Dockers' wage comparable at lastto workers in other industries.

19301930s: low wages caused by theDepression preventedmodernisation.

1933

Dispute reported in BIMCOJournal concerning disputes inCanada on the use of ship'swinchmen with shore stevedores.NB:This argument recurred in1990s.

1934UK Stevedores' NationalAgreement—stevedores' pay cut3.75%.

1941National Dock Labour Board setup and put on a permanent basis in1947. See next table.

Post Second World War

Date Details

1962

Number of piecework rates inLondon reduced from 4,300 to240. See section on How Dockerswere Paid.As a result of Lord Devlin's

1967

Report, what was known asDevlin Stage 1 was introduced inthe UK. As a result of this, casuallabour was abolished and dockersguaranteed a weekly wage, thoughthis was paid to them via theDocks' Board. In 1970 DevlinStage 2 was introduced. Thismeant each man worked for aspecific employer and manyrestrictive practices wereremoved. One immediate effectwas to reduce the number ofemployers of dock labour (400employers prior to 1967—after1967 only a few remained). NewYork decasualised in 1954, NewZealand 1965, Sweden 1967,

Dublin 1971.

1967Eight-week strike in Londonmainly concerning the introductionof container technology.

1970

25% drop in productivity inLondon after Devlin Stage 2introduced. This was because thefinancial incentive offered bypiecework rates was replaced bya fixed weekly wage.

How Dockers wereEmployed

Ports have always suffered from themajor transport problems of “peaks”. Inthe days of sail an off port wind couldhold a queue of ships outside the port.Then when the wind changed they wouldall arrive together. For instance, asmentioned previously, in fourconsecutive weeks in 1861 at Londonthe number of ship arrivals were 42,131, 209 and 21. At this timestevedoring was very labour-intensive,so to arrange a supply of labour to meetthis fluctuating demand the obvioussolution was to look to casual labour.This seems to have been the solutionadopted almost universally. It remained

the pattern until the late 1960s whensocial expectations, strong unions,increased technology and reduced labourrequirements saw a swing to permanentemployment. Casual labour in practicedid, however, come in a variety offorms. In some places and periods it wasliterally thrown open to anyone whoappeared at the agreed hiring station.

The introduction of steam tugs in theearly part of the nineteenth centuryobviously improved the situationconcerning the effect of wind on peaksbut fluctuations in the supply anddemand for various commoditiesthroughout the year has meant that peaks

in ship arrivals have remained aproblem in port labour management.

Although casual labour was the normthere were many interesting and intricatelocal variations which varied from dockto dock and country to country. InLondon in the nineteenth century therewere many accepted pools of casuallabour such as the A, B and C registersof workers which designated employers’preference. That is, A men were firstchoice, etc. Other groups existed forspecific cargoes such as corn porters,timber porters, coal porters, etc. Theactual building of docks and theformation of dock companies in the early

part of the nineteenth century also madea radical difference. While shipshandled their cargo in the river or at ariverside wharf it was largely theproblem of the Master or receiver to usethe crew or find labour to handle thecargo. When the dock companies wereformed, many of them gradually tookover the task of arranging the cargo-handling labour and devised variousschemes. Some had a small nucleus of“permanents” followed by various“preference groups” who would get thefirst options when work was beingoffered.

In the UK this casual system ran into

problems during the Second World Waerwhen conscription was introduced formen who were not permanentlyemployed in certain “important’ jobs. Toovercome this the National Dock LabourBoard was set up in 1941. It drew up aRegister of Dockworkers and onlyregistered dockworkers could beemployed. This Register was put on apermanent basis after the war in 1947but only applied to scheme ports (largeports in 1947). This in turn created itsown problems because ports likeFelixstowe, which grew rapidly after1947, enjoyed certain labour advantagesdenied to their competitors. Further,

because of the high labour costs andrestrictive practices associated withscheme ports, many shipownerspreferred the non-scheme ports.Therefore, post-war UK saw aresurgence of the smaller ports and adecline of the larger ones. This Registercontinued right up to 1989 when it wasdiscontinued during a period of anti-union legislation to prepare the way forprivatisation of UK ports.

Because of labour unrest in the Port ofLondon the Devlin Inquiry was set up inthe early 1960s. The outcome of this wasthat in 1967 under “Devlin Stage 1”casual labour was abolished and the

dockers received a guaranteed weeklywage, though this was paid to them viathe docks’ Board. It is also worth notingthat at this time the specific terms suchas stevedore, lumper, etc., wereabolished and the all-embracing term ofdocker was to be used to cover allcargo-handling personnel. The idea wasto have one flexible labour force and notspecific groups of people each with theirown restrictive practices. In 1970 inLondon Devlin Stage 2 was introduced,which meant that each docker nowworked for a specific employer.However, if the docker’s employer wentout of business, which many did in the

new circumstances, the docker was notout of work. He was simply returned tothe Board who reallocated him amongthe remaining employers. The dockerwas in effect guaranteed a job for life—that is, until the Board was disbanded in1989.

Therefore, in the UK, the docker’semployment had gone from a veryprecarious ad hoc casual arrangement toa protected period of guaranteed wagesand conditions, and then to relativelyunprotected “permanent” employmentunder “market force” conditions.However, in October 2004 the EUintroduced a new package on port

service legislation, which would, ifenacted, break the monopoly of dockersto handle cargo. Such legislation wouldallow the ship’s crew or such personnelas determined by the shipowner, tohandle the cargo. However, in 2008 suchlegislation remains just a remotepossibility.

How Dockers werePaid

Piecework or time rates

The obvious and traditional way ofpaying casual workers is by pieceworkor by the amount of work done. Formany occupations this may besatisfactory. However, for cargohandling serious problems arose. Withthe development of unions, “rates for thejob” were negotiated but every cargoand even a variation of the same type ofcargo becomes a different job. InLondon by the 1960s this rates systemhad become very complex with manythousands of rates being involved. Thisled to many sudden “wildcat” strikes as

the boarding gang of dockers viewed thecargo down the hold and reckoned that abetter rate was needed and workstopped until a satisfactory new rate wasnegotiated.

The variety of rates involved indischarging general cargo also meantthat calculating payment for the dockerwas complicated.

A further problem arose for ashipowner with “low rate” cargoes onhis ship, because in periods of highdemand he might well find difficulty infinding dockers willing todischarge/load his ship when the rewardfor working on other ships was

significantly higher.In some ports, particularly in

developing countries when dockers aredesperate for money, safety can becomea secondary issue as men struggle tomake a living wage. Even in Londonthere was evidence to indicate that manyyoung dockers with large financialcommitments worked too hard and were“worn out” by their mid-thirties.

It is perhaps therefore not surprisingthat when Devlin Stage 2 was introducedin London in 1970 nearly all wanted toend the piecework system and opted fora fixed weekly wage. However, also notsurprisingly, productivity dropped 25%

without the spur of financial incentive.Now most UK ports have a fixed-

wage system combined with an incentivebonus system, which is hopefully not toocomplicated in its application. Perhapsthe design and monitoring of thisincentive bonus system should be one ofthe jobs to which labour managementshould give high priority.

Dockers’ pay

Dockers' basic rates of pay in GBPper day

Year London

1840 0.181880 0.211920 0.801960 1.601993 60.00

The casual system and the high supplyof labour meant that during the nineteenthcentury dockers in London were not wellpaid in comparison with other workers.By 1920 the dockers’ wage wascomparable with that of workers in otherindustries. By 1960 they were thehighest paid “blue collar” workers in thecountry. These relative high rates of paywere particularly so at this time in the

USA and Australia, which was whythese were the two countries wherecontainerisation was first introduced.These relatively high rates for dockerscompared with other workers was alsothe cause of the long-running dispute inmany countries as to who should stuffand strip containers—highly paiddockers or lower paid workers fromother unions.

Dockers’ monthly wage rates in US$1992 (ITF Review)

CountryAveragemonthly

wage

% Higher thannational average

Argentina 847

Australia 1,572 35Belgium 2,243 25Germany 2,280Spain 1,980UK 2,540 23India 145Japan 2,366 3Koreg 1,200Portugal 50Sweden 6

According to the ITF (see thefollowing section) in 2005 “the sameGlobal operator in one part of the world,that respects workers’ rights andmaintains a social dialogue, might be

acting as a union buster in another”.Where in one port the company willemploy the existing registered dockers,in other ports it will sack the existingworkforce, specifically those who standup for their rights, and employ non-unionised and casual labour. In somecases the company will even set up a“trade union-like” institution to suggestto the outside world that the company isworker-friendly.

The reality is that some of the world’sbiggest container terminals do not evenemploy their dockers. They leave that toagencies who will hire workers on acontractual basis and deny them job and

income security. When the terminaloperator is challenged to assumeresponsibility on labour-related issues itsimply waives its responsibility, statingthat it is not a party to the labour contractand has nothing to do with the employee.“Go and see the contractor”, is itsanswer.

We remain convinced, however, thatdockers around the world should enjoythe freedom to join a trade union, whichrepresents them in negotiations with theemployer over labour-related issues.

Casualisation

ILO Dock Work Convention 137provides that dockers should beregistered and should enjoy permanentor regular employment that assures theman income. This Convention was agreedin 1973. The reality in the twenty-firstcentury is that dockers in many ports arehired and fired at will. While dockers’work in some of the major ports is stillregulated, these rules are seen by someneo-liberal decision makers asunacceptable restrictions on the market.

International institutions such as theWorld Bank, IMF and WTO, andregional institutions such as theEuropean Union are key driving forces

behind liberalisation and deregulation.They reason that the invisible hand of themarket will create benefits for all.Transport has to be cheap and efficient.

Employing casual workers in the portsseems to be the preferred way to cutcosts further: dockers who are on calland who you only pay a lump sum pershift—no overtime, no social benefits,no social protection. This is the magicanswer to the demands of capital.

It goes without saying that casualworkers who have not receivedadequate training are a risk to the safetyof their fellow workers and themselves.Work accidents hurt not only the victims,

but are also bad for productivity.On the subject of productivity, well-

trained, well-remunerated labour isundoubtedly more productive. Manyterminal operators now regularly usecontractors and casual labour. TheMaritime Department of Hong Kong(until recently the world’s largestcontainer port), has since February 2005issued six notices in relation to thesafety requirements that must beobserved during container operations,and we are convinced that this list willget longer.

Unions

As already mentioned, the first dockers’union in the UK was formed in 1872, butin the early days fear of victimisationseems to have kept the membershipdown to a relatively small percentage ofthe total.

The great strike for “the dockers’tanner”, although not a victory for theunions, did make the workers realisetheir strength, and the employers knewthey had to improve conditions, such assome degree of permanency, paidholidays, sick pay, pension at 70, etc.

Where the UK differs from some othercountries is in the number of unions.British industry in general, not just thedocks, has been bedevilled by squabblesbetween the unions safeguarding theirmember “differentials”, interests andgroup perks.

As can be deduced from the tablesshowing the relative high salaries fordockers, these unions have beenpowerful and largely successful, thoughduring the 1980s over much of the worldthere seems to have been a generalreduction in this power. This is perhapspartly due to a changing political andsocial climate and partly due to the

changing nature of transport itself.Intermodalism allows competition notonly between ports themselves but alsobetween different modes of transport.

Dockers in the UK can no longer holdthe country to ransom. The workers onthe Channel Tunnel have now probablymore power.

The table in Chapter 10 (see page161) does show how serious the strikesituation was in post-war UK during the1950s and 1960s compared with otherindustries. The sharp rise in 1970following the introduction of containersand container working practices is verynoticeable

ITF and ILO

In 1896, as a result of a series of seriousstrikes in Europe, the InternationalFederation of Ship, Dock and RiverWorkers was formed. This led to theformation of the International TransportWorkers’ Federation (ITF) in 1898.Although the ITF does not seem to haveplayed a great part in the development ofport labour it has, over the last couple ofdecades, successfully called on portlabour to “black” various ships (usuallyof a flag of convenience), to bringpressure on shipowners on mattersconcerning crews’ wages and

conditions.In 1919 the International Labour

Organisation (ILO) was formed, andultimately provided a voice within theUnited Nations relating to the rights,social conditions and employment ofport workers world-wide.

Working hours

Until 1920 in the UK, Saturday was anormal working day in ports. It thenbecame a half-day and remained so forthe next 50 years until the ports adopteda five-day working week. Most ports,

particularly container and bulkterminals, will of course now work 24hours a day, seven days a week.However, the establishment of theofficial working hours is an importantelement in the formula for working outaspects of laytime and dockers’ overtimerates.

Numbers Employed

Labour split

For different cargo typesYear Port Details1985 Rotterdam10,303 dock workers

43.0% work withbreakbulk generalcargo 24.7% work withcontainer cargo 19.0% work withbulk cargo 13.3% work withgrain cargo

For different work gradesYear Port Details

1992AllPorts 31,487 persons working in

UK UK Ports (only 8% women)

37.4% Cargo handlers 8.6% Managers 54.0% Others

The above table does indicate that nowthat the number of cargo-handlingpersonnel has been reduced, the “others”group is becoming relatively larger.

Gang size

Gang size depends on type ofcommodity, type and design of ship, type

of equipment available, local workingpractices and union agreements.

Date Gang sizeComponents Total

1880 Ship’s Gang—BBCargo

10–15

Shore Gang—BBCargo

70–80 80–95

1990 Ship’s Gang—BBCargo 12

Shore Gang—BBCargo 16 28 (tph

say 20)Ship’s Gang—Container Basic 8

Shore Gang—Container Basic 9 17 (tph

say 216)

Ship’s Gang—Container Advanced

1

Shore Gang—Container Advanced 0 1 (tph

say 276)

Typical gang size per crane on anAustralian container terminal per shift =10–13—made up of two crane drivers,three to five straddle carrier drivers, oneto four general hands, one to threeforemen, one clerk (1999 ResearchPaper).

In Tilbury, Singapore, Port Klang thefigures would be smaller—for instance,only one crane driver. In Australia about80–89% of the stevedores werepermanent employees.

Reduction in labour due totechnological change andimproved operation

The table above shows a steadydecrease in the labour force over theyears at virtually all ports even thoughcargo throughput has been rising steadily(Note: the tons per man per year ratioseems to be remarkably consistent at 6%growth per year.)

The figures shown before 1970 showthat this decrease due to technologicalchange and more efficient operationalpractices did not just start withcontainerisation but has been a steadyongoing progress.

A report by the Department forTransport on port employment in UK,completed in 2005, considered that

current numbers could be expected to bein the region of 40% of those found fourdecades previously. It also estimatedthat, in considering port employment byfunction, 21% were working in marineoperations, 53% in cargo operations,5% in passenger operations while theremaining 21% it classified as employedin other operations.

It can be argued that the reduction indock labour requirement, since theintroduction of the container, could bemisleading. It is true that the dock labourrequirements have been dramaticallyreduced but the containers have to bestuffed and stripped and this takes

labour. Even in a sophisticated high-techcountry, for example Sweden, it takes onaverage three persons 20 minutes to stuffa container and a similar sort of figure tostrip one. That is, it takes around oneman-hour to fill a container and the sameto empty it. Therefore, to empty and fillthe 6,000 boxes on a large container shiptakes some 12,000 person hours. Labouris therefore still needed though notnecessarily on the terminal, and as far asone can see, this requirement will needto be met for some time in the future.One hears relatively little of automatedcontainer stuffing equipment.

In some aspects containers will

increase labour requirements.Containers have to be built, surveyedregularly, cleaned and maintained.Containers get lost and have to be foundeven though there are sophisticatedcomputer packages and operators whorecord their every movement.

Labour v Technology

Comparison of tonnage andlabour figures for the Port of

London (1925–1975)

Tons per man per year

Year (SourceWilson—Dockers)

Numbersemployed

in UKports

Tons perman per

year (tonsmn)

1921 125,000 296 (37)1924 118,000 567 (67)1929 110,000 608 (67)1931 111,000 466 (52)1935 104,000 593 (62)1938 100,000 669 (67)1947 78,458 655 (52)1950 75,265 796 (60)

1955 80,674 897 (72)

1960 72,550 1,290(94)

1965 65,128 1,550(101)

1970 46,912 2,580(121)

1973 32,0001976 31,0621981 21,0221982 15,000

(The figures for tonnage throughput excludepetroleum cargoes.)

If technology replaces one link in thecargo-handling chain then the effect onthe cargo-handling throughput will beonly to reduce the labour content and

perhaps cost. It will not increase cargo-handling speed unless the link beingreplaced is the slowest link.

For the cargo-handling speed to besignificantly increased the wholelogistic system needs to be analysed andnew technology and methods appliedwhere they will be most effective.

From 1840 to 1970 the technologicalimpact on cargo handling in ports waslargely in replacing activities requiringhigh labour content. The effect of thecontainer was not just the new gadgetsbut that it forced all concerned in themovement of goods to re-evaluate thesystem, not just in the ports but

throughout the whole transport chain.Vacuvators and grabs seem to have

been introduced into many large ports bythe 1890s but the carriage of grain inbulk was still only a relatively smallpercentage of the total, even though thistechnology made the discharge from theship faster and cheaper. However, as theshipments were still in small quantitiesand arrived at the port of loading in bagsand the distribution at the port ofdischarge was in bags, any advantagegained in the ship-handling speed andcost would be lost in the effort of de-bagging and re-bagging.

The North American Great Lakes

ports trading in grain and many othercargoes, have since the end of the lastcentury often led the way in shiptechnology and cargo-handlingtechnology and enjoyed the benefit ofhigher cargo-handling speeds. However,until the St Lawrence Seaway opened in1959 it was a closed system and did notsuffer from the constraints imposed byinternational trading. (See Figure 32 onpage 134, showing the reduction in thenumber of London dockers against theincrease in cargo handled.)

How Labour isManaged

With casual labour and simpleequipment, labour management’s mainproblems were obtaining labourcontracts with shipowners if there wascompetition from other stevedoringcompanies, and negotiating handlingrates and conditions with the union. Withpermanent employment come all thegrowing problems associated with anyemployer of labour.

The tradition of casual labour hasmeant that in the UK and in many other

countries, labour management has tendedto be confrontational. In the pastrelatively few of the “workers” havewished, or been invited to cross thelabour divide into management.However, in most ports old attitudes arechanging fast, encouraged by theprivatisation and the general revolutionin port administration that has happenedalmost universally in the last decade.

Perhaps one of the greatestdifferences between developed andundeveloped countries is in thehierarchical pyramid for decisionmaking. In developing countries virtuallyall decisions are referred upwards

whereas in ports in developed countries,many of the basic decisions are left tothe gang to decide for themselves.

Safety and security

Dockers’ safety

See Chapter 8.

Training

Until the 1950s it was assumed that theindividual would ensure that he wastrained for the job he was hired for andas the work was mainly labour-intensivethe level of skill required was, for muchof the work, fairly low. Since the 1950sdock work has become rapidly moremechanised and sophisticated, requiringskilled operation and maintenance.Today training is not just a good idea, itis a sound investment, particularly as inmost ports a multi-skilled work force isrequired.

Chapter TenTime in Port andSpeed of CargoHandling

Turnaround time in days for sailingvessels 1863–1912—general cargo—containers—bulk cargoes—tankers—general operational delays—strikes

—port time other than berth time—port delays (congestion)—portproductivity

Minimising the time a ship spends inport will now be virtually every portmanager’s priority. This priorityincreases as ships grow in size andcapital intensity and ports faceincreasing competition for customers.

Turnaround Time inDays for Sailing

Vessels 1863–1912

The figures in the following table werederived from taking random samplesfrom back copies of Lloyd’s List, whichgave the vessels’ arrival and departuredates.

Size 1863–1877

1878–1890

1891–1912

250–499 25.6 21.0 29.1500–999 29.7 24.2 25.1

1000–1499 38.7 30.5 31.31500 + 50.5 32.3 21.9

Specificports

Liverpool 24.1 23.2 26.1London 25.8 25.8 26.4

New York 21.3 18.6 31.9Antwerp 30.6 24.3 21.2Rio deJaneiro 27.7 25.2 20.3

Bombay 29.2 26.1 24.7Melbourne 35.8 34.3 31.6

The table suggests that all sailingvessels showed an improvement inturnaround time between 1878–1890.This improvement was sustained in thefinal period only for the largest vesselsor those ports which still catered largelyfor sailing vessels. In ports catering for

the new steam vessels the sailing shipswere probably relegated to the olderareas and given lower priority asregards cargo handling. This probablyalso indicates that the larger sailingvessels were in more secure traderoutes, i.e. they could still find cargoes.The smaller vessels were less capableof finding ports with ready cargoes—hence their longer time in port.

In his book British MerchantShipping, published in 1922, ClementJones quotes Edward Arnold and Co.,who estimated that at that time a shipspent half its life in port, though the tablebelow indicates that on the Australia

trade around the early 1920s, thepercentage time spent in port was nearer40%.

General Cargo

What is interesting in the preceding tableis the virtually constant total port time ofaround 140 days from 1870–1970. It

would seem to indicate that this was theupper limit of port time that theshipowner considered tolerable. As thecargo-handling speed increased, asshown by the tons per day per hatch, thesize of the ship increased. The thesis thatthe maximum economic size of ship islargely governed by the port time whichin turn is a factor of cargo-handlingspeed is borne out by the fact that assoon as containerisation was introduced,with its higher cargo-handling speeds,cargo ship size increased dramatically.

The daily fuel consumption shown isalso remarkably constant, in spite of theincrease in ship size and speed.

Although the economics of ship speedhas many factors, port time is animportant one, as it is quite easy todemonstrate that with a high proportionof port time relatively little effect ismade on voyage time by adjusting shipspeed.

Figure 35: Gross average speed of cargohandling per hatch for the entire stay in port

Figure 36 shows the relationshipbetween ship size and cargo-handlingspeed. The samples taken have been forships carrying general cargo betweenEurope and the Far East (includingAustralia). As can be seen there isalmost perfect correlation.

The interesting question is, which isthe cause and which the effect?

Figure 36: Relationship between ship sizeand cargo-handling speed

1965—conventionalbreakbulk

A Clan Line General Cargo-handlingSurvey made in 1965 (an internal surveydone by their own R & D department)concluded that on average:

Handling speed per hatch was 10-40 tons per hour.

Loading speed on average wasabout half discharge speed.

Cranes were about twice as fast asderricks.

1965 is a good year to benchmarkconventional breakbulk cargo handlingspeed, as new ideas of unitisation werebeing tried and conventional breakbulkprobably reached the peak of itsefficiency at this point. The sailing ship,a century earlier, only reached itsoptimum efficiency just before it waseclipsed by the steamship.

Year Some examples of generalcargo-handling speeds

1876 London 1,100 tons sugar in 23days 55 tpd (tpd = tons per day)

1880

Discharge of 50 tpd consideredpoor. Belfast offered dischargerates of 60 tpd in winter, 80 tpd insummer, but capable of 330 tpd ifright financial inducements wereoffered.

1888

3,400 tons wheat discharged inLondon in 22 hours, which gives38.6 tons per hatch per hour.Hawarde Castle discharges 200tons in 14 hours (48 men) whichgives 35.7 tons per hatch.Sailing ship had to give shippersthree days' notice before workingcargo but steamships had to giveonly one. Mail ships wouldhowever commence workimmediately. Steamships worked

1888 faster than sail, where there waslittle overtime. Docks were morehighly mechanised than riverwharves so they worked faster butrequired less labour per tonhandled.

1924Paper to the NE Coast MarineEngineers estimates speed ofcargo work 800–1,600 tpd.

1928Chamber of Shipping AnnualReport: Sydney 550 tpd, S.Australia 430 tpd.

1929 Lagos—electric cranes 600 tonsper day.

1939 Average lay time in UK ports 17days—1951 20 days.

1945 London—1,500 tpd for

discharging bagged sugar.

1969

NPC Port Progress Report givesthe following comparison for tonsof cargo handled per man per houron the terminal—Container 30,palletised 4.5, conventional 1.7.

1978

UNCTAD report gives thefollowing figures. Deep-sea ships700 tpd, short sea routes 500 tpd,palletised and preslung 900 tpd,forest products 1,500 tpd, bundlediron and steel 2,000 tpd.

1982

Typical 18–25 tons per gang hour(tpgh) Bremen and Hamburg 14–22 tpgh, New York 12–18 tpgh,Karachi 2–18 tpgh, Valparaiso14–18 tpgh.

Containers

The loading/discharge speed forcontainers are virtually the same.

Speed in boxes per hour per crane =10–50 (average 30 for good port).However, in 2006 Westport, Port Klang,claimed a record by handling 452containers per hour. In 2008 severalcommentators have indicated how littlecontainer-handling speeds have changedover last few decades. Also many feelthat dramatic improvement in handlingspeeds are needed if container ship sizesare to be significantly increased. For

large mother ships at a container centreport, 80 moves per hours should beexpected.

Figure 37: If using several cranes to loadand discharge

Examples 1998

Port CountryBoxes

per shipBoxes per

crane

hour hourJuwaharial India 15

Colombo SriLanka 20–24 26

Singapore 69 36

Bulk Cargoes

Date Some examples of bulk cargo-handling speed

1813

Coaling equipment (coal drops).Coal first to mechanise replacingpack animals in 1813. Whitehavenhad an inclined plane for iron

wagons. Similar system in Tyne(500–600 wagon loads a day).

1835Darlington coal drop could load awagon load (4 tons) into a ship in2 minutes (120 tph).

1880Average loading speed for bulkcargo was 1,000 tpd in developedcountries.

1890

2–4 ton grabs introduced allowing500 tpd to be achieved. Thissimple development reduced coststo a third compared with shovelsand tubs.

1897 Grain loading in USA 700 tph.

1910Loading rates of 2,000 tpdcommonplace for coal and ore.5,000 tpd possible.

1910

Transporter introduced atRotterdam. This was a widebridge structure spanning severalrail tracks reaching 140ftoverside.

1912

In Surrey Docks pneumatic orbucket elevators were capable oflifting, delivering and weighing200 tons of grain per hour. 1903Millwall had two floatingpneumatic elevators that couldhandle 500 tph.

1912 Continuous self-unloading lakersfor ore carriage.

1924 Coal discharge speeds of 500—600 tph were typical.Typical chartering figures forcoal: 7,000 tons allowed three

1930 weeks laytime for loading anddischarging.

1934

Baltimore could load 240,000bushels of grain per hour. AtNarvik ore trains 60 ft aboveberth could load a vessel in twohours. Norfolk, Virginia couldload 1,500 tph. For bulk ports aweek more or less should besufficient but some ports exceedthat time. For coal discharge ratesof 500—1,500 tph cover themajority of ports.

1939

Ore loaded by spouts—littletrimming required—very fast.Great Lake ore-carriers coulddischarge at 2,500 tph and some

were self-unloaders. Liftingmagnets capable of lifting up to 20tons.

1949 Coal could be loaded at HamptonRoads at a speed of 2,500 tpd.

1954 Coal could be discharged atRotterdam at 3,000 tpd.

1955

Typical chartering figures for coal—15,000 tons were allowed 1.5weeks laytime for loading anddischarging.

1966Typical chartering figures: coal—25,000 dwt six days laytime allpurposes.Average loading speed for bulkcargo was 2,300 tpd in developedcountries. Australia—for shipsloading bulk the average time in

1970 port was 9.7 days, time prior toloading 2.8 days; time spentloading 6.5 days—average speedof loading 3,865 tpd.

1989Antwerp bulk (ore, coal, etc.)2,500 tph discharge. Grainelevators 400 tph.

1992

Hamburg 34.9 million tons bulkcargo—45.5% liquid and pumped,15.5 % suction cargo, 39%grabbed.

This table illustrates that the cargo-handling technology for bulk cargo hasbeen constantly changing and improvingwith very significant improvements incargo-handling speeds, unlike breakbulk

cargo where cargo-handling speed hasshown little change.

1987 Bulk cargo-handlingspeeds (tons per hour)

Sample of 50 load ports and 50discharge ports selected at random

from the BIMCO Journal 1987

CommodityAverage of

sample Best ofsampleLoad Discharge

Grain 167 108 316Ore 618 482 1,705Coal 678 352 1,342

Phosphates 183 120 340Scrap 96 49.5 174

As one might anticipate, the higherfigures are for ore and coal which arethe two main dry bulk cargoes shippedin large quantities from specialisedterminals. Therefore, one would expecta greater capital investment in thehandling equipment.

For all bulks in sample:

— mean loading speed 365 tph;— mean discharge speed 218 tph.

Correlation between loading speed andcargo dwt is 0.85. Correlation between

discharging speed and cargo dwt is 0.78.These correlation figures indicate that

larger vessels go to larger ports wherethe cargo-handling speed is faster.

UNCTAD Port Development gives thefollowing:

Ship loaders 1,000–7,000 tphGrabs 180–2,000 tphSlurry 6,000–8,000 tphPneumatic 200 tphBucket elevators 1,000–5,000 tphN.B. Weighing accuracy between 1%and 2%.

Scale loading speed

Some specialised bulk cargo terminals,such as Richards Bay, have a loadingscale which gives the expected metrictonnes loaded per weather working day.Such a scale rate may be used whenchartering the vessel to determine thelaytime.

Figure 38: Scale loading speed for RichardsBay

Tankers

There are 72 hours allowed for load +

discharge time. See the New WorldscaleBook.

As tankers are handling liquids, whichcan be easily pumped, very fast handlingspeeds are possible. This is one of thereasons why tankers were the first shiptypes to grow in size after the SecondWorld War. Virtually all tankers areallowed the same port time becauselarger tankers have larger pipelines andlarger pumps and so can handle thecargo proportionally faster. As a simplerule of thumb, a tanker can be estimatedto have a maximum pumping speed perhour of 10% of her deadweight tonnage.This does not mean that a tanker can

discharge in 10 hours since time has tobe allowed for the more viscous oils todrain. Hence the discharge time isusually slightly longer than loading time.

However, prior to 1950 when 10,000dwt could be considered to be thetypical tanker, 200 tph could beconsidered to be a typical cargo-handling figure.

General OperationalDelays

The table below summarises the causesof operational delays at a general cargoberth over a one-week period in 1990.

Delay caused Man hourslost

Absenteeism 170Late starts 110Non-availability ofcargo 76

Extended meal breaks 70Shifting quayside cranes 55Bad weather 40Equipment breakdown 25

Strikes

The word “strike” appeared in Englishin its more aggressive sense in thethirteenth century, but it was not until themid-eighteenth century that it wasapplied to the withdrawal of labour.This use was first recorded in 1768 andis thought to have derived from thespecific use of the word strike in thesense of “to pack up and go”, as in thenautical expression “to strike sail”.

Year

No. ofstoppages

in UK

Days lostper 1,000

Days lostper 1,000empl. all

ports employed industries1947 77 1,687 N/A

1950 63 (av.50–54) 3,162 90

1955 93 (av.55–59) 4,602 270

1960 113 (av.60–64) 3,180 138.5

1965 224 (av.65–69) 3,929 169

1970 374 13,986 475

The preceding table shows what aserious problem strikes were in the UKports in the three decades following theSecond World War, much worse than

was experienced throughout the rest ofBritish industry. It reached a climax, asone might have expected, at the end ofthe 1960s when containerisation wasintroduced and labour requirementswere being savagely reduced. However,by 1989 when Margaret Thatcher’sgovernment finally abolished the dockworkers’ registration scheme set up in1941, the labour situation seems to havestabilised and the UK ports have nowone of the best strike-free records inEurope.

The following table indicates thecountries whose ports have been worstaffected by strikes over the last couple

of decades.

As the following table shows, not allport strikes are caused by thestevedores, in fact over 50% of delayscaused by labour problems can be seento arise from among the other groups ofworkers connected with the port.

Port delays caused by strikes 1993/94Incidence by type of workforce %Stevedores 47.5

Other port workers 23.7Factory and other workforce 9.0

Land transport workers 7.3Customs officers 7.3Pilot and tug crews 2.3

The Strike Club covers vesselsdelayed due to many perils outside thecontrol of the operator that may takeplace miles away from ports. Forexample, a coal mine strike halting coaldeliveries may cause as much delay to avessel as a dockers’ strike. Similarly,losses suffered due to delays caused byperils such as physical obstruction,stowaways, etc., are covered.

2000–2006 peril categoriescovered by a mutual strikeclub

“Strike by Miners, Crew Strike,Collision/Grounding, Stevedore Strike,Factory & Office Workers, Forest ProductWorkers, Political and Civil Unrest,Accidental Loss of Damage to any vehicle,Customs Strike, Detention due toPollution, Import–Export Control, PortWorkers Strike, Physical Obstruction,Closure of the Port/Sea Lane, LandTransport Strike, Mechanical Breakdown onLand, Storm, Tempest, Flood etc …, Crew

Illness/Injury/Death, Stowaways, MachineryDamage, General Strike,Collision/Grounding, Forest ProductWorkers, Drugs on Board, Earthquake,Landslide, Imposition of Quarantine, Pilot& Tug Strike, Seizure of Cargo, FishermenBlockade.”

Port Time other thanBerth Time

The National Ports Council Report1978 states that for UK ports “port timeis 6.5% longer than berth time”.

However, if all the ships which loadedor discharged at Bombay are consideredfor the years 1983–1987 the averageexcess of port time over berth time wasabout 40%. However, it would be onlyfair to state that the situation in Bombayhas greatly improved since then. In 1992at Singapore the average containershipwait for berth was 2.3 hours.

Ship catastrophe

The global probability of a delay orproblem due to a mechanical failure,collision, contact damage, fire, etc., has

been estimated at .00012 per day.(Analysis of one month’s casualty datareported in Lloyd’s List in the mid-1970s.)

Pilotage and mooring time

This will obviously vary for each portdepending on the length of pilotage, tide,currents, weather, locks, etc. Thefollowing table shows the pilotage timesfor large powerful vessels arriving andleaving 18 randomly selected ports onthe world’s major trade routes.

Pilotage time

(Hours) No. of Ports

0 00.5 4

1 52 23 24 25 18 1

22 1

Weather delays

The weather can affect port time inseveral ways. Gales and fog can reduceor halt movement within a port. Galesmay also prevent cargo handling atberths with large cranes, as at containerterminals, and at exposed berths. It canbe one of the few causes of stoppages ata tanker terminal. With some cargoes,particularly the traditional generalcargoes and bulk cargoes, such as sugar,rain can stop all cargo working.

Climates do of course vary widelybetween ports throughout the world, andat any one port the climate will vary

with the seasons. However, byconsulting the Admiralty Pilot Booksand the Admiralty SeasonalClimatological Charts for 16 major portspositioned evenly over the major traderoutes, the following conclusions shouldgive some indication of themeteorological problems to be expectedin port over the course of one year’sworld-wide trading.

Weathertype

Range in daysper annum whenphenomenon is

experienced

%Time(Averagefor all 16

ports)Gales 0–30 5%

Fog 0–45 1%Rain 0–169 5%

Port Delays(Congestion)

Port congestion arises when portcapacity is insufficient to cope with thetraffic arriving at the port. It is not a newproblem and can occur at any port ifthere is a sudden upsurge in demand orhold-up in the port such as a strike. Afterthe oil price rise in 1973 many of the

OPEC countries spent their increasedrevenues on extra imports which causedsevere congestion in many cases. In1976, for example, ships carryingcement to Nigeria were waiting over200 days at Apapa/Lagos.

A conference of experts organised byUNCTAD in April 1976 gave thefollowing table (see page 164) for theaverage waiting time for 30 ports whichare regularly subject to port congestion:

Year Average days delay

1971 2.21972 2.3

1973 4.01974 4.81975 14.31976 40.4

Extending the table for the average delayat the 30 worst ports following 1976,from the port data given in Lloyd’s List,gives:

1979 17.51983 8.91986 4.51998 3.72004 5.3

The above extension to the table

shows that the problem has declined butstill flares up from time to time, as in2004 due to the surprising growth indemand at this time. During the autumnof 2004 at many of the world’s leadingports, such Los Angeles, Long Beach,New Orleans, Felixstowe, etc., shipswere experiencing several days’ delay,though at many ports the managementpreferred to simply say that they werevery busy.

Note: In October 2002 a port strike onthe West Coast of the USA also causedproblems. Lloyd’s List reported: “The200 or so ships anchored off the coastsof California, Oregon and Washington

are carrying enough freight to fill morethan 650,000 tractor trailers.”

In 2007 the queues of ships waiting toload coal in Newcastle in Australiawere in the eighties. And as congestionincreased around the world many soughtto cover their increased costs byintroducing surcharges. For example, inDecember 2007 the Far Eastern FreightConference (FEFC) were asking for$145 per TEU container on westboundvoyages. Rotterdam introduced acongestion surcharge of $20 per TEU.

It is very important to identify clearlythe cause of the delay. If, for instance,the delay was caused by slow customs

clearance but this was not recognisedand new berths were built, then it wouldonly aggravate the situation.

Because of the severe nature of someof the congestion in the early 1970s,UNCTAD set up a small group toanalyse the situation in 1975. BIMCO,who were represented on the UNCTADworking group, summarised the 10 majorcauses of congestion in one of their 1976Bulletins as follows, and although about30 years old the summary is still valid:

1. Planning

(a) Investment in newberths without ensuring

that back-up areas, portaccess and operatingcapabilities such astrained manpower,cargo-handlingequipment andwarehousing space(either within or outsidethe port area) are ableto service these newberths.

(b) Inadequacy of inlandtransport, both incapacity and efficiency,in relation to trucks,wagons, highways and

port access routes.(c) Late completion of port

and transportdevelopment projects,so that expectedcapacity is not availableon time.

(d) Failure to keep trafficforecasts updated toreflect changes in thepace of major economicdevelopments.

(e) Improvements byrebuilding wharveswithout providing forthe accommodation of

expanding trafficvolumes duringconstruction.

(f) Failure of portmanagement andplanning authorities tomake adequate plans intime for portdevelopments.

(g) Inflexibility indevelopment plans toallow later changes inmodes of traffic flows.

(h) Low appeal of port andshipping problems inthe public mind, leading

to lesser prioritiesbeing accorded to portinvestment.

(i) Political and socialinterference which bearon the decision-makingprocesses.

2. Management

(a) Lack of continuity insenior port managementpositions.

(b) Senior portmanagement chosenwithout regard for thequalifications required

by the job and theadequate provision forupgrading knowledge.

(c) Too little training forother staff, particularlyof the middlemanagement andoperating levels.

(d) Lack of direct authorityof management to effectremedial actions.

3. Labour

(a) Poor labour relations,leading to inefficientrestrictive practices.

(b) Problems caused bytoo much or too littlelabour, according tocircumstances.

(c) Inefficient deploymentof labour.

(d) Failure to adaptworking practices tolocal circumstances,such as the climate.

(e) Lack of training ofdockworkers,especially in the use ofsophisticatedequipment.

4. Co-ordination

(a) Lack of co-operationbetween differentprivate andgovernmentalorganisations workingin the port area.

(b) Inadequateconsultation betweenthe port authority andusers of the port inrespect of operationsand development.

5. Traffic

(a) Irregular traffic due toerratic import andexport policies,especially with regardto bulk purchasing andthe granting of importlicences.

(b) Short-term trafficvariations due tounrationalised shippingschedules, leading toship bunching.

(c) Too many shipsoperating on certainroutes and consequentlycalling for small

tonnages and makinginefficient use of berths.

(d) Inefficient distributionof cargo betweenhatches thus preventingintensive working of theship.

(e) Cargo stowed at portof loading withoutregard to efficiency ofdischarge.

(f) Forms of packaging andcargo presentationunsuitable for efficienthandling at the port.

(g) Consignees without

adequate financialresources or physicalfacilities to take cargo.

(h) Ships spending longerthan necessary at berthfor reasons such asslack in their schedules.

6. Operations

(a) Inappropriate policieswhich lead to transitfacilities being used forlong-term storage wherespace is inadequate,thus reducing berththroughput.

(b) Lack of inland or portwarehousing facilities,causing cargo to remaintoo long in the porttransit facilities.

(c) Necessity of handlingbulk cargoes at generalcargo berths.

(d) Lack of reservecapacity to deal withrecurring surges ofdemand placed on ports.

(e) Pilferage andsmuggling resulting intight controls whichimpede a free and

efficient movement.(f) Lack of finance for

modern handlingequipment.

(g) Inefficient mix ofhandling equipment dueto circumstances beyondthe control of portmanagement.

7. MaintenanceInadequate maintenance

policies which result in a highproportion of equipment beingout of service due to:

(a) Absence of

preventative andrunning maintenance.

(b) Lack of qualifiedmaintenance personnel.

(c) Lack of adequatestocks of spare parts.

(d) Insufficientstandardisation ofequipment types.

8. Clearance Procedures andDocumentation

(a) Late arrivingdocuments.

(b) Faulty documents.(c) Outmoded

documentationrequirements andprocessing methods.

(d) Outmoded clearancefacilities for vessel andcargo.

(e) Importers allowed toorder shipments withoutsufficient funds to takedelivery on arrival.

9. Dynamic Effects

(a) Changes in ship types,especially on anexperimental basis, withinadequate prior

consultation, leading totemporary inefficiency.

(b) Teething troubles withnew cargo-handlingmethods.

(c) Emergency diversionand trans-shipment ofcargo destined foranother port, which canbring temporary peaksin quantities of cargoes,which a port has tohandle.

(d) Periods ofexceptionally badweather.

10. Function and Location of thePort

(a) Impossibility ofimproving back-up landaccesses in portsbecause adjacent landshave been occupied byurban developments.

(b) Activities carried outin the port area, notrelated directly to cargohandling, which mayconflict with higher portthroughput. (Forinstance, customs’

controls inspectionprocedures, etc.)

(c) Special difficultieswhich may occur withtraffic of landlockedcountries.

(d) Dislocation of trafficby decisions ofneighbouring countriesif ports are serving aregional trade.

In the long term the cure for congestionis of course to rectify the cause. In theshort term there are, however, someimmediate alternatives that can be tried:

(1) Use other ports nearby.(2) Use different types of ships. For

instance, Ro/Ro ships havehelped considerably to reducecongestion at some ports in thelast few years.

(3) Use alternative transportsystems such as air.

(4) Pass immediate legislation toimplement better control on theflow of traffic entering thecountry.

Compensation if the agreedtime in port is exceeded

In tramp ship chartering the charterer hasto compensate the shipowner if the timein port (laytime) exceeds an agreedlimit. This compensation is known asdemurrage and is meant to reflect whatthe ship could be earning per day if notheld up in port. The charterparty willnearly always also contain clauses as towhich delays or stoppages should beexcluded or exempted when calculatinghow much laytime was used.

In liner shipping, the shipowner hastraditionally had to bear virtually all thecosts of a port visit. However, in the lastfew years we have seen some portsprepared to indemnify the shipowner if

the port stay is prolonged beyond anagreed limit.

Port Productivity

Productivity

To a great extent most attempts toimprove port productivity reduce eitherthe time the ship spends in port orreduce costs without seriously effectingthe time the ship spends in port. To knowwhether the level of productivity in a

port is acceptable the port has to be ableto compare its activities against certainstandard benchmarks achieved by itscompetitors.

As regards productivity, one of themost commonly used statistics is theBerth Occupancy Ratio (see Chapter 7,especially page 108). This is the ratioobtained by dividing the time a berth (orgroup of berths) has been occupied bythe time the berth (or group of berths) isavailable during a considered period oftime (week, month or year). However, asa useful comparable statistic it is oflimited value. There are many reasonsfor this but the two main ones are:

(1) In many terminals with a longquay wall there is no determinednumber of berths.

(2) The time actually measuredvaries from port to port. Someports will use the service time,which is usually the total actualtime the vessel is berthed, whileother ports may consider only theworking time.

Another variation of this statistic is theberth utilisation ratio = occupancytime/working time.

It would seem better to consider oneor all of the following:

— For each crane or “cargo-handling gateway” measure thenumber of boxes moved percrane in both the total ship timeon the berth and the working shiptime on the berth. This gives agross and net productivity level.

— The number of people employedon the terminal concerned withcargo handling can also bemeasured, as can the equipment(e.g. straddle carriers, fork lifts,etc.). Therefore, the annualnumber of boxes per person andper piece of equipment perannum can be measured.

— The ratio of berth length to thenumber of cranes is a usefulindicator.

— Dwell time of a container on theterminal is important but not tooeasy to measure to get ameaningful result. However, thetime for a driver arriving at thegate to drop/pick up cargo andreturn back through the gate ismeasurable and a usefulindicator. Also the length of timeper day the gate is in operationcan be determined.

— Further delays lost by strikesshould be recorded—say,

average days lost per month overthe last five years. These arerecorded by the various strikeP&I clubs that exist—also inLloyd’s List. Time waiting for aberth should also be recorded.

Figure 39: Basic data a port should collect

Examples of different ways ofestablishing benchmarks

In most cases the following statistics arecalculated as averages of randomsamples of at least 50 ports taken on aworld-wide basis. Where no figures aregiven this indicates that research in thatarea is not complete. Note that portproductivity may fall off sharply asmaximum capacity is approached.

(1) (a) Berth length/numberof cranes = 350 metreswhere vessel capacity< 1,500 TEUs.

(a) Berth length/numberof cranes = 130 metreswhere vessel capacity> 1,500 TEUs.

(2) Total working time onberth/total time on berth. Thereis no average for this but a higherfigure indicates higherproductivity.

(3) Number of TEUs/terminal areain square metres. This seems tovary between 0.53 and 2.1

(4) Average vehicle turnaroundtime on the terminal whenreceiving/delivering containers.

For an efficient port the averageshould lie between about 20–30minutes.

(5) Number of boxes moved perperson per year on the terminal:no average yet available but onemillion boxes per person is agood ratio.

Figure 40: Port productivity

Figure 40 shows that productivity wasrelatively stagnant from around 1930 to1960. From the 1960s unitisation in itsvarious forms and the increasing use ofspecialist ships and the carriage of cargo

in bulk, has encouraged large increasesin port productivity. This latter increasein productivity is of course well known.What is not so well appreciated is thesteady increase in productivity over theprevious 150 years.

Safety of cargo—animportant element in portefficiency and productivity

Safety of cargo through ports is seldomcovered or mentioned by the ports forobvious reasons. Global average

statistics are produced and published bythe major P&I clubs which do providesome guidance as regards a norm. Forinstance, as mentioned in Chapter 8, theUK P&I club shows that for the years1987–1990 the averages for major cargoclaims (i.e. claims over US$100,000)are:

— 23% due to bad stowage;— 8% due to bad handling;— 2% due to fraud; and— 1% failure to collect cargo.

The following are suggested comparablesafety statistics which could becollected—perhaps as average figures

over five years:

— Percentage of cargo value lostthrough cargo damage over fiveyears.

— Percentage of boxes handledwhich are damaged.

— Percentage of cargo lost orstolen.

— Percentage number of portworkers who suffer fromindustrial injuries.

The above data is all recorded bydifferent organisations and could befound by any diligent researcher.

Chapter ElevenPort Costs, Pricesand Revenue

How much does a port cost?—totalport charges—average portdisbursements (non cargo handling)—cargo-handling costs—typical portrevenue and expenditure—port pricing—costs and cost centres—current port

charges—port finance and profitability

Where relevant or considered useful,costs and prices have been giventhroughout the book. The aim of thischapter is to take a brief look at ports asa whole and analyse how some of themore important costs and prices havechanged and developed, especiallywhere they have been catalysts forchange.

How Much Does aPort Cost?

This is, of course, an impossiblequestion to answer in general, as everyport is different, unlike ships where onecan generalise. Average prices forPanamax bulkers or VLCCs, forexample, are frequently given in themaritime press. Further, ports are rarelysold on the open market. However, on18 December 1997 Lloyd’s List gavedetails of the sale of Thamesport,basically a container terminal developedin the late 1980s on an old BP oilterminal at the Isle of Grain. In 1997Thamesport forecast a throughput of240,000 TEUs, which was a healthyincrease on the 180,000 TEUs handled

in 1996. The reported price paid forThamesport at the end of 1997 was £112million ($186 million) which was alarge increase on the £52.45 millionpaid for it in 1995 when the port was infinancial difficulties, being unable toservice its £100 million debt.

In 1997 Thamesport was technicallyone of the most advanced ports in theworld from an automated cargo-handlingpoint of view and being on the site of anoil terminal has good deep-waterfacilities and space to expand. Further,as Felixstowe (its major competitor)bought Thamesport, the new owners willcontrol just under 50% of the UK

container market. Those trying toestimate a model for port value fromthese details should bear in mind what isin fact the port’s biggest problem, itspoor road and rail connections.

A similar development that wasreported in Lloyd’s List on 12 January1998 was that at Taranto in southernItaly. At this port the large container shipcompany Evergreen were proposing toinvest in a new dedicated containerterminal, to be developed at what hadbeen a dry bulk terminal. The newterminal would consist of a 2,100-metrelong pier with 16 post Panamax cranesand a depth alongside of 14.5 metres,

though further dredging was beingconsidered. For this terminal Evergreenwere proposing to invest $50 millionwith the Italian government adding afurther $11 million.

On 22 January 1998 Lloyd’s Listreported that Antwerp was to go aheadwith a planned construction programmethat would double the container-handlingcapacity at the port from 2.5 millionTEUs to over 5 million. The estimatedcost of the proposed quay constructionwas about $109 million while theexpected dredging costs were to bearound $22 million. The Belgiangovernment will finance 60% of the

project.

Figure 41: Development of port costs

In September 2002, Lloyd’s Listreported that the proposed new containerterminal at Dibden Bay at Southamptonwould cost around US$1 billion.However, the fact that in 2004 the portlost the planning permission battle

against the environmentalists does notinvalidate the estimate.

A further complication arises as UKports are now required to fund road andrail infrastructure to improve access tothe port.

Concerning the cost of purchasing aterminal, the price/earning ratio is oftenused to compare prices, and from 2005to 2007 this ratio varied from 14 to 58.This latter figure is that reported for theShanghai International Port Group inDecember 2007.

Figure 41 above (aggregated figuresfor several ports) and the table at the topof page 173 (London figures) indicate

that at the beginning of the period shown,the non cargo-handling costs were higherthan the cargo-handling costs. In fact,this was the case until the 1950s, whenstevedoring labour throughout much ofthe developed world started to becomeexpensive. During the 1960s the cargo-handling costs rose dramatically, and forliner shipowners became their largestcost. Hence one can argue that it wasmanagement’s desire to reduce this costthat brought about the introduction ofbulk cargoes in the 1950s and unitisationin the 1960s and 1970s. This argument isstrengthened when one considers thatcontainerisation first appeared in

countries where the stevedoring costswere the highest, i.e. USA and Australia.

The graph and table also make clear,that as expected, dockers’ wages andcargo-handling costs were highlycorrelated throughout this period.However, now where containerisationhas made cargo-handling a capital-intensive operation rather than a labour-intensive one, it no longer exists.

Costs in Pounds SterlingNon

cargo-handling

£ per

Loadingcosts per

ton(London)

Stevedores'daily wage

NRT

Year

Noncargo-

handlingcosts

Cargo-handling

costs

Dockers’wage

1870 0.20 0.03 0.211890 0.20 0.03 0.251910 0.25 0.05 0.291930 0.46 0.09 0.561950 0.50 0.52 1.001970 1.42 3.33 2.601990 1.25** 6.08*

Source: Author's M.Phil.* Based on £90 per container (world average)with an average load of 15 tonnes.** World average for dry cargo vessels.

Australia cargo-handlingcosts

Year Cargo-handling per ton of cargo(£ per ton)

1922 0.89 In and Out1930 1.04 In and Out1935 0.94 In and Out1939 1.07 In and OutSource: Paper by Dr K. Trace.

The above table shows how muchmore expensive cargo handling was inAustralia compared with the UK.Presumably during this periodAustralian stevedores were better paid

than their British counterparts

Figure 42: Shipowners’ major costsexpressed as a percentage

As shown above, cargo handlingthroughout this period changed frombeing one of the shipowners’ lowestcosts to, after 1950, a rapidly escalating

one. In fact by 1960 on the UK/Australialiner trade virtually 50% of the freightearned by the shipowner for carrying thecargo on this route was being usedsimply to lift the cargo on and off theship. On shorter routes the percentagewould of course have been much higher.

Total Port Charges

As can be seen in the above table, UKaverage port costs for shipowners are67% higher than the continental costsand this basic difference in costspersists to the present day. The lightdues are often blamed for this differencebut the table shows that in 1923 all thecosts at the continental ports are lowerexcept tallying.

The following table shows some costsfor 1933/34. This indicates that

Rotterdam and Leghorn are still verymuch cheaper than London, althoughNew York costs are at a similar level.

Cranage and winchmen were usuallycharged as an extra cost per day.BIMCO also reported on a case wherethe Master checked the labour presentand claimed the labour bill should havebeen £30 not £80. Receivers refused toreduce the price and said it was the

normal practice. Half the cost ofweighing cargo was debited to theshipowner. There was little evidence ofFIO contracts. These seem to have comein around the Second World War.

According to a report made for theNational Ports Council in 1969, manycontinental countries such as Germany,Belgium, the Netherlands and France dooffer very extensive subsidies to theirports. Even though this was some timeago, British ports are still convinced thattheir continental rivals do receiveconsiderable “financial aid” in someform or other. However, it is verydifficult to prove or establish that one

port is helped more or needs more helpthan another.

These continental ports are competingfor a very large continental hinterlandand the ports in this case can betremendous foreign currency earners.These possibilities do not really applyto ports in the UK, though London hasundoubtedly lost trade to Rotterdam withits lower charges. Note that the NationalPorts Council is now defunct but theliterature and surveys this bodycompleted were amongst some of thebest documentary work on British ports.

The table above compares portcharges for different sizes of vessels in1985 and 1992. As one would perhapsexpect, the costs at a large oil port likeRas Tanura are less than at a largegeneral port such as Rotterdam, though itis interesting to note that, according tothese figures, Rotterdam is expensivewhen compared with Yokohama.

The table below is a good example ofhow port charges can vary from port toport and country to country within

Europe for the same ship with the samecargo, e.g. a 64,500 dwt Panamax vesselhaving a draft of 13.25 metres and alength overall of 225 metres (Lloyd’sList, 1988).

Country/Port Port charges US$Yugoslavia 65,000Rotterdam 50,000Finland 150,000Lisbon 12,500Italy 30,000France 85,000Southampton 150,000

The table above again shows UK ports

as among the most expensive.

Average PortDisbursements (NonCargo Handling)

All port non cargo-handlingdisbursements—charges per net ton

(NT) in USD:

Drycargovessels:

Average US$2 per NT, SD 1.5(Ship-handling made up 57%of total)

Tankers:Average US$1.5 per NT, SD0.97 (Ship-handling made up55.5% of total)

The statistics above were calculated asaverages of random samples of at least50 ports taken on a world-wide basis(SD = standard deviation).

These costs are usually made up ofthree groups:

— Agency costs. These costs are

usually based on a scale ofcharges agreed by someappropriate nationalorganisation. The fee chargedwill depend on the nature andscale of the work involved.

— Harbour dues. This is primarilythe rental charged for the use ofthe terminal. A random samplefrom 120 ports world-wideshowed for dry-cargo ships anaverage of 0.186 per NT with astandard deviation of 0.47, whilefor tankers the average was0.0618 per NT with a standarddeviation of 0.19.

— Ship-handling. Charges madeup of pilotage, boatmen and tugs.From the same sample of portsthe average for dry-cargo shipswas 0.707 per NT with astandard deviation of 0.77, whilefor tankers the average was0.5963 per NT with a standarddeviation of 0.63.

There are other charges by some ports;in the UK, for instance, charges arelevied for the maintenance of lights,navigational aids and dredging.

Cargo-Handling Costs

Total terminal cargo-handling charges(1864)

Place Commodity Charge

Glasgow Pig iron—per ton (Loading) L£0.04

Glasgow

Coal—loadedandtrimmedper ton

L£0.07

GlasgowBarrels—ale, flour,etc.

L£0.01

Heavy

Glasgow machinerylifted withcrane

L£0.15

GlasgowBags—oats andflour

L£0.01

NewYork

Pig iron,guano,saltpetreper ton

(Discharge)D $0.50

NewYork

Lightgoods perton

D $0.30

NewYork

Heavygoods perton

D $0.44

New Coffee per

York bag D $0.03

NewYork

Ballastper ton L or D $0.45

NewYork

Coal perton L$0.50

This table gives some typical cargocharges per bag or ton as indicated forthe latter part of the nineteenth century.

Total terminal handlingcharges (THC)

Average total terminal charges per TEU

(sample of some 100 ports in 1993) =US$136.8 having a standard deviation of56.5 (Source: 1993 WMU studentresearch).

A survey published in Lloyd’s List in1997 indicated that many Caribbeanports were too expensive, chargingUS$200–400 per TEU when comparedwith most Latin American ports whichcharged only US$150 per TEU.

In 1998 the conference, THC for HongKong to Europe, USA & Australia,charge was $267 per TEU.

A report published in 2001 suggesteda charge of $80 as a competitive price inthe Mediterranean for a trans-shipment

box in a port such as Giao Tauro.A survey done by dockers’ unions in

2004 to refute the Brussels port planindicated that average cost per TEU inthe EU was $100, the USA was $200and Japan was $300.

Typical terminal charges forloading/discharging specific cargo asindicated:

— per ton of grain 2–7 US$— per ton of pig iron 5–15 US$— per ton of coal 2.5–10 US$— per ton of general 3–20 US$— per car loaded—around 19 US$— per ton of paper pulp—around

10 US$

International benchmarkingof container stevedoring

“Prices and productivity at Australianbox terminals generally improvedagainst their overseas counterpartsbetween 1997 and 2002”, according to anew report by the ProductivityCommission.

The Commission’s report,International Benchmarking ofContainer Stevedoring, shows thatmajor Australian container ports in 2002

are now cheaper “rather than moreexpensive as used to be the case” thanLos Angeles.

On the US East Coast trades,Philadelphia has moved from ratingequally with Australian ports to beingmore expensive.

Both Los Angeles and Philadelphiaare considerably more expensive thanAustralia on reefer handling, a trendrepeated around the world.

In Europe, Australian ports havemoved from being more costly in 1997to being on a pricing par with Hamburgand Tilbury, and they are cheaper thanboth for reefers.

Australian reefer charges are muchlower than the south-east Asian ports ofSingapore and Port Klang. For drycargo, however, Singapore remainscheaper “though not by as much as1997”. The price gap with Port Klang,however, has opened considerably.

Australian terminals are still muchmore expensive than Busan, and cheaperthan the neighbouring north-east Asianport of Nagoya though the gap has closedsince 1997. The cost of handling reefersat Busan and Nagoya is much higher thanin Australia.

The Commission says that some of thegains are a result of more 40-ft

equipment being handled in Australia,which reduces the per 20-ft cost rating.

The shift in exchange rates also had amajor impact on the cost comparisonwith US ports, accounting for half of theincrease of Los Angeles over Australianports. But even allowing for the dollarfactor, the price gap in Australia’sfavour is still considerable. The gains incrane productivity on overseascounterparts were marked, but not asimpressive as the gains in cost.

A sample survey of net crane rate atSydney showed the port closing the gapon Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Hamburg,Nagoya and Busan. However, Sydney

pulled ahead of only one port in theperiod, Tilbury. Singapore and PortKlang actually increased their lead of1997.

Typical Port Revenueand Expenditure

The table above gives a percentagebreakdown of the expenditures andrevenues for the ports of Singapore andRotterdam. The differences in the listsreflect the differences between the portauthorities on the matter of portownership.

Port Pricing

See also Chapter 6.

Who sets prices?

(a) The state or regional authority This has often been the case to avoidunfair competition between ports. Analternative is where the state does notset the price but requires its ports toseek its permission before making anyprice changes.

(b) The port The question of port charges has becomemore significant since the advent ofintermodalism has increased thecompetitive potential between ports.

Lord Rochdale in his report on British

ports (1962) stated:

“There has been a tendency, not only in thiscountry, to treat various branches of thetransport industry as some form of publicservice to which, for one reason or theother, sound financial principles need notbe applied. As far as major ports areconcerned, we entirely reject the conceptof public service in so far as this might beheld to limit the responsibility forconducting their financial affairs on thebasis of sound economic and accountingprinciples. In other words we see no reasonwhy the major ports should not be treatedfor this purpose as commercialundertakings.”

For a long period most of the ports in

north-west Europe have lookedenviously at each other convinced thattheir competitors all enjoy substantialfinancial subsidies which make amockery of the concept of faircompetition. As already mentioned, in1969 the British National Ports Councilproduced a report which indicated thatmany continental countries such asGermany, Belgium, the Netherlands andFrance all offered extensive subsidies totheir ports. When charged with thisunfair practice all the ports in thesecountries strenuously deny such help andclaim the situation is totally otherwise.The disparity in the assessment seems to

lie in the interpretation of whatconstitutes financial assistance. In 1969,for example, the Port of Hamburg andthe City of Hamburg were treated as onein such matters as street lighting androad maintenance, so who could say ifthe port was being subsidised in thisarea? Communities also differ as to theirperception as to who should pick up thebill for costs such as dredging,navigation marks, ice breaking, policing,etc. However, in a European ports’ studyby Hulse and Speel as reported inLloyd’s List on 20 February 1986, UKports charge 60% more due toinvestment, maintenance costs and light

dues which their continental competitorscan leave to governmental finances.Note: dredging is usually a relativelyhigh cost. For instance in 1962 thedredging cost per ton of cargo in Londonwas 3d (1.25 pence).

Costs and CostCentres

The table at the bottom of page 179(Charges on cargo) is based on theUNCTAD Report on Port Pricing and ispart of a widespread attempt to get someuniformity into the system. Many portsmay due to their own specific problems

wish to adjust the charging system. Forinstance, a port with very little spareberth space may charge for its berthoccupancy by the hour rather than theday.

A variation on the attempt tostandardise port charges was made bythe British National Ports Council. Asthe Council is now defunct, its proposalsto simplify and standardise port chargesnever progressed to their logicalconclusion. However, these proposalssowed the seeds for change and therehave been many moves to simplify thecharges. With the advent of containersthere have been further moves to

simplify these charges. For instance, atsome ports, container ship operators arecharged a standard rate per container,laden or empty, which is inclusive ofdock and conservancy charges, portrates and all normal handling chargesfrom the time of receipt or dischargeuntil the time of shipment or loading toland transport.

Current Port Charges

As the previous data indicates there isno general model or formula to estimate

current port expenses but if you need orare interested in current expenses themost direct way is to try the internet.BIMCO can be found athttp://www.bimco.dk.

The BIMCO port database containsdetails of over 2,500 ports including up-to-date port conditions, while the portcost estimator is an active spreadsheetallowing members to calculate the costsof calling at ports in more than 60countries based on actual tariffs andregulations. For those who are notmembers, some university librariescovering maritime economics may havean arrangement to allow access to the

BIMCO cost estimator. However, forthose without the necessary contacts askyour internet search engine for portcosts, where with luck you will find portagents’ port cost estimators for theirlocal ports. Before looking for anestimator you need to have the detailsfor the ship you are interested in, i.e.ship type, dwt tonnage, GT, NT, length,breadth, draft and perhaps nationality.

Port Finance andProfitability

A port’s profitability is not a directreflection of management efficiency butmore of market forces. If the portmanagement is efficient, however, it willrespond quickly to changes in prevailingmarket conditions. Different accountingmethods, different tax requirements andconcessions in different countries, andthe very varying elements of financialassistance that are offered make mostforms of comparative financial analysisof dubious value. However, since theSecond World War most ports do seemto have moved in general from being afinancial liability to being a profitablecommercial activity.

Chapter TwelvePort EnvironmentalMatters—SustainableDevelopment

The organisations, Conventions andReports—the basic argument—thecauses of port environmental pollution

—a policy for sustainable developmentin a port—emergency plans, personneland training—examples

The Organisations,Conventions andReports

UNCTAD—Sustainable DevelopmentFor Ports (Report, 25 October 1993).IMO—Convention on the Prevention ofMarine Pollution by Dumping of Wastesand Other Matter (London Dumping

Convention—in force since 1975).

— Marpol/Solas 73/78 in forcesince 1983. (MARPOL AnnexV1 in force 19 May 2005)

Oil Pollution Preparedness, Responseand Co-operation (ORPC90) inforce since 1990—makes itmandatory for ports to have oilpollution plans coordinated within anational contingency arrangement.Since maritime casualties canseriously effect ports, shippingConventions may also apply.

UNCED—UN Conference onEnvironment and Development in

1992— Agenda 21 of the RioConference. This recommendsassessment of environmental impactin project planning, port receptionfacilities, contingency plans for oiland chemical spills, systematicrecording of the state of the marineenvironment.

IAPH—International Association ofPorts and Harbours has established asubcommittee on Port, Ship, Safetyand Environment and Construction—COPSSEC. IAPH has also prepareda draft Charter on environmentalpolicy for ports.

PIANC—Permanent International

Association of Navigation Congressnow includes environmental issueson its agenda.

World Bank—Technical Paper No.126/1990, EnvironmentalConsiderations for Port and HarbourDevelopment.

ESCAP—Assessment of theEnvironmental Impact of PortDevelopment 1993.

ICS—International Chamber of ShippingINTERTANKO—International

Association of Independent TankerOwners.

ISGOTT—International Safety Guide forOil Tankers and Terminals.

OCIMF—Oil Companies InternationalMarine Forum.

SIGTTO—Society of International GasTankers and Terminal Operators.

ESPO—European Seaports OrganisationPublished (founded 1993) updates toCode of Practice including 10commandments for managing greenobjectives.

FEPORT—Federation of EuropeanPrivate Port Operators. Formed in1993 and by 2005 had 800 membercompanies. Informs and co-ordinatesmembers on EU policy

The Basic Argument

The use of maritime transport throughoutthe world is necessarily of interest tothose who must consider the possibleconsequences of the transportation ofcargoes potentially harmful to theenvironment. It is also of interestbecause of the potential for harm to theenvironment from investments inmaritime transport infrastructure andsuperstructure.

Those concerned with globalenvironmental issues often look withgrave concern at a 20-year future where

population levels are greatly increasedcompared to the present day. Trends inenergy consumption, if projected overthe next 20 years for the increasingglobal population, give cause for alarmbecause of the greater stress that will beplaced on non-renewable resources.Other potential effects—such as globalwarming, sea-level rise and depletion ofthe ozone layer—can result from theburning of these fuel resources. Whilethese two issues are not the only causesfor environmental alarm when looking atthe future, they are both major factorswith which the world must deal. (Figure43 is a possible projection for 2025.)

Figure 43: Global population and oilconsumption in 2025 (estimated)

This suggests an increase in total dailyconsumption of crude oil from 10million tonnes to roughly 13 milliontonnes. If, however, the consumption forthe developing world is adjusted basedon the per capita consumption of thedeveloped world, then one could expectan increase in total daily consumption ofcrude oil from 10 million tonnes to

roughly 50 million tonnes.From this one example it is clear that

the environmental problems will growrather than diminish as societiesdevelop.

At the same time, these two issueshold great promise for those whoseprimary concern is the movement of theworld’s raw materials, processedmaterials and manufactured goods. Atpresent it is estimated that 80% of thegoods of the world are moved bymaritime transport. The huge increase inpopulation holds within it the potentialfor a steadily and rapidly increasingconsumer base and the greater

consumption of fuel sources portends theneed for distribution systems that areable to handle significantly greaterquantities with capability for delivery toan increasing number of locations. Whilean evaluation of potential consequencessuggests that consumption of productsand energy cannot increase in directproportion to the population withoutincurring devastating effects upon theglobal environment, there can be nodoubt that the world will for many yearsface a need for the transport of steadilyincreasing quantities of material to newand more remote locations. Thisportends a steady increase in the number,

and/or size, of vessels that will beengaged in moving these goods.

As the existing global transportationsystem expands to meet this growingtransport demand, we must anticipate thethreats that this holds for the globalenvironment. Already busy ports willexpand to accommodate the increasedcargo throughput. New ports will bedeveloped where in the past there wasonly a waterway. Needs to accommodatethe efficient movement of goods willrequire the use of previouslyundeveloped land, or the transformationof existing land uses in the vicinity ofmodal connection nodes. Extension of

distribution systems to reach newlocations at greater distances into thehinterlands and expansion of existingdistribution systems to accommodate anincreased flow of materials will subjectareas to new or greater risks from thehazards of products being transportedand to the emission effects of thetransport vehicles.

All of this is not to suggest that thisanticipated development in maritimetransport will be bad environmentallyand therefore should not take place, butone must emphasise the point that withthis anticipated significant developmentwill come a significant threat to the

environment. The global transportationsystem will expand in response to theanticipated levels of economicdevelopment and the challenge will beto find a way to accommodate thisexpansion in an environmentallysustainable manner.

Since the international carriage offreight continues to move in increasingvolumes through effectively linkedintermodal systems, much of the comingincrease in transport demand can be

expected to be accommodated by wellplanned intermodal transport systems.How the world’s intermodal systemsgrow to accept this demand, whenviewed in the macro sense, will have atremendous global environmentalimpact. Yet, there will be no singlegovernment entity that will oversee thisgrowth and, thus, no single entity toexamine the global environmentalimpact. The environmental interests ofthe world will be safeguarded only ifeach of the governments, and each of theadministrations, organisations andcompanies involved in this development,take local actions that are in harmony

with global thinking. The very fact thateffective intermodal freight movementrequires careful planning bodes well forthe global environment—if, as a part ofthat planning, principles for achievingsustainable development areincorporated.

There is a great challenge here forthose who will be involved with thedesign and operation of the maritimetransport systems needed to support thisincreased demand. In countries withdeveloping economies, the need foreconomic development will continue tofoster a tendency to favour developmentat the expense of, and sometimes without

a thought for, the environmentalconsiderations. In countries withdeveloped economies, the possibility ofgaining a larger share of the export andtransport market will provide similarpressures to ignore or downplayenvironmental consequences despite agrowing environmental awareness of thepopulace.

The greatest proportion of populationincreases will come within countriescharacterised as having developingeconomies. This means that the newmarket that must be supplied with freightwill lie largely in regions thatpreviously have not been subjected to

the environmental degradation that sooften accompanies the industrialisationprocess. These are regions which,because of past industrialisationpractices in countries with developedeconomies, have taken on an evengreater significance in maintaining theecological balance of the world. Thedevelopment here will come and, infairness to those who live in theseregions, should come. But, it must besustainable development.

The greatest capability of providingthe goods and the means of transport tothis emerging market lies within thecountries with developed economies.

And, it is in these countries that thelargest areas of wetlands have alreadybeen filled in or destroyed. It is in thesecountries that the greatest contaminationof air and waterways has already takenplace. The populations that live nearthese existing transport corridors andnodes can perhaps least afford theconsequences of continued developmentto meet this increased transport demand.It will be critical to the long-termenvironmental and thereby economichealth, of these regions for any furtherdevelopment to be sustainabledevelopment.

A cautionary tale for theover-zealous

In the early 1990s the Peruvianauthorities stopped chlorinating theirwater supplies because ofenvironmentalists’ claims that thechlorine was carcinogenic. Cholera thenflourished in the chlorine-free water,infecting over a million people andkilling 10,000.

The Causes of Port

EnvironmentalPollution

See also Chapter 5.

(1) Pollution from portmaintenance.

(a) Maintenance dredging.In 1997 New York had todelay important channeldredging until it couldfind a suitable dumpingplace for the toxicdredged material.

(b) Maintenance ofsuperstructure andequipment.

(2) Pollution from developinginfrastructure.

(a) Deepening accesschannels.

(b) New construction—boththe above may unsettlethe local marineecosystem.

(3) Pollution from maintenance andrepairs to ships and portindustrialisation.

(4) Pollution from cargo handlingand storage. With dry bulk cargothere appears to be a widelyaccepted principle that 1% ofcargo is “lost” in the process oftransportation and most of thiswill be in ports. Enclosedhandling systems for dry bulkmaterials were first introducedin 1967. An example is theEurosilo concept manufacturedby ESI Engineers andContractors in the Netherlands.See ICHCA Cargo Today,October 1996.

(5) Pollution due to sea-based

activities.

(a) Tanker accidents.(b) Discharges from ships.

Ship’s exhaust gasemissions—MARPOLAnnex V1 (in force 2005)on air pollution iscausing some anxietyconcerning ship’s exhaustgases containing sulphuroxide. It is anticipatedthat ships will be bannedfrom the use of residualbunker fuels. Such amove would of course

increase the ship’sbunker costs.

(c) Discharge of “clean”ballast water may causeunwanted effects due tothe presence of pathogensand foreign organisms.An article in The Times,18 October 1998,indicated that, in a surveyof 111 ports, 79% ofthese ports had no policyor regulations concerningdumping of ballast water.In fact only three portshad any idea that ballast

water posed anenvironmental risk.

12 billion tonnes ofballast water aretransferred each year.4,500 species of plantsand animals transportedround the world each day(IMO estimate).

E-mail for informationon ballast water news:dpughiuc@imo.org.

(d) IMO seeks a total banon tributyltin and othertoxic anti-fouling paintsby 2008.

(6) Pollution from shore-basedtransport operations—theport/city interface.

(a) Visual and noisepollution.

(b) Traffic congestion.(c) Accidents involving

dangerous substances.

Top 10 port environmentalissues—Lloyd’s List, 26October 1999

Air quality, dredging, dust, energy use,habitat loss, health and safety, noise, soilcontamination, waste management andwater quality.

Port and harbour relatedpollution types, sources andenvironmental effects

Type ofpollution Sources Environmental

effectsMunicipal andindustrialeffluent.Urban run-off Very common

Oil andhydrocarbons

and riverineinput.Accidentalspillage.Bilge waters,fuel oil andballast water.Marineterminals andrefinery input.Drydocking/repairoperations.Atmosphericinput.

pollutant inharbours.Large slickspills impacton marinewildlife.The socialimpact of tarball formation.Tainting of fishand shellfishtissue canoccur.

Organic decaygiving rise tosmelly and

Oxygendemandingwastes

Sewage outfallswithin the portand from ships.Gull colonies.Fishing relatedwaste.Processindustry waste(organic).Agriculturaland industrialriverine input.

toxic hydrogensulphide,ammonia andmethane.Migratorysalmonids willnot travelthrough lowoxygen water.Seagulldroppingsreduce oxygenand introduceviruses andbacteria (suchas salmonella).

Dischargesfrom marine Unsightly and a

health risk as it

Litter andgarbage

transport.Recreationalareas and allharbour areas.Constructionwork andriverine input.

encourages ratsand gulls.Danger towildlife andharbouractivities.

Heavy metals

Riverine input,municipal andindustrialeffluents.Anti-foulingpaints,chemicalspillage,dredging

The metals canbe toxic andcauseabnormalitiesin thoseorganismswhichaccumulatethem.Shellfish andalgae are

disturbance. importantbioaccu-mulators.

Solidinorganic

Capital andmaintenancedredging, shippropellerdisturbance,constructionwork, riverineinput.

Water clarity isaffected andincreasedsuspendedsolids havesmotheringimplicationsfor sessilemarine floraand fauna.

Persistenthalogenatedorganic

Effects arelittleunderstood butmay be toxic orcarcinogenic or

Persistentpollutants

compoundssuch as PCBsare componentsof a variety ofmaterials andeffluents. Thedrins are usedas pesticides.

harmlessdepending oncompound.May affectsomeorganismsmore thanothers and indifferent ways.

Nutrients(nitrates and

Agriculturalrunoff.Domestic and

Nutrientscontained inriverine andcoastal runoffcan in certainclimaticconditions,lead to algalblooms and

phosphates) industrialeffluents.

low oxygenconditionsresulting fromthe decay ofalgal matterandeurophication.

Atmosphericpollutants

Transportexhaustemissions.Volatile organiccarboncompounds.Cargo spills,construction

Poor airquality,greenhouseeffect.The oxides ofnitrogen andsulphur causeacidificationby wet and drydeposition.Harmful

work, reeferunits.

organic nitratecompoundsmay also beformed.

Noise

Virtually allactivity butespeciallyrepair,maintenanceandconstructionwork.

Health threatand nuisance.Disturbance tolocal wildlife.

Odours

Cargo/materialsstorage,leakage,disposal.

Local nuisancewith possibletoxicconsequences.

Level of risk

Level of risk = frequency × magnitude ofdamage

The frequency can be calculated frompast experience at the port and theexperience of other ports with similaractivities and geographicalcharacteristics. Lloyd’s List tabulatesmost incidents that occur in ports world-wide.

The effect will vary greatly from portto port according to the particularphysical features and situation of theport. Thus each port will have to make

its own assessment.

Examples: Major claims to large P&Iclub

Pollutionclaims

Percentage1993

Average value($ million)

Grounding 23 1.6Bunkering 12 1.5Collision 12 0.9Valvefailure 12 0.3

Shell platefailure 11 1.1

Wrongvalve 8 0.6

Pipe failure 5 0.2

Fire/Sinking 4 5.0

Other 13 1.3Source: UK P&I club—analysis of majorclaims 1993.

Costs

Direct costs—personnel (recruiting andtraining), infrastructure, equipment,operating and maintenance, creation oflaws and regulations, etc.

Development costs—in 1999 a largeUK port developing a large newterminal found that currentenvironmental factors added 10% todevelopment costs, not to mention many

additional delays.Indirect costs—protective measures

which cause delays in port activities,and in traffic and port productivity zones

The “polluter pays” principle statesthat the polluter should in principle bearthe costs of pollution, prevention andclean up as determined by the publicauthorities (Rio Declaration—Principle16).

Cost examples 1992—one Europeanport made an investment of US$1m inspecific devices to control waterpollution, while a major Australian portspent almost $2m on harbour cleaningand beach cleaning vehicles. The

harbour vehicle alone costs US$0.2m ayear to operate. Zero pollution is notpossible and the more one strives for itthe more expensive it becomes.Therefore for every pollution situation,there is an optimum point for correctivemeasures to be taken. In eachcountry/port the authority should definesuch an “acceptable degree” ofpollution.

Consider the implication of the aboveas regards the port’s pricing policy.

Note: In 2001 700 tons of styrene, acolourless and toxic liquid, was spiltinto the Shanghai delta following acollision involving a small chemical

tanker— but no Conventions or fundsexist to deal with this problem.

A Policy forSustainableDevelopment in a Port

Objectives

In terms of action an environmentallysensitive port development objectivemust involve a balance between the

exploitation of resources, the directionof investments and the orientation oftechnological development andinstitutional change. The objective mustachieve harmony between the viablecommercial sustainability of the port’sperformance and the sustainability of theport’s total environment.

Within the port authority and otherbodies working in the port area, thereshould be specific and quantitative sub-objectives or targets assigned to eachorganisation or unit.

Environmental impact

assessment

(a) What changes will be caused incoastal ecology by the proposedphysical development?

(b) What effect will ships’operations have on theenvironment?

(c) What effect will the variousemissions have on theenvironment?

(d) How will dredged material bedisposed of?

Environmental audit

The EC Directive 85/337 advocates thatall major industries carry out anenvironmental audit. In the UK this isimplemented by the 1990 EnvironmentalProtection Act. This applies to everyport, including those on inlandwaterways, which accepts vessels ofover 1,350t. A comprehensive auditshould detail in tabulated and map formsthe handling and storage areas ofprescribed materials, waste emissions,spoil disposal areas, dust and noisezones and all other sources of pollution.It should detail areas of fishing,wetlands, zones of specific scientific orcultural interest, recreational areas,

urban and industrial areas and so on. Itwill show the impact of port activitieson the environment as a whole and theway in which the port is dealing withthese. Such an audit must be availablefor public scrutiny.

The purpose of an audit will includeprovision of a proper basis foridentification of priorities inenvironmental protection, where andhow regulations such as MARPOL andthe Dangerous Goods Code are beingapplied and indicate degrees of conflictbetween uses and interests involved.

In the UK environmental audits are notyet mandatory but port managements can

be and have been found liable forenvironmental damage with consequentpunitive damages.

Control

It is obviously necessary that the policybe initiated and controlled from a centralpoint which might be the port authorityor a branch of the Transport Ministry. Animportant part of this policy mustinvolve waste management strategy.This will include the classification ofwastes and sources, setting standardsand controlling permits/licences for

transporters, operators and facilities.International Conventions require

ports to provide adequate receptionfacilities to meet the needs of shipswithout causing undue delay. One veryimportant decision that has to be madeby the appropriate authority concerns thecost recovery mechanism (CRM).Points to consider are:

1. Will the CRM reduce orprevent illegal discharges?

2. Does the measure stimulatewaste-reducing measures onboard?

3. Is the CRM environmentally

acceptable?4. Does the CRM interfere with

free competition?5. Does the CRM obstruct the

“polluter pays” principle?6. Does the CRM provide an

incentive for reception andtreatment facilities to applyinnovative technologies?

7. Is the CRM enforceable?

Port reception facilities

With well over 600 individual EU portshandling around 90% of EU external

trade and considerable through trade,waste management is a serious businessin the European Union. First,appropriate methods need to be in placeto manage the waste and, secondly, shipsmust be encouraged to use thesefacilities rather than to discharge wasteinto the sea.

With port reception facilities in mind,the European Community set in place ECDirective 2000/59 with the aim ofsubstantially reducing discharges ofship-generated waste and cargo residuesinto the sea. The Directive is especiallyaimed at reducing illegal dischargesfrom ships using ports in the Community,

by improving the availability and use ofport reception facilities, therebyenhancing the protection of the marineenvironment. This is not a new concept,and was previously addressed by theMarplot 73/78 Convention in 1973,although Member States are stillencountering difficulties in fullyimplementing the requirements. Inaddition to all of this, the overallsituation is changing, with more andmore through traffic, particularly oiltankers, travelling through EU waterswithout calling at ports to dischargetheir waste. With EMSA’s assistance, itwill be necessary to continually adjust

EU legislation to take changing transportpatterns into account.

In the UK the Department of theEnvironment, Transport and the Regions(DETR) has produced a requirement forport waste management plans. Detailedrequirements are given in the MerchantShipping Notice MSN 1709. See alsoStatutory Instrument 1997/3018 (PortWaste Reception Facilities) Regulations1997. Under these regulations everyharbour authority in the UK must preparea waste management plan with respect tothe provision and use of facilities. Suchplans had to be submitted to the MarineSafety Agency by 30 September 1998

and a revised plan must be submitted attwo-yearly intervals following formalapproval of the plan.

The pricing system for all receptionfacilities must be such to encouragevessels to use the facilities and it willoblige all visiting vessels to deliver allwastes and residues to the receptionfacilities unless the Master can provethat the vessel has sufficient storagespace for the proposed voyage.

Figure 44: Who pays for reception facilities

Communication andconsultation

Ideally these objectives would bearrived at by consultation and agreementrather than by being imposed, and above

all everyone should know what they are.For instance, the British PortsFederation has adopted an“Environmental Code of Practice” in thehope that it will create a greaterawareness of the environment on the partof both port employees and users. Such aPolicy Statement should include sectionson:

— environmental managementsystems;

— monitoring the environment;— preparedness plan;— compliance with legislation;— consultations;

— list of current legislation; and— list of environmental

consultants.

The establishment of a legalframework

See The Organisations, Conventions andReports on page 181.

Example: NLS Certificate—International Certificate for Preventionof Pollution by Noxious LiquidSubstances in Bulk.

Enforcement and control

This is the essence of the problem. Anexcellent policy which lacks thiselement is obviously useless. Note theusefulness of civil liability as a means ofallocating responsibility for the costs ofenvironmental damage. Note also thedifficulties and problems that arose inthe early days of port state control.

ISO 14001 environmentalmanagement system (EMS) is focused onenvironmental impacts. The idea is toidentify significant impacts and ifnegative to reduce or remove them.

Tankers trading to the USA must have

a letter (renewed each year) from USGCbefore loading and discharging. Thepurpose of the letter is to indicate thatthe vessel is essentially safe andenvironmentally sound.

Green Award Flag for ships

An award established in Rotterdam in1994. In 2007 there were 250 vesselsenrolled in the scheme. Fifty ports in theworld give between 5–7% discount onall port dues for ships under the GreenAward Flag. Sullom Voe gives a 5%reduction in dues to ships accredited by

the Green Award scheme. Somecharterers are also showing interest inlooking for owners who participate inthe scheme. There are some who aresuggesting that an environmental salvagereward could be included in the Lloyd’sOpen Form but there have beencomments from P&I club managers thatsuch a move might be counter-productive.

In a speech by the BIMCO Presidentin 2007 it was suggested that a GreenAward Flag for Ports would have amongits major requirements adequate wastereception facilities, incentives for GreenFlag ships and means of reducing

sulphur oxide emissions from ships.

Emergency Plans,Personnel andTraining

Seaport oil pollutionemergency plans (IMOContingency Plans 1995)

An analysis of oil spill incidents

between 1974 and 1990 indicates thatover 70% occurred in port duringloading and discharging operations, anda further 12% were from ships in portthat were engaged in bunkeringoperations. The majority of these spillswere of less than 7 tonnes; therefore it isimportant that port authorities andterminal operators develop plansdesigned to respond to the most likelyspill scenarios.

In year 2000 it was estimated that12% of all maritime pollution came fromshipping activities. Further, of all themaritime pollution caused by shipping, agreater percentage came from non-

tankers rather than tankersIn preparing a port plan due

consideration should be given to allemergency incidents which could occursuch as collisions, grounding, fire,personnel casualties. Based on theforegoing, priorities may be defined andresponse mechanisms established.

An on-scene commander should bedesignated and personnel should betrained in the use and deployment ofavailable equipment. Such a port planwill of course be integrated into and bea sub-group of a national emergencyresponse plan.

Maritime Environmental RiskManagement System—MERMS

This should comprise the following:

1. Identification of sources ofenvironmental risk—such ascargo handling and storageareas, tank cleaning facilities,etc.

2. Establishment of objectives andtargets for MERMS.

3. Compliance with Laws andRegulations on environment,

health, and safety.4. Compliance with all the

relevant IMO Conventions andCodes of Practice.

5. Compliance with all therelevant ISOGOTT, OCIMF,ICS, SIGITTO, INTERTANKOand IAPH Guides.

6. Organisation of andresponsibility for theimplementation andmaintenance of the MERMS.

Organisation andresponsibilities for

environmental riskmanagement

— Appointment of a MERMSmanager.

— Appointment ofenvironmental/safety officerswho are responsible for thecarrying out of site audits usingthe pre-defined checklists, andcarrying out spot checks.

— Establishing standard operatingprocedures for each main area ofidentified environmental risk.

— Setting up emergency responseprocedures which should be

practised under realisticconditions.

— System maintenance and review.— Establishing a marine

environmental forum wherecomplaints or suggestions frominterested parties or the publiccan be aired.

— Training managerial staff to beable to cope with media andpressure groups onenvironmental sensitive matters.

Examples

Rotterdam

Rotterdam is a municipal port. TheRotterdam Municipal Port Management(RMPM) is the landlord of the portindustry within the legal limits of theport. RMPM provides the portinfrastructure and leases the site ready tothe terminal operator who provides hisown superstructure.

RMPM is divided into threedirectorates:

1. Directorate of Shipping, whichregulates the shipping traffic,enforces by-laws and national

laws concerning dangerousgoods and the environment.

2. Directorate of CommercialDevelopment, which leases outsites, acquires new businessand is responsible for portdues.

3. Directorate of Planning whichis responsible for long-termdevelopment, strategic planningand research.

Each directorate has its own safety andenvironment department. Their activitiesare co-ordinated by a group whichanswers to the management board.

The environmental standards are setby the national government but RMPMhas its own policy on water quality andquality of silt.

Each year 23 million cubic metres aredredged of which 10 million arecontaminated to such an extent that theycannot be dumped at sea or deposited onland except in the Slufter, a 150 millioncubic metre hole that has been speciallylined. It hopes this level of pollutionwill decrease and is taking legal actionagainst the industrial polluters upstream.Pollution from ships (of which bunkeringhas been one of the worst offenders) isbeing continually reduced by the

operation of better procedures.The port has reception facilities for

oily and chemical waste and garbage.Spills of hazardous materials must be

reported immediately and equipment isavailable within RMPM control toallow for speedy clean up, whose cost isborne by the polluter. Computer modelsare available to calculate the possibleextent of the potential damage anddanger area.

Polluted industrial sites are beingencouraged to clean up their operations.The goal is to make all sites clean withinone generation (30 years)

The State has strict noise levels

necessitating the research into quietercranes, for example.

RMPM is advocating a commonEuropean Ports Policy on theenvironment so that this aspect of costcould no longer feature as an aspect ofcompetitive advantage.

RMPM employ some 20 staff directlyresponsible for environmental protectionand this does not include those engagedon research projects. Some 700operational personnel are also involvedin the process of enforcing RMPMpolicy.

Sea Empress (23 February1996)

In July 1997 the UK EnvironmentalAgency commenced criminalprosecutions following the grounding ofthe Sea Empress against:

1. Milford Haven Port Authority.2. Milford Haven harbour master.

The charges were:

(a) that the Port Authority caused anuisance to the public by thedischarge of crude and bunker

oil into the harbour area and theneighbouring coastline by failingto properly regulate navigationwithin the harbour and by alsofailing to take adequate steps toprevent or reduce the dischargeof oil after the incident occurred;and

(b) that the port authority failed toprovide a proper pilotageservice in that they permitted aninsufficiently trained andqualified pilot to perform an actof pilotage alone on the SeaEmpress.

The harbour master was also chargedwith failing to safely control andregulate shipping at the entrance andwithin the port.

The Marine Accident InvestigationReport found that the immediate causewas pilot error caused by inadequatetraining and experience. The Report alsosuggests that the standards of trainingand examination in the port areunsatisfactory and in need ofimprovement.

Following the incident, the initialsalvage response by the ship’s crew, theport authority, the Marine PollutionControl Unit and the salvage consortium

was, say the inspectors, prompt andefficient, but as the situation progressedlack of information, poor communicationbetween the parties concerned andworsening weather meant that all thepossible options were not fully exploredand mistakes were made. A problemalso seems to have been caused by keypersonnel having to be diverted toanswer media briefings at criticalperiods. A further criticism alsosuggested that the onshore managementteam became too large and unwieldy tocope with the rapidly changing incident.

In January 1999 the port was fined£4m arising out of these charges;

however, this was reduced to £750,000on appeal in March 2000.

Index

(All references are to page number.)

24-hour ruleport security, and, 57

Accidents at seaenvironmental effects, and, 185

Administration of portsfunctions of ports, 5generally, 73–78

Adverse weather

port development, and, 18time in port, and, 163

Angle of reposecargo handling, and, 122

Anti-fouling paintsenvironmental effects, and, 185

“Arrived ship”sea approaches, and, 65–66

Artificial harbourstypes of port, and, 10

Autonomous ownershipport management, and, 74

Average disbursementsport costs, and, 176

Barge

training and licensing, and, 64–65Benchmarking

cargo handling, and, 131port costs, and, 177–178

Berthsalternatives

bulk oil, for, 118–120general cargo, for, 118

berth occupancy ratios, 108container stacking areas, 113cruise ship berths, 114definitions, 108–109distribution centres, 120dry bulk carrier berth, 115dwell time, 108land productivity, 110

layout, 111–112logistics, 120maintenance, 117–118number required, 107–108offshore berthing

generally, 118–119legal considerations, 119–120

passenger berth, 114productivity definitions, 108–109quantity of equipment, 111“queuing theory”, 108reductions in waiting time, 109–110ro/ro berth, 114safe berths

Dock Regulations, 62dredging, 62–63

elements of safety, 60environmental protection, 61generally, 59–60harbour patrol service, 62hydrographic surveying, 63river works licensing, 62Sea Empress accident, and, 60–61turning basins, 62

service time, 108ship/shore liaison, 116–118shuffling containers, 114stacking area, 113tanker berth, 116traffic paths, 113type, 114–115user dedicated berths, 111–113

waiting ratio, 108waiting time, 108

Boatmentraining and licensing, and, 64

Breakwatermeaning, 6

Broken stowagecargo handling, and, 123

Bulk cargoport development, and, 31time in port, and, 158–160

Bulk oiloffshore berthing, and, 118–120

Bunker supplysea approaches, and, 66

Cargoangle of repose, 122benchmarking quality standards, 131broken stowage, 123containers

definition, 132empty containers, 133facts concerning, 132–133gang size, 133–134growth of containerisation, 131–132stuffing, 132

cranesdefinitions, 134introduction, 134requirements, 136UNCTAD Notes, 134–136

dangerous cargo, 140definitions, 121–123derricks, 134developments in handling

benchmarking quality standards, 131mechanisation, 127–131

dockers’ safety, 139drug control, 141dunnage, 121–122empty containers, 133environmental effects, and, 185equipment

cranes, 134–138introduction, 134purchase, maintenance and control,

138–139

estivage, 121gang size, 133–134hogging, 124–125mechanisation

development, 128–131generally, 127–128

on-board stowage, 123operational safety

dangerous cargo, 140development, 139–140dockers’ safety, 139

port costs, andgenerally, 176international benchmarking, 177–178total terminal charges, 174–175

positioning, 123–124

pre-shipment plan, 123safety

cargo, of, 140dockworkers, of, 139operations, of, 139–140

sagging, 124–125security

drug control, 141theft, 140–141warehouse technology, 141

ship stresses, 124–125stability, 125–126stevedore, 121stevedoring, 121stowage factor, 122stowage plan, 123

stuffing containers, 132terminal stowage, 123–124theft, 140–141trailers, 136–138warehouse technology, 141

Cargo interfacegenerally, 7–9

Casualisationdockworkers, and, 149–150

Catastrophetime in port, and, 162

Centre portcase study, 8–9generally, 7–8

Civil engineeringfeatures of ports, 4–5

Coastal submergencetypes of port, and, 10

Common Transport Policyport policy, and, 99

Competitionport management, and, 86–88

Computerised communicationsship technology, and, 46

Congestiontime in port, and, 163–167

Container security initiativesea approaches, and, 57

Container stacking areasberths, and, 113

Container stevedoringport costs, and, 177–178

Container terminalsoperating companies, and, 87–88port management, and, 87–88ship technology, and, 41–44

Containersdefinition, 132empty containers, 133facts concerning, 132–133freight stations, 120gang size, 133–134growth of containerisation, 131–132port costs, and, 177–178port management, and, 87–88security initiative, 57stacking areas, 113stuffing, 132

time in port, and, 158Co-operation

port management, and, 87Corruption

port policy, and, 97Costs, prices and revenue

average disbursements, 176benchmarking, 177–178cargo-handling

generally, 176international benchmarking, 177–178total terminal charges, 174–175

container stevedoring, 177–178cost centres, 179–180current charges, 180expenditure, 178

generally, 171–173introduction, 171pricing, 178–179profitability, 180revenue, 178total charges, 174–175

Cranesdefinitions, 134introduction, 134requirements, 136UNCTAD Notes, 134–136

Cruise shipsberths, and, 114

Customs free porttypes of port, and, 10

Customs officials

sea approaches, and, 65Customs procedures

port development, and, 23

Dangerous cargocargo handling, and, 140sea approaches, and, 58–59

Delaystime in port, and, 163–167

Derrickscargo handling, and, 134

Development of portsadverse weather, 18bulk cargo terminals, 31changes in growth, 20–23constraining factors, 13–14

customs procedures, 23financing, 22–23growth in world trade

generally, 14–16political factors, 16–18

growth of world portschanges, 20–23generally, 19–20specific cargoes, 20–21

introduction, 13–20location, 21–22phases, 13physical development, 21political factors, 16–18success factors, 18–19swot analysis, 18

technology changes, 18terminal operation

bulk cargo, 31container age, 27–28historical background, 23–27introduction, 23unitisation, 28–29

workforce, 18Disbursements

port costs, and, 176Discharges from ships

environmental effects, and, 185Distribution centres

generally, 120Dock

meaning, 5

Dock Regulationssafe berths/ports, and, 62

Dockworkerscargo handling, and, 139development, 143–145employment terms, 146–147gang size, 151international federation, 150management, 154numbers employed, 151–153port development, and, 18remuneration

casual workers, and, 149–150generally, 148–148piecework, 147time rates, 147–148

working hours, and, 150–151safety, and, 139strikes, and, 161–162technology, and, 153–154training, 154union involvement, 150–151working hours, 150–151

Dolphinmeaning, 6

Domestic portgenerally, 9

Draft for sailing shipsship technology, and, 35–36

Dredgingenvironmental effects, and, 184–185port disbursements, and, 176

port policy, and, 100port pricing, and, 103safe berths/ports, and, 62–63type of port, and, 10

Drug controlcargo handling, and, 141

Dry bulk carrier berthberths, and, 115

Dunnagecargo handling, and, 121–122

Dwell timeberths, and, 108

Economic multiplierport management, and, 84–86

Electronic data interchange

port management, and, 89–89Empty containers

cargo handling, and, 133Entrepot port

generally, 9Environmental matters

accidents at sea, and, 185anti-fouling paints, and, 185basic issues, 182–184cargo-handling, and, 185causes of pollution, 184–187conventions, 181–182discharges from ships, and, 185dredging, and, 184–185emergency plans, 191–192examples, 192–194

level of risk, 186–187organisations, 181–182pollution types, sources and effects, 186port maintenance, and, 184–185safe berths/ports, and, 61shore-based transport operations, 185sustainable development policy, 188–191

Estivagecargo handling, and, 121

EU Port and Transport Policyport policy, and, 98–100

Fast Shipsship technology, and, 44–45

Feeder portgenerally, 9

Financingport development, and, 22–23

Fishing porttypes of port, and, 10

Forwarding agentsea approaches, and, 54

Free portsport management, and, 83–84

Gang sizecargo handling, and, 133–134dockworkers, and, 151

Governing boardsport management, and, 78–79

Gross registered tonnageship technology, and, 34

Gross tonnageship technology, and, 34

Harbourmeaning, 5

Harbour mastersea approaches, and, 49–51

Harbour patrol servicesafe berths/ports, and, 62

Health officialssea approaches, and, 65

Hoggingcargo handling, and, 124–125

Hubcase study, 8–9generally, 7–8

Hydrographic surveyingsafe berths/ports, and, 63

IAPHport management, and, 78

Immigration officialssea approaches, and, 65

Inland approachesgenerally, 69intermodal transport, 69–71logistics, 69–70modal costs, 71modal split, 71–72shoreside distribution, 69

Inland clearance depotsgenerally, 120

Inland transportgenerally, 69intermodal transport, 69–71logistics, 69–70modal costs, 71modal split, 71–72shoreside distribution, 69

Internetport management, and, 90

ISPS Codesea approaches, and, 55–57

Jettymeaning, 6

Land productivity

berths, and, 110Less than container load (LCL) shippers

distribution centres, and, 120Lighter

training and licensing, and, 65Linesmen

training and licensing, and, 64Location of port

port development, and, 21–22ship technology, and, 45

Lockmeaning, 5–6

Logisticsberths, and, 120cargo management, 89conclusion, 90–91

electronic data interchange, 89–89Internet, 90introduction, 88management information systems, 88–89MARTRANS project, 90terminal management, 89vessel operation facilities, 89

Londontypes of port, and, 10–11

Management information systemslogistics, and, 88–89

Management of portsadministration, 73–78basic issues, 73competition, 86–88

development, 79–86governing boards, 78–79IAPH, 78logistics IT, 88–91ownership, 73–78safety, 92–93

Maritime industrial development areatypes of port, and, 10

Maritime intermodal interfacegenerally, 2

Maritime policyclassification, 95–96Common Transport Policy, 99constraining influences on port management,

101corruption, 97

EU Port and Transport Policy, 98–100general points, 95–97generally, 97–98meaning, 95NAFTA, and, 97–98objectives of ports, 100–101national planning, 98port ownership, 101port-state relationship, 100–101pricing, 103–105state aid, 102–103subsidies, 96–97tariffs, 103–105Trans-European Transport Network, 99WTO, and, 97

MARTRANS project

logistics, and, 90Mechanisation

development, 128–131generally, 127–128

MIDAStypes of port, and, 10

Molemeaning, 6

Mooringtime in port, and, 162

Municipal ownershipport management, and, 74

NAFTAport policy, and, 97–98

National planning

port policy, and, 98Naval port

types of port, and, 10Net registered tonnage

ship technology, and, 34Net tonnage

ship technology, and, 34Non-tidal rivers

types of port, and, 10

Offshore berthinggenerally, 118–119legal considerations, 119–120

Oil porttypes of port, and, 10

On-board stowage

cargo handling, and, 123Operational delays

time in port, and, 161Operational functions

functions of ports, 5Operational safety

dangerous cargo, 140development, 139–140dockers’ safety, 139

Ownershipport management, and, 73–78

Passenger berthberths, and, 114

Pieceworkdockworkers, and, 147

Piermeaning, 6

Pilotagetime in port, and, 162–163training and licensing, and, 63–64

Political issuesport development, and, 16–18

Pollutionaccidents at sea, and, 185anti-fouling paints, and, 185basic issues, 182–184cargo-handling, and, 185causes of pollution, 184–187conventions, 181–182discharges from ships, and, 185dredging, and, 184–185

emergency plans, 191–192examples, 192–194level of risk, 186–187organisations, 181–182pollution types, sources and effects, 186port maintenance, and, 184–185shore-based transport operations, 185sustainable development policy, 188–191

Port administrationAnd see Port managementtypes, 73–78

Port approachesinland, from

generally, 69intermodal transport, 69–71logistics, 69–70

modal costs, 71modal split, 71–72shoreside distribution, 69

sea, by24-hour rule, 57“arrived ship”, 65–66bunker supply, 66container security initiative, 57customs officials, 65dangerous cargoes, 58–59forwarding agent, 54harbour master, 49–51

health officials, 65immigration officials, 65ISPS Code, 55–57organisations concerned, 53

port captain, 49–51port security, 55–57port state control, 58safe berths, 59–63safe ports, 59–63safety at ship/port interface, 55ship’s agent, 53–54tides, 68training and licensing, 63–65vessel traffic services, 53water depth, 66–68

Port captainsea approaches, and, 49–51

Port Marine Safety Codeport management, and, 92

Port costs

And see Costs, prices and revenueaverage disbursements, 176cargo-handling, 176–178cost centres, 179–180current charges, 180expenditure, 178generally, 171–173introduction, 171pricing, 178–179profitability, 180revenue, 178total charges, 174–175

Port delaystime in port, and, 163–167

Port developmentAnd see Development of ports

changes in growth, 20–23introduction, 13–20terminal operation, 23–31

Port environmental mattersAnd see Environmental mattersbasic issues, 182–184causes of pollution, 184–187conventions, 181–182emergency plans, 191–192examples, 192–194organisations, 181–182sustainable development policy, 188–191

Port labourAnd see Dockworkersdevelopment, 143–145employment terms, 146–147

management, 154numbers employed, 151–153remuneration, 147–149technology, and, 153–154training, 154union involvement, 150–151

Port logisticsdistribution centres, 20generally, 20

Port maintenanceberths and terminals, and, 117–118environmental effects, and, 184–185

Port managementadministration, 73–78autonomous ownership, and, 74basic issues, 73

competition, 86–88container terminal operating companies,

87–88co-operation, 87development

assumption of risks and liabilities, 81first generation port, 79fourth generation port, 80rise and fall, 81–83second generation port, 80summary of differences, 81third generation port, 80

economic multiplier, as, 84–86electronic data interchange, 89–89free ports, 83–84governing boards, 78–79

introduction, 73IAPH, 78Internet, 90logistics IT

cargo management, 89conclusion, 90–91electronic data interchange, 89–89Internet, 90introduction, 88management information systems, 88–89MARTRANS project, 90terminal management, 89vessel operation facilities, 89

management information systems, 88–89MARTRANS project, 90municipal ownership, and, 74

objectives, 84ownership, 73–78Port Marine Safety Code, 92private ownership, and, 74privatisation, and, 77–78safety

environmental, 93generally, 92Port Marine Safety Code, 92port security, 92–93

security, 92–93state ownership, and, 74vessel operation facilities, 89

Port ownershipAnd see Port managementport policy, and, 101

types, 73–78Port policy

And see Maritime policycorruption, 97EU Port and Transport Policy, 98–100general points, 95–97generally, 97–98port ownership, 101port-state relationship, 100–101pricing, 103–105state aid, 102–103

Port security24-hour rule, 57container initiative, 57generally, 55–57

Port state control

sea approaches, and, 58Ports

administrationAnd see Port managementtypes, 73–78

administrative functions, 5approaches

And see Port approachesinland, from, 69–72sea, by, 49–68

basic issues, 1–2berths

And see Berthsalternatives, 118–119container stacking areas, 113definitions, 108–109

land productivity, 110number required, 107–108quantity of equipment, 111reductions in waiting time, 109–110ship/shore liaison, 116–118shuffling containers, 114type, 114–115users, 111–113

classificationfunction, by, 7–9geographic type, by, 10–12

conclusion, 12costs

And see Costs, prices and revenueaverage disbursements, 176cargo-handling, 176–178

cost centres, 179–180current charges, 180expenditure, 178generally, 171–173introduction, 171pricing, 178–179profitability, 180revenue, 178total charges, 174–175

definitionslegal, 6–7operational, 5–6

developmentAnd see Development of portschanges in growth, 20–23introduction, 13–20

terminal operation, 23–31engineering features, 4–5environment, and

And see Environmental mattersbasic issues, 182–184causes of pollution, 184–187conventions, 181–182emergency plans, 191–192examples, 192–194organisations, 181–182sustainable development policy, 188–191

facilities available, 5features, 4–5functions, 5fundamental observations, 3–4importance, 2–3

introduction, 1labour

And see Dockworkersdevelopment, 143–145employment terms, 146–147management, 154numbers employed, 151–153remuneration, 147–149technology, and, 153–154training, 154union involvement, 150–151

logistics, 120management

And see Management of portsadministration, 73–78basic issues, 73

competition, 86–88development, 79–86governing boards, 78–79IAPH, 78logistics IT, 88–91ownership, 73–78safety, 92–93

meaning, 6operational functions, 5ownership

And see Management of portstypes, 73–78

policyAnd see Maritime policycorruption, 97EU Port and Transport Policy, 98–100

general points, 95–97generally, 97–98port ownership, 101port-state relationship, 100–101pricing, 103–105state aid, 102–103

services provided, 5ship technology, and

And see Ship technologyinfluential developments, 36–45introduction, 33other developments, 46–47terminology, 33–36

time in portbulk cargoes, 158–160congestion, 163–167

containers, 158general cargo, 156–157introduction, 155mooring, 162non-berth time, 162–163operational delays, 161pilotage, 162–163port delays, 163–167productivity, 167–170ship catastrophe, 162strikes, 161–162tankers, 160turnaround time, 155–156weather delays, 163

types, 7–12Pre-shipment plan

cargo handling, and, 123Pricing

See also Costs, prices and revenuegenerally, 178–179port policy, and, 103–105

Privatisationport management, and, 77–78

Productivitytime in port, and, 167–170

Profitabilityport costs, and, 180

“Queuing theory”berths, and, 108

RevenueSee also Costs, prices and revenue

generally, 178River works

safe berths/ports, and, 62Rivers

types of port, and, 10Ro/ro ships

berths, and, 114Ryas

types of port, and, 10

Safe berthsdefinition, 7Dock Regulations, 62dredging, 62–63elements of safety, 60environmental protection, 61

generally, 59–60harbour patrol service, 62hydrographic surveying, 63river works licensing, 62Sea Empress accident, and, 60–61turning basins, 62

Safe portsdefinition, 6–7Dock Regulations, 62dredging, 62–63elements of safety, 60environmental protection, 61generally, 59–60harbour patrol service, 62hydrographic surveying, 63river works licensing, 62

Sea Empress accident, and, 60–61turning basins, 62

Safetyberths, and

cargo, of, 140dockworkers, of, 139operations, of, 139–140

environmental, 93generally, 92Port Marine Safety Code, 92port security, 92–93sea approaches, and, 55ship technology, and, 47ship/port interface, and, 55

Saggingcargo handling, and, 124–125

Sea approaches24-hour rule, 57“arrived ship”, 65–66bunker supply, 66container security initiative, 57customs officials, 65dangerous cargoes, 58–59forwarding agent, 54harbour master, 49–51health officials, 65immigration officials, 65ISPS Code, 55–57organisations concerned, 53port captain, 49–51port security

24-hour rule, 57

container initiative, 57generally, 55–57

port state control, 58safe berths/ports

Dock Regulations, 62dredging, 62–63elements of safety, 60environmental protection, 61generally, 59–60harbour patrol service, 62hydrographic surveying, 63river works licensing, 62Sea Empress accident, and, 60–61turning basins, 62

safety at ship/port interface, 55ship’s agent, 53–54

tides, 68training and licensing

barge, 64–65boatmen, 64lighter, 65linesmen, 64pilotage, 63–64tugs, 64watermen, 64

vessel traffic services, 53water depth, 66–68

Sea Empress accidentsafe berths/ports, and, 60–61

Seaportsgenerally, 1–2

Security

cargo handling, anddrug control, 141theft, 140–141warehouse technology, 141

port management, and, 92–93Ship catastrophe

time in port, and, 162Ship management

ship technology, and, 46Ship size

ship technology, and, 39–44Ship speed

ship technology, and, 45Ship stresses

cargo handling, and, 124–125Ship technology

draft for sailing ships, 35–36influential developments

container terminals, 41–44Fast Ships, 44–45increase in supply of ship tonnage, 36introduction, 36location of port, 45ship size, 39–44ship speed, 45ship type specialisation and equipment,

37–39introduction, 33knowledge, 33–36other developments

computerised communications, 46safety, 47

ship management attitudes and goals, 46ship requirements, 47terminal staff specialisation, 46

terminology, 33–36tonnage, 33–35

Ship/shore interfacetypes of port, and, 10introduction, 2

Ship/shore liaisonberths, and, 116–118

Shipping policyclassification, 95–96Common Transport Policy, 99constraining influences on port management,

101corruption, 97

EU Port and Transport Policy, 98–100general points, 95–97generally, 97–98meaning, 95NAFTA, and, 97–98objectives of ports, 100–101national planning, 98port ownership, 101port-state relationship, 100–101pricing, 103–105state aid, 102–103subsidies, 96–97tariffs, 103–105Trans-European Transport Network, 99WTO, and, 97

Ship’s agent

sea approaches, and, 53–54Shore-based transport operations

environmental effects, and, 185Shuffling containers

berths, and, 114Specific commodity export port

types of port, and, 10Stability

cargo handling, and, 125–126Stacking area

berths, and, 113State aid

port policy, and, 102–103State ownership

port management, and, 74Stevedore

cargo handling, and, 121meaning, 6

Stevedoringcargo handling, and, 121port costs, and, 177–178

Stowage factorcargo handling, and, 122

Stowage plancargo handling, and, 123

Strikestime in port, and, 161–162

Stuffing containerscargo handling, and, 132

Submerged estuariestypes of port, and, 10

Subsidies

port policy, and, 96–97Sustainable development policy

environmental effects, and, 188–191Swot analysis

port development, and, 18

Tariffsport policy, and, 103–105

Tankersberths, and, 116time in port, and, 160

TechnologyAnd see Ship technologyport development, and, 18

Terminal operationbulk cargo, 31

container age, 27–28historical background, 23–27introduction, 23unitisation, 28–29

Terminal stowagecargo handling, and, 123–124

Terminalsalternatives

bulk oil, for, 118–120general cargo, for, 118

berth occupancy ratios, 108container stacking areas, 113cruise ship berths, 114definitions, 108–109distribution centres, 120dry bulk carrier berth, 115

dwell time, 108land productivity, 110layout, 111–112logistics, 120maintenance of berths, 117–118number required, 107–108offshore berthing

generally, 118–119legal considerations, 119–120

passenger berth, 114productivity definitions, 108–109quantity of equipment, 111“queuing theory”, 108reductions in waiting time, 109–110ro/ro berth, 114service time, 108

ship/shore liaison, 116–118shuffling containers, 114stacking area, 113tanker berth, 116traffic paths, 113type of berth, 114–115user dedicated terminals, 111–113waiting ratio, 108waiting time, 108

Theftcargo handling, and, 140–141

Tidal estuariestypes of port, and, 10

Tidessea approaches, and, 68

Time in port

adverse weather, 163bulk cargoes, 158–160congestion, 163–167containers, 158general cargo, 156–157introduction, 155mooring, 162non-berth time, 162–163operational delays, 161pilotage, 162–163port delays, 163–167productivity, 167–170ship catastrophe, 162strikes, 161–162tankers, 160turnaround time, 155–156

weather delays, 163withdrawal of labour, 161–162

Tonnageship technology, and, 33–35

Traffic pathsberths, and, 113

Trailerscargo handling, and, 136–138

Training and licensingbarge, 64–65boatmen, 64lighter, 65linesmen, 64pilotage, 63–64tugs, 64watermen, 64

Trans-European Transport Networkport policy, and, 99

Transit portgenerally, 9

Tugsmeaning, 6training and licensing, and, 64

Tunmeaning, 33

Turnaround timetime in port, and, 155–156

Turning basinssafe berths/ports, and, 62

Type specialisationship technology, and, 37–39

Unitisationport development, and, 28–29

User dedicated terminalsberths, and, 111–113

Vessel operation facilitiesport management, and, 89

Vessel traffic servicessea approaches, and, 53

Waiting ratioberths, and, 108

Waiting timeberths, and, 108

Warehouse technologycargo handling, and, 141

Water depthsea approaches, and, 66–68

Watermentraining and licensing, and, 64

Weatherport development, and, 18time in port, and, 163

Wharfmeaning, 6

Withdrawal of labourtime in port, and, 161–162

WorkforceAnd see Dockworkersdevelopment, 143–145employment terms, 146–147management, 154

numbers employed, 151–153port development, and, 18remuneration, 147–149safety, and, 139strikes, and, 161–162technology, and, 153–154training, 154union involvement, 150–151

Working hoursdockworkers, and, 150–151

Worlds Trade Organisation (WTO)port policy, and, 97

Zones industrielles portuaires (ZIP)types of port, and, 10