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Populism and Fascism

An evaluation of their similarities and differences

MA Thesis in Philosophy

University of Amsterdam

Graduate School of Humanities

Titus Vreeke

Student number: 10171169

Supervisor: Dr. Robin Celikates

Date: 04-08-2017

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Table of Contents

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 3

1. Ideology ............................................................................................................................................. 8

1.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 8

1.2 Populism and fascism as ideologies ........................................................................................................ 9

1.3 The Dichotomies of Populism and Fascism ........................................................................................... 13

1.4 Culture and Nationalism in Populism and Fascism ............................................................................... 19

1.5 The Form of the State and its Role in Security ...................................................................................... 22

1.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 25

2. Practice ................................................................................................................................................ 28

2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 28

2.2 Organizational structure of populism and fascism and the importance of leadership ......................... 29

2.3 Propaganda and the use of media ........................................................................................................ 35

2.4 Role of Emotion ..................................................................................................................................... 40

2.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 43

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................... 45

Literature ................................................................................................................................................. 48

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Introduction

In recent years, populism has been a popular and highly debated topic. With the electoral successes of

populist leaders and parties all around the world, the media as well as the scientific community have

jumped on the subject to analyse its role and place in Western democracies. In some of the discussions in

the media, populism is being discussed alongside fascism. The opinions on the subject are diverse. Some

of the articles highlight similarities between populism and fascism, arguing that populism is a new, modern

form of fascism. A column in the Dutch newspaper ‘De Volkskrant’ (Huseman 2017) for example, warns

for the extreme polarization in politics. The author argues that this polarization is partially caused by the

rising populist parties and compares this situation to the 1930’s, when the European fascist leaders started

their rise to power. Another Dutch article in newspaper ‘Vrij Nederland’ (Broer 2017) points out several

similarities between populism and fascism, using observations on fascism from an article by political

scientist Robert Paxton (2004). The discussed similarities between populism and fascism include the

creation of a common enemy, taking on the role of the victim and emphasizing a commonly felt social

crisis.

There are however, also plenty of newspaper articles and columns that defend populism from

these accusations and attempt to correct them by pointing out differences between populism and fascism.

An article in another Dutch Newspaper ‘Trouw’ (Klijn and Te Sla 2010), states that the common assimilation

of populism and fascism distorts the discussion surrounding populism by focusing on the wrong attributes

of populism. Populism, the authors claim, is much less extreme than fascism and has no true ideological

standpoints as fascism is known to have. We would be better off discussing populism and its standpoints

separately rather than merely making comparisons with the extremist ideology of fascism.

I do not agree with this last statement. I believe the debate that is stirred up by these comparisons

is an interesting one and it is why I explore it more thoroughly in this thesis. The various authors seem to

prioritize and interpret features of populism and fascism differently. There is no denying that there are

some characteristics of contemporary populism that are reminiscent of fascism, but are they the same?

Or are they so minutely similar that a comparison quickly becomes an exaggeration of the similarities. In

this paper I investigate populism and fascism alongside each other. Ultimately, I aim to distil whether an

assimilation of populism to fascism is justifiable and on what features this assimilation holds or falters. I

discuss the ideologies over the course of two chapters that address the ideology and practice of populism

and fascism. I will introduce the specific contents of the chapters in detail in the respective introductions

but I will start with a more general overview here.

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The first chapter contains a discussion of the ideological differences and similarities between populism

and fascism. Both ideologies are difficult to typify as ideologies for their own separate reasons. Populism

is generally understood as a ‘thin-centred ideology’ (Mudde 2004: 544), which means that the ideology

does not carry a complete idea of how society should be organized. Instead populism relies on an

attachment to other, full ideologies such as conservatism, liberalism or socialism (Freeden 1998: 752) to

answer these questions. The result of this is that populism comes in many forms, depending on what

ideology it attaches to. Nevertheless, the populist ‘shell’ has very distinct ideological properties which lend

themselves to a comparison with fascism. Fascism as an ideology is somewhat problematic because of the

strong historical connotations attached to the ideology. Although fascism should be understood as a full

ideology (Eatwell 2013, Griffin 1991, Pinto 1986, Sternhell 2008), there is little literature that discusses the

ideology as a concept detached from the historical reality. Most literature discusses the concept in tandem

with German and Italian fascism, thereby clouding the general features of fascist ideology with details that

might be relevant to the specific example, but not necessarily for fascism in general. For these two reasons,

the difference in ‘fullness’ of the ideology and the historical connotations of fascism, populism and fascism

as ideologies are not as straightforward to compare as it might seem.

To work around the difficulties of populism being such a diverse ideology, I focus my discussion on

Western European right-wing populism. Western Europe is starting to develop a rich tradition of right-

wing populism as virtually all Western European countries are home to a successful populist party or

movement (Johansson 2014). Furthermore, most of these parties share a great deal of features. They

generally rely on strong leadership, they are anti-immigration and they oppose globalizing trends and

institutions like the European Union. By centring the ideological discussion on European populism I am

able to provide a clear, concise overview of a common populist ideology. However, this means that my

conclusions are not universally applicable. Although some of my observations regarding populism address

general features of the ideology and could be indicative of more general trends I will not attempt to

generalize my conclusions. My research is centred around West European populism specifically and as

such I have no grounds to make claims beyond that scope.

The common practice of relating fascism to history when discussing the ideology, is difficult to

circumvent. I want to clarify that I do not wish to write a historical account of populism and fascism, nor

relate them historically. I compare the ideologies without considering their genesis or historical relation. I

therefore distil from the literatures those features of fascism that are commonly found in all or most fascist

regimes that have existed, and that have come to be understood as general features of fascism.

Nevertheless, I will at times make use of historical examples to clarify the features I describe. On the same

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note, I will make references to recent events and debates surrounding populists to strengthen my

arguments. It must be clear however, that the goal of these examples is not to define the ideologies, but

to indicate and visualize their general features.

The first chapter consists of three sections. I will introduce them shortly here, a more detailed

overview can be found in the introduction of the chapter. The first section contains a general description

of populism and fascism as ideologies. I introduce the key components of the ideologies and I discuss the

important concepts that I will use throughout the rest of the chapter. In the second section I address the

importance of dichotomies in populist and fascist ideology. Especially populist ideology is characterized by

its Manichean world view. Using theory on inclusion and exclusion by West European populists I discern

and discuss several populist dichotomies, like the people versus the elite and producers versus parasites,

and I show to what extent these dichotomies play a role in fascist ideology. The third section addresses

the role of culture and nationalism. I argue that whereas culture is the central reference point for populists,

the nation is what matters most for fascists. In the fourth and final section I discuss the relation of populism

and fascism to the state and their role in security, specifically focusing on the role of violence in the

ideologies. The preferred form of the state differs between populist and fascist ideology. Although

populism stands in a complicated relationship to representative democracy, it does not advocate

totalitarianism like fascist ideology does. Furthermore, both ideologies highly value security and law and

order, but this has different implications when it comes to the use of violence. Fascism idealizes the active

use of violence and often attributes therapeutic value to it. Populism, like all the common ideologies in

contemporary Western democracies, condones violence as a means of providing security. However,

populists do not actively pursue or encourage the use of violence.

As a general conclusion to this chapter, I argue that the assimilation of populism and fascism on

the basis of ideology is understandable, but cannot be justified. Because of the similarities that exist, it is

not surprising that the two ideologies are often compared to each other. However, when taking a closer

look at these similarities one will find that there are large differences in what the ideologies prioritize in

their relation to culture, state and society.

In the second chapter I turn to a discussion of the practice of populists and fascists. Some

clarifications are in order. With practice, I do not mean the practical undertakings of various historical

regimes or movements. As explained earlier, I do not intend to write a historical account addressing

specific historical events. Instead, what I mean by practice is the general and visible conduct of populist

and fascist parties or movements in the public sphere. Things like propaganda usage and interaction with

the media and the electorate are topics that will be given considerable attention. To accomplish a

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description of practice without solely relying on historical examples, I reference the works of several

important critical theorists. Theodor Adorno, Leo Lowenthal, Norbert Guterman and Franz Neumann have

analysed fascist leadership, propaganda and other techniques from a historically neutral perspective. This

makes their work an excellent tool for my purposes. It allows me to describe the workings of fascism

without directly describing historical realities. However, as is the case in the first chapter, I will at times

reference examples from history to clarify and validate the arguments I make.

The second chapter consists of three related sections. The first section contains a discussion of the

organizational structures of populist and fascist parties and movements. I structure this discussion around

three themes: organization, factionalism and leadership. Especially leadership is of key importance for

understanding the structures of the parties and movements. Both the organization and the degree of

factionalism are strongly affected by the importance of the leader. Leadership itself plays a similar role for

populism and fascism. Leaders are a key part of creating a bond between the masses and the movements

they represent. There are differences however. The bond between leader and followers for populism is

one sided, flowing from the electorate towards the leader. In fascism, the bond exists between leader and

followers, but also amongst the members of the mass who identify with each other through their love of

the leader. In the second section I discuss the role of media and propaganda for populism and fascism. I

argue that the current state of the media and the existence of social media allow populists to engage with

their audience in a manner that resembles fascist propaganda. Sensationalist media with a preference for

negative news enable populists to highlight and validate their discontent with certain societal problems.

Both populism and fascism strive under this general state of discontent. Finally, in the third section I

address the role of emotion in populism and fascism by discussing resentment and anxiety. Resentment

plays an important role in creating the common enemy that is pivotal for both populism and fascism.

Anxiety in the population creates the conditions in which populism and fascism can operate. When faced

with anxiety, people tend to look to a strong leader for redemption.

Altogether, the sections lead me to conclude that populism and fascism are highly similar in

practice. There are some minor discrepancies, but in every discussed aspect the general mechanisms and

practices are comparable. However, the question that remains is whether this means populism can be

assimilated to fascism. I believe we cannot draw this conclusion. Instead it is fascism that relies on populist

practices. Populism being a thin-centred ideology, influenced the fascist practices by attaching itself to the

ideology. This is a possible explanation for the frequent comparisons between populism and fascism. They

look and feel the same, but it is not populism that is modelled after fascism. Instead populism has always

been present in fascism and as such they are easily associated with each other.

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This conclusion for a large part informs the general conclusion of this paper. On an ideological level,

populism and fascism show some similarities but not enough to fully equate them with each other. Some

parts of the ideology, like the idealization of violence, are too far apart to warrant this comparison.

However, because of the similarities in practice as well as some smaller ideological similarities, the

comparison is understandable. As mentioned, the question is whether this is because of populism

modelling after fascism or because of fascism inherently carrying populist attributes. From my research I

conclude that it is the latter. The thin-centred nature of populist ideology allows attachment to other

ideologies, as it did to fascism. Fascist leaders made use of populist techniques and rhetoric, but this does

not mean that contemporary populists are fascist because they use these same techniques and rhetoric.

In the case of contemporary Western European populists, the thin-centred ideology has not attached itself

to fascist ideology as the discrepancy between what these populists stand for and what fascism stands for

is too large.

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1. Ideology

1.1 Introduction

In this chapter I discuss what similarities and differences exist between populism and fascism on an

ideological level. Both ideologies are difficult to capture in their own way. Populism is a thin-centred

ideology, meaning its shape depends for a large part on the ideology it attaches itself to. Fascism is a full

ideology, however the interpretations of fascism are highly diverse and often depend on what historical

period or regime the concept is related to. In order to investigate populism as a specific ideology, I have

limited myself to investigating the ideology of Western European right-wing populism. The dominant form

of populism in Western Europe has a great deal of features that are ideological in their own right which

allows me to treat European populism as a specific ideology. As for fascism, I remain as historically neutral

as possible but I will at times make references to National Socialism and Italian fascism. It has been argued

that these two regimes are the only truly fascist regimes that have existed in Europe (Payne 1980: 4). There

were many fascist movements and parties throughout the rest of Europe, but none of them rose to power.

Because of this, nearly all literature on fascism discusses the ideology using historical facts that often refer

to Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. I distil from these literatures those points that are general for fascist

ideology but I cannot avoid the use of historical examples to clarify these points.

I discuss and compare populist and fascist ideology over the course of four sections. In the first

section I address populism and fascism separately from each other. I explain the difference between thin-

centred and full ideologies and introduce some of the key concepts that I use in the remainder of this

chapter. Introducing them beforehand allows me to make comparisons without continuously having to

clarify the concepts making the remaining sections more concise and to the point. In the second section I

address the inherent dichotomies that are present in both populism and fascism. Making use of theory of

inclusion and exclusion I go over several dimensions that shape the way populism in particular creates and

upholds sharp oppositions between groups in society. I relate these oppositions to a variety of theoretical

claims concerning fascism.

The third section contains a discussion of the role of culture and nationalism in populist and fascist

ideology. Culture is a key concept for populism especially; much of the Western European populist rhetoric

revolves around the protection of culture. Using an example from Dutch politics, I argue that culture is the

most important value in populist ideology. In fascism this is less clear, there the nation is the single most

important entity and culture is only part of this nation. Culture is valuable for fascism, but the main

difference between populism and fascism in regards to culture, is that populism tries to preserve an

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existing culture whilst fascism idealizes a previous culture and tries to restore it to its former glory. The

fourth and final section contains a discussion of populism’s and fascism’s ideas on the form and role of the

state. Populism stands in a complex relation towards liberal representative democracy as it relies on it to

some degree, but at the same time undermines some of its principles. The populist rhetoric and emphasis

on the existence of a general will enables ‘representation without participation’ (Müller 2014: 487) which

slightly pushes the ideology towards a totalitarian outlook on the state and society. The differences to

fascism are still large however. Fascism does away with any pretence of representation and takes the elite

to be more capable of deciding what is good for society. As for the role of the state I have chosen to discuss

one topic in particular. Both fascism and populism strongly emphasise the importance of law and order

and security, for this reason a comparison regarding the way security is treated becomes interesting. This

is especially true when considering the role of violence in providing security and stability for a nation. Here

we find a final important difference between populist and fascist ideology. Fascism often attributes some

kind of therapeutic value to physical violence and thus promotes usage of violence for the good of the

nation. Populism, like all other dominant ideologies in Western European democracies, condone reactive

violence for the sake of security, but cannot be said to promote active engagement in violence for its

therapeutic value, nor for the accomplishment of political goals.

1.2 Populism and fascism as ideologies

Populism and fascism are both concepts that have been interpreted in various ways. In the media and the

public debate, the term populism is often used to describe either demagogism, opportunism or a mix of

both (Mudde 2004: 542). A column in Dutch newspaper ‘Algemeen Dagblad’ for example, lists ‘short term

thinking, strong language and cheap sentiment’ (De Jong 2017) as the defining qualities of populism.

Although demagogism and opportunism are often present within populist movements, in academic

literature they are not taken as the defining qualities of populist ideology. Recently, a number of media

seem to have picked up on this, dedicating articles (NOS.nl 2017, Giebels 2017) to explaining what the

academic understanding of populism is, which might indicate a shift in the common understanding of

populism.

Fascism, as explained in my introduction, is often discussed as a form of rule rather than as a

distinct ideology. When discussed in this manner the concept is usually related to historical regimes and

periods, most commonly the fascist regimes that emerged before and during the Second World War

(Neumann 2009; Payne 1980; Renton 1999). Interpreting Fascism as a form of rule however, undermines

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the potential for a fruitful comparison to populism. Populism is not a regime and comparing ideology to

practice would be pointless. Fascism however, might also be interpreted as an ideology. One that might

well be applicable to various regimes or political movements, but is only connected to, rather than

entangled with them. In the coming paragraphs I clarify how I interpret and define both populism and

fascism for the sake of their comparison. In tandem, I introduce several of the key components of both

ideologies that will be discussed over the course of this paper.

The dominant interpretations of populism as demagogy or opportunism refer to several features

that are commonly present in populist parties. Certainly, populist parties are often demagogical. Their

leaders tend to employ simplistic language and appeal to emotions to win people over (Mudde 2004: 542).

On the same note, opportunism is a property that is far from uncommon amongst populist parties. The

term is used to describe policies or promises that aim to quickly please the electorate. Rather than

rationally considering the best options for society, an appeal is made to what people would want most

(Mudde 2004: 542). Populists thereby disregard the costs or problems attached to these wishes. These

features however, are not integral to populism as an ideology. Instead they are tactics or strategies

commonly employed by populists to navigate the political arena. I will pay closer attention to them in the

second chapter where I discuss and compare the practice of populism and fascism.

A very clear and usable definition of populism as an ideology has been provided by political

scientist Cas Mudde. He defines populism as ‘An ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated

into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which

argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’ (Mudde

2004: 543, italics in original). There are two aspects of this definition that stand out. First and foremost,

populism is highly Manichean, it takes society to be filled with polar opposites. The pure people stand in

direct opposition to the corrupt elite, there is no room for fluidity or compromise in this ‘with us or against

us’ mentality. I would like to point out that the people versus elite dichotomy is not the only antagonism

affiliated with populism. Producerism is a rhetoric closely attached to American populism but in the past

decades it has gained traction in European populism as well. This rhetoric divides society into a group of

producers that is weighed down by a group of ‘parasites’ who feed off their labour (Jamin, 2011: 27).

Producerism is particularly interesting as it provides populist with an opportunity to circumvent racism

whilst still targeting specific groups of outsiders. I come back to producerism in the next section where I

discuss the material dimension of populist exclusionism towards groups of outsiders. Secondly, there is an

emphasis on the general will that is reminiscent of Rousseau’s political theory. It is unclear where this

general will comes from. Yet according to populist parties, the general will exists and the populist leaders

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claim to be its representatives. This claim to knowledge of the general will puts populism in a strange

relationship to liberal, representative democracy (Müller 2014). As I will explain in the final section of this

chapter, it allows for ‘representation without participation’ which is at awe with an important principle of

liberal democracy.

There is one final remark on populism made by Mudde that is key to understanding the concept

as an ideology. According to Mudde, populism is only a ‘thin-centred ideology’ (Mudde 2004: 544). Thin-

centred ideologies exhibit a ‘restricted core attached to a narrower range of political concepts’ (Freeden

1998: 750). Thin-centred ideologies are incapable of providing their own answers to grand societal

questions that you would expect from full ideologies. Instead, they attach themselves to other, full

ideologies in order to fill these gaps. In the case of populism, ‘the people’ are the core of the ideology. All

other important aspects of populism flow from this core concept: the elite are the people’s polar opposite

and the general will emerges from the people. This strong focus on the people however, does not provide

populism with a way to fully answer questions of social justice, distribution of resources and society wide

conflict management. To answer these questions, thin-centred ideologies need a ‘host’. They can attach

themselves to a wide variety of other, full or thin-centred, ideologies in order to find the answers they

need. This means that populism can come in many different shapes and sizes. Depending on what other

ideologies it is paired with, the outlook of populist parties can differ greatly. It is one of the reasons why

there are so many different types of populism. Left-wing populism, right-wing populism, or even green

populism are all very real outings of the populist mind-set, though their ideas when it comes to organizing

society often differ greatly. Any connection made by the media between populism and fascism has always

revolved around extreme right-wing populism. For this reason my discussion of populism will address this

type of populism in Europe specifically.

Fascism is typically understood as a full ideology (Eatwell 2013, Griffin 1991, Pinto 1986, Sternhell

2008). Nonetheless there seems to be little consensus over what exactly constitutes fascist ideology. In

most literature the ideology is discussed in tandem with historical events, pointing towards specific

examples found in National Socialism or Italian fascism to describe its ideology. This results in a concept

that has different meanings depending on what specific example it is referring to rather than a singular

definition that would help in the historically neutral comparison I intend to make. There are however

several distinct features that are present in all types of fascism and they can provide some insight into

what could be seen as the core of fascist ideology. At its core, fascism is made up of three overlapping, yet

distinct themes (Eatwell 2013: 595). The first is ‘the new man’, the second is fascism’s holistic nationalism

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and the third is its quest for a Third Way. I will introduce them here and explore them more thoroughly in

the coming sections where I relate them to common features of populism.

The term ‘the new man’ refers mainly to the inherent aim of creating a new type of leadership and

a ‘true-racial community’ thereby uniting the people (Eatwell 2013: 603). This aim dominated fascist

ideology when it entered the European scene at the start of the 20th century (Eatwell 2013: 602). The quest

for new leadership was somewhat paradoxical however. On the one hand it was elitist, picturing a new

elite or a ‘leader of genius’ that should rule the people. Hitler himself even claimed that ‘the parliamentary

principle of majority rule sins against the basic aristocratic principle of Nature’ (Hitler 1977: 73-74). Yet on

the other hand, it was a strong move against the established elite who relied upon this majority rule. The

goal to create new leadership thus meant installing a new elite to replace the establishment and rid of

democratic majority rule.

Holistic nationalism is a form of nationalism that is based on an ethnic conception of the nation

(Eatwell 2000: 413). It stresses the opposition of the more important national people towards the ‘Other’

and defends a traditional conception of community. Holistic nationalism takes different forms in the fascist

regimes that have existed. In Nazism, holistic nationalism took shape as biological racism and a total

opposition of the producing national people against the ‘parasitic’ Jewish community (Eatwell 2013: 604).

Mussolini took a more cultural approach and had a strong belief in the usage of myth to stress the ethnic

roots of Italians and create a national unity. The Italian state created myths like the cult of Romanità, which

told Italians that they were proud descendants of ancient Rome. These myths served a dual purpose. They

unified the often divided Italians and taught them lessons on the importance of duty and great leaders

(Eatwell 2013: 605). Race certainly played its part in Italian fascism but it was not as dominant as in its

German counterpart. The main strand of racial thinking in Italy revolved around Europeanism. Mussolini’s

colonial ambitions are often portrayed as an attempt at achieving the military power that he deemed

necessary for the defence of Italian and European culture which was allegedly threatened by ‘other

coloured races’ (Griffin 1995: 59).

The Third Way refers to the economic dimension of fascist ideology. Naming it the ‘Third Way’ is

a reference to the goal of finding a middle ground between the two dominant strands of economic thought

in the early and mid-20th century. Prominent Fascist thinkers aimed to develop an economic system

between capitalism and socialism (Eatwell 2013: 606). They emphasised the need for socio-economic

equality but wanted to maintain private property. This essentially resulted in an authoritarian welfare state

that lacked the liberal freedoms we associate with most welfare states today (Eatwell 2013: 607). The

promises made by liberal democracies regarding these freedoms were generally viewed as illusions, false

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promises made by the rich to maintain their economic positions. This distrust opened the path for an

economically totalitarian state that disregarded a distinction between state and civil society and

legitimized its own meddling in private spheres by referring to the national interest (Eatwell 2013: 608).

These three general facets of fascism provide important grip for the discussions to come as they allow me

to discuss fascism as historically neutral as possible. In the next section I use them to compare the most

common dichotomies of populist ideology to those of fascist ideology.

1.3 The Dichotomies of Populism and Fascism

As explained in the previous section, populism is an ideology of oppositions. Populist parties continuously

stress the differences and perceived struggles between ‘the people’ and other groups like the elite or

immigrants. In this section I explore in more detail what dichotomies are typical of the populist ideology

and identify to what extent these dichotomies exist in fascist ideology. An article by Cas Mudde and

Cristobal Kaltwasser (2013) assesses populism on the basis of inclusion and exclusion of certain groups in

society. These concepts of inclusion and exclusion are excellent tools to assess the dichotomies of

populism as it is through inclusion and exclusion that opposing groups are created by populists. I therefore

use their assessments of contemporary European populism as a foundation for identifying which

dichotomies are created through inclusion or exclusion and to what extent these dichotomies can be found

in fascist ideology.

‘The pure people’ is a concept that is central to virtually all populism in the world, yet who is

included in this group and how populists intend to treat this group varies. Much of these differences are

determined by how inclusionary or exclusionary the populist party in question is. In Latin-America for

example, populism tends to be more inclusionary whilst European right-wing populism is known for its

exclusionary approach (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013). Exclusionary and inclusionary approaches have

three dimensions: material, political and symbolic. The stances populist parties take on these dimensions

determine who are a part of ‘the people’ and how they intend to treat those who are included or excluded

from this group.

The degree of exclusionism or inclusionism on the material dimension is determined by the

distribution of monetary and non-monetary state resources to specific groups in society (Mudde and

Kaltwasser 2013: 158). Exclusionary policy excludes specific groups from access to these resources.

Conversely, inclusionary policy provides greater access to these resources for specific groups. On the

political dimension, exclusion and inclusion refer to the possibility for and degree of political participation

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and public contestation for specific groups (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013: 161). Much like on the material

dimension, exclusion on the political dimension means that specific groups are denied participation and

are deliberately excluded from arenas of public contestation. Political inclusion targets specific groups to

increase their participation and representation. Finally, the symbolic dimension is what sets the

boundaries of who is included in ‘the people’, who is considered ‘the elite’ and who belongs to neither of

these categories. Much of this is determined by rhetoric (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013: 164). By referring

to ‘we’ or ‘us’ when referring to specific groups, they are implicitly included in ‘the people’. Referring to

elites, immigrants or other groups as ‘them’ or ‘they’, automatically excludes them from the group that

the populists try to represent. European right-wing populism has a specific position for each of these

dimensions and they relate to fascism in their own way.

Material exclusion/inclusion

On the material dimension European populists are generally exclusive (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013: 160).

European societies tend to be relatively egalitarian. Socio-economic differences exist, but even members

of the economically weakest groups in society can usually rely on a welfare state that provides them with

stable conditions to lead autonomous lives. The prime focus of European populists is to protect these

conditions, which are allegedly threatened by outside forces. Immigrants and refugees are said to feed off

the generous welfare programs which leaves less resources for the native people who should be protected,

rather than exploited for the good of outsiders. Populists present the effect of immigration on welfare as

a zero-sum game: whatever benefits the outsider, burdens the natives. This narrative has often been called

welfare chauvinism. Welfare is strongly supported, but non-native groups are to be excluded from any

welfare policy (Karapin 1998: 221).

Welfare chauvinism is comparable, though not identical, to the rhetoric of producerism.

Producerism divides society into two antagonistic groups of ‘parasites’ and ‘producers’ whose interests

oppose each other. Parasites exploit the wealth produced by the producers but do not participate in the

production of this wealth. The group of parasites can be subdivided into two categories: ‘parasites from

above’ and ‘parasites from below’. Parasites from above generally correspond to the elite. Politicians,

globalists and bankers have all been made out to be parasitic by various populist leaders (Jamin 2011: 28).

Parasites from below are a group of lazy people, unwilling to contribute to society and its wealth. Typically

they are the unemployed, welfare recipients, immigrants, but also those that benefit from state resources

like subsidized artists. Strangely enough it has been shown that high unemployment rates have a positive

effect on the electoral success of right-wing populist parties (Givens 2005: 78). It seems that even though

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the producerist rhetoric employed by populist condemns the unemployed, they still feel attracted to

populist parties. The most common explanation for this is captured by the losers of globalization thesis.

Unemployment of the native population is blamed by populists on increasing globalization and immigrants

taking jobs. For the unemployed, this provides a convenient explanation for their economic situation. Since

populist parties attack this globalization and immigration, it is not surprising that the unemployed ‘losers

of globalization’ choose to vote for them. In their minds, they are not parasites but victims of a globalizing

world.

Interestingly, the producerism rhetoric maintains the idea that parasites from above and below

share a bond or some form of tacit agreement (Jamin 2011: 28). The elite that aspires to globalism, open

borders and the free movement of people share interests with the refugees and immigrants that are

accused of feeding off Western nations’ wealth. Producerism is a powerful discourse for populists because

it does not challenge people for what they are, like traditional racism would. Instead it attacks people’s

actions and pushes the principle of ‘those who work should be better rewarded’ (Jamin 2011: 28), which

is much easier to accept by an electorate. Furthermore the narrative allows for a simultaneous attack on

the elite as well as on groups of ‘outsiders’ based on the same grounds, further accentuating ‘the people’

as a homogeneous and exploited group.

Aspects of producerism can also be found in fascist ideology, but they are more dispersed and

unconnected than in the producerist rhetoric that is typical of populist ideology. There is no notion of a

bond between the elite and other parasitic groups, yet aversion to the elite as well as to parasitic groups

is present separately from each other. Two elements of populist producerism are present in fascist

ideology. However, their meaning differs significantly in fascist ideology from their populist counterparts.

The first element is the producer versus parasite dichotomy, but instead being defined solely on the basis

of economic criteria, parasites are defined in terms of race. Hitler for example described the Jews as

‘parasites’. Not only because they were feeding off the labour of hardworking Germans, but also because

he believed they saw themselves as the master race and were involved in a plot to undermine the German

state from within (Eatwell 2013: 604). The second element is the aversion to the established elite.

Fascism’s anti-elitism is not as widespread as populism’s however. In fascist ideology, the elite are still

attributed major political roles. I will discuss this in more detail in the next part of this section where I

address political exclusion and inclusion.

Populism thus involves dichotomies that were also present in fascism, but defines the opposing

groups differently and expresses the dichotomies as a more complete narrative. Populism stitches

together the aversion against the elite and non-native groups and turns it into a rhetoric that allows for an

16

attack against both groups simultaneously. Furthermore, materialist considerations are far less

individualist in fascist ideology. Fascist regimes were battling against capitalism and communism

simultaneously which resulted in authoritarian welfare states which were hardly concerned with

guaranteeing individual well-being (Eatwell 2013: 608). In Western European countries individual

economic situations are a primary concern and an easy way for populist parties to rally ‘the people’ behind

them.

Political exclusion/inclusion

On the political dimension, European right-wing populism has both exclusive and inclusive properties

(Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013: 162). Depending on the group, European populist parties take a different

stance. To its national people, they tend to be inclusive. Many populists have propagated various forms of

direct democracy. They often favour referendums and call for citizen initiatives to circumvent the

traditional political arenas that are dominated by the elite. Populists thereby claim to give a voice to a

‘silent majority’ that cannot effectively voice their concerns and opinions in political arenas. It must be

noted however, that the populist ideology actually stands in opposition to direct democracy (Müller 2014:

484). Populists claim to represent the people who are uniform in their wants and needs, opposed only by

illegitimate intruders into our politics. Because of this, any outcome of direct democracy is predefined in

the eyes of the populist. If the outcome does not correspond to the general will, the intruders are to blame.

This paradoxical stance towards direct democracy also applies to representative democracy, I will discuss

it in more detail in the third section of this chapter where I address the relation of populism and fascism

to democratic institutions. Promoting direct democracy however, is a useful tool for showing your trust in

the native people and correspondingly your distrust in the political elite. When it comes to ‘aliens’, most

populist parties are much less enthusiastic about granting political rights. They generally strive for a nativist

democracy, where the native people are the ones steering the state (Mudde 2007: 151).

A mantra often employed by Marine Le Pen, leader of the French right-wing populist party Front

National (FN), perfectly captures both sides of this political in- and exclusion. The slogan ‘return the word

to the people’ (rendre la parole au peuple), contains an emphasis on political inclusion of the people, as

well as on the perceived political dominance of the elite. In the populist discourse employed by Le Pen,

the people are the native, common people of France. Immigrants and the political elite are symbolically

excluded from this group. This slogan thus implies that the word is currently not with the French people

and must be returned to them by Le Pen. She is thus politically inclusive towards ‘the people’ whilst being

politically exclusive to those who do not belong to this group. These outsiders are essentially the political

17

elite and any ‘aliens’. This attitude is typical of European right-wing populism. Geert Wilders, the leader of

the Dutch populist party ‘Party for Freedom’ (PVV), campaigned with the slogan ‘make the Netherlands

ours again’ (Nederland weer van ons). Although this slogan is more culturally focused than Le Pens, the

implicated antagonism of the native people versus the elite and outsiders is the same. Both slogans are

clear examples of how populists make use of dichotomies to gain support. By stressing that the common

man has little influence over political affairs or is losing their native culture, the groups of antagonists are

automatically formed.

Fascist ideology diametrically opposes populism when it comes to the inclusion of the people in

politics. The concern of fascist regimes with the creation of a ‘new man’ was primarily aimed at establishing

a new type of leadership (Eatwell 2013: 602). As much as this aim was anti-establishment in the sense that

it targeted the dominant political elite, it was not anti-elitist. No fascist regime expected the new form of

leadership to arise from the people. Rather, the people were portrayed as a mob in need of ruling as they

themselves were incapable of understanding complex societal problems. Fascist ideology does not

celebrate the common sense of the people like populist ideology does, nor does it aim to include them in

political decision making. On the contrary, fascism aims to break down majority rule and takes on

aristocratic ideals of a small, competent elite that makes all decisions. Nearly all fascist parties and

movements rely on strong leadership by an unelected elite who gather around a single, highly dominant

leader (Payne 1980: 13). As such, political exclusion stretched across every part of the population and the

distinction between native people and outsiders that is so important for the political in- and exclusionism

of populism loses its significance.

Symbolic exclusion/inclusion

On the symbolic dimension, European right-wing populism mainly focusses on the exclusion of non-native

groups. The symbolic exclusion of these groups is almost always centred on cultural elements and excludes

any group that is not part of the ethnic people. Illegal aliens, legal non-citizens, citizens of foreign decent

and ethnic minorities are all spoken of as though they are in opposition to the native groups (Mudde and

Kaltwasser 2013: 166). This exclusion happens predominantly through the use of language. There are many

examples of outings by populist leaders that are indicative of this separation. Perhaps one of the most

famous and exemplary ones from Dutch politics is an outing done by Geert Wilders in 2006. Roughly two

years after a horrific tsunami struck the coastlines of the Indian Oceans, Wilders gave an interview in which

he warned Dutch politicians and citizens for a ‘tsunami of Islamization’ (tsunami van Islamisering) that

would strike the Netherlands. In the same interview, Wilders addressed criminality in the Netherlands and

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stated that there is a direct link between the behaviour of Moroccan ‘street terrorists’ (straatterroristen)

and their religion and culture (Ten Hoove and Du Pré 2006).

The symbolic strength of these statements is evident. The natural disaster in the Indian Ocean was

still fresh in everyone’s mind and the Netherlands is a country with a past of flood related disasters.

Additionally, the word terrorist obviously evokes negative associations. By binding together in a couple of

sentences natural disaster, Islam, terrorists and Moroccan culture, Wilders symbolically attacks the whole

of Islam and poses it as a threat to Dutch culture. Whether or not a Muslim belongs to the group of

criminal, street terrorizing Moroccans, the association made with their religion and culture makes it that

any Muslim becomes part of the attacked group. This is both an example of symbolic exclusionism as well

as of speech techniques employed by populist leaders. As a means of symbolic exclusionism, using charged

language to attack certain groups clearly excludes them from the group the populist parties are claiming

to represent. The example above is an obvious one, but as explained near the start of this section, symbolic

exclusionism can also be more subtle. The for populists common way of referring to Muslims and non-

natives as ‘them’ or ‘they’, whilst addressing native groups as ‘we’ or ‘us’ already implies a strict and

exclusionary separation.

This symbolic forming of a national group posed against any excluded group, is also an important

facet of fascist ideology. Propaganda played a crucial role in virtually all fascist regimes and its purpose

was often to create national unity. I will pay more attention to fascist propaganda in the second chapter

as it is one of the most important techniques employed by fascist regimes. The aim of the propaganda is

ideological however. An important feature of fascist ideology is its holistic nationalism. The nation is the

single most important entity in any fascist regime and its foundation is the ethnic, national people. In some

cases, like in Nazi Germany, this national unity was formed racially in opposition to the Jews. Others, like

fascist Italy, relied more on myths of a national people. The commonality however, is that the national

people were always intentionally created through the use of symbols, myths or stories about the people

and their enemies. Fascist regimes place a large emphasis on meetings, marches, ceremonies and visual

symbols to create a rigorous national community (Payne 1980: 11).

To a certain extent, most right-wing European populist parties can also be classified under the

banner of holistic nationalism. Although perhaps these parties make less of an effort to actively construct

a national people, they do appeal to this group in the majority of their arguments. Furthermore they make

a strict separation between this group and groups of ‘Others’, often through the use of symbolic language.

Thus in terms of symbolic exclusion and inclusion populism and fascism share several characteristic. There

is a subtle difference however. For fascist ideology the symbolic inclusion and even creation of the national

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people is of a greater concern than the exclusion of other groups. Symbolic exclusion of the ‘Other’ is

obviously a part of this, but it happens in name of creating national unity through a common enemy. For

populism, symbolic exclusion has priority over inclusion. Populist parties generally aim to exclude certain

groups. Whomever feels represented by the populist leader becomes part of the people he claims to

represent. The emphasis in populism is more on the other groups with a national people as a result,

whereas fascism focusses on the national people and uses these groups of outsiders as a tool for

unification. In the next section I discuss holistic nationalism and its role for populism and fascism in more

detail. For now it is important to realize that it is the foundation of most, if not all, symbolic exclusion and

inclusion for both ideologies.

1.4 Culture and Nationalism in Populism and Fascism

Although I already touched on nationalism and the role of culture in the previous section I would like to

address them more thoroughly. In the coming paragraphs I discuss the importance of culture and

nationalism for populist and fascist ideology. Culture is a particularly elusive concept as its meaning differs

for populism and fascism. Instead of providing universal definition I discuss the meaning and role of culture

for specifically populist and fascist ideology. It has an important place in both ideologies, but there are

significant differences. Populist parties stress the importance of national culture and claim it needs

protecting from outside forces. Fascist regimes on the other hand, put more emphasis on the nation as a

‘higher’ power. Culture in fascist ideology is both a part of the nation, and a tool for creating a unified

national people. Furthermore, populism stresses the protection of an existing, national culture that is in a

process of rapid deterioration, whilst fascism idealizes a previously existing culture that has already been

corrupted by the elite and needs reinstating to unite the nation.

Culture is a central theme in the rhetoric of the right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. A

popular explanation for the relatively high amount of support for populist by the working class argues that

this support stems from an aversion to or fear of non-native culture and its effect upon the native culture

(Oesch 2008: 369). Populist parties treat the culture of their respective nation as being under threat from

outside forces. This argument is directed against two groups of ‘intruders’, those from ‘within’ and those

from ‘outside’ (Oesch 2008: 352). Intruders from within are immigrants, guest-workers, refugees or any

other group on the territory that does not belong a nations ethnic group. Intruders from outside are

supranational political institutions like the European Union or the United Nations. Populist parties aggress

against both these types of intruders on the basis of them interfering or changing the nation’s culture.

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Culture in the populist sense refers to some form of national identity that is shared amongst the original

inhabitants of a country. Because of this, it becomes a very broad and rather vague term. It includes the

national people’s norms, values, customs, traditions and cultural symbols (Tonkers et al. 2008: 7). As

mentioned, populists claim it to be under threat from groups of outsiders and in need of protecting. To

indicate the meaning and importance of culture for populist parties I would like to dedicate a few

paragraphs to a recent example of a cultural debate in the Netherlands and the reaction of the Dutch

populist party PVV. The debate concerning ‘Black Pete’ (Zwarte Piet) has kept the Netherlands in its grip

for several years to date. The controversy surrounding Black Pete existed for quite some time before, but

the discussion really picked up in 2013 and has since then been a hot topic in the Netherlands. It gained

international traction in 2015 when the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial

Discrimination published a report urging the Netherlands to rid of Black Pete (Sengupta 2015). Before I

discuss the populist reaction to this discussion I will shortly introduce the debate.

A popular Dutch holiday celebrates a good Samaritan named Sinterklaas who is comparable,

though not identical, to the internationally more well-known Santa Claus. Sinterklaas has a large group of

black helpers, Black Petes, who aid him in the distribution of presents and candy. In the festivities

surrounding the Sinterklaas holiday, people dress up as Black Pete for the amusement of children. They

do so by painting their faces black and wearing black afro wigs and golden earrings. The aforementioned

United Nations report stated that ‘the character of Black Pete is sometimes portrayed in a manner that

reflects negative stereotypes of people of African descent and is experienced by many people of African

descent as a vestige of slavery’ (CERD 2015: 4).

When in 2013 similar accusations first gained significant attention from Dutch media, a part of the

Dutch community was outraged. A Dutch Facebook group named ‘Pietition’ (Pietitie) received over a

million likes within a day. The arguments against Black Pete were felt by many as an attack on Dutch culture

and tradition and a significant portion of the defenders of Black Pete perceived immigration and the multi-

cultural society as major contributors to this attack. In the eyes of the defenders of Black Pete, the holiday

had never been problematic. Thus why should it suddenly be so, if not for the influx of uninformed

outsiders? This is a classic ‘us against them’ argument that is commonly found in populist rhetoric and the

PVV did not hesitate to join the debate. In 2014 the PVV proposed the ‘Black Pete law’ (Zwarte Piet-wet)

(Tweede Kamer 2014) which according to the party should be installed to safeguard the cultural tradition

of the Sinterklaas holiday. In the proposal, PVV leader Geert Wilders and his partisan Martin Bosma

stressed the importance of Black Pete for the Dutch cultural traditions and the Dutch identity. Changing

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anything about the Sinterklaas holiday in favour of ‘a small group of people’ (Tweede Kamer 2014) directly

impedes upon Dutch culture and sweeps away the Dutch identity.

This reaction is exemplary of the strong emphasis on culture that is typical of populist ideology. It

shows how identity and culture are tightly entangled in the populist rhetoric and how they are supposedly

threatened by groups that do not share this identity. The example is even more striking because it also

shows the perception that culture is under threat from intruders from outside as well as outsiders from

inside. The involvement of the UN provided the perfect opportunity for the PVV to aggress against the UN

for interfering with Dutch culture and traditions (Wilders 2013), whilst the heated debate provided the

PVV with opportunities to blame a small group of ‘anti-racists’ for a campaign against Dutch culture (Duk

and Den Hartog 2017). It is important to stress that although populist leaders generally view culture as

being in the process of changing, they do not label it as already completely corrupted. National culture,

embodied by traditions like Sinterklaas, needs some degree of restoring, but it still exists by virtue of the

native people and should be cherished and protected (Tonkers et al. 2008: 4). Although this culture is

under constant attack from multiculturalist influences, it has not yet been overrun completely.

In fascist ideology, the concept of culture takes a different form. As opposed to culture defining

the national identity like in populism, nationhood is the primary collective identity in fascist ideology

(Bayraktar 2002: 28). During the rule of both Nazism and Italian fascism, cultural forms were used to

promote the nationalist ideologies of these regimes. In Nazism, there was a strong emphasis on the folk

culture which was perceived to be the essence of the nation (McWilliam 2008: 417). In Italy, Mussolini

idealized Roman culture and history as the ‘guiding star’ for the Italian nation (Gentile 1990: 245). Culture

was comprised of the stories, songs and other artistic outings describing culturally better times. These

stories portrayed the nation and made it a lively and bonding entity in the minds of the people. In short,

the cultural sphere was ‘a weapon in promoting a nationalist ideology’ (McWilliam 2008: 414).

This attitude towards culture also indicates the inherent discontent of fascism with existing

culture. The idealizing of past cultures is a way of expressing discontent with the dominant culture. Fascism

believes there to be a ´true´ culture that is suppressed by the current one and it needs to be promoted to

ultimately take over the dominant, but corrupted culture. ‘Fascism is a genus of modern politics which

aspires to bring about a total revolution in the political and social culture of a particular national or ethnic

community. (…) Generic fascism draws its internal cohesion and affective driving force from a core myth

that a period of perceived decadence and degeneracy is imminently or eventually to give away to one of

rebirth and rejuvenation in a post-liberal new order’ (Griffin 2002: 24). The emphasis placed on rebirth in

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this citation is particularly important. It confirms my observations regarding the fascist idea that there was

once a better culture that needs to be revived, which explains the emphasis on tales of previous cultures.

Culture thus plays a prominent role in both populist and fascist ideology, both ideologies

understand culture to be an essential aspect of society and they both stress its importance. There are two

important differences however. First of all, whereas populism tries to protect and to a lesser degree

restore an existing culture perceiving it to be under threat (Tonkers et al. 2008: 4), fascism aims for a total

rebirth of culture (Griffin 2002: 24). Instead of protecting the existing culture, it claims it to be corrupted

and aims to replace it with an idealized culture of the past. Secondly, culture for populists is not a weapon

in forging the nation like it is for fascists. Stressing the threat to the national culture is a way to gain support

from the electorate, but generally populists are not trying to forge a national unity. In fascism, the nation

is stressed much more vigorously. To consolidate power, fascism creates myths of the nation that aim to

transform the masses into an organized community that can be morally steered by those in power (Gentile

1990: 241). This is a crucial element in the formation of a people that religiously stand behind a nation

(Gentile 1990: 242). In his discussion of the role of nationalism in fascism, Roger Griffin brands it ultra-

nationalism, which he associates with ‘a concept of the nation as a ‘higher’, racial, historical, spiritual or

organic reality which embraces all the members of the ethical community who belong to it.’ (Griffin 1999:

45). Populism does not have this ‘ultra-nationalism’, but is more moderate in its nationalism as culture

takes a more central role than the nation. In essence, both ideologies are holistically nationalist, regarding

the ethnic community as ethically superior and under threat from outside forces. The difference however,

is that populism does so in reference to culture. Fascism takes the nation itself as the defining aspect with

culture as an element that shapes this nation.

1.5 The Form of the State and its Role in Security

Like in most political ideologies, the state has a central place in fascism and populism. There are however,

major differences in the proposed form and role of the state. Western European populism is generally

found in representative democracies and populist parties rarely criticize this democratic basis. Fascism,

being a full ideology, has its own ideals of how the state should be organized and what its function is.

These fundamental differences between the ideologies in their relation to the state translate to their

ultimate outlook on its desired form and role. Although its relationship to democracy is somewhat

paradoxical, populism condones and, to a certain extent relies, on the democratic form of the state.

Fascism on the other hand propagates a militaristic, totalitarian state that has full power and attributes

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only a very limited role to the people when it comes to state affairs. In terms of the envisioned role of the

state however, there are some similarities. Both ideologies idealize law and order and in extension of this

they highly value security for the national people and take this to be a prime responsibility of the state.

The similarities quickly fade when we consider the extremity of measures however. The idealization of

physical violence as a means of providing security is a crucial part of fascist ideology, which cannot be said

of populism.

The relation of populist ideology to representative democracy is complicated. On the one hand,

populist parties rely on being chosen by the electorate to consolidate any form of power. There are few

cases of populist parties entering government, but they generally thrive when they are in opposition

because it allows them to be critical towards the elite. Contrary to popular perception, it is possible and

by their own logic coherent for populist parties to govern (Müller 2014: 484). On the other hand, populists

denigrate the elite who were chosen by the same electorate. What this means is that populists are not

against the principle of representation. They do however want different representatives and importantly,

a relationship between the represented and the representatives that differs from what liberal democracy

offers (Müller 2014: 484).

Populists endorse representation, but the twist is that populists make a pseudo-Rousseauian claim

to knowledge of the common good. This means that in the eye of the populist, representation is only

justified if the representatives follow this common good, which the elite do not. Populists are thus not

against representation as such, but they demand representation by people they consider morally pure and

knowledgeable of the common good (Müller 2014: 487). The important difference between the common

good of populism and that of Rousseau, is that in Rousseau’s theory the common good is in need of

constant political participation by the people to give their consent to newly formed laws (Müller 2014:

487). The populist claim to the common good does not need popular support or participation because

their knowledge of the common good exists without feedback from the people. Populist present

themselves as possessive of a popular mandate and their policies as corresponsive to an established

general will, when in fact there are no factual grounds for these claims. In their picture of the world, there

is only one group of people with homogenous and morally just demands. All demands that deviate from

this norm come from groups of illegitimate intruders and selfish elites. In short, by populist logic

‘representation without participation’ is entirely coherent.

The result of this is that populism opposes a fundamental feature of liberal democracy, namely

the possibility of legitimate opposition (Müller 2014: 487). Populists consistently deny the legitimacy of

anyone that does not agree with them. After all, they are the only true representatives of the general will

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and anyone opposing this will is considered an illegitimate intruder. This total unification of the people

under the populist banner is strikingly reminiscent of the kind of totalitarianism found in fascism (Müller

2014: 488). Evidently, Western European right-wing populists are not demanding a totalitarian state, but

a supposed monopoly on legitimacy is as much a feature of fascism as it is of populism.

Of course, this does not mean that populist and fascist outlooks on the form of the state are the

same. Even though participation is not strictly necessary for legitimacy claims of populists, fascism does

away with any form of representation. The key difference is that where populists claim they represent the

will of the people which coincidentally is what is best for nation, fascist regimes did not rely on this claim.

The decisions made by these regimes were not based on some vague conception of the common will. Even

though it was claimed that the policies reflected the common good, no real effort was made to claim that

they were also in line with what the people wanted. Unlike populism, fascism makes no claim to

representation. Although fascist leaders and regimes claimed their policies to be best for the nation, the

community and the ethnic population (Fernandes 2006: 25) they did not rely on a pseudo-Rousseauian

claim to the general will. In fact, Hitler spoke of ‘making the mob understand’ since they could not possible

comprehend the complexity of problems that the state was facing (Eatwell 2013: 602). The elite thus

carried the burden of decision making and they were, from a Darwinist viewpoint of human beings, free

to impose their will upon other humans as they were perceived as superior (Eatwell 2013: 604). Fascism

goes as far as seeking the destruction of any democratic legitimacy (Pinto 1986: 480). Which is a much

stronger and more apparent negative stance towards liberal democratic ideals. Although in principle

populists do not rely on participation, they still make claims to democracy and even call for forms of direct

democracy to legitimize themselves.

When it comes to the role of the state there is one area that I would like to highlight specifically

since on this topic that populism and fascism show some overlap. Both ideologies put a lot of emphasis on

security with similar arguments. Populists claim to represent and service the people. Promising their

security and protection is a way of showing their allegiance to the people. Furthermore, since populism

makes constant references to outside threats like terrorism, the emphasis on security comes naturally.

This same line of argument applies to fascism, only it is the nation as a whole that needs protecting. The

people are of course part of what makes the nation, but as was the case with culture, the nation is the

central entity of which the people are just a part. The difference between populism and fascism in this

regard however, is how they choose to promote security. Populists do so in reference to law and order,

arguing for extra police and surveillance (Mudde 2007: 146). Law and order is important for fascism too,

but fascists are more extreme in their measures of providing security. Pro-active violence as a means of

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maintaining security is legitimized and even idealized in fascism. In fascist ideology, war is seen as an

endemic in the international system and promoting violence as a central act of bonding in paramilitary

groups prepares and motivates men to fight effectively (Eatwell 2013: 603). In general fascist ideology has

‘a positive evaluation and use of, or willingness to use, violence’ (Payne 1980: 7). Violence in fascist

ideology is more than just an act. Some fascist movements evaluated violence as possessing a certain

therapeutic value in and of itself. In their eyes, a continuous violent struggle was necessary to secure the

continued health of national society (Payne 1980: 12). Populist ideology does not share this view of

violence. Under populist ideology, violence is condoned on the basis of law and order when it is needed

for the sake of security, but it is not actively promoted for its therapeutic value.

1.6 Conclusion

To a certain extent, the assimilation of populism to fascism in various media is understandable. There are

several features of populist ideology that are reminiscent of and similar to aspects of fascist ideology.

However, the assimilation cannot be fully justified on the basis of ideology. The similarities only exist on a

basic level. When looked at more closely one will find that although these similarities exist, there are large

differences in what is considered important by the ideologies and how they relate to the nation, culture

and society. Furthermore, there are some aspects of the ideologies that even directly oppose each other.

Dichotomies are an important aspect of both populist and fascist ideology and the dichotomies

that play a role are for a large part similar. Both ideologies emphasize a distance between the elite and

the people and between producers and parasites. Nevertheless, there are differences in the interpretation

of these dichotomies. Populism for example, has a highly negative stance towards the elite and claims that

moral righteousness lies with the people. Fascists are anti-establishment, but not necessarily negative

towards the elite. In fact, fascism has a Darwinist viewpoint of human beings (Eatwell 2013: 604), which

means fascists accept that some people, namely the elite, are better fit to rule and make important

decisions. Although fascists claim to make these decisions in favour of the people, they do not rely on their

judgment or input. The producer versus parasite, or producerist rhetoric, also shows differences between

the two ideologies. Whereas for populisms producers and parasites are defined on the basis of economic

criteria, fascism uses racial criteria to brand parasites. Furthermore, the populist producerist rhetoric

maintains the idea that there is a bond between parasites from above and parasites from below, which is

not the case for the fascist producerist rhetoric. It makes the populist rhetoric more elaborate as it allows

26

for a simultaneous attack of the elite and other groups that supposedly feed off others, whilst in fascism

these groups are disjointed.

Further differences can be found in the populist and fascist stances towards culture and

nationalism. Culture is the prime reference point for populist ideology, whereas for fascist ideology it is

the nation. This is not to say that culture and the nation do not play a role in respectively fascist and

populist ideology, but the prioritization is different. In populism, culture is defined as the national culture

and is perceived to be under threat and in need of protecting. Fascist ideology maintains the idea that

culture is already corrupted and needs restoring to an idealized previous culture. References to this

idealized culture are used as a tool in shaping and unifying the nation. To some degree, an idealized

national culture thus has a role in the creation of a nation for fascism. In populism national culture does

not have this role but already exists as an integral part of the nation but is under constant threat.

Finally, when it comes to the form and role of the state there are again significant differences

between populist and fascist ideology. Many of these differences can be explained by the ‘fullness’ of the

ideologies. Populism being a thin-centred ideology does not possess a fully developed picture of how the

state should be organized, but instead always relies on other host ideologies to provide answers to greater

questions like these. As Western European right-wing populism resides in democratic states, the populist

parties are more or less reliant on the liberal ideologies of these countries. Effectively, this means they

cannot oppose the ideals of liberal democracy. Fascist ideology on the other hand, promotes a completely

totalitarian state with an extremely limited role for the people in state affairs. This diametrically opposes

the liberal democracy upon which Western European populist ideology relies. It must be noted however,

that populist ideology does not necessarily rely on the participation principle of liberal representative

democracies. Because of a pseudo-Rousseauian claim to the common good, populist parties make possible

a paradoxical ‘representation without participation’. Yet they still make claims to democratic outcomes

and are reliant on them for their success, which is not the case for fascist movements. These movements

do not make a pseudo-Rousseauian claim but rely on a Darwinist viewpoint of human beings, pitting the

judgements of elites above those of the common people. When it comes to the role of the state,

specifically in security, there is also a difference between populist and fascist ideology that can be derived

from their attitude towards violence. For many fascist movements, violence was considered to possess

therapeutic value and generally looked upon positively both as a way of creating national unity and as

means for providing security in a war infested world. Populism on the other hand, does not idealize

violence but only condones reactive violence for the sake of security like any other dominant ideology in

contemporary Western Europe.

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Populist and fascist ideology thus share many basic features like the emphasis on dichotomies and the

importance of culture and nationalism. However, even in these seemingly similar features there are

differences between the ideologies. Furthermore, there are also parts of the ideologies that do not

correspond altogether like the pseudo-Rousseauian claim that is central to populist ideology or the

idealization of violence that is commonly found in fascist movements. This means that although the

assimilation of populism to fascism is understandable, it cannot be justified on the basis of ideology. It is

understandable because there are many things that are indeed very similar at first glance. But it is

unjustifiable because even within these similar themes there ultimately are differences and there are

other themes in which there is no correspondence at all. In the next chapter I take a closer look at the

practice of populism and fascism to see whether the assimilation can be justified on the basis of how

populist and fascist parties and movements act and organize themselves.

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2. Practice

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter I investigate what differences and similarities exist between populism and fascism on a

practical level. Both ideologies are strongly related to specific political movements, parties or states

making them fit for a comparison on this practical level. As became clear in the previous chapter, the

ideologies of populism and fascism show some similarities, but because of large differences in crucial

aspects of the ideologies these similarities are not enough to warrant the assimilation populism to fascism

that is found in some media. When it comes to the practice of populist and fascist parties and movements

however, there are many similarities that likely contribute to this comparison. For this reason, I want to

take a closer look at these similarities.

My comparison of the practice of populism and fascism will be structured around three related

themes that I discuss over the course of three sections. In the first section I address the organizational

structure of populist and fascist movements. This section is subdivided into three parts, namely:

organization, factionalism and leadership. The first two parts of the section give an indication of what the

organization of populist and fascist movements generally looks like. It will become apparent that the leader

of the organization plays a very dominant role in the way these movements are organized. Because of the

importance of the leader, both types of movements generally have a hierarchical structure. Factionalism,

although existent, is limited or suppressed because of the dominant position the leader has. Ultimately

there is no room for disagreement with the leader, which smothers any form of factionalism before it can

escalate. In the third part of the section I address what leadership means and looks like for populism and

fascism. Strong leadership is typically not understood as a defining factor of populism (Mudde and

Kaltwasser 2017: 82), yet virtually all Western European right-wing populist parties revolve around a

strong leader. I analyse the role and behaviour of these leaders in comparison to literature on fascist

leadership from the critical theorists Adorno, Lowenthal and Guterman. The role of the leaders in creating

a mass that can identify with the leader is very similar for both movements. However, there are slight

differences in the bond that is created between the followers and the leader. In fascism, the bond exists

not only between the leader and his followers, but also amongst the members of the ‘mass’. Whereas in

populism, there is no need for such a collective bond and the relation is more unilateral, flowing from the

masses towards the leader thanks to his charisma.

The second section addresses the role of media and propaganda for populism and fascism. I argue

that the current state of the media allows populist parties to use the media’s focus on sensational news

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to their advantage, giving them a way to reach their audience with effects similar to fascist propaganda.

Both fascist propaganda and the interaction between media and populists rely on a degree of performance

to influence the subconscious mechanisms of the followers. Again, there are slight differences. Outside of

the more limited reach of social media, populism is always reliant on the media as a middle man to reach

their audience, whilst fascist propaganda is targeted directly at the audience. Finally, the sensationalist

approach of the media also means that grievances are more prominently displayed, which is beneficial to

populists as they generally emphasise certain problems. When these problems are highlighted in the news

it provides them with a way to legitimize their discontent. Fascism too relies on the highlighting of

grievances to secure support; a general state of discontent is where both populist and fascist leaders

flourish.

In the third and final section I discuss the role of emotion for populism and fascism. This is strongly

related to the second section as both fascist propaganda and the populist usage of the news plays upon

the unconscious mechanisms of the masses, in other words upon their emotions. I argue that there are

two overarching emotions that are key to both populist and fascist success. They are resentment and

anxiety. For both populism and fascism, resentment exists towards a common enemy. Importantly, this

enemy is perceived to be aware of their wrongdoings which allows for resentment to exist. The emotion

is an expression of the producerist and Manichean rhetorics that are present in both ideologies as well as

an effect of the constant highlighting of grievances. A specific form of ‘inner’ anxiety that critical theorist

Franz Neumann connects to fascism as a contributor to the success of fascist movements and strong

leaders, plays a similar role for contemporary populism. The existence of anxiety, coupled with a wrongful

understanding of history give rise to an innate desire for strong leaders to redeem the masses of their

fears.

2.2 Organizational structure of populism and fascism and the importance of leadership

In a report specifically targeted at mapping the typical organization of populist parties, Karl Magnus

Johansson argues that party ideology has a direct impact on the organizational structures of parties

(Johansson 2014: 11). The anti-establishment stance typical of populist parties implies that they tend to

prefer a different organization than the established standard as to set them apart from the parties they

oppose. It is a form of protest against the professional-bureaucratic party that is dominant in liberal

representative democracies (Taggart 1996: 37). Claiming to be a new kind of party obviously feeds into

the rhetoric of being an alternative to the ‘corrupt’ elitist parties that dominate the political arena.

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Johansson distinguishes three dimensions of populist party structure and I will follow his systemization.

The three dimensions are organization, factionalism and leadership. I will commence with a brief

discussion of organization and factionalism whilst discussing their relationship to fascism. Leadership

receives some extra attention as this topic is a keystone in the comparison between populism and fascism.

I believe that the clearly distinguishable importance of populist leaders is an essential component of the

frequently made comparison between populism and fascism.

Organization

Party organization refers to the internal organizational structure of a party. European populist parties

almost exclusively have centralized, hierarchical organizational structures (Johansson 2014: 15). They

often show a ‘pyramid’ structure with top-down decision making and near authoritarian power for the

party leader. Quite obviously, these organizational features stem from the emphasis on populist leaders.

The importance of the leader for populist parties is indicated by the fact that populist parties who lose

their leader often crumble. The organizational structure of these parties fail to function without a single

central and almost all-powerful leader. Importantly, this centrality around a single leader means that the

parties have very little internal democracy (Johansson 2014: 23). In a way, this fits the ‘representation

without participation’ ideology of populist parties that I addressed in the previous chapter. Representative

democracy is unnecessary as the leader knows the will of the people and executes it autonomously. This

requires no direct input from the people, nor from the rest of the party representatives.

Fascism in its grander organization of society and correspondingly in fascist parties, is very much

like populist party organization. Fascist movements are organized in line with the general philosophy on

how society should be organized. Their organizations are highly hierarchical, with a dominant leader at the

top of the pyramid. The movements are organized as a semi-military corps (Loewenstein 1937: 424).

Leadership, order and discipline are central to the functioning of fascist parties and fascist societies in

general. There is no room for democracy in this kind of organization as democracy supposedly leads to

corruption, chaos and selfishness (Loewenstein 1937: 423). Because of the utmost dominance of the

leader, there is no need for democratic feedback as the leader is always right. He does not need popular

support for his actions because there is no room for rebuttal, which challenges democratic ideal of free

speech (Loewenstein 1937: 424).

Evidently, the idea that the leader knows what is best without any feedback from the people or

other party members is present in both populism and fascism. This philosophy feeds into the organization

of their movements. For fascism, this entails more than just the fascist movements as this philosophy is

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applied to the whole of the nation under fascist rule. It would be a stretch to argue that right-wing populist

parties in a ruling position would reject the reliance on legitimation through the vote of the people. In fact,

opposed to fascism, populist parties tend to promote free speech and appeal to it when they are accused

of racism (Volkskrant 2016). Furthermore, they are never outspokenly against democratic institutions and

they are bound by constitutional protections. Yet the ideas behind the organization of the populist parties

themselves which are not affected by these restrictions, are very similar to the organizational philosophy

of fascism. The leader knows best and his knowledge does not require democratic feedback, resulting in

highly hierarchical and authoritarian organizations.

Factionalism

Johansson takes factionalism to be one of the defining qualities of populist parties. Factionalism, in

Johansson’s interpretation of the term, refers to internal party conflicts, splits and forming of separate

groups within the party. This should not be confused with factionalism as the opposition between a ‘we’

and a ‘they’ created in society by populist rhetoric. Johansson notes that right-wing populist parties have

had a factious history with many internal conflicts and power struggles. Nearly all of the populist parties

described by Johansson have experienced some form of internal conflict that either caused a split in the

party or brought about changes to the parties structure and organization (Johansson 2014: 29-35).

Johansson argues that this factionality is one of the reasons for the lack of internal democracies in populist

parties (Johansson 2014: 27). They rely on strong leadership to avoid the pitfall of endless internal

quarrelling. It is also why many populist parties have failed miserably to continue their existence after the

loss of their leader. The lack of internal democracy and the resulting reliance on the leader diminishes the

negative effects of internal quarrels as ultimately everyone must either stand united behind this leader or

split off from the party entirely. This means that although factionalism is often present in populist parties,

the hierarchical organization essentially does not allow it to persist over longer periods of time.

This organizational structure that prevents long term factionalism is also present in fascism. In fact,

in fascism factionalism is actively combatted by creating a strong unity with continuous reference to the

importance of the state. In his work The Doctrine of Fascism, Mussolini writes: ‘No Individuals or groups

(political parties, cultural associations, economic unions, classes) [exist] outside the State.’ (Mussolini

1932: 3). Although this goes beyond the scope of fascist parties or movements, this attitude of total

unification under the banner of the state is indicative of how factionalism has no place in fascist states.

Any split from the ruling class is intolerable under fascism as it goes against the total unity that fascist

states aspire. It must be noted however, that in the years leading up to the dictatorial rule of fascist Italy,

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the fascist party led by Mussolini was not always unified. There were considerable disagreements over

doctrine and tactics but ultimately the core of the party stayed together because of the unchallenged

leadership of Mussolini (Payne 1980: 70). As soon as Mussolini took power, the party became a

bureaucratic instrument in service of the state. All radical and idealistic party members were eliminated

thereby forcefully creating total unity within the party (Payne 1980: 72).

Both populism and fascism thus show similarities when it comes to the degree of factionalism.

Although disputes may occur within populist and fascist parties, the structure of the party ultimately does

not allow them to persist and this is mainly due to the central role played by the leaders. Their dominant

position binds their followers and creates an atmosphere of unity in which anyone who disagrees either

gives in or leaves the party altogether. This same mechanism applies to fascist parties before they rise to

power. There too, the dominance of the leader keeps the party unified as disagreements result in either a

split or a surrender by the challengers. Once consolidated in power, the fascist idea of the state as total

unity does not allow for any form of factionalism as it is eradicated before it can truly develop. Factionalism

thus is fairly limited in both populist and fascist parties and movements. It does arise, but is quickly

smothered due to the dominant role of the leader.

Leadership

As has become clear in the previous paragraphs, the leader plays a pivotal role in the organizations of both

populism and fascism. However, charismatic or strong leadership should not be seen as a defining factor

of populism (Mudde 2014: 2). It is not an inherent factor like the Manichean worldview that is necessary

for a party or movement to be labelled as populist. Strong leaders are typically seen as facilitators of

populism, but it is possible for ‘leaderless’ populism to exist. The right-wing Tea Party and the left-wing

Occupy Wall-Street movement are the most notable recent examples (Mudde 2014: 11). Yet the fact of

the matter is that virtually all populist parties in Western European democracies are centred around a

single leader or a very small dominant group (Johansson 2014: 36). Power is concentrated around these

leaders and they control the hierarchical organizations with the authority to make decisions. Because

charismatic leadership is not understood as a defining factor however, there is very little literature that

discusses the form of leadership of populist parties as a general phenomenon. In theory on fascism,

leadership receives more widespread attention. Critical theorists such as Theodor Adorno, Leo Lowenthal

and Norbert Guterman have written extensive accounts of the role, appearance and importance of fascist

leaders for their regimes. In the coming paragraphs I will give an account of their descriptions and relate

them to theory on, and examples from populism.

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According to Adorno, narcissism and idealization of the self are key components of fascist leadership.

Falling back on Freud’s theory of the ‘Primal horde’, Adorno argues that fascist leaders present themselves

as being the ideal man, capable of great leadership and worthy of followers. At the same time however,

fascist leaders are identifiable by the people as being their fellow man. He is at the same time a ‘superman’

and an average person: ‘a great little man’ (Adorno 1951: 127). With this paradox, the leader accomplishes

that the people simultaneously love themselves and the leader. It creates a pattern of identification

through the simultaneous idealization of the followers and the leader, resulting in a collective solidarity

and sense of community (Adorno 1951: 126). The leader thus resembles his followers psychologically and

can therefore voice their worries and concerns, awakening what is latent in them. This makes the masses

particularly susceptible to the leader’s propaganda, which I will address more thoroughly in the next

section. What is important however is that fascist leaders are oral characters and the ‘spell’ they put over

their followers is dependent on their oral skills. Their strength comes from the identifiability by the masses

when the leader acknowledges their problems and makes them visible. (Adorno 1951: 132).

Narcissism, personal idealization and their role in identification with the masses can be related to

populism as well. As a matter of fact, political scientist Ernesto Laclau employs the same Freudian theory

as Adorno to explain the identification process in populism (Laclau 2005: 52). According to Laclau,

populism is a way of constructing a political bond (Laclau 2005: 63). This bond, as Adorno argued of

fascism, is formed through the leader’s narcissism. The love of himself combined with the mass’s

identification with the Freudian ‘father’ creates a social unity that rests on an idealization of the leader. It

results in a self-idealization of the masses because they identify themselves with this idealized leader

(Laclau 2005: 59).

A more simple way of understanding the bond between a populist leader and his followers can be

found by referring to charisma. Charismatic leadership, in the Weberian sense, refers to a specific bond

between a leader and his followers (Mudde 2017: 86). This bond is formed through the people’s

acknowledgement of extraordinary traits and capabilities of the leader. The people are drawn to him

because of their belief in his empathy, his dedication and his leadership qualities, granting him a specific

form of charismatic authority (Mudde 2017: 85). To a certain extent this bond based on charisma is similar

to the bond described in Freud’s ‘Primal horde’ theory. The idealization of the leader by the masses plays

an important role in his success. An important difference between Weber and Freud’s theories however

is that Weberian charisma is unilateral, the bond between leader and follower flows from the masses

towards the leader because of his charismatic properties. In Freud’s theory, the bond is collective. It flows

from the people towards the leader but exists among the people as well, creating a community that loves

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both themselves and their leader simultaneously. The basic idea of idealization of the leader instigating a

relationship of trust and solidarity exists in both theories however, and can be applied to both fascist and

populist leaders.

Critical theorists Leo Lowenthal and Norbert Guterman address a different side of fascist leaders.

Although they discuss the ‘American agitator’ in their work, their descriptions are relevant as they claim

that these agitators resemble the European fascist leaders before they rose to power (Lowenthal and

Guterman 1948: 418). Lowenthal and Guterman’s work focusses specifically on the uncovering of

grievances by agitators. They claim that the agitator works from within the audience, stirring up their

worries and concerns to a point where they blend together into ‘malaise’ (Lowenthal and Guterman 1948:

425). Malaise is a key part of the success of agitators. It distorts and veils reality to a point where only the

bad sides of a certain situation are perceivable by those who follow the agitator. Yet the agitator never

offers a full solution for this malaise, but uses it as a pseudo-explanation for all of the problems

experienced by his audience. He thereby binds his followers to the very problem he opposes, they become

reliant on him for coping with reality and seek relief from this permanent predicament through irrational

outbursts. Lowenthal and Guterman call it ‘the doctor who prevents the cure’ (Lowenthal and Guterman

1948: 426).

This accusation of identifying and magnifying problems without offering realistic solutions is an

accusation that many populist leaders have suffered as well. Perhaps the most infamous example comes

from the 2016 American presidential elections where the populist presidential candidate Donald Trump

promised to build a wall on the Mexican border to combat the influx of Latin American refugees. When

asked how this wall would be funded he replied that Mexico would be held responsible for the costs. To

be fair, Trump has not given up on his plan after being elected to office. In July 2017 at the G20 summit he

confirmed that the wall was still on his agenda and that Mexico will ‘absolutely’ pay for it (Salama and

Superville 2017). The costs of this proposed wall are astronomical. Not only would it cost an estimated $25

billion to build, estimates indicate a yearly upkeep of another $750 million (Drew 2017). Additionally,

experts expect the huge concrete structure to cause numerous ecological problems (BBC.com 2017).

Besides the costs, the effectiveness of the wall is highly disputed. Approximately 40% of illegal immigrants

in the United States enter the country legally and then overstay their visas. Furthermore over half of the

border already has a physical barrier, further diminishing the value of building a wall (Ramos 2017). The

idea of the wall is thus viewed by many as symbolic rather than an actual solution to the problems it should

combat.

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Similar, though less specific accusations of unrealistic wishful thinking have befallen Dutch populist leader

Wilders when he published his party’s election program for the Dutch parliamentary elections in 2017. The

program consists of one page of policy suggestions. Some notable examples are: the closing of all Mosques

and Islamic schools, the lowering of house rent and a stop to any spending on ‘development aid, windmills,

art, innovation, public service broadcasting etc.’ (PVV.nl 2017). These policy suggestions are accompanied

by an estimation of their financial costs and benefits. The ‘de-islamization’ (de-islamisering) of the

Netherlands for example, would net the state treasury €7.2 billion. Dutch medium De Correspondent took

a closer look at these solutions and their estimated costs and benefits. They argue that the solutions are

not only highly unrealistic to implement, but also that the financial implications of the policies are radically

different from the calculations made in the party program (Wijnberg 2016).

The examples of Trump’s and Wilders’ actions relate to the observations made by Lowenthal and

Guterman in the sense that they follow the dynamic described by the them: populist leaders focusing on

certain grievances without offering realistically viable solutions. Trump and Wilders both address

immigration issues and the corresponding problems. They magnify these grievances by arguing that their

solutions would solve social and economic problems, focusing only on the negative sides of the issues they

address. Ultimately the solutions they offer are hardly realistic when considered more rationally. This

distorts the reality of voters who come to believe that the problems they face can be solved with the

erection of a wall or some simple policy changes. Its similarity to fascism is confirmed by Adorno who

states that ‘a certain vagueness with regard to political aims is inherent in fascism itself’ (Adorno 2002:

212). He argues that this vagueness is necessary for the ‘cheating’ of the followers, not pinning oneself

down to promises you might not be able to fulfil (Adorno 2002: 212). Populist leaders and their ideas thus

closely resemble the agitators described by Lowenthal and Guterman, who in turn model themselves after

European fascist leaders.

2.3 Propaganda and the use of media

Fascist regimes are well known for their extensive use of propaganda to control the masses and ensure

that they rally behind the state. In this day and age, propaganda in Western countries is less overt or

obvious, but the relation of populists to the media still allows for practices that are at the very least

comparable to propaganda. In this section I explore how populism uses the media to get its points across

and rally support from the electorate. I argue that in some ways it is very similar to the usage of

propaganda by fascist regimes.

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The media, in their attempts to find sensational news items that ‘break the routine’ have indirectly helped

populist by spreading their message to a wide audience. A common precondition for the growth of anti-

political establishments like populist parties, is the existence and experience of political and social malaise

(Mazzoleni 2008: 50). This malaise may not be created by the media, but in their highlighting of populist

complaints regarding social or political problems, they do create a more intense experience of it through

heightened awareness. There are two important forms of media that each contribute to the success of

populism in their own way. They are the ‘mainstream’ news media and the ‘popular’ news media

(Mazzoleni 2008: 51). Mainstream news media such as newspapers are often understood as the

mouthpieces of the ruling class: ‘They tend to adopt a law-and-order attitude and to use their journalistic

weapons for the defence of the status quo when it comes under attack from anti-establishment forces,

such as protest groups and populist movements’ (Mazzoleni 2003: 16). However, their attempt at

containment of these forces tends to have an opposite result. In being dismissive of things like political

corruption, government misdeeds or controversial policies they create fertile ground for citizen discontent

(Mazzoleni 2008: 50).

Popular media such as tabloids or televised news should not be understood as mouthpieces of the

establishment. Their contribution to populist success is more direct. The commercial approach of these

media means they look for sensational news items. The often animated events surrounding populist

parties increase their relative attention, creating an even larger amount of awareness of these parties and

the problems they address (Mazzoleni 2008: 51). Besides the creation of awareness, this sensational

reporting has two important effects that are beneficial to populist parties. First, it changes political

communication into a spectacle. Secondly, grievances are emphasized over ‘good news’. Both of these

effects relate in their own way to fascism and propaganda. They allow for populists to push out statements

that are comparable to propaganda, both in reaction to the often emotionally charged news items and by

using the media as a mouthpiece. I will address the two effects of sensational news reporting on populism

and the respective comparison to fascism separately.

The change of political communication into a spectacle is the result of the dual relationship

between media and politics. On the side of politics, populists often deviate from the typical political

behaviour as a way of aggressing against the establishment and their traditional ways of conduct. This

provides the media with out of the ordinary events to report on (Mazzoleni 2008: 55). On the side of the

media, the marketization of media pushes them to report on spectacular events as a way of increasing

their audience and revenue. Together, these factors result in increased attention for the deviant behaviour

of the populists. Populists and other politicians notice this increased attention and in realizing the

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importance of media exposure, politicians go out of their way for some free air time. As a result, all political

communication, populist or not, becomes a spectacle. It is filled with one-liners and strong statements

aimed at getting that precious media attention. Populists however, are in a better position to take

advantage of this dual relationship than other parties (Mazzoleni 2008: 57). ‘In the game of mutual

exploitation/manipulation between the media and politicians, populist leaders can always gain a

comparative advantage, at least in the beginning. Having little to lose and everything to gain, they feed

the media with provocative and fiery statements, and with violent attacks on their opponents’ (Mény and

Surel 2000: 216). By doing this, populists put up a performance, in full knowledge that the media will gladly

provide a stage for these spectacles.

Besides performance in the mainstream media, social media provide populism with a more direct

way to interact with the electorate. Even though the sensationalism of the media tends to be

advantageous for populist parties, they often criticize the some media for being elitist. The national public

service broadcasters in particular, are often accused of being a part of the establishment by populist

leaders (Engesser et al. 2017: 1118). Social media allow populists to circumvent the traditional media and

send messages directly to the population (Engesser et al. 2017: 1113). It must be noted however, that a

combination of both social media and mainstream media usage is vital to populist success. Social media

reach a more specific audience made up of people that are already more likely to be aware of the populist’s

arguments and point of view. Because of this, it makes sense for populist parties to pursue a hybrid

communication strategy. The mainstream media can be used to address widely felt grievances and

maximize public attention, whilst using social media to send more specific messages through ‘like-minded

peer networks’ (Engesser et al. 2017: 1113), thereby avoiding modification of criticisms of their message

by journalists.

Performance also plays an important role in fascist regimes, but it takes a different form. It is not

a tool to manipulate the media into increased exposure. Instead performance in fascism is more directly

aimed at the population to gather their support. In his Freudian analysis Adorno brands fascist

performance as phoniness and argues that it is a crucial tool for sustaining the identification of the masses

with the fascist leader (Adorno 1951: 135). Phoniness, in his analysis, manifests itself in both the leader

and his followers. The masses do not truly identify with the leader or his plans, but they perform an act of

identification because of a spell cast over them by constant fascist propaganda. Mass psychology is used

by fascist leaders as a tool of domination (Adorno 1951: 135). The argument is related to the discussion of

narcissism in the previous section: the created self-love of the leader, and consequently that of the masses,

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creates a bubble of trust and blind obedience: ‘If they would stop to reason for a second, the whole

performance would go to pieces, and they would be left to panic’ (Adorno 1951: 137).

It must be noted that Adorno is referring to propaganda of fascist leaders in power as he mentions

Hitler specifically multiple times, speaks of having to ‘win support of millions of people’ (Adorno 1951:

121), mentions the propaganda of German minister of propaganda Goebbels (Adorno 1951: 132) and

refers to the ‘Third Reich’ (Adorno 1951: 133). This suggests that his analysis is aimed at the propaganda

of National Socialism when it was in full force. The circumstances surrounding the fascist’s propaganda

that I have analysed here are thus dissimilar to the situation in West European democracies where

populism is currently on the rise and has not obtained considerable political power. Nevertheless, it is the

mass psychology behind the fascist propaganda that is important in the comparison to populism. Even

though populism does not have the tools at its disposal to engage in the massive propaganda campaigns

that were possible under Hitler’s reign, the role of performance and phoniness in fabricating identification

from the masses with the leaders is similar.

The difference between fascist and populist performance as I have described them here, is that

the propaganda performance of fascism does not rely on a middle man. It is directly aimed at its recipient

and is used to affect their psychology which is possible because the fascist leader that benefits from the

propaganda is in power. Populist leaders rely on the media to stage their performance if they want to

reach a broad audience and must cater their actions in such a way that the media picks them up and

provides the valuable exposure. This is not sending a direct message to the full electorate, but rather

creating some turmoil with the welcome result of attention for the populists and their ideas. Social media

provide populism with a way to avoid this need for media exposure, but social media messages will never

have the same reach as mainstream media and cannot be relied on to gain the attention of the whole

population. Performance in populism is thus generally less direct than in fascism, as in populism it is still

the media that stage the performance, whereas fascism cuts out this middle man without losing the ability

to reach large audiences.

This is not to say that the populists do not use the media to push a form of ‘propaganda’. Here we

come to the second effect of the marketization of the media and the corresponding need for

sensationalization of the news. The interest of the media in grievances over positive news gives populists

an easily accessible platform to voice their concerns. In what has been labelled ‘newsroom populism’

(Mazzoleni 2008: 59), populists and media find common ground in the need to emphasize bad news and

negative stories. Populists benefit from bad news because it supports their arguments and fuels the

discontent they feed off. In the case of anti-immigration populism that is so common in Western Europe

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for example, any bad news involving crimes or misconduct of immigrants provides populists with

something to point at. On the same note, any news of corruption or other political misconduct supports

their anti-establishment standpoints. The media in turn, benefit from bad news simply because it attracts

a larger audience. In short, the creation of unrest through the prioritization of negative stories works in

the advantage of the media as well as the populists and creates a ‘convergence of goals’ (Mazzoleni 2008:

59). The result of this convergence is that whenever a negative story pops up, populists get ample

opportunities to use it to their advantage. Media will turn to the populist leaders to spice up the story,

who are more than happy to oblige. Ultimately this creates a system where the negative narratives receive

far more attention than the positive ones. This lack of nuance affects the electorate and drives them into

the populist’s arms. This system might not be consciously created propaganda, but their mechanism and

effect are the same. A large part of the audience that relies on mass media for their information receives

constant one-sided stories without any chance for critical reflection because they lack other information.

This same mechanism of emphasizing grievances to create unrest and rally support is typical of

fascism. Lowenthal and Guterman view the stressing of grievances as an important tool in the agitator’s

rise to power. I already mentioned the creation of malaise by fascist leaders in the previous section. This

creation of general malaise and emphasizing of negativity is a technique to create a state of discontent in

which the fascist leader flourishes. Lowenthal and Guterman also observe a role for the news in the stirring

up of this discontent: ‘sensational news items supply him with the occasions for branding culprits whom

he holds responsible for all social evils’ (Lowenthal and Guterman 1948: 419). The agitator uses these news

items to highlight economic, political, cultural and moral grievances and does so in reference to a common

enemy. Be it foreigners who are taking the nation’s money in the case of economic grievances, or

internationalists in the case of political grievances. (Lowenthal and Guterman 1948: 422). Both these

examples must by now sound familiar. As discussed extensively in the first chapter, they are the same

issues Western European populist parties tend to highlight. The important thing to realize for this section

however, is that both fascist and populist parties use negativity towards one or multiple groups as a way

of securing support for their movements.

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2.4 Role of Emotion

Emotions play an important role in the success of populism and fascism. They create the basis for populist

and fascist leaders to gain support and they are continuously created and nurtured by them to ensure that

this support continues to exist. There are two emotions that are arguably most important for both

populism and fascism. They are resentment and anxiety. Both of these should be understood as

overarching concepts under which a greater range of emotions can be sorted. Because of this, there might

be some overlap between the two concepts and their meaning in relation to populism and fascism. Yet I

believe they are distinct enough that discussing them separately will provide a more complete overview

of the emotions at play in the two ideologies.

Resentment is a concept that has a rich philosophical history. I do not intend to give a full account

of its possible meanings and forms here. Instead I will give a basic overview which should be sufficient to

indicate the similarities between populism and fascism when it comes to the role of resentment. The

concept ‘ressentiment’ originates from Nietzsche, who used it to refer to a feeling of the weak.

‘Ressentiment’ is a feeling of subordination and the wish for revenge but at the same time the incapability

of acting on this demand because of sheer weakness (Demertzis 2006: 108). Since Nietzsche however, the

concept has evolved and has been used to refer to a different feeling which leaves more room for activity

by those who experience it. It is this non-Nietzschean approach to resentment that is most relevant to

populism and fascism. In this approach, resentment carries a moral dimension. One interpretation to

which every other interpretation is similar, describes resentment as ‘the negative reactive attitude that a

person develops in the face of another person’s indifference toward, and insult and injury of, him or her’

(Demertzis 2006: 105). Resentment captures a range of negative emotions including anger, hate and

dissatisfaction. Importantly, the emotion presupposes moral responsibility of the wrongdoer, we cannot

feel resentment if we believe that the person who did us injury was unaware of his or her actions and their

negative effects. The emotion thus has a dimension of justice: whoever experiences the feeling

understands their spite as a justifiable reaction to the morally unjustifiable actions of another party. In

short, it is ‘a sentiment which arises when wrongs are done to us’ (Demertzis 2006: 106).

Especially for populism, the relevance of this emotion is apparent. Considering the prominence of

the Manichean distinction between the corrupt elite and the pure people, and between parasites and

producers, it is quite obvious that resentment plays an important role. Populist parties attack the

established elite on their indifference to the people and the use of their power for personal benefit. As

explained in the previous chapter, political exclusion of the people by the elite is a common reproach made

by populists. Populist voters that feel excluded and ignored, vote for these populist parties who formulate

41

this feeling of resentment. The same mechanism applies to the producer versus parasite, or producerist

rhetoric. People feel exploited by ‘parasites’ from above and below who use the fruits of their labour

without offering anything in return. Importantly, the exploitation is experienced as a conscious act. This is

indicated by the words populists use to describe these parasites. Parasites from above are branded as

corrupt, which indicates a moral wrongdoing; you can hardly be corrupt by accident. Parasites from below

are made out to be lazy, or in the case of immigrants the Dutch populist party PVV commonly refers to

them as ‘fortune hunters’ (gelukszoekers) (PVV.nl 2015). Again, these labels do not indicate accidental

exploitation, but a conscious decision to feed off the working man’s labour.

The presence of resentment in fascism is less obvious, but it certainly plays a part. Its implication

goes back to the emphasizing of grievances and referencing a common enemy to build support for fascist

regimes. As indicated in the previous chapter, the producer versus parasite dichotomy was also very

prominent in fascist regimes. In Nazi Germany for example, Jews were labelled as ‘parasites’ feeding off

the wealth of hard-working Germans (Eatwell 2013: 604). The role of resentment there is the same as it is

in populism. It is a tool used for creating a common enemy upon which fascism relies for the unification of

the people. Resentment is also triggered by the constant emphasis on grievances that is typical of fascism.

The previous section explained how these grievances are highlighted in reference to a common enemy as

well. Resentment is created through pinning the guilt for the experienced grievances on this common

enemy (Lowenthal and Guterman 1948: 422). Effectively, this is also what happens in populism.

Grievances, like for example the loss of jobs or high criminality, are blamed on immigrants and

mismanagement by governments or supranational institutions.

More so than resentment, anxiety comes in many forms that all have their own type of relevance

to populism and fascism. The first things that come to mind in relation to populism and fascism are

xenophobia, fear of the unknown and fear for the deterioration of one’s own economic and social position.

All of these emotions however, have the same political effects which is why I have chosen to discuss them

more generally under the banner of anxiety. To understand what anxiety is on a political level, we go back

to a discussion of Freudian theory. Political theorist Franz Neumann provides an excellent analysis of the

Freudian meaning of anxiety and its role in politics (Neumann 2017). Freud argues that the political kind

of anxiety is an inner anxiety, produced from within but nevertheless susceptible to outside impulses once

the anxiety has manifested itself. As a matter of fact, outside dangers that normally cause true anxiety

(Realangst) become more threatening as they amplify the inner, or neurotic, anxiety (Neumann 2017:

615).

42

Inner anxiety is possible because of a certain understanding of history which Neumann brands as a

´conspiracy theory of history´ (Neumann 2017: 618). This view of history is the result of embedded true

anxiety that sprouts from previous angstful experiences, be they war, hunger, threat of violence or any

other threatening situation. This is relevant to populism and fascism, as a situation that triggers inner

anxiety has a significant impact on the identification with a leader (Neumann 2017: 617). Neumann typifies

this kind of identification that is born of anxiety as ‘Ceasaristic identification’ (Neumann 2017: 618).

Ceasarism and the conspiracy theory of history are strongly connected. Neumann argues that when the

masses have this conspiracy view of history, they turn to a single strong identity to redeem them from the

anxiety caused by this view. Inner anxiety is thus an emotion triggered by perceived threats, which do not

necessarily need to be truly frightening at all. When activated, this anxiety ‘can become a cruel weapon in

the hands of irresponsible leaders’ (Neumann 2017: 624). They are able to exploit the blind trust of the

masses who feel they need someone to take away their fears.

Neumann explicitly connects inner anxiety to German and Italian fascism (Neumann 2017: 626).

They are, according to him, the result of a perceived outside threat to the prestige, income or existence in

combination with a wrongful understanding of history that prohibits comprehension of this process. This

logic can also be applied to populism. It is not unreasonable to argue that this form of anxiety exists in

Western European democracies and that it is a possible contribution to the success of right-wing populist

parties. The conditions for the prominence of inner anxiety are all present in Europe. First of all, there is a

constant threat of violence. Terrorist attacks are frequent and receive high amounts of attention from the

media, which causes real anxiety and a distorted view of history as the conspiracy theory of history would

suggest. People come to understand Muslims and immigrants from Muslim countries as threatening

because they are constantly confronted with Muslim extremism. This conspiracy view of history combines

with a perceived outside threat to economic security and prestige. This threat is expressed in the familiar

producerist arguments regarding immigrants taking away jobs or otherwise benefitting from our wealth,

as well as in the cultural arguments that warn of a loss of cultural identity due to immigration. The

combination of these two conditions, the existence of real anxiety and the perception of threat to

economic security and prestige, creates a society in which inner anxiety can exist. This causes the masses

to look for a strong leader to redeem them, which they find in the populist leaders who address their fears.

At the same time, populist leaders help maintain these fears by constantly repeating that the threats exist.

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2.5 Conclusion

Based on the preceding sections, it is apparent that the practices of populism and fascism are highly

similar. These similarities show in their organization, in the way populist and fascist leaders interact with

the population and in the emotions they evoke. Although there are also plenty of slight differences, in

general they follow the same patterns and never truly oppose each other in any way.

From an organizational standpoint, the leader is the greatest influence for both populist and fascist

movements and organizations. Because of the dominance of the leaders, their organizations are generally

highly hierarchical with a central, nearly all-powerful leader at the top. There is little to no internal

democracy as the leader has the power to make all decisions. This dominant position also reduces the

potential for lasting factionalism in populist and fascist movements. Any person or group that opposes the

will of the leader must either back down or leave entirely, meaning that internal opposition rarely lasts.

The role and behaviour of populist and fascist leaders are similar as well. They are highly important for the

success of the movements as it is through their leaders that popular support is gained. The masses identify

with the leaders because he presents himself as their fellow man. At the same time he is narcissistic, which

creates a feeling of self-love in the population alongside, and because of, identification with the leader.

This results in the masses simultaneously idealizing their leader as well as themselves creating a strong

bond between the leader and his followers. Furthermore, both populist and fascist leaders distort reality

by focusing on grievances without ever truly offering solutions to the problems they address. This

vagueness in solutions further binds the followers as they become reliant on the stories of the leaders to

cope with the problems they experience.

When it comes to the use of media and propaganda, populism and fascism show more similarities.

Although populists cannot employ propaganda in the same manner as fascists, they can use the

commercial approach of the media, and the resulting focus on sensational news, to their advantage with

an effect that is similar to fascist propaganda. Populist and fascist leaders both rely on performance as a

way of getting attention and rallying support. Fascists do so through the use of propaganda, generally by

emphasizing grievances and accusing others for the problems they discern. Contemporary media tend to

focus on negative stories as well, which works in favour of the populists whose own focus on grievances

gives the media incentive to provide them a stage. This convergence of goals results in a relationship

between media and populists that has the same effect as direct propaganda, although with the difference

that populists rely on a ‘middle man’ in the form of the media if they want to reach a large audience.

Finally, the same emotions are important for populism and fascism. I highlighted resentment and

anxiety as overarching concepts that capture a range of negative emotions typically tied to populism and

44

fascism. Resentment is especially important in the creation of a common enemy that is typical of both

populism and fascism. This common enemy is a tool in the creation of a unified group of supporters who

share their emotions of resentment for particular groups, branded by populists or fascists as the cause of

their grievances. Anxiety, or more specifically ‘inner’ anxiety, creates the preconditions for populism and

fascism to exist and be successful. Because of a perceived threat to people’s security and economic

position, they turn to strong leaders to redeem them. Populist and fascist leaders are able to exploit the

fear of the unknown present that is born out of previous angstful experiences, by claiming to combat the

‘threats’ that lay this fear in them.

In many ways, the practice of populism and fascism thus resemble each other. Although there are

slight differences in the way they target their audiences for example, their organization, the techniques

they use and the emotions they evoke or make use of are highly similar. The question to be asked then is:

does the existence of these similarities warrant an assimilation of populism to fascism? The answer to this

question resembles my conclusion of chapter one but for a different reason. Like the ideological similarities

I distinguished in chapter one, these practical similarities make an assimilation of populism to fascism

understandable. But as the ideological similarities, the practical similarities cannot fully justify assimilation.

It cannot be justified for one simple reason: fascism itself employs many populist techniques. Because of

this, it is hardly a surprise that fascism and contemporary populism show similarities in their practice. If

fascist regimes, parties or movements employ populist techniques then some similarity is to be expected.

It does not follow from these similarities that populism can be equated with fascism. This goes back to the

arguments regarding the ‘thin’ nature of populist ideology. Populism attached itself to fascist ideology

during the prime of European fascist movements. Currently, it has attached itself to different, more liberal

ideologies in Western European democracies. This in no way implies that the ideologies are the same, only

that they are both hosting the populist attachment. Nevertheless, my observations regarding the

similarities of practice are useful as they indicate a possible reason for the assimilation and pinpoint in

what way the practices of populism and fascism resemble each other.

45

Conclusion

The assimilation of populism to fascism in the media is understandable to some degree. There are many

ideological similarities between populism and fascism, and in their practice they resemble each other

closely in multiple ways. Nevertheless, these similarities are not enough to warrant a full assimilation of

populism to fascism. Ideologically, there are several features that are too far apart, or even in opposition

to each other, which removes the potential justification for an assimilation on the basis of ideology. The

strong similarity in their practice might at first glance seem like a strong enough basis for assimilation.

However, when considering the ‘thin’ nature of populist ideology, one quickly realizes that populist

practices were an important tool for fascist regimes to secure popular support and maintain power. If the

thin-centred ideology of populism attached itself once to the full ideology of fascism, that does not mean

that current Western European right-wing populists are fascists themselves or that they have a fascist

ideology.

On an ideological level, the similarities between populism and fascism seem numerous and wide-

ranging. To name some examples: they share a Manichean world view, culture is an important concept for

both ideologies and they both emphasize the importance of security. These similarities however, are

rather shallow. When looked at more closely, the details reveal inherent differences and even conflicting

elements. The distinction between the elite and the people for example, is less clear in fascism than in

populism. Although fascism is negative about the established elite, it has an elitist, Darwinist view of

human beings, allocating greater capabilities for decision making to elites in general (Eatwell 2013: 604).

Populist ideology considers all elites to be morally corrupt and idealizes the common person, which cannot

be said of fascism. Culture is indeed important for both ideologies, but populism idealizes and tries to

protect an existing culture from further corruption (Tonkens et al. 2008: 4). Fascism idealizes a previous

culture and aims to restore it to its former glory, simultaneously using this idealization of the past as a tool

for unifying the nation. Finally although security is highly prioritized in both ideologies, the role of violence

in this differs. Contemporary Western European populism, in its attachment to a liberal ideology, only

condones reactive violence for the sake of security, whereas fascism supports and even idealizes violence,

both to foster security and for the therapeutic value that is attributed to violence.

Admittedly, the similarities in the practice of populism and fascism are striking. Their

organizational structures, the dominance of leaders in the organizations and the role of leaders for the

identification of the masses are all highly similar. Furthermore populism and fascism rely on a similar

mechanism to rally support from society. The difference is that populism does so through the use of media,

46

fascism on the other hand targets a large audience more directly through propaganda. However, both

ideologies rely on performance and a focus on negative stories to gain attention and ensure support

through the conjuring of negative emotions. I discussed resentment and anxiety in particular as

overarching emotions that play an important role in fascism and there are very little differences when it

comes to the role of these emotions in their success. Both ideologies rely on stirring up resentment in the

population and play on this emotion to create a common enemy to which is held responsible for people’s

grievances. The existence of ‘inner’ anxiety in a society provides fertile ground for both populism and

fascism, as people who are affected by this anxiety look towards strong leaders to combat their fears. As

mentioned however, if we consider that fascism made use of populist techniques, we cannot conclude

from these similarities that contemporary populism is fascistic.

Considering that I specifically discussed Western European right-wing populism to get a more

manageable grip on the generally elusive populist ideology, a question concerning my conclusions is

whether they are applicable to every other form of populism. Although I cannot answer this with full

conclusiveness, I can make some general remarks regarding this question. Populism might be a thin-

centred ideology and therefore very diverse in its forms, nevertheless there are very clear general features

of populism that can be found in every form of populism in the world. The Manichean world view for

example, or the pseudo-Rousseuaian claim to knowledge of the common good are general and universal

features of populism. Because of this, at least parts of my conclusions are transferable to a more general

comparison of populism and fascism. However, other parts of my investigation are specific to European

right-wing populism. The inclusion versus exclusion dimensions discussed in chapter one are clear

examples of this. Whereas European populism is generally more exclusive, largely because of the emphasis

placed on immigration problems, Latin American populism tends to have more inclusive qualities because

their success is reliant on the inclusion of the lower classes in economic and political systems. Thus a

comparison between Latin American populism and fascism might yield slightly different results as the

ideology of Latin American populists differs from European populist ideology. An investigation into Latin

American populism and its possible fascistic features would be especially relevant considering the recent

events in Venezuela. There have been accusations of rigged elections in this country and the government

has enacted violence against its own population multiple times. The country has been said to have started

its plunge into totalitarianism following the succession of populist leader Hugo Chávez by current president

Nicolás Maduro (Brodzinsky 2017, Jurna 2017).

On the basis of my research however, I can only speak for Western European right-wing populism

and I conclude that Western European right wing populism might often seem to resemble fascism because

47

of its techniques and parts of the populist ideology, but this resemblance is not sufficient to justify an

assimilation of populism to fascism. Assimilations like these are highly charged accusations considering the

negative associations that the majority of people will have with fascism and they cannot be based on

justifiable grounds. Nevertheless, we can ask ourselves how populist parties in Europe will behave if they

ever manage to gain considerable political power. As populist parties seem to subscribe to the principle of

representation without participation as a feature of their populist reasoning, if they were ever to rule they

could defy some of the representative principles that are cherished in Western representative

democracies. For now this is pure speculation, but if populism continues its successful streak in Western

Europe we might find new questions to ask regarding its political motives and behaviour.

48

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