Polyarchy in Five South American States: Assessing the Quality of Democracy in Bolivia, Colombia,...

8/8/2019 Polyarchy in Five South American States: Assessing the Quality of Democracy in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,

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Polyarchy in Five South American States:

Assessing the Quality of Democracy in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela

by

Miguel Centellas

Department of Political Science3303 Friedmann Hall

Western Michigan UniversityKalamazoo, MI 49008

[email protected]

This paper measures the degree of polyarchy in five South American states (Bolivia, Colombia,Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela) since 1978 using a model developed by Altman and Prez-Lin(1999) and Centellas (1999). The model measures polyarchy in the electoral process along twoaxes: participation and competition. Our model follows Dahls basic premise that polyarchyrequires high levels of both effective participation and political competition within a context of civil and political liberties. Effective participation is a function of voter turnout, modified toaccount for null/blank votes and votes for parties not elected to the legislature. Effectivecompetition is a function of the relative balance between government and opposition forces in thelegislature. These measures should complement qualitative assessments of the progress of

polyarchy in these five states and coincide with observed reality.

Prepared for delivery at the 58th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association,


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Chicago, 27-30 April 2000. I thank Emily Hauptmann and Anbal Prez-Lin for their comments and advice.

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Polyarchy in Five South American States

Introduction

Twenty-five years after the beginning of democracys third wave (Huntington1991) we are presented with a virtual laboratory within which to study democracy.More countries select their governments by relatively free, fair, and competitive elections(a standard commonly deemed central to calling a country a democracy) today than atany other period in the worlds history. Still, we are not much closer to understanding theconditions favorable to the development of democracy than we were before the thirdwave began in 1974. Some progress has been made, of course. Robert Dahl points outthat we have much better answers than could be obtained only a few generations agoand far better answers than at any earlier time in recorded history (1999, 31). It is onlyrecently, after a substantial amount of time has passed since many of the third wave

states took their tentative steps into the democratic world, that we are able to rigorouslytest more formal hypotheses. In short, despite the explosion of literature ondemocratization and democratic consolidation literature in recent years, we now stand atthe edge of a new horizon of social scientific exploration into the nature of democracyas a social scientific concept. This paper is only one preliminary attempt at such anexploration.

David Collier and Steven Levitsky (1997) produced an important exploration intothe categorization of democracy qua democratization literature. Their work ondemocracy with adjectives is a rigorous discussion of alternate classification strategiesfor subtypes of democracy along theoretical criteria in order to encourage scholars to bemore careful in their definition and use of concepts (Collier and Levitsky 1997, 432). Itshould come as no surprise that Collier and Levitsky were spurred by the proliferation of democratic subtypes produced by the post-third wave literature. Their article is animportant attempt to unify these new democratic subtypes into a more coherentframework. Another approach to analytical within-type differentiation of democracies isan empirical one. Such is the approach pursued in this paper.

Empirical studies of political concepts are driven by data that is, by the realworld of cases. Aristotle conducted one of the earliest studies of politics. The Politics wasthe result of painstaking data collection and analysis of the Greek world. It was from thisdata that Aristotle formulated a six-category typology of political systems andsubsequently developed formal hypotheses about causal effects. This basic socialscientific approach has not changed substantially since the time of Aristotle. Thedevelopment of theories and hypotheses concerned with democracy and democratizationis still developed from available data cases of democratic governments are observedand analyzed to find similarities and modal patterns that provide understanding of causalmechanisms or necessary conditions.

The limited number of cases of polyarchy both in time (only since the 1900s) 1

1 As Robert Dahl points out (e.g. 1971, 1999), the limitation of the suffrage to property holding menrestricted the democratic nature of those states. Since polyarchy means that the many rule, theexclusion of these groups particularly women, who constitute approximately half of the adult

population means that no regime was a polyarchy until the early part of this century.

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and space (predominantly in European countries) severely restricted and over-determined causal models developed to produce empirical theories of democracy. Untilquite recently, it was widely accepted that democracy was a product of certain specificsocioeconomic or cultural variables. The harsh reality of the distribution of democracyaround the globe led to various ethnocentric notions of democracys necessary

preconditions including the now-laughable theory that climate was a significantfactor.Today there are approximately one hundred democratic countries in the world

(including the island microstates). Most of the remaining countries make some claim todemocratic legitimacy. This means that for the first time in modern history, Europeanstates (or transplanted European states) no longer constitute the bulk of democratic states.Although European states still constitute a disproportionately higher number of democratic states than any other region, the recent rise in the number of non-Europeandemocratic cases allows for more careful testing of hypotheses about possible causes or

patterns of democracy. We now have a larger and more varied sample of countries for which data can be collected and analyzed. Careful collection of data allows for testing of

previous hypotheses concerning the causes or preconditions of democracy. Moreimportantly, the collection of data allows us to begin our study of democracy with atabula rasa; we, as political scientists, can undertake an Aristotelian endeavor and begincategorizing regimes along various dimensions as well as disaggregating the componentsof their constitutions (using the Aristotelian understanding of the word) for analysis. 2

Subsequently, we should reconsider and rebuild democratic theory with a morevigorous and data-driven critical esprit . This does not mean, of course, that we reject all

previous theories. Our previous theories and hypotheses are still relevant to the progressof the discipline. But we must not attach ourselves too strongly to theories and hold fastto them in the face of contradictory empirical evidence. Instead, we political theoristsshould embrace the availability of new and more diverse data and methods. Dahl (1999)

points out that after twenty-five centuries of political theory we are still not much closer to understanding what democracy is or how it comes to be. But, he also points out, wenow have more cases of democracy from which to develop and test better theories andhypotheses. I agree; the future of democratic theory is an open vista waiting to beexplored.

Theory

Georg Srensen argues that a narrow concept of democracy provides the mostadequate starting point (1998, 11) for developing theories of democratization. He usesDahls concept of polyarchy to provide a minimalist definition of democracy as a

political system. 3 The various conditions Dahl gives for polyarchy are combined into

2 For recent examples of such works, see Arend Lijphart and Carlos Waisman (1996), Kurt vonMettenheim (1997), Giovanni Sartori (1997), Thomas Manz and Moira Zuazo (1998), Dieter Nohlenand Mario Fernndez (1998), Matthew S. Shugart and John Carey (1997), John Carey (1997), Emerson

Niou and Peter Ordeshook (1997), and Philipe Schmitter (1997).3 The distinction of democracy as a political system was advanced by Joseph Schumpeter (1942)

and even more recently by authors such as Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996). This does not mean,of course, that democracy was not understood as a political system much earlier. Rather, the emphasis

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three dimensions: competition, participation, and civil and political liberties . LarryDiamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan J. Linz, and S. M. Lipset (1999) follow a similar approach in their volume on democracy in Latin America. Collier and Levitsky also

provide a typology of democracies using these three dimensions of polyarchy in their discussion of diminished subtypes (1997, 437-42). The use of a limited definition of

democracy provides practical benefits for the study of democracy and democratization.Dahls Polyarchy (1971) provides a conceptual starting point or ideal-type against whichwe can measure the various democratic states in the world. It is important to keep inmind that this paper limits itself by considering only political democracy (i.e. polyarchy)as opposed to social or economic democracy. The minimalist definition of democracyused in this paper, however, does go beyond Joseph Schumpeters definition of democracy as merely a method or institutional arrangement for arriving at politicaldecisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitivestruggle for the peoples vote (1976, 269).

Still, a minimalist definition does provide a large degree of leverage. The use of a minimalist definition of democracy allows us to avoid the minefield of more normative

or value-driven approaches. As such, minimalist definitions refer to democratic procedures , rather than to substantive policies or other outcomes that might be viewed asdemocratic they deliberately focus on the smallest possible number of attributes thatare still seen as producing a viable standard for democracy (Collier and Levitsky 1997,433). Linz, for example, defines democracy as a free competition of power by peacefulmeans, free elections at regular intervals in a constitutional framework that provides theconditions for such a free competition in terms of freedom of speech, of assembly, of

political organization, etc. (1978, 5-6). Yossi Shain shares Linzs conviction and pointsout that holding onto more idealistic or utopian definitions of democracy can bedetrimental to democracy itself (1995). As Linz and Stepan (1978) point out, democraticidealists who are to critical of imperfect democracies may inadvertently help anti-democrats to come to power.

Throughout any discussion of polyarchy as a minimalist definition of democracywe must remember that Dahl has no intention to limit democracy only to the politicalsphere. The call for more participatory or direct democracy raised by authors as variousas Jean-Jacques Rousseau, C. B. Macpherson (1977), and Carol Pateman (1970) are alsoshared by Dahl (e.g. Dahl 1982; 1985). Polyarchy is more than merely aninstitutionalized system of frequent elections; it requires that those elections bemeaningful . I do share Dahls hope that polyarchy is the best vehicle with which to reachsocial or economic democracy. Still, this paper does limit itself to consider polyarchy

primarily as a product of institutional components rather than economic, social, or cultural preconditions. This paper shares Srensens conviction that socioeconomicconditions do affect the quality of political democracy but they do not prevent thedevelopment of a democratic system (1998, 19). Like Srensen, this paper argues thatdemocratic systems can exist in countries regardless of their level of socioeconomicdevelopment. Thus, this paper does not expect that any of the traditionally acceptedeconomic, social, or cultural preconditions for democracy are necessary for democracy.

here is on the distinction between democracy as means (or method) and democracy as ends (or product).The use of a minimalist definition of democracy as used in this paper focuses on democracy asmeans.

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Several of these preconditions have previously been refuted. S. M. Lipset(1959) argued that modernization or industrialization was necessary for democracy.Drawing from Aristotle and Max Weber, Lipset wrote that the more well-to-do a nation,the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy (1959, 31). Consequently, Lipsetand other modernization scholars argued that, for democracy to flourish in non-

industrialized countries, economic development would have to precede democracy.Guillermo ODonnell (1973) presented a scathing critique of this approach when he pointed out that economic development tended to produce bureaucratic-authoritarianstates rather than democratic ones. Also drawing from the Weberian tradition, GabrielAlmond and Sidney Verba (1963) argued that the ideal political culture required for democracy was the Anglo-American (i.e. Protestant) model. Samuel Huntington (1984)and Terry Lynn Karl (1990) criticize this ethnocentric approach, pointing out thatcultures are not so readily reduced into pro-democratic and anti-democratic dichotomies.For example, though Catholicism was once considered a central element of an anti-democratic culture, it was a powerful force behind the third wave of democracy as wellas in opposition movements against authoritarian rulers. Another similar precondition

presented was that of social structure. Barrington Moore concluded that a vigorousand independent class of town dwellers has been an indispensable element in the growthof parliamentary democracy. No bourgeois, no democracy (1966, 418). Goran Therbornargues against Moores position, stating that democracy has always and everywhere

been produced from a struggle against the bourgeoisie (1983, 271).This paper stands in stark contrast to earlier perspectives which stressed the

preconditions for democracy. Instead, this paper stems from the perspective thatinstitutions and state structures are more crucial in determining the success or failure of democracy. 4 Thus, the five states discussed in this paper allow for a research design thatcontrols for cultural, economic, or social preconditions of democracy. This paper instead focuses on the institutions of polyarchy and political democracy that can help or hinder democratic consolidation. A more detailed discussion of the rationale for caseselection and method is presented in the subsequent section.

Dahl shifted the democratization literature toward the concept of polyarchy . Dahldescribed polyarchies as regimes that have been substantially popularized andliberalized (1971, 8). This led Dahl (1971) to outline seven necessary institutions 5

necessary for polyarchy:

4 State institutions and structures are also preconditions of a sort for democracy. But these are asubstantially different character than the preconditions developed by modernization theorists. States andtheir leaders have more direct control over their constitutional designs than over socioeconomic or cultural conditions. Leaders cannot simply decide to develop a country in the same way that they candecide to change the electoral law. Secondly, however, the institutional preconditions are neither

necessary nor sufficient for democratic consolidation. Some electoral laws may be better than others; but states can sustain democracy even with poor institutions. The United States, for example, hassurvived more than two centuries with a plurality electoral system combined with presidentialism. Theframework for the institutional approach I adopt is that some institutional designs produce less hurdlesthan others. A citizenry with enough determination and will for democracy can overcome any number of obstacles on the road to democratic consolidation. Still, the lower the cost for democraticconsolidation, the greater the likelihood for democratic consolidation.

5 Dahls use of the word institutions is very different from the use of the word throughout this paper. Instead, Dahls seven institutions are best understood as minimal necessary conditions for polyarchy.

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(1) Freedom to form and join organizations(2) Freedom of expression(3) Right to vote(4) Right of political leaders to compete for support

(5) Alternative sources of information(6) Free and fair elections(7) Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other

expressions of preference

The term polyarchy is used by Dahl to distinguish modern representative governmentfrom all other political systems, whether nondemocratic regimes or earlier democraticsystems (1989, 218). The seven institutions of polyarchy outlined above distinguish

polyarchy not only from authoritarian regimes, but are also necessary to solve thedemocratic problem of scale: Athenian-style, direct democracy is no longer possible inmodern polities with millions of autonomous, diverse, and territorially scattered citizens.

These seven necessary institutions constitute the minimum viable standard for cases to be considered as polyarchies. Each of the cases presented in this paper meets thisminimal threshold.

The greatest advantage of using Dahls concept of polyarchy is that, while itretains a minimalist character in its procedural elements, it allows for further conceptualization of democracy into spheres other than the political. This means thatwhile polyarchy has minimum conditions, it does not have a ceiling. Similarly, Dahls

polyarchy can be applied to a variety of different types of democracies, not only to liberaldemocracies. The minimal necessary conditions of polyarchy are also quite compatiblewith a broad range of constitutional designs.

The use of an operationalized definition of polyarchy in this paper allows for more quantitative discussion of democratic consolidation . I first wish to emphasize thatthis paper is not intended to dismiss qualitative assessments of democratic consolidation;such accounts of democratizing nations are vital for gaining understanding of particular cases, for hypothesis testing, and for theory formation in short, for the advancement of cumulative social scientific knowledge. Rather, I wish to encourage the use of quantitative assessments of democracy along side qualitative understanding of particular cases and their particular sociohistorical context. Quantitative assessments provide theadvantage of clearer specification of causal mechanisms and help avoid normative biases

by focusing on a priori established and theory-driven empirical criteria. Qualitativeassessments provide the advantage of allowing subtler readings of empirical data to takeinto consideration and account for other variables which may be peculiar to an aspect of time or space of the case in question which may effect, but are not included in, a strictlyquantitative model. The combination of these two traditionally opposed researchstrategies can provide more balanced even if less statistically powerful findings.Thus, the conclusions reached about each case in this study are based equally onquantitative data developed and presented in this paper as well as qualitative assessmentsfrom case-specific literatures.

First, however, we need to understand what is meant by democratic consolidation .Perhaps the simplest way to describe democratic consolidation is as that condition that

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exists when democratic norms become the routinized and accepted process for politicaldecision-making. Or, as Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan write: we mean by consolidateddemocracy a political situation in which democracy has become the only game intown (1996, 5). To say that democratic norms become the only game in town is tosay that (at least) most political and social actors agree to an electoral mechanism to

choose leaders, that these leaders are accountable to those who voted for them, thatdecisions are made with regard to the majority principle, but with minority rights, andthat decisions that political leaders make are accepted as binding.

Such a definition of democratic consolidation does not, of course, imply any particular type of democratic state so long as it meets the minimal necessary conditionsfor polyarchy. Linz and Stepan (1997) agree that there may be more than one type of consolidated democracy. Samuel Huntington (1991) also rejects the political cultureargument that democracy is linked to certain cultural aspects unique to Western Europe,leaving the door open for new variants of democracies and democratic theory. Dahlhimself, in his most recent work (1999), continues to emphasize the diversity of institutional arrangements that can produce democratic norms.

This paper begins from the premise that more careful differentiation of newdemocracies leads to better understanding of the institutional designs best suited todemocracy either in general theories or region-specific theories. Or, as Collier andLevitsky argue, that improved description is essential for assessing the causes andconsequences of democracy (1997, 432). An example of analytical assessment of theconsequences of democratic subtypes is a recent work by Arend Lijphart (1999) whichcompares the policy outcomes and effectiveness of government between consensus andmajoritarian democracy. A significant benefit of careful cataloguing of democraticsubtypes will allow for other similar explorations into the patterns and consequences of those subtypes.

This paper considers the problem of democratic consolidation by focusing on polyarchy as measured along the dimensions of participation and competition . Such aformulation follows Dahls own typology (1971). Figure 1 represents the four basicregime types identified by Dahl (1971): closed hegemonies, competitive oligarchies,inclusive hegemonies, and polyarchies. Each of the cases considered in this paper fit theminimal definition of a democratic state; hence, they are all polyarchies. This paper isconcerned with assessing the quality of polyarchy of each case relative to the others.Thus, a case of democratic consolidation is synonymous with what Dahl terms a full

polyarchy.

Figure 1. Types of political regimes as defined by Robert Dahl.

Low participation High participation

High competition Competitive oligarchy Polyarchy

Low competition Closed hegemony Inclusive hegemony

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This two-dimensional analysis does not diminish the importance of the thirddimension of polyarchy civil and political liberties. Instead, the dimension of civil and

political liberties is a free-floating dimension that can (at least in theory) coexist withinany type of political system. Although we intuitively expect high levels of civil and

political liberties to exist as a product of high levels of competition and participation, it isconceivable that such a condition could exist in the absence of broader proceduraldemocratic norms. Aristotles The Politics differentiates between six types of regimesalong the dimensions of number of persons in power and how they used their power (Book III). That is, a monarchy and an aristocracy are distinguished from despotism andoligarchy , respectively, by their concern for the common good. The case of Colombia(discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections) provides a good example; untilrecently, Colombia maintained high levels of civil and political liberties (as measured byFreedom House) despite low levels of both participation and competition. The civil and

political liberties dimension does come into consideration, however, for assessingwhether a state is a full polyarchy. A state with relatively high levels of competition and

participation that does not also protect the civil and political liberties of all its citizens isnot a full polyarchy; at best such a state is a near-polyarchy. Thus, this paper emphasizesthat civil and political liberties are a necessary though not sufficient condition for democratic consolidation . Following the Collier and Levitsky (1997) typology, we could

place illiberal democracy in this category of regimes with high levels of participationand competition but without high levels of civil and political liberties.

Democratic consolidation is a step in the democratization process. Dahl considersdemocratization as consisting of three distinct stages (1971, 10):

(1) Transformation of hegemonies and competitive oligarchies into near-polyarchies(2) Transformation of near-polyarchies into full polyarchies(3) Further democratization of full polyarchies

Dahl uses the term democratization to refer to the fact that states can become moredemocra tic even though the ideal-type of democracy is never attainable. Thus, even after democratic consolidation states should continue to seek ways to become even moredemocratic (e.g. more inclusive, participatory, representative, just, etc.). What this paper describes as democratic consolidation is Dahls second stage of democratization:transformation of near-polyarchies into full polyarchies. Thus, this paper operationalizeddemocratic consolidation as existing once a state is categorized as a full polyarchy for at least two consecutive elections.

Daniel Levine and Brian Crisp similarly conceive of four stages of democratization running from inauguration through consolidation to a transformation tomaturity (1999, 369). They, like Dahl, also emphasize that democratization is not aunidirectional process, pointing out that hard-won stability can be put in jeopardy byrapid social change, institutional rigidity, and organizational complacency (1999, 369).Thus, we understand that democratic decay is as important a concept to understand asdemocratic consolidation. More importantly, however, the model of polyarchy developedin this paper does not consider polyarchy or democratic consolidation as a final stageafter which democrats can rest easy. Instead, polyarchy is only the first giant leap into a

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world of greater inclusion, participation, and empowerment of the demos . But it is animportant first leap nevertheless.

Much of the early debate concerning the consolidation of third wave democraciesappeared to ignore the emphasis Dahl placed on further democratization of polyarchies.Democracy is a moving target (Dahl 1989) which is never reached though it can, of

course, be steadily approached. Part of the measure of a consolidated democracy is that of a state that after fair and competitive electoral forms are stable and routinized consistently strives to reform itself in order to offer greater degrees of democracy for itscitizens. This paper, therefore, labels a state a full polyarchy if it has a regime in which

political democracy is instituted even while the regime makes explicit efforts (not mere posturing or rhetoric) towards deeper democratization of the political, social, or economicspheres. A regime may thus be a consolidated democracy even if deeper social or economic democracy is temporarily lacking. By temporarily lacking I mean, however,that a polyarchy enters a phase of democratic deepening and strives to improve itself along social or economic (or other) dimensions.

Finally, it must be kept in mind that all of the cases studied in this paper are at

least near-polyarchies; that is, they are all democratic in varying degrees. All five of theSouth American states considered in this paper have experienced relatively free and fair competitive elections for at least two decades .6 Thus, we focus our attention todifferentiating the quality of democracy of states a priori categorized as polyarchies asspecified in Dahls regime typology.

Focusing on cases that are democratic in some sense, this paper develops awithin-type differentiation along the same three dimensions of polyarchy. This paper considers those cases that rate highly along all three dimensions as full polyarchies andall others as near-polyarchies. Full polyarchies can also be further subdivided intodistinctions between those that lack governability and those that do not (Collier andLevitsky 1997, 443). This dimension should be further distinguished between lack of governability due to continued military influence (praetorian polyarchies) and due toweak or minority governments (ineffective polyarchies). Near-polyarchies can befurther subdivided into six subtypes based on relatively low levels of one or moredimensions:

(1) aristocratic high levels of competition and civil and political liberties(2) hegemonic high levels of participation and civil and political liberties(3) illiberal high levels of competition and participation(4) restricted high levels of civil and political liberties only(5) oligarchic high levels of competition only(6) plebeian high levels of participation only(7) electoral low levels on all dimensions

Of course, near-polyarchies could also be further differentiated along the governabilitydimension. This further classifies polyarchies such as aristocratic polyarchies,praetorian-aristocratic polyarchies, or ineffective-aristocratic polyarchies.

6 Bolivias democracy is, technically, only eighteen years old (1982-2000). But the 1978, 1979, and1980 elections were considered, by most observers, as relatively free and fair. Two such elections,1979 and 1980, actually produced civilian governments that endured for several months.

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Case Selection and Method

This paper follows a most-similar research design. The case selection was meant

to control for the variables presented in the preconditions literature as well as for other differences between Latin American democracies. Since the five cases will differ in their ratings as polyarchies, the most-similar research design helps support the argument thatinstitutional factors are responsible for the differences in the quality of democracy acrosscases. The case selection also allows for an embeded least-similar research design.Colombia and Venezuela are both similar to each other on some important dimensionsand different to the other three cases.

The analysis for our time-series data begins from 1978 for three reasons. First,this date was selected because it was the closest year in which Colombia and Venezuelahad election both had elections that year in close proximity to the date of democratictransitions in the other three cases. Second, the date also marks a transition of sorts for

Colombia as well; the National Front agreement between the Conservative and Liberal parties ended that year. Third, Freedom House data used in this paper to measure civiland political liberties are available only from 1972. Going back to 1972 only adds twomore elections to the sample (Colombia 1974 and Venezuela 1972) and does not changethe findings significantly. 7

All five cases share a common (political) culture. The centralist tradition of Latin America (Vliz 1980) is evident in each case. Each of the five states has a traditionof centralized political processes, especially when compared to the more federalArgentina and Brazil. All of the countries also share the culture of caudillaje described

by Glen Caudill Dealy (1992). This culture of caudillaje stands in contrast to the Westernnon-dualist tradition in its defense of a distinction between the public and private andapplies a one-morality/two-morality construct which leads to personalismo (Dealy1992). Finally, all five countries share a similar Spanish colonial heritage, which includesa common language (Spanish), religion (Catholicism), and historical symbols (e.g. allwere liberated by Simn Bolvar). The singular exception may be Colombia, which has alonger tradition of political parties than all the others. Still, for most of the modern period(beginning in the 1850s) Colombias two largest political parties the Liberals andConservatives engulfed the countryside in bloody civil wars that were not resolveduntil the 1958 National Front agreement.

In terms of socioeconomic development, the five South American cases are rather similar (see Table 1). All are also clearly developing nations when compared toadvanced industrial states. In order to compare beyond these five cases, this paper alsoincludes data on five European states. This group of states also includes three thirdwave regimes (Greece, Portugal, and Spain) and two second wave regimes (France

7 The inclusion of Freedom House scores for Venezuela since 1972 changes the mean for FH to 2.0 rather than 2.1 (a difference of only 0.1) and does not change the lowest or highest scores. Similarly, inclusionof Freedom House scores for Colombia since 1972 changes the mean for FH to 2.9 rather than 2.8 (alsoa difference of only 0.1). Colombias pre-1978 scores do, however, produce a different lowest score of 2.0. Of course, including pre-transition FH scores for Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru would heavily biasresults against any finding of democratic consolidation. Subsequently, this paper will consider data onlyfrom 1978 onwards or from first year of democratic rule (Bolivia 1982, Ecuador 1979, Peru 1980).

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and Italy). Although data for competitiveness and effective participation are not yetavailable, these five cases will also be included in future research. 8 With the exception of Greece, which is predominantly Orthodox, these European countries are, like the SouthAmerican cases, predominantly Catholic. 9 Greece, Portugal, and Spain can also beconsidered developing countries in comparison to the remainder of Europe. Similarly,

although France is substantially more developed, Italy is among the less developed statesin the European Union. Thus, like the five South American cases, these five SouthernEuropean cases further develop the most-similar research design employed in this paper.

Table 1. UNDP socioeconomic indicators for South American and South Europeancases, circa 1997.

Country

Real GDP per capita

(PPP$)

Adultliteracy rate

(%)

Lifeexpectancy

(years)

Humandevelopment

index

Bolivia 2 880 83.6 61.4 0.652Colombia 6 810 90.9 70.4 0.768Ecuador 4 940 90.7 69.5 0.747Peru 4 680 88.7 68.3 0.739Venezuela 8 860 92.0 72.4 0.792

France 22 030 99.0 78.1 0.918Greece 12 769 96.6 78.1 0.867Italy 20 290 98.3 78.2 0.900Portugal 14 270 90.8 75.3 0.858Spain 15 930 97.2 78.0 0.894

Source: UNDP 1999.

Table 1 is instructive. First, of course, the South American cases are clearly lessdeveloped than the European ones; the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)ranks all five among the medium human development countries. Thus, thepreconditions literature should lead us to expect that the five South American cases areless capable of sustaining polyarchies than the European cases. Second, however, it isimportant to note that Bolivia is the poorest and least developed of the South Americancases. Yet the results presented in subsequent sections point to Bolivia as the only clear case of democratic consolidation. A more case-specific study using the same data andmethod supports this conclusion (Centellas 1999). The classification of Bolivia the

poorest of the South American cases as a consolidated democracy falsifies thepreconditions hypothesis that equates socioeconomic development with democracy.

8 This paper is part of a larger dissertation project that involves at least twenty-two countries,including Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, Hungary, Mexico, Paraguay, Poland,Rumania, and Uruguay.

9 Here I do not mean to imply that all ten states share a similar level of religiosity (i.e. churchattendance, doctrinal obedience, etc.). I simply mean that each of these ten cases share non-Protestant

political cultures. Even for secularists within these countries, we can speak of a broader Catholicculture (or civilization) in the way that Dealy (1992) or Huntington (1991) speaks of them.

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Lijphart (1999) makes a similar argument regarding India, which has sustaineddemocratic rule since 1977 despite extremely low levels of development.

Each of the five South American states also has relatively small governments interms of total government spending as percentage of gross domestic product (GDP).Overall, Latin American governments steadily spend close to 25 percent of GDP during

this time period, in contrast to increasing expenditures of 40 to 50 percent of GDP for theindustrial economies (Gavin and Hausmann 1998, 35). Each of the five South Americanstates considered here performed slightly above the Latin American median, however,with the exception of Peru (Stein 1998, 97). It is also clear that all five South Americancases are rather similar in economic structure and all have moved towards privatization of their state-owned industries in recent years (e.g. Boeker 1993; Fukasaku and Hausmann1998).

Along with socioeconomic similarities, our five South American cases also sharemany institutional features, allowing us to focus better on the relevant variables thatexplain successful democratic consolidation. All five states have presidential systems, aninstitutional variable widely discussed as critical for explaining the failures of democracy

in Latin America (e.g. Linz 1994; 1996a). Bolivia, however, is a significant exception. Itshybrid system of parliamentarized presidentialism (Mayorga 1997) helps demonstratethe validity of Giovanni Sartoris (1994) argument that a simple division of regimes intodichotomous presidential and parliamentary systems misses some key differences.Controlling for presidentialism as a possible independent variable affecting democraticconsolidation allows us to examine other institutional variables often associated with,

but not necessary for, presidentialism. Those findings are presented in subsequentsections.

All five cases also shared similar experiences with the post-1982 economic crisisthat ravaged Latin America. Though the debt crisis impacted each state differently, allfive weathered the economic storm with democratically elected governments. Thetransitions to democracy in Ecuador and Peru (1979 and 1980, respectively) were amongthe earliest in the third wave of democracy and occurred before the debt crisis. Boliviadid not have a democratic government until 1982, although its transition to democracy

began in 1978. More importantly, however, the 1982-85 government of Hernn SilesZuazo came to power just as the debt crisis began. Unlike countries such as Argentina,Brazil, or Chile, the economic crisis was not a contributing factor to the collapse of authoritarian regimes in the five South American cases considered here. Finally, the factthat each of the five countries managed to survive the debt crisis without a return toauthoritarian rule adds a level of optimism to ones sense of their ability to survive futurecrises.

The inclusion of Colombia and Venezuela adds further to this paper. Although both have been governed by democratically elected governments since 1958, both haverecently come under scrutiny both for Colombias lack of democratic consolidation andfor Venezuelas recent democratic crisis (e.g. McCoy 1999; Hoskin and Murillo 1999;Gaviria Vlez 1998). This unfortunate reality allows us to control for any possible thirdwave variable. The analysis presented in this paper sheds some light on the quality of democratic rule in those countries since 1978. Also, the theory of democratizationunderpinning this paper is not unidirectional but rather recognizes that democraticregimes can break down. Thus, including Colombia and Venezuela may add to the

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current knowledge about the possible causes of democratic breakdowns.Colombia and Venezuela have different experiences with democracy. The data

presented in this paper demonstrates that Colombia was never a consolidated democracy(or full polyarchy), a case also made by Jonathan Hartlyn and John Dugas (1999) andGary Hoskin and Gabriel Murillo (1999). Bruce Bagley (1984) went so far as to classify

Colombia as an inclusionary authoritarian regime rather than a democracy. In contrast,Venezuela appears to be a consolidated democracy from at least 1968 through 1988, anargument also made by Levine and Crisp (1999). By this time, Venezuelas two dominant

parties AD (Accin Democrtica, Democratic Action) and COPEI (Comit deOrganizacin Poltica Electoral Independiente, known as the Social Christian Party) had moved away from their Punto Fijo power-sharing arrangement and into a competitivetwo-party system. Colombia, on the other hand, became mired in a system described byFermn Gonzlez and Miguel E. Crdenas as mono(bi)partism (1998). This differenceallows us to speculate both why Colombias was never a consolidated democracy andwhy Venezuelas consolidated democracy is having such problems today especiallyafter the end of partyarchy and the collapse of the traditional party system (McCoy

1999). Finally, the collapse of party systems in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuelaare compared to Bolivias more stable political party system.Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru are compared to each other to differentiate within the

third wave cases. Although all three began their democratization with similar trajectories, by 1992 Peru was no longer democratic in any meaningful normative senseof the word after Fujimoris autogolpe (self-coup) and the collapse of the party system.Similarly, although Ecuador has not had a democratic breakdown of the magnitude of Perus, it seems to be merely muddling through (Barczak 1997; Isaacs 1996). Again,the reasons for these differences appear to be institutional in nature and are explored inthe analysis section of this paper.

Finally, the use of cross-panel data also allows us to consider a combination of synchronic and diachronic comparisons between cases. Diachronic comparisons allow usnot only to compare cases across time, but also to compare one case at one time intervalwith another case at a different time interval. This approach can prove quite fruitful for

pinpointing causal variables. Subdividing the time analysis by decade allows us to see adramatic change in values among cases as Peru and Venezuela began demonstratingdemocratic breakdowns in the second time period while Bolivia and Colombia improved.Subsequently, institutional causes for democratic consolidation and democratic

breakdown become even clearer. Most especially, the collapse of the party system inVenezuela, Peru, and Ecuador become clear as an explanatory variable. These findingsgive greater leverage to the finding of institutional factors as causes for democraticconsolidation.

Data

The model of polyarchy used in this paper contains three dimensions. The twomore institutional dimensions of competition and participation are measured usingelectoral data for all elections since 1978. Data for Bolivias 1978 and 1979 generalelections are dropped out of much of the analysis, however, since 1982 is the actual

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beginning of the nations democratic period. Election results for Bolivias 1980 elections,however, are included in the analysis because the 1982-85 government was constitutedfrom the results of the 1980 general elections. The data presented come from elections for the lower legislative chamber. The two exceptions are Ecuador (which has a unicamerallegislature) and Bolivia (where a single ballot is used for the presidential contest and both

legislative chambers). The third dimension, civil and political rights, is measured usingFreedom House data.

Competition

One dimension of polyarchy is competition . This dimension is operationalizedusing a measure for effective competition first developed by David Altman and AnbalPrez-Lin (1999). Their measure relies on the distinction between government andopposition political parties. This paper defines government parties as those partiesrepresented in legislature which are members of a formal government coalition.

Consequently, opposition parties include all other political parties represented in thelegislature but which do not formally participate in the government coalition (even if theysupport the government some of the time).

Altman and Prez-Lin developed measures for the size of the typicalopposition and government parties. These measures are designed to account for fragmentation but are weighted in favor of the largest political parties. We first calculatethe size of the typical opposition party (O):

O =

2

where oi is the share of seats for the i-th opposition party. We next calculate the size of the typical government party (G):

G =

2

where g i is the share of seats for the i-th government party. These measures allow us tofind the relative size of government and opposition blocs rather than using aggregateshares of seats for government and opposition. Aggregate measures do not capturemeasures for the size of typical government and opposition parties since they disregard

fragmentation and party size. This calculation of government and opposition sizeassumes that one-party governments with large shares of seats in the legislature are moreeffective at implementing policies than multi-party government coalitionseven if bothcontrol the same aggregate number of seats in the legislature.

Using these two measures, Altman and Prez-Lin next developed an index of effective opposition (IEO) to measure the oppositions influence over the process of theformation of public policies and [its ability] to present a viable electoral alternative to thegovernment party (1999, 89):

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IEO =

with IEO values measured along a scale from zero (when the government controls the

entire legislature) to one (when the opposition is the same size as the government). IEOvalues can also be greater than one in the case that the opposition is more powerful thanthe government. Of course, IEO values greater than one do not signify a better

polyarchy. If the opposition is stronger than the government, governability suffers due toa substantial distortion of the majority preference nested in the political regime(Altman and Prez-Lin 1999, 88).

Finally, using government and opposition values, Altman and Prez-Lin alsocalculate an index of competitiveness (C):

C = 1

100

with C values measured along a scale from zero (when either the government or theopposition controls the legislature) to one (when the government and opposition are

balanced). It is this final index that is the actual measurement used to categorize countriesas competitive for classification as polyarchies.

Participation

The second dimension of polyarchy is participation. This dimension can beoperationalized with an index of effective participation . Effective participation is related

to the idea that democracy (as ideal-type) is distinguished from other political systems bybeing completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens (Dahl 1971, 2). Theindex of effective participation (IEP) is calculated as:

IEP = 1 ( ) 1 ( )

where T is the ratio of voter turnout, B is the ratio of blank and null votes, and E is the

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ratio of votes cast for excluded parties. Effective participation values are measured as aratio from zero (no citizen participation) and one (ideal or complete citizen

participation).This index of effective participation measures the degree to which all citizens

preferences are represented in the legislature. This definition is based on the a priori

conception of an ideal-type polyarchy in which:

(1) All citizens participate in general elections(2) All citizens vote for political parties(3) All political parties competing in elections are represented in the legislature

Of course, no actual polyarchy can live up to these three standards. 10 This measure of effective participation, therefore, measures the degree to which a political regimerepresents its citizens ( via political parties). 11 The above criteria for an ideal-type

polyarchy are derived from the assumption that a legislative body only represents thosecitizens who voted for the political parties represented in that legislative body. The

criteria are useful, however, to compare the performance of polyarchies relative to eachother.Voter turnout data is obtained from the International Institute for Democracy and

Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) and measures the ratio of votes over voting age population (Votes/VAP). Although the voting age population figures are often estimates,this measure of voter turnout seems more appropriate than figures reported as votes over registered voters. A glance at the International IDEA data shows that some states havesignificant discrepancies between these two figures. There is no evidence to believe thatvoting age population figures have significant errors. The benefit of using voting age

population figures, however, is that they also help us to measure how inclusive anelectoral system is. The degree to which the voting age population is not registered tovote (which, by definition, means they cannot vote) limits the participation of citizens. If registration is a particularly difficult process (e.g. literacy tests or travelling longdistances to registration offices) then many citizens may effectively be restricted from

practicing their right to suffrage.The measure for effective participation is weighted to reduce voter turnout based

on the ratio of spoiled ballots (blank and null votes) and votes for excluded parties.10 We may, of course, not always want every citizen to vote (e.g. uninformed citizens) or every party

(e.g. fascist parties) to win a seat to the legislature. But, I insist, to the degree that citizens are notinformed or capable of making decisions or support anti-democratic parties is, to a great degree, ameasure of the quality of a polyarchy. In a normative sense, better polyarchies produce citizens who are

better informed, more highly educated, and capable of making individual and collective decisions.Similarly, better polyarchies produce more tolerant and democratic political cultures that would

diminish anti-democratic sentiment and the political parties they produce.11 It must be made clear that the index of effective participation only measures representation via the political party system. Representation and participation are, of course, more complicated phenomenonand more difficult to quantitatively (or even qualitatively) measure. Participation especially in LatinAmerica often entails direct, public action (marches, demonstrations, hunger strikes, etc.) but can alsotake informal forms (membership in civic organizations, letters to representatives, campaigncontributions, etc.). The absence of detailed survey and other data on Latin American political

participation creates a problem for quantitatively measuring political participation. There is evidence,however, that electoral participation is strongly correlated to other forms of political participation. Thus,using voter turnout to calculate a rough measure of participation may be appropriate.

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Voters casting blank and null votes participate in the most basic act of citizenship voting and may demonstrate some confidence in the legitimacy of the electoralmechanism. This paper assumes that voters casting blank ballots express a rejection of specific political actors even if still accepting the democratic system (Rojas and Zuazo1996, 56). This is similar to the conception of spoiled ballots as protest votes. Spoiled

ballots correspond with voter preferences or interests not represented by any political party or a rejection of the political system en toto . It is a gross distortion to consider anelection inclusive if protest voting is high regardless of raw voter turnout.

The model of polyarchy developed in this paper emphasizes the need for allcitizens to find their interests expressed through a political party. Polyarchies rely on theinstitution of political parties to represent citizens in order to address the problem of scalein modern polities. As such, political parties are indispensable for democracy (Lipset2000). Those political parties that participate in elections constitute the party system . A

party system becomes more inclusive as the ratio of the electorate casting blank andnull votes diminishes and voter identification with existing parties increases.

Parties that are excluded are those parties that compete in legislative elections

but do not win any seats in the legislature. Such parties are excluded from the process of ruling defined as the ability to initiate collective action, to participate in thedetermination of public policy and supervise its execution, to attend to the needs of thelarger society and shape its future (Poggi 1978, 68). At the very least, political partiesrepresented in the legislature have some ability to shape political outcomes. Even if limited to a small number of seats, parties can initiate legislation, participate in publicdiscussion and alter its promulgation, and give a legitimate voice to issues concerningtheir constituent or ideological base. An electoral system is also more inclusive as thenumber of parties not winning seats in the legislature diminishes. This is especially truein proportional systems (as are all five South American states) but also applies to

plurality electoral systems.A careful distinction must be made between effective participation and

competition. A polity may be competitive in the sense that two or more parties trulycompete among each other. Thus, the restriction or exclusion or political parties (either through gerrymandering or other electoral institutions) may not diminish the level of within-system competitiveness . But the exclusion of relevant parties or actors from the

political system diminishes the representative nature of the state. To the extent that votesare not translated into seats (with-system representation), the electoral participation of voters was not effective .

Due to missing data for some countries, adjustments in the measurement of participation were necessary. For Colombia 1994 and Colombia 1998, first round presidential votes were used as a proxy for legislative votes. A test of the relationship between presidential and legislative elections showed that the margin of difference between the two was rather small. 12 For those elections, however, effective participation

12 The mean value for Valid/VAP for 1978-90 presidential elections (N=4) was 0.398. The meanvalue for Valid/VAP in legislative elections for the same years (N=4) was 0.378. The difference

between the two is only 0.02. However, presidential Valid/VAP figures were not always higher than for legislative elections; in the 1990 election presidential Valid/VAP figures were lower than legislativeValid/VAP by 0.094. The size of the sample does not allow for a confident conclusion that presidentialelections since 1990 have lower voter participation than legislative election. The relatively closecongruence of figures for both types of elections, however, suggest that presidential Valid/VAP figures

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measures were not conceptually possible; the closest value obtained was of the ratio of valid votes over voting age population (Valid/VAP). Colombia 1991 data does not allowfor accurate calculation of votes for excluded parties due to the large number of independent candidates classified as other. Instead, the Colombia 1991 calculationalso uses the ratio of valid votes over voting age population. Data for Ecuador 1998 does

not include information on blank and null votes. Similarly, there is not the necessary datato calculate effective participation. Subsequently, only the ratio of votes over voting age population figures is available; the reader should keep in mind that information on blank and null votes and votes for excluded parties should substantially deflate this number. 13

The data used for calculating the variables presented in this paper are included inAppendix A.

Civil and Political Liberties

The third dimension of polyarchy is civil and political liberties . This dimension is

operationalized with data from the Freedom House Annual Survey of Freedom . FreedomHouse uses a seven-point scale for both civil rights and political liberties. It is importantto note that the Freedom House score does not rate governments per se but rather therights and freedoms individuals have in each country (Freedom House 1998, 592).Measures are related to the relative degree of freedom citizens can enjoy regardless of theofficial rights offered by governments or constitutions. This paper creates a simplemeasure for civil and political liberties by taking the mean of ratings for civil rights and

political liberties. Subsequently, the combined scale for civil and political liberty rangesfrom a low of one (most freedom) to seven (least freedom). Freedom House indicators of

political rights and civil liberties (FH) are taken from the organizations Annual Survey of Freedom . Freedom House considers countries with combined scores between 1.0 and 2.5free; between 3.0 and 5.5 partly free; and between 5.5 and 7.0 not free.

Both Freedom House measures include all of the seven institutions of polyarchyas defined by Dahl. The Political Liberties index includes information on electedofficials, free and fair elections, and associational autonomy. The Civil Liberties indexincludes information on freedom of association, access to alternative sources of information, as well as associational autonomy. Both indexes, however, go beyondDahls minimal requirements for polyarchy and include other types of civil and politicalrights. These include questions about the rule of law, trade unions, and property rights,among others. 14

Results and Analysis

may serve as a relatively close proxy for IEP values in the absence of legislative electoral data.13 The mean difference between Votes/VAP and IEP for Ecuador 1979-1996 (N=8) is 0.159. This means

that Ecuadors measure for 1998 IEP could be estimated as 0.34 rather than the measure of 0.49 used asa proxy. Thus, the measure errs on the side of overestimating effective participation for 1998. If 0.34 isused for Ecuador 1998 IEP, then the mean IEP for Ecuador becomes 0.43 rather than the reported 0.45.The difference of 0.02 is rather small, however and does not appear to significantly bias the estimate.

14 For a full discussion, consult the methodology chapter of the Annual Survey of Freedom.

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The data demonstrate that the experience of among our five cases of competitiveelections is, on the whole, somewhat positive (see Table 2). Bolivia and Ecuador sharethe highest means, though Bolivia ends the time series with the highest score at aconsiderably high 0.95 (Bolivia also has the highest low score). Venezuelas meancompetitiveness score falls in the middle of the group. Its fate, however, now rests largely

in the hands of President Hugo Chvez Frias. After Chvez closed the legislature in 1999 claiming the newly-elected constituent assembly should replace the parliament andsuspended many constitutional provisions, its competitiveness score was a low 0.10.Similarly, Perus measures for competitiveness collapsed after President AlbertoFujimoris autogolpe in 1992. Colombias measures for competitiveness have vacillated,although they end at a moderately high level (ranking third behind Bolivia and Ecuador respectively).

Table 2. Average, lowest, highest, and last index of competitiveness values from the period since 1978 or first year of democratic rule.

Mean Lowest Highest Last

Bolivia 0.89 0.74 0.97 0.95Colombia 0.61 0.50 0.82 0.78Ecuador 0.88 0.66 0.99 0.88Peru 0.63 0.51 1.00 0.51Venezuela 0.78 0.10 0.97 0.10

Sources: Based on data in CNE 1997a, CNE 1997b, Nohlen 1993, Gutirrez 1998, Hoskin 1998, Barczak 1997, McCoy 1999, Inter-Parliamentary Union PARLINE Database, and data provided by MonicaBarczak, Arend Lijphart, and Grace Ivana Deheza.

Data for effective participation are more mixed (see Table 3). Again, Boliviasmean ranks among the top two, along with Venezuela. Figures for effective participationin the last election of the time series, however, catapult Bolivia into first place whileVenezuela sinks almost to the level of Peru. Colombia has the lowest mean, though it hasimproved even as effective participation for Peru and Venezuela in their latest electionshave collapsed to 0.31 and 0.32 respectively.

Table 3. Average, lowest, highest, and last index of effective participation valuesresulting from elections since 1978 or first year of democratic rule.



Sources: Based on data in International IDEA 1999, CNE 1997a, CNE 1997b, Nohlen 1993, Gutirrez1998, Barczak 1997, McCoy 1999, and Inter-Parliamentary Union PARLINE Database, Political Database

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of the Americas, and data provided by Arend Lijphart and Monica Barczak. Notes: Uses estimated values for Colombia 1991, Colombia 1994, Colombia 1998, and Ecuador 1998.

A consideration of voter turnout over total voting age population demonstrates theimportance of using a measure for effective participation (see Table 4). This is especiallyclear in the case of Peru, whose mean difference between voter turnout and effective

participation is 0.19. This dramatic difference is due primarily to the substantial number of blank and null votes cast in the last two elections (both after Fujimoris autogolpe ).The difference is smallest for Colombia (0.01), which may be explained by the fact thatColombia does not have a mandatory voting law. Thus, there may not be a need for protest voting in Colombia; voters merely stay away from the polls instead. Peru,however, experiences high levels of protest voting. A case in point is that blank and null

ballots accounted for a full 44.4 percent of all ballots cast in the 1995 Peruvian election.

Table 4. Average, lowest, highest, and last voter turnout (Vote/VAP) for elections since1978 or first year of democratic rule.



France 0.63 0.58 0.70 0.60Greece 0.86 0.84 0.88 0.84Italy 0.92 0.87 0.94 0.87

Portugal 0.80 0.77 0.88 0.79Spain 0.76 0.71 0.83 0.81

Sources: Based on data in International IDEA 1999, CNE 1997a, CNE 1997b, Barczak 1997, Nohlen 1993,Inter-Parliamentary Union PARLINE Database, and Political Database of the Americas.

Voter turnout figures for the European cases are, not surprisingly, higher than for the South American ones. This higher turnout rate for Europe cannot be explained bymandatory voting, since all of the South American states (except for Colombia) haveobligatory voting laws. It is certain that effective participation measures should lower thevoter turnout rates somewhat. This effect should be largest for France and Italy both

have higher percentages of spoiled votes reported by International IDEA. Still, it isinteresting to note that voter turnout figures for France (the lowest of the Europeangroup) are very close to those for Bolivia. More striking is the fact that voter turnout inthe last French election is only slightly higher than the effective participation measure for Bolivias last general election. This finding suggests that a strong argument can be madefor Bolivia as a consolidated democracy. If we assume that measures for competitivenessare high throughout Europe, then Bolivia should rate well in comparative perspective.Bolivia may not have as high levels of participation as some European countries; but it

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has certainly reached the level of France.Finally, Freedom House data on civil and political liberties demonstrate that

Bolivia and Ecuador are, once again, among the better performers (see Table 5). Keepingin mind that, for Freedom House indicators, lower scores mean higher levels of freedom,Venezuelas mean of 2.1 is the best in the group. Venezuela, however, has seen its

Freedom House scores increase recently, reaching 4.0 (classifying the country as onlypartly free) after Chvez suspended the legislature in 1999. Similarly, Perus mean places it in the partly free category, due mainly to the high scores following Fujimorisautogolpe in 1992. Colombias results are somewhat puzzling at first glance; levels of competitiveness and participation increased in recent years even as Freedom Housemeasures have indicated dramatic reductions in civil and political liberties. This is mainlydue, however, to the combination of an escalation in both the guerrilla war and thegrowing strength of drug cartels and right-wing paramilitary groups in its wake.

Table 5. Average, lowest, highest, and last Freedom House scores from the period since1978 or first year of democratic rule.



France 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5Greece 1.8 1.5 2.0 2.0Italy 1.4 1.0 2.0 1.5

Portugal 1.4 1.0 2.0 1.0Spain 1.6 1.0 2.5 1.5

Sources: Based on data in Freedom Houses Annual Survey.

The improvements in Colombias polity after the 1991 Constitution may simply be a matter of too little, too late. However, Colombia never scored better than 2.5 onthe Freedom House scale the highest score possible within the free category. Thus,the presence of the leftist guerrilla insurgencies (and, subsequently, the systemic

problems they created) was felt for some time. Recently, however, observers are openlyadmitting that Colombia faces a severe crisis of state (Hartlyn and Dugas 1999). If we

accept the argument that polyarchy requires a functioning state, and that no state, nodemocracy (Linz and Stepan 1996), then Colombia cannot be considered consolidated polyarchy when the state effectively controls only slightly more than one third itsnational territory. Colombias measures for participation and competition appear to beimproving (though still not at relatively high levels when compared to other states).However, the inability of the Colombian state to monopolize the mechanisms of coercionthroughout its territory leaves the protection of civil and political rights beyond the abilityof the state. Similarly, the anti-guerrilla and anti-narcotics military campaigns have begun

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to erode the guarantees of civil and political liberties in Colombia.Table 5 also allows for a comparison among the levels of civil and political

liberties between the European and South American cases. Not surprisingly, theEuropean cases do much better as a group on the Freedom House indicators. Again,Bolivia and rates rather well in direct comparison to the European cases, especially in the

most recent three years. Bolivia ended the time series with a Freedom House score of 2.0, putting it at the same level as Greece and only one notch below France, Spain , and Italy.The decline in levels of civil and political liberties for Venezuela is even more dramaticwhen compared to the European cases. For the 1978-1988 period, Venezuelas meanFreedom House scores as 1.5, rivaling that of all the European cases. Since then,however, Venezuela has become among the worst rated of the South American cases.

Results of the analysis of data for two dimensions of polyarchy ( competition and participation ) after the last election is summarized in Figure 2. A fuller categorization of each post-electoral case (a country-year combination, e.g. Colombia 1992, Bolivia 1989)is presented in Table 6. Bolivia clearly qualifies as a full polyarchy or consolidateddemocracy due to its relatively high measures along all three dimensions combined with

majority governments since 1985. Ecuador appears to rank in the ineffective polyarchycategory. Ecuador also scores relatively well in all three dimensions (only slightly behindBolivia), but it does not score well on the measure of effective opposition (see AppendixA-3). Ecuadors opposition is very often too strong in comparison to the government.Thus, even though Ecuadors system remains competitive, it appears to lack

governability . That is to say, an executive who faces a very large opposition block inCongress and with whom he has had to negotiate very often heads the state. 15 The

problem is made even more acute by the fact that Ecuadors political party system ishighly fragmented and parliament members can defect from their parties at will (Barczak 1997). This problem of governability was made evident in the recent January 2000 coupthat replaced President Jamil Muhuad Witt. Because of the coup, Ecuador may perhapsalso be described as a praetorian polyarchy due to the political power of the military.

Figure 2. Classification of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela along thedimensions of competition and participation after their most recent elections.

Low participation High participation

High competitionColombia 1998

Venezuela 1998

Bolivia 1997

Ecuador 1998 (*)

Low competition Peru 1995 no cases

15 It has been pointed out that the United States also often exists with a divided government withdifferent parties controlling the executive and legislative branches of government. This problem,however, is a recent phenomenon (see Cox and Kernell 1991; Jacobson 1991; Mayhew 1991). Juan J.Linz (1996a) argues that the potential for dual legitimacy (i.e. divided government) is a key problemof presidentialism and argues that the United States has sustained democracy despite its presidentialsystem.

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Venezuela 1999 ()

Note: (*) Ecuador has maintained levels of competition almost as high as Bolivia. Unlike Bolivia, however,Ecuador also tends to score above 1.00 on the effective opposition scale. This means that while Ecuadors

political system is competitive, the government is unable to govern effectively as it is most often a minority

government. This has produced executive instability, leading up to the military-backed golpe of January2000. () The collapse of political competition after Chvez suspended the Venezuelas legislature andSupreme Court in 1999 may tentatively place Venezuela in the same category as Peru.

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Table 6. Differentiation of existing cases by polyarchy subtype.

Country/Year FH C IEP Governability

Full polyarchiesBolivia 1985 2.5 0.74 0.54 YesBolivia 1989 2.5 0.96 0.45 YesBolivia 1993 2.5 0.90 0.46 YesBolivia 1997 2.0 0.97 0.59 YesEcuador 1986 (*) 2.5 0.84 0.43 YesEcuador 1988 (*) 2.0 0.66 0.50 YesEcuador 1990 (*) 2.0 0.99 0.51 YesEcuador 1998 (*) 2.0 0.88 0.49 YesPeru 1980 2.5 0.69 0.43 YesPeru 1985 2.5 0.60 0.55 YesVenezuela 1978 (*) 1.5 0.92 0.72 YesVenezuela 1983 1.5 0.65 0.74 YesVenezuela 1988 (*) 1.5 0.75 0.67 Yes

Ineffective polyarchiesBolivia 1982 2.5 0.95 0.49 NoEcuador 1992 2.5 0.96 0.52 No

Aristocratic polyarchiesColombia 1986 2.5 0.82 0.39 YesEcuador 1979 (*) 2.0 0.72 0.33 YesEcuador 1984 2.0 0.90 0.38 NoEcuador 1994 2.5 0.86 0.38 NoVenezuela 1998 2.5 0.97 0.32 No

Illiberal polyarchiesColombia 1998 3.5 0.78 0.47 No

Ecuador 1996 3.0 0.91 0.52 NoPeru 1990 3.5 1.00 0.43 No

Restricted polyarchiesColombia 1978 2.5 0.52 0.30 YesColombia 1982 2.5 0.50 0.38 Yes

Oligarchic polyarchiesColombia 1991 3.0 0.60 0.25 YesVenezuela 1993 3.0 0.88 0.36 No

Electoral polyarchiesColombia 1990 3.5 0.51 0.37 YesColombia 1994 3.5 0.56 0.27 YesPeru 1992 5.5 0.52 0.35 YesPeru 1995 4.5 0.51 0.31 Yes

Sources: Based on data in International IDEA 1999, CNE 1997a, CNE 1997b, Barczak 1997, Nohlen 1993,Gutirrez 1998, Hoskin 1998, McCoy 1999, Inter-Parliamentary Union PARLINE Database, PoliticalDatabase of the Americas, and Freedom Houses Annual Survey , and data provided by Monica Barczak,Arend Lijphart, and Grace Ivana Deheza.

Notes: The cut-off point between high and low levels of competition and participation is 0.60 and 0.40,respectively. (*) Size of the typical government party larger than the typical opposition party but

presidents parties or coalitions did not hold a majority in the legislature.

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Bolivia best fits the category of democratic consolidation after its last election.Table 6 also shows that Bolivia has rated as a full polyarchy for the past four elections;the country also rated high on all dimensions during its first democratic government(1982-85), although the UDP (Unidad Democrtica Popular, Democratic Popular Union)government did not control a legislative majority. More significantly, each election since

1985 has produced an alternation of power along with a trend towards increasingcompetitiveness, voter electoral participation, and civil and political liberties.Colombia appears to be a clear case of a ineffective-oligarchic polyarchy due to

its relatively high levels of competition combined with low measures of participation,low levels of civil and political liberties, and minority government after the 1998election. For most the earlier period of this time-series, Colombia qualified as arestricted polyarchy due to its relatively low levels of competition and participationcombined with relatively high levels of civil of political liberties. This assessment fits thequalitative description often given of Colombia as exclusionary due to the congruence

between the Liberal and Conservative parties since the 1958 National Front agreement.Similarly, the reduced levels of participation in both the 1993 and 1998 elections place

Venezuela somewhere in between the categories of aristocratic polyarchy andineffective-oligarchic polyarchy even though it could be classified as a full polyarchyuntil 1993. The dramatic drop in competition after Chvez suspended the legislature in1999, however, may lead us to tentatively place Venezuela in the category of electoral

polyarchy. It is too early to tell, however, whether this is a temporary condition or whether Chvez is, as some speculate, another Fujimori.

Finally, Peru is clearly a case of a electoral polyarchy despite the faade of democratic norms. After Fujimoris 1992 autogolpe , Peru has experienced very lowlevels of competition and effective participation. Similarly, Freedom House measures of civil rights and political liberties in Peru are rather high. Thus, Peru scores low along allthree dimensions since 1992. The recent April 2000 elections were also marred byaccusations of voter fraud and irregularities, although Fujimori did finally concede a run-off election for June of this year. The June 2000 elections offer an opportunity for another democratic transition in Peru.

Discussion

A critical consideration of cases presented in Table 6 suggests only two cases of democratic consolidation. Bolivia is the clearest case with four consecutive elections(15 years) that produced high levels of competition, participation, and civil and politicalliberties as well as governability. Bolivia also has a total of five consecutive elections (18years) that produced high levels of competition, participation, and civil and politicalliberties. Venezuela also appears as a consolidated democracy, rating as a full

polyarchy from 1978-1992 and three consecutive elections (also 15 years). However, the president enjoyed a legislative majority in only one of those governments (1983-88) Theother two countries, Ecuador and Peru, are more dubious. Ecuador did experience threeconsecutive elections (5 years) rating as a full polyarchy, but this was short-lived andin the context of only two presidential elections. Also, in none of these years didEcuadors president enjoy a parliamentary majority. Similarly, Peru only experienced two

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consecutive elections (10 years) that produced cases within the full polyarchy category.Colombia has not yet reached the level of full polyarchy.

A key condition for democratic consolidation is a combination of institutionalrules that produce high levels of competition with executive governability. This paper stresses governability because democracy is also a form of government of the state (Linz

and Stepan 1996). A high level of competition combined with governability (measured asa larger size of typical government party versus the typical opposition party) isessential for a full polyarchy as defined in this paper. More importantly, an institutionalarrangement that combines effective opposition and high levels of competition withexecutive and legislative congruence produces a government that is both governable andcompetitive. The balance of government and opposition means that no party or coalitionis hegemonic. At the same time, congruent government control of the executive andlegislature is a positive value often associated with parliamentarism (e.g. Linz 1996b).

The logic of presidentialisms checks and balances which Linz decries (1996a)often lead to gridlock a political fact not conducive to new democracies. 16 Weshould, of course, be weary of too-powerful presidents (such as Fujimori and Chvez)

who wield their legislatures like rubber stamps. These authoritarian presidents do not by themselves refute the need executives have for legislative support. After all, they gaingovernability at the expense of competitiveness. If we accept Linzs (1996a) claim that

presidentialism produces the problem of dual legitimacy, then the problem of presidentialism can be formulated another way: legislatures with electoral legitimacyneed friendly executives to sign and execute their laws. Either way, I argue that

presidential democracies work best (both in a technical and normative sense) when theexecutive and legislative branches are controlled by the same party or coalition. AlthoughVenezuela, and to lesser extent Ecuador and Peru, showed signs of democraticconsolidation, these proved fragile over time. This paper, of course, does not claim thatBolivias democracy will not break down in the future. But the accomplishment of one of the regions poorest and least developed countries to achieve such dramatic democraticsuccess is, to say the least, remarkable.

A great deal of Bolivias success has to do with its method of selecting theexecutive. Like Chile, Bolivias constitution allows for the election of the executive bythe legislature if no presidential candidate wins a majority of the votes. Unlike Chile,however, Bolivia has a multiparty system that virtually guarantees no presidentialcandidate wins an electoral majority. Thus, the selection of the Bolivian president has

been made by the legislature since 1982. This political fact produced a hybrid systemRen Antonio Mayorga (1997) terms parliamentarized presidentialism. The Bolivianmodel of parliamentarized presidentialism relies on two key features: strong partydiscipline and synchronic elections of the legislature and executive. These two features

produce one of the simplest electoral systems. Voters cast one single party list ballot (asin many parliamentary systems) that determines the fate of both legislative chambers and

presidential candidates. 17 This electoral system is in tune with Nohlens (1999) call for simpler electoral designs.16 I do not believe that presidential systems and their potential for gridlock is inherently bad for

democracy. An important distinction must be made, however, between new and older democracies. TheUnited States can afford to experience prolonged periods of divided government after more than twohundred years of democratically elected governments. Newer democracies, however, face pressuresgreat pressures, including the need to spur socioeconomic development.

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Future extensions of this research project will not only extend beyond thecountries included in this study; the research agenda includes exploration into causalmechanisms. Including a larger number of cases will allow for the testing of severalhypotheses relating various institutional designs and the three dimensions of polyarchy(used as dependent variables). In the meantime, this paper suggests that in the context

of disciplined parties electoral rules that provide for synchronic elections for theexecutive and legislative branches and ensure majoritarian government offer lessobstacles to democratic consolidation. Bolivias parliamentarized political system

bridges the gap between presidentialism and parliamentarism, offering the stability of presidentialism with the increased legitimacy of parliamentarism. Although it may be tooearly to promote the Bolivian political model for export, it is at least an option for newdemocracies to consider.

17 The introduction of a multi-member plurality system (MMP) in the 1994 constitution has made theBolivian electoral system only slightly more complicated. Whereas before the 1997 general electionBolivians cast a single party-list ballot, they now cast two: one ballot for their uninominal (district)representative and the other for the single party list that determines the president, the senate, and theremainder of the lower legislature.

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