Politicka misla 19

str. 1Godina 5, br. 20, dekemvri 2007, Skopje

Jajceto ili koko{kata?

Dolgo vreme postoi dilemata:{to e postaro, jajceto ili koko{-kata? I dvete se me|usebno povr-zani i nerazdelni. Toa {to sejajceto i koko{kata vo faunata, toase pazarot i pravnata sigurnost voekonomijata. Ne postoi biznis koj nepodle‘i na pravno dej-stvo duri i ako se rabotisamo za pra{awe na do-verba. Doverbata e edensistem koj{to gi {titiu~esnicite na pazarot.Jasno e deka pravniotsistem i ekonomskiotsistem se razli~ni, novoedno i potrebni edenna drug. Nobelovcite odSAD go prepoznale ova ime|uzavisnosta ja isko-ristile vo Razvojot nateorijata na igrata. Tieednostavno trgnale od postavkatadeka u~esnicite na pazarot nemo‘at da znaat s¢, i vo eden otvo-ren sistem ne mo‘at da gi imaatsite informacii. Od ovie pri~ini,mora da se potprat na pravniotsistem so nade‘ deka nivniteinvesticii }e bidat za{titeni. Toa{to mo‘ebi zvu~i ednostavno, natrojcata amerikanski eksperti imdonese Nobelova nagrada. Svoetoistra‘uvawe go fokusiraa na mo‘-nostite {to vo dene{noto brzotempo na ‘iveewe ~ini mnogu pari,

Ulrih Klepman

no i {to donesuva mnogu pari.Trkaloto ne be{e povtorno otkri-eno, tuku u{te edna{ se prepoznadeka toa sepak se vrti.

Fiskalnata i monetarna poli-tika vo Germanija po Vtorata svet-ska vojna, od dobro poznati pri~ini,be{e strogo podelena pome|u poli-tikata i centralnata banka. Istiot

princip Germanija go pri-meni i pri osnovaweto naEvropskata centralnabanka (ECB). Zemjite voEvrozonata ne se vo mo‘-nost pove}e da ja zgole-muvaat ili namaluvaatvrednosta na valutata zada gi pokrijat ekonom-skite fluktuacii, bidej-}i nemaat direkten pri-stap do evroto. Eden bla-goslov za Germancite,zna~e{e prokletstvo zaGrcite i Italijancite, a,

od skoro, i za Francuzite. Vsu{-nost, toa e u{te od odamna, no odpred nekolku meseci Francija seobiduva da ja potrese ECB vo Frank-furt. Mo‘nosta za ko-odlu~uvawevo odnos na koli~inata na pari ikamati, treba da im se priznae nazemjite-~lenki. Odnapred ve}edogovorenite obvrski da se pri-dr‘uvaat do kriteriumite na sta-bilnost, treba da omeknat zatoa{to, vo sprotivno, se zakanuvaatdolgovi, a vo nekoi slu~ai bi sepovlekle odredeni merki od strana

Politi~ka mislastr. 2

Ulrih Klepman

na Brisel. Pokrivaweto na defici-tot vo buxetot preku pottiknuvawena ma{inite za pe~atewe pari, zaGermancite e isto {to i samiot |a-vol, bidej}i tokmu toa vo prvite po-voeni godini gi dovede do infla-cija i hiperinflacija. Par~e leb vo1919 god. ~ine{e 0,15 marki, a skoro5 godini potoa skoro 2.400.000.000.000marki. Nezamislivata zaguba navrednosti ja osiroma{i celata zem-ja. Sekako, toa denes e nemo‘noporadi me|unarodnata finansiskapovrzanost, no Germanija i Avstrijazaedno so Finska stojat zaednoprotiv obidite da se naru{i neza-visnosta na ECB. Toj {to se zadol-‘uva, toj mora i da si gi plati smet-kite. Samo taka evroto kako valuta}e bide stabilna i }e ja postignecelta da bide vode~ka i konkurentavaluta vo svetot sprema dolarot.

Vo pedesettite godini socijal-nata pazarna ekonomija vo Germa-nija se pojavuva kako garant za eko-nomski uspeh i socijalna stabil-nost. Konkretno se odnesuva nasocijalnata, a ne na socijalisti~kasfera, bidej}i terminite ~esto seme{aat. Socijalnata pazarna eko-nomija se smeta za ekonomska us-pe{na prikazna, koja stana nose~kistolb na germanskoto op{testvo.No, dali taa e model i za ekono-miite vo tranzicija? Sekako da, novo soodvetna forma. Preduslovitese tuka kako i izgledite za uspeh.Fondacijata "Konrad Adenauer# sejavuva kako afirmator na ovojekonomski op{testveno-politi~kikoncept, koj{to e razvien od strana

na Ludvig Erhard i Konrad Aden-auer so politi~ka perspektiva na-sproti nekoi sprotivstavuvawatana toga{nite eksperti kako i na go-lemite sili koi vo toj period beaprisutni vo Germanija, SAD i Veli-ka Britanija.

Aktuelnosta na modelot za soci-jalna-pazarna ekonomija i den-denes ne samo {to ne e izgubena tu-ku, naprotiv, vo pogled na prediz-vicite na idninata se javuva kakomodel na poredok koj{to dobivanovi zna~ewa. Od tie pri~ini,Fondacijata "Konrad Adenauer# sodecenii go promovira ovoj model igo ima vo fokusot na svoeto rabo-tewe niz godinite. Fondacijata ze-ma aktivno u~estvo vo formulira-weto i ponatamo{niot razvoj na so-cijalnata pazarna ekonomija, kakoprimer vo novonastanatite uslovivo Germanija i na me|unarodnatascena. Socijalnata pazarna ekono-mija ne e ekonomska teorija! Tuku na-protiv: gi postavuva lu|eto, nivniotanga`man i nivnite inicijativi vofokusot na interesot. Nivnoto re-alizirawe, me|u drugoto, se odnesu-va i na celosniot kapacitet za po-stojana, politi~ka i ekonomska ino-vativnost, vo samostojnoto pretpri-ema{tvo i vo podgotvenosta za pre-zemawe odgovornost. No, prvo trebada se o`iveat prakti~noto dejstvu-vawe i li~niot primer. Socijal-nata pazarna ekonomija be{e otkri-ena i primeneta kako eden uspe{enmodel vo Nov Zeland i Estonija,pred okolu edna i pol decenija.


Voved

Abstract

In economic terms, trust is a system which protects the participantson the market. Providing the necessary financial stability, the economicsystem and legal security, function in mutual dependence and beneficialdifferences. Concerning the wide open market and the lack of informationas its consequence, people have a need of legal protection. In order toprovide economical success and social stability of its citizens, after theWW II Germany implemented the model of the social market economy.This model, developed by Ludwig Erhard and Konrad Adenauer, evolvedduring the years in a successful economic story that stands as a pillar ofthe German society. The Konrad Adenauer Foundation continuouslypromotes this model during its work and stands for the main idea of takingresponsibility, placing people, their engagements and initiatives in thefocus of its interest.

Social market economy is not just an economic theory!


SODR@INA / CONTENTS

VovedUlrih Klepman

IntroductionUlrich Kleppmann

Ekonomija i slobodna trgovija /Ekonomija i slobodna trgovija /Ekonomija i slobodna trgovija /Ekonomija i slobodna trgovija /Ekonomija i slobodna trgovija /Economy and FEconomy and FEconomy and FEconomy and FEconomy and Free Tree Tree Tree Tree Trrrrradeadeadeadeade

Social Market Economy: A Model for Economies in Transition? ............ 11Ulrich Kleppmann

Socijalna pazarna ekonomija: model za ekonomii vo tranzicija?Ulrih Klepman

Creation of a Free Trade Area in the Western Balkans ............................. 15Aleksandar Kostadinov

CEFTA vo zemjite od Zapaden BalkanAleksandar Kostadinov

Globalniot pazar i konkurentnosta: integrirawe na biznisstrategiite i ~ove~kite resursi ............................................................ 27Vesna Zabijakin - ^atleska

Global Markets and Competition: Integrating Business Strategiesand Human ResourcesVesna Zabijakin - Catleska

Convergence towards Good Corporate Governance:The Case of Macedonia ................................................................................ 35Kiril Nejkov

Konvergencija kon dobroto korporativno upravuvawe:Slu~ajot na MakedonijaKiril Nejkov

Aktuelno / Aktuelno / Aktuelno / Aktuelno / Aktuelno / CurrentCurrentCurrentCurrentCurrent

How to Design Better Markets? .................................................................. 43Shenaj Hadzimustafa

Anita Popovska

Kako da se sozdadat podobri pazari?[enaj Haximustafa

Anita Popovska


Me|unarodni organizacii /Me|unarodni organizacii /Me|unarodni organizacii /Me|unarodni organizacii /Me|unarodni organizacii /InternaInternaInternaInternaInternational Organizational Organizational Organizational Organizational Organizationstionstionstionstions

Grupacijata Svetska banka....................................................................... 53Mihaela Ristovska

World Bank GroupMihaela Ristovska

Predizvici i perspektivi /Predizvici i perspektivi /Predizvici i perspektivi /Predizvici i perspektivi /Predizvici i perspektivi /Challenges and PerspectivesChallenges and PerspectivesChallenges and PerspectivesChallenges and PerspectivesChallenges and Perspectives

Politikata na konkurencija vo ramkite na pregovoriteza ~lenstvo vo Evropskata Unija ............................................................ 57Pen~o Kuzev

Competition Policy within the Framework of the Negotiationsfor EU MembershipPenco Kuzev

Makedonija i EU /Makedonija i EU /Makedonija i EU /Makedonija i EU /Makedonija i EU /Macedonia and EUMacedonia and EUMacedonia and EUMacedonia and EUMacedonia and EU

Patot kon EU vodi i preku razvoj na ruralnite sredini ................. 65Mitko Jovanov

The Road to the EU also Leads through Development of the Rural AreasMitko Jovanov

Teorija / Teorija / Teorija / Teorija / Teorija / TheoryTheoryTheoryTheoryTheory

Economic Development through Policy Decisions,Incentives and Clusters ............................................................................... 71Aleksandra Davitkovska

Ekonomski razvoj preku politi~ki odluki, stimulacii i lokalnigrupiAleksandra Davitkovska

Portret Portret Portret Portret Portret / Portr Portr Portr Portr Portraitaitaitaitait

Milton Fridman......................................................................................... 81Elena @ikoska

Milton FriedmanElena Zikoska


Recenzii Recenzii Recenzii Recenzii Recenzii / Reviews Reviews Reviews Reviews Reviews

International Marketing, 8th Edition ........................................................... 85Maja Pavlovik

Me|unaroden marketing, VIII izdanieMaja Pavlovi}

Dokumenti Dokumenti Dokumenti Dokumenti Dokumenti / Documents Documents Documents Documents Documents

Potreba od donesuvawe nov Delovnik na Sobranieto naRepublika Makedonija .............................................................................. 89Marjan Maxovski

The Need for Adopting of the New Rules of Procedure ofthe Parlaiment of the Republic of MacedoniaMarjan Madzovski

Za avtorite /Za avtorite /Za avtorite /Za avtorite /Za avtorite /About the AuthorsAbout the AuthorsAbout the AuthorsAbout the AuthorsAbout the Authors ......................................................................... 97


Godina 5Br. 20dekemvriSkopje, 2007ISSN 1409-9853

Spisanie za politi~ko-op{testveni temi

Izdava~ :Ulrih KlepmanUrednici :

m-r Dane Taleskim-r Sandra Koqa~kova

Emilija Tuxarovskam-r Nenad Markovi}

m-r Ivan Damjanovskim-r Vladimir Bo`inovski

Goce Drtkovski

Adresa :Fondacija "Konrad Adenauer#

ul. Maksim Gorki 16 kat 3MK - 1000 Skopje

Tel.: 02 32 31 122Faks: 02 31 35 290

E-mail: [email protected]: www.kas.de

Institut za demokratija"Societas Civilis# Skopje

ul. Mitropolit Teodosij Gologanov 59/1/6-13MK - 1000 Skopje

Tel./Faks: 02 32 17 080E-mail: [email protected]: www.idscs.org.mk

Makedonska asocijacija na politikoloziE-mail: [email protected]

Pe~at:Vinsent grafika

Dizajn:Natali Nikolovska

Organizacija:Daniela Trajkovi}

Tehni~ka podgotovka:Pepi Damjanovski

Prevod:Qupka Siqanoska

Lektura:Rajna Ko{ka

Mihail Loparski

Year 5N∫ 20

DecemberSkopje, 2007

ISSN 1409-9853

Magazine for Political and Societal IssuesPublisher:Ulrich KleppmannEditors:Dane Taleski M.A.Sandra Koljackova M.A.Emilija Tudzarovska B.A.Nenad Markovic M.A.Ivan Damjanovski M.A.Vladimir Bozinovski M.A.Goce Drtkovski

Address:Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftungul. Maksim Gorki 16/3MK - 1000 SkopjePhone: 02 32 31 122Fax: 02 31 35 290E-mail: [email protected]: www.kas.de

Institute for Democracy"Societas Civilis" Skopjeul. Mitropolit Teodosij Gologanov 59/1/6-13MK - 1000 SkopjePhone/fax: 02 32 17 080E-mail: [email protected]: www.idscs.org.mk

Macedonian Political Science AssociationE-mail: [email protected]

Stavovite izneseni vo spisanieto ne sestavovi na Fondacijata "Konrad Adenauer#

i Institutot za demokratija"Societas Civilis# Skopje, tuku se li~ni

gledawa na avtorite. Izdava~ite ne odgovaraatza gre{ki napraveni pri prevodot.

Spisanieto se izdava 4 pati godi{no i im sedostavuva na politi~kite subjekti,

dr`avnite institucii, univerzitetite,stranskite pretstavni{tva vo

Republika Makedonija.

The viewpoints expressed in the magazine are notthe viewpoints of the "Konrad Adenauer"Foundation and the Institute for Democracy"Societas Civilis" Skopje. They are personalviews of the authors. The publishers are not liablefor any translation errors.

The magazine is published 4 times a yearand is distributed to political subjects, stateinstitutions, universities andforeign representatives inthe Republic of Macedonia.

Printing:Vinsent grafikaDesign:Natali NikolovskaOrganization:Daniela TrajkovicTechnical preparation:Pepi DamjanovskiTranslation:Ljupka SiljanoskaProof reading:Rajna KoskaMihail Loparski


Social Market Economy: A Model forEconomies in Transition?

Social Market Economy is the brandof Germany. It is one of the most famouspolitical and economic models of thiscentury. Social Market Economy can beunderstood only if we are familiar withthe historical situation during and afterWW II. In this context, a model was cre-ated, developed and later implementedwhich nobody believed would be suc-cessful except its fathers. The state wascompletely destroyed, the society wasin a state of disbalance, people wereideologically confused and democracywas still not really known. Economistslike Andreas M¸ller-Armack, WalterEucken and Ludwig Erhard assured thebasic living conditions of the populationand promised to build up a new stateand a new economy. They found them-selves amongst a struggle as to whatkind of system the new state shouldhave. One group of politicians put thesocial policy first, another group put theeconomy first, Erhard and his group triedto combine both as a third way. Socialistor communist ideas versus liberal orcapitalist ideas were on the table. Finally,even the constitution (Grundgesetz) didnot mention a special economic systemdue to the discord among the membersof the constitutional assembly. Actually,this was the hour of Ludwig Erhard whoimplemented the Social Market Eco-nomy which remains to this day a

successful model of social and economicbalance.

The Concept: Liberty and Order

In the Social Market Economy thehuman beings are in the center. It con-siders them as free in their decisionsand able to be responsible. Speakingof the ethics and spirit of the SocialMarket Economy, Ludwig Erhard hassaid: “Essential parts of the SocialMarket Economy are individual respon-sibility, personal initiative and privateproperty. It is a social order in which theperception of personal freedom, equa-lity of chances and growing wealth is inbalance with the social progress. Idefine the Social Market Economy(SME) as a practical attempt to combineliberty with order, in order to gain more(social) justice.” The frame of order ofSME is not restrictive, it wants to protectindividual potential, competition andplurality: the rule of law providesfairness and security, subsidy protectsfrom centralism and spoon-feeding,performance and solidarity ensureprosperity and justice. ìThe SME isbased on order with the principle ofperformance and competition, which si-multaneously protects the human beingfrom merciless exploitation.” Thismakes it not only politically and econo-

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Ulrich Kleppmann


Ulrich Kleppmann

mically an unprecedented success mo-del, but also a great integration formula.Every man shall have the chance to useand realize his opportunities. “Everyoneis needed, nobody should get lost.” Tothis ethic the SME has been committedsince the time of Ludwig Erhard.

The theory of the SME refers to theclassical liberal thinking with a few al-terations. It can be regarded as theGerman variety of neoliberalism, actu-ally called ordoliberalism. It has beendeveloped since the 1940s mainly bythe school of economists at the Univer-sity of Freiburg. The most importanttheorists were Walter Eucken andAndreas M¸ller-Armack, who inventedthe term. It should be mentioned thatthe theory of man on which this con-ception is based came from the Chris-tian idea of brotherly love and is char-acterized by the influence of the respon-sible individual. For M¸ller-Armack, re-sponsibility needs freedom as a nec-essary condition to enable the individualto select responsibility among differentoptions. The moral concept of the SMEconsists of three basic principles:• the principle of subsidiary, which

means an institutional rule intendedto shape the relation between†theindividual and solidarity. This regula-tion should assure the individualsírights and give them†the highest pri-ority, which means that anything whichcan be done by the individual shouldbe done by him†and not by the state.

• the principle of individuality, whichaims at the liberal ideal of individualfreedom,

• the principle of solidarity, which re-fers to the idea that every individualis part of a society of mutual depend-encies which obliges them to over-come injustice.

A Model for Countries inTransition?

The SME has been a guarantee forGermanyís economic recovery afterWW II. It was also under pressure whenthe first crises arose. By the end of the1960s too many people were in thesocial net of the welfare state. Modifi-cations like laws on competition, mo-nopolies and foreign trade law werepassed. The SME has also carried theimmense burden of the cost of Germa-nyís reunification, an incredible chal-lenge for the society and the economy.The social security system was shakendue to almost 16 million new membersof the state who did not pay in the pastfor it but had full rights and claims. Whatcan the SME do to be prepared for thefuture? Globalization, a shrinking andageing population, and a knowledge-based society are the mark of our time.Questions of European and global orderare gaining in importance. Therefore,there is a new and challenging task, tocombine the already known liberty withorder. More than in the past, it isimportant to balance regional withinternational solutions. Today, just as inthe past, reliable frameworks areneeded to harmonize economical dy-namics and social settlement. Espe-cially in phases of transition and up-heaval, the spirit of SME is in danger ifpeople expect from the state too muchand are credited with something. Turn-ing away from freedom, liberty, privateinitiative and individual responsibility ismisleading! Even in economies withlong periods of low growth and high un-employment rates it is necessary to rec-ognize that the promotion of privateinitiative through the state is creatingadditional problems. The consequences


Social Market Economy: A Model for Economies in Transition?

are limited and restricted potential andsocial targets become more and moreunclear. ìChances for allî need frame-work conditions in order to create spacefor development.

The policy-makers are asked to cre-ate new faith in the opportunities of glo-balization. In New Zealand, the govern-ment changed its economic policy to-wards a SME in the ìdown underî way.Today, New Zealand has one of thehighest growth rates, low unemploy-ment figures and a new modified socialsystem which is more and more attrac-tive for immigrants. Estonia, like Mac-edonia, came out of a greater state withalmost the same size and number ofinhabitants, including a significant mi-nority; however, it has overcome thementality of expecting everything tocome from the state. Estonia alsochanged its attitude towards JohnFitzgerald Kennedyís sentence: ìDonítask what your country can do for you,ask what you can do for your countryî.Becoming independent at the sametime, Estoniaís economy was muchworse than Macedoniaís, the GDP in1992 was half of that in Macedonia. Thesocial problems of the big Russian mi-nority and the economic blockades of

Russia led to a dramatic change notonly in the reform of the economy, butalso in handling social problems. TodayEstonia is a member of NATO and EU,so there must have been somethingthey did?!

The SME can be the answer to de-creasing social or welfare state subsi-dies. People should not be marginalizedor absolved from personal responsibil-ity. Finally, SME has in its conceptioninvestment in people, investment ineducation and training in order to makethem fit for the challenges of a glo-balized world. All this is only possiblewith values like freedom, responsibilityand personal initiative. Also, today, acombination of freedom (liberty) andorder is needed: we need a future ori-ented system which is not against glo-balization, but better equipped to copewith the conditions of the globalization.Such an approach is adequate not onlyfor small national systems, but also forlarger economic areas. The answer totodayís challenges for economies intransition can be a (modified) SocialMarket Economy that can take thesecountries along the roads leading to the21st century.

Rezime

Vo tekstot e poso~ena va‘nosta na socijalnata pazarna ekonomijakako eden od najzna~ajnite politi~ki i ekonomski modeli vo 21 vek.Tekstot nudi informacii za pojavata, potrebata i celta na samataimplementacija na modelot – socijalna pazarna ekonomija, kako iglavnite principi vrz koi{to se zasnova ovoj uspe{en model naop{testvena i ekonomska ramnote‘a. Vo tekstot se pojasneti i triteosnovni principi na moralniot koncept na socijalnata-pazarnaekonomija: principot na subsidijarnost, principot na individualnosti principot na solidarnost. Implementacijata na socijalnata pazarnaekonomija vo 21 vek, kako odgovor na sovremenite predizvici naekonomiite vo tranzicija, e agol na gledawe koj nudi novi perspektivina razmisluvawe.


Country Area (km2)

population 2005

GDP(current 000 US$) (2005)

GDP growth (annual %)

2005

GDP per capitaUS$ in 2005

Albania 28, 748 3,129,678 8,380,314 5.5 2678

Bosnia and Herzegovina 51,066 3,907,074 9,948,769 5 2546

Croatia 56,594 4,443,350 38,505,553 4.3 8666

Macedonia 25.713 2,034,060 5,766,178 4 2835

Serbia and Montenegro 88,361 8,064,253 26,215,215 4.7 3251

Total 196,047 21,578,415 88,816,029 4.7 (average)

3995 (average)

(Standard devia-tion) 2624.448 without Croatia

305.89

Creation of a Free Trade Area in theWestern Balkans

Aleksandar Kostadinov

Introduction and MainMacroeconomic Indicators of theWestern Balkan Countries

The Western Balkans is a geopoliti-cal term that refers to countries of Al-bania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cro-atia, Macedonia and Serbia and Monte-negro. The term "Western Balkans" wasused for the first time in the beginningof the 1990s and is often explained asYugoslavia minus Slovenia plus Alba-nia. Western Balkan countries are alsoin a political and economic context de-scribed as the ìblack holeî of Europeas a result of lacking cooperation withthe rest of Europe and a slow reform

process toward modernization and de-mocratization of their societies.

Western Balkan countries occupyan area of 196,047 km2, with a popula-tion of around 21,500,000 citizens. De-spite the bloody wars and conflicts dur-ing the 1990s and a heavy downturn oftheir economies, WB economies in thelast 5-6 years have grown fast and theforecasts are that they will continue toperform well as a result of the stabiliza-tion of the region, involvement of theInternational Community and preferen-tial trade agreements signed among thecountries. In 2005 all WB countries gen-erated an output of 88,816 million US$,with an average growth of 4.7%.

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Table 1: Main Macroeconomic indicators of Western Balkan countriesin 2005

Source: Authorís calculations based on World Bank online database and IMF data statistics



Country

Merchandise exports, f.o.b. (million US$)-

2005

Merchandise imports, c.i.f. (million US$)-

2005

Trade Balance (E-M) (million

US$)

deficit as a share of GDP %

Albania 658 2618 -1960 -23.39

Bosnia and Herzegovina 2405 7107 -4702 -47.26

Croatia 8772 18560 -9788 -25.42

Macedonia 2041 3228 -1187 -20.59

Serbia and Montenegro 5065 11 635 -6570 -25.06

Trade policies and strategies remaina weak point of all WB countries andthey all have proven high trade deficitsin the last decade. Trade deficits rangeas a share of the GDP from 20 to 25 %,except Bosnia and Herzegovina, wherethis share was around 47 %. Trade lib-

Table 2: Trade balance of WB countries in 2005

Source: authorís calculations based on World Bank online database and IMF data statistics

Figure 1: Trade balances of WB countries in 2005

eralization and recent signing of theCEFTA Agreement will probably in-crease trade deficits because WB coun-tries had high protective measures ofdomestic production, especially for ag-ricultural products.

Figure 2: Export/import share of GDP in 2005


Creation of a Free Trade Area in the Western Balkans

Regional Cooperation in WesternBalkan

At the summit in Zagreb in Novem-ber 2000, it was decided that an EUenlargement toward WB would be con-ditioned by the creation of regional co-operation among WB countries. Thebelief that the process of regionalizationwould lead to stabilization and eco-nomic development of the region wasthe crucial idea for the decisions made1.

Benefits of the Creation of CEFTA2

in the Western Balkans

- Market Size, Economy of Scale,Competition, FDI

The first and most important issueof the creation of CEFTA is the marketsize of the region. All WB countriescompared to the world economy areìsmall economiesî, some 0.15% of thetotal world GDP.

Figure 3: Convergence rate of Western Balkan countries with EU-25

Source: (Eurostat-Statistical books 2007) and (www.worldbank.org 2007)

Country county’s share of the world GDP

Albania 0.000137362

Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.000163064

Croatia 0.000631161

Macedonia 0.000094514

Serbia and Montenegro 0.000429708

Total 0.00145581

Table 3: WB countries GDP shareof the world GDP

Source: (www.worldbank.org 2007) own calculations

For the region as fragmented as theBalkans it is essential to have regionalcooperation in order to create goodcommercial strategies and policies.Good and well structured trade strate-gies would increase the volume of tradeamong the countries and defend theireconomies from more aggressive SouthAsian economies.

Small countries are not capable ofgaining the economy of scale of theirindustrial production. This is becauseof two reasons: the small domestic mar-ket and thus high production costs perunit and insufficient specific quantitiesof inputs necessary for mass produc-

1 See Stiblar, 2006.2 In my opinion the Central European Free TradeAgreement should be renamed to SEEFTA- South EastEuropean Agreement.

country's



tion. The enlarged market allows theuse of economy of scale and, as a re-sult, lower prices and more quantity ofgoods and services. The market as aconsequence of regionalization wouldnot just increase as a sum of all mar-kets, but, moreover, lower prices ofgoods would enlarge the access toeven more goods and services avail-able and will generate more consum-ers. Lower prices would also lead togreater competitiveness of the productson an international market and increaseefficiency of the production. Some re-cent studies have shown that regional

Figure 4: FDI stock 2001-2008 in million US$ (forecast)

Country county’s share of the world GDP

Albania 0.000137362

Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.000163064

Croatia 0.000631161

Macedonia 0.000094514

Serbia and Montenegro 0.000429708

Total 0.00145581

Table 4: FDI stock in WB countriesfor the period 2001-2005

Source: (www.worldbank.org 2007) own calculations

Year FDI stock WB countries2001 2265

2002 1739

2003 4071

2004 3300

2005 3903

2006* 4507*

2007* 4990*

2008* 5474*

Table 5: FDI inflow 2001-2005 with fore-cast for the years 2006, 2007 and 2008

agreement would not only decreaseprices of goods and services producedin domestic markets, but also importedgoods would have lower prices if theywant to compete in the region.

There is empirical evidence thatcountries which have signed Free TradeAgreements (FTA) have better perfor-mance to attract FDI. CEE countries area good example for attracting FDI aftercreation of the CEFTA. (VladimirGligorov, Mario Holzner, MichaelLandesmann 2003). All WB countrieshave instable inflow of FDI as a resultof political and economic risks.



Table 6: FDI in WB countries in the period 2001-2005

Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005Macedonia 441 77 96 157 100

Bosnia and Herzegovina 118 267 381 612 299

Croatia 1334 1123 2056 1224 1761

Serbia and Montenegro 165 137 1360 966 1481

Albania 207 135 178 341 262

Source: (www.worldbank.org 2007)

Figure 5: FDI in WB countries 2001- 2005

Source: (www.worldbank.org 2007), own calculations in eviews

120

160

200

240

280

320

360

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

A L B A N IA

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

C R O A T IA

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

SERBIA &�MONTENEGRO

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

2000

2200

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

B IH

0

100

200

300

400

500

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

M A C E D O N IA



Trade

Although all WB countries have al-ready signed bilateral agreements,trade volume is still low and below po-tentials. Table 7 represents intra tradeamong WB countries and share of trad-ing with EU25 and USA. As expected,Albania has had the lowest intra tradevolume with just 1.69% of export fromWBCs and 2.36% of import. This is dueto the fact that Albania was an autar-chic country for more than 50 years inthe last century, because of the lan-guage barriers3 and the fact that is wasnot ìpartî of the Yugoslav economic sys-tem. Major partners for Albania remainItaly, Germany, Greece and Turkey. The

other country that ìdiffersî from the re-gion as a trade partner is Croatia. Withimport of almost 4% and export of 20%,Croatia proves low involvement of tradein the WB region. The main reasonscould be the wars and the disruptedtrade connections and higher standardof living which allows the Croatians toimport more better-quality productsfrom western markets. Bosnia andHerzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegroand Serbia have more constant tradeand involvement in the region. Moreover,Albania, BaH and Montenegro are thecountries which had trade deficits in2005, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbiahave had surplus from the trade in 2005.

ImportEx-porter

ALB BaH CRO MAC MON SER Sum EU25 USA Total*

ALB - 1 0 1 5 2 9 369 5 532

BaH 4 - 394 18 37 280 733 1066 66 1920

CRO 17 1014 - 66 66 250 1413 3195 245 7084

MAC 22 41 65 - 11 358 497 760 36 1642

MON 5 23 6 2 - 160 196 220 1 435

SER 2 670 129 211 327 - 1339 1658 47 3630

Sum# 50 1749 594 298 446 1050 4187 7268 400 15243

EU25 1321 2711 10408 1342 400 2529 18711 - 251291 1071#

USA 15 14 128 25 2 104 288 163000 - 727#

Total** 2119 5673 14915 2596 940 8290 34533 855# 1390# 7550#

Table 7: Intra and inter-trade of WBCs in 2005, in million Euros

Legend:# = in billion ÄSum = for intra-trade among WBCs, where: sum of exports = sum of imports*Total: is total exports of individual country which is not sum in its row** Total: is total imports of country, which is not equal to sum in its column Source: (Stiblar 2006, 130-131)

3 The rest of WB countries speak BCS (Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian) language and Macedonian which is similar.



In December 2006, all WBCs plusMoldavia have substituted their bilateralagreements with one multilateral. Thiswas a logical step because there weremany obstacles in trade relations as aresult of the different levels of negotia-tions among some countries of the re-gion with WTO and EU. Thus, the ìspa-ghetti bowlî of contracts is substituted

by a modern agreement that includesnot only trade issues but, moreover, allthree work tables of the Stability Pact4:

- Security;- Economy;- Environment.

Figure 7: Percentage of import ofWBCs in 2005

Figure 6: Percentage of export ofWBCs in 2005

Exporter% of

export in WBCs

% of export in

EU 25

% of total export in WB+EU25

% of im-port from

WBCs

% of im-port from

EU25

% of total import in WB+EU25

Albania 1.69% 69.36% 71.05% 2.36% 62.34% 64.70%

BaH 38.18% 55.52% 93.70% 30.83% 47.79% 78.62%

Croatia 19.95% 45.10% 65.05% 3.98% 69.78% 73.76%

Macedonia 30.27% 46.29% 76.55% 11.48% 51.69% 63.17%

Montenegro 45.06% 50.57% 95.63% 47.45% 42.55% 90.00%

Serbia 36.89% 45.67% 82.56% 12.67% 30.51% 43.17%

% of export to WB as sum of total export

27.47% 47.68% 75.15% 12.12% 54.18% 66.31%

Table 8: Percentage of intra trade

Source: (Stiblar 2006) own calculations

4 See more at www.stabilitypact.org.



proximate index of comparative advan-tage of the countries, regions, commodi-ties etc. (Dimitrov and Stanchev 2002)

The RCA indicator can take valuesfrom -1 to +1. A positive and high valueof RCA for a particular commodity ap-proximates the take off point, whichcompanies may (or may not) convertinto better competitiveness of differentcommodities on different markets. We

Alba-nia

Bosnia-Herze-govina

Croatia Macedonia Moldova*Serbia & Montene-

gro**

UNMIK/ Kosovo***

Albania Applied 01/12/04 WTO ****

Applied 01/06/03

WTO

Applied 15/07/02

WTO

Applied 01/11/04

WTO

Applied 01/08/04

WTO

Applied 01/10/03

WTO

Bosnia-Herze-govina

Applied 01/

12/04 WTO

Applied 01/02/05

WTO

Applied 01/07/02

WTO

Applied 01/10/04

WTO

Applied 01/06/02

Signed 19/10/06

Provisional application 01/12/06

Croatia Applied 01/

06/03 WTO

Applied 01/02/05

WTO

Applied 11/06/97 Revised 11/06/02 Applied 11/07/02

WTO

Applied 01/10/04

WTO

Applied 01/07/04

WTO

Signed 28/09/06

Provisional application 01/11/06

Macedonia Applied 15/

07/02 WTO

Applied 01/07/02

WTO

Revised 11/06/02 Applied 11/07/02

Applied 01/12/04

WTO

21/10/05 Applied

Applied 02/02/06

Moldova* Applied 01/

11/04 WTO

Applied 01/10/04

WTO

Applied 01/10/04

WTO

Applied 01/12/04

WTO

Applied 01/09/04

WTO

Serbia & Montene-gro**

Applied 01/

08/04 WTO

Applied 01/06/02

Applied 01/07/04

WTO

Signed 21/10/05 Applied

01/06/06

Applied 01/09/04

WTO

UNMIK/ Kosovo***

Applied 01/

10/03 WTO

Signed 19/10/06

Provi-sional ap-plication 01/12/06

Signed 28/09/06

Provi-sional ap-plication 01/11/06

Applied 02/02/06

Table 9: Bilateral agreements among WBCs plus Moldova5

Source: Stability Pact December 2006* Moldova is associated to the process with an extended timeline.** Serbia & Montenegro started negotiation process when it was known as FR Yugoslavia; therefore, bothnames may appear on the agreements.*** All agreements in line with UNSCR 1244**** FTA notified to WTO

Revealed Comparative Advantage(RCA) in the Western Balkans

After presenting intra trade volumeamong WBCs, it is easy to calculateRCA. The Revealed Comparative Ad-vantage indicator can reveal the ap-

5 I have excluded Bulgaria and Romania from the tablebecause those two countries entered EU on 1 January 2007.



assume that the primary role in thesefurther developments is rather depen-dent on the countryís strategies andability to enhance productivity, andthese eventually will be reflected ingreater (smaller) country market shareson different commodity markets. In turn,a strongly negative RCA indicates al-ready existing or a provisional lack ofcompetitiveness and, respectively, sig-nificant challenge to identify niches andopportunities. The RCA I have calcu-lated is the conventional formula:

RCA ={( – )X Mij

ij

( + )X Mij

ij

(Equation 1)6

The country with the lowest RCAindex in 2005 was Albania. The coun-try had ca. 41 million EUR of deficitwhich is not serious compared with thelow participation of the country in theregional trade. In absolute numbers,BaH has shown highest deficit from theregion trade -1,016 million EUR. Croatiahas had success in its export with 1,413million EUR and import of 594 million

RCA in WBC’s in year 2005 (mil. €)Country Exporter Importer X-M X+M RCA

Albania 9 50 -41 59 -0.694915254

BaH 733 1749 -1016 2482 -0.409347301

Croatia 1413 594 819 2007 0.408071749

Macedonia 497 298 199 795 0.250314465

Montenegro 196 446 -250 642 -0.3894081

Serbia 1339 1050 289 2389 0.120971118

Table 10: RCA in WBC’s in year 2005


*LegendRCA values between 0.7 and 1 (+++)RCA values between 0.35 and 0.7 (++)RCA values between 0 and 0.35 (+)RCA value 0 (0)RCA values between 0 and -0.35 (-)RCA values between -0.35 and -0.7 (- -)RCA values between -0, 7 and -1 (- - -)

Table 11: RCA on WB region

Country RCA Significance*

Albania -0.694915254 - -

BaH -0.409347301 - -

Croatia 0.408071749 + +

Macedonia 0.250314465 +

Montenegro -0.389408100 - -

Serbia 0.120971118 +

EUR and trade surplus of 819 millionEUR.

I think this calculation is just a proxyof the situation in 2005 and does notdiscover competitiveness of the coun-tries by industry. A more detailed analy-sis would reveal which sectors are mostcompetitive on a given market andwhich industry is weak and does notperform well. However, signing of theCEFTA agreement would settle manyobstacles and it is expected to increasethe trade volume. Albania is expectedto increase its export share on Monte-negrin market and possibly in Kosovo.A more detailed RCA on each countryis as follows:

6 RCA - revealed comparative advantage in production ofcommodity i in respect of a given country.X - the value of exports of commodity i to a given country bycountry j.M - the value of imports of commodity i from a given countryto country j.



Albania BaHX-M X+M RCA X-M X+M RCA

BaH -3 5 -0.6 Albania 3 5 0.6

Croatia -17 17 -1 Croatia -620 1408 -0.44034

Macedonia -21 23 -0.91304 Macedonia -23 59 -0.38983

Montenegro 0 10 0 Montenegro 14 60 0.233333

Serbia 0 4 0 Serbia -390 950 -0.41053

Croatia MacedoniaX-M X+M RCA X-M X+M RCA

Albania 17 17 1 Albania 21 23 0.913043

BaH 620 1408 0.440341 BaH 23 59 0.389831

Macedonia 1 131 0.007634 Croatia -1 131 -0.00763

Montenegro 60 72 0.833333 Montenegro 9 13 0.692308

Serbia 121 379 0.319261 Serbia 147 569 0.258348

Montenegro SerbiaX-M X+M RCA X-M X+M RCA

Albania 0 10 0 Albania 0 4 0

BaH -14 60 -0.23333 BaH 390 950 0.410526

Croatia -60 72 -0.83333 Croatia -121 379 -0.31926

Macedonia -9 13 -0.69231 Macedonia -147 569 -0.25835

Serbia -167 487 -0.34292 Montenegro 167 487 0.342916

Table 12: RCA on the Western Balkan countries in year 2005

Conclusions

The EU enlargement toward theWestern Balkan countries is a realisticprocess. Previous enlargements in thelast decade have shown more intensiveeconomic relations and mutual benefitsto the new member states and old ones.Besides the fact that EU is not reallyinterested is an accelerated integrationof WB countries, benefits for the EUstates could be even greater. Quick in-tegration (less than a decade) with WBcountries would have three immediateeffects on the regional economies: an


increase in the trade volume and out-put, outsourcing of cheap labor will de-crease the cost of production and in-crease the competitiveness of EU prod-ucts on international markets, and rapidgrowth of FDI in the region.

It appears that the Western Balkancountries devote most of the time to theacceleration of the process of integra-tion in EU instead of focusing on re-gional cooperation already agreed andsigned. Increased efforts in deeper re-gional cooperation will lead to improve-ment of the competitiveness, produc-tivity and reasonable allocation of the



resources. Skepticism about new Re-gional Trade Agreement signed lastyear is mainly concerned with the lackof experience with the new regionalregulations and the ìnewî commercialpartners. Other concerns that can riseare the structure of industries. All West-ern Balkan countries (except Croatia)have a high share of the agriculturesector in respective economies andsimilar export strategies and subsidies

for agricultural products, which can giverise to rivalry among countries.

Overall, WB countries are makinglarge scale reforms and believe stronglyin full membership within EU. As theconflicts are past, Western Balkaneconomies are stabilizing and have hadsustainable GDP growth in the last halfdecade; it is likely that they can con-tribute for further progress with EU re-lations.

Rezime

Zemjite od Zapaden Balkan vo poslednite 5-6 godini privlekuvaats¢ pove}e stranski direktni investicii i imaat povisoki pozitivnistapki na ekonomski rast kako rezultat na stabilizacijata naregionot, involviraweto na me|unarodnata zaednica i bilateralnitedogovori za slobodna trgovija. Za region koj{to e tolku mnogufragmentiran, kakov {to e Zapadniot Balkan, od golema va‘nost eregionalnata sorabotka. Dobro strukturiranite trgovski strategii}e go zgolemat obemot na trgovija pome|u zemjite od regionot i }e seza{titat od s¢ pokonkurentnite ju‘noaziski ekonomii.

Kako rezultat od regionalizacijata, mnogu industriski granki }ebidat vo mo‘nost da ostvarat ekonomija od obem, a so toa inamaluvawe na cenite na proizvodite i uslugite, {to ponatamu bipridonelo za pogolema konkurentnost na me|unarodnite pazari,efikasnost vo proizvodstvoto i pristap do pogolem broj potro{uva~i.



References

Dimitrov, Martin, and Krassen Stanchev. A Case Study on Bulgaria andthe Region. project:International and regional integration in SEE, Vienna:Vienna Institute for International Economics , 2002.

Environmental and Energy Products, the benefits of liberalizing trade.ìwww.oecd.org.î OECD Trade Policy Studies. 2006. http://www.sourceoecd.org/industrytrade/9264024816 (accessed May 31, 2007).

Eurostat-Statistical books. Europe in Figures. Brussels: European Com-mission, 2007.

Gligorov, Vladimir. Trade and investment in the Balkans. 1998.

http://europa.eu. 09 1, 2006. http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l60018.htm (accessed May 13, 2007).

http://www.bankwatch.org. http://www.bankwatch.org/billions/detail.shtml#p1.

http://www.unctad.org. 2007. http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID =3146&lang=1.

OECD. OECD Benchmark definition on Foreign Direct Investment. Paris:OECD publication, 1999.

PriceWaterHouseCoopers. Doing business and Investing in Macedonia.Skopje, 2006.

Stiblar, Franjo. Solutions for Western Balkans. project Report, USA:Woodrow Wilson Center, 2006.

Vladimir Gligorov, Mario Holzner, Michael Landesmann. Prospects forFurther (South) Eastern EU Enlargement:From Divergence to Conver-gence? Wien, June 2003.

www.worldbank.org. May 31, 2007. www.worldbank.org (accessed May31, 2007).


Globalniot pazar i konkurentnosta:integrirawe na biznis strategiite i~ove~kite resursi

Vesna Zabijakin – ^atleska

Voved

So otvoraweto na makedonskataekonomija se zgolemija doma{nitei stranskite trgovski operacii, aso toa se zgolemi i konkurencijata.Kapacitetot na pretprijatijata odR. Makedonija da participiraat ida se natprevaruvaat na nadvo-re{nite pazari stana pra{awe odkrucijalna va‘nost za sevkupniotrazvoj na makedonskata ekonomija,osobeno vo period na zabrzaniprocesi na EU-integracijata. Ime-no, spored Kopenhagenskite krite-riumi, definirani od Evropskiotsovet vo 1993 god., dr‘ava-kandi-dat mo‘e da stane ~lenka na EUdokolku, me|u drugoto, ima i funk-cionalna pazarna ekonomija i kapa-citet da se soo~i so konkurencijatana pazarnite sili na Unijata.

Konkurencijata vo globalnataekonomija na 21 vek, koja e kom-pleksna i ispolneta so zakani imo‘nosti, bara pretprijatijata daadaptiraat novi biznis strategiizaradi ostvaruvawe konkurentnost.Promenite vo strategijata neminov-no nalo‘uvaat promeni i vo drugitefunkcii na pretprijatieto, vklu-~uvaj}i ja i funkcijata na menax-mentot na ~ove~ki resursi (M^R).Uspe{noto rabotewe na pretpri-jatieto vo golema mera zavisi od

poddr{kata {to odbranata stra-tegija ja dobiva od sistemot na ^R.Empiriskite istra‘uvawa na Bu-ler, a pokasno i na Torington, poka-‘uvaat deka pretprijatijata koideluvaat vo poturbulentna sredinapove}e ja involviraat funkcijatana ^R vo strate{kite odluki.1

Strate{kata sposobnost brzo dase odgovori na promenite vo opkru-‘uvaweto zavisi od organizacis-kiot "know-howî za zdru‘eno delu-vawe na ~ove~kiot kapital i adek-vatno odnesuvawe, koi }e go pod-dr‘at procesot na dostignuvawekonkurentna prednost. Naodite naistra‘uva~ite sugeriraat dekapribli‘no 20% od profitabil-nosta na pretprijatieto mo‘e da seobjasni kako vlijanie na faktoritevo industrijata, a 36% od otstapu-vaweto vo profitabilnosta sepripi{uvaat na vnatre{nite fak-tori.2

Konvergencija na strategijatai pra{awata na ^R

Procesite na tranzicija na ma-kedonskoto op{testvo i promenatana politi~kiot sistem so sebe

Eko

no

mi

ja i

sl

ob

od

na

tr

gov

ija

1 Derek Torrington; Laura Hall and Stephen Taylor. ìHumanResource Managementî (5th edition), (International edition:Prentice Hall/Financial Times, 2001).

2 Fred R. David. ìStrategic Management: Concept and Casesî(11th edition), (New Jersey: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2005).



donesoa i promena na ekonomskiotsistem. Izmenetite uslovi vo de-lovnoto opkru‘uvawe uslovijapromeni vo stopanskiot sektor i janametnaa potrebata od redefi-nirawe na modalitetite na ekonom-skiot razvoj. Generalno, toa zna~e-{e prifa}awe na paradigmite narazvienite ekonomii, {to, pak, napretprijatijata im ja nametna potre-bata za postojano adaptirawe votrkata za opstanok i kontinuiranrazvoj. Zaradi profitabilno iodr‘livo konkurentsko pozicioni-rawe vo industrijata, pretprijati-jata razvivaat novi biznis strate-gii koi treba da kreiraat vrednostza klientite, no istovremeno dabidat unikatni i neimitabilni.

Od druga strana, pak, pretprija-tijata, soo~eni so procesite nademasifikacija (downsizing, out-sourcing) i reorganizacija, se prinu-deni da kreiraat vnatre{na spo-sobnost i kapacitet za uspeh na od-branata stategija, a istovremeno dagi namaluvaat rabotnata sila i tro-{ocite povrzani so vrabotenite. Voovaa to~ka, vsu{nost, nastanuvakonvergiraweto na biznis stra-tegijata i pra{awata povrzani so^R. Strate{ka odgovornost voupravuvaweto na ^R e procenka napotrebite i tro{ocite za ekipi-rawe za predlo‘enata nova stra-tegija (pri formulirawe na stra-tegijata) i razvivawe plan za eki-pirawe (za efektivno izvr{uvawena strategijata). ̂ ove~kite resursise nositeli na znaewe, ve{tini isposobnosti. No, tie sami po sebene mo‘at da bidat nositeli nakonkurentna prednost. Za da sepostigne prednost preku ̂ R, potreb-na e silna povrzanost na strate-

gijata so unikaten splet na procesii aktivnosti na sistemot na ^R.

Vo literaturata, vakvata po-vrzanost dobiva s¢ pogolem legi-titimitet, a me|u najvlijatelniteproponenti na vakvoto tvrdewe se:- Xej Barni, koj 1991 god. go pla-

sira Pogledot baziran na resur-si, spored koj konkurentnosta eprodukt na resursite i spo-sobnostite (vredni, retki, ne-imitabilni, nezamenlivi) i seva‘ni inputi vo kreiraweto nastrategijata. Tuka se vbrojuvaati ^R – vrabotenite i nivno re-grutirawe, obuka, iskustvo,znaewe, menaxerski ve{tini,procesi i informacii kontro-lirani od pretprijatieto. Po-gledot baziran na resursi davateoriska racionalnost zo{to ̂ Rmo‘at da imaat implikacii voprocesite na formulirawe iimplementirawe na strategi-jata;

- Majkl Porter i negoviot generi~-ki lanec na vrednosti vo koj M^Re poddr‘uva~ka aktivnost soimplikacii vrz primarnite idrugite poddr‘uva~ki aktiv-nosti vo lanecot i toa prekuopredeluvawe na ve{tini navrabotenite, motivacija i tro-{oci za vrabotuvawe i obuka;

- Xejms Brajan Kvin, koj tvrdi dekaefektivnite strategii zavisatpove}e od razvojot i anga‘i-raweto na intelektualnite re-sursi otkolku od menaxmentot nafizi~kiot kapital. Uspe{nitepretprijatija Kvin gi narekuva"inteligentni pretprijatija# koiinvestiraat vo intelektualni ispecijalizirani ve{tini navisoko motivirani i dobro in-


Globalniot pazar i konkurentnosta:integrirawe na biznis strategiite i ~ove~kite resursi

formirani lu|e, zasileni odnajdobrite praktiki na ^R.

Ekonomija bazirana na znaewe

Vo dene{nata ekonomija bazi-rana na znaewe, znaeweto stanuvanajvreden kapital. Kako pretprija-tieto generira, poddr‘uva, trans-ferira, integrira i za{tituvaznaewe, stana zna~ajno. Teorijatana firma bazirana na znaewe imenaxmentot na znaewe se oblastikoi po mnogu pra{awa se dopiraatdo pra{awata vo domenot na M^R.Menaxmentot na znaewe pretsta-vuva proces na definirawe na zna-eweto, identifikuvawe na posto-e~kite bazi na znaewe i obezbe-duvawe mehanizmi za promocija nakreirawe, za{tita i transfer naznaeweto. Iako e jasno deka infor-mati~kite sistemi obezbeduvaattehnolo{ko skladirawe na znaewe-to, pretprijatijata sfa}aat dekaklu~ za uspe{en menaxment na zna-ewe se socijalniot i kulturniotorganizaciski sistem. Najgolemarazlika po odnos na znaeweto me|uliteraturata za ^R i literaturataza strategija se odnesuva na fo-kusot na znaeweto i na negovotonivo. Literaturata za ^R se foku-sira na znaewa povrzani so rabo-tata, a strate{kata literatura zarelevantni znaewa za pazarot(znaewa za klientite, konkuren-cijata, kreirawe nov proizvod).

Znaeweto mo‘e da bide karak-teristika na individuata (t.e.~ove~ki kapital), spodeleno vogrupa ili mre‘a (t.e. socijalenkapital) ili institucionaliziranovo organizaciskite procesi i bazina podatoci (t.e. organizaciski

kapital). Kako i da e, jasno e dekarazli~nite nositeli na znaewe sekomplementarni i si vlijaat ednina drugi vo definiraweto na orga-nizaciskata sposobnost i go for-miraat intelektualniot kapital napretprijatieto.

Postojat supstancijalni razlikivo sistemot na ^R vo odnos napoddr{kata na individualnotou~ewe i poddr{kata na organiza-ciskoto. Organizaciskoto u~ewe iinovaciite se gradat na ~etirime|uzavisni procesi i nivnitevrednosti:3

• sopstvenost/re{avawe na pro-blemite (egalitarijanizam);

• integrirawe na internoto zna-ewe (spodeleno znaewe);

• kontinuirano eksperimentira-we (pozitiven rizik) i

• integrirawe na eksternoto zna-ewe (otvorenost kon nadvor).Sekoja kombinacija od ovie

procesi/vrednosti baraat razli~enadministrativen sistem na ^R vokoj se vklu~eni elementi na ekipi-rawe, dizajn na rabotno mesto, tre-ning, menaxment na kariera, nagradii ocenka na rabotata. Po ovoj odnospovtorno se doa|a do linkot me|ustrategijata i ^R.

Strate{ka sposobnost napretprijatieto

Stepenot na strate{ka sposob-nost na pretprijatieto e vo pozi-tivna korelacija so uspe{nosta nabiznis strategijata. Poseduvawestrate{ka sposobnost e kapacitet

3 Spored Leonard-Barton, a citirano od Patrick, M. Wright;Benjamin, B. Dunford and Scott, A. Snell. ìHumanResources and the Resource Based View of the Firm”,Journal of Management, 27 (2001): 714.



za izvedba na nivo koe e potrebnoza da se bide pouspe{en od drugitevo industrijata. Osnovnite kompo-nenti na strate{ka sposobnost sepovrzuvaweto na strate{kiot me-naxment na ~ove~ki resursi (SM^R)so biznis strategijata preku upra-vuvawe so unikatnite ^R, kom-petencii i odnosi koi kreiraatklu~ni kompetencii i generiraatdinami~ka sposobnost. Zdru‘enotodeluvawe na komponentite sozdavaunikaten splet na kauzalna dvo-smislenost i sinergizam koi seneimitabilni (Slika 1).

Odnesuvaweto na vrabotenite eva‘na nezavisna komponenta naSM^R. Za razlika od fondot na~ove~ki kapital, odnesuvaweto navrabotenite se bazira na indivi-dualitetot na li~nosta kako kogni-tivno i emocionalno su{testvo koeima slobodna volja i donesuvaslobodni odluki. Osnovna premisana Teorijata na ~ove~ki kapital edeka pretprijatieto ne gi poseduvaodnesuvawata, tuku individuata.Pretprijatieto mo‘e da ima pri-stap do vreden ~ove~ki kapital, noso oskuden dizajn na rabotata ilinedostatok na menaxment na ovojkapital, }e se slu~i da ne ostvaristrate{ko vlijanie. Konkurentskaprednost mo‘e da se postigne samokoga onie koi go so~inuvaat fondotna ~ove~ki kapital individualnoi kolektivno }e odlu~at da seanga‘iraat vo odnesuvawe koe }eproducira benefit za pretpri-jatieto.

Klu~nite kompetencii se pri-marna determinanta na strategijatai osnova na strate{kata sposobnostna pretprijatieto. Toa se aktiv-nosti koi pretprijatieto gi izve-duva podobro od svoite rivali vodostignuvaweto na kriti~nitefaktori na uspeh. Sistemot na ^Rgi razviva i odr‘uva klu~nitekompetencii preku kompetentnostana lu|eto anga‘irani vo procesite,nivnite individualni i kolektivnive{tini i odnesuvaweto. Fokusi-ranosta na elementite na klu~nitekompetencii koi se odnesuvaat nalu|eto go dava linkot me|u stra-tegijata i SM^R. Vo M^R se koristivarijablata kompetencii kakoznaewe povrzano so rabotata, ve{-tini ili sposobnosti koi gi pose-

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Fondot na ~ove~ki kapital seodnesuva na rezervite na ve{tirabotnici koi egzistiraat vo pret-prijatieto vo sekoe vreme. Razvi-vaweto na fondot na ~ove~ki kapi-tal istovremeno se fokusira napostignuvawe povisoko nivo nave{tini (generalni i specifi~ni)i podobro usoglasuvawe me|u ve{ti-nite koi se poseduvaat i onie {togi bara strate{kata namera.

Kompetenciite {to gi pose-duvaat individuite sami po sebe nese dovolni ako tie ne se anga‘iraatvo adekvatni procesi i aktivnostivo funkcija na startegijata.

Slika 1. Komponenti na strate{kasposobnost na pretprijatieto



duva individuata. No, ova ne e istoso klu~ni kompetencii za koi zboru-va literaturata za strate{ki me-naxment. To~no e deka sekoja indi-vidua poseduva kompetencii ipretpijatieto ima individui sorazli~ni kompetencii. No, klu~-nite kompetencii zna~at zdru‘u-vawe na mnogute kompetencii kakokolektivno znaewe.

Organizacijata postojano morada razviva novi sposobnosti ilikompetencii vo dinami~noto opkru-‘uvawe. Vakvite sposobnosti senarekuvaat dinami~ki sposobnostikoi se definiraat kako – organiza-ciski i strate{ki rutini so ~ijapomo{ pretprijatieto postignuvarekonfiguracija ili smena na ba-zata na resursi spored promenitena pazarite (pojava na novi, sudir,delewe, razvivawe ili smrt). Ovazna~i deka organizacijata treba davostanovi procesi koi }e £ ovoz-mo‘at da gi promeni rutinite, uslu-gite, proizvodite, pa duri i paza-rite so tekot na vremeto.

Implikaciite na ovoj model sedeka pretprijatieto mo‘e da imasuperiorna pozicija vo edna od oviekomponenti, no odr‘liva konku-rentska prednost bara superiornapozicija vo site.

Efektivni praktiki na ^R koigo ovozmo‘uvaat uspehot na stra-tegijata se slednive:4

• Procenka na potrebite na ^R zapoddr{ka na strategijata i iden-tifikacija na klu~nite kompe-tencii bazirani na ~ove~kiotkapital;

• Postavuvawe celi i procenka naizvedbata ili 360∞ ocenka navlijanieto na rabotata vrz us-pe{nosta na strategijata;

• Kreirawe sistem na nagradizaradi individualen potstrek;

• Regrutacijata – koga se baraatnovi kompetencii;

• Obezbeduvawe kompetentni in-dividualci i procesi na mento-rirawe za pro{iruvawe i kodi-fikacija na znaeweto kako ra-botna rutina; kontinuitet naprocesi na inovativnost i krea-tivnost zaradi odr‘livost nastrate{kata sposobnost i

• Obuka i razvoj na individualci(formalna obuka, mentorirawei podu~uvawe).

Empiriski pokazateli

Vo izminatiot period na tran-zicija, makedonskite pretprijatijabea ispraveni pred mnogu pre-dizvici. Paralelno so procesite naprestrukturirawe se izvr{uva{e ipromena na sopstveni~kiot kapital(privatizacija). Ishodot od vakvitepromeni ne sekoga{ be{e uspe{en,a rezultatot po makedonskata eko-nomija e daleku od o~ekuvaniot. Voobidot da se odgovori uspe{no naovie predizvici, pretprijatijatado‘ivuvaa silni potresi i samoodreden del uspeaja da se pozi-cioniraat na makedonskiot pazar.Od druga strana, se pojavija inovoformirani pretprijatija koise obiduvaa da razvijat kapacitetza uspe{en nastap i odr‘uvawe,pred s¢, na doma{niot pazar. Osno-ven imperativ na pove}eto be{esteknuvawe konkurentnost vo ram-kite na nacionalnata ekonomija. No,

4 Gerry Johnson and Kevan Scholes. ìExploring CorporateStrategyî (6th edition) (International edition: Prentice Hall/Financial Times, 1999, str. 480).



procesite na integrirawe vo EU isilnata ekspanzija na internaci-onalniot sektor uslovija, para-lelno so vnatre{nata konsoli-dacija, pretprijatijata da se nat-prevaruvaat i so globalnata kon-kurencija. Toa zna~e{e postojanoadaptirawe spored nadvore{nitefaktori i razvivawe vnatre{nisposobnosti i resursi preku efek-tivno strate{ko upravuvawe.

Sprovedenoto empirisko istra-‘uvawe na tri vode~ki pretpri-jatija vo grafi~kata industrija voR. Makedonija,5 poka‘a deka uspe{-noto rabotewe i odr‘livata konku-rentnost e rezultat na efektivnostrate{ko menaxirawe i soodvetnipraktiki na ^R.

Spored intervjuata so izvr{ni-te direktori i anketata sprovedenana primerok od vraboteni vo tritepretprijatija, postoi strate{koplanirawe i utvrdeni strategii:

Fundament na strate{kata spo-sobnost na pretprijatieto se kompe-tenciite, ve{tinite i znaeweto navrabotenite. Odgovorite na ispi-tanicite upatuvaat na zaklu~okotdeka pretprijatijata razvivaatkompetencii i sposobnosti koi sekriti~ni faktori na konkurent-skoto pozicionirawe:

5.8%

26.0%

67.3%

malku prisutno

delumno prisutno

mnogu prisutno

Slika 2. Postoi jasna strategija zaidninata na pretprijatieto

5 Vo tekstot se prezentira mal del od empiriskotoistra‘uvawe koe e sprovedeno vo periodot septemvri-oktomvri, 2006 god. vo ramkite na avtoroviotmagisterski trud. Primerokot go so~inuvaa trinajprofitabilni pretprijatija vo sektorot, so srednagolemina, od koi ednoto (koe postoi 60 godini)uspe{no odgovori na tranzicionite procesi, aostanatite dve se novoformirani so relativno kratokvek na postoewe (12 god. i 6 god.).

19.2%

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35.6%

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delumno prisutno

mnogu prisutno

Vrabotenite se otvoreni za noviznaewa i imaat pozitiven odnos konu~eweto. Imeno, 78.8% (mnogu pri-sutno) od ispitanicite smetaatdeka u~eweto e va‘na zada~a vonivnata sekojdnevna rabota, no ona{to nedostasuva e kontinuiranotoinvestirawe vo znaewata i ve{-tinite – 35.6% smetaat deka emalku prisutno; 34.6% delumnoprisutno i samo 27.9% deka e mnoguprisutno vo nivnata organizacija(1.9% neodgovoreno).

Pretprijatijata poka‘uvaatpozitivni praktiki i od aspekt naanga‘iranosta na vrabotenite inivniot odnos kon postojano podob-ruvawe na na~inite na izvr{uvawena rabotata, 63.5% smetaat dekavakvata praktika e mnogu prisutnavo sekojdnevnoto rabotewe.

Slika 3. Sposobnostite na lu|eto seva‘en faktor na konkurentna prednost



Kreiraweto adekvaten sistemna nagradi i negovo povrzuvawe sorabotnata izvedba, e krucijalnastrate{ka odluka vo strate{kotoupravuvawe so ^R i vo tesna rela-cija so odbranata biznis strategija.Empiriskite naodi poka‘uvaatdeka ne sekoga{ menaxmentot napretprijatijata poka‘uva dosled-nost vo sistemot na nagraduvawe:

Vo naporite na makedonskitepretprijatija da gi prifatat para-digmite na razvienite i uspe{nikompanii, ne treba da go zanemaratfaktot deka modernata ekonomijabazirana na znaewe kako klu~enimperativ gi postavuva intelek-tualniot kapital i znaeweto kakofaktor na produktivnost i efek-tivnost. Ako se znae deka ~ove~kiotkapital e izvor na intelektualniotkapital i skladirano znaewe, to-ga{ }e se sogleda i golemoto zna-~ewe {to go ima strate{koto mena-xirawe na ^R, a vrabotenite }e sesmetaat kako investicija, a netro{ok na pretprijatieto.

Abstract

14.1%

61.5%

23.1%

1.3%0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

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1

Praktikuvawe nov na~in na rabota, kogae vo funkcija na postignuvawe nacelite, se nagraduva od strana na

pretpostavenite

a) da, toa e ~esta praksa

neodgovoreno

v) nema nagradi i bonusi

b) se nagraduva no ne sekoj ine sekoga{ koga e potrebno

The processes of globalization of the businesses imply significant changes.A defining feature of the global economy is the flow of information, capitaland people. Competition in the 21st centuryís global economy is complex.With the increasing speed of transactions and global sourcing, marketsbecome more open (free trade agreements between nations) and more foreignfirms are likely to enter domestic markets. Opening up of the Macedonianeconomy means more competition and improved performance and requiresthat organizations increase the competence and commitment levels of theiremployees, their ability to learn and collaborate. Effective strategic humanresource management can help firms enhance performance while competingin a turbulent and unpredictable environment. The basic problem is that manyfirms develop business strategies that try to align the firmís assets with theirenvironment, but yet do not account for the firmís HR capabilities. This paperexamines the human resourceís role in supporting competitive strategies andexplores the link between business strategy and HR strategies. HR practicesenable a strategic capability to the extent that they impact the corecompetence, knowledge and intellectual capital of the firm.



Bibliografija

Anthony, William, P. et al. “Human Resource Management: A StrategicApproach” (third edition), USA: The Dryden Press, 1999.

Barney, Jay; Wright, Mike and Ketchen, Jr. David. “The resource basedview of the firm: Ten years after 1991”, Journal of Management 27 (2001):625-641.

David, Fred, R. “Strategic Management: Concept and Cases” (11th edition),New Jersey: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2005.

Dess, Gregory, G.; Lumpkin, G. Tom and Taylor, Marilyn, L. “StrategicManagement: Creating Competitive Advantages” (2nd edition), InternationalEdition: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2005.

Dessler, Gary. “Human Resource Management” (10th edition), Internationaledition: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2005.

Johnson, Gerry and Scholes, Kevan. “Exploring Corporate Strategy” (6th

edition), International edition: Prentice Hall/Financial Times, 1999.

Porter, Michael, E. “Competitive Advantage: Creating and SustainingSuperior Performance”, New York: The Free Press, 1998.

Quinn∏ James, Brian. (2005), “The Intelligent Enterprise a New Paradigm”,Academy of Management Executive 19 (2005): 109-121.

Torrington, Derek; Hall, Laura and Taylor, Stephen. “Human ResourceManagement” (5th edition), International edition: Prentice Hall/FinancialTimes, 2001.

Wright, Patrick, M.; Dunford, Benjamin, B. and Snell, Scott, A. “Humanresources and the resource based view of the firm”, Journal ofManagement, 27 (2001): 701-721.


Convergence towards Good CorporateGovernance: The Case of Macedonia

Kiril Nejkov

This paper gives an overview of thekey aspects of the notion of corporategovernance; it highlights the key issuesof debate in corporate governancenowadays through the observations oftwo recognized academics in thissphere ñ one from Continental Europe,and one from the Anglo-Saxon legal tra-dition and, finally, it provides an over-view of the findings which have beenharvested through the Macedonia Cor-porate Governance Survey which wasundertaken in 2006 by the InternationalFinance Corporation: Program for Cor-porate Governance which, with the sup-port of the Swiss Secretariat for Eco-nomic Affairs is being implemented inMacedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Her-zegovina, Albania and Montenegro fromJuly 2005 till December 2008.

Two very short definitions of corpo-rate governance enlighten the essenceof this term. The Cadbury Report on theFinancial Aspects of Corporate Gover-nance from 1992 defined it as ìa sys-tem in which companies are directedand controlledî. James Wolfensohn,former president of the World Bank,defined corporate governance as ìpro-motion of fair relations, transparencyand accountabilityî. The first definitionexplains the structure and actions withincorporate governance. The second oneunderlines the values on which it shouldbe based.

More details about the scope of cor-porate governance is to be found in thecomprehensive definition of corporategovernance of the Organization for Eco-nomic Cooperation and Development(OECD) which reads that ì[it comprises]internal means by which corporationsare operated and controlled [Ö] whichinvolve a set of relationships betweencompany management, its board, itsshareholders and other stakeholders.Corporate governance also providesthe structure through which the objec-tives of the company are set, and themeans of attaining those objectives andmonitoring performances are deter-mined. Good corporate governanceshould provide proper incentives for theboard and management to pursue ob-jectives that are in the interest of thecompany and shareholders and shouldfacilitate effective monitoring, therebyencouraging firms to use resourcesmore efficiently.î

The definition of OECD containsthree segments. The first one deter-mines the relationships between the keyactors in corporate governance. Thoseare, in the order of proximity to day-by-day operations of the company: theManagement ñ as a set of executiveswho are involved in the daily naviga-tions of the company; the Board of Di-rectors ñ as a body which is respon-sible for the oversight of the operations

Eko

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Kiril Nejkov

and strategic guidance of the corpora-tions, which - at its meetings that in prin-ciple take place several times a year -provides the necessary monitoring andorientations; the shareholders ñ as theowners of the company, who, in prin-ciple, once a year decide on the keystrategic issues of the company, includ-ing the appropriateness of the existingleadership and/or the election of newmembers of the Board; and lastly, theother stakeholders which include, firstlyand foremostly, the employees, the cli-ents and suppliers, as well as the gov-ernment and regulatory bodies.

The second segment defines thepurpose of corporate governance. Therelationships explained above do notexist and are not to be improved for theirown sake. They have an aim to set ap-propriate objectives for the companyand to make sure that those objectivesare met.

Finally, the last segment of the defi-nition sets the basis of what is under-stood as good corporate governance,bringing the value element in scope. Inthis regard, good corporate governanceprovides sufficient incentives for theinvolved parties to contribute towardssustainable profit making of the com-pany.

There are [at least] three major con-tributions which the advent of corporategovernance terminology and discourseprovided to the academic debates andpractice-oriented solutions-seeking en-terprises. Firstly, as a holistic concept,it allowed for an analysis and regula-tion of issues which were previouslyseparated between the company lawand securities regulations. Secondly, itre-opened some very important com-pany-related concepts which were ei-ther forgotten or omitted in practice,

such as directorsí liability. Thirdly, it con-tributed to the awareness of both thepublic and the legislators of the com-petitive nature of the countryís laws andinstitutions.1

The level of concentration of theownerships in the companies, the num-ber of listed companies per capita andthe market capitalization of the statemarkets2 are detrimental factors to thecorporate governance system of anygiven country. Companies quoted fortrading in the United Kingdom and theUnited States, for example, generally donot have a dominant shareholder. Incontrast, the dominant shareholders arecommon in the public companies incontinental Europe - in Germany,France or Italy. As of 1996, the UnitedKingdom had thirty-six listed companiesper one million people; the UnitedStated had thirty, whereas France hadeight, Germany five and Italy four mil-lion.3 In 1996, the market capitalizationof US stock markets was around 95%of the GDP, in Britain it was 135%, andin most other European countries, itwas either 35% or less.4

In 2000, Prof. Klaus J. Hopt, definedfour key challenges of corporate gov-ernance for the new century. Thesechallenges are still relevant, and theyare the following: firstly, the finding ofthe right balance between delegationthrough business judgments of the di-rectors and control by structural and

1 Prof. Klaus J. Hopt, ìModern Company Law Problems:European Perspectiveî, Company Law Reform in OECDCountries: A Comparative Outlook of Current Trends,Stockholm Sweden, December 2000; OECD, 2001,[Hereinafter ìProf. Hoptî] p. 9.

2 Market capitalization of a given market represents the totalmarket value of all shares of all companies listed for trading.

3 "Current Trends in Corporate Governance: Going fromLondon to Milan Via Toronto", Brian Cheffins, Duke Journalof Comparative and International Law, 1999, [HereinafterìBrian Cheffinsî] see *5 to * 10.

4 Brian Cheffins, * 14.


Convergence towards Good Corporate Governance: The Case of Macedonia

other legal rules and, ultimately, liabil-ity; secondly, the conflict between theminority and majority shareholders;thirdly, proper inclusion of the interestsof all stakeholders in the decision mak-ing process of the company; andfourthly, the regulation of Group of Com-panies.5

However, further analysis of thesechallenges shows that they are themodern form of the challenges withwhich corporate governance was facedfrom the moment of its inception as dis-tinct practical and academic discipline:the first two are related to the Princi-pal-Agent Problem6, the third one to the

duality of Shareholder-StakeholderTheories7, and the fourth one is a ratio-nalization of an issue that has beeneconomic reality for a long time almosteverywhere.

The resolution of the first problemis based on the finding of a solution forthe Agency Problem. There have beentwo principal approaches in this respect.The first one, looking for solution in thecontrol function of the board of direc-tors and the second one, in finding in-centives which would align the interestof the managers with those of the share-holders.

The first approach has been look-ing for solutions in restructuring theexisting formats of the boards, focus-ing on the size of the boards and itsoptimal composition which would allowa productive mix of internal companyknowledge and external non-biasedview, on determination of the limits ofbusiness judgment rule, the role of in-dependent directors, firstly and fore-mostly with regard to their monitoringfunction; definition of the conflict of in-terests and formulas for their mitigation;creation of board committees and de-termining of their functions; decidingon the number and frequency of theboard meetings; and last but far fromleast, creation of sound remunerationpolicy and definition of liability prin-ciples.8

Another side of the coin of principle-agent problem is the issue of agencycosts related to the work and perfor-mance of executives. Different market

5 Prof. Klaus J. Hopt, ìModern Company Law Problems: Eu-ropean Perspectiveî, Company Law Reform in OECD Coun-tries: A Comparative Outlook of Current Trends, StockholmSweden, December 2000; OECD, 2001

6 As per the Anglo-Saxon legal theory, an Agent is a personauthorized to act on behalf of another [called the ìPrinci-palî] to create legal relationship with a third party. The Agenthas a fiduciary duty towards the Principal, a duty to be loyalto him and a duty to care about the assets he is controllingin the name of the Principal. The fiduciary duty preventsthe Agent to accept any new obligation that would be in-consistent with the duties owned to the Principal. Namely,an Agent may represent conflicting interests of differentPrincipals only if the following conditions are met: there isfull and timely disclosure of the existence of these interestsand the Principals retain the authority to prevent situationsin which the Agentís loyalty to one of multiple principles isjeopardized. In the cases of corporations, the shareholdersare the Principals, and the directors and managers of thecorporations are the Agents. The problem is how to makesure that the Agents, who have both the right and obliga-tion to manage someone elseís money to do that in theinterest of the Principal [the shareholders] and not in theirown interest? Various solutions have been found for thisproblem, and they can be classified in two broad catego-ries: the carrot - provision of incentives, which means tyingthe wealth of investors with the wealth of executives, thusmaking them both want the same things; and the stick -development of monitoring mechanisms through supervi-sion of the work of executives by Board of Directors, audi-tors, investment banks and analysts, creditors and creditrating agencies, state regulators as the Securities and Ex-change Commissions, self-regulating bodies as the StockExchanges and last but not least, the development of cor-porate citizenship concepts.

7 Corporate governance took two different paths in the Anglo-Saxon world, and in the Continental Europe and Japan,along the lines of ìShareholder Valueî and ìStakeholderîtheories. Professor Kay states that ìÖin the Anglo-Ameri-can environment the corporation is a private, rather than apublic body, defined by a set of relationships between aPrincipal and an Agent. Shareholder-owners, too busy andtoo numerous to undertake the responsibility them-selveshire salaried executives to manage their affairs. [Ö] In Con-tinental Europe and Japan, the corporation is an institutionwith a personality, character and aspirations of its own. Its

objectives encompass the interests of a wide range of stake-holder groups ñ investors, employees, suppliers, custom-ers and managers, but can not be equated with any of them.The corporation is therefore a social institution, with publicresponsibilities and proper public interest in defining theway in which it is run and governedÖî See Prof. John Kay,ìThe Business of Economicsî, 1996.

8 Prof. Hopt, p. 12.


Kiril Nejkov

forces play an important part in this re-spect, and there are authors who optedfor allowing the well-developed marketsin different areas to contribute towardsthe regulation of this issue. The rel-evance of the impacts of the labor mar-ket for executives, the market for com-pany products or services, the capitalmarket and the threat for hostile take-over bids9 are the strongest factors inaligning the interests of the individualswith managerial capacities in the widelyheld companies with those of the share-holders, and limiting the temptations fortheir acting in a self-serving manner. Inorder to impress potential alternativeemployers, senior managers do theirbest to run companies well. If a declinein the market share is sufficiently pre-cipitous to cause company to fail, ex-ecutives will loose their jobs. With re-spect to capital markets impact, it suf-fices to be noted that companies withpoor managerial practice will receiveless advantageous terms. Hostile take-overs are feasible in companies with awidely dispersed ownership structure,because bidders can acquire control onthe open market, rather than by nego-tiation with the dominant shareholder.10

The Principle-Agent problem is alsopresent in the second challenge men-tioned by Prof. Hopt. But, in this case,it gets its European form. Unlike in theAnglo-Saxon economic systems inwhich corporations are owned by a va-riety of shareholders, and the PrincipleAgent problem emanates in the rela-tionship between the shareholders [asowners, and Principals] and the Direc-

tors [as Agents] in the European con-text, with the concentrated structure ofownership of companies, the majorityshareholders hold the keys to the com-position and the work and the efficacyof the board, which calls for the protec-tion of the minority shareholders, andthat is why the agency problem is re-defined towards relationship betweenmajority and minority shareholders, andprotection of the latter.

The third issue, which poses thequestion as to what are the key inter-ests that the company should focus on,(the shareholders and the maximizationof their profits, or if the purpose of thecompany should be the function of allinterests of all stakeholders) could beresolved through the deeper under-standing of the real interest of share-holders which, when perceived throughlenses of long-term view, shows thatshareholders and stakeholders inter-ests are not only intertwined beyondseparation, but are actually mutualones.

The resolution of the fourth issue isrelated to the regulation of the Groupof Companies, through disclosure, le-gal recognition of the group manage-ment under certain safeguard condi-tions, special investigation in the inde-pendent company as well as group,mandatory bid, buy out and withdrawalrights.

Prof. Cheffins from the University ofCambridge, also on the eve of the newcentury, presented three key avenuesfor reform of corporate governance.These avenues are: strengthening ofthe corrective mechanisms of the boardof directors, restructuring of the execu-tives pay schemes, and increasing therole of institutional investors as activecompany owners.

9 Hostile over take bids are those in which a bidder makes anoffer to the shareholders of a target company to buy theirequity with a view to installing new executives.

10 See for example: G.P. Stapledon, Institutional Shareholdersand Corporate Governance 228 (1996)



With regard to the first issue, themost important is the role of the non-executive directors, who are seen askey to the reduction of the agency costsby monitoring the management team ina conscientious and objective manner.Outside directors are seen as naturalìwatch-dogsî because of their indepen-dent status which would allow them tohave a detached perspective.

The restructuring of the executivepay-schemes is to be done in a man-ner which allows for these pays to fluc-tuate in accordance with the share-holder return, in order for the executivesto share the same risks and benefits asshareholders, and to have direct incen-tives to act in the best interest of theshareholders.11

Lastly, institutional investors areable to improve the performance of thecompanies through engaging in a moreìhands-onî approach and by activelyseeking to improve the performance ofthe company in which they hold stock,primarily through the promotion of goodcorporate governance.12

Bearing in mind all the aforesaid,and the facts that in Anglo-Saxon coun-tries the large companies are usuallypublicly quoted, the public companieshave widely diffused share-ownership,the equity markets are well developedand institutional investors participateextensively in these equity markets andthat in Continental Europe, the largebusinesses are not always quoted onthe stock-exchanges, equity marketsare often underdeveloped relative to thestate of economy, institutional investors

are often ìgreat absenteesî from thosemarkets, in which the powerful familiesand possibly the state dominate thepublic companies,13 Professor Kay rea-sonably concludes that ìÖin the Anglo-American environment the corporationis a private, rather than a public body,defined by a set of relationships be-tween a Principal and an Agent. Share-holder-owners, too busy and too numer-ous to undertake the responsibilitythemselves, hire salaried executives tomanage their affairs. [Ö] In Continen-tal Europe and Japan, the corporationis an institution with a personality, char-acter and aspirations of its own. Its ob-jectives encompass the interests of awide range of stakeholder groups ñ in-vestors, employees, suppliers, custom-ers and managers, but can not beequated with any of them. The corpo-ration is therefore a social institution,with public responsibilities and properpublic interest in defining the way inwhich it is run and governedÖ14î

The situation in Macedonia with re-gard to Corporate Governance can beillustrated through several figures,taken from the Corporate GovernanceSurvey undertaken by the InternationalFinance Corporation Program for Cor-porate Governance in 2006. They sur-vey represents a sample of 70 jointstock companies in Macedonia. The keyfindings of the survey can be organizedin five areas: general company informa-tion, commitment to good governancepractices, good board practices, share-holders rights, information disclosureand transparency.

13 See the overview of the debate on corporate governancein the United Kingdom and Italy as an illustration for theabove stated indicators. Cheffins, *31.

14 John Kay, ìThe Business of Economicsî, 1996.

11 There are opposing views in this respect. For an overviewof these, as well as for a critique of this approach see alsoBrian Cheffins, Company Law: Theory , Structures andOperation, (1996) pp 685 ñ 687

12See Robert A.G. Monks, The Emperor ’s Nightingale:Restoring the Integrity of the Corporation, 162- 164, (1998).


Kiril Nejkov

With regard to general company in-formation, it has been found that 47.1%of the companies have between 101and 500 shareholders, and additional29% have more than 500 shareholders.The analysis of who represents the firstmajor shareholder in the joint stockcompanies in Macedonia shows thatthree biggest categories of sharehold-ers in the country are: Macedonian pri-vate entities (in º of the companies);individuals or entities (in 1/5 of the com-panies) and the members of the man-agement (in 17.2% of the companies).More than 9 out of 10 companies claimnot to have any relationship with themajor and controlling companies. Lessthan 15% of the companies have in-creased the charter capital of the com-pany in the last three years before 2006,with almost 2/3 of the companies nothaving attracted any external invest-ment in the last five years. Those whichdid attract external capital in this period,predominantly did that through foreigndirect equity investment (87.5%); thisis followed by loans from foreign finan-cial institutions and loans from domes-tic financial institutions.

With regard to the commitment togood corporate governance, it shouldbe stated that more than three out offour companies in Macedonia areaware of the OECD Principles of Cor-porate Governance. As for the questionconcerning the three most importantgoals that Macedonian companies wantto achieve through improvement ofCorporate Governance, it has beenshown that those are: firstly, to increasethe operational capacity (over half of thecompanies expect improvement of cor-porate governance to help them in thisrespect); secondly, to improve companyreputation, and to provide better access

to capital markets in the country. As forthe key obstacles to improvement ofcorporate governance in the compa-nies, the predominant answer is insuf-ficient Macedonian corporate legislation(51%), lack of information and knowl-edge, and the perception that sharingof the information related to corporategovernance is a commercial secretwhich the companies are afraid thecompetitors might use against them.One more important point of informa-tion in this respect is that 70% of thecompanies have not used consultancyservices for the improvement of thestate of their corporate governance.

The most common principles of cor-porate governance in the Charters ofthe Macedonian companies are the pro-visions on the general principles ofshareholders rights protection, proce-dures for conducting annual Sharehold-ers Meetings and requirements forelecting independent directors and theindependence criteria. On the otherhand, the Charters of the Macedoniancompanies pay the least attention to thetreatment of the minority shareholderin the event of a takeover, the prohibi-tions of restrictions on the sale of sharesand the requirements for rotation of theexternal auditor.

With regard to Board practices, themost important findings are the follow-ing: supervisory boards in most com-panies (43%) meet once every month,and the members of the SupervisoryBoard receive the background materi-als up to one week before the meeting.As of the Committees of the Supervi-sory Board, 4 out 5 companies do haveor plan to have specialized committees.The most popular existing type of com-mittees in the companies are: Ethicscommittee (68% of the companies),



Corporate Governance Committee andConflict Resolution Committee. Thecommittees which the companies planto establish are: Nominations Commit-tee, Strategic Planning and FinanceCommittee and Audit Committee.

The average Management Board inMacedonia has 7 members, out ofwhich 1 is female, and the average ageof these members is 50 years. The av-erage Management Board meets 12times a year.

The data related to conflict of inter-ests in the Boards is very interesting.Firstly, 3 out of 5 companies state thegoverning documents of the Companydo not require disclosure of conflict ofinterests by the members of the Boards,and 2/3 of all the companies claim thatthe members of the Boards are requiredto abstain from voting if the issue atstake involves conflict of interest withthe Board member in question. Butthen, the data go on to show that, forexample, in the fiscal year 2004 lessthan 5% of the companies did face asituation in which a member of any ofthe Boards abstained from voting dueto conflict of interests.

The remuneration of the membersof the Supervisory Board of the Com-panies is linked predominantly to thefollowing two criteria: results from per-formance evaluation, existence of ad-ditional responsibilities of the Supervi-sory Board members (for example,election as chairperson). In this respect,it should be noted that in 1/3 of the com-panies, the remuneration of these boardmembers is not linked to any criteria.The situation is similar with regard tothe remuneration of the Management:in 37% of the companies there are noindicators to which the remuneration islinked, and in those in which there are

such indicators, in more than half of thecompanies those are related to the prof-its of the companies and in 1/3 to themarket values of the shares.

With regard to the protection ofshareholder rights the most indicativefindings are the following: 5 out 6 com-panies inform the shareholders throughannouncements in the press about theShareholder Meeting, and this an-nouncement is available 21 ñ 45 daysbefore the Meeting. The most usual setsof information available to the share-holders when they are notified about theShareholders Meeting are: the Agendaof the meeting (in 91% of the cases),and the Annual Report and the Finan-cial Statements (in 84% of the cases).With regard to voting through proxiesat the Meetings, in 92% of the compa-nies this has been the case at the lastShareholders Meeting they had. Themost important formalized mechanismwith regard to voting in the companiesis the equal treatment with respect tovoting rights, existing in 61% of the com-panies. The results of the meetings aredistributed to the public in most casesthrough announcements in the media.

Last, but not least ñ with regard totransparency and disclosure ñ the mostimportant results are that the compa-nies in Macedonia, in most cases, donot publicly disclose the following: anyinformation on the remunerations to themembers of the Management and/orSupervisory Board, neither on a collec-tive nor on the individual basis; mate-rial event reports, list of related partiesand, it should be noted, 83% of the com-panies do not publicly disclose their or-ganizational charts. The potential inves-tor could find information on thecompanyís management, operationsand financial conditions in 3 out 4 cases


Kiril Nejkov

from the company upon request, in halfof the cases, in the Annual Report, andin less than half of the companies, onthe companyís website. Finally, one lastthing related to the assurance of theintegrity of reporting: in more than 2/3of the companies, the local audit firm isthe external auditor, in º of the compa-nies it is an international audit form, andin 5%, an individual auditor.

The ongoing debates in the regionwith regard to corporate governance,as the global ones, are focused on theissue whether the corporate gover-nance systems in the countries in theBalkans do have common characteris-tics, and secondly, if they incline to-wards the Anglo-Saxon or German/Eu-

ropean model. These discussions con-tinue, despite the several-years longdebate on the convergence of the mod-els and/or predominance of the Anglo-Saxon system. The Macedonian modelof corporate governance should notstay out of the scope of these discus-sions. The results of the MacedoniaCorporate Governance Survey pre-pared by IFC should be taken into con-sideration in the evaluation of the cor-porate governance system in Mace-donia and in the efforts for its furtherimprovement, efforts which would natu-rally incline towards a fine-tuning of therole of the companies most suitable forthe expectations of the Macedoniansociety.

Rezime

Napisot dava pregled na klu~nite aspekti na poimot korporativnoupravuvawe, se osvrnuva na klu~nite pra{awa na sovremenata debataza nevralgi~nite to~ki za potrebni reformi vo korporativnotoupravuvawe, preku elaboracija i komparacija na stavovite na dvajcaavtori – edniot od anglo-saksonskata pravna tradicija, a vtoriot odkontinentalno-evropskata, i, na krajot, dava pregled na naodite odistra‘uvaweto na sostojbata vo korporativnoto upravuvawe voMakedonija, koe be{e sprovedeno od strana na Me|unarodnatafinansiska korporacija, koja e del na grupacijata na Svetska banka –od Proektot za korporativno upravuvawe, {to se implementira sopoddr{ka na [vajcarskiot sekretarijat za ekonomski pra{awa voMakedonija, Srbija, Bosna i Hercegovina, Albanija i Crna Gora odjuli 2005 do dekemvri 2008.


The Basic Principles of theMechanism Design Theory

In economics, Mechanism Design isthe art and science of designing rulesof a game to achieve a specific out-come. This is done by setting up a struc-ture in which each player has an incen-tive to behave as the designer intends.The game is then said to implement thedesired outcome. The strength of sucha result depends on the solution con-cept used in the game. MechanismDesigners commonly try to achieve thefollowing basic outcomes: truthfulness,individual rationality, budget balance,and social welfare. More advancedmechanisms attempt to resist harmfulcoalitions of players.

Mechanism Design Theory showswhich mechanisms are optimal for dif-ferent participants, such as sellers orbuyers. The theory shows, for example,that so-called double auctions (wherebuyers and sellers post their bid-andask-prices) can be efficient trading in-stitutions when each trader has privateinformation about his or her valuationsof the goods traded. As the number oftraders increases, the double-auctionmechanism will more and more effi-ciently aggregate privately held infor-mation, and eventually all informationis reflected by the equilibrium prices.Likewise, mechanism design theory hasenabled economists to find solutions to

the monopoly pricing problem, showing,for example, how the price should de-pend on quality and quantity so as tomaximize the sellerís expected rev-enue.

The awarding body of the NobelPrize, the Swedish Academy, says thetheory also explains why there is oftenno good market solution to providingsome goods, like uncrowded roads.1

The Nobel Prize ìfor having laid thefoundations of mechanism designtheoryî was split between LeonidHurwicz, Professor Emeritus at theUniversity of Minnesota and two aca-demics from the next generation whobuilt on his work, Eric Maskin of the In-stitute for Advanced Study in Princeton,N.J., and Roger Myerson of the Univer-sity of Chicago. Maskin and Myersonwere PhD candidates in applied math-ematics at Harvard University in the1970s. The Nobel Prize award ceremo-nies will take place on December 10, inStockholm, Sweden.

The Mechanism Design Theory is,in a way, a continuation of the GameTheory of John Nash, the 1994 NobelPrize winner in Economics. MechanismDesign Theory explores the implemen-tation of the game theory in a wide va-riety of areas even in political science,as in the example of the mathematical

Shenaj HadzimustafaAnita Popovska

How to Design Better Markets?

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1 Source: http://bbs.putclub.com/index.php?s= a02860d42bc0c8febd1b033413195e9d&showtopic=126435&pid=1031091&st =40&#entry1031091 (last accessed: October 26th,2007)


Shenaj Hadzimustafa, Anita Popovska

model for elections developed by RogerMyerson. He found a voting systemthat, according to him, would havehelped Florida avoid its problems in the2000 presidential election. A simpleexplanation2 of the Mechanism Designis a situation when, for example, twochildren are squabbling over how to di-vide a pie. We need a method to dividethe pie fairly. Parents will already knowone answer ñ one child cuts and thesecond child gets to choose the slice.The second child will choose the largerhalf, which gives the first child the in-centive to cut as evenly as possible. Thefirst-cut, second-choose solution is asimple example of an incentive-compat-ible mechanism.

The theory shows, for example, thatthe so-called double auctions (wherebuyers and sellers post their bid-andask-prices) can be efficient trading in-stitutions when each trader has privateinformation about his or her valuationsof the goods traded.

More generally, the theory can beused to analyze the economic efficiencyof alternative institutions for the provi-sion of public goods, ranging from mar-kets and consensual collective deci-sion-making through majority decisionrules all the way to dictatorship. An im-portant insight is that consensual deci-sion-making is frequently incompatiblewith economic efficiency. The theorythus helps to justify governmental fi-nancing of public goods through taxa-tion. Applications of Mechanism DesignTheory have led to breakthroughs in anumber of other areas of economics as

well, including regulation, corporate fi-nance, and the theory of taxation.

The idea of Mechanism Design isto create institutions that produce a de-sirable outcome while respecting thefact that agents have private informa-tion and are self-interested.3 It turns outthat designing mechanisms that workwell while respecting information andself-interest constraints is very difficult.To identify an optimal mechanism for agiven goal function (such as profit to agiven seller or social welfare), the re-searcher must first delineate the set offeasible mechanisms, and then specifythe equilibrium criterion that will be usedto predict the participantsí behaviour[Hurwicz 1972]. We could focus on theset of ìdirect mechanismsî, where theagents report their private information(for example, their willingness to pay fora public good) [Hurwicz 1972]. Thereis no presumption that the agents willtell the truth; they will be truthful only ifit is in their self-interest. Based on allthese individual reports, the directmechanism assigns an outcome (forexample, the amount provided of thepublic good and fees for its financing).Suppose we use the notion of dominantstrategy equilibrium as our behaviouralcriterion. Hurwiczís notion of incentive-compatibility can now be expressed asfollows: the mechanism is incentive-compatible if it is a dominant strategyfor each participant to report his privateinformation truthfully. In addition, wemay want to impose a participation con-straint: no agent should be made worseoff by participating in the mecha-

2 Source: paper available via EBSCO ñ Host Online Re-source, Mechanism Design Theory, Scientific backgroundon the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences inMemory of Alfred Nobel 2007, Compiled by the Prize Com-mittee of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences.




nism.4 Under some weak assumptionson technology and taste, Hurwiczproved the following negative result: ina standard exchange economy, no in-centive-compatible mechanism whichsatisfies the participation constraint canproduce Pareto-optimal outcomes. Inother words, private information pre-cludes full efficiency [Hurwitcz 1972].

A natural question emanating fromHurwiczís classic work thus is: canPareto optimality be attained if we con-sider a wider class of mechanisms and/or a less demanding equilibrium con-cept than dominant-strategy equilib-rium, such as Nash equilibrium or Baye-sian Nash equilibrium? If not, then thequestion that needs to be answered ishow large the unavoidable social wel-fare losses are, and what the appropri-ate standard of efficiency should be.More generally, the question is whatkind of mechanism will maximize agiven goal function, such as profit orsocial welfare (whether this outcome isfully efficient or not). In the papers is-sued by the 2007 Nobel Prize winners,these questions have been answered.Much of the success of this researchprogram can be attributed to the dis-covery of the revelation principle.[Myerson 1979, 1982, 1986]. The rev-elation principle states that any equi-librium outcome of an arbitrary mecha-nism can be replicated by an incentive-compatible direct mechanism.5 In itsmost general version, the revelationprinciple is valid not only when agentshave private information, but also when

they take unobserved actions (the so-called moral hazard), as well as whenmechanisms have multiple stages. Al-though the set of all possible mecha-nisms is huge, the revelation principleimplies that an optimal mechanism canalways be found within the well-struc-tured subclass consisting of directmechanisms. Accordingly, much of hiswork has focused on the well-definedmathematical task of finding a directmechanism that maximizes the goalfunction, subject to the incentive-com-patibility (IC) constraint and, where ap-propriate, also the participation con-straint [Myerson 1979].

An example6 of the revelation prin-ciple for the case with no moral hazardis as follows. First, fix the equilibrium ofany given mechanism. An agentís pri-vate information is said to be his ìtypeî.Suppose that an agent of type sendsthe message in this equilibrium. Nowconsider the associated direct mecha-nism in which each agent simply reportsa type t0, where t0 may be his true typet or any other type. The reported typet0 is his message in the direct mecha-nism, and the outcome is defined to bethe same as when the agent sends themessage m(t0) in the equilibrium of theoriginal mechanism. By hypothesis, anagent of type t preferred to send mes-sage m(t) in the original mechanism (theagent could not gain by unilaterally de-viating to another message). In particu-lar, the agent preferred sending themessage m(t) to sending the messagem(t0), for any for t0 = t. Therefore, healso prefers reporting his true type t inthe direct mechanism, rather thanfalsely reporting any other type t0. So


5 Source: Myerson, R. (1982): ìOptimal coordination mecha-nisms in generalized principal agent problemsî, Journal ofMathematical Economics 11, 67-81.

6 Source: Hurwicz, L. (1972): ìOn informationally decentral-ized systemsî, in Radner and McGuire, Decision and Or-ganization. North-Holland, Amsterdam.



the direct mechanism is incentive com-patible: no agent has an incentive tomisreport his type. By construction, thedirect mechanism produces the sameoutcome as the original mechanism.Thus, any (arbitrary) equilibrium can bereplicated by an incentive-compatibledirect mechanism. A direct mechanismis said to be incentive efficient if it maxi-mizes some weighted sum of theagentsí expected payoffs subject to theirIC constraints.7

The Theory and Its Founders

The oldest Noble Prize winner inEconomics, Prof. Leonid Hurwicz, is theone who first laid the foundations of theMechanism Design Theory. LeonidHurwicz was born in Moscow in 1917,the year that Vladimir Lenin led theBolshevik seizure of power in Russia.Ninety years later ó on 15 October2007 ó Hurwicz was awarded theNobel Prize in Economics, in part forexplaining the fundamental flaw in thecentral planning that Lenin imposed inthe Soviet Union.8

Hurwicz defines the mechanism asa communication system in which par-ticipants exchange messages with eachother, messages that jointly determinethe outcome.9 These messages maycontain private information, such as anindividualís (true or pretended) willing-ness to pay for a public good. In hisseminal work (1960 ñ 1972), Hurwiczstates that the mechanism is like amachine that compiles and processesthe received messages, thereby aggre-

gating (true or false) private informa-tion provided by many agents. Furtheron, Hurwitz states that each agentstrives to maximize his or her expectedutility or profit, and may decide to with-hold disadvantageous information orsend false information, or, in a moresimplified manner, hope to pay less fora public good. This leads to the notionof ìimplementingî outcomes as equilib-rium of message games, where themechanism defines the ìrulesî of themessage game.10 The comparison ofalternative mechanisms is then cast asa comparison of the equilibrium of theassociated message. Hurwicz diag-nosed the core flaw of centrally plannedeconomies more accurately than did hispredecessor, Friedrich von Hayek, theAustrian-born free-market economistwho shared the Nobel Prize in 1974. Ithas not just that economies were toocomplicated to be run efficiently by acentral planner. It was that people hadthe wrong incentives [Hurwicz 1960].Centrally planned systems, he found,suffered from ìmoral hazard,î meaningessentially that people could get aheadby cheating ó for example, not work-ing hard enough. The applicability of theMechanism Design Theory can be ex-plained by the fact that the interactionsof individuals and institutions, marketsand trade today are analyzed and un-derstood using the models that Hurwiczdeveloped. Mechanism Design Theoryfinds its applications in a wide varietyof economic and social issues such ascomparison and analysis of systemsand techniques of economic organiza-tion, welfare economics, game-theo-retic implementation of social choice7 Source: Hurwicz, L. (1972): ìOn informationally decentral-

ized systemsî, in Radner and McGuire, Decision and Or-ganization. North-Holland, Amsterdam.)

8 Source: http://almaz.com/nobel/economics/2007a.html9 Source: Coy, Peter, "Father of Mechanism Design Wins

Nobel", article, available via EBSCO host

10 Source: Hurwicz, L. (1972): ìOn informationally decentral-ized systemsî, in Radner and McGuire, Decision and Or-ganization. North-Holland, Amsterdam.



goals, and modelling economic institu-tions. Asked in an interview whetherthere is one particular application thathe is most pleased about, he answeredthat he is particularly pleased aboutwelfare economics applications.11

The co-Nobelist in Economics,Roger Myerson, was born in Boston,USA, in 1951, and is currently teachingat the Department of Economics at theUniversity of Chicago.12 Myerson ex-plored the concept in detail in his work,Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict, andeven built a mathematical model thatanalyzed elections. His contribution tothe Mechanism Design Theory findsthat free markets have their own prob-lems with misaligned incentives. Ac-cording to Myerson, the biggest incen-tive problem in free markets is ìadverseselection,î also known as ìthe lemonproblemî. Health insurers, for example,suffer from this because the only peoplewho sign up for high-cost policies arethe ones who secretly know they havebig health problems, for which the costof the coverage is worthwhile.13 Myer-son, while acknowledging that he is nota health-care economist, said in an in-terview that the adverse selection prob-lem gives fundamental reasons whyeverybody or almost everybody mightbe better off with universal, compulsoryhealth insurance.14

The third co-Nobelist in the row, EricMaskin, was born in New York in 1950.Maskin is Professor of Social Scienceat the Institute for Advanced Study, and

a visiting lecturer with the rank of Pro-fessor at the Princeton University Eco-nomics Department.15 With regards tothe theory, Maskin is cited for his workon determining what kinds of auctions,or selling procedures, could bring in themost revenue to sellers. Asked in aninterview to give an example of an ef-fective application of the theory, hestated that, ìÖprobably the most dra-matic example in recent years was thevarious auctions that have been usedfor decentralization. In various countriesaround the world, assets that had pre-viously been in the hands of govern-ments were sold off to the private sec-tor in the hope that this would lead to amore efficient allocation, that these as-sets would be put to better use. And theway that they were sold off was via auc-tions, in the hope that the auctionmechanism would help promote a bet-ter application. So auctions are a par-ticular example of a mechanism thathas been used very effectively.î

Overall, the three Nobelists, start-ing in 1960 with Hurwicz, studied howthe game theory can help determine thebest, most efficient method for allocat-ing resources.

Example: Bilateral Trade

Mechanism Design Theory offersmany powerful results that may seemquite abstract. In order to illustrate theunderlying principles in an accessibleway, we present a detailed (albeit stillincomplete) analysis of a simple ex-ample.

Suppose that Ana owns an indivis-ible object, for instance, a painting. She

11 Source: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/lau-reates/2007/hurwicz-telephone.html

12Source: http://almaz.com/nobel/economics/2007a.html13Source: http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/con-

tent/oct2007/db20071015_ 488815.htm? campaign_id=rss_topEmailedStorieshost

14Source: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20071015/ap_on_bi_ge/sweden_nobel_economics (last accessed October 26,2007)

15 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_Maskin



is considering selling the painting to aprospective buyer, we can call himPhilip. Ana and Philip each value thepainting. Suppose that the painting isworth x to Ana and y to Philip. (That is,Ana would be happy to sell it at anyprice above x but would prefer to keepit if the price is below x, and converselyfor Philip.) They may be able to agreeon a price so that both of them gain fromthe transaction, but only if the paintingis of more value to Philip than to Ana(that is, only if y>x). For each of them,the utility gain from a transaction equalsthe difference between the agreed priceand the value each of them ascribes tothe painting. If the agreed price is p,then Anaís utility gain is p-x and Philipísgain is y-p. The total gain from trade isthus p-x+y-p=y-x. If no trade occurs,then no party obtains any utility gain,so we are looking for a mechanism inwhich trade will always occur if and onlyif Philipís evaluation of the painting ishigher than Anaís.

Now suppose that neither Philip norAna know how the other values thepainting, so they each have private in-formation about their own valuation.What kind of mechanism could they useto trade with each other? One possibil-ity is that Ana makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to Philip. Another possibility isthat Philip makes such an offer to Ana.A third possibility would be a so-calleddouble auction, a mechanism in whichboth parties simultaneously announcea price at which they are willing to trade,and, if Philipís offer exceeds Anaís, theytrade at the price half way between thetwo proposed prices (or according tosome other pre-specified splitting rule).However, none of these three mecha-nisms has the property that trade al-ways occurs if the buyerís evaluation is

higher than that of the seller. For ex-ample, if Ana makes a take-it-or leave-it offer, then it is in her interest to setthe price above the actual value sheascribes to the painting. If she sets aprice exactly equal to her own valua-tion, she does not care whether Philipbuys or not. If she sets a slightly higherprice, she does better ñ gaining some-thing if Philip buys, and losing nothingif he does not. Philip will, of course,accept her offer only if the proposedprice is equal to or less than the valuehe ascribes to the painting. So, even ifAna values the painting less than Philip,she may end up proposing a price thatis higher than Philip is prepared to pay.The argument is of course analogous ifit is instead Philip who makes an offer.

The double auction would realize allgains of trade if traders were to bid ac-cording to their private valuation, thatis, if Ana announced the bid p=x andPhilip the bid p´=y, since then tradewould occur if and only if y exceeds x.However, Ana and Philip will not bidaccording to their valuations, becauseErica benefits from bidding above hervaluation (in order to obtain a higherprice) and Philip benefits from biddingbelow his valuation (in order to obtainthe object at a lower price). To see why,consider Anaís problem. By biddingslightly above her valuation, Ana knowsthat she forgoes the opportunity to tradein case her valuation is just about thesame as Philipís bid. But Ana loses vir-tually nothing from the forgone trade,because (i) the loss in trading probabil-ity is small, and (ii) the price is almostthe same as Anaís valuation. On theother hand, whenever Philipís bid sub-stantially exceeds Anaís, Anaís higherbid remains below Philipís. In thesecases, there is still trade, and Ana re-



ceives a higher price than if she wereto bid truthfully. This (first-order) gainoutweighs the (second-order) loss fromforgone trade.

The outcome is illustrated in the dia-gram, where Anaís valuation, x, is plot-ted on the horizontal axis and Philipísvaluation, y, on the vertical axis. Ide-ally, trade should occur whenever y>x,that is, for all valuation pairs in the largetriangle above the diagonal. In equilib-rium, however, trade will occur only ina subset of this triangle. For instance,if we think of Ana and Philip as randomlydrawn from a population in which thevaluations of paintings are uniformlydistributed between zero and one, andif Ana and Philip use linear bidding strat-egies (that is, their bidding prices arelinear functions of their valuations), thenthe best possible equilibrium outcomeis that trade occurs in the shaded areañ the smaller, upper triangle. In otherwords, there is trade if and only ifPhilipís valuation y exceeds Anaís valu-ation x by a certain positive amount. (Inthe example, there is trade if and onlyif Philipís valuation exceeds Anaís valu-ation by / .)

The double auction described aboveis formally identical with a direct mecha-nism; namely, the mechanism wherebyeach agent is asked to report his or hervaluation of the object at hand to a ìcen-ter,î and where the object changeshands if and only if the sellerís valua-tion exceeds that of the buyer, at a pricethat lies half way (or at any other pre-specified point) between the announcedvaluations. This direct mechanismwould realize all gains of trade, andhence be Pareto efficient, if the agentsannounced their valuations truthfully.However, for the reasons given abovefor the double auction, this particular

outcome is not incentive compatible: theseller will have an incentive to inflateher valuation and the buyer will havean incentive to deflate his. Truthful re-porting of private information is incom-patible with equilibrium.

The remarkable power of Mecha-nism Design Theory is that it does notstop here. It allows a characterizationof the best mechanism of all conceiv-able mechanisms. Specifically, Myersonand Satterthwaite established a preciseupper limit for the expected gains fromtrade that are realizable in any tradingmechanism in bilateral situations likethis. Moreover, they showed that thisupper limit can be realized by way of adouble auction. That is, no mechanismcan ensure a better outcome than thedouble auction equilibrium outcomedescribed above.

Conclusion

The Mechanism Design Theory de-fines institutions as non-cooperativegames, and compares different institu-

Y

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Source: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2007/maskin-telephone.html (last accessed October 26, 2007)



tions in terms of the equilibrium out-comes of these games. It allows econo-mists and other social scientists to ana-lyze the performance of institutions rela-tive to the theoretical optimum. Mecha-nism design has produced a large num-ber of important insights in a wide rangeof applied contexts, influencing eco-nomic policy as well as market institu-tions. We have discussed here someof the most important results and appli-cations.

The example shows why markets ingeneral, and auctions in particular, canbe efficient institutions for the allocationof private goods. However, efficiencydoes not imply that an institution will bechosen by those who have the powerto select it. Instead, we may expect thechoice of institution to reflect the inter-ests of the designer. Fortunately, me-chanism design theory can equally wellbe used to analyze such situations andexplain what mechanisms (menus ofprice offers, bundling of products, auc-tions etc.) that sellers and buyers pre-fer, thus providing a theory of whichmarket institutions will emerge. Thetheory admits a sophisticated analysisof institutions for the provision of publicgoods, of optimal forms of regulation,and of voting schemes.

The Mechanism Design Theory in-creases our appreciation of marketsbecause it provides further explanationabout their functioning. The basic con-tribution of the theory is that it hashelped in explaining how incentives andprivate information affect decision-mak-ing procedures involved in economictransactions including, for example,what insurance polices will provide thebest coverage without inviting misuse.It has been used in everything fromnegotiations over labour issues to theauctioning of government bonds andhas helped countries and companiesbetter understand how markets functioneven if there are unsteady conditions.

As a comparison, Mechanism De-sign is to markets what genetic codesare to human life. As the three co-Nobelists have build up the Nash GameTheory, some other theorists some daymay design a better market mechanismor a better genetic code, but for nowtheir theory enables us to have deeperunderstanding of the functioning of themarkets and by that to improve ourknowledge about something that has al-ready been quite stunning (Nashís GameTheory).

Key words: effectiveness, efficiency,markets, individual choice…

Rezime

Mnogu ne{ta se efektivni, no ne i efikasni. Da se bide efikasenzna~i da se proizvede posakuvan efekt so {to pomalku tro{oci. Kakoda se dizajniraat pazarite so cel da se napravat poefikasni? Ova epra{aweto na koe trojcata dobitnici na ovogodi{nata Nobelovanagrada za ekonomija se obidoa da dadat odgovor. Tie ja vospostavijaMehanizam dizajn teorijata, t.e., gi postavija nejzinite osnovni



References1. Abreu, D. and A. Sen (1991): ìVirtual implementation in Nash equi-

libriaî, Econometrica 59, 997-1022.2. Armstrong, M. (1996): ìMultiproduct nonlinear pricingî, Econometrica

64, 51- 75.3. Arrow, K.J. (1979): ìThe property rights doctrine and demand rev-

elation under incomplete informationî, in M. Boskin (ed.), Econom-ics and Human Welfare. Academic Press, New York.

4. Baron, D. and R. Myerson (1982): ìRegulating a monopolist withunknown costsî, Econometrica 50, 911-930.

5. Chatterjee, K. and W. Samuelson (1983): ìBargaining under incom-plete informationî, Operations Research 31, 835-851.

6. Dasgupta, P., P. Hammond and E. Maskin (1979): ìThe implementa-tion of social choice rules: some general results on incentive com-patibilityî, Review of Economic Studies 46, 181-216.

7. díAspremont, C. and L.A. GÈrard-Varet (1979): ìIncentives and in-complete informationî, Journal of Public Economics 11, 25-45.

8. Ellison, G., Fudenberg, D. andM. Mˆbius (2004): ìCompeting auc-tionsî, Journal of the European Economic Association 2: 30-66

postulati. S¢ po~na so rabotata na Leonid Hurvic od Univerzitetotvo Minesota vo 1960 god. Erik Maskin od Institutot za naprednistudii pri Univerzitetot vo Prinston i Roxer Majerson od Ekono-mskiot fakultet pri Univerzitetot vo ^ikago so svojata rabotapridonesoa za potemelen razvoj na osnovnata teorija. [vedskataKralska akademija na naukite gi nagradi trojcata Amerikanci i tieme|usebno }e ja podelat presti‘nata nagrada koja e vo vrednost od1,5 milioni dolari. Pove}eto kriti~ki osvrti za ovogodi{nitenobelovci se fokusiraat vrz toa kako nivnata teorija go potenciradizajnot na aukcii kako, na primer, onie za koristewe na vozdu{nitebranovi ili, pak, pravoto za emisija na karbon dioksid. Me|utoa, soogled na toa {to nivnoto delo e fundamentalno i mnogu teoretsko,toa se povrzuva so mnogu {irok spektar na ekonomski temi. Kako da sesobiraat danocite, kako da se regulira monopolot, kako da se finan-sira javnoto dobro, kako da se nazna~uvaat praktikanti vo bolnici,kako da se podelat zaedni~kite dobra, kako da se alocira elektri~-nata energija niz strujna mre‘a – site ovie pra{awa mo‘e da sedefiniraat kako problemi na Mehanizam dizajn teorijata. Soodvetno,ovaa teorija nudi edna koherentna ramka za analiza na golem brojinstitucii, ili "mehanizmi za alokacija#, stavaj}i akcent vrz proble-mite koi se povrzani so pottiknuva~kite inicijativi i so protokotna privatni informacii. Ottuka, ovoj tekst }e ponudi objasnuvawe naosnovnite principi na Mehanizam dizajn teorijata i na nejziniotgeneralen pridones kon ekonomskata teorija.

Klu~ni zborovi: efektivnost, efikasnost, pazar, individualen izbor...



9. Harsanyi, J. (1967-8): ìGames with incomplete information playedby ëBayesianí playersî, Management Science 14, 159-189, 320-334,486-502.

10. Hurwicz, L. (1960): ìOptimality and informational efficiency in re-source allocation processesî, in Arrow, Karlin and Suppes (eds.),Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences. Stanford UniversityPress.

11. Hurwicz, L. (1972): ìOn informationally decentralized systemsî, inRadner and McGuire, Decision and Organization. North-Holland,Amsterdam.

12. Hurwicz, L. (1973): ìThe design of mechanisms for resource alloca-tionî, American Economic Review 63, Papers and Proceedings, 1-30.

13. Hurwicz, L. and D. Schmeidler (1978): ìConstruction of outcome func-tions guaranteeing existence and Pareto-optimality of Nash equilib-riaî, Econometrica 46: 1447-1474.

14. Maskin, E. (1977): ìNash equilibrium and welfare optimalityî. Paperpresented at the summer workshop of the Econometric Society inParis, June 1977. Published 1999 in the Review of Economic Stud-ies 66, 23-38.

15. Maskin, E. (1992): ìAuctions and privatizationî, in H. Siebert (ed.),Privatization: Symposium in honor of Herbert Giersh. Mohr (Siebek),Tubingen.

16. Maskin, E. and J. Moore (1999): ìImplementation and renegotiationî,Review of Economic Studies 66, 39-56.

17. Maskin, E. and J. Riley (1984a): ìOptimal auctions with risk-aversebuyersî, Econometrica 52, 1473-1518.

18. Maskin, E. and J. Riley (1984b): ìMonopoly with incomplete infor-mationî, RAND Journal of Economics 15, 171-196.

19. Maskin, E. and T. Sjˆstrˆm (2002): ìImplementation theoryî, in K.Arrow, A.K. Sen and K. Suzumura (eds.), Handbook of Social Choiceand Welfare, Vol. 1. Elsevier Science, Amsterdam.

20. Maskin, E. and J. Tirole (1999): ìUnforeseen contingencies and in-complete contractsî, Review of Economic Studies 66, 84-114.

21. Myerson, R. (1981): ìOptimal auction designî, Mathematics of Op-erations Research 6, 58-73.

22. Myerson, R. (1982): ìOptimal coordination mechanisms in general-ized principal agent problemsî, Journal of Mathematical Economics11, 67-81.

23. Myerson, R. (1983): ìMechanism design by an informed principalî,Econometrica 52, 461-487.

24. Myerson, R. (1986): ìMultistage games with communicationî,Econometrica 54, 323-358.

25. Myerson, R. (1989): ìMechanism designî, in J. Eatwell, M. Milgateand P. Newman (eds.), The New Palgrave: Allocation, Informationand Markets. Norton, New York,

26. Myerson, R. and M. Satterthwaite (1983): ìEfficient mechanisms forbilateral tradingî, Journal of Economic Theory 28, 265-281.

27. Samuelson, P. (1954): ìThe pure theory of public expenditureî, Re-view of Economics and Statistics 36, 387-389.

28. Williams, S. (1986): ìRealization and Nash implementation: Two as-pects of mechanism designî, Econometrica 54, 139-151.

29. Wilson, R. (1977): ìA bidding model of perfect competitionî, Reviewof Economic Studies 44, 511-518.

30. Wilson, R. (1979): ìAuctions of sharesî, Quarterly Journal of Eco-nomics 93, 675-689.


Mihaela Ristovska

Grupacijata Svetska banka

Edna od poslednite vesti povr-zani so Svetska banka vo RepublikaMakedonija, ovojpat pozitivna, evesta za 4-toto mesto na zemjata nalistata na Top 10 Reformisti nalistata na Doing Business Proektotna Svetska banka.1 Osnovniot kri-terium za vakvoto rangirawe pret-stavuva brojot na sektori kade {toe zabele‘an pozitiven napredok vonasoka na obezbeduvawe na povolnaklima za razvivawe na biznisot. VoMakedonija pozitivno bea ocenetiizmenite na nacionalnoto zakono-davstvo vo pogled na eliminirawena baraweto za minimum kapitalnainvesticija za zapo~nuvawe nabiznis, zabrzuvawe na procesot naizdavawe na grade‘ni dozvoli,namaluvawe na danokot na dobivkana 12% (so najava deka vo 2008godina se planira namaluvawe do10%) i poednostavuvawe na proce-durite za naplata na danocite.Sepak, generalnata ocenka na zem-jite pretstavuva predmet na Doingbusiness 2008, koj e 5-ti po red Godi-{en izve{taj {to ja prou~uva nacio-nalnata regulativa koja go poddr‘u-va razvivaweto na biznis klimatai regulativata koja pretstavuvapre~ka vo taa nasoka i sporedFinancial Times slu‘i kako "pot-setnik deka edna od neophodnite

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ulogi na Svetska banka e da gipribira vakviot tip podatoci, kojapretstavuva skapa aktivnost i s¢u{te nevrednuvana kako op{todobro#.2 Republika Makedonija naovaa lista se nao|a na 75-to mesto,za razlika od prethodnoto 96-tomesto. Napredok za pozdravuvawe,koj treba da prodol‘i, na {to upatii noviot direktor na Misijata naSvetska banka vo Makedonija, g-dinMarkus Repnik, na prezentacijatana Izve{tajot.

Svetska banka vsu{nost pret-stavuva izvor na finansiska itehni~ka pomo{ za zemjite vo razvojod celiot svet. Se razbira, Bankatane pretstavuva banka vo voobi~aenasmisla, tuku finansiska organi-zacija sostavena od dve sui generisinstitucii za razvoj, Me|unarod-nata banka za obnova i razvoj (IBRD)i Me|unarodnata asocijacija zarazvoj (IDA). Sekoja od instituciiteima razli~na uloga, no so ednamisija, namaluvawe na globalnatasiroma{tija i podobruvawe nastandardite na ‘iveeweto. Za taacel Me|unarodnata banka za obnovai razvoj se fokusira na zemjite sosredni prihodi i siroma{ni zemji"vredni# za kreditirawe, dodekaMe|unarodnata asocijacija za razvoje naso~ena kon najsiroma{nite

1 Za celiot tekst vidi na stranata: http://www. doingbusiness.org/features/Reform2007.aspx. 2 Financial Times, 26.09.2007.


Mihaela Ristovska

zemji vo svetot (81 zemja so okolu2,5 milijardi ‘iteli), pri {to idvete obezbeduvaat zaemi so niskikamatni stapki, krediti bez kamat-ni stapki, soveti za razvivawe napolitiki, kako i grantovi za razvojna obrazovanieto, zdravstvoto,infrastrukturata, komunikaciite,sudskite reformi itn. Vo Grupa-cijata na Svetska banka ~lenuvaati Me|unarodnata finansiska korpo-racija (IFC), Multilateralnataagencija za investiciski garancii(MIGA) i Me|unarodniot centar zare{avawe na sporovi od oblasta nainvesticiite (ICSID). Zemjite ~len-ki na Grupacijata na Svetska bankase pretstaveni od Odborot na guver-neri koi ja ureduvaat politikata naSvetska banka. Guvernerite naj-~esto se ministri za razvoj ili zafinansii na zemjite ~lenki, koi sesostanuvaat edna{ godi{no na go-di{nite sobranija na Svetskatabanka i Me|unarodniot monetarenfond. So ogled na faktot dekapretstavnicite na zemjite se sos-tanuvaat edna{ vo godinata, dele-giraat posebni nadle‘nosti na 24izvr{ni direktori, koi rabotat nasekojdnevno sproveduvawe na ce-lite na Bankata. Najgolemite petpretstavnici, Francija, Germanija,Japonija, Velika Britanija i Soedi-netite Amerikanski Dr‘avi imenu-vaat po eden izvr{en direktor,dodeka ostanatite se pretstaveniso imenuvawe na 19 direktori.Pretsedatelot na Svetska banka,g-din Robert Zoelik pretsedava sosostanocite na Odborot na direk-tori i e odgovoren za upravuvawetoso Bankata. Dosega{nata tradicijauka‘uva na faktot deka naj~esto zapretsedatel na Bankata e nomini-

ran pretstavnik na SAD ili na ednaod zemjite so najgolemo u~estvo.Pretsedatelot se izbira od stranana Odborot na guverneri za periodod pet godini, so mo‘nost za re-izbor. Vo kontekst na funkciite naBankata, osobeno na finansiskapomo{ na dr‘avite, ponekoga{Svetska banka se poistovetuva soMe|unarodniot monetaren fond, koje formiran na istata konferencijavo 1944 godina vo Breton Vuds, sofunkcii komplementarni na funk-ciite na Svetska banka, me|utoa, seraboti za kompletno razli~naorganizacija, ~ija cel e obezbe-duvawe stabilnost na me|unarod-niot monetaren sistem i nabqu-duvawe na svetskiot kurs na valu-tite, dodeka Bankata obezbeduvapomo{ za zemjite vo razvoj.

Kako organizacija fokusiranana poddr{ka na razvojot, Svetskabanka za Jugoisto~na Evropa gipoddr‘uva celite, generalno defi-nirani kako: namaluvawe na siro-ma{tijata; i ekonomski i socijalenrazvoj vo nasoka na zalo‘bite za~lenstvo vo Evropskata Unija.Centralen instrument za poddr{kana nacionalnite programi za re-formi e Strategijata za pomo{ nazemjata (CAS), bazirana na procenkina prioritetite na zemjata, pret-hodno portfolio na zemjata i potre-bata od kreditirawe, pri {to seutvrduvaat strate{ki prioriteti,kako i nivoto i strukturata nafinansiskata i tehni~ka pomo{koja ja obezbeduva Bankata. Vonasoka na namaluvaweto na siro-ma{tijata i zgolemuvaweto naekonomskiot rast klu~en dokumentpretstavuva Strategijata za nama-luvaweto na siroma{tijata (PRSPs)


Grupacijata Svetska banka

koja se izrabotuva od strana navladite na zemjite so pomo{ nakonsultantsko u~estvo. Vo pogledna finansiskata pomo{ za periodot1999-2005 godina za ovoj region,Svetska banka poddr‘a golem brojproekti vo nekolku sektori (infra-struktura, energetski sektor, razvojna privatniot sektor, upravuvaweso ekonomijata, namaluvawe nasiroma{tijata, socijalnite sek-tori, ruralen razvoj i za{tita na‘ivotnata sredina) kumulativno voiznos od 5,9 milijardi amerikanskidolari, od koi Republika Make-donija ima dobieno 304 milioniamerikanski dolari.3 Za fiskal-nata 2006 godina obvrskite na Svet-ska banka kon Makedonija iznesuvaa87 milioni amerikanski dolari odvkupnata suma predvidena za aktiv-ni proekti vo iznos od 122 milioniamerikanski dolari.

Pokraj faktot deka se raboti zasiroma{ni ekonomii, zemjite naJugoisto~na Evropa, vklu~uvaj}i jai Republika Makedonija, pretrpeakonflikti {to dopolnitelno gozgolemi nedostigot od administra-tiven kapacitet i statisti~ki po-datoci za razvivawe na strategiiza gra|anskiot sektor. Svetskabanka odigra vitalna uloga vo tojpogled, pri {to zemjite na porane{-na Jugoslavija bea vklu~eni vo "ini-cijativata za te{ko zadol`eni zem-ji# vo periodot 2000-2002 godina.

Po za~lenuvaweto na RepublikaMakedonija vo Svetska banka vo1993 godina, finansirani se brojniaktivnosti na vladite so cel obez-beduvawe na makroekonomska sta-

bilnost i razvoj na privatniot sek-tor. Od 2001 godina zemjata primizaemi od IDA za ekonomsko, po-liti~ko i socijalno zakrepnuvawepo vnatre{niot konflikt, dodekadenes gi koristi zaemite na IBRD iu‘iva EU kandidatski status. Naekonomsko pole se zabele‘uva mak-roekonomska stabilnost, kontro-lirana inflacija i otstranuvawena barierite za normalno razvi-vawe na pazarnata ekonomija. Se-pak, rezultatite na poleto na eko-nomski rast od 3,5% za periodot2003-2006 i formalniot sektor zakreirawe rabotni mesta se razo~a-ruva~ki i ja rangiraat RM vo zemjiteso bavni ekonomii. Stapkata nanevrabotenost e edna od najvisoki-te vo regionot i pokraj nerealnite30% vo oficijalnite podatoci.

Soglasno Strategijata za part-nerstvo pome|u Makedonija i Me-|unarodnata banka za obnova i raz-voj i Me|unarodnata finansiskakorporacija za periodot 2007-2010godina4 poso~eni se slednite oblas-ti kako klu~ni za dadeniot period:

Poddr{ka od strana na Svetskabanka vo naporite na RepublikaMakedonija za ~lenstvo vo Ev-ropskata Unija;Zabrzuvawe na ekonomskiotrast, kreirawe rabotni mesta,podobruvawe na ‘ivotnite stan-dardi, kako i podobruvawe naupravuvaweto i transparent-nosta na javniot sektor vo na-soka na poddr{ka na pazarnataekonomija, preku zajaknuvawe ipomo{ na:

3 Economic Reconstruction and Development in South EastEurope, na http://www.seerecon.org/gen/wbrole.htm.

4 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development andInternational Finance Corporation Country Partnership forFYR Macedonia for the Period FY07-FY10, March 2 2007.


Mihaela Ristovska

• Poddr{ka na ambicioznite pla-novi na Vladata za zgolemuvawena ekonomskiot rast i sozda-vawe rabotni mesta preku inte-griran program na pove}e nivoa;

• Odr‘uvawe na makroekonom-skata stabilnost i namaluvawena tro{ocite;

• Podobruvawe na biznis klimatavklu~uvaj}i gi reformite vodelot na legislativata, osobenoza izvr{uvawe na dogovorniteobvrski na doveritelite;

• Namaluvawe na cenata na kapi-talot i zgolemuvawe na prista-pot do kapital;

• Zgolemuvawe na konkurencijatavo privatniot sektor, ohrabru-vawe na tehnolo{kiot napredoki promovirawe na poleto za in-vesticii;

• Zgolemuvawe na konkurencijataod oblasta na zemjodelstvoto;

• Voveduvawe na funkcionalenpazar na nedvi‘nosti i razvoj nainstitucii;

• Podobruvawe na infrastruk-turata za ekonomski rast prekuzajaknuvawe na ramkata na pri-vatno-javnite partnerstva i se-lektivno investirawe vo ener-getskiot sektor i transportot;

• Otstranuvawe na rigidnata regu-lativa koja go ureduva pazarotna trudot;

• Razvivawe na produktivna iadekvatno obu~ena rabotna sila;

• Namaluvawe na pravnata nesi-gurnost i nedoverbata vo pravo-sudniot sistem;

• Primena na adekvatni finan-siski principi i standardi naupravuvawe na nivo na lokal-nite samoupravi, vklu~uvaj}i gii lokalnite javni pretprijatijai javniot servis;

• Prodol‘uvawe na koristewe naresursite od javniot sektor imonitoring na koristeweto nazdravstveniot servis vo nasokana postignuvawe pogolem kva-litet i pogolema dostapnost;

• Koristeweto na gotovinskiottransfer sistem (cash transfersystem) za obezbeduvawe na ob-razovanie i preventivno zdrav-stvo.Na poslednoto Godi{no sobra-

nie na Svetska banka bea afir-mirani zalo‘bite za odr‘liva glo-balizacija i multilateralna obvrs-ka za globalen prosperitet izgra-deni na soznanieto deka sme del odne{to pogolemo od nas samite.

Abstract

The article is mainly focused on a brief introduction of the World BankGroup role in reducing the poverty and providing assistance for macro-economic stability in undeveloped and developing countries. In respect ofbetter understanding of the functions of the World Bank the article provides asuccinct insight into its organizational structure. In terms of the Bankís role inMacedonia, the key features and pillars of the results based on the PartnershipStrategy between the World Bank Group and Macedonia for the period of2007 to 2010 are also provided.


Politikata na konkurencija voramkite na pregovorite za ~lenstvo voEvropskata Unija

Pen~o Kuzev

Ekonomskiot uspeh na Evrop-skata Unija (EU) i nejziniot karak-ter kako podobro mesto za ‘iveewebea osnoven motiv na site isto~-noevropski dr‘avi da go defini-raat ~lenstvoto vo EU kako nivnastrategiska cel. Oficijalniotpo~etok na intenziven struktu-riran dijalog pome|u dr‘avite~lenki na EU, od edna strana i,dr‘avata-kandidat za ~lenstvo, oddruga strana, go ozna~uva procesotnare~en pregovori.

Od pettoto pro{iruvawe na EUdo denes kriteriumite za otpo~-nuvawe i vodewe na pregovorite nese promeneti. So ogled deka poglav-jeto za politikata na konkurencijase smeta za osobeno zna~ajno, kakoi faktot na serioznite problemikoi se pojavija kaj Bugarija i Roma-nija na patot kon provizorno zatvo-rawe tokmu na ova poglavje, toazazema centralno mesto vo ovojtrud. Site analizi vo ovoj tekstimaat svoja osnova vo Dogovorot naEvropskite zaednici (EZ) i sekun-darnata legislativa, od edna stra-na i, vo Evropskite spogodbi (ES) iSpogodbata za stabilizacija iasocijacija (SSA) so Makedonija iHrvatska, od druga strana. Poisto-vetuvaweto na ES i SSA e sood-vetno bidej}i i dvata tipa spogodbise smetaat za pred-pristapna stra-tegija. Vo prilog na ova odi i

argumentot {to, spored Evropskitepartnerstva, procesot na stabili-zacija i asocijacija ostanuva ramkaza evropskiot kurs na dr‘avite odZapadniot Balkan na patot do niv-niot priem vo Unijata.1

1. Jadro na poglavjetopolitika na konkurencija

Razli~no od drugite oblasti naacquis,2 poglavjeto politika nakonkurencija pretpostavuva akcijai deluvawe, a ne samo politi~kazalo‘ba. Donesuvaweto soodvet-nite kompatibilni zakoni od ovaaoblast, ne zna~i deka se ispolnetikriteriumite za ova poglavje. Po-glavjeto gi sodr‘i slednite triosnovni uslovi koi treba da giispolni sekoja dr‘ava-kandidat:

1.1 Soodvetna legislativa zaanti-trustovo zakonodavstvo idr‘avna pomo{

Stepenot na soglasnost na legis-lativnata ramka i proceduralnataimplementacija mora da ja obvrzesekoja dr‘ava-kandidat da gi pri-

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1 Council Decision of 30 January 2006 on the Principles,Priorities and Conditions Contained in the EuropeanPartnership with the Republic of Macedonia.

2 Terminot acquis communautaire se upotrebuva vopravoto na EU za da gi ozna~i celokupnoto nejzinozakonodavstvo i site pravni akti koi se zadol‘itel-ni za dr‘avite-~lenki. Za potrebite na pro{iru-vaweto na EU acquis e podelen na 35 poglavja.


Pen~o Kuzev

menuva istite anti-trustovi pra-vila i pravila za dr‘avna pomo{kako i zaednicata, iako postoimo‘nost za pregovarawe za tranzi-torni odredbi.

1.2 Funkcionalen i efikasenadministrativen kapacitet

Visok stepen na ~ove~ki kapi-tal, solidna finansiska potkrepa,vklu~uvaj}i soodvetni uslovi zarabota za zadol‘enata adminis-tracija se preduslov za nejzinofukcionirawe. Dopolnitelno, nej-zinata postavenost vo javnata admi-nistracija treba da osigura poli-ti~ka nezavisnost. Toa e receptotza stabilna administrativna struk-tura sposobna da proizvede zado-volitelen anti-trustov registar ida izre~e respektivni kazni.

Zaradi ispolnuvawe na kri-teriumite, nacionalnite insti-tucii za konkurencija imaat golemaodgovornost vo gradeweto na vis-tinska kultura na konkurencijata iu~ewe na pravilata. Toa vklu~uvane samo sankciona politika tuku ipromovirawe na konkurentska kli-ma za ekonomski aktivnosti prekupodignuvawe na javnata svest zapridobivkite od efektivna konku-rencija. Pozicijata na nacional-nite institucii za konkurencija evidno zgolemena i preku odlukatana Evropskiot sud na pravdata voslu~ajot Consorzio Industrie Fiammi-fiery.3 Imeno, tie imaat te{ka za-da~a koja duri gi obvrzuva da ne goprimenuvaat nacionaloto zakono-

davstvo dokolku za odredeno pret-prijatie e zakonski stupuliranonekonkurentsko odnesuvawe ili nadrug na~in toa od nego se pobaruva.

1.3 Konkreten i kredibilenregistar za anti-trust idr‘avna pomo{

Sposobnosta za efektivno pri-menuvawe na konkurentskoto zako-nodavstvo se meri tokmu preku ovojuslov. Zatoa, konkurentskite vlas-ti moraat celosno da gi koristatnivnite istra‘ni merki i da poka-‘at konkreten broj slu~ai. Istotaka i sudovite moraat paralelnoda ja primenuvaat evropskata legis-lativa i da rabotat paralelno soniv. No, {to zna~i kredibilen re-gistar? Ona {to Evropskata komi-sija (EK) go o~ekuva od dr‘ava-kan-didat, na primer, vo oblasta nadr‘avnata pomo{ e slednoto:4

1. Odlukite da bidat doneseni vrzosnova na ~len 87 (1) ili (3) odEZ;

2. Merkite da sodr‘at jasen iden-tifikacija na korisnikot i vi-sinata na sumata i

3. Da sodr‘at argumentirana pro-cenka za efektot vo solasnostso acquis.Registarot e klu~niot del vo

pregovorite. So pravo e insisti-raweto na ovoj uslov vo prego-vorite, bidej}i zajaknatata konku-rencija e eden od mehanizmite zanamaluvawe na ekonomskite dis-krepanci pome|u dr‘avite ~lenkina EU i dr‘avata-kandidat. Logi-kata e: podobrenata konkurencijaimplicira ekonomski rast, podob-3 Case C-198/01 (Reference for a preliminary ruling from the

Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Lazio): ConsorzioIndustrie Fiammiferi (CIF) v Autorità Garante dellaConcorrenza e del Mercato [2003] E.C.R. I-0805. 4 COM (2006) 214 final, p. 86.


Politikata na konkurencija vo ramkite napregovorite za ~lenstvo vo Evropskata Unija

ren ‘ivoten standard i namalenanevrabotenost per se. Sepak, zadopolnitelna jasnost treba da senaglasi deka kapacitetot da sedemonstrira efektivna konku-rencija vklu~uva {irok spektar nafaktori, predmet na skenirawe nadrugi poglavja od pregovorite. Toase, me|u drugoto, makroekonomskatastabilnost, proporcijata na malitefirmi vo ekonomijata, stepenot natrgovska integracija, t.e. volumenoti prirodata na stokite trguvani soEU5 itn.

2. Dr‘avnata pomo{ kako delod pregovorite

ES i SSA se baziraat na poste-peno formirawe na slobodna trgov-ska zona.6 Dvata vida spogodbi givklu~uvaat odredbite od Dogovorotza EZ i, me|u drugoto, utvrduvaatdeka „koja bilo javna pomo{ {to janaru{uva ili se zakanuva da janaru{i konkurencijata preku favo-rizirawe odredeni pretprijatijaili odredeni proizvodi# e nekom-patibilna so pravilno funkci-onirawe na spogodbata.

Iako odredbite za dr‘avnapomo{ vo Dogovorot za EZ se konci-pirani za generalna zabrana nadr‘avnata pomo{,7 toa ne zna~ideka zaradi po~ituvawe na pravotona zaednicata, dr‘avata-kandidatne mo‘e da dodeluva finansiskapomo{ za privlekuvawe inves-titori ili za restrukturirawe na

nejzinata industrija. No, pritoadr‘avite treba da se vodat od logi-kata na op{t ekonomski razvoj i dagi prifatat pravilata za kompati-bilna i nekompatibilna pomo{ sozaedni~kiot pazar.

2.1 Nekompatibilna pomo{

Dodeluvaweto dr‘avni resursizaradi promovirawe na odredeniekonomski aktivnosti ili zaradiza{tita na nacionalnata indus-trija se definira kako dr‘avnapomo{. Za da bide taka kvali-fikuvana taa treba treba da imakarakter na pomo{ dodelena beznadomest i da stava na raspolagawesredstva koi vo normalni pazarniuslovi ne bi bile investirani iliobezbedeni od privatni inves-titori.

Ovoj koncept e jasno definiranvo ~len 87 (1) od EZ i e preslikanvo ES i SSA. Vakvata pomo{ sogolema verojatnost ja popre~uvakonkurencijata na zaedni~kiotpazar duri i koga se raboti zainterna praktika so efekt vo ednadr‘ava. Sepak, postoi prostor zavladini intervencii i vodewe naodredeni politiki definirani vo~len 87 (2), koi imaat za cel da gikorigiraat gre{kite na pazarot,kako i politiki koi se posvetenina razvojot na ekonomijata vo ce-lina.

2.2 Kompatibilna pomo{

Soglasno ~len 87 (2) od EZ,kompatibilna, me|u drugoto, e onaapomo{ koja ima socijalen karakteri onaa koja e nameneta za indi-vudualni potro{uva~i, a pritoa e

5 Vidi DG for Economic and Financial Affairs, Recital of allEnlargement Papers.

6 EC Report, State Aid Scoreboard, COM (2006) 130 final, 7.7 Mario Monti, Enforcement of Competition Policy – case for

the accession negotiations and for developing a realcompetition culture (Speech, 7th Annual CompetitionConference, Ljubljana, 2001) ,6.


Pen~o Kuzev

dodelena bez diskriminacija povr-zana so potekloto. Kon ovaa, glavno,dozvolena pomo{ pripa|a, istotaka, i pomo{ta koja mo‘e taka dabide deklarirana, a e nameneta dago promovira razvojot vo siroma{-nite regioni koi se soo~uvaat sonevrabotenost.

Vo ispolnuvaweto na uslovite ikriteriumite za dr‘avna pomo{ EKse obiduva da im predo~i na dr‘a-vite-kandidati soodvetno da gikoristat alatkite koi im stojat naraspolagawe i da izvr{at sood-vetna klasifikacija i prenaso-~uvawe na dr‘avnata pomo{ soglas-no so modelot na EZ. Taa klasifi-kacija vklu~uva horizontalna po-mo{ (za ekologija, mali i srednipretprijatija, istra‘uvawe i raz-voj, vrabotuvawe i obu~uvawe,prestrukturirawe), sektorska po-mo{ (na pr. transport, zemjodel-stvo, ribarstvo) i regionalna po-mo{ koja e osobeno zna~ajna zadr‘avata-kandidat so ogled dekaistata e primenliva vo oblastitekoi se soo~uvaat so visoka nevra-botenost, kade ‘ivotniot standarde abnormalno nizok i kade BDP po‘itel, meren vo kupovna mo}, epomalku od 75% od prosekot na EU.

So ogled deka cel na EU e pro-movirawe na balansiran razvoj,regionalnata pomo{ celi kon soz-davawe rabotni mesta i novi inves-ticii. Dr‘ava kako RM treba maksi-malno da gi upotrebi mo‘nostitekoi gi nudi regionalnata pomo{ ipreku edna legalna forma na sub-vencionirawe da pottikne razvoj naekonomijata vo najnerazvieniteoblasti. Pritoa, treba da se koris-tat upatstvata za regionalna po-

mo{8 na EK, koi treba da se vodilkaza pravilno aplicirawe na po-mo{ta. Imeno, upatstvata razli-kuvaat pomo{ za inicijalni inves-ticii i pomo{ za otvorawe rabotnimesta. Dodeluvaweto na pomo{ta eusloveno so odr‘uvawe na inves-ticiite i/ili rabotnite mesta zaperiod od minimum pet godini. Voodnos na vidot na pomo{ta, postojatpove}e varijanti: grantovi, povolnikrediti, vladini garancii, dano~niosloboduvawa, namaluvawa vo so-cijalnite pridonesi i sl.

3. Implementira~ki odredbiza dr‘avna pomo{

Odredbite za dr‘avna pomo{ vospogodbite za asocijacija se dopol-neti so odluki za implementacija.Tie ja utvrduvaat odgovornosta nadvete strani za monitoring na dr-‘avnata pomo{. Toa se EK, kakomonitoren organ na stranata na Za-ednicata, i kompetitivnite vlastivo dr‘avata-kandidat. Vo pogled natolkuvaweto na konceptot "javnapomo{#, odlukite za implementacijapovikuvaat na primena na krite-riumite koi va‘at za ~len 87 od EZ.

Zaradi vospostavuvawe transpa-rentnost i pravna sigurnost za dr-‘avnata pomo{ koja }e bide "impor-tirana# so vlezot na dr‘avata voEU, va‘na e diferencijacijatapome|u "postoe~ka# i "nova# pomo{.Ova e dotolku pobitno zaradikonkretizirawe na pristapnitedogovori, od pri~ina {to postoe~-kata pomo{ pretstavuva nivenintegralen del.

8 O.J C 074, 10/03/1998 P. 0009-0018.



3.1 Postoe~ka versus novapomo{

Su{tinata vo razlikuvaweto napostoe~kata od novata pomo{ e vopravnata sigurnost i istra‘napostapka od strana na EK poslepriemot. Site merki koi steknalestatus na postoe~ka pomo{ vo pret-pristapniot period ili vo interimpostapkata imaat za{tita poslepriemot. Eventualna merka na EKmo‘e da se odnesuva samo za voidnina, no ne postoi rizik ododluka za povratok na celokupnataprimena pomo{ i kaznena kamata zaizminatiot period.

Imaj}i predvid deka sekojadr‘avna pomo{ mora prvo da bideodobrena od nacionalnite vlasti,a potoa i od EK, s¢ drugo {to e vosprotivnost so ovaa procedura,prvo, }e se smeta za prekr{uvawena dogovorot za asocijacija i, vtoro,}e ima tretman na nova pomo{ poslepriemot.9 Implikacija od nepri-dr‘uvawe do procedurata soglasno~len 88 (1) od EZ, prvo, da se odobripa da se implementira nekoja mer-ka, e deka, vo momentot na priem voEU, novata dr‘ava ~lenka mora daprekine so dodeluvaweto na bilokakva dr‘avna pomo{ koja vo peri-odot pred priemot ne dobila statusna postoe~ka pomo{ i, vtoro, dokol-ku saka da prodol‘i so istata, daja notificira i da go ~eka odgo-vorot na EK.

Vo toj poled, kako primer bimo‘elo da se navede odlukata naEK posle notifikacija od strana na

konkurentskite vlasti na Latvija.Notifikacijata se odnesuva naperiod 2001 do 2003, odnosno naperiodot pred priemot na Latvijavo EU.10 Latvija pobara odobruvawena dodeluvawe na kompenzacionapomo{ za {teta koja ima svoja os-nova vo odluka na arbitra‘a voStokholm od 19 juni 2003 godina.Latviskite vlasti odbile da japlatat {tetata so argumentacijadeka ne smeat da go storat toa s¢dodeka Evropskata komisija ne jaoceni merkata za dozvolena i deka,vo sprotivno, toa bi zna~elo kr{e-we na ~len 87 od EZ.

Arbitra‘nata odluka protivLatvija e donesena kako rezultat naonevozmo‘uvawe od strana na dr-‘aven regulator na privatna kompa-nija da ostvari razumen profit ida ja poka~i cenata na gasot zadoma}instvata kako reakcija naporast na cenata na svetskiotpazar, poradi {to privatnata kom-panija pretrpela {teti. Soglasnoarbitra‘ata, Latvija ima pravo dagi regulira cenite, no vo slu~aj kogakompanijata ne mo‘ela da ostvarirazumen profit, toga{ taa e dol‘nada gi kompenzira zagubite. Sporedtoa, dokolku Vladata na Latvijasakala da go namali cenovniot {okza gra|anite, taa mo‘ela da dogo-vori finansiska pomo{, no samotolku za kompanijata da ostvarisamo razumen profit. Ponatamu,Latvija trebalo da notificira pos-toe~ka pomo{ vedna{ posle odlu-kata na arbitra‘ata, t.e. 19 juni2003 godina. Na ovoj na~in, kom-penzacionata pomo{ bi prodol‘ila

9 Monti Mario, Competition Policy in the candidate countries– the accession negotiations and beyond (8th AnnualCompetition Conference between the Candidate Countriesand the European Commission, speech/02/287, Vilnius,2002), 4.

10 N380/2004 Decision by the Commission, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_Aid/decisions/n380_2004/en.pdf.


Pen~o Kuzev

i posle priemot na Latvija vo EU ibi bila predmet samo na eventualnimodifikacii vo idnina.

Otuka proizleguva konstatacija-ta deka EK ne bi se sprotivstavilana takov vid pomo{ vo period predstanuvawe ~lenka na EU i pomo{tabi dobila status na postoe~kapomo{ posle priemot na Latvija voEU. Komisijata ne bi se sprotiv-stavila na politikata na vladatabidej}i pomo{ta e legalna, so ogleddeka poentata na zabrana na dr‘av-nata pomo{ e da se spre~i distor-zija na konkurencijata i da se osi-gura deka konkurencijata e fer.Vpro~em, latviskiot regulator gopopre~uval slobodniot pazar i ra-zumniot profit, pa dokolku vlas-tite obezbedat kompenzacija so toane ja popre~uvaat konkurencijata,tuku osiguruvaat deka regulatorotne gi popre~uva konkurencijata i ra-zumniot profit.

4. Analiza na uslovite ipregovorite

Imaj}i predvid deka spogodbiteza asocijacija se od dogovornapriroda, do momentot na priemotdvete strani ostanuvaat nezavisniedna od druga. Zna~i, ovie spogodbisozdavaat, pred s¢ de facto otkolkude jure, obvrski.11 No, dokolkukrajnata cel e ~lenstvo vo EU, to-ga{, prezemenite obvrski treba dase tolkuvaat kako vo Belata kniga12

pri pettiot bran na pro{iruvawe-

to, t.e., da se sfatat seriozno i voduhot na pravnata tradicija na EU.

Evidentno e od izve{taite naKomisijata deka dr‘avite polesnose spravuvaat so obvrskite vooblasta na kartelite, a pote{ko vooblasta na dr‘avnata pomo{. Pri-toa, dva problemi se o~igledni:prviot, dr‘avnata pomo{ namenetaza privlekuvawe stranski inves-ticiii i, vtoriot, dr‘avnata pomo{nameneta za akutnite sektori.Primer za prviot problem bi mo‘e-la da bide Polska, vo toga{niotpregovara~ki proces. Imeno, pol-skata vlada pobara preoden perioddo 2017 godina za biznisite vo t.n.specijalni ekonomski zoni. Toa esigurno dobar na~in za privle-kuvawe investitori vo pred-pris-tapniot period, no toa vo nikoj slu-~aj ne mo‘e da se vr{i preku nekom-patibilna fiskalna pomo{, kako napr. tax breaks, tax holidays, tax creditsi sl. Vtoriot o~igleden problemima pozadina vo mentalitot naporane{nite centralno-planskiekonomii vo Isto~na Evropa. Taka,obiduvaj}i se da gi odr‘at proble-mati~nite industriski granki na-mesto da gi restrukturiraat, dr‘a-vite-kandidati upotrebuvaat nedo-zvoliva finansiska pomo{, naj~es-to vo forma na tolerirawe nanepla}awe na dava~kite kon dr‘a-vata ili preku garantirawe na pla-tite.

Zaradi ovie i sli~ni problemi,^e{ka i Polska pobaraa fleksi-bilnost vo pregovorite, a kakoargumentacija ja upotrebija finan-siskata pomo{ za Isto~na Germa-nija po nejzinoto obedinuvawe.Sepak, treba da e jasno deka dr‘av-

11Estrin Saul/Holmes Peter, Competition and EconomicIntegration in Europe (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.,Northampton, 1998), 6-7.

12COM (1995) 163 final.



niot intervencionizam mo‘e dabide samo isklu~ok i predmet nastroga kontrola za negovata efi-kasnost. Vo pazarno orientiraniteop{testva, takviot intervencioni-zam e transparenten, limitiran vovreme i opseg i predmet na verifi-kacija na negovoto vlijanie. Imaj}igo predvid ova, treba da se znaedeka dr‘avnata pomo{ ne mo‘e dase prifati kako mehanizam zapoddr{ka na permanentnite zagu-bari i kako sredstvo za odr‘uvawena socijalniot mir.

Namesto zaklu~ok

Patot do ~lenstvo vo EU pret-postavuva ispolnuvawe na Kopenha-gen{kite kriteriumi, me|u drugoto,i vo oblasta na ekonomijata. Toa eosnovata na pregovorite vo oblastana konkurencijata koi treba dazavr{at so zaklu~ok deka dr‘a-vata-kandidat ima funkcionalnapazarna ekonomija i ima kapacitetda se spravi so pritisokot nakonkurencijata i pazarnite sili voramkite na Unijata. Pregovorite za~lenstvo imaat za cel da se defi-niraat uslovite pod koi dr‘avata}e £ se priklu~i na EU. Ne treba dase zaboravi deka pregovara~kiotproces ne e vo duhot na iznao|awekompromisi, tuku barawe prifat-liva vremenska ramka za imple-mentacija na soodvetniot acquis.Pregovara~kata pozicija na dr‘a-vata-kandidat mora, od edna stra-na, da gi opi{e aktuelnata legisla-tiva i strukturata na raspolagaweza nejzino implementirawe, a, oddruga strana, da pretstavuva objek-tivna proekcija za promenite koi }esledat. Barawata za eventualni

preodni merki moraat da bidatrezonirani so evropska interpre-tacija na faktite, a onamu kade emo‘no da se koristat izvinuvawaopravdani so dogovorni obvrskisprema investitori (t.n. acquiredrights), no so prifatlivo vremetrawe.

Vo odnos na poglavjeto za poli-tikata na konkurencija, prego-vara~kata pozicija treba da bidemaksimalisti~ka, no da se imaatpredvid vrmenskite limiti zapreodnite fazi od pettiot bran napro{iruvawe.13 Sekoja dr‘ava, bezogled na politi~kata retorika,treba da ima realisti~na proekcijaza eventualniot datum za vlez voEU. Imaj}i go predvid ova, treba isoodvetno da se deluva. Toa zna~i,deka, za privlekuvawe stranskiinvestitori treba da se upotrebicelokupnata dr‘avna pomo{ zapodobruvawe na finansiskataslika na dr‘avata pred otpo~-nuvawe na pregovorite. Vo odnos navidot i dol‘inata na koncesiitekoi se davaat na investitorite,prvo, dr‘avata treba da go imapredvid eventualniot datum naotpo~nuvawe na pregovorite i,vtoro, eventualniot datum na vlezvo EU.

Startot na pregovorite mora dabide propraten so pro-aktivnimerki koi }e ja doka‘at determini-ranosta na stranata na nacional-nite vlasti zadol‘eni za konkuren-cijata. Toa zna~i zajaknata kulturana konkurencijata, efikasna sank-ciona politika i zapirawe na ne-dozvolivata dr‘avna pomo{ zaidni dogovori. Trkata po investi-tori i vleguvaweto vo dogovori za

13 Najmnogu do 10 godini.


Pen~o Kuzev

nedozvoliva fiskalna pomo{ zavreme na pregovorite, go usporuvatempoto i nivniot progres. EU nanitu eden na~in ne garantira dekavetenata i dodelenata pomo{ }eprodol‘i i po priemot na zemjata.Naprotiv, EU potsetuva na odred-bite za vra}awe so kamata na kakvabilo nedozvoleno dodelena pomo{.Koga bi se pojavile takvi problemi,postojat dve opcii. Prvo, dr‘avatamo‘e da pobara tranzitoren periodza razumen period, {to posle pri-emot vo EU e te{ko zamislivo, ili,vtoro, }e mora da gi napu{ti nedo-zvolivite praktiki i da pla}a kom-penzacii za prekr{enite kontrak-torni obvrski. Isto taka, inves-titorite }e treba soodvetno da jacenat atraktivnosta na dr‘avnatapomo{ vo smisla na nejzinata legal-nost i da ja imaat predvid verojat-nosta na reakcijata na Komisijatapo vlezot na zemjata vo EU.14

Trite sub-acquis vo oblasta napolitikata na konkurencija (sood-

vetna legislativa za anti-trustovozakonodavstvo i dr‘avna pomo{;funkcionalen i efikasen adminis-trativen kapacitet; i konkreten ikredibilen registar) se precizni ine ostavaat mnogu prostor vo prego-vorite. Toa zna~i deka konse-kventnata upotreba na konkurent-skite pravila na EZ kon pret-prijatijata i efektivnata kontrolana dr‘avnata pomo{ se preduslovza uspe{no vodewe na pregovorite.Vo toj pogled, posebno vnimenietreba da se obrne na zatajuvawetona danocite i socijalnite pri-donesi, kako na pr. vo RM, {to ne eni{to drugo osven nedozvolivadr‘avna pomo{ koja ja naru{uvakonkurencijata vo dr‘avata. Istotose odnesuva i vo odnos na trkata ponovi investicii i idejata za dava-weto odredeni povolnosti za stran-skite vo odnos na doma{nite inves-titori, a, so samoto toa, stavawe narazni delovni subjekti vo need-nakva polo‘ba.

Klu~ni zborovi: konkurencija, dr‘avnapomo{, pregovori.

This paper is focused on the elaboration of the Chapter Competition Policyfollowing the experiences from the former Accession Negotiations with theEuropean Union. The author gives an exhaustive and documented report onthe place of the competition policy in the Accession Negotiations. This is ahighly complex issue, concerned with competition policy in the traditionalsense, i.e., fighting restraints of competition by undertakings and state aidwhich may distort competition in the internal market. A significant part of thepaper is dedicated to the state aid control policies, its monitoring and possibleexemption which are defined and developed by the author.

Abstract

14 EU accession series: EU state Aid law (Hungary) (Issue 1,Squire Sanders, October, 2003), 6.


19 Milioni evra evropska pomo{ za razvojna makedonskoto zemjodelstvoPatot kon EU vodi i preku razvoj naruralnite sredini

Mitko Jovanov

Voved

Po dobivaweto na statusot kan-didat za ~lenstvo vo EvropskataUnija (EU), na Makedonija od ovaagodina £ stojat na raspolagawe 19milioni evra evropska pomo{ zarazvoj na zemjodelstvoto. Evrop-skata pomo{ za razvoj na makedon-skoto zemjodelstvo e petatta kompo-nenta ili, pokonkretno, IPARDprogramata od pretpristapnitefondovi na EU koi Makedonijatreba da gi iskoristi vo slednitegodini vo koi treba da se podgotviza polnopravno ~lenstvo vo EU.IPARD programata pretstavuvaprodol‘uvawe na instrumentotSAPARD koj se koriste{e predvoveduvaweto na fondovite IPA.Fondovite SAPARD gi koristeadeset zemji do krajot na minatatagodina. Site zemji korisnici naSAPARD fondovite do po~etokotna 2007 godina stanaa ~lenki naEvropskata Unija (EU), osven Hrvat-ska. Komponentata IPARD od pret-pristapnite fondovi na EU vo mo-mentot ja koristat Makedonija, Hr-vatska i Turcija.

Pettata komponenta od pretpri-stapnite fondovi na EvropskataUnija, odnosno programata IPARD,

e nameneta za razvoj na ruralnitesredini na dr‘avite-kandidatki za~lenstvo vo EU. Krajna cel na ovaaprograma e da go podgotvi zemjo-delskiot sektor za pristapuvawena zemjata vo EU. Toa podrazbiranadgradba na farmite i pretprija-tijata za hrana do stepen koj }e gizadovoli standardite na EU za ‘i-votna sredina, higiena, bezbednostna hranata i blagosostojba na ‘i-votnite.

Uspe{noto sproveduvawe naIPARD programata treba da rezul-tira so ekonomski razvoj na rural-nite sredini vo zemjata. IPARDprogramata pokriva 50 otsto od in-vesticijata vo zemjodelskiot sek-tor, a ostanatiot del go finansirakorisnikot na pomo{ta. Od 50 otsto{to gi pokriva IPARD programata,75 otsto se sredstva na EU a 25 ot-sto na dr‘avata-kandidat za polno-pravno ~lenstvo EU.

Na Makedonija £ stojat na raspo-lagawe vkupno 19 milioni evra odEU za ruralen razvoj, odnosno tolkupari se predvideni vo IPARDprogramata, koi treba da bidat is-koristeni po~nuvaj}i od ovaa go-dina do 2009 godina. Parite za ovaagodina vo iznos od 2.1 milioni evra,Makedonija nema da mo‘e da gi

Ma

ke

do

ni

jai

EU


Mitko Jovanov

povle~e bidej}i institucionalnos¢ u{te ne e podgotvena da gi ispol-ni uslovite na EU. Sepak, sporedregulativite na EU, ovoj podatok nemora da bide porazitelen, zatoa{to parite predvideni za godinava}e mo‘at da se koristat vo nared-nite godini koga se o~ekuva Make-donija da bide podgotvena da jakoristi evropskata pomo{ za rura-len razvoj.

Podgotovki na Makedonijaza koristewe na IPARDprogramata

Koristeweto na sredstvata odIPARD }e se odviva preku plate‘-nata agencija {to ja formira Minis-terstvoto za zemjodelstvo, vodosto-panstvo i {umarstvo. Agencijata s¢u{te ja ~eka akreditacijata predorganite na EU vo Brisel. Sporedodgovornite vo Ministerstvoto koirabotat na ovaa problematika,nejzinoto oficijalizirawe prednadle‘nite organi na EU se o~ekuvada bide zavr{eno najkasno do mart2008 godina. Preduslov za ovaaakreditacija e utvrduvawe na va‘-ni sektori vo zemjodelstvoto iruralniot razvoj kade {to }e selocira finansiskata pomo{, sokonkretizirawe na celite prekuizrabotka na programite za pod-dr{ka. Vladata gi opredeli ipredlo‘i sektorite za poddr{ka,tie se ovo{tarstvoto, gradinar-stvoto, lozarstvoto i vinarstvoto,proizvodstvoto i prerabotkata namleko i proizvodstvoto i prera-botkata na meso. Odlukata za naso-~uvawe na sredstvata od IPARD vo

navedenite sektori e donesena vrzosnova na brojni ekspertski ana-lizi koi poka‘ale deka stepenot narazvoj na ovie zemjodelski grankie najgolem i vo niv imame najmnoguprednosti.

Plate‘nata agencija }e upra-vuva so sredstvata od IPARD. Odisklu~itelno zna~ewe za uspe{noi navremeno iskoristuvawe naevropskite pari za ruralen razvoje izgotvuvaweto kvalitetna pro-grama, preduslov za toa e agencijatada bide rakovodena od iskusen iprofesionalen menaxment. Vo taanasoka e potrebno postavuvawe navisoki krietriumi koi treba da giispolnuvaat menaxerite koi }ebidat anga‘irani. Soodvetno obra-zovanie, po mo‘nost magistri ilidoktoranti, pove}egodi{no iskus-tvo na rabota na proekti, dobropoznavawe na legislativata na EU,poseduvawe analiti~ki i organiza-ciski sposobnosti, se del od krite-riumite koi treba da gi ispol-nuvaat licata koi }e rabotat voplate‘nata agencija. Za realiza-cijata na proekti od IPARD progra-mata, potrebno e da se postavatproceduri i obu~at lu|e koi }e gosledat nivnoto implementirawe nateren. Ova e od golemo zna~ewezatoa {to izve{taite {to }e bidatizgotveni od evropskite monitoringkomisii za toa kako se koristievropskata pomo{ }e vlijaat naocenkite za dobli‘uvaweto nazemjata kon EU i odobruvaweto nanovi sredstva za ponatamo{enrazvoj vo pravec na ispolnuvawe naevropskite standardi.


Patot kon EU vodi i preku razvoj na ruralnite sredini

Prednosti i slabosti naMakedonija vo koristewetona IPARD fondovite

Spored analizite napraveni oddoma{ni i stranski eksperti (GTZ,SIDA, KARDS), silna strana naMakedonija se visokiot procent nanezagadena obrabotliva po~va,solidnite prirodni resursi, viso-kiot stepen na u~estvo na zemjo-delstvoto vo formiraweto na brutonacionalniot prihod (BNP) i poten-cijalot {to go poseduva zemjata zarazvoj na "selskiot turizam#. Sla-bostite se identifikuvani vo nedo-volnata organiziranost i koordi-niranost na zemjodelcite, nemo-tiviranosta za primena na novitehnologii vo procesot na proiz-vodstvo, potoa, niskite ceni na pro-izvodite i nedoverbata vo dr`av-nite institucii.

Dogovorot za stabilizacija iasocijacija i ~lenstvoto vo Svet-skata trgovska organizacija ovozmo-‘uvaat izvoz na makedonskite pro-izvodi vo EU i po{iroko. No, mo‘-nostite {to gi davaat Dogovorot zastabilizacija i asocijacija i ~len-stvoto vo STO ne se od golema polzaza makedonskoto zemjodelstvo, bi-dej}i toa se karakterizira so slabakonkurentnost na makedonskiteproizvodi na stranskite pazari, noi na doma{niot pazar, poradi sil-nata konkurencija na zemjodelskiproizvodi od stranstvo. Za uspe{nonadminuvawe na ovie problemi,iskoristuvaweto na sredstvata odIPARD treba da ovozmo‘i vlez nanovi tehnologii, znaewe i iskustvaod EU vo makedonskoto zemjodel-stvo.

Komparativnite analizi poka-‘uvaat deka Makedonija ima pred-nosti za razvoj na zemjodelstvoto vosporedba so dr‘avite vo regionot,{to se osnova za uspe{no koris-tewe na evropskata pomo{.

Najzna~ajni od niv se:- 80 otsto od teritorijata na dr-

‘avata e ruralna,- 50 otsto od teritorijata na dr‘a-

vata se vodi kako zemjodelskiobrabotliva zemja,

- 18 otsto od vkupnoto rabotospo-sobno naselenie e vraboteno vozemjodelstvoto,

- prihodot od zemjodelstvoto etret po visina,

- udelot vo BNP e nepromenet voperiodot na tranzicija, {to nee slu~aj so drugite dr‘avi odregionot,

- dobrata mestopolo‘ba na Make-donija i nejzinata dobra soobra-}ajna povrzanost so zemjite naEU, {to e va‘en preduslov zanavremena razmena na zemjo-delski proizvodi.

Predizvici so koi }e sesoo~at makedonskite farmerivo koristeweto na sredstvaod IPARD programata

Spored iskustvata na drugitedr‘avi korisnici na evropskapomo{ za ruralen razvoj, se o~ekuvaMakedonija da se soo~i so najgolemiproblemi vo obezbeduvawe na kom-pletna dokumentacija za apli-cirawe od strana na zemjodelcitei menaxerite na farmi. Vo Minis-terstvoto za zemjodelstvo, {umar-stvo i vodostopanstvo vo tek e izra-botka na Pravilnik za realizacija


Mitko Jovanov

na proekti od programata IPARD,koj }e bide izraboten vo soglasnostso Nacionalniot plan za ruralenrazvoj. So Pravilnikot }e se pre-ciziraat uslovite koi treba podno-sitelite na proektite da gi ispol-nat za da apliciraat za nivno fi-nansirawe od IPARD programata.

Za sporedba, so Pravilnikot zaprogramata SAPARD od Hrvatska enavedeno deka korisnicite nainvesticii vo zemjodelskite sto-panstva treba da bidat zapi{ani voRegistarot na zemjodelski sto-panstva, da se registrirani za da-nok na dodatna vrednost i da giimaat podmireno site obvrski kondr‘avata.

Vo Makedonija postojat Zakon zavr{ewe zemjodelska dejnost, so kojse ureduvaat uslovite za na~inot zavr{ewe zemjodelska dejnost, iZakon za zemjodelsko zemji{te sokoj se ureduva koristeweto, raspo-lagaweto i za{titata na zemjo-delskoto zemji{te. I pokraj done-senata zakonska regulativa, voMakedonija mnogu mal broj zemjo-delci i zemjodelski stopanstva giimaat registrirano farmite spo-red soodvetnite zakoni od oblastana vr{ewe na zemjodelska dejnost.Poradi vakvata sostojba tie nepretstavuvaat praven subjekt koj }ebide identifikuvan i finansiskipoddr‘an od IPARD programata,bidej}i ne postoi dokument so koj}e se doka‘e negovoto postoewe.

Vakvata situacija }e rezultiraso toa {to golem del od primarnitezemjodelski proizvoditeli, vopo~etniot period za prijavuvawe zakoristewe finansiska pomo{, nemada gi ispolnat osnovnite krite-riumi.

Drug problem so koj }e se soo~atmakedonskite farmeri za apli-cirawe na finansiska pomo{, eobezbeduvawe dozvoli za gradba nafarmite i nezavedenoto zemji{tevo Katastarot. Fakti~kata sostojbae deka mnogu mal del od subjektitevo zemjodelstvoto mo‘at da prilo-‘at grade‘ni dozvoli za objektitena farmite i imoten list za zemjo-delskoto zemji{te.

Makedonija donese Zakon zaidentifikacija i registracija na‘ivotnite, ~ija cel e pratewe nabrojnata i zdravstvenata sostojbana ‘ivotnite, no obele‘uvaweto na‘ivotnite i odgleduvali{tata edelumno. Odnosno, dosega obele-‘ani se samo govedata i odgle-duvali{tata na govedata. Odgo-vornosta za vakvata sostojba trebada se locira vo dr‘avata, odnosnoVeterinarnata uprava e taa kojatreba da go sprovede Zakonot.

Za odobruvawe finansiska po-mo{ od IPARD fondovite, farme-rite pred nadle‘nite vo Plate‘-nata agencija treba da prilo‘at ifinansiska dokumentacija za rabo-tata na farmata vo izminatitegodini, koi }e bidat pokazateli zaodr‘livosta na proizvodstvoto.Vakva dokumentacija poseduvaatsamo zemjodelcite koi bile koris-nici na krediti od IFAD kredit-nata linija, poseduvaat finansiskadokumentacija za nabavka na opremai osnovni sredstva na farmite.

Najgolem problem pred koj }ebidat ispraveni makedonskitefarmeri e obezbeduvaweto sred-stva za pokrivawe na investicijata,za podocna da im bidat vrateni 50otsto od vrednosta na investi-cijata. Problemot se pojavuva pora-


Patot kon EU vodi i preku razvoj na ruralnite sredini

di slabata kreditna sposobnost nazemjodelcite, od koi mal del mo‘atda gi ispolnat uslovite postaveniod bankite za dobivawe krediti.Iskustvoto od Bugarija zboruvadeka merkata na ovaa dr‘ava da imizleze vo presret na zemjodelciteso izdvojuvawe 60 milioni evra odnacionalniot buxet za kreditira-we na farmerite, ja stopiralaEvropskata komisija koja konsta-tirala deka merkata pretstavuvadr‘avno subvencionirawe i bugar-skata Vlada bila prinudena da sepovle~e. Litvanija formiraladr‘aven garanten fond preku kojzemjodelcite bile kreditirani zakoristewe na evropskata pomo{ zarazvoj na zemjodelstvoto. No, vo ovojslu~aj, Evropskata komisija nereagirala iako i ovaa merka naVladata na Litvanija ima elementina dr‘aven subvencionizam. Glav-nite kritiki na smetka na Evrop-skata komisija za programata zaruralen razvoj e tokmu za toa {toBrisel ne izleze so predlog zanadminuvawe na ovoj problem so kojse soo~uvaat zemjodelcite prikoristeweto na evropskata pomo{vo dr‘avite-kandidatki za vlez voEU. Odgovorot na Evropskata komi-sija e deka ekonomski neodr‘li-vite farmi nema da bidat opfateniso programite. Vakvata situacijanegativno vlijae vrz procesot narekonstruirawe na zemjodelskiotsektor vo dr‘avite-kandidati zavlez vo EU.

O~ekuvawa od IPARDprogramata

Makedonskoto zemjodelstvo de-neska e daleku pod standardite koi

gi odobruva Evropskata Unija. Tok-mu celta na IPARD fondovite e vozemjava da vlezat evropskite isvetskite tehnologii vo oblasta nazemjodelstvoto i primenuvawe napravilata {to va‘at vo EU. Make-donskite zemjodelci nema da bidatkorisnici samo na parite tuku i nastru~nosta, znaewata, a o~ekuvawa-ta se podobruvawe na nivniot ‘i-voten standard.

Sredstvata od IPARD treba daovozmo‘at visok kvalitet i niskacena na zemjodelskite proizvodi so{to }e se ovozmo‘i nivna konku-rentnost na stranskite pazari. Sopotpi{nata Spogodba za stabili-zacija i asocijacija, na Makedonija£ e ovozmo‘en izvoz na zemjodelskiproizvodi vo EU. Vo momentotMakedonija izvezuva 50 otsto odzemjodelskoto proizvodstvo vo EU,no so iskoristuvaweto na sredstva-ta od IPARD programata, se o~ekuvanegovo zgolemuvawe kako po pro-cent taka i po koli~ini, no samo akose proizveduvaat proizvodi {to giispolnuvaat evropskite standradi.Preku IPARD fondovite }e senastojuva da se podobri kvalitetotna odredeni proizvodi, pred s¢mlekoto, mle~nite proizvodi, meso-to i proizvodite od meso.

Kako rezultat na uspe{notoiskoristuvawe na programite zaruralen razvoj od dr‘avite koi £pristapija na EU, se javil trend napridvi‘uvawe na naselenieto odgradovite kon ruralnite sredini,poradi toa {to uslovite za egzis-tencija vo gradovite se iscrpuvala.

O~ekuvawata od koristeweto naIPARD fondovite se razvoj naruralnite sredini, a toa podraz-bira otvorawe novi rabotni mesta.


Mitko Jovanov

IPARD fondovite }e gopodobrat kvalitetot na‘iveewe na gra|anitevo Makedonija

Pridobivki od uspe{noto isko-ristuvawe na parite od IPARDprogramata, pokraj farmerite zakoi se i nameneti, }e imaat i pos-toe~kite institucii koi }e bidatvklu~eni vo nivnoto realizirawe,kako i instituciite koi }e bidatformirani za taa cel.

Od postoe~kite institucii ko-rist od IPARD fondovite }e imaatMinisterstvoto za zemjodelstvo,vodostopanstvo i {umarstvo, Mi-nisterstvoto za ‘ivotna sredina,Veterinarnata uprava, Plate‘nataagencija formirana za da bidenositel na ovaa evropska pomo{.Korist }e imaat i zdru‘enijata nagra|ani i asocijacii koi deluvaat

vo sferata koja ja pokriva IPARDprogramata kako, na primer, Fede-racijata na farmeri na RepublikaMakedonija, Asocijacijata na mle-koproizvoditeli i taka natamu.

Pridobivka od iskoristuvawetona evropskite pari od IPARD pro-gramata }e imaat i del od doma{-nite konsultantski ku}i koi }edavaat uslugi na farmerite.

Od golemo zna~ewe IPARD fon-dovite }e bidat i za razvoj na ru-ralnite op{tini vo koi se o~ekuvada niknat pravni subjekti koi }e sezanimavaat so zemjodelska dejnost{to }e rezultira so namaluvawe nanevrabotenosta.

Na indirekten na~in korisnici odIPARD fondovite }e bidat site‘iteli na dr‘avata koi te‘neat daim se zgolemi kavlitetot na ‘iveewe.

The Republic of Macedonia as a candidate country for membership in theEU has at its disposal 19 million EUR of European assistance for restructuringthe agricultural sector in accordance with the European standards in thefollowing five years. Whether the Republic of Macedonia is going to use thesefunds from the pre-accession funds of the EU i.e., IPARD programme, dependson whether the state institutions will fulfill conditions set by the EuropeanCommission. The utilization of the funds will also depend on the participants inthis area, and whether the farmers will work in accordance with the statelegislation developed according to the EU requirements.

Although 2.1 million EUR are available for Macedonian agriculture for thisyear, still they are not going to be used immediately, due to the fact that theAgency established by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Supplywhich is to implement the IPARD programme has still not been accredited bythe European institutions in Brussels.

The road to the European funds is long and difficult. It is especially difficultfor the individuals and organizations from the rural areas to get prepared tofulfill the conditions for the utilization of the European assistance. The stateand every individual are facing great responsibility in restructuring theagricultural sector in compliance with the European requirements.

Abstract

Klu~ni zborovi: ruralen razvoj, pretpri-stapni fondovi, IPARD, evropska pomo{.


Economic Development through PolicyDecisions, Incentives and Clusters

Aleksandra Davitkovska

Introduction

In todayís global economy, everymetropolitan region and communitymust compete both with its neighborsand the rest of the world. What is im-portant is that every region must inno-vate and adapt to the changing envi-ronment. Innovation and adaptation tothe today's changing environment canbe seen through promotion of economicdevelopment. Sustainable economicdevelopment could be achieved by theconstantly growing quantity and qualityof life through innovation and adapta-tion. Is it that all levels of governmentsneed to foster economic developmentin their jurisdictions or is it the privatesectorís responsibility to engage in eco-nomic development? Public and privatesectors both have to be part of eco-nomic development. They must be in-terrelated and well-organized in orderto promote increased growth.

Economic development in tomorrowísglobal marketplace is everybodyís jobñ the education system, regulatoryagencies, banks, investors, laboratoriesand utilities. Because everybody is af-fected by economic development andincreased globalization, everybody ispart of it. Political and geographicboundaries are losing relevancy; virtu-ally every product or service developedtoday is for the worldwide market. Com-peting worldwide, now more than ever,

requires regional collaboration amongindustries, cities, counties, states, andthe federal government. In addition, allstakeholders need to identify theirshared interests and take advantage ofregional assets. In order to foster eco-nomic viability, high employment rates,and increased productivity, the eco-nomic development policies and pro-grams need evaluation in terms of theireffectiveness and efficiency. Therefore,reforms need design that will encour-age less effective economic develop-ment policies to be dropped and sociallybeneficial policies to be kept (Bartik,1994).

Regions and communities mustcompete. Competition requires a con-tinuously changing environment to beanticipated. Even though Americancommunities are still relying on pro-grammatic approaches to development,they must start to foresee the changes(Gollub, 2004). New ways of doing eco-nomic development need establish-ment, which require continuous en-gagement and increasingly growingaspects to be considered. Current eco-nomic development needs to expandbeyond traditional efforts that focus onspecific programs or company creation,business retention or sector attraction,to what is known as cluster develop-ment (Gollub, 2004). The author statesthat, ìa continuous engagement of allstakeholders in a process of learningand innovating their service deliveryî is

Te

or

ija



a key for cluster developmentthat willpromote the relevant changes to a high-performing economy (Gollub, 2004).

Our research examines two modelsfor promoting economic development.It introduces the process of shifting gov-ernment responsibilities from traditionalto the new cluster development ap-proach.

Cluster Development Approach

What Is a Cluster?

The process of globalization, com-petition, and changing environment isnot something new. It is influencing thequality of life and requires attention fromall communities. Traditional roles of lo-cation are no longer important, becauseit is no longer necessary to locate nearlarge markets in order to be effectiveand successful (Porter, 1995). Com-petitive advantages lie outside compa-nies, and location of the company hasrelative importance. Therefore, clusterdevelopment needs to be understoodin terms of the local competitiveness inthe global economy.

Clusters are geographic concentra-tions of interrelated companies in a par-ticular field that compete, but also co-operate (Porter, 2004). New ways ofthinking about competition, strategy,management and efficiency are estab-lished, and continuous improvement,learning and changing is what the ba-sis of the cluster development be-comes. This also means that new rolesof government at the federal, state, andlocal level must be created (Porter,2004). While some ideas underline thatthe importance of clusters has dimin-ished with the process of globalization,others focus on the leading role new

influences of clusters have taken oncompetition (Porter, 2004).

Drawing cluster boundaries is oftentoo hard to achieve. It involves a pro-cess that will understand the linkagesand complementarities across indus-tries and institutions. The strength of thespillovers and the importance of produc-tivity and innovation often are the ulti-mate boundary-determining factors(Porter, 2004). Sometimes clusters aredefined too generally, if they are aggre-gates such as manufacturing, services,consumer goods, or ìhigh techî. If clus-ters are defined only around one singleindustry, they will miss the critical im-portance of the interconnections and re-lations with other industries in the clus-ters. However, regulatory changescould also contribute to shifting clustersíboundaries (Porter, 2004).

Cluster Theory

“Industries tend to cluster in distinctgeographic districts,with individual cities specializing inproduction of narrowly related set ofgoods”

Alfred Marshall

Clusters have long been part of eco-nomic development. Concentration ofindustries within particular geographiclandscapes, which results in taking ad-vantages of regional location, date backat least to Marshallís arguments in ThePrinciples of Economics. The heart ofMarshallís analysis concerns the waythat industrial localization has collective,systemic properties that fall somewhatbetween market and firm (Marshall,1890). The basic assumption is that, asthe ìmeans of communicationî be-comes more and more cheap, the ac-


Economic Development through Policy Decisions, Incentives and Clusters

tion that drives industries to localizetogether is decreasing. That is why clus-ters are held together. On the otherhand, other forces might appear that willcontinuously bring together industriesto cluster. Although ìdisagglomerationîis unquestionably an industrial realitythat is currently existing, in some indus-tries and regions, remarkable cheapen-ing does not appear to have consider-ably altered ìthe action of the forcesîthat keep competitors geographicallylocal (Marshall, 1890). For example,even if Silicon Valley has cheapenedthe ìmeans of communicationî and en-hanced its capacity to disaggregate, theìforces that tend to localize industriesîhad paradoxically only intensified(Marshall, 1916). Therefore, we couldsay that opposite aspects and incon-sistent opinions need to be taken intoconsideration with respect to clusterdevelopment.

The two critical questions at theback of the theory are: (1) why, despiteall predictions and the development ofadvanced communication technologies,does localization remain important, and(2) where, given the significant forcesof disagglomeration, could the localiza-tion process continue to exist? The chal-lenge of moving knowledge must be firstunderstood; that will help in the expla-nation of the structure of the compa-nies. Simply by understanding the com-plexity of moving knowledge, the chal-lenge of innovation and the contributionof the company to the innovative pro-cess could be known and understood(Lee, 2000). In addition, the externalrelations of the company to other com-panies are explained by knowledgedynamics. The flow of knowledge insidethe company and within companies re-flects the multidirectional flows, com-

posite feedbacks, and different struc-tural forms that are important to be un-derstood for the interdependent rela-tionship between companies (Lee,2000).

The agglomeration of related firmsin specific location has involved greatinterest among the writers since thetime of Alfred Marshall. Some modelshave shown that in industries with ag-glomeration economies, regional clus-tering occurs (Arthur, 1994; Canter,1994). An agglomeration is defined asthe economies of scales that are gen-erated when two or more companiesfrom the same industries locate next toeach other (Canter, 1994). Economiesof agglomerations are ìexternal to thefirm and internal to the city or industry,and result from increases in city or in-dustry sizeî (Canter, 1994). Once acompany agglomerates within a particu-lar location, they rarely leave becauseof the interdependent relationship thathas been developed. High-tech indus-trial complexes are an example of spe-cialized agglomeration. The best knownof these is the Silicon Valley. The con-centration of microelectronics industryin Southern California has been a maindriver of economic growth and devel-opment in the region for nearly 50 years(Lee, 2000).

While external and internal econo-mies of scale are responsible for ag-glomeration, external economies aremore important to economic develop-ment. Two types of external economiesexist: (1) location, and (2) urbanization(Carlino, 1978). The first one, localiza-tion economies (ìindustry specificî andìplace-specificî), explains that the lowerproduction costs and higher output in agiven industry at a specific locationleads to job growth in that industry (Mill,



1992; OíSullivan, 1993). The second,urbanization economies (ìplace-spe-cificî), explains that an increase in thegiven areaís economic size will lead toan increase in the number of establish-ments across all industries in that area(Carlino, 1978; Mill, 1992; OíSullivan,1993). In addition, there are small-sizedfirms located in dense urban areas suchas the urban core of metropolitan ar-eas because the core acts as an incu-bator. This incubator environment helpsthe growth of small and new firms.

There is disagreement as to whetheridentifying the type of external economythat is responsible for agglomerationcould help in crafting cluster-based eco-nomic development policies. In thosecases where urbanization economieshave the greater influence on economicgrowth, promoting business incentivesappears more suitable (Moomaw,1988). On the other hand, if locationeconomies have greater impact on eco-nomic growth, industry-specific policiesneed to be promoted (Moomaw, 1988;OhUallachain, 1989). In general, as anew paradigm of economic growth,cluster economic development rests onone fundamental concept: the econo-mies of agglomeration (Canter, 1994).An agglomeration tends to attract simi-lar companies to its spatial location.However, if agglomeration economiesare not maintained and enhanced, eco-nomic drivers will exit the region inwhich they were originally located. Theloss of the regionís economic driversmeans the cluster that formed aroundthe economic driver will fail which, inturn, will decrease economic growthand development (Canter, 1994).

The strength of understanding com-pany activity in the context of clustersis how to highlight the significance of

the local environment for a company.In addition, these explanations empha-size that the firm or the viable economicunit is imbricate in its context. Clustercreation is a highly dependent processin which the different actors embeddedwithin previous social connections andinstitutions try to manipulate the envi-ronment for their benefit (Uzzi, 1996).According to this consideration, clustersthus are not simply a bundle of eco-nomic benefits; they are regions of con-structed benefits. In other words, tocreate a self-reinforcing cycle, it is im-portant to construct a set of institutionsand routines that reward particular ac-tors for systematically beneficial behav-ior.

According to the theory, there arethree extensive ways in which clusterscould affect competition between re-lated industries. First, they increase theproductivity and effectiveness of thecompanies in the cluster (Porter, 2004).Second, they will help the process ofinvestment and innovation of the com-panies due to the changing environ-ment (Porter, 2004). Third, geographicconcentration of related companies willhelp the creation of new business withinthe cluster (Walker, 1985).

Shifting Responsibilities forEconomic Development

One of the basic roles of the gov-ernment is to promote macroeconomicand political stability. However, it is notjust the macroeconomic environmentthat needs to be encouraged and sup-ported, but also the general micro-economic capacity through continu-ously fostering positive economic de-velopment. On the microeconomiclevel, this indicates collaboration and



cooperation of all levels of government,and also establishing microeconomicrules and incentives governing compe-tition that will encourage productivitygrowth (Porter, 2000). Although allthese government roles are significantlyimportant, they might not be sufficient.The government needs to facilitate clus-ter development and upgrading as partof its economic development. In addi-tion, government policies necessarilyaffect the opportunities for upgradingclusters. Many of the competitive andinnovative advantages of clusters alsorest on externalities and spillovers thatinvolve participation of public entities(Porter, 1998).

Because of the continuously chang-ing environment, different roles of gov-ernment need to be taken into consid-eration when we address economicdevelopment. Two models, known asthe ìoldî and the ìnewî model, corre-spond to the shifting government re-sponsibilities for economic develop-ment (Porter, 2000). Under the oldmodel, ìgovernment drives economicdevelopment through policy decisionand incentivesî (Porter, 2000). On theother hand, economic development isseen as a collaborative process thatinvolves government at multiple levels,companies, learning and research in-stitutions, and other institutions for col-laboration (Porter, 2000). This ìnewîmodel represents the transition of thegovernment responsibilities in eco-nomic development (Feser, 2000).

In emerging new economies, theprocess of transition involves severalcharacteristics, such as intensifying glo-bal competition among the key constitu-ents of economic development; increas-ing capital intensity and downsizing thatwill produce higher productivity and

higher incomes, but more displacedworkers; establishing of knowledge-in-tensive sectors that will drive growth;creating competitive states where theinfrastructure and resources (public andprivate) will continuously upgradeworker skills as well as support innova-tive enterprises (Feser, 2000). Never-theless, the foundation of the ìnewîeconomy rests on: (1) technology-inten-sive industry clusters as the key eco-nomic engine; (2) research strengths inuniversities and institutes; (3) enablinginfrastructure, government, non-profit,and technology; (4) education and train-ing strengths, universities, and col-leges; (5) eliminating program duplica-tion and target resources to build onstrengths (Feser, 2000).

These new roles of government inthe economic development under theìnew economyî are significantly differ-ent that the economic developmentthrough policy decision and incentives.Cluster development recognizes theimportance of initiative at state and lo-cal level. Multiple levels of governmentresponsibilities have a dynamic char-acter and influence on competitivenessmore than normally are recognized,particularly within the government itself(Michael, 2000).

Economic Development ThroughPolicy Decisions and IncentivesUnder the Old Model

Tax and Nontax Incentives

Previous studies of governmentbusiness incentives have shown thatthey will lead to business investmentand thus to new jobs, which will in-crease the local demand for goods andservices and then the economic pros-



perity (Fisher & Peters, 2004). Theseincentives include tax instruments ñproperty tax abatements, tax incremen-tal financing, sales tax exemptions andnon-tax incentives such as businessgrants, loans, loan guarantees and de-sign of infrastructure.

Estimated effects of taxes comingfrom different measures that are usedshow various associations with busi-ness location, activity, and the use towhich tax revenues are put will gener-ally affect the attractiveness of differ-ent locations (Courant, 1994). Otherapproaches have identified new eco-nomic development policies that willfocus on promoting business develop-ment. These include the expansion andretention of indigenous business andsupport for entrepreneurial activities(Markley & McNamara, 1995). More-over, while traditional economic devel-opment programs are measured throughbusiness incentives, a new approach isemerging (Fisher & Peters, 2004). Thenew approach of public investmentleads to the expansion of existing firmsand existing businesses, versus newrelocating businesses and thus creat-ing jobs (Markley & McNamara, 1995).

In the evaluation of these programsand their impact on the employmentgrowth, the previous literature has mea-sured both direct and total employmentand thus the change in income of theeconomy. However, the literature hasevaluated business incubators thathave measured jobs created, businessstarts-ups, product innovation and suc-cess rates for incubator firms. On theother hand, the literature recognizes thelimited evaluation of the economic im-pact of the business development pro-grams. Also, there is evidence thatsome programs have the potential to

create or sustain jobs and income incommunities that cannot expect to at-tract outside investment (Markley &McNamara, 1995).

Over time, increased employmentthat arises from stimulating local de-mand is driven from the local potentialforce, as distinct from immigration to thelocal area. Local residents that are atthe back of the labor queue (those withfewer economic options), would tend toremain there while immigrants take thenew jobs created by the incentives(Fisher & Peters, 2004).

Some researches have used varia-tions on the case study methods toevaluate the impact of specific eco-nomic development programs. The ad-vantage is that the work has covered avariety of different incentive instru-ments: enterprise zones, researchparks, and property tax abatements.However, the impact evaluations needto establish some sort of comparativecontrol economy in order to measurethe effect of incentives precisely.

One of the criticisms of the targettax/financial subsidies for economicdevelopment is that because they areexpensive per job created, they mustuse them more where they are mostcost-effective, or in high unemploymentareas. In low unemployment areas,many persons obtaining jobs becauseof an economic development programcould have obtained jobs anyway(Bartik, 1994).

Few studies directly estimate theeffects of incentives. However, underthe assumption that dollar is a dollar,tax incentives for large business shouldhave similar effects on its location de-cisions to an equal dollar-sized busi-ness tax cut (Bartic, 2005). Anotherauthor states that, ìtherefore, the effects



of incentives on the possibility of a par-ticular branch plant locating in a stateshould, on average, be such that theexpected gross dollar cost per job assome as business tax cutsî (Fisher &Peters, 1997). For example: the high-est incentives offers are correspondingto an annual subsidy of about $2,800per worker inside an enterprise zone(Fisher & Peters, 1997).

In addition, states within regions withsimilar tax structures may offer similarfactors, costs or access to markets. Theresults may be different among thestates (Bingham & Mier, 1997, pp 154-155). On the other hand, from a theo-retical perspective, taxes and develop-ment incentives are spatially variablebusiness costs, and thus should influ-ence location and investment decisionsat the margin (Fisher & Peters, 1997).Regionally, variations in constructions,transportation, and energy costs areoften larger than variations in state andlocal taxes, and thus development in-centives (Fisher & Peters, 1997).Therefore, the relationship between theeconomic development incentives andtaxes, and their influence on economicgrowth is contradictory and inconclu-sive.

Economic Gardening as an AlternativeTraditional Economic Development

The economic gardening approachwas introduced by the inspiration of thegrowing realization that business attrac-tion and traditional expansion and re-tention programs, which rely on eco-nomic development groups for imple-mentation, were failing to produce andmaintain high-skill, value-added jobs.Economic gardening moves away fromoffering financial incentives directly to

a small number of firms (Barrios, 2004).The key goal of the economic garden-ing is to foster economic growth by es-tablishing well-articulated public policiesbased on ìextensive strategic planning,public-private collaboration, foundationof technology, human resources andcapital, and the development of strate-gic industrial clustersî (Bradshaw &Blakely, 1999). The approach incorpo-rates the same general objectives of thetraditional approach (business expan-sion, retention, and attraction) but, atthe same time, it stimulates a networkof economical administrative programswith similar interests that coordinateand cooperate (Bradshaw & Blakely,1999). Economic gardening locates lo-cal entrepreneurs (who typically pos-sess deep roots in the area) that pro-vide them with technical information, fi-nancial planning, or networking assis-tance they need in order to grow anddevelop (Barrios, 2004).

In addition, economic gardeningencourages industry cluster develop-ment, or a geographic concentration ofrelated industries, such as that whichhas occurred in the Silicon Valley(Bradshaw & Blakely, 1999). The as-sumption is that an area economy thatfeatures strong industry clustering willnot only be more productive and com-petitive, but will tend obviously to mag-netize more companies, both new start-ups and outside entrants (Held, 1996).The idea is that the resistance to theeconomic gardening could be over-come only incrementally in those areasthat are highly dependent on traditionalapproach for economic development.The transition from traditional schemesto more cooperative enterprises is likelyto occur if it is understood first. Eco-nomic gardening as an alternative to



traditional economic development triesto make sure that public economic de-velopment goals are distributed in a waythat over the long-term all members ofthe community will benefit equally (Bar-rios, 2004).

Conclusion

It is obvious that economic devel-opment does not occur equally amongthe people. The process of globaliza-tion and downsizing of the governmentbudgets request a more dramatic andenthusiastic role of the government atall levels, which will encourage growthand economic prosperity. Economicdevelopment at federal level needs toreduce unnecessary regulation, createmore favorable conditions across thecountry for regional development, andstrengthen communitiesí innovation andinvestment process (Sampson, 2004).On the other hand, state and local gov-ernments should provide important ini-tiatives that will pursue competitive ad-vantages and specialization (Porter,2000). The multiple involvements ofevery constituent (federal, state, andlocal government) are the foundation ofthe new economic development. How-ever, active government participation inprivately-led efforts, rather than an ini-tiative controlled by the government, willhave a better chance of success. Thesecontradictory conclusions mean that theìnew modelî of economic developmentfosters more private involvement, sup-ports private/public collaboration, andencourages active participation at alllevels of government in the process ofeconomic development. Those regionsthat have lost a significant portion oftheir economic base and are facing eco-nomic depressions need to go back and

redefine their strategies for economicdevelopment. In the changing environ-ment, they must go through the processof transition and employ a new modelthat will redefine the responsibilities ofthe government in economic develop-ment (Feser, 2000).

How government promotes eco-nomic development has been seen intwo ways: (1) traditional; and (2) clus-ter development. What is interesting isthat the significance of neither of thetwo ways of achieving economic devel-opment could be exactly compared.Each approach represents a uniqueway for promoting economic vitality. Theindicators of growth and prosperity un-der the one model in one particular re-gion may not generate the same levelof growth and prosperity in another re-gion, due to the specific characteristicsthat the region represents. In addition,different models may also generate thesame result, which means that othercircumstances have influences on theeconomy.

Confusion also arises when govern-ments are not clearly taking one ap-proach or way in which they promoteeconomic development. Traditionalpolicy decisions and incentives aresometimes incorporated into the clus-ter development approach. Or, in theprocess of transition, which usually re-quires incremental steps, governmentsare somewhere between the two mod-els of economic development. The wayit is done, most of the time, is overlap-ping. For example, Silicon Valley re-mains an attractive and influentialmodel for regional development. Thequestion is: should it be understood asa unique example of American entre-preneurship? Or, can it provide a modelfor regional development in other



places? Should it be understood as anew model for cluster development, orshould it be defined as entrepreneurialeconomic development?

Silicon Valley today is far more thanan agglomeration of individual technol-ogy firms. Moreover, it represents amodel for cluster development, and alsoa unique example of American entre-preneurship. Therefore, first we couldsay that the economic development andthe way it is done represent overlap-ping models. Secondly, they could notbe defined as universal because theygenerate different results due to thespecific characteristics carried by theregion in which they are applied. Thirdly,sometimes, even within similar regions,economic development will create con-

tradictory conclusions. Fourthly, mod-els tend to create contradictory findingsthat will lead to inconclusiveness. Anoverall opinion for the promotion of eco-nomic development under the differentmodels could be defined in terms ofgovernments that need to foster newways of doing economic development.Changes must be anticipated under thespecific environment in which the gov-ernment operates. Finally, governmentsneed to facilitate cluster development inthose regions in which it is possible tocreate economic prosperity. Other re-gions benefit more if traditional policy de-cisions and incentives are applied by thegovernment. However, economic devel-opment needs to be a dynamic processunder the changing environment.

Rezime

Avtorot na ovoj tekst n¢ dobli‘uva do dva modeli na ekonomskirazvoj, koi podrazbiraat proces na promena na vladini odgovornostivo nasoka na ekonomski razvoj od takanare~en tradicionalen pristapkon nov pristap za razvoj na klasteri. So cel dostignuvawe na ekonom-ska zrelost, visoki stapki na vrabotenost i zgolemena produktivnost,ekonomskite razvojni politiki i programi potrebno e da se procenatod aspekt na nivnata efektivnost i efikasnost vo odreden period od‘ivotniot ciklusot na ekonomijata. Zatoa i krajnata cel na ovoj tekstne se odnesuva na prifa}awe ili preferirawe na eden ili drug modelkolku {to se odnesuva na podobro razbirawe na dadeniot model inegova aplikativnost na odredeno nivo na razvoj na ekonomijata.


Milton Fridman

Elena @ikoska

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Milton Fridman e, bespogo-vorno, edno od najgolemite imiwana sovremenata ekonomija na mina-tiot vek. Potvrda na vakvoto tvr-dewe e i Nobelovata nagrada odoblasta na ekonomijata, koja Frid-man ja dobi vo 1976 godina, pred s¢poradi postignuvawata vo poletona analiza na potro{uva~kata,monetarnata istorija i teorija,kako i zaradi negovata teorija voodnos na slo‘enosta na stabili-zacionata politika. Goleminata napridonesot na Milton Fridman zaglobalnata ekonomska teoretska iakademska misla e te{ko sogled-liva ili, kako {to Robert Hecel,eden od analiti~arite na ‘ivototi deloto na Fridman, slikovito }eka‘e "obidot da se portretirarabotata na Milton Fridman... ekako da proba{ da gi fati{ Nijaga-rinite Vodopadi vo lonec#.1 Zavlijatelnosta na Fridmanovataekonomska teorija govori i faktotdeka negovata teorija najde najgo-lema primena vo neokonzervativ-nite politi~ki programi na dvagolemi lidera od osumdesettitegodini na dvaesettiot vek ñ Marga-ret Ta~er i Ronald Regan.

Milton Fridman e roden na 31juli 1912 godina, vo Bruklin, Wu-

jork. Sin e na siroma{ni evrejskiemigranti od Ungarija, i godinite nanegovoto detstvo }e gi pameti poisklu~itelnata siroma{tija vo kojaFridman ima porasnato. Po presel-bata vo maloto grat~e Rovej (20 kmod Wujork), kade go zavr{uva iosnovnoto i srednoto obrazovanie,vo 1928 godina dobiva stipendija naRutgers University, kade {to i diplo-mira vo 1932 godina. Za vreme nasvoeto {koluvawe, kako {to i sa-miot naveduva vo svojata avtobio-grafija, se izdr‘uva i ja pla}a {ko-larinata so rabota kako kelner volokalnite barovi, prodava~ vo mar-ketite ili od povremenite anga‘-mani za vreme na letniot raspust.Diplomata koja tamu ja steknuva giopfa}a ekonomskite nauki, no i ~is-tata matematika, {to vo golema me-ra }e mu pomogne vo razvivaweto nanegovata ekonomska i statisti~kateorija.

Svoeto ponatamo{no {koluvawe(magisteriumot) }e go prodol‘i naChicago Economics Department (Chi-cago University), opredeluvaj}i se zaekonomijata kako svoe primarnopole na interes. Tamu }e ja ima sre-}ata da mu predavaat profesoriteArtur Burns i Horner Xons, koi –toj samiot }e re~e, gi smeta za najgo-lemi vlijanija i primeri vo svojataakademska kariera. Vo 1934 godinadobiva stipendija na Columbia Uni-

1 Hetzel, Robert L. The Contribution of Milton Friedman toEconomy. Economic Quarterly, volume 93 ñ number 1,winter 2007, str. 1.


Elena @ikoska

versity, a po vra}aweto vo ^ikagoraboti kako asistent na reno-miraniot profesor Henri [ulc.Doktoratot go steknuva na ColumbiaUniversity vo 1946 godina.

Privatno, celiot svoj ‘ivotbe{e o‘enet so soprugata Rouz, kojaja zapoznal vo ^ikago za vreme nastudiskiot prestoj. Po~ina na 94godi{na vozrast vo San Francisko,Kalifornija, na 16 noemvri 2006godina.

Po~etocite i osnovite naFridmanovata ekonomskateorija

Stavovite na Fridman }e proiz-lezat od agendata na klasi~niteliberali, a politi~kata filo-zofija na Fridman }e go formuliraona {to e denes vo politi~katanauka poznato kako libertarija-nizam. Slobodniot pazar, samoregu-lacijata, protiveweto na dr‘av-nata intervencija kako i ekonom-skata sloboda se osnovite na poli-ti~kata i ekonomska teorija na Mil-ton Fridman, koj go posveti svojot‘ivot da gi vidi implementiraniprincipite na laissez-faire ekono-mijata. Tokmu ovie principi }e jaformuliraat i negovata politi~kateorija, spored koja voveduvawetona pazarna ekononomija vo totali-tarnite dr‘avi, konsekventnorezultira so politi~ka sloboda.

Kako i da e, ranite razmislu-vawa i teorii na Milton Fridmanse nedvosmisleno determiniraniod situacijata vo koja se nao|aatSoedinetite Amerikanski Dr‘avivo triesettite godini na dvaeset-tiot vek. Golemata depresija, bez-raboticata i op{tata besperspek-

tivnost od ekonomistite koi vo toavreme ‘iveat i rabotat vo SAD }enametne jasna agenda na baraweizlez od golemata ekonomska kriza,namaluvawe na bezraboticata, no iteoretsko objasnuvawe na eden odnajgolemite ekonomski paradoksi ñgolemata pobaruva~ka, od ednastrana i, neiskoristenite ekonom-ski resursi, od druga strana.2 Ne e~udno {to vo ovaa situacija Frid-man vo ranite godini }e stane pod-dr‘uva~ na teorijata na Xon Maj-nard Kejns (kejnzijanizam) no i za-stapnik na programata New Deal,naporedno so gledi{teto za imple-mentacija na visoki danoci. Sepak,otkako }e gi uvidi efektite navakvata politika Fridman }e jaotfrli politikata na centralnadr‘avna kontrola i }e zapo~ne daja promovira politikata na slobo-den pazar, {to vo toa vreme vo SAD(i po{iroko) pretstavuva malcin-sko razmisluvawe.

Svojot odnos kon politikata zaizlez od golemata ekonomska depre-sija Fridman najnedvosmisleno }eja izrazi niz svoeto delo Monetar-nata istorija na Soedinetite Ame-rikanski Dr‘avi vo koja silno }egi poddr‘i programite za kreirawerabotni mesta, no, od druga strana,ostro }e ja kritikuva politikata nafiksirani ceni i plati. Ras~is-tuvaj}i so svoite prethodni ubedu-vawa, }e ja napadne politikata nacenovna kontrola kako instrumentkoj onevozmo‘uva resursite da sealociraat onamu kade {to nivnatavrednost e najgolema. Vo odnos napolitikata na New Deal, samiot }ere~e deka pari~nata ponuda ednos-

2 Ibid., str. 2.


Milton Fridman

tavno trebala da bide pro{irena,namesto dogovorena (contracted).Tokmu namaluvaweto na pari~natamasa, kako i nedostatocite vo rabo-teweto na bankite i lo{o vodeniotpoliti~ki proces, Fridman }e ginavede kako glavni vinovnicizaradi koi SAD }e zapadnat voekonomska kriza.

Pridonesot na MiltonFridman kon ekonomskatanauka

Kako eden od najgolemite eko-nomski umovi na dene{nicata, no ikako retko sestran nau~nik, pri-donesot na Milton Fridman konekonomskata (pa i politi~kata) na-uka se reflektira na pove}e poli-wa. Edno od primarnite poliwa vrzkoi Fridman ima izvr{eno golemovlijanie e, sekako, statistikata,kade ima dadeno ogromen pridonesvo analizite na varijabilnosta.Analiziraj}i gi, vo najgolem del odvremeto, prihodite i tro{ocite,Fridman ima pridoneseno za napre-duvawe na empiriskiot aspekt naekonomskata nauka. Za vreme naVtorata svetska vojna raboti vostatisti~kata istra‘uva~ka grupana SAD, a, bazirano na negoviteidei, podocna e formulirana teo-rijata za "sekvencijalno sempli-rawe# koe deneska {iroko se koris-ti za kontrola na kvalitetot naproizvodite.

Vtorata oblast vo koja Fridman}e izvr{i ogromno vlijanie e teo-rijata na potro{uva~kata. Vo 1953Fridman }e go napi{e isklu~itelnoprovokativniot esej Metodologijana pozitivnata ekonomija, vo koj }etvrdi deka teoriite treba da se

doka‘uvaat samo preku nivnatakorespondencija so faktite i pred-viduvawa, a ne obratno. Ova }evnese ogromna provokacija vo to-ga{nite ekonomski akademski kru-govi i }e ima ogromen efekt vrzponatamo{niot razvoj na metodo-logijata na ekonomskata nauka. Ona{to e vrv vo karierata na Fridmane sekako teorijata na potro{uva~-kata kriva (funkcija), koja general-no gi detektira i demantira gre{-kite vo Kejnsovata ekonomska teo-rija. Vo ovaa teorija Fridman velideka lu|eto voobi~aeno ja adapti-raat nivnata potro{uva~ka na bazana promenite na nivniot dolgo-ro~en prihod, {to pretstavuvasosema novo gledi{te apropo empi-riskata ekonomija. Vo tesna vrskaso ovaa teorija stoi i Fridma-novata teorija na o~ekuvana do-bivka, {to pretstavuva novo vidu-vawe na ekonomskiot izbor na lu-|eto vo situacija na rizi~ni alter-nativi.

Vo odnos na ~istata ekonomskateorija, deloto na Milton Fridman}e ostane zapameteno po negovitemonetarni teorii. Vo ve}e spome-natata Monetarna istorija na So-edinetite Amerikanski Dr‘aviFridman }e tvrdi deka stabilniotrast na pari~nata ponuda ne e voz-mo‘en pod re‘im na fiksiranvaluten kurs. Zatoa toj }e se zalo‘iza varijabilen valuten kurs, kon-centriraj}i se na platniot bilansi na procesot na monetarna ponuda.Vo ovaa smisla toj }e go prou~uvavlijanieto na monetarnite vari-jacii na nominalniot prihod, ceni-te i proizvodot zaklu~uvaj}i dekavarijaciite vo stepenot na rast namonetarnata ponuda imaat kratko-


Elena @ikoska

ro~ni efekti, no deka na dolg rok(pove}e od tri godini) edinstveniotsu{tinski efekt e vrz cenite.

Kone~no, Fridmanoviot pri-dones e zna~itelen i vo poleto nateorijata na vrabotuvaweto i in-flacijata, kade {to toj prv }e uka-‘e deka korelacijata pome|u vrabo-tuvaweto i inflacijata e samokratkoro~na, vo uslovi na adapti-rawe na nova inflatorna klima/politika, no deka na dolg rok nepostoi direktna vrska. Ova, za ‘al,}e se potvrdi i vo praktikata, bi-dej}i vo sedumdesettite godini nadvaesettiot vek brojot na vrabotu-

vawa vo SAD zna~itelno }e opadne,a inflacijata nema da se namali.

Vo 1976 godina na Milton Frid-man mu be{e dodelena Nobelovatanagrada za ekonomija za "dostig-nuvawata vo poliwata na analizana potro{uva~kata, monetarnataistorija i teorija, kako i za demon-stracija na kompleksnosta na sta-bilizacionata politika#. Fridman}e ostane zapameten kako eden odnajgolemite ekonomski umovi, no ikako avtor na golem broj dela soepohalno zna~ewe za ekonomskatanauka.

Abstract

The text is a portrait of Milton Friedman, one of the greatest economicminds of the 20th century. One of the most influential economists, Friedmanhas made a multilateral impact on the economic science starting from statistics,through monetary and consumption theory. Friedman has also been thefounder of modern political and economic theory of libertarianism found in thepolitical agendas of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. He died in 2006at the age of 94, leaving behind revolutionary economic theories that havehad a tremendous impact on global economy.


International Marketing, 8th Editionby Michael R. Czinkota and Illka Ronkainen

Maja Pavlovik

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International Marketing is a studywhose target group are junior and mid-career professionals; at the same time,it is a valuable text for MBA students.The main objective of the text is topresent an overview of the theory andapplication of international marketing.The globalization of capital marketsmakes the corporate practices adjustto the marketplace realities of today.Furthermore, rapid international enviro-nment change and globalization areoffering new opportunities for firms,individuals and policymakers and thesepresent major challenges for the entireworld. In addition, it provides the readerwith a thorough understanding of theinternational market from a truly globalperspective, where businesses that areaware of necessary changes are flex-ible in their adaptation to new realitiesand are thus are likely to survive in theinternational market arena.

The study is organized into fourparts. Part One (Chapters 1-5) dealswith the international marketing envi-ronment and trade institutions and tradepolicy. Part Two (Chapters 6-9) exam-ines the international market entry anddevelopment. Part Three (Chapters 10-13) explores the export marketing mix.Part Four (Chapters 14-19) elaborateson the global marketing mix.

The authorsí approach is to presentsimplistic topics before the more diffi-cult topics are presented. Chapter 2gives an overview of trade institutionsincluding WTO, IMF, and the WorldBank. The multilateral GATT negotia-tions in the Uruguay Round incorpo-rated several new elements in contrastto the Tokyo summit. An important newissue introduced was the liberalizationof international trade. Trade liberaliza-tion at home brings competition to theentire economy. It spurs innovation,

"International Marketing, 8th edition", Michael R.Czinkota and Illka Ronkainen, South-WesternCollege Publishing, 8 edition, Boston, 2006.


Maja Pavlovik

controls costs, and keeps downwardpressure on prices. For consumers,trade means lower prices, better qual-ity, and wider variety, raising the realvalue of their wages. For domestic pro-ducers, trade allows access to lower-cost inputs and more sophisticatedmachinery. For exporters, trade ex-pands markets abroad, making possi-ble larger production runs and cost sav-ings through economies of scale.

The purpose of the World TradeOrganization (WTO) is ìto remove tariffand non-tariff barriers and provide amechanism for solving disputes be-tween member states.î No ruling froma dispute brought before the WTO canbe blocked or refuted, which could bedone under GATT. Disputes are han-dled and decided on a consensusreached by all members. Disputes dealwith trade issues and are not meant todeal with environmental or labor stand-ards issues. As William Lash puts it,ìThe United Nations should continue toaddress global environment issues.Similarly, the International Labor Or-ganization, a long standing body oflabor states and firms, is best suited tohandle labor concerns.î

For smaller or undeveloped coun-tries, the WTO opens the economiesof smaller and underdeveloped coun-tries and makes possible their entry intothe economies of other countries,something they would not be able to doon their own. Negotiating bilateralagreements with all the individual mem-ber states that are part of WTO wouldbe impossible for these smaller coun-tries to even attempt. For large andsmall countries, the WTO works to cre-ate a global market based on free trade.

Some argue that the WTO hurts smallcountries and helps large countries.Small countries have brought disputesagainst larger countries, the U.S. forexample, and have won or been victo-rious on calling out larger countrieswhich attempt protectionist measuresfor whatever reason.

The WTOís main goal is to promoteinternational trade. It does this by aid-ing in creating a level playing field forthe member nations. When there areno trade barriers, goods and servicesare freer to move across boarders.When these member nations agree toand follow WTO rulings there is a senseof international confidence and coop-eration that aids in the stimulation ofgrowth that freer trade produces.

Growth would not be seen in in-stances where protectionist measuresare in place. When a government in-vokes protectionist measures, the con-sumers are the ones who end up pay-ing for the barrier to be in place becausethese barriers increase prices. Barriersthat are in place and are taken awayas a result of WTO rulings are donegradually so that domestic marketshave time to adjust. The growth that isa result of ousting barriers comes in theform of increased competition, lowerprices, increased quality, and morechoices. Freer trade brings in competi-tion from other countries. This compe-tition may be able to offer goods andservices at a lower price or higher qual-ity, which would motivate domestic com-panies to either lower their prices orincrease quality. The new competitionand increased offerings by domesticcompanies create more choices for theconsumer.


International Marketing, 8th Edition

About the Authors ofInternational Marketing

Michael R. Czinkota is one of theforemost experts on international busi-ness and marketing in the world. Hisinsights and counsel are frequentlysought by the media, global companies,and governments all over the world. Heis a frequent speaker on issues relatedto trade, trade policy, and global busi-ness strategies. He has served in theU.S. Government as Deputy AssistantSecretary of Commerce, where he wasresponsible for trade analysis, supportof trade negotiations and retaliatoryactions, and policy coordination for in-

ternational finance, investment, andmonetary affairs. He currently teachesat the McDonough School of Businessat Georgetown University.

Illka Ronkainen, a leading expert inthe areas of international business andmarketing, has taught at the McDonoughSchool of Business at Georgetown Uni-versity for the past 20 years. In addi-tion, he is Director of the School ofBusiness Program in Hong Kong. Heis also Assistant Professor of Interna-tional Marketing at the Helsinki Schoolof Economics and frequently teachesexecutive classes in Europe, Asia,South America and the United States.

Glavnata cel na tekstot Me|unaroden marketing e da dade osvrtna teorijata i primenata na me|unarodniot marketing. Globali-zacijata na pazarite na kapital nametnuva da se adaptiraatkorporativnite praktiki kon realnosta na pazarot. Isto taka, brzatapromena na me|unarodnoto opkru‘uvawe i globalizacijata nudat novimo‘nosti kako i predizvici za firmite, poedincite i kreatoritena politiki. Voedno, ~itatelot go zbogatuva svoeto znaewe zame|unarodniot pazar od globalna perspektiva, kade {to pravnitesubjekti koi se svesni za promenite, se fleksibilni i gi znaatpravilata na igra na me|unarodnite insitucii, Svetskata trgovskaorganizacija (STO), Me|unarodniot monetaren fond (MMF) iSvetskata banka (SB), imaat pogolema verojatnost da opstanat name|unarodnata pazarna arena.

Rezime


Do

kum

en

tiPotreba od donesuvawe nov Delovnik

na Sobranieto na Republika Makedonija

Parlamentot mora da ja zacvrstuva kulturata na doverba vopravniot sistem na dr‘avata koja, pak, go dvi‘i uspehot na nacio-nalnite ekonomii. Soglasno istra‘uvawata na teorijata na institu-ciite vo ekonomijata, pravnata kultura i doverbata, odnosno veruva-wata i preferenciite na ekonomskite subjekti, prakti~no ja pravatrazlikata me|u uspe{nite i neuspe{nite nacionalni ekonomii. Vomisijata za sozdavawe prijatelski ambient za postignuvawe ekonomskirezultati, parlamentot mo‘e da ima konstruktivna, no i destruktivnauloga. Dokolku regulatornite blokadi se slu~uvaat vo samiot par-lament, i toa od ~isto proceduralni ili politi~ki pri~ini, toga{ sepostavuva pra{aweto kakva poraka se ispra}a vo kontekst na grade-weto kultura na doverba kon ekonomskite subjekti i gra|anite.

Delovnikot ne smee da se koristi kako alatka za blokada nazakonodavniot proces. Mo‘nosta da se govori neograni~eno, mo‘nostaza javuvawe neograni~en broj pati za diskusija i mo‘nosta samo edenpratenik so podnesuvawe na ogromen broj amandmani da blokira opre-delen zakonodaven predlog, mora da se ograni~i i stavi vo balansi-ra~ka ramka. Mo‘nosta za stavawe veto na Pretsedatelot na Republi-kata i postapuvaweto na Ustavniot sud na Republika Makedonija sepredvidenite garantni mehanizmi za soglasnosta na zakonot so Ustavoti politi~kiot sistem.

Inicirawe na postapka za donesuvawe nov Delovnik

Po usvojuvaweto na Amandamanite na Ustavot vo noemvri 2001godina se pristapi kon donesuvawe nov Delovnik, {to Sobranieto godonese na 16 juli 2002 godina.

Od donesuvaweto na ovoj Delovnik do denes se izvr{eni pove}enadvore{ni i doma{ni ekspertizi, a posledni od niv se od: KoenMuylee, ekspert na Parlamentarnoto sobranie na Sovetot na Evropa;ekspertite od Tvining proektot so Sobranieto na Republika Slove-nija, komponenta 4, Jo‘ica Veli{~ek i Tina Bitenc Pengov; i eksperti-zata na prof. d-r Wolfgang Zeh, zamenik generalen sekretar vo german-skiot Bundestag. Od niv generalno mo‘e da se zaklu~i deka efikasnoto

Marjan Maxovski


Marjan Maxovski

rabotewe na Sobranieto e mo{ne va‘en del od procesot na na{ataevrointegracija i vo taa smisla potrebno e posebno prilagoduvawe nanegovata struktura. Nasokite na prilagoduvawe i usoglasuvawepodrazbiraat formalni i neformalni promeni vo negovata odlu~u-va~ka, institucionalna, proceduralna, organizaciska, informaciskai kulturna komponenta.

Donesuvaweto nov Delovnik na Sobranieto be{e inicirano odporane{niot pretsedatel na Sobranieto, pri krajot na mandatot naprethodniot parlamentaren sostav, za {to be{e izgotven predlog tekstzasnovan na analizite od spomenatiot tvining proekt. Mnozinstvotovo noviot parlamentaren sostav isto taka oceni deka e potrebnodonesuvawe nov Delovnik, po {to na po~etokot na 2007 godina dostavitekst na Predlog delovnik koj vo golema mera e baziran na prethodnoizgotveniot predlog tekst. Vo momentov razgleduvaweto na predlogotza donesuvaweto na noviot Delovnik e prekinato vo prvata faza. Voraspravata i ona {to prethode{e se poka‘a nedostig na politi~kavolja i konsenzus me|u mnozinstvoto i malcinstvoto vo paralmentot,kako vo pogled na potrebata i vremeto za donesuvawe nov delovniktaka i vo pogled na ~ekorite soglasno koi treba da se odviva celatapostapka.

Nadle‘nata komisiska rabota po tekstot na predlogot za donesu-vawe nov Delovnik, opravdano be{e supstituirana so rabotna grupasostavena od pratenici od site politi~ki partii zastapeni vo Sobra-nieto so ogled na zna~eweto na Delovni~kiot akt. Kako sumarum i iskus-tvo od celata postapka za usoglasuvawe na potrebata od donesuvawenov Delovnik mo‘at da se notiraat slednive principi i metodolo{ki~ekori:

1. Vo postapkata za donesuvawe nov Delovnik se napravi raz-grani~uvawe na spornite pra{awa od politi~ka priroda od ~istoproceduralno-racionalnata su{tina na Delovnikot. Rabotna grupa giizzede od rasprava pra{aweto za upotreba na jazikot pri vodewetona plenarnata sednica i komisiite, pra{aweto za brojot na zakonitekoi treba da se donesat soglasno Badinteroviot princip, kako iograni~uvaweto na govorot. Prvite dve pra{awa go nadminuvaatpoliti~kiot kapacitet na Sobranieto za nivno direktno usoglasuvawevo redovna postapka, a za niv, kako visokoparni politi~ki pra{awa,potreben e prethoden partiski konsenzus od naj{irok karakter.Pra{aweto, pak, na ograni~uvaweto na govorot soglasno standarditevo zapadnoevropskite zemji stoi na samata granica me|u navedenitepoliti~ki pra{awa i noviot racionaliziran koncept. Toa, po mojaocenka, e re{livo i vnatre vo parlamentot, so ogled deka postoi stavdeka treba da ima razumno ograni~uvawe, koe vo sporedba so drugiteparlamenti bi bilo dva do tri pati pogolemo, a so mo‘nost za dve


Potreba od donesuvawe nov Delovnik na Sobranieto na Republika Makedonija

prijavuvawa na pratencite. Postoi varijanta govorite da se dvi‘atvo vremenska ramka raspredelena po prateni~ki grupi, a vo zavisnostod nivnata golemina. Vo celina gledano, problemot so nere{enitepoliti~ki pra{awa ne e pri~ina delovnikot da ne se donese vo svojataproceduralno-racionalna osnova i da se ~eka ras~istuvawe napoliti~kiot del koj mo‘e da se oddol‘i do nedogled. Noviot delovniktreba da se donese so odlo‘ena primena, a politi~kite pra{awa vome|uvreme da se razre{at.

2. Na Delovnikot kako akt koj sodr‘i parlamentarni pravila netreba da se gleda kako na trajno zadadena materijata koja e opasno dase menuva. Treba da se ima predvid i deka vo Delovnikot, pokrajsu{tinskite, postojat i pomalku zna~ajni odredbi koi se predmet nanu‘ni periodi~ni promeni i podobruvawa – nivnata promena epraktika vo pove}e parlamenti.

3. Po donesuvaweto na noviot Delovnik, potreben e preodenimlementaciski vremenski interval za prilagoduvawe od najmalku{est meseci. Vo ovoj period treba da se izvr{i sumulacija nazakonodavniot proces soglasno noviot koncept, so cel da se otkrijati, potoa, soodvetno izmenat i podobrat nekonzistentnite re{enija.Isto taka, vo ovoj period nu‘no e prilagoduvaweto na stru~nataslu‘ba.

Principi koi treba da se implementiraat vo Delovnikot

Predmet na razgovorite vo rabotnata grupa za noviot Delovnikbea i soodvetnite principi koi se usoglasuvaa za implementacija, avrz koi bi se potpirala delovni~kata struktura i koi bea prifatenii od pretstavnicite na Nacionalniot demokratski institut, koiasistiraa vo celiot proces. Stanuva zbor za slednive principi:

- Primena na principot na podelba na vlasta, pri {to, zakonotkoj e vo zakonodavna postapka ne go napu{ta parlamentot s¢ do negovotokone~no donesuvawe, odnosno, kone~nata odluka povrzana so nego;

- principot na nezavisnost na parlamentot od izvr{nata vlast,koj podrazbira avtonomna mo} da donese svoi delovni~ki odredbi, daopredeli svoja vnatre{na organizacija i red;

- principot na racionalizirawe na zakonodavnata postapka,sporedliva so zapadnoevropskite zemji, za da se zabrza harmo-nizacijata na doma{noto so zakonodavstvoto so EU, {to podrazbiraizbegnuvawe na duplirawata;

- principot na racionalna podelba na rabotata me|u rabotnitetela i plenarnata sednica {to bara zajaknuvawe na ulogata narabotnite tela vo zakonodavnata postapka vo celina i vo realizacija


Marjan Maxovski

na javni raspravi (principite na participativnost i transparentnost),kako i vo ostvaruvaweto na kontrolnata funkcija vrz izvr{nata vlast;

- principot na racionalizacija vo rabotnite tela podrazbira vomati~noto rabotno telo da se slevaat izve{taite od ostanatite zainte-resirani rabotni tela po koi toa bi se izjasnuvalo, so istovremenaprimena na principot na transparentnost preku sledewe na raspravatavo mati~noto rabotno telo od javnosta preku direkten prenos naSobraniskiot televiski kanal;

- principite na planirawe i organizacija na rabotata;

- principot na efikasnost, {to podrazbira u~estvo na sekojpratenik na efikasen i aktiven na~in vo rabotata na zakonodavniotproces;

- principot na efektivnost (kombiniran so mo‘nosta za u~estvo,razgleduvawe i kvorum), koj podrazbira pravo na inicijativa, pravo nagovor i amandman i pravo na postavuvawe pra{awa do izvr{nata vlast,odnosno, drugi na~ini na kontrola na egzekutivata;

- dozvoleno e regulirawe na prateni~kite predlozi na zakoni,predlagaweto amandmani ili postavuvaweto pra{awa, kako ivremensko ograni~uvawe na govorot, dokolku toa e neophodno za da senapravi vistinski balans me|u efikasnosta na parlamentarniteaktivnosti i mo‘nosta pratenicite da gi branat interesite na nivniteizbira~i;

- principot na ednakov tretman na pratenicite kako poedinci ikako ~lenovi na parlamentarnite grupi na politi~kite partiizastapeni vo Sobranieto.

Vo tekstot na noviot Delovnik bi mo‘ele da vlezat i nekolkuprincipielni komponenti i mehanizmi koi go efektuiraat principotna podelba na vlasta i nezavisnost na parlamentot od izvr{nata vlast:

- Kapacitetot na pratenicite i parlamentot vo celina za pred-lagawe zakonski proekti treba da se optimalizira, za {to se potrebnisopstveno dimenzioniran parlamentaren buxet i parlamentarna slu‘baza zakonodavna poddr{ka, analiza i istra‘uvawe. Vo ovaa nasokapotrebno e osnovawe posebno sobranisko telo so reperezentativensostav (Buxetski sovet), koe }e go koncipira sobraniskiot buxet kojtreba da korespondira so buxetskite proekcii na dr‘avata vo celina;

- So ogled na poslednite incidentni nastani vo Sobranieto,potrebno e formirawe sopstvena parlamentarna slu‘ba za obez-beduvawe, koja }e funkcionira vo tesna koordinacija so Ministerstvotoza vnatre{ni raboti, no koja celosno }e odgovara na Sobranieto i ~ijpersonal }e bide vraboten vo nego (po primerot na zemjite odKomonveltot);



- Sobranieto treba da donese svoj Eti~ki parlamentaren kodeks.Vo nego mo‘e da se preciziraat i t.n. "govor na omrazata# i mo‘nitesankcii itn.

Zavr{ni sogleduvawa

EU tvining proektot me|u Sobranieto na RM i Slovene~kiotparlament generalno dojde do slednite soznanija za slabostite vona{eto parlamentarno rabotewe:

- nedovolno organizirani i ottamu ~esto bespolezni debati naplenarnite sednici, koi{to mo‘at da go popre~at procesot nanavremeno nosewe na zakonskata regulativa;

- delumno neefikasna zakonodavna postapka, osobeno vo delotna beskorisnoto prvo ~itawe;

- neadekvatna uloga na komisiite, koi {to moraat da bidat vosostojba i da imaat mo‘nost da gi re{at pogolemiot broj pra{awa{to bile pokrenati;

- neefikasno organizirana zakonodavna i pravna pomo{ inedostatok na ekspertska pomo{ vo prateni~kite grupi.

Osnovniot koncept vo noviot Delovnik se bazira na tri ~itawa,i toa:

Prvoto ~itawe bi trebalo da se zavr{i so ispra}awe na predlogzakonot do pratenicite, osven ako odreden broj od niv bara ~itawetoda se odr‘i na sobraniska sednica;

Vtoroto ~itawe e so namera da se izvr{at modifikacii nasodr‘inata so amandmanite (akcentot na amandmanskata rasprava evo nadle‘nata komisija pred vtoroto ~itawe, kade usvoeniteamandmani se vgraduvaat vo tekstot na zakonot koj komletiran sedostavuva na vtoro ~itawe na plenarnata sednica).

Po diskusijata i glasaweto na sednicata na Sobranieto parla-mentarcite mo‘at ili vedna{ da glasaat po zakonot vo celost, poduslov da nema predlo‘eno amandmani ili istite da se ve}e usvoeni,ili da se prodol‘i so tretoto ~itawe;

Tretoto ~itawe e so cel da se eliminiraat mo‘nite vnatre{nineusoglasenosti, odnosno neadekvatnosta na onie odredbi na predlogzakonot koi bile modificirani vo tekot na vtoroto ~itawe.


Marjan Maxovski

Since its independence, the Republic of Macedonia has been going throughan intensive process of institutional and legal reforms. Similarly to othertransition countries, this process in the Republic of Macedonia has beencharacterised by the adoption of numerous laws, some of which have beenintroduced in our legal system for the first time. Such dense legislative activityhas imposed adoption of laws in a shortened procedure, without making thenecessary comparative analyses and without assessing their influence andharmonisation with other regulations in the countryís legal system. Hence,implementation problems occurred and there was a need to frequently changethe laws.

The Parliament must strengthen the culture of confidence in the legalsystem of the state that, on the other hand, is contributing to the success ofthe national economies. According to the institutional theory, in economy, thelegal culture and confidence, i.e. the trust and preferences of the players inthe economy practically constitute the difference between the successful andthe unsuccessful national economies. In the mission for the creation of afriendly atmosphere for achieving results in the filed of economy, the Parliamentcan have a constructive, but also a destructive role. If regulatory blockadesoccur within the Parliament, and this is done only because of procedural orpolitical reasons, then the question is what is the message that is being sentin the context of the creation of a culture of trust with the players in the economyand the citizens.

The current Rules of Procedure, in the opinion of a number of experts, isnot consistent with the modern European parliamentarism. In the Assemblythere is still a lack of broad support for the adoption of new Rules - a fact thatundoubtedly impacts the process of harmonisation with the European laws.

Abstract



Bibliografija

1. Franc Grad – Usoglasuvawe na Nacionalnoto sobranie naRepublika Slovenija so procesite na evropskata integracija

2. d-r Drago Zajc – Usoglasuvawe na Slovene~kiot parlament sointegracionite procesi na EU

3. Ordinance on the organisation and tasks of the service of Sobranieof the Republic of Macedonia, draft 26 July 2005

4. Rabotna verzija na Predlog za donesuvawe na Delovnik naSobranieto na Republika Makedonija, EU tvining programa2006

5. Prezentacija na dosega{nite rezulatati na Tvining proektotkomponenta 4 – Sobranie na Republika Makedonija, 2006

6. Koen Muylee, expert of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council ofEurope ñ Analysis of the Draft Rules of Procedure of the Parliamentof Republic of Macedonia

7. Komparativna analiza na delovnici za rabota na parlamentitena zemjite od sosedstvoto i Evropa, Sektor za istra‘uvawe ianaliza, Sobranie na RM, 2006

8. Delovnik na Sobranieto na Republika Makedonija (Sl. vesnikna R. Makedonija, br. 60/02)

9. Delovnik na Vladata na Republika Makedonija (Sl. vesnik naR. Makedonija, br. 59/00, 12/03, 55/05 i 37/06)

10. Predlozi za donesuvawe na Delovnik na Sobranieto naRepublika Makedonija: dekemvri 2006; fevruari 2007; juli2007

11. d-r Wolfgang Zeh, zamenik generalen sekretar vo germanskiotBundestag – Izve{taj od konsultaciite vodeni od 27.11. do2.12.2006 godina vo vrska so Delovnikot na Sobranieto naRepublika Makedonija, Sobranie na RM

12. Amedee Turner, po~esen ~len na Evropskiot parlament.Predlozi za dopolnuvawe, izmenuvawe i pojasnuvawe naPredlog na delovnikot na Sobranieto, 30 januari 2002 iSogleduvawa za rabotata na Makedonskoto sobranie, EU ñPHARE, MA ñ 9684 ñ 03/01-0069, Skopje, fevruari 2002

13. OECD (2004a), Regulatory Performance: Ex-Post Evaluation ofRegulatory Tools and Institutions, OECD, Paris

14. The American Bar Association; Central and East European LawInitiative (CEELI) ñ Analysis of Proposal for the Regulations of theAssembly of the Republic of Macedonia, March 9, 1994


Za avtorite

Za

av

to

ri

te

Aleksandra Davitkovska, rodena1981 godina vo Skopje. Taa e magis-ter po Javna administracija naAppalachian State University vo So-edinetite Amerikanski Dr‘avikade magistrirala na tezata "Eko-nomskiot razvoj preku dano~niolesnuvawa i klasteri#.

Elena @ikoska e rodena vo Skopjena 19 april 1980 godina. Vo 2005godina diplomira na Ekonomskiotfakultet vo Skopje, smer marke-ting. Vo momentov e magistrant napostdiplomskite studii za statis-ti~ki metodi za biznis i ekonomija,vo organizacija na Ekonomskiotfakultet vo Skopje, UniverzitetotRoma III od Rim i UniverzitetotCarlos III od Madrid.

Vesna Zabijakin – ̂ atleska, rode-na 1967 god. vo Skopje. Raboti kakoproekt menaxer vo firmata "6ti Maj#,Skopje. Magister po menaxment na~ove~ki resursi, Institut za socio-lo{ki i politi~ko-pravni istra-`uvawa – Univerzitet "Sv. Kiril iMetodij#, Skopje. Pole na nau~eninteres: strate{ki menaxment na~ove~ki resursi, organizaciskakultura, menaxment na promeni.

Mitko Jovanov, roden na 10.10.1974godina vo Veles. Diplomiran poli-tikolog i magistrant na Institutotza istorija na Filozofskiot fa-kultet pri Univerzitetot "Kiril i

Metodij# vo Skopje. Porane{en sti-pendist na Fondacijata "KonradAdenauer#.

Ulrih Klepman, roden e vo 1968 g.,diplomiran ekonomist, oficijalenpretstavnik na fondacijata "Kon-rad Adenauer# vo Republika Make-donija.

Aleksandar Kostadinov, roden1980 god. vo [tip. Student na post-diplomski studii na Univerzitetotvo Bolowa. Diplomiran ekonomist;departman Nadvore{na trgovija,Ekonomski fakultet – Univerzitet"Sv. Kiril i Metodij#, Skopje. Polena nau~en interes: ekonomski poli-tiki na zemjite vo tranzicija, poli-tiki za privlekuvawe stranski di-rektni investicii i trgovska raz-mena vo zemjite od Zapaden Balkan.

Pen~o Kuzev e roden na 03.01.1980god. vo Veles. Diplomira na Prav-niot fakultet vo Skopje, a magis-trira na Pravniot fakultet voBremen, Germanija. Toj e doktorantna Bremenskiot univerzitet istipendist na Fondacijata "KonradAdenauer#. Pokraj raboteweto voadvokatska kancelarija, negovonajzna~ajno rabotno iskustvo eu~estvoto vo rabotata na Pravnatakomisija na germanskiot Bundestagi vo Pravniot sektor na Evropskiotkoncern EADS-Airbus.


Za avtorite

Marjan Maxovski e {ef na Kabi-netot na Pretsedatelot na Sobra-nieto na Republika Makedonija.Dodiplomski studii zavr{il naPravniot fakultet vo Skopje priUniverzitet "Sv. Kiril i Metodij#.Magister po Javno pravo na Insti-tutot za socijalni, pravni i poli-ti~ki istraùvawa pri Univer-zitet "Sv. Kiril i Metodij# – Skop-je. Magisterskata teza ja fokusirana: "Dràvnite slu`benici i reali-zaciite na dràvniot-slu`benkarakter na javnata administracijavo Republika Makedonija# (2005);Gra|ansko pravo; Dràvni slu`-benici; Javnata administracija iinstituciite; Komparativni me|u-narodni standardi i javno pravo;Me|unarodni standardi za ~ovekoviprava; U~esnik vo podgotovkata naZakonot za lustracija (2007) –Sobranie na Republika Makedonija.

Kiril Nejkov, roden 1977 vo Skop-je. Toj e magister po Me|unarodnopravo na Univerzitetot vo Kembrix.

Maja Pavlovi} diplomirala naDr‘avniot univerzitet vo Floridavo 2001 godina. Momentalno epostdiplomec na Ekonomskiot fa-kultet pri Univerzitetot "Sv. Ki-ril i Metodij# – Skopje. Od 2006godina raboti kako sorabotnik zakorporativni finansii vo Make-donski telekomunikacii. Od 1999do 2006 rabotela vo SAD, primarnovo bankarskiot sektor.

Anita Popovska e rodena vo 1982god. Taa e istra‘uva~ vo "Centarotza ekonomski analizi#, kako i ~leni nacionalen pretstavnik na Make-donija pri "Svetskata asocijacija na

dano~ni obvrznici# so sedi{te voStokholm. Voedno, taa e i osnova~i ~len na Izvr{niot odbor na di-rektori na "Institutot za ekonom-ski strategii i me|unarodni odnosi#– Ohrid. Momentalno taa e studentna poslediplomskite studii po"Inovacija, strategija i organiza-cija# pri Judge Business School naUniverzitetot vo Kembrix. Nejzi-nite istra‘uva~ki interesi senaso~eni kon strate{koto plani-rawe i autsorsing, implikaciite naautsorsingot vrz globalnata ekono-mija vo 21 vek, procesot na tranzi-cija na porane{nite planski ekono-mii, novite raste~ki pazari itn.

Mihaela Ristovska e rodena 1979godina vo Tetovo. Taa e magister poPravni nauki, Evropsko i kompa-rativno pravo na Univerzitetot voGent, Belgija.

[enaj Haximustafa e rodena na04.05.1979 vo Skopje. Svoite studiigi zavr{uva vo 2001 godina na Eko-nomskiot fakultet vo Skopje, naso-ka Menaxment. Nejzinoto obrazo-vanie prodol‘uva so posledi-plomski studii vo oblasta na Eko-nomskiot razvoj i Me|unarodnitefinansii vo istata institucija,kade i se zdobiva so zvaweto magis-ter po ekonomski nauki. Taa imarabotno iskustvo vo nekolku insti-tucii. Zapo~nuvaj}i so rabota voT.X. Ziraat Bankasi – Skopje (2001),potoa kako del od USAID finan-siraniot Proekt za fiskalni re-formi (2002), prodol‘uvaj}i sorabota vo Prokredit banka – Skopje(2003) i, na kraj, od 2004 godina taaraboti kako asistent na Jugoisto~-niot evropski univerzitet – Tetovo.

Politicka misla 19

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