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Political Science
Eric KeelsPh.D. Candidate
Department of Political ScienceUniversity of North Texas
Post-War Electoral Reform and Peace Duration
Following Negotiated Settlements
Political Science
Building Peace after Civil Wars
Negotiated settlements are often unstable Post-civil war peacebuilding and civil war
recurrenceo Peacebuilding security objectiveso Successful Agreements
Reduce Commitment Problems (Walter 2002; Fortna 2004; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003)
Share Information (Mattes and Savun 2010) Raise costs for Defection (Mattes and Savun 2009)
o Peacebuilding and democratization
Incompatibility between security and democracy objectives
Political Science
War-to-Democracy Dilemma
Democratization may generate post-civil war instabilityo Paris (2004), Jarstad and Sisk (2008), Autesserre
(2009), Brancati and Snyder (2013) Democracy objectives may undermine post-war
security
Security objectives may undermine post-war democracy
How can post-war governments maintain security while instituting democratic reforms?
Political ScienceFalse Dichotomy
Post-Civil War Democratization and Securityo Joshi et al (2015)
Primary focus on elections rather than democracy more broadlyo Democracy Requires:
Broad participation Open competition Meaningful translation of votes into national
representation
Political ScienceTheory: Electoral Reform and
Peace Duration
Revisions to electoral laws act as a signal to opponents that the incumbent government is committed to the peace process
Revisions to electoral laws make it more difficult for dissidents to renege on peace process
Political ScienceTheory: Electoral Laws
Electoral laws have historically been a way for governments to limit political competition
Laws determine who is allowed to participate (vote or run for office) and how votes are translated into representation (electoral systems)
Post-war elections may occur under the old electoral system which limits competition
Political ScienceTheory: Reform as a Signal
Electoral reforms are costly for elites in the incumbent governmento Past systems may have ensured access to
goods and serviceso Elites shoulder considerable risk by alienating
their supporters
Implementing these reforms act as a costly signal that elites are interested in the peace process
H1: The implementation of electoral reforms called for in peace agreements reduces the risk of civil war recurrence.
Political Science
Theory: Reform as a Deterrent
Electoral reforms should make the initial post-civil war election more stableo Armed militant groups have an incentive to abandon
the peace process after losing (Brancati and Snyder 2013)
o Militant groups rely on some civilian supporto Electoral reforms make conventional participation more
attractive than supporting violent dissent
H2: First post-war elections that occur after electoral reforms are implemented reduce the risk of civil war recurrence as compared to first post-war elections that occur when no electoral reform has taken place.
Political Science Research Design
Post-Civil War Comprehensive Peace Agreements from 1989-2010 o UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset (Kreutz 2010)o UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Högbladh 2011)o Peace Accords Matrix (Joshi and Darby 2012)
Dependent Variable: Civil War Recurrence (0,1) Independent Variable: Electoral Reform
o 0=No reform implemented, 1= Reform initiated, 2=Partial implementation, 3=Fully implemented
Independent Variable: First Post-War Election*Electoral Reforms
Political ScienceResearch Design cont.
Controls o Agreement Provisions: Disarmament, Demobilization,
and Reintegration. Transitional Power-Sharing and Peacekeeping
o Conflict Variables: Conflict Intensity, Conflict Duration, Ethnic Conflict, Incompatibility with Government
o Government Controls: Polity IIo Economic Controls: Logged GDP Per Capita
Unit of Analysis: Post-war Country Year Model: Weibull Duration Model
o Robustness checks with Cox Proportional Hazard Models and LogLogistic Duration Models
o Used Selection Models for robustness
Political Science
Results: Electoral Reforms after Full Implementation
Substantive Results
Predicted Impact on Recurrence
Actual Impact on Recurrence
Statistically Significant?
Reduction in Risk of Recurrence
H1 Electoral Reforms
Negative
Negative
Yes
(Reject H0 by 95%)
97.2%
H2Electoral Reforms *First Election
Negative
Negative
Yes(Reject H0 by
99%)
99.9%
Political Science
Impact of Electoral Reforms cont.
Table II:Hazard Ratios for each stage of implementation
Electoral Reforms
Initiated
Electoral Reforms
Mostly Implemented
Electoral Reforms Fully Implemented
Electoral Reform Implementation
Reduced Risk by
69.7%
Reduced Risk by
90.9%
Reduced Risk by
97.2%
Political ScienceGraphical Illustration
Figure I: The Impact of Electoral Reforms on the Survival of Peace Following Negotiated Settlements
Political ScienceFurther Robustness Checks
Examine rates of Pro-Government and Antigovernment violence after civil warso SCAD dataset (Salehyan et al 2011)o Peace agreements in Africa and Latin Americao Measured simple inclusion of Electoral Reform in peace
agreementso Reduced rates pro-government violence by 76.8% o Reduced rates of antigovernment violence by 81%o Results remain robust when only looking at election
violence
Political Science
Substantive Findings and Conclusion
Post-Civil War Electoral Reforms o Reduce the risk of civil war recurrence
Implementing these costly reforms signals a willingness to abide by the peace process
o Ensures that post-war elections are stable Reduces the ability of dissidents to abandon the peace process
by allowing conventional participation
o Results remain robust when looking at post-war event data
Political ScienceThank you for your time
Questions?
Eric KeelsPh.D. Candidate Department of Political ScienceUniversity of North [email protected]
Political ScienceDescriptive Statistics
Descriptive Statistics
Total Peace Agreements Electoral Reform Inclusion
Average Implementation
MinimumImplementation
Maximum Implementation
37 57% 1.37 0 3
Political ScienceFull Model
Table I Weibull Hazard Model on Risk of Peace Failure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Implemented Disarmament -8.816*** -8.835*** -8.788*** (0.453) (0.456) (0.472)Implemented Demobilization 1.883*** 1.872** 1.660** (0.702) (0.753) (0.713)Implemented Reintegration -8.756*** -9.193*** -8.167*** (1.305) (1.846) (0.716)Implemented Transitional Political Power-Sharing 0.0391 0.0168 0.0158 (0.343) (0.344) (0.342)lnGDP Per Capita -0.589 -0.619 -0.617 (0.470) (0.457) (0.450)Major War 1.715 1.773* 1.768* (1.070) (1.067) (1.059)War Duration -1.296*** -1.299*** -1.305*** (0.111) (0.113) (0.106)Government Incompatibility 0.119 0.140 0.150 (0.753) (0.765) (0.760)Polity II -0.157** -0.162** -0.162** (0.0627) (0.0653) (0.0650)Peacekeeping Operation 0.179 0.254 0.248 (0.721) (0.725) (0.720)First Post-war Election 0.660 0.690 (1.180) (1.200)Implementation of Electoral Reforms -1.156** -1.231** -1.214** -1.193** (0.470) (0.598) (0.594) (0.599)Electoral Reform*First Election -7.147*** (1.012)Ethnic War -0.500 -0.500 -0.497 (0.762) (0.766) (0.765)Constant -2.170*** 2.573 2.629 2.618 (0.310) (3.292) (3.260) (3.224) P 0.78 1.22 1.24 1.24
6.04** 1736.95*** 1634.08*** 2586.91***Observations 329 329 329 329
Coefficients Listed. Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Political Science DDR Robustness Check
Table IV DDR Index Check Model 1 DDR Index -69.73*** (3.645)Transitional Political Power-Sharing 0.0158 (0.342)lnGDP Per Capita -0.617 (0.450)Major War 1.768* (1.059)War Duration -1.328*** (0.104)Government Incompatibility 0.150 (0.760)Polity II -0.162** (0.0650)Peacekeeping Operation 0.248 (0.720)First Post-war Election 0.690 (1.200)Implementation of Electoral Reforms -1.193** (0.599)Electoral Reform*First Election -7.247*** (1.012)Ethnic War -0.497 (0.765)Constant 2.643 (3.224) Chi Squared 2253.24***P 1.24Observations 329
Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Political Science
Selection Model (whether reforms are implemented)
Log Logistic Regression Selection Model Selection Stage
(Probit Predicting Implementation)Full Model
(Log Logistic Duration Model)
Integrated Army 1.700** -2.009** (0.705) (0.931)
DDR -0.483 -1.418 (0.764) (1.435)
GDP per Capita -4.60e-05 0.00148** (6.60e-05) (0.000696)
Peacekeeping Operation 2.326** -4.814 (0.928) (3.009)
Polity II -0.300 (0.254)
Major War -2.400*** (0.651)
War Duration 0.354** (0.145)
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.900 (1.078)
Electoral Reforms 12.19*** (3.032)
Inverse Mills Ratio -1.564** (0.739)Monopoly Ethnic Group -2.570* (1.413)
Political Power-Sharing 0.121 (0.760)
Constant -2.992*** 11.40*** (1.128) (3.981) Observations 371 308
18.88*** 381.62***Gamma 0.54
(0.30)
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Inverse Mills Ratio measures degree of selection effects.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Political Science
Selection Model (Whether reforms are included in peace
agreement)Bivariate Probit Model Predicting a) Choice to Include Electoral Reform and b) Choice to Return to Civil War
Model I
Equation Predicting Return to Violence Implementation of Electoral Reforms -1.00
(0.41)**GDP Per Capita -0.0003
(0.0001)***War Duration 0.10
(0.04)**Major War 0.86
(0.32)***Peacekeeping Operation 0.16
(0.45)Polity II -0.07
(0.03)**Transitional Power-sharing Government 0.38
(0.36)Ethnic War 0.44
(0.37)T1 -0.13
(0.04)***T2 0.03
(0.05)T3 -0.02
(0.03)Constant 230.3
(113.6)**Equation Predicting the Inclusion of Electoral Reforms in Peace Agreements
Peacekeeping Operation 1.09 (0.49)**
GDP Per Capita 0.00001(0.00004)
Ethnic War -1.65 (0.50)***
Polity II -0.08 (0.04)*
Past Experience with Democracy 0.28(0.44)
Constant 0.55(0.44)
Rho -0.23(Not statistically different) 77.32***N 357
Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
Political ScienceSCAD Data
TABLE INegative Binomial RegressionTotal Violence vs. Election Related Violence
Total Antigovernment
Violence
Election Antigovernment
Violence
Total ProGovernment
Violence
Election ProGovernment
Violence Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Lagged Antigovernment Violence 0.274** 0.149 (0.114) (0.161) Electoral Reform -1.660* -4.359** -1.460** -5.152*** (0.858) (2.050) (0.590) (1.339)Disarmament 0.256 1.570*** 0.198 1.159*** (0.201) (0.339) (0.244) (0.353)First Election -0.856 1.893** -0.155 4.013*** (0.547) (0.785) (0.724) (1.115)Peacekeeping Operation -0.875 -1.407 -2.110*** -2.683** (0.631) (1.854) (0.517) (1.109)Ongoing Civil War -0.405 -1.992** -0.149 -1.822 (0.378) (0.789) (0.512) (1.191)Transitional Power-Sharing 0.430** 1.579*** 0.780*** 1.517*** (0.204) (0.540) (0.241) (0.431)Infant Mortality Rate -0.00258 0.0100 0.0181 -0.0109 (0.00877) (0.0267) (0.0119) (0.0222)Total Casualties 1.48e-06** 2.98e-06 2.70e-06*** 3.62e-06* (6.10e-07) (2.72e-06) (5.40e-07) (2.08e-06)Duration 0.00282 0.00792 0.00204 8.94e-05 (0.00231) (0.00592) (0.00272) (0.00527)Lagged Polity II -0.0544 -0.0566 -0.0160 0.210*** (0.0408) (0.0633) (0.0372) (0.0754)Lagged Pro-Government Violence 0.522 -0.134 (0.343) (0.231)Constant -0.0270 -5.184* -3.066* -3.277 (1.122) (2.921) (1.571) (2.608) 75.00*** 188.62*** 56.79*** 516.46***
Alpha 3.73 17.1 5.03 20.3Observations 260 260 260 260
Coefficients listed. Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1