Political Reform and Fiscal Decentralization Revised

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    POLITICAL REFORM AND FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION:

    COMPARING THE PHILIPPINES WITH CHINA

    Philip Camara, February 4, 2010

    THE POLITICAL POWER OF MONEY

    In the Philippines, with its march towards decline, it has become difficult to

    separate money from power. Candidate Manuel Villar said it best when he

    said that he has prepared his budget to run for the presidency and only

    considered worthy challengers as those who likewise had pledges for the

    vast sums, estimated at P4 to 8 billion, needed for a serious run for the

    highest office.

    Our big-bucks political electoral system locates itself at the center of the

    disease that traps our country in a vicious cycle of maldevelopment wherepublic office is a franchise for private returns.

    The ultimate catch is the Office of the Presidency and in this paper I hope to

    shed light on the enormous financial resources at hand, just from the regular

    budget, our taxes, that along with the ultimate control over our vast natural

    resources and investment flows are easily worth the billions in campaign

    funds. I would like to compare the Philippines with China to contrast and

    highlight our governance fiscal structure dysfunctionalities.

    HIGHLY CENTRALIZED FISCAL OPERATION IN RP, NOT SO IN CHINA

    It is hard to find other countries with similar concentration of government

    revenues and spending with the Central Government as opposed to the

    spending by component Local Governments as that of the Philippines.

    The Philippines(2007 Figures; in

    Million Pesos)

    Central* Local**Revenue 1,096,875

    .01234,760.

    08% to Total 82.37% 17.63%Expenditure

    1,029,377.66

    194,736.81

    % to Total 84.09% 15.91%*Net of IRA of P146,591.95 million**Inclusive of IRA of P146,591.95 millionSource: Philippine Commission on Audit 2007 Financial Reports

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    Keep in mind that the figure for Local Governments includes all 1,600 plus

    LGUs in the Philippines. And while 30% of the National Budget is used for

    debt service, still a disproportionately large per cent of the Total Government

    Budget is under the control of the Philippine President. This is not really that

    surprising considering that our government was originally organized by our

    colonial masters for the purpose of centralization and exploitation.

    Apparently, our government today continues in that role. And it is from this

    highly centralized control of the expenditures that a sitting President can

    recoup investments in getting elected.

    Ironically, it is the Chinese Communist Dictatorship that has a well developed

    devolved fiscal system. Not only is there a good sharing of tax revenue

    between the Central and Local Governments, we find that the Central

    government even shares from its revenue take with the Local Governments

    bumping up the share of Chinese Local Governments Expenditures to over

    70% of total government expenditure.

    China (2004Figures; 100M

    Yuan)

    Central LocalRevenue 14,503.

    1011,893.

    37% to Total 54.90

    %45.10

    %Expenditure

    7,894.08

    20,592.81

    % to Total 27.70%

    72.30%

    Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

    Evidently, having the Local Governments conduct such a large share of the

    Peoples Tax & Collection Money is a big factor in China being the fastest

    growing economy in the world. They have been successful in unleashing the

    productive energies of their people by putting expenditures for government

    services closer to the people.

    LOCAL GOVERNMENTS SHORT-CHANGED

    Indeed, given such a low share of Philippine Government expenditures while

    having to absorb important front line expensive services such as in health &

    agriculture since 1992, it is not surprising that we have become more food

    and health insecure as a result of LGUs being short-changed. Not so in China

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    as we have seen above where the Central Government even gives more to

    the Local Governments from its own collections to support front line service

    delivery. For a comparison of Philippine Local Government and China Local

    Government expenditure responsibility please turn to Annex 1.

    DYSFUNCTIONAL LOCAL REVENUE SOURCES: ROOT OF PATRONAGE

    The way our fiscal system works is really quite insane. You would think that

    any designer of a fiscal system would build in an incentive match between

    the economic performance of an area and its tax revenues. Not so in the

    Philippines. For Provinces and Municipalities, for example, the dependency

    on Internal Revenue Allotments or IRA are 83% and 78%, respectively. IRA

    allocation, in turn, has 3 factors: equalization, population and size of

    territory. None of these 3 factors have anything to do with the economic

    performance of the Province or Municipality! In fact, the easiest way for a

    Municipality to massively expand its IRA is simply to lobby to the politicalbenefactors above to allow its conversion into a City where, due to the

    equalization factor, they automatically have a large increase in IRA. (No

    Local Executive is rewarded for exceptional economic performance except

    for the cities which serve as the Corporate domiciles such as Makati, Quezon

    City, Cebu City, etc. due to the business tax based on their nation-wide

    income generation.)

    LocalGovernment

    Units IRA

    % to

    Total Local Taxes % to Total

    IRA and IncomeLocal

    Taxes &

    Income

    TOTAL146,591,948

    .4082,349,413

    .05

    Provinces43,011,998.

    49 29.34%8,963,717.

    84 83%

    Cities43,043,605.

    14 29.36%55,972,204

    .00 43%

    Municipalities60,536,344.

    81 41.30%17,453,490

    .92 78%

    Source: Figures are from the Philippine Commission on Audit 2007 Financial Reports and BIR website

    These are the sources of LGU Revenue:

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    The Philippines

    Local Taxes such as:

    Business Tax ( neglible for non-domicle areas of largecorporations).

    Real Property Tax

    Transfer Tax

    Franchise Tax

    Printing and Publication Tax

    Amusement Tax

    Community Tax

    Share in National Taxes

    Internal revenue Allotment (IRA) representing 40% of internal revenuecollections based on the third preceding year (Regional distribution is asfollows: Provinces 23%; Cities 23%; Municipalities 34%; and Barangays20%

    Non-Tax Revenue

    Share in national wealth exploitation in their area

    Share in the earnings of government agencies or government-owned orcontrolled corporations engaged in the utilization and development ofnational wealth in their area based on the following: 1% of the grosssales or receipts of the preceding calendar year or 40% of mining taxes,royalties, forestry or fishery charges and such other taxes, fees orcharges including related surcharges, interests, or fines, whichever ishigher

    While Provincial and Municipal LGUs are given the authority to raise new

    sources of revenue under the Local Government Code, it is not surprising the

    few turn to this option considering the already over-taxed and short-changed

    status of the Filipino.

    In contrast, Chinas system for LGU revenue raising is eminently sensical:

    there is more Local Government Revenue when the citizens and the

    enterprises perform well. For here are the sources of Local Revenue for

    Chinese Local Governments:

    China

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    Local Taxes such as:

    Business Tax

    Income Tax of enterprises subordinate to the local government

    Personal income tax

    Tax on the use of urban land

    Tax on the adjustment of the investment in fixed assets Tax on town maintenance and construction

    Tax on real estates

    Tax on the use of vehicle and ships, stamp tax, slaughter tax

    Tax on agriculture and animal husbandry

    Tax on special agriculture products

    Tax on the occupancy of cultivated land, contract tax

    Shared Taxes

    25% of the value added tax

    50% of the tax on stock dealing (stamp tax)

    Tax on resources other than the ocean petroleum resources

    Non-Tax Revenue

    State-owned assets profit

    Planning subsidies to loss-suffering state-owned enterprises

    Income from administrative fees

    Penalty and confiscatory income

    Income from use of sea area, field and diggings

    Expert project income

    Other income

    Just compare the 10 sources of Philippine LGU revenue sources with that of

    the 20 juicy ones of their Chinese counterparts (and weep!). There, in a

    snapshot, is the tap root and dynamic of Philippine patronage

    politics. Patronage politics, in turn, is the mother of corruption. LGUs

    (and their citizens) have been disempowered and the ticket for a Local

    Government Chief Executive to more projects and funds is by joining the

    bandwagon of the President.

    CENTRALIZED REVENUE SYSTEM LEADS TO LOW COLLECTION RATES

    The Philippines has one of the lowest percentages of revenue collections to

    our Gross Domestic Product standing at around 15.50%. Take a look at the

    same figure for other countries:

    REVENUE EFFORT (% of GDP) 2008

    United States 28.20%

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    United Kingdom 39.00%

    Australia 30.50%

    Japan 27.40%

    Philippines15.40

    %

    It is not surprising that our Revenue Effort will be low due to the disconnect

    between economic (GDP) performance and the tax collecting unit, unlike

    China (and even in the United States, Australia and Japan) where Local

    Governments sources of revenue are connected to the GDP (income of the

    economy in one given year). This connection is critical as the Local share of

    taxes become the basis for the Central governments collections as well.

    What does it gain a Philippine LGU if tax collections in their area go up sincethe increase does not necessarily mean a larger IRA for their particular area

    especially if other LGUs are slouches when it comes to assisting tax

    collections of the national government?

    IMPROVING TAX COLLECTIONS

    What can be done as a quick fix to input incentives for both the National and

    Local Governments to improve tax collections? Immediately, an incentive

    scheme must be implemented. A simple one would be to regionalize tax

    collection and spending whereby Regional Development Councils are

    empowered to supervise BIR regional Revenue District Offices and directly

    retain for the component LGUs the IRA from these collections. A share of

    improved collections (above BIR targets for that region) should stay in the

    region for funding historical levels of National Regional expenditures.

    In this way, in a simple stroke we make our dysfunctional system just a little

    bit more rationale and lead to improved collections, as is clearly shown by

    both China (and even the United States shown in the table above).

    Regional Fiscal and Governance Decentralization has the power to unleash

    the creative potentials and energies of Filipinos who have turned apatheticfrom centuries of dysfunctional governance systems that simply strengthen

    the few in the hope that benefits will trickle down to the surrounding areas

    (principle of Superiority). This is pinatulo. True transformation beyond lip

    service can only mean moving towards strengthening the bottom-up or

    Pinatubo principle where the concept of government is that of a nurturer of

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    individual, community and enterprise initiatives towards productive and

    dignified lives. That is the principle of Subsidiarity.

    ANNEX 1

    LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ALLOCATION

    The Philippines

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    The general expenditure which localgovernments incur is consist of:

    Personal Services (45-55% ofthe total budget)

    Infrastructure development and

    maintenance

    The cost of delivering basicservices out of local governmentexistence

    Payments of debts and othermandatory obligations

    Sources: Country Report- the Philippines-United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and

    the Pacific; Local Government Code

    China

    Expenditure for armed police troopsExpenditure for capital constructionExpenditure for comprehensivedevelopment of agricultureExpenditure for circulating fundsExpenditure for city maintenanceExpenditure for developing land and seaareaExpenditure for foreign affairs

    Expenditure for geological prospectingExpenditure for governmentadministrationExpenditure for innovation enterprisesExpenditure for national defenseExpenditure for operating expenses ofagriculture, forestry, water conservationand meteorologyExpenditure for operating expenses ofdepartment of industry & transportationExpenditure for operating expenses ofdepartment of commerce

    Expenditure for operating expenses ofdepartment of culture, sport &broadcasting

    Expenditure for operating expenses ofeducationExpenditure for operating expense s ofdepartment of sciencesExpenditure for operating expenses ofdepartment of tax, etc.Expenditure for price subsidiesExpenditure for public security agency,procuratorial agency and court of justice.

    Expenditure for public healthExpenditure for pensions and relief funds forsocial welfareExpenditure for retired persons inadministrative departmentsExpenditure for supporting agricultureproductionExpenditure for science and technologypromotionExpenditure on subsidies to social securityprogramsExpenditure for supporting underdeveloped

    areasExpenditure for special items and otherexpenditure

    Source: Country Report China-United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific