1

Political Opportunities, Resource Constraints, and Policy Advocacy of

Environmental NGOs in China

Forthcoming at Public Administration

Xueyong Zhan (corresponding author)

Assistant Professor

Department of Management and Marketing

The Hong Kong Polytechnic University

Hung Hom, Kowloon, Hong Kong

Email: msxzhan@polyu.edu.hk

Tel: (852)3400-3648

&

Shui-Yan Tang

Professor

School of Policy, Planning, and Development

University of Southern California, CA, U.S.A.

Acknowledgment:

An earlier version of this article was presented at the Symposium on ―Reform and

Transition in Public Administration Theory and Practice in Greater China‖ at the

University of Hong Kong, February, 2010. The authors would like to thank anonymous

reviewers and the editors for helpful comments on earlier versions of the article. Research

for the article was supported in part by the Departmental Research Fund for New

Academic Staff (Project No. 4-ZZ8A) of Department of Management and Marketing, the

Hong Kong Polytechnic University and a Faculty Research Grant of the US-China

Institute, University of Southern California.

2

Political Opportunities, Resource Constraints, and Policy Advocacy of

Environmental NGOs in China

Abstract

Drawing on political opportunity and resource dependency theories, this paper traces the

development of 28 environmental NGOs (eNGOs) in China and examines the political and

institutional factors that have constrained or facilitated these organizations‘ policy

advocacy activities. The paper shows that political structural changes have created greater

opportunities for eNGOs‘ policy advocacy, and eNGOs with better financial resources and

connections to the party-state system are more capable of utilizing these opportunities to

enhance their policy advocacy capacity. Yet party-state connections may in turn constrain

the types of policy advocacy pursued by these eNGOs.

3

Political Opportunities, Resource Constraints, and Policy Advocacy of

Environmental NGOs in China

INTRODUCTION

A well-functioning civil society is one of the key forces for enhancing government

accountability and democratizing public governance (Huntington 1991; Putnam et al. 1993;

Hadenius and Uggla 1996; Berman 1997; Inglehart 1997; Diamond 1999; Anheier and

Salamon 2006). In turn, democratic institutions such as freedom of assembly and open

elections, together with other supporting policies such as a tax-exempt status for nonprofits,

are essential for the growth of civil society organizations. Brian O‘Connell argued that ‗a

vibrant civil society is most likely to thrive in a vibrant democracy and vice versa‘

(O‘Connell 2000, p. 477). His observation highlights the difficulties of civil society

development in countries that lack supportive political institutions. This is especially true

for China whose authoritarian system lacks a well-developed legislative framework and

institutional channels for citizen participation in public policy and administration (Lo and

Leung 2000).

As key players in China‘s civil society, non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

have drawn increasing academic attention in the last two decades (White et al. 1996; Chan

1997; Metzger 1998; Saich 2000; Howell 2004). Numerous empirical studies have

examined the development of NGOs in various fields, such as foster care (Shang 2002;

Shang and Wu 2003), environmental protection (Ho 2001 and 2007), trade unions (White

et al. 1996), HIV/AIDS prevention (Wu et al. 2007; Peersman et al. 2009), disaster relief

4

(Teets 2009), and urban neighborhood communities (He 2009; Heberer 2009). These

studies show some evidence of a growing NGO sector in contemporary China; yet Chinese

NGOs are still constrained by their limited organizational capacity, especially in relation to

policy advocacy.

Emerging since the early 1990s, environmental NGOs (eNGOs) are among the

most frequently studied NGOs in China (Ho 2001; Economy 2004; Schwartz 2004; Yang

2004; Yang 2005; Cooper 2006; Ru and Ortolano 2009; Wu 2009). In China, civic eNGOs

are operated by private citizens and are grassroots oriented, and they differ from other

types of eNGOs, such as government organized NGOs (GO-NGOs), student environmental

groups affiliated with universities/schools, and foreign/international eNGOs with

operations in China. According to two national surveys conducted by the All China

Environmental Federation, the total number of Chinese eNGOs increased from 2768 by the

end of year 2005 to 3539 by October 2008, and the total number of civic eNGOs almost

doubled between 2005 and 2008 (Cui 2008).

Unlike their counterparts in western countries, Chinese civic eNGOs have in

general been less involved in public policy advocacy and large-scale social movements.

Moreover, unlike a few other domestic civic groups that have attempted to challenge the

authoritarian system, Chinese eNGOs have largely adopted a non-confrontational stance

toward it (Ho 2001 and 2007). They have in general limited organizational capacity and

interest in policy advocacy (Lu 2007). Many important environmental issues, such as those

related to local environmental victims, have largely been ignored by eNGOs. Most eNGOs

also lack extensive grassroots support, and many, especially the larger ones, were founded

5

mainly with financial support provided by overseas foundations, which tend to avoid

politically sensitive activities (Ho 2007; Turner 2003; Economy 2004; Yang 2005). Yet

there have been signs in the past few years, especially after the tragic earthquake in

Sichuan in 2008, that some eNGOs have become more capable in mobilizing grassroots

support for their programs and engaging the media and, to a limited extent, government

authorities in policy discussions through various formal and informal channels (Teets

2009).

The development of eNGOs‘ policy advocacy activities thus provides a unique

window to examine the dynamics between political changes and civil society development

in China. Yet few existing studies trace these dynamics over time. Moreover, most studies

focus primarily on eNGOs in specific regions, predominantly Beijing and a few other

places. Another weakness of existing studies is their limited connections to standard social

science theories. While these studies have been enriched by data collected from field trips,

individual interviews, and personal reflections, few scholars have attempted to use existing

theories of political science or organizational studies to examine the development of NGOs

and civil society in China over time.

In this paper, we present an empirical study on the development of policy advocacy

among China‘s civic environmental eNGOs. Our research is based on two rounds of

interviews. The first round of interviews was conducted with 28 eNGOs between 2003 and

2005. In that study (Tang and Zhan 2008), we found that socio-economic transformations,

the accompanying environmental problems, and a partial retreat of the totalitarian party-

state have created conditions for the emergence of eNGOs in China. Specifically, we

6

identified the non-oppositional role of Chinese eNGOs in the public policy process and

their primary focus on environmental education and other non-political activities. To some

extent, many civic eNGOs, especially those with strong connections to local communities,

had been successful in ‗expressing their interests, exchanging information, and achieving

collective goals‘ (Diamond 1999) in the environmental arena. Yet due to a lack of solid

societal support, a heavy reliance on international funding, and various political

constraints, eNGOs had been less successful in attempts ‗to make demands on the state, to

improve the structure and functioning of the state, and to hold state officials accountable‘

(Diamond 1999).

Given the rapidly changing social, economic, and political landscapes in the past

decade, have there been changes in opportunities for increased policy advocacy for eNGOs

since our previous study? Which types of eNGOs have been more capable of utilizing new

advocacy opportunities? Have eNGOs adopted new advocacy strategies? In this paper, we

address these questions by (1) drawing on concepts derived from the political opportunity

and resource dependency literature, and (2) analyzing data we collected in 2009 and 2010

on the same set of eNGOs we studied back in 2003-2005.

In the latest round of data collection, we were able to conduct follow-up interviews

with some, but not all, of the 28 eNGOs we studied in the previous round. Based on data

obtained from these interviews and other secondary sources, we found that political

structural changes have given eNGOs greater opportunities for policy advocacy, and

eNGOs with better financial resources and political connections to the party-state system

are more capable of utilizing these opportunities to enhance their policy advocacy capacity.

7

Yet party-state connections may in turn constrain the types of policy advocacy pursued by

these eNGOs.

In the following sections, we first develop a framework of analysis that connects

concepts from political opportunity and resource dependency theories to scholarly

observations on recent political and social developments in China. The framework helps

assess how broader political and social developments in recent years may have impacted

the growth of eNGOs in China. We then explain our data collection and research methods

for addressing issues raised in our framework. Next we present the empirical findings, and

conclude by discussing the significance of the findings and directions for future research.

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES, AND

POLICY ADVOCACY

Changes in Political Opportunities

As posited by political opportunity theory, organizations seek to take advantage of

opportunities created by political changes (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). Social

movement organizations, in particular, seek to exploit opportunities resulting from changes

in institutional structures and informal power relations, of which several dimensions are

especially relevant: increasing openness of the political process, unstable alignments and

conflicts among political elites, and the government‘s decreased capacity and propensity

for political repression (Tarrow 1994).

During the 1980s and 1990s, for example, NGOs and civil society organizations

took advantage of several political opportunities—especially the opening of the political

8

process and the political system‘s decreased capacity and propensity for political

oppression—and acted to promote the transformation of many authoritarian regimes

(Kitschelt 1986; Tang and Tang 1997 and 1999; Kim 2000; Lim and Tang 2002). In recent

years, the Chinese central government‘s concerns for social stability, or in official terms ‗a

harmonious society‘, have encouraged government authorities at various levels to be more

supportive of NGOs as a vehicle for helping disadvantaged groups and for reducing social

conflicts, creating a more favorable context for eNGOs to play a more active role in

China‘s environmental policy.

Despite these positive signs, scholars differ in their assessments of the limits of

these political changes. Pei Minxin, for example, has raised doubts on the Chinese

Communist Party‘s willingness to share political power and to initiate genuine political

reform (Pei 1998 and 2006). Others note that the party-state apparatus had regularly

interfered with the development of civil society organizations (Ma 2002). Yet, as Johnson

(2003) indicates, the role of the state in China‘s public life has declined in recent years, and

the government cannot simply be labeled as an authoritarian regime with no space for

dissenting voices or voluntary organizations (Ho 2007). Heurlin (2010) argues that the

Chinese government‘s policy towards NGOs has moved from exclusion to corporatism

since the initiation of economic reform. Under some circumstances, party-state leaders

have felt compelled to relax the extensive political control of society and to tolerate some

types of voluntary actions by citizens and NGOs (Zhou 1993). The authoritarian state is

gradually loosening its firm grip on many aspects of society for a number of reasons.

9

First, along with China‘s open-door reform and the rise of a market economy, state-

society relations have undergone significant changes. Chinese society has become more

pluralistic, with its people having more diversified policy preferences and being less likely

to be unquestionably supportive of every government policy (Tang 2001; Mertha 2009).

As argued by Huntington (1968), for transitioning societies to maintain political order, the

political system needs to create institutional channels for widespread public participation.

China‘s transitional context has created opportunities for the emergence of civic NGOs that

represent diversified public preferences and work as intermediaries between citizens and

the state. Recent decades have witnessed the rise of civic organizations outside the control

of the party-state system, including civic groups established in the cyber space (Yang

2003a and 2003b), private neighborhood associations (Heberer 2009), and foreign NGOs

in China (Hsia and White 2002). Instead of simply commandeering society, the Chinese

state now has to ‗negotiate‘ with society in many circumstances (Saich 2000), partially

reflecting the gradual erosion of authoritarianism as well as the regime‘s resilience to adapt

to new political challenges (Nathan 2003). As argued by Ho (2007), the semi-authoritarian

political system in China both restricts and facilitates the embedded development of civil

society in recent years.

Second, as a result of the gradual decentralization of political and administrative

authorities, increasing conflicts have emerged between different levels of governments and

between different administrative divisions (Qian and Weingast 1996 and1997; Cai and

Treisman 2007). These structural conflicts within the party-state system have created

many opportunities for NGOs to participate in policy making and implementation. The

10

central and local governments, for example, differ significantly in their policy priorities,

with the former promulgating many environmental regulations and targets while the latter

being concerned primarily with local economic development issues (Tang et al. 2003; Lo

and Tang 2006). Within each level of government, both central and local, conflicts have

also emerged between environmental protection agencies and other administrative

divisions, especially those representing economic and land use interests (Lieberthal 1997;

Lo and Tang 2006). The great demand for more effective environmental protection has

made it necessary in many circumstances to involve eNGOs in the policy process. For

instance, the central government, especially the Ministry of Environmental Protection, has

begun to encourage, though limitedly, voluntary actions by citizens and eNGOs as

watchdogs of local governments and business firms against major pollution activities.

Third, the Chinese government has faced increasingly limited administrative

resources that are necessary to implement all policies or to provide social services

(O‘Brien and Li 1999; Ma 2002; Pei 2006). The relative scarcity of administrative

resources has led the Chinese government to relax its extensive control of civic

organizations and created opportunities for their growth. Recent studies, for example, have

identified the importance of the nonprofit sector in urban social service delivery (Tang and

Lo 2009) and self-organized groups in China‘s local governance (Tsai 2007). Numerous

well-functioning eNGOs in China have never legally registered with the government, a

signal that the Chinese government has not fully enforced its rules of social organization

registration. Thus, though varying from time to time, Chinese civil society organizations

can enjoy some organizational autonomy and political space. Certainly, the political

11

bottom line has always been clear: political opposition against the central government and

especially the Communist Party can never be tolerated.

Overall, China‘s political system has been moving towards a more fragmented, but

also resilient, authoritarian style since the initiation of market-oriented economic reform

(Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Lieberthal 1992; Nathan 2003; Lemaa and Rubyb 2007;

Mertha 2009), and such a setting has created more political opportunities and social space

for eNGOs to play a more active role in shaping public policy formulation and

implementation (Xie and Heijden 2010). Some eNGOs have taken advantage of the

conflicts between the central and local governments; some have also taken advantage of

legislative changes that instituted both public participation requirements for environmental

impact assessment and limited measures for governmental transparency.

During our first round of interviews in 2003-5, we found that similar to Peter Ho‘s

(Ho 2001) observation, leaders of civic eNGOs lacked both the will and the opportunity to

openly confront the central government (Tang and Zhan, 2008). Yet with the expansion of

public participation channels in the past few years, Chinese eNGOs could begin to take

advantage of conflicts between the central and local governments, and those between local

governments and local residents. Moreover, the expansion of the media and the increasing

popularity of the internet have also created more channels for eNGOs to appeal for direct

support from the grassroots public and to engage in policy debates. These developments

have provided eNGOs with political opportunities to engage in policy advocacy and

political actions.

Organizational Resources

12

Resource dependency theory (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978)

argues that organizations need resources—funding, people, information, and recognition—

from the outside world to survive and grow. Governments and foundations that provide

NGOs with critical resources and networking opportunities can potentially impact their

agendas and programs (Saidel 1991; Snow 1992; Delfin and Tang 2007). Dowie (1995),

for example, argues that through the grant conditions and the implicit expectations they

imposed on their NGO grantees, mainstream foundations in the United States may steer

their NGO grantees to less radical and more conservative social agendas. The theory has

been applied extensively to examine the development of nonprofit organizations in western

contexts (Heimovics et al. 1993; Froelich 1999; Guo and Acar 2005; Delfin and Tang

2007).

In the context of China, obtaining sufficient financial and human resources has

been a major challenge for civil society organizations (Schwartz 2004; Zhang and Baum

2004). Compared with their western counterparts, NGOs in China face stricter legal and

administrative barriers, which may affect their ability to obtain many kinds of resources.

For example, the most preferable registration status for eNGOs in China is ‗social

organizations with tax-exemption status‘, but in every local jurisdiction only one social

organization may obtain such a registration status in the environmental protection area. In

order to register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs for that status, a NGO must also find a

sponsoring organization that is either a governmental agency or a government-affiliated

organization. Thus many NGOs in China need to register as private non-profit

organizations or corporations, both of which face higher tax liabilities/rates. Non-

13

registration is an option for many NGOs; yet this status limits their capacity for building

public trust, social acceptance, fundraising and personnel recruitment, and eventually

policy advocacy.

As noted in our earlier study (Tang and Zhan 2008), Chinese civic eNGOs have for

many years relied on funding from foreign organizations, such as international foundations,

foreign governments, and multi-national corporations. Most of these funding sources,

especially those that have operations in China, try to avoid creating any political

controversies; thus most of their funding has been directed to politically neutral projects,

such as environmental education, species protection, conferences, etc. This political

preference of donors constitutes another external resource constraint of eNGOs in China.

Despite the continuing restrictions imposed by the government, Chinese eNGOs

have in recent years increased access to more diversified sources of funding than before,

including voluntary donations from foundations and businesses as well as grants and

contracts from governments. For example, in 2004, a group of successful business leaders

established the Society of Entrepreneurs and Ecology in Beijing seeking to provide grants

for civic eNGOs. With five to six million graduates leaving college each year, eNGOs have

also become less constrained by a lack of volunteers and staff. Moreover, informal social

connections (guanxi) between organizational leaders and the party-state establishment can

also be key resources for eNGOs to draw on to influence policy making and

implementation, and advance their organizational missions (Swanson et al. 2001). From

the perspective of resource dependency theory, these external resources may also affect the

type of activities, including policy advocacy, pursued by eNGOs.

14

Connecting Political Opportunities and Resource Dependency to Policy Advocacy

To examine how political opportunities and resource dependency affect eNGO

policy advocacy, we adopt a classification originally developed by Larry Diamond. In his

widely cited book Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (1999), Diamond

identifies six types of activities that NGOs may engage in: 1. ‗to express their interests,

passions, and ideas; 2. to exchange information; 3. to achieve collective goals; 4. to make

demands on the state; 5. to improve the structure and functioning of the state; and 6. to

hold state officials accountable‘ (Diamond 1999, p. 221). Diamond argues that the more

civil society organizations engage in activities further down the list, the more they can

contribute to the development of civic community and democratization. In recent years,

Diamond‘s classification has been widely used to study civil society development and

democratization in many countries, including Japan (Hirata 2002), Ethiopia (Teshome

2009), Vietam (Wischermann 2010), and Asian societies (Porio 2002). In our previous

study, we used Diamond‘s classification and reported that most of the Chinese eNGOs we

studied had limited their programs to type 1 to 3 activities, which can be termed as

‗nonpolitical activities‘; and only a few had limited engagement in type 4 to 6 activities

such as helping pollution victims and challenging local firms, which can be termed as

‗political activities‘ (Tang and Zhan 2008).

In this research, we treat eNGOs that focus primarily on type 4 to 6 activities as

policy advocacy groups. When eNGOs are engaged in these activities, they have to

interact with governments in an intensive or even confrontational way, which is inevitably

political in China. Given the transformations of the underlying political and institutional

15

constraints, the main conjecture of our research is that overall eNGOs in China have

increased their willingness and abilities in their engagement in type 4 to 6 political

activities. Furthermore, those that have increased engagement in political activities are (1)

those that have secured more stable and diversified financial and human resources, and (2)

those whose leaders have more extensive connections to the party-state system.

DATA COLLECTION AND RESEARCH METHODS

The first round of data collection was conducted from August 2003 to May 2005. We

originally contacted around 50 eNGOs in China based on information we collected from

the internet and public documents. We were able to interview leaders from 28 civic eNGOs,

among which 10 were Beijing-based, and the remaining18 were located in 14 provincial-

level jurisdictions, including Chongqing City, Fujian Province, Guangdong Province,

Hebei Province, Henan Province, Hubei Province, Hunan Province, Jiangsu Province,

Liaoning Province, Shandong Province, Sichuan Province, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous

Region, Yunnan Province, and Zhejiang Province. These interviews were conducted

through various methods, including face-to-face talks, phone calls, and email

communications. Although the original sample was not randomly selected, it covers more

than half of China‘s provincial level jurisdictions, representing a greater geographical

diversity in comparison with most other studies.

Between December 2009 and August 2010, we attempted to collect information on

the original 28 civic eNGOs and conducted a second-round of interviews with them. Four

of the original 28 eNGOs were no longer in operation (A03, A07, B05, B07, and the

16

coding is based on time sequence). We sent email messages or placed phone calls to

contact the remaining 24 eNGOs and were able to interview officials from 11 of these 24

eNGOs. In the summer of 2010, we visited Beijing and Chengdu and had face-to-face

conversations with officials of three among the 11 eNGOs. We were unable to conduct a

second interview on 13 of the 24 eNGOs. One eNGO explicitly declined our interview

invitation, citing a lack of time. The other 12 eNGOs did not respond to our invitations.

However, we were able to collect relevant information on them from other sources such as

their organizational websites and the China Development Brief which regularly provides

information on NGOs in China.

In the two rounds of data collection, we used semi-structured interviews. Questions

included organizational registration status, organizational activities, human resources,

financial resources, relationships with other NGOs and governmental agencies, and

challenges to organizational development. The interview results were supplemented by

documents from other sources, such as the organization‘s annual statements posted online,

third-party research reports, etc. Data collected in the two rounds of interviews and from

multiple other sources enables us to examine how Chinese eNGOs have developed in the

past five to six years.

In our latest round of data collection, we paid special attention to the eNGOs‘

policy advocacy and collective petition activities, which were relatively rare before 2005,

but have been increasing in recent years. In western societies, civil society organizations,

especially eNGOs, have had a long tradition of being leaders in policy advocacy and

broader social movements (Sabatier 1988; Minkoff 1997; Fox 2001). In China, however,

17

collective petitions and protests by individuals and civil society organizations can risk

being considered as political subversion. Although Chinese eNGOs might be committed to

the environmental cause, most had been disinclined to engage in overt policy advocacy

when organizational conditions and political environments remained unfavorable. Yet in

the past few years, some eNGOs appeared to have increased their involvement in policy

advocacy.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Operational and Registration Status

Organizational registration is a major administrative tool used by the Chinese government

to control the growth and activities of NGOs. Among the 28 civic eNGOs examined in the

first round, 24 of them are still active now, and four of them have ceased operation,

representing an 86 percent survival rate. Among the four non-active eNGOs, two are

Beijing-based and two are local ones. One Beijing-based eNGO merged with another

poverty reduction NGO in 2006; another Beijing-based eNGO appears to have ceased

operation before 2009; and both of them had legal registration status when they were

interviewed in the first round. Among the two local eNGOs, one with legal registration

status as social organization ceased operation in 2009. The registration of this organization

was canceled by the local Bureau of Civil Affairs in July 2009, and the announcement was

posted online. Another eNGO, a web-based group without registration, ceased operation

before 2009, and its original website is no longer accessible.

18

During the period, there has been no significant change in the procedural

requirement for registration with the government. As shown in Table 1, most eNGOs in

this sample have been able to maintain their registration status. One Beijing-based eNGO‘s

registration status changed from ‗corporation‘ to ‗private nonprofit organization‘, and one

local eNGO‘s registration status changed from ‗corporation‘ to ‗social organization‘. Yet

several other eNGOs reported difficulties for registration renewal. One Beijing-based

eNGO leader, for example, said that he had to find a new sponsoring organization when

the previous one was disqualified by the Ministry of Civil Affairs (Interview with an

official of B09, January 2010). A local eNGO lost its sponsorship from a government-

affiliated organization and was unable to find a new sponsor; yet it has been able to

continue its active operation without legal registration (Interview with an official of B14,

January 2010). Another Beijing-based eNGO was registered as a business corporation

before 2005, but later it chose to maintain a non-registration status and has encountered no

trouble (Interview with an official of B20, January 2010). Yet despite these continuing

difficulties, most Chinese eNGOs as reported in this sample have not encountered

significant interventions from the government regarding registration issues.

Table 1 about here

Organizational Activities

In our first round of interviews, we found that most eNGOs tended to focus on

activities such as education and conservation projects that were considered as politically

19

non-controversial (Interviews with officials of A01&A02&A06 in 2003). We also found

that informal channels such as personal connections with government officials and the

media were the primary channels for eNGOs to influence policy making. This observation

is consistent with Nathan‘s argument in the early 2000s that the regime utilized a few

citizen participation channels, such as individual complaints or media exposure, to enhance

its political legitimacy, but it did not encourage group-based public inputs (Nathan 2003).

In the past five to six years, the government has taken steps to develop official

channels for individual and group-based inputs into policy processes. For example, the

Environmental Impact Assessment Law and Government Information Disclosure Act have

open more official channels for such inputs, and increasingly eNGOs are actively citing

these laws to justify their actions against local governments and polluting firms. These

changes show that the Chinese government has gradually realized the utility of some

involvement of non-government entities—businesses, individual citizens, and NGOs—in

various environmental protection efforts.

That said, the amount of space for political action should not be overstated. One

example is the increasing internet censorship from the Chinese government. During our

first round of interviews, most eNGOs were able to maintain active websites or online

forums. In recent years, however, the Chinese government has strengthened its control

over the internet, and a few eNGOs‘ websites are no longer accessible, possibly reflecting

some degrees of self or imposed censorship. Moreover, the Chinese government has

tightened its control on civil society organizations that work on politically sensitive issues

or directly challenge governmental authority. A more extensively reported case was the

20

closure in recent years of several NGOs working on human rights issues. For example,

Gongmeng, a Beijing-based human rights NGO established by several lawyers in Beijing,

was closed by the government on tax evasion charges.

Despite increased restrictions on some aspects, the overall political and institutional

environments have provided more space for NGO advocacy. In the current sample, several

eNGOs have moved beyond their traditional focus on environmental education and

conservation projects (type 1 to 3 activities in Diamond‘s classification), and have become

more engaged in environmental policy advocacy and other political actions (type 4 to 6

activities as defined by Diamond). Among the 24 active eNGOs, 18 eNGOs are still

primarily engaged in environmental education and conservation projects (type 1 to 3

activities), although they have made some progress in terms of policy advocacy. The other

six have transformed into policy advocacy groups, and now they are primarily engaged in

political actions ‗to make demands on the state, to improve the structure and functioning of

the state, and to hold state officials accountable‘ (Table 2).

Table 2 about here

As mentioned earlier, type 1 to 3 activities are non-political in nature, while type 4

to 6 activities are political. We used this classification to examine eNGOs‘ organizational

activities. Among the six eNGOs identified as advocacy groups, four are Beijing-based and

two are outside Beijing. Three Beijing-based eNGOs have significantly shifted towards a

more active involvement in policy advocacy, and in recent years they have worked as

21

leaders in many collective campaigns related to specific environmental policy issues. This

analysis is based on content analysis of organizational websites and annual reports of A01,

A02 and A06. We also use other sources to collect documents related to collective

campaigns among eNGOs in China.

Table 3 highlights examples of such collective campaigns in the recent five to six

years. The three Bejing-based eNGOs were leaders of these eight collective campaigns.

The number of participating eNGOs in these campaigns ranged from three to 56, often

involving individual environmentalists and local eNGOs. In several of these campaigns,

open letters were used to express collective opinions on key environmental issues—

including calls for more stringent environmental law enforcement by the Ministry of

Environmental Protection, calls for better environmental information disclosure by

governmental agencies, requests for public hearing procedures in environmental impact

assessment, written comments to the Chinese Supreme Court for judicial rulemaking, calls

for public attention to energy saving and climate changes, etc. (for more details, see Table

3). These campaigns were extensively reported by the mass media in China. In a few

cases, confrontational tactics were used by these eNGOs, and these tactics did not

significantly impact their development. In 2005, for example, when the EIA process for a

park project at Yuanming Yuan in Beijing proceeded without public participation, the three

Bejing-based eNGOs criticized Beijing‘s local authority for a lack of public participation

and asked for intervention from the State Environmental Protection Administration

(SEPA). After the involvement of SEPA, public hearings were conducted and the EIA

report was revised. In another open letter addressed to Asia Pulp & Paper Group, one of

22

the largest paper and pulp companies in the world, six eNGOs asked this firm to disclose

fully the pollution data of its local firm in Jiangsu Province in previous years. The coalition

also asked the Ministry of Environmental Protection to temporarily postpone the approval

of the firm‘s initial public offering (IPO) in the Shanghai Stock Exchange Market.

Overall, when conducting type 4 to 6 activities, these eNGOs have utilized

institutional channels—legal, administrative, and political—to formally engage the state

and ensure that governmental agencies and business firms be more environmentally

accountable, similar to commonly used strategies by western eNGOs when engaging the

state (Ju and Tang 2011).

Table 3 about here

Three other eNGOs have also participated in a few of these collective campaigns.

In addition, they have also conducted activities that can be categorized as type 4 to 6

activities. One local eNGO clearly defines itself as a policy advocacy organization, and it

collaborated with many other eNGOs to oppose the construction of hydropower stations in

southwestern China that might cause significant ecological degradation. Their collective

efforts successfully persuaded the central government to postpone the project. In addition

to collective efforts in policy advocacy, participation in lawmaking and local elections has

also been used as a way for policy engagement. One Beijing-based environmental law

NGO has actively participated in environmental lawmaking at the national level. In the

past ten years, it has provided legal assistance for 135 lawsuits by pollution victims in 24

23

provinces, and many of these lawsuits were against local polluting firms and local

environmental protection bureaus (organizational report of A11, January 2010.). One local

eNGO leader participated in a local election and served one term (three years) as a village

head (Interview with an official of B08, January 2010). This elected leader implemented an

initiative to build an ecological village, and closed a few local polluting firms. This leader,

however, lost the reelection for a second term due to strong opposition from local firms. As

reported by this eNGO leader, local polluting firms have become more powerful, and many

owners of these polluting firms have also obtained prestigious positions in provincial or

national legislative bodies, making it more difficult to monitor them and ensure their

compliance.

For the 18 eNGOs that are not categorized as policy advocacy groups, most of them

focus primarily on environmental education, endangered species protection, and

conservation projects in either Beijing or other localities. Yet most of them have

participated in some collective campaigns led by other eNGOs. For example, among these

18 eNGOs, 16 of them have participated as co-signers at least once in the eight collective

campaigns listed in Table 3.

Organizational Resources

In our previous study, we noted that most eNGOs, especially those with higher

reliance on international funding, were disinclined to engage in politically sensitive

activities (Tang and Zhan 2008). This situation has gradually changed. On the one hand,

there are signs that international foundations have become more willing to support

programs that are more compatible with local interests and priorities (Interview with an

24

international foundation representative in January 2007). On the other hand, recent years

have witnessed the emergence of more diversified funding sources, including domestic

foundations, individual membership fees, and governmental purchases of social services.

One eNGO also reported that services purchased by local governments have become its

primary funding source in recent years, and annual revenues from governmental purchases

have been between 400 to 500 thousand Chinese Yuan (Interview with an official of B09,

January 2010). That said, although increasing funding has become available to civil society

organizations in China, one Beijing-based eNGO and a few non-Beijing eNGOs reported

that funding is still the major challenge to their organizational development (Interviews

with officials of A05, A11, B01, B08, B16, January 2010).

ENGOs that have become more active in policy advocacy tend to be those with

better financial resources. As has been extensively reported, financial difficulty has always

been a great challenge to Chinese eNGOs. Because of government restrictions on NGO

fundraising and the scarcity of voluntary donations, many grassroots eNGOs have faced

serious financial difficulties, making international aid extremely important for their

survival and development. Four of the six eNGOs that have become more active in policy

advocacy are in good financial shape, and no financial difficulty was reported by them

during the first round of interviews between 2003 and 2005. Another eNGO that is active

in policy advocacy does not regard financial difficulty as a major problem because its

activities are mostly staffed by volunteers. Among the six eNGOs, the only one that has

reported financial difficulty is one outside Beijing; yet its leader was a successful business

25

owner, and in recent years this person has devoted around 300 thousand Chinese Yuan and

other resources to the eNGO‘s operation (Interview with an official of B08, January 2010).

ENGOs located in Beijing are more likely to be engaged in policy advocacy than

those located outside it. Given the political status of Beijing as the capital of China, this

pattern is not surprising. For many years, Beijing has been the primary location of

activities for many active NGOs in China, and such a unique location has provided them

many advantages in raising public attention or lobbying the government. Meanwhile,

leaders of Beijing-based eNGOs are more likely to build strong personal relationships with

officials and leaders of the central government. Under certain circumstances, central

governmental officials may want to use eNGOs as a channel for delivering policy

messages to local governments, and eNGOs leaders are mostly happy to help with the task;

yet it is also true that eNGOs that focus too much on politics cannot survive in China

(Interview with an official of B20, July 2010). Also, as shown in Table 2, currently half of

Beijing-based eNGOs are primarily engaged in political activities and/or policy advocacy,

while the majority of local eNGOs are still focusing on traditional activities, such as

education and species protection, etc.

ENGOs with more active policy advocacy tend to have better political connections

with the existing party-state system. For the six eNGOs that are active in policy advocacy,

their leaders can all be categorized in some ways as social elites, including three former or

current university professors, one environmental scholar, one senior news reporter for a

state news agency, and one local politician. In China, these social elites usually have well-

established political connections and access to the policy process, as well as

26

communication channels with government agencies and business firms. ENGOs that have

experienced growth in policy advocacy tend to occupy central positions in networking

relations with other eNGOs. For example, among the six eNGOs that are politically active,

three of them are identified by Sullivan and Xie (2009) as major actors in China‘s online

environmental community.

Registration status is associated with an NGO‘s willingness to engage in policy

advocacy. All six eNGOs that are active in policy advocacy are legally registered

organizations. Having a non-registration status may reduce an eNGO‘s willingness and

capacity for policy advocacy or collective campaigns. That being said, it appears that

registration status is not necessarily related to the amount of non-political activities carried

out by an eNGO. As long as they are not in political trouble and can obtain financial

resources from somewhere, eNGOs can maintain their operations no matter whether they

have a legal status. Based on these observations, one may conclude that governmental

control on organizational registration has to some extent limited the policy advocacy

activities of eNGOs in China.

In sum, recent years have observed growth in policy advocacy and collective

campaigns by eNGOs in China, and the diversification of organizational activities among

Chinese eNGOs also indicates a possible trend toward a more pluralistic civil society.

Table 4 provides a summary of the changes with respect to institutional environments,

organizational resources, and political activities.

Table 4 about here

27

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Existing literature has documented extensively the political and resource constraints that

have limited the growth of civil society in China; yet few of them have traced the changes

of these political and resource parameters over time and in what ways such changes may

have facilitated or reshaped the development of Chinese NGOs. Our study fills a gap in

the literature by focusing on these changes. Specifically, our study shows that, in the past

few years, some political changes have had positive, and some have had negative, effects

on the development of NGOs in China. Positive changes include the increased political

tolerance for media reports on environmental incidents and the introduction of public

participation requirements into official environmental policy making and implementation

procedures. Negative changes include the continued restrictions on NGO registration and

increased internet censorship. In combination, these changes have opened up more

opportunities for policy advocacy, but the eNGOs that were better able to explore these

opportunities are those that are formally registered and led by social and political elites.

This mixture of positive and negative changes reflect the inherent fragmentation of

China‘s authoritarian political system, characterized by increasing conflicts among

political leaders over environmental issues as well as misalignments between the central

and local governments. Some eNGOs have taken advantage of the opportunities created

by these conflicts and misalignments to increase their influence in the policy process.

Some eNGOs have also strengthened their societal connections by raising funds

domestically and reaching out to pollution victims.

28

Our study applied existing social science theories to examine the evolution of

eNGOs in China. From the perspective of political opportunity theory, the case of China

represents a unique set of political changes, involving a combination of willingness of

governments at various levels to draw on NGOs to help address various societal issues and

continuing attempts by the party-state system to control NGO activities. This set of

changes has allowed for sustained, but limited, growth of the eNGO sector. From the

perspective of resource dependency theory, the case of China illustrates how various forms

of resources—financial, human, and informal social connections with the party-state—

enable some eNGOs to become more active in policy advocacy; yet some resources, such

as informal social connections with the party-state, in turn may constrain the types of

advocacy undertaken by these eNGOs.

Our research also moves the existing literature forward by identifying the political

strategies used by eNGOs to hold government accountable in environmental governance.

For many years, Chinese eNGOs had been ‗mild‘ in terms of policy advocacy. Yet recent

changes in institutional constraints have created opportunities for eNGOs to play a more

politically active role, and those with better financial resources and political connections

have made significant progress in policy advocacy and are more active in conducting type

4 to 6 activities as defined by Diamond (1999). ENGOs have increased the use of legal and

administrative channels to express their concerns and justify their actions. This change

represents significant progress compared with what we found in our previous round of

research in 2003-5 when personal connections or media reporting were the primary

channels for eNGOs to influence environmental decision making. Of course, many eNGOs

29

are still constrained by limited financial resources and human resources, and focus on

environmental education. Moreover, a few eNGOs have been able to operate without any

legal registration status, and this non-registration status may have constrained their

willingness or capacity to conduct policy advocacy work. All these findings help us to

understand the internal dynamics of and institutional constraints on eNGO policy advocacy

in China.

Moreover, the initiation of some degrees of political contestation by eNGOs, as in

the case of collective campaigns involving multiple domestic civic eNGOs and sometimes

international NGOs, may have broad implications for China‘s governance reform and

democratization. These activities were almost non-existent in China during the 1990s and

the early 2000s. With increasing numbers of eNGOs and their involvement in collective

campaigns, some eNGOs have developed greater capacities for challenging governments

and holding officials accountable for their environmental performance. If this trend

continues, civic NGOs in China may eventually become a stronger force in democratizing

governance in China.

Our research shows that eNGO leaders that have stronger personal connections to

the party-state tend to be more active in policy advocacy. This pattern of elite politics

raises important questions for future research, that is, to what extent these connections to

the party-state may also affect the types of policy advocacy undertaken by the eNGOs, and

to what extent these connections may enhance or undermine the abilities of these eNGOs

to hold governments accountable. Questions can also be asked about the patterns of

interactions between political and social elites and in what ways such interactions may

30

shape the evolution of the authoritarian regime itself. To answer these questions, it is

necessary to probe deeper into the career backgrounds of these eNGO leaders, and how

their career backgrounds and current political connections shape their work with their

eNGOs. Another direction for future research is to explore what resource mobilization

strategies eNGOs have utilized to strengthen their policy advocacy capacity. Overall,

studying the political leadership and resource mobilization strategies of eNGOs will enable

us to have a more comprehensive appraisal of the development of civil society and

governance reform in China.

31

References:

Anheier, H. K. and L. Salamon. 2006. ‗The Nonprofit Sector in Comparative Perspective‘, in W.

W. Powell & R. Steinberg (eds.), The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook. New

Haven, CT: Yale University Press, pp. 89-116.

Berman, S. 1997. ‗Civil Society and Political Institutionalization‘, American Behavioral Scientist,

40, 5, 562-74.

Cai, H. and D. Treisman. 2007. ‗Did Government Decentralization Cause China's Economic

Miracle?‘ World Politics, 58, 4, 505-35.

Chan, A. 1997. ‗In Search of a Civil Society in China‘, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 27, 2, 242-

51.

Cui, J. 2008. ‗3500 Environmental NGOs in China‘, Xinhua News Agency,

http://news.xinhuanet.com/environment/2008-10/30/content_10282938.htm, checked

January 2010.

Cooper, C. M. 2006. ‗This is Our Way In: The Civil Society of Environmental NGOs in South-

West China‘, Government and Opposition, 41, 1, 109-36.

Diamond, L. 1999. Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, Baltimore: The John Hopkins

University Press.

Dowie, M. 1995. Losing Ground: American Environmentalism at the Close of the Twentieth

Century, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Delfin, Jr., F. and S.-Y. Tang. 2007. ‗Elitism, Pluralism, or Resource Dependency: Patterns of

Environmental Philanthropy among Private Foundations in California‘, Environment and

Planning A, 39, 9, 2167-86.

Economy, E. C. 2004. The River Runs Black: the Environmental Challenge to China’s Future,

Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Fox, J. 2001. ‗Vertically Integrated Policy Monitoring: A Tool for Civil Society Policy Advocacy‘,

Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 30, 3, 616-27.

Froelich, K. A. 1999., ‗Diversification of Revenue Strategies: Evolving Resource Dependence in

Nonprofit Organizations‘, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 28, 3, 246-68.

Guo, C. and M. Acar. 2005. ‗Understanding Collaboration among Nonprofit Organizations:

Combining Resource Dependency, Institutional, and Network Perspectives‘, Nonprofit and

Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 34, 3, 340-61.

Hadenius, A. and F. Uggla. 1996. ‗Making Civil Society Work, Promoting Democratic

Development: What can States and Donors Do?‘, World Development, 24, 10, 1621-39.

He, L. 2009. ‗Still the Age of the State? Organized Social Participation and Civil Society

Development in Urban China‘, Pacific Focus, 24, 3, 317-40.

Heberer, T. 2009. ‗Evolvement of Citizenship in Urban China or Authoritarian

Communitarianism? Neighborhood Development, Community Participation, and

Autonomy‘, Journal of Contemporary China, 18, 61, 491-515.

Heimovics, R. D., R. D. Herman and C. L. J. Coughlin. 1993. ‗Executive Leadership and Resource

Dependence in Nonprofit Organizations: A Frame Analysis‘, Public Administration

Review, 53, 5, 419-27.

Heurlin, C. 2010. ‗Governing Civil Society: The Political Logic of NGO–State Relations Under

Dictatorship‘, Voluntas, 21, 2, 220-39.

Hirata, K. 2002. Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Role of NGOs in Tokyo’s Aid and

Development Policy, New York: Palgrave.

32

Ho, P. 2001. ‗Greening Without Conflict? Environmentalism, NGOs and Civil Society in China‘,

Development and Change, 32, 5, 893-921.

Ho, P. 2007. ‗Embedded Activism and Political Change in a Semiauthoritarian Context‘, China

Information, 21, 2, 187-209.

Howell, J. 2004. ‗New Directions in Civil Society: Organizing Around Marginalized Interests‘, in

J. Howell (ed.), Governance in China, Oxford, England: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher,

pp. 143-71.

Hsia, R. Y.-J. and L. T. White, III. 2002. ‗Working amid Corporatism and Confusion: Foreign

NGOs in China‘, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 31, 3, 329-51.

Huntington, S. P. 1991. The Third Wave, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Huntington, S. P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, CT: Yale University

Press.

Inglehart, R. 1997. Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political

Changes in 43 Societies, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Johnson, I. 2003. ‗The Death and Life of China's Civil Society‘, Perspectives on Politics, 1, 3. pp.

551-54.

Ju, C. B. and S.-Y. Tang (2011), ‗External Legitimacy, Goal Congruence, and Collective

Resistance: Environmental NGOs and Land Use Politics in South Korea‘, Urban Studies,

48, 3, forthcoming.

Kim, S. 2000. ‗Democratization and Environmentalism: South Korea and Taiwan in Comparative

Perspective‘, Journal of Asian and African Studies, 35, 3, 287-302.

Kitschelt, H. P. 1986. ‗Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear

Movements in Four Democracies‘, British Journal of Political Science, 16, 1, 57-85.

Lemaa, A. and K. Rubyb. 2007. ‗Between Fragmented Authoritarianism and Policy Coordination:

Creating a Chinese Market for Wind Energy‘, Energy Policy, 35, 7, 3879-90.

Lieberthal, K. G. 1997. ‗China‘s Governing System and Its Impact on Environmental Policy

Implementation‘, China Environmental Series, 1, pp. 3-8, Washington, D.C.: The

Woodrow Wilson Center.

Lieberthal, K. G. 1992. ‗Introduction: the ―Fragmented Authoritarianism‖ Model and Its

Limitations‘, in Lieberthal, K. and D. Lampton (eds.), Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision

Making in Post-Mao China, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, pp. 1-29.

Lieberthal, K. G. and M. Oksenberg. 1988. Policy Making in China, Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press.

Lim, J. H. and S.-Y. Tang. 2002. ‗Democratization and Environmental Policy Making in Korea‘,

Governance, 15, 4, 561-82.

Lo, C. W.-H. and S. W. Leung. 2000. ‗Environmental Agency and Public Opinion in Guangzhou:

The Limits of a Popular Approach to Environmental Governance‘, The China Quarterly,

163, 677-704.

Lo, C. W.-H. and S.-Y. Tang. 2006. ‗Institutional Reform, Economic Changes, and Local

Environmental Management in China: the Case of Guangdong Province‘, Environmental

Politics, 15, 2, 190–211.

Lu, Y. 2007. ‗Environmental Civil Society and Governance in China‘, International Journal of

Environmental Studies, 64, 1, 59–69.

Ma, Q. 2002. ‗The Governance of NGOs in China Since 1978: How Much Autonomy?‘, Nonprofit

and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 31, 3, 305-28.

McCarthy, J. D. and M. N. Zald. 1977. ‗Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial

Theory‘, The American Journal of Sociology, 82, 6, 1212-41.

33

Mertha, A. 2009. ‗Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0: Political Pluralization in the Chinese Policy

Process‘, The China Quarterly, 200, 995-1012.

Metzger, T. A. 1998. The Western Concept of the Civil Society in the Context of Chinese History,

Hoover Essays No. 21, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution.

Meyer, D. S. and S. Staggenborg.1996. ‗Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of

Political Opportunity‘, The American Journal of Sociology, 101, 6, 1628-60.

Minkoff, D. C. 1997. ‗Producing Social Capital: National Social Movements and Civil Society‘,

American Behavioral Scientist, 40, 5, 606-19.

Nathan, A. J. 2003. ‗Authoritarian Resilience‘, Journal of Democracy, 14, 1, 6-17.

O‘Brien, K. J. and L. Li. 1999. ‗Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China‘, Comparative

Politics, 31, 2, 167-86.

O‘Connell, B. 2000. ‗Civil Society: Definitions and Descriptions‘, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector

Quarterly, 29, 3, 471-8.

Peersman, G., L. Ferguson, M. A. Torres, S. Smith and S. Gruskin. 2009. ‗Increasing Civil Society

Participation in the National HIV Response: The Role of UNGASS Reporting‘, Journal of

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes, 52, S97-S103.

Pei, M. 2006. China’s Trapped Transition: the Limits of Developmental Autocracy, Cambridge,

MA: Harvard University Press.

Pei, M.1998. ‗Democratization in the Greater China Region‘, Access Asia Review, 1, 2, 5-40.

Pfeffer J. and G. R. Salancik. 1978. The External Control of Organizations: A Resource

Dependence Perspective, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Porio, E. 2002. ‗Civil Society and Democratization in Asia: Prospects and Challenges in the New

Millennium‘, in Yeung, Y.-M. (ed.), New Challenges for Development and Modernization:

Hong Kong and the Asia-Pacific Region in the New Millennium, Hong Kong: The Chinese

University of Hong Kong Press, pp. 225-44.

Putnam, R., R. Leonardi and R. Y. Nanetti. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in

Modern Italy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Qian, Y. and B. R. Weingast. 1996. ‗China‘s Transition to Markets: Market-preserving Federalism,

Chinese Style‘, Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 1, 2, 149-185.

Qian, Y. and B. R. Weingast. 1997. ‗Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market

Incentives‘, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11, 4, 83-92.

Ru, J. and L. Ortolano. 2009. ‗Development of Citizen-Organized Environmental NGOs in China‘,

Voluntas, 20, 2, 141-68.

Sabatier, P. A. 1988. ‗An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of

Policy-oriented Learning Therein‘, Policy Sciences, 21, 2-3, 129-168.

Saich, T. 2000. ‗Negotiating the State: The Development of Social Organizations in China‘, The

China Quarterly, 161, 124-41.

Saidel, J. R. 1991. ‗Resource Interdependence: The Relationship Between State Agencies and

Nonprofit Organizations‘, Public Administration Review, 51, 6, 543-53.

Schwartz, J. 2004. ‗Environmental NGOs in China: Roles and Limits‘, Pacific Affairs, 77, 1, 28-

49.

Shang, X. 2002. ‗Looking for a Better Way to Care for Children: Cooperation Between the State

and Civil Society in China, The Social Service Review, 76, 2, 203-30.

Shang, X. and X. Wu. 2003. ‗The Changing Role of the State in Child Protection: The Case of

Nanchang‘, Social Service Review, 77, 4, 523-40.

Snow, D. P. 1992. Inside the Environmental Movement: Meeting the Leadership Challenge,

Washington, DC: Island Press.

34

Sullivan, J. and L. Xie. 2009. ‗Environmental Activism, Social Networks and the Internet‘, The

China Quarterly, 198, 422-32.

Swanson, K. E., R. G. Kuhn and X. Wei. 2001. ‗Environmental Policy Implementation in Rural

China: a Case Study of Yuhang, Zhejiang‘, Environmental Management, 27, 4, 481-91.

Tang, S.-Y. and C. W.-H. Lo. 2009. ‗The Political Economy of Service Organizational Reform in

China: an Institutional Choice Analysis‘, Journal of Public Administration Research and

Theory, 19, 4, 731-67.

Tang, S.-Y. and X. Zhan. 2008. ‗Civic Environmental NGOs, Civil Society and Democratisation in

China‘, Journal of Development Studies, 44, 3, 425-48.

Tang, S.-Y., C. W.-H. Lo. and G. E. Fryxell. 2003. ‗Enforcement Styles, Organizational

Commitment, and Enforcement Effectiveness: an Empirical Study of Local Environmental

Protection Officials in Urban China‘, Environment and Planning A, 35, 1, 75-94.

Tang, S.-Y. and C.-P. Tang. 1999. ‗Democratization and the Environment: Entrepreneurial Politics

and Interest Representation in Taiwan‘, The China Quarterly, 157, 350-66.

Tang, S.-Y. and C.-P. Tang. 1997. ‗Democratization and Environmental Politics in Taiwan‘, Asian

Survey, 37, 3, 281-94.

Tang, W. 2001. ‗Political and Social Trends in the Post-Deng Urban China: Crisis or Stability?‘,

The China Quarterly, 168, 890-909.

Tarrow, S. 1994. Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics. New

York: Cambridge University Press.

Teshome, B. W. 2009. ‗Civil Society and Democratization in Africa: The Role of the Civil Society

in the 2005 Election in Ethiopia‘, International Journal of Human and Social Sciences, 4,

2, 80-95.

Tsai, L. L. 2007. ‗Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in

Rural China‘, American Political Science Review, 101, 2, 355-72.

Turner, J. L. 2003. ‗The Growing Role of Chinese Green NGOs and Environmental Journalists in

China‘, Statement presented at the Clearing the Air: The Human Rights and Legal

Dimensions of China's Environmental Dilemma, Roundtable before the Congressional-

Executive Commission on China of the 108th Congress, Washington, D.C., January 27,

2003. (http://www.cecc.gov/pages/roundtables/012703/turnerHandout.php)

Teets, J. C. 2009. ‗Post-Earthquake Relief and Reconstruction Efforts: The Emergence of Civil

Society in China?‘, The China Quarterly, 198, 330-47.

White, G., J. Howell and X. Shang. 1996. In Search of Civil Society: Market Reform and Social

Change in Contemporary China. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Wischermann, J. 2010. ‗Civil Society Action and Governance in Vietnam: Selected Findings from

an Empirical Survey‘, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 29, 2, 3-40.

Wu, F. 2009. ‗Environmental Politics in China: An Issue Area in Review‘, Journal of Chinese

Political Science, 14, 4, 383-406.

Wu, Z., S. G. Sullivan, W. Yu, M. J. Rotheram-Borus and R. Detels. 2007. ‗Evolution of China‘s

response to HIV/AIDS‘, The Lancet, 369, 9562, 679-90.

Xie, L. and H.-A. V. D. Heijden. 2010. ‗Environmental Movements and Political Opportunities:

The Case of China‘, Social Movement Studies: Journal of Social, Cultural and Political

Protest, 9, 1, 51-68.

Yang, D. D.-H. 2004. ‗Civil Society as an Analytic Lens for Contemporary China‘, China: An

International Journal, 2, 1, 1-27.

Yang, G. 2005. ‗Environmental NGOs and Institutional Dynamics in China‘, The China Quarterly,

181, 46-66.

35

Yang, G. 2003a. ‗The Co-evolution of the Internet and Civil Society in China‘, Asian Survey, 43, 3,

405-422.

Yang, G. 2003b. ‗The Internet and Civil Society in China: A Preliminary Assessment‘, Journal of

Contemporary China, 12, 36, 453-75.

Zhang, X. and R. Baum. 2004. ‗Civil Society and the Anatomy of a Rural NGO‘, The China

Journal, 52, 97-107.

Zhou, X. 1993. ‗Unorganized Interests and Collective Action in Communist China‘, American

Sociological Review, 58, 1, 54-73.

36

TABLE 1 Registration types of civic eNGOs

Types of

Registration

Beijing-based NGOs Non-Beijing NGOs 2003-2005 2009-2010 2003-2005 2009-2010

Social organizations 2 2 11 10

Private non-profit

organizations

2 2 2 2

Corporations 4 1 3 2

Registered with other

governmental

agencies

1 1 0 0

Operation without

registration

1 2 2 2

Total Number of

eNGOs

10 8 18 16

Data reported in this table were collected through interviews, online sources, and other third-part reports.

These data must be interpreted cautiously because we were not able to directly reach a few eNGOs in the

second round of interviews and had to rely on indirect sources to determine the status of these organizations.

37

TABLE 2 Organizational activities of civic eNGOs

Beijing-based NGOs Non-Beijing NGOs

Time 2003-2005 2009-2010 2003-2005 2009-2010

Primarily engaged in

environmental

education and

conservation projects

(type 1 to 3 activities),

with limited

engagement in

advocacy

8 4 17 14

Primarily engaged in

political actions (type

4 to 6 activities) *

2 4 1 2

Total Number of

eNGOs

10 8 18 16

* Data reported in this table was collected through interviews, online sources, and other third-party reports.

These data must be interpreted cautiously because some eNGO officials might not have reported their

environmental advocacy activities during our interviews.

38

TABLE 3 Examples of Collective Campaigns of Civic eNGOs in China

ID Time Policy Issues Addressed by the NGO Coalition Number

of

eNGOs*

1 January

2005

Issue: Environmental Law Enforcement

In an open letter to the general public, 56 eNGOs expressed their

support to the State Environmental Protection Administration‘s

enforcement decision to suspend 30 local power plants and industrial

projects, all of which had failed to follow environmental impact

assessment (EIA) procedures as required by the law. This letter also

called for more stringent environmental law enforcement and more

public participation in EIA.

Source:

http://www.people.com.cn/BIG5/huanbao/1072/3142058.html

56 (17)

2 November

2005,

February

2008

Issue: EIA Information Disclosure

In two separate open letters to governmental agencies, the eNGO

community asked for the disclosure of the environmental impact

assessment report of the Nujiang Hydropower Station Project. The

letters cited related laws, such as EIA Law, Administrative License

Law, to support their petitions.

Source:

http://www.nujiang.ngo.cn/Dynamics/2005/080

http://www.ngocn.org/?action-viewnews-itemid-25294

First

letter: 61

(13);

second

letter: 26

(12)

3 July 2005 Issue: Public Hearing in EIA

In 2005, the EIA process for a cultural heritage park, to be built in

Yuanming Yuan, Beijing proceeded without public participation.

Several eNGOs in Beijing expressed their concerns and asked for

intervention from the State Environmental Protection Administration.

As a result, the EIA was revised.

Source:

http://www.fon.org.cn/content.php?aid=11435

3(3)

4 2004-2009 Issue: Energy Saving

Every year in the summer since 2004, an alliance of many eNGOs

issued an open letter to the general public asking people to keep their

indoor temperature at no less than 26℃ for the purpose of energy

saving.

22(7)

5 August

2008,

November

Issue: Environmental Information Disclosure

In an open letter addressed to Goldeast Paper, a member of APP

6 (4)

39

* The first number indicates the total number of eNGOs that participated in a collective campaign. The

second number in parentheses indicates the number of eNGOs in our sample that participated in a collective

campaign.

2009 Group, six eNGOs asked this firm to fully disclose its pollution data

in previous years. The coalition also asked the Ministry of

Environmental Protection to temporarily postpone the approval of the

firm‘s initial public offering (IPO) in the Shanghai Stock Exchange

Market.

Source:

http://www.fon.org.cn/content.php?aid=10090

6 November

2009

Issue: EIA and Approval of a Hydropower Station Project

In a letter addressed to the Ministry of Environmental Protection, six

eNGOs expressed their concerns over the ecological consequences of

the approval of Xiaonanhai Hydropower Station Project, which may

cause harm to many endangered fish species in the river.

Source:

http://www.fon.org.cn/content.php?aid=12214

6(5)

7 November

2009

Issue: Judicial Rulemaking on Environmental Information Disclosure

Government Information Disclosure Act

The alliance of seven eNGOs submitted comments to the Supreme

People‘s Court on judicial rulemaking related to Government

Information Disclosure Act. They asked the Supreme Court to clearly

indicate in the rules that governmental agencies should be responsible

for mandatory environmental information disclosure as requested by

citizens and civic groups.

Source:

http://www.fon.org.cn/content.php?aid=12211

7 (4)

8 November

2009

Issue: Climate Change

In an open letter to the international community, seven eNGOs

expressed their positions and opinions on global climate change and

provided policy suggestions to foreign countries and the Chinese

government.

Source:

http://www.fon.org.cn/content.php?aid=11579

7 (3)

40

TABLE 4 Continuities and changes: a comparison of eNGOS

Dimensions Issues 2003-2005 2009-2010

Institutional

Environment

Organizational

Registration

Registration was a major challenge

for many eNGOs.

No significant change in registration

requirements. A few eNGOs in this

sample lost the support from their

sponsoring organizations.

Public

Participation

Channels

A lack of legal procedures requiring

public inputs prevented active

participation of eNGOs in

environmental policy processes.

Several new laws and regulations that

mandate public participation or

information disclosure have taken effect.

Organizational

Resources

Financial

Resources

Beijing-based eNGOs were heavily

reliant on international funding,

while local eNGOs had limited

access to international funding and

were more likely to rely on funding

from individuals.

ENGOs‘ funding is from more ample

and diversified sources.

Human

Resources

Most eNGOs relied on volunteers. More eNGOs have fulltime staff with

pay.

Organizational

Activities

Major

Activities

Environmental education was a

major focus of eNGOs in China.

Although environmental education is

still a major focus of most eNGOs, more

eNGOs have participated in policy

advocacy.