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CHAPTER – V

Political Manoeuvres and the Barren Years of Indo-French Relations

Since the creation of the Progressive Democratic Party on the eve of 1948

Municipal elections in French India, there was a serious friction in the relationship

between Baron, the Commissaire of French India and the ruling French India Socialist

Party leaders and which resulted in the breaking of ties between the French India

administration and the pro-French Socialist Party. Having experienced the double

standard and unreliable attitudes of the Socialist leaders, Baron backed the pro-French

Progressive Democratic Party as an alternative force. As the situation compelled him

to subordinate French interests in India, he decided to depose Edouard Goubert and

the Socialists and to install in power the Progressive Democrats. The Progressive

Democrats now openly denounced Goubert as a tool of the Indian Consul General and

an agent of the capitalistic, anti-democratic Nehru government.1 The quarrel between

Baron and the leaders of French India Socialist Party came out in the open at the time

of elections of representatives from French India to the French Senate and Council of

French Union. In the elections held on 16th November and 19th December 1948 Baron

put up Paul Latour as his candidate in both the elections. Paul Latour, who received

the support of the Communists, the Ashram group and of the Chandernagore and

Yanam members, lost the elections by a least margin. Both Maurice Gaudart and

Pakkirisamy were elected by the support of Goubert’s followers and of the Congress

group respectively for the Council of French Union and the Senate.2 Attempts were

1 File No: D.289/49, (15(98)-Eur-I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi. 2 File No: D.92/48, (15(98)-Eur-I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi.

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made from Baron’s side even before the elections to remove permanently

Pakkirisamy from the French Indian political scene. In Karaikal, the French

Administrator Goumain, taking advantage of the absence of Pakkirisamy who had

gone to Paris for his election campaign, attempted to secure the resignation of three

Municipal Councillors by exercising tremendous pressure and coercion. This was

done in order to dissolve the Municipal council of which Pakkirisamy was the Mayor.

It was at that time that an ingenious move was made by the pro-French elements to

declare Pakkirisamy an Indian by nationality so that he was not qualifying to

participate in French India elections.3 As a counter-retaliation the French India

Assemblée Représentative passed a resolution on 17th December 1948 condemning the

high-handed action of the Karaikal Administrator. The President of the Assemblée

Représentative demanded Goumain’s immediate recall.4 Further, determined that it

was very difficult to adjust with Baron, the French India Socialist Party called upon

Paris authorities to transfer Baron and appoint a non-official Commissaire for French

India.5 Moreover neither Tézanas du Montcel the Inspector of Colony nor Daniel Levi

the French Ambassador in New Delhi was in favour of retaining Baron any more in

his present position as the head of French India administration. Baron’s enemies- both

in France and French India brought about his withdrawal. Just like his predecessors

Baron had to vacate his office with humiliation and disgrace.

The departure of Baron was a significant turning point in the history of French

India. The French government wanted to replace him by a man who would be more

pliable and independent but they failed to select a successor capable of breaking the

impasse. In next six years French India, witnessed the appointment of four 3 The Hindu, 24 February 1949. 4 The Indian Express, 18 January 1949. 5 File No: D.92/48, (15(98)-Eur-I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi.

179

Commissaires of whom three were temporary. None was capable of doing business

like Baron and they failed to neither enlist the friendship and confidence of the local

people especially the local political elite nor promote French interests and tactfully

adjust with the new situation. These Commissaires were merely restricted to confine

themselves to local administration and the responsibility for all questions that bear on

the future of French India was directly taken over by the Ministry of French Foreign

Affairs, French Overseas Ministry and French Embassy in New Delhi.6 The

Commissaires followed a negative policy, acceptable neither to the government of

India nor to the people of French India and they bungled the situation and made it

more complicated in the years to come. Taking full advantage of this above said

situation the French India Socialist Party under the leadership of Edouard Goubert,

Muthu Pillai and Muthukumarappa Reddiar ( other wise called as ‘three pillars’ of the

party) began to flirt with both India and France hoping to enjoy the best of both the

worlds. This prolonged the problem and complicated it more. French India needed an

urgent solution. But it took another six years to reach a solution.

The days following the Indo-French agreement and the subsequent Municipal

election in French India witnessed a critical phase in Indo-French relations. The

termination of Customs Union agreement from 1st April 1949 led to moves and

counter-moves by both Indian government and French government to tackle the

economic situation in French India. After consolidating their position through

Municipal elections, the French India Socialist Party started its grand political

manoeuvres. Holding the merger threat as their trump card against the French

authorities and exploiting the situation to their own benefits, the violence and

6 File No: D.512/49, (15(98)-Eur-I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi.

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atrocities committed by the French India Socialist Party resulted in a lawless situation

in the French Indian settlements. Chandernagore’s accession to the Indian Union by a

referendum had its repercussion in the four south Indian settlements. Apart from

causing hardship to the people and producing irritation between France and India, it

made New Delhi-Paris-Pondicherry relations more unsatisfactory.

Termination of the Customs Union Agreement

Problems arose out of the termination of the Customs Union agreement-a

wartime Franco-Indian agreement concluded on 28th January 1941.7 When, the Indian

government, in its intention to use it as weapon, tried through some punitive measures

to put pressure on the French Indian administration the issue took a serious turn. As

per Article 23 of the convention the agreement could be terminated on the giving of a

years’ notice by either government to the other government with which the agreement

was to be terminated. Accordingly, the government of India gave the notice of

termination of the Customs Union agreement to the French government through the

French Ambassador in Delhi on 29th March 1948.8 The government of India in its

intention to protect the national economic interests tried to stop all types of fraudulent

and contraband trade between French settlements and adjoining Indian territories, To

avoid the economic difficulties of French Indian people, the government of India

expressed to the government of France its willingness to continue the agreement until

the referendum is over, if the latter wished to do so. This suggestion, however, evoked

no response from France. But the French authorities in the middle of March 1949 put

7 The Convention was signed to meet the situation created by the World War II and established a Customs Union between French settlements in India and British India for 10 Years. Under this agreement, French Indian settlements had been exempted from the export and import regulations in force in British India against foreign countries; customs tariff on imports into and exports from French Indian territories to countries other than India were collected by the British Indian government, in exchange for which French Indian government received about 6,20,000 rupees annually (R. L. Purushothama Reddiar Papers, N.A.I, Puducherry). 8 The Hindu, 19 March 1949.

181

forth proposals, not for the continuance of the same agreement of 1941, but, for its

considerable modification in favour of a free flow of trade between India and the

settlements on the ground that the earlier agreement had largely outlived its utility and

lost its relevance. Moreover the French thought that the acceptance of the renewal

would imply its inability to feed the people of the settlements which would have an

adverse effect on the referendum.9 Because of the very short time left before it

expired on 31st March 1949 the government of India could not consider the French

proposal and as a result, the 1941 agreement lapsed from 1st April 1949.10 With the

termination of the Customs Union agreement, French India thereupon became a

foreign territory and a customs cordon was thrown around Pondicherry and Karaikal.

The government of India also introduced a permit system regulating the movement of

people between the French settlements and surrounding Indian territory.

Measures were taken by the French Indian authorities contemplated to

overcome the economic difficulties caused by the annulment of the customs

agreement of 1941. C. J. Camouilly the Acting Commissaire of French India, in his

speech to the Assemblée Représentative said that following the cancellation of the

Customs Union agreement Pondicherry and Karaikal would revert to the position as it

was in 1941 and he expressed the hope that local business, with the help of French

administration, would find commercial activity like a free zone (free ports).11

Preparations were made with the help of merchant marine, to bring coal and rice from

Indo-China and Ceylon, cotton from Pakistan and transhipped consumer goods of

France, England and America from free port of Singapore (See Appendix -V, gives

the movement of ships at Pondicherry port and details of exports and imports for the

9 R. L. Purushothama Reddiar Papers, N.A.I. Puducherry. 10 The Hindu, 19 March 1949. 11 The Madras Mail & the Hindu, 28 March 1949.

182

year 1949). The French policy was a short-term programme with the forthcoming

referendum in view. Presiding over the centenary celebrations of the Pondicherry

Chambre de commerce, Camouilly announced the plan and grant of 500.000.000

francs under the Lend-Lease Scheme to French India by the government of France for

providing social, medical, educational and other needs. Among the new development

programmes were included the installation of a central electrical plant of 5000

kilowatts power imported from France, a radio-transmission station costing rupees

70,00,000 and the repair, re-equipment of the Pondicherry pier and irrigation works in

Karaikal to improve rice production.12 Tézanas du Montcel, the Inspector of colonies

at Pondicherry interviewed each and every member of the Assemblée Représentative

and also the Mayors of the Municipalities and energetically canvassed for their

support, using the propaganda of the financial and economic prosperity that France

has decided to usher in French India.13 The French authorities, knowing fully well that

the amount of money, immense for such a small area, would be largely spent through

the instrument of Municipalities, that a considerable portion of it would remain in the

pockets of those who spend it, expected at this psychological moment that it might

turn opinion in their favour. As such the Lend-Lease Scheme was viewed with some

apprehension by the political elite. In regard to the annulment of the Customs Union

agreement of 1941 the French authorities’ assurance was that things will be better and

not worse. Quite contrary to French assurances the effects of the annulment of the

customs agreement were far reaching and unexpected.

12 The proposal of this plan was prepared in a meeting held on 17th December 1948 at Pondicherry and later submitted to the Council of Ministers at Paris on 22nd December 1948 ( File No: 109, 0.P.Ramasamy Reddiar Papers, Nehru Memorial and Library, manuscript section, New Delhi). 13 File No: D. 641/49, (15(98)-Eur-I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi.

183

As 1st April drew nearer, local interests became more and more disturbed,

population remained very sceptical, disquiet and apprehension steadily increased. The

Indian press painted a graphic picture of the era of financial and economic difficulties

that French India was going to face in regard to the imposition of the land custom

cordon. In anticipation of the absence of a free flow of goods into Pondicherry and

Karaikal merchants purchased large consignments of provisions, including food

grains and salt and brought an artificial scarcity for purpose of black-marketing.14

Commodities prices had risen nearly 25% even though the French Indian authorities

claimed that they had enough stocks of most commodities to last three or four months

even without supplies from abroad.15 From 1st April, with the termination of the

customs agreement not only exportation and importation were stopped, there was to

be a complete stoppage of the supply of electricity in the mills and factories of

Pondicherry and Karaikal as well as closure of the markets of rice, cotton and jute etc.

In a day’s time, French Indian people were denied the supply of essential

commodities like vegetables, meat, fish, rice and medicines. It produced hardships to

the people in running their daily life and the French Indian administration struggled to

meet the demands of its people.

On the other hand, with the termination of the customs union agreement, the

making of Pondicherry a “free port” came as a boon to certain sections of people and

traders. Huge quantities of foreign goods were imported to French India and

commodities such as diamonds, gold, cycle, silk, perfumes, pens, watches etc., were

smuggled across the borders to India. Similarly essential commodities were imported

on the sly from the adjacent Indian districts for exporting abroad. Both Pondicherry

14 The Hindu, 27, March 1949. 15 File No: D.1357/49, (15(98)-Eur-I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi and the Hindu, 29 March 1949.

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and Karaikal became smugglers’ paradise. A smugglers’ community emerged in

Pondicherry and Karaikal. Commercial speculators and moneylenders operated

unhindered. They all flourished under the patronage of the Indo-China bank which

gave particularly unrestricted credit against imports for a commission on boom time

basis.16 Rich merchants, mostly Indians, living in French Indian settlements, were in

favour of the continuation of French rule due to this factor. Table 5.1 and 5.2 bring

out respectively the commodity input to and output from Pondicherry.

Table 5.1 Commodities Imported to Pondicherry

Name of the Commodity Quantity in 1949-1950 Quantity in 1950-1951 Quantity in 1951-1952 Playing cards 104 boxes 607 boxes 3,966 boxes Gold 42,268.13 2,21,933.78 56 boxes, 10,09,579.094

Liquors 15,352 boxes 9,520 boxes, pots 9,636 boxes, 142 pots, 345 big boxes.

Artificial pearls 1 boxes, 16 68 boxes, 63 boxes, Pencil 57 boxes 109 boxes Watches, big clocks 48 boxes, 113 (big sizes), 99 boxes, 217 boxes, Artificial diamonds 2 boxes 49 boxes 166 boxes, 16.5 kilogram Perfume things 140 boxes 551 boxes 512 boxes Drug sugar 26 boxes, 1,050 cases 140 boxes 145 boxes Milk powder 647 boxes 1,035 boxes 3,772 boxes

Diamonds (natural) 15,563 3,227.75 29 packets, 2 big size

boxes, 12 normal boxes, 4,389.82

Source: French Pockets in India. Madras: Free India Publications, 1952, p.27.

Table 5.2 Seizures made on the Pondicherry Frontier 1949-1950 1950-1951 1951-1952

Values values values

Name of the Commodity

No. of

cases

Rupees A P

No. of

cases Rupees A P

No. of

cases Rupees A P

Diamonds 5 2612871 10 0 5 83955 0 0 6 147426012 12 0 Gold 59 26334 15 0 144 347166 13 0 179 925786 5 0 Fountain pens 20 10167 13 0 145 110512 15 0 128 68452 10 0 Liquor 183 15411 15 0 207 37762 12 0 251 27338 12 0 Watches 38 3862 7 0 107 43828 2 0 198 82100 9 0 Silk yarn 8 5956 12 0 40 47321 13 0 7 40127 2 0 Playing cards 1 173 12 0 135 103827 4 0 231 331022 10 0 Synthetic 8 413 6 0 16 9590 5 0 73 119556 1 0 Lead pencil - - - 0 35 31063 11 0 42 29523 7 0 Miscellaneous 2028 145460 7 0 1212 189522 11 0 1093 306882 5 0

* A-Anna, P-Paise. Source: French Pockets in India. Madras: Free India Publications, 1952, p.26. 16 Patrick Pitoëff, “ L’Inde française en sursis 1947-1954,” Revue Française d’Histoire d’Outre-mer, 78 (1991), pp.105-31.

185

Since the notice of termination of Customs Union on 1st August 1949, the

government of India had systematically resorted to the threat and pressure on French

India. A real blockade was organised, the populations had to suffer direct brutality.

The introduction of the Indian permit system had great effect. This was followed by

the introduction of identity cards for regulating the movements of the people17. French

Indians would not be permitted to enter India unless they would provide themselves

with travel documents validated for entry into India by Mayors of the communes and

Indian Consul General at Pondicherry.18 A general interdiction was applied on all

merchandises, vehicles and passage of troops entering Pondicherry and Karaikal.

Train and bus services were suspended and the movements of the people stopped.

People realized that Pondicherry along with its communes and Karaikal had become a

“foreign territory”. The measures adopted by the government of India had paralysed

the total life of the people of French India. Those who severely felt the pinch of the

termination of the customs union agreement were the weavers and mill labourers and

a large number of them left their hearth and home for Indian territory and those

staying were reduced to poverty and begging.19

The French authorities reacted strongly against measures adopted by the

Indian government and remarked that the government of India adopted this

“economic blockade” with a view to putting pressure on the French India people to

cast their votes in favour of merging with Indian Union.20 Le Monde (dated 13th April

1949) wrote, ‘according to travellers from Pondicherry and Karaikal… the French

Establishments in India are at present subjected to a “veritable economic blockade”…

17 The identity cards contained a photograph of the holder and sufficient particulars to identify him and served the purpose of a passport for the holder when travelling between India and French settlements. 18 The Hindu, 2 April 1949. 19 R.L Purushothama Reddiar Papers, N.A.I. Pondicherry and Swadesamitran, 19 May 1949. 20 The Hindu, 1 May 1949.

186

the rigour of the “pitiless” Indian customs and police authorities having established

“practically a state of siege.” Not only is merchandise of primary necessity no longer

imported from Indian territory, but it does not move any more even between the

villages, separated by stretches of Indian territory, rigidly supervised by the pitiless

customs and police officials… local population now feel British tolerance of pre

1941 now replaced by national India’s systematic policy of blockade which does not

even respect the rights of transit between enclaves provided for in the Barcelona

Convention of 1921 which India has signed.’21 Accordingly the French authorities

lodged a protest that the customs barriers and the permit system regulating passenger

traffic were contrary to the June 1948 agreement and a gross violation of the

Barcelona Convention of 1921.22 According to the convention signatory states

(including India) agreed to provide normal facilities for movement of persons and

goods across territory under their sovereignty. The French India authorities placing

reliance on this provision urged that the customs barriers and permit system should be

removed and free movement of persons and flow of goods between India and the

French settlements must be permitted. India also relied on the same convention and

quoted it in support of the action she had taken. One provision in the convention

categorically stated that if there were enclaves of foreign territory within the state of

adjoining states, then the provisions of the convention should not apply to them if it

was impracticable to do so for administrative reasons.23 Therefore on the purely legal

point, the government of India was fully within their rights in maintaining a check on

the movement of persons from one settlement to another as well as between the

enclaves of the settlements.

21 File No: D.1919/49, (15(52)-Eur-I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi. 22 The Hindu, 1 May 1949. 23 The Hindu, 1 May 1949.

187

The French government seriously concerned over the economic situation in

French India, in its Aide-mémoire of 14th May 1949, pointed out how the economic

conditions of the people of Pondicherry and Karaikal as well as the life of the

adjoining communes had been paralysed consequent on the measures taken by the

government of India undermining the good neighbourly relations so far existing

between French Indian authorities and Indian Union and requested the Indian

government to remove all the difficulties.24 To this Nehru sent a telegram to Robert

Shuman, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs on 20th May 1949, assuring him to

resolve “the difficulties and misunderstanding as may have arisen between our two

governments” in the traditional sprit of friendship and understanding that had been

existing between the two countries25 and P.P. Pillai, the Indian Chargé d’affaires in

Paris handed over him an Aide-mémoire containing the views of Indian government

on the situation prevailing in the French settlements. The Aide-mémoire emphatically

denied any intention on the part of the government of India “to resort to any measures

which would result in exercising pressure either on the Government of France or the

people of the French Establishments in India.”26 The administrative measures taken,

the Aide-mémoire added, were the inevitable consequences of the termination of the

Customs Union agreement on 1st April 1949. Export and import regulations of the

government of India, which were of general application, came into operation and any

inconvenience caused to the inhabitants of French India by their normal applications

was unavoidable. The government of India assured that instructions had been issued

to the local authorities not to cause any avoidable hardship to the people of the

settlements. To ensure that, the government of India was proposed the deputation of a

senior officer to Pondicherry to study the situation on the spot and to report to the 24 File No: D.1850/49, (55-R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi. 25 File No: D.1954/49, (55-R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi. 26 File No: D.1956/49, (55-R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi.

188

government of India.27 Further, in order to avoid serious inconvenience of distress to

French India, the government of India renewed their offer to continue the customs

agreement till the referendum is over.28

Followed by the exchange of letters between Shuman and Nehru, in

Pondicherry Chambon, the newly appointed Commissaire of French India submitted a

memorandum to Rashid Ali Baig, the Indian Consul General at Pondicherry

proposing (a) Goods transiting Indian territory between enclaves may be exempted

from export and import duties; (b) All goods transiting Indian territory between

Pondicherry and Karaikal by rail may proceed free of import and export licence and

custom duties; and (c) Peoples between enclaves should be exempted from necessity

to produce identity certificates.29 The Muslim associations of Karaikal adopted the

following resolution: “As the present Permit System existing between Indian Union

and French India renders difficulties in many ways to the Muslim women and affects

their Purdah system, the Karaikal Muslims request the French India Government to

insist on the Indian Union that the Muslim women, in their interests, should be

allowed with permits without photographs or with family permits under the

responsibility of the head of the family as is the case with those who go on pilgrimage

to Mecca.”30 The Municipalities of Pondicherry, Karaikal, Kottucherry,

Tirumalrayanpatnam, Néravy and Nedungadu had passed resolutions and submitted a

memorandum to the French government through the Commissaire of French India

urging postponement of the referendum till the present abnormal conditions on the

frontier, almost amounting to an economic blockade by the Indian government, are set

27 File No: D.1956/49, (55-R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi. 28 File No: D.2010/49, (55-R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi. 29 File No: D.2200/49, (55-R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi. 30 Velli, 6 May 1949.

189

right.31 The pro-merger parties were happy over the situation but felt that all the

measures taken by the Indian government are still half measures so long as the salt

supply from Indian Union continued. They felt that the Indian pressure if it continues

would change the mentality of people in favour of India in the upcoming

referendum.32 R.L. Purushothama Reddiar, the President of the French India National

Congress observed that the customs union agreement of 1941 conferred numerous

economic advantages to the entire population of French Settlements in India, from the

urban businessmen to the rural agriculturalists including the many thousands of mill

workers and hand-loom craftsmen who otherwise would have been subjected to a

miserable economic situation, in the critical conditions prevailing at present and urged

the French India administration to renew the customs agreement immediately.33 A

group of leading merchants of Pondicherry had also sent request telegrams to the

French authorities in Paris in view of reinstating the customs union.34

In order to mitigate the hardships of the people, the government of India had sent

to Pondicherry P.A. Menon, Secretary of External Affairs and Commonwealth

Relations to examine on the spot the inconveniences caused to the people because of

the termination of the customs union agreement.35 In Pondicherry he had several

meetings with the French India Commissaire and leader of the various political

parties. Following the recommendations of P.A. Menon, the government of India

announced relaxation of the economic measures taken earlier. They were

(i) Goods carried between the enclaves be exempted from import and export

regulations and customs duties;

31 The Hindu, 24 May and 6 June 1949. 32 File No: D.2201/49, (55-R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi. 33 R. L Purushothama Reddiar Papers, N.A.I. Pondicherry. 34 The Liberation, 26 May 1949. 35 The Hindu, 24 May 1949.

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(ii) No identity cards be required for persons moving between the enclaves;

(iii) Goods in transit between Pondicherry and Karaikal by rail be exempted

from import and export regulations customs duties if conveyed under

customs seal;

(iv) All goods of Pondicherry or Karaikal for which contracts had been signed

before 1st April 1949, when Customs Convention of 1941 terminated, be

exempted from the operation of the new regulations.36

These measures substantially relaxed the so-called “economic blockade” measures in

force since 1st April 1949.

Referendum in Chandernagore:

In accordance with the Indo-French declaration of June 1948, the Municipal

Councils of Pondicherry, Karaikal, Mahe and Yanam met in a general assembly on

the 20th March 1949 and fixed 11th December 1949 as the date for the referendum in

the four south Indian settlements.37 The following were the recommendations of the

Council:

(i) The Referendum (to decide the future of four south Indian French

settlements) should be held on 11th December 1949.

(ii) Those who were in the electoral roll on 31st March 1949 should be

eligible to participate in the referendum.

(iii) The Referendum should be conducted by neutral observers jointly

appointed by the governments of France and India.

36 The Hindu, 12 June 1949. 37 Journal officiel de l’Inde français dans l’Inde, 1949, p.117.

191

(iv) The personnel of the neutral observers as well as the expenditure

involved therein should be met by the governments of France and

India.

(v) If the decision of the referendum was in favour of France, fullest

autonomy should be granted to French India. If the decision is in

favour of India, complete administrative autonomy should be

granted for a transition period of 30 years.38

It also decided to send a delegation of three members to Paris and New Delhi with a

view to ascertaining the attitude of the two governments towards the settlements. The

pro-French Progressive Democratic Party condemned the Municipal Councils and the

ruling French India Socialist Party for not following the advice of du Montcel39 and

for even considering union with India by asking for a transition period and for sending

a delegation to Delhi.40 The pro-merger journal Maanilam wrote about the delegation

“There are certain members of Municipal Assemblies who say secretly that they are

real patriots. If they are, why not boldly come out and say so. If they are genuinely

patriotic, as they say, why should they behave like public woman (prostitute) who

goes to the man who bids the highest offer? In case India is refused, they threaten that

they will remain in French Union and thus lay down a lot of conditions. Are they real

patriots or traders?”41

An extraordinary session of the Municipal Assembly of Chandernagore also

met on 2nd and 3rd April 1949 decided to hold the referendum on 19th June 1949.42

38 The Hindu, 21 and 22 March 1949. 39 Tézanas du Montcel was the Inspector of Colonies, who was then in Pondicherry to study the political situation in French India and to advise the leaders on the political questions. 40 File No: D.1357/49, (15(98)-Eur-I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi. 41 Extracts from File no: 15 (98)-Eur-I, Ministry of External Affairs, 1949 and Maanilam, 14 May 1949. 42 Journal officiel de l’Inde français dans l’Inde, 1949, p.323.

192

Since the end of Municipal elections the question of merger without referendum

gained its momentum and created a deal of sensation and roused passion and heat in

the minds of the people of French India. Lambert Saravane believed that the future of

French India could be decided by “an amicable settlement” without the formality of a

referendum. He approached P.P. Pillai, the Indian Chargé d’affaires at Paris and

expressed his willingness to table the resolution in the French Assemblée Nationale,

recommending as a transitional measure that France should hand over to India the

entire administration of French India in the same way as customs administration was

handed over in 1941. He sought India’s informal support for this move.43 India

believed referendum as the best method of solution to the vexed problem and rejected

Saravane’s proposal.

Chandernagore’s pro-merger leaders were radical and forward-looking in

many respects. The Chandernagore Municipal council which projected itself as the

“legitimate and rightful interpreter of the voice of the population,” had earlier on 15th

December 1948 passed a resolution for “natural union” with the Indian Union even

without undergoing the formality of referendum and announced its desire “to effect

the change of administration in a smooth and amicable manner before 31st March

1949 at the latest.”44 The French government’s reaction pointed out that from

constitutional point of view such an evasion of popular consultation was not possible.

Article 27 of the Fourth Republic’s constitution made it obligatory; the French

insisted that the Chandernagore Municipal council should hold a referendum to fulfil

the constitutional obligation. In order to secure a favourable verdict, the French India

government passed a Décret on 3rd March 1949 which conferred full and complete

43 File No: D.1588/49, (55-R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi. 44 File No: D.1955/49, (55-R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi.

193

autonomy for Chandernagore to regulate its financial and budgetary regulations.45

From then Chandernagore had been completely separated from the four southern

French settlements and suppressed its representation to the French India Assemblée

Représentative in Pondicherry.

A new controversy arouse between France and India over the selection of

international observers to be deputed at the time of referendum in Chandernagore.

The Municipal Council insisted on having mutual observers for supervising the

referendum. India had demanded neutral observer. On the other hand, the French

government decided in favour of a deputation of international observers at the time of

the referendum. At the same time, taking advantage of the new situation flowing from

the economic measures taken by the government of India, the French government

unilaterally widened the scope of work of the international observers, by asking them

to study the consequences of the economic pressure exerted by India and to report if

referendum could be held in such an environment.46 The French stand led to serious

misunderstandings and further exchange of letters between the two governments.

France tried to achieve her goals by approaching the International Court of

Justice (ICJ) to nominate observers to French India on a fact-finding mission and to

supervise the referendum. In addition, the French government claimed that the

referendum was a matter of internal administration. In March 1949, news of the

French request to ICJ to designate certain number of neutral observers who would

assist in the referendum was brought to the knowledge of the Indian government

through Daniel Levi. The government of India told the French Ambassador that the

General-Secretary of the United Nations must be directly approached to nominate

45 Journal officiel de l’Inde français dans l’Inde, 1949, p.116. 46 Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol: 11, p.147.

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observers rather than the President of the International Court of Justice as the

referendum was more a political than a judicial process.47 Moreover, it was repeatedly

impressed on the French Ambassador that the observers should be appointed with the

approval of both the governments. The government of India also strongly repudiated

the allegation that the French government has chosen the consequences of termination

of the customs agreement as “economic blockade.”48 It categorically stated that if the

intention of the observers was to judge this issue, the government of India could not

be a party to it.49

On French request, the Vice President of the ICJ, purely in his personal

capacity, named two observers - Holger Anderson, former member of the Danish

parliament and Rudulfo Buron Castro, Counsellor of the El-Salvador legation in

Madrid to determine whether it would be possible to hold referendum in the French

settlements labouring under internal and external pressures.50 The Indian official

circles expressed considerable surprise at the action of the Vice-President of the ICJ

in agreeing to send neutral observers to French India.51 The government of India

strongly criticised French action as arbitrary and unilateral. India warned the French

authorities that if any referendum was held under this condition they reserved the

right to repudiate it as inconsistent with the agreement of June, 1948.52 The French

government stood firm in its decision and observed that “NO (repeat NO) mention of

the designation of neutral observers had been made in the exchange of letters of the

29th June 1948 and that in asking the Vice-President of the International Court of

Justice to choose the persons in question it could NOT (repeat NOT) therefore have

47 File No: D.878/49, (55-R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi. 48 File No: D.1768/49, (55-R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi. 49 Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol: 11, pp. 276 and 289. 50 The Hindu, 3 June 1949. 51 The Hindu, 3 June 1949. 52 File No: D.1768/49, (55-R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi.

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acted contrary to the terms of this accord. Nor have the French Government any

intention of keeping the Government of India in ignorance of the MODALITIES for

the organisation of the consultation.”53 The French went ahead with the visit of

international observers to their Indian settlements.

Chandernagore’s reaction to the selection of international observers was

equally strong. Arun Chandra Dutta, President of the Chandernagore Municipal

Assembly, declared that “selection of international observers was done in an arbitrary

manner without the approval of the Municipal Assembly…a private deal between

France and the Vice-President of the International Court of Justice could not be

binding on the Municipal Assembly of Chandernagore”. He opposed the referendum

and proclaimed that “a white paper was enough to dismantle an Empire.”54

Meanwhile, Gaudart, and Tézanas brought the message of the President of the French

Assemblée nationale to the Chandernagore Municipal Assembly. The message, which

embodied in a motion voted by the French Assemblée nationale in Paris on 25th May,

suggested Chandernagore to defer the date of the referendum from June 19th to 11th

December 1949. Deban Das, President of the Municipal Assembly reacted to this and

said that, “we cannot rely on France any more. We wish to maintain friendly relations

with the French, but not as masters and servants” and stuck to its decision of holding

the referendum on 19th June 1949.55 The French apprehension was that

Chandernagore’s verdict may influence the December referendum in the other

settlements in south India. Moreover, it was expected that the success of the

referendum in the four south Indian settlements depended not only on the method and

53 File No: D.1944/49, (55-R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi. 54 The Hindu, 3 June 1949. 55 The Hindu, 4 June 1949.

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outcome of the Chandernagore referendum but also on the status that would be given

to Chandernagore in the future.

As the date of the referendum was approaching, Chandernagore witnessed a

new kind of excitement. Two weeks of vigorous propaganda was carried out by both

the pro-mergerists and anti-mergerists to win over the population. About the pro-

French propaganda The Hindu remarked: “outwardly, there is not very much

propaganda against merger with India, but there are indications of anti-social elements

working underground, opposing the union with India. With the ban on the Communist

Party in West Bengal, a large number of Communists have found haven in the city.

These have been trying their best of impress on the voters the ‘benefits’ of

Chandernagore continuing under French domination. The so-called benefits are

enumerated as: small incidence of taxation, liberal rations and other Municipal

amenities which are at present not the case in India.”56 Moreover, according to N. V.

Rajkumar who had already arrived in Chandernagore as observer on behalf of the All

India Congress Committee, certain French agents were moving around the city freely

offering bribes of various sorts to unscrupulous elements and unprincipled individuals

and buying their votes in favour of France. Taking advantage of the local differences,

these agents made serious attempts to strike a bargain with a few influential people of

the locality.57 One of the 15 polling booths was set on fire on the night of 17th June by

some miscreants and it was quickly extinguished by volunteers and local people. On

the evening of 18th June a procession was brought out by about 100 activists, exciting

slogans like “Down with the French Government” and “Down with the present

56 The Hindu, 11 June 1949. 57 N. V. Rajkumar, N.V. The Problem of French India. New Delhi: All- India Congress Committee, 1951, pp. 66-88.

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Municipal Assembly” were shouted.58 A tense situation was deliberately created and

it was feared that voting might be disturbed, the motive being to create a panic and

ward off the voters, particularly the women voters from casting their votes. The pro-

mergerists were coalesced into a Joint Council of Action for referendum took up the

challenge and they appealed to the people of Chandernagore “to give a death blow to

French imperialism in the ensuing referendum by making maximum polling in favour

of Indian Union…”59

Meanwhile, the two observers appointed by the ICJ-Holger Anderson and

Rudulfo Buron Castro had reached Chandernagore a few days before the referendum.

However as regards the modalities of referendum it was decided that vote should take

place by means of ballot papers, called Bulletins by the French in two different

colours on which was printed in Bengali and French the question “Do you approve of

keeping Chandernagore within French Union?” and the white paper bore the answer

“Yes” and the pink “No”. Referendum was held on 19th June 1949, as scheduled. Out

of 12, 194 Voters, 7,608 Voters cast their votes. To the question, whether you accept

to continue to be part of the French Union, some 7,473 Voters of Chandernagore

replied in negative, while just 114 reacted positively.60 The verdict of the referendum

was clear and categorical and this brought nearly 261 years of French rule in

Chandernagore to an end.

Table 5.3 Results of the Referendum in Chandernagore

Total Population

Total Voters

Total Voted

Votes for India

Votes for France

53,000 12,194 7,608 7,473 114

Source: The Hindu, 22 June 1949.

58 The Hindu, 19 June 1949. 59 The Statesman, 19 June 1949. 60 The Hindu, 22 June 1949.

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Figure 5.1: Distribution of Votes in Chandernagore Referendum

Negotiations over the modalities of transition of Chandernagore to India were

delayed and only on 2nd May 1950, the government of India took over the de facto

administration. This de facto transfer was recognised on 2nd February 1951, when the

Indian Ambassador in Paris and a representative of the French government signed a

Treaty of Cession of Chandernagore, consisting of a preamble and twelve articles

(See Appendix-VI). De jure transfer was delayed due to technical reasons, the

French Assemblée nationale ratified the treaty on 11th April 1952, which later got the

approval of President Vincent Auroil on 19th April and the de jure transfer of

Chandernagore actually took place on 9th June 1952. This treaty completely freed

Chandernagore from the French administrative control.61

While sending his greetings to the people of Chandernagore on this historical

occasion Nehru, welcomed Chandernagore and its people to the Indian Union and he

said

The Government and the people of France, for whom the Government and the people of India entertain feelings of sincere friendship, should see in the results of the referendum in Chandernagore proof of the sentiment of the people of their Settlements in India for reunion with their Motherland and of India’s desire that this process of change, inevitable by reasons of history, geography, culture and the spirit of times, should be voluntary and peaceful and should strengthen the existing bonds of friendship between India and France.62

61 The Hindu, 21 September 1954. 62 The Hindu, 21 June 1949.

India 98%

France 2%

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When Chandernagore celebrated the verdict in great jubilation, the New York Times

wrote in a different vain: “Opinion here (Chandernagore) is that this referendum is no

guide to those due in December in other French Settlements” and added

“Chandernagore is landlocked while the others are ports. In Chandernagore, the

dominant political party is akin to the Indian Congress Party, while elsewhere the

Socialist Party has closer links with French.”63 It may be true at least in French point

of view. They repeatedly insisted that Chandernagore is totally different from other

French Indian settlements and had relied much on the south Indian pro-French

political elite.

Political manoeuvres:

The results of the Chandernagore referendum had its repercussion in

Pondicherry. The pro-merger elements of Pondicherry, who stood for the ouster of the

French from the Indian soil and merger with Indian Union, floated the “National

Liberation Front”.64 The Front decided to celebrate 26th June 1949 as ‘Chandernagore

Victory Day’ and sought permission from the French Indian authorities to organise a

procession and to hold public meeting at odiyansalai maidan (Pondicherry).

Simultaneously permission was given to Bhupathi, a pro-French leader to take another

procession and hold another meeting in a neighbouring maidan on the same day and

at the same hour. Trouble broke out. The repression that was let loose by the pro-

French elements on that date aimed to completely quell all the pro-Indian sentiments

in the settlements. As drunken and armed goondas paraded the streets creating

anarchy, a demonstration of rowdies opposite the Indian Consul General took place

and, Indian Union flags were forcibly removed from pro-merger residences,

63 Cited in R.L. Purushothama Reddiar Papers, N.A.I, Pondicherry and The New York Times, 20 June 1949. 64 The Hindu, 20 June 1949.

200

disfigured and worn as loin-cloth or tied to the tails of stray, roaming dogs.65 A

private band of goondas from that date onwards, with the aid and abetment of the

French Indian police, under the banners of the French India Socialist Party and

Progressive Democratic Party, roamed the territories and committed atrocious crimes

against the Indian sympathisers. The residences of Communist leaders and Congress

mergerists were stoned, raided, looted and inmates beaten. Hundreds of political

refugees had to flee the territories and temporary camps had to be put up on the border

areas.

Rashid Ali Baig, the Indian Consul General at Pondicherry protested against

the incidents which culminated in the Indian Union flag being pulled down by

miscreants.66 Immediately, the Commissaire of French India passed an Arrêté on 9th

July 1949 forbidding meetings or public manifestations of political nature and

forbidding the political parties from abusing a National Emblem in the public

manifestations of their activities.67 The purpose of such acts was done to ensure a

period of political calm during which the delegation from French India could carry

out discussions in Paris and New Delhi in a proper atmosphere.

In accordance with the resolution taken in March (1949) meeting of the four

Municipal Committees of south India to send a delegation to Paris and New Delhi, a

three-man delegation headed by Edouard Goubert, the leader of the French India

Socialist Party and the Minister for General administration, the other members be

Karunendra Mudaliar, the Finance Minister and M. Balasubramanian, the President of

the French India Assemblée Représentative left for Paris on 11th July 1949. As

mentioned earlier the aim of the delegation was to get from the French and Indian 65 Dinamani, 28 June 1949. 66 The Hindu, 4 July 1949. 67 Journal officiel de l’Inde français dans l’Inde, 1949, p.324.

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governments “clarifications” about the status that the four south Indian French

settlements could expect from the nation they might choose to join.68

In Paris “The three invisible keystones”69 met many political personalities,

expressed their desire to obtain “a large measure of autonomy” for French India

within the frame work of French Union and urged to have this autonomy before the

referendum.70 The French officials, who doubted the composition and the legality of

the delegation, were non-committal and did not want to give any “definite

clarification” before the referendum, although the French Council of Ministers agreed

to examine the proposed status. The official communiqué of the French Council of

Ministers of 28th July 1949 stated that “the Government, after hearing a statement of

the Minister of Overseas France, has recorded the wish of the delegation of the French

Establishments in India to obtain for the Establishments in south India an autonomous

administration within the frame-work of the French Union. It has been decided to

examine this problem in the light of international agreements entered into up to now

and with a desire to see that these requests are fulfilled.”71 Goubert himself admitted

that the treatment they had received in France was “far from satisfactory” and the

Pondicherry delegation “returned to New Delhi thoroughly dissatisfied and

disappointed.”72

It should be remembered that the delegation had no legal standing whatsoever

and the French government thought that New Delhi refused to accept it. On the

contrary the government of India had received the delegation as “the Government

68 Cross reference, Chapter-V, pp.1870-188. 69 That’s the way R.L. Purushothama Reddiar, the President of the French India National Congress called this three-man delegation. 70 The Hindu, 26 July 1949. 71 File No: 15(58)-Eur.I/1949, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi. 72 The Hindu, 18 October 1949.

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guests.” The reason behind this cordial reception was that during P.A. Menon’s visit

to Pondicherry73 Goubert told P.A. Menon that it was their desire to avoid a

referendum and to settle the problem of the future of the French settlements by a

tripartite conference. He also assured P.A. Menon that should the government of India

guarantee their autonomy for a period of some years; the French India Socialist Party

will use its influence in favour of merger with India.74 In view of this change in the

French India Socialist Party’s attitude and its desire to join the Indian Union, the

government of India received the Pondicherry delegation with utmost courtesy-“a

reception cordial and satisfactory.”75

In New Delhi the Pondicherry delegation met Nehru, Rajaji, the Governor

General of India and other Indian leaders and officials. India had taken its stand

strictly not on the bargaining spirit but in accordance with the Jaipur resolution of the

Indian National Congress. The government of India considered “referendum as the

best method of solution to the problem for both India and France and provided

decisions were in favour of joining the Indian Union; informed the delegation that

(a) “they(India) did not intend, unless the people themselves so wished,

that these territories should become part of the Madras Presidency;

(b) they were willing that French India should retain its language,

system of administration and the personnel, other than French,

which the Administration now employs and

(c) French India would, in the event of joining India, be treated, in

broad terms, as a Province or, as Provinces are to be called

73 He visited Pondicherry in the middle of May 1949 to examine on the spot the inconveniences caused to the people of French India because of the termination of the Customs Union agreement. He also met various political leaders in Pondicherry. 74 File No: D.1313 /1949, (15(58)-Eur-I), Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi. 75 The Hindu, 19 October 1949.

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hereafter, a State of the Indian Union and that every attempt would

be made to make a provision in the Constitution of India in order to

meet their desire to send an elected representative to Parliament.”76

The delegates seemed satisfied with what India promised.

Apart from this manoeuvre, there were some other understandings also

reached between Nehru and the Pondicherry delegates77:

(1) The delegation informed the Indian Prime Minister that their party

(French India Socialist Party) intended to declare, at the earliest possible moment, for

union with India.78

(2) Goubert explained to Nehru that the French India Socialist Party was

formed to combat French India Communist Party and to oust V. Subbiah, the leader of

the Communist Party from the political scene. In this they have succeeded and now

controlled an overwhelming support throughout French India. The delegation

informed that they were now as nationalist as the Congress who stood for the same

thing except that the Congress demanded the immediate merger of French India in the

Madras province due to the affiliation of the French India National Congress with the

Tamil Nadu Congress Committee. So Goubert requested Nehru to use his good

offices to see that since there was now no political issue in regard to the future of the

French India, the Tamil Nadu Congress did not help French India National Congress

to needlessly oppose them. For this Nehru stated that he agreed that once French India

joins the Indian Union there would be as little local rivalry as possible and to the

extent that the good offices of himself and of the government could be exercised to

this end they would so. Nehru wrote a confidential letter to Kumaraswamy Raja, the

Premier of the Madras presidency requesting him to exercise his influence to prevent 76 File No: 15(58)-Eur.I/1949 (Secret), Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi. 77 See Appendix -VII, for the Minutes of the Meeting. 78 File No: 15(58)-Eur.I/1949 (Secret), Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi.

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conflicts in Pondicherry between rival groups, at any rate between the French India

National Congress Party and the French India Socialist Party.79 B. Pattabhi

Sitaramayya, the President of the All India Congress Committee also wrote a letter to

R.L. Purushothama Reddiar in a similar vein.80

(3) The members of the delegation expressed their desire to have a

representative in the parliament at New Delhi particularly in view of the fact that they

at present had three representatives in Paris. In response to their political demands

Nehru pointed out that there were certain difficulties which will have to be carefully

examined. There was, for instance, the question of representation at Delhi. According

to the Indian constitution one member of the Constituent Assembly was selected for

every million voters. Since French India had only 3,00,000 this naturally created a

difficulty. He also pointed out that Mahe and Yanam were very small areas and

widely separated. He doubted whether they could exist as separate entities for very

long. He, therefore, personally thought that the best course would be to make as little

changes as possible for the present in the transition period of 2 to 3 years except

administrative changes necessary to bring about accession to India. After 2 to 3 years

they would then have a clearer picture of the question and the necessary changes

could then be made in consultation with the local people.81

(4) The delegation next brought up the question of reverting to the customs

agreement between the French India and India which was in force until 1941. They

believed that, if this could be done, it would have an excellent psychological effect on

the population and facilitate their task in rallying the voters to unanimous support of

joining the Indian Union. Goubert also stressed the need for an early decision in

regard to the Customs Union. In regard to the Customs Union the Prime Minister 79 File No: 15(58)-Eur.I/1949, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi. 80 R. L Purushothama Reddiar Papers, N.A.I. Pondicherry. 81 File No: 15(58)-Eur.I/1949, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi.

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stated that he agreed that an early decision should be arrived at and that he believed

that the matter was at present under consideration.82 The Pondicherry delegation

returned from New Delhi apparently fully satisfied in regard to the future of French

India and determined to vote for union with India at the referendum.

However commenting on the visit of Pondicherry delegation and policy of the

Indian government over French India, Nehru said in a press conference

Our policy, first of all, is that these foreign possessions must necessarily revert to India because we cannot tolerate the idea of this Indian sub-continent having footholds occupied by foreign powers. But apart from that, we have said that as far as possible, autonomy should be given, their distinctive character should be recognized and a period of transition with their consent and co-operation should be fixed.83 It was in this backdrop that the Pondicherry delegation was in New Delhi.

Daniel Levi came up with the idea that creation of a state consisting of the five French

settlements in India. To the state to be thus created India and France would guarantee

in common complete autonomy. Such a state, he believed, would be able to resolve

the vexed problem between the two countries. The new state could maintain political,

economic and cultural relations with the two governments. The proposed new state

would be linked with the French and Indian Union and would have their

representation in the assemblies in New Delhi and Paris.84 When Levi proposed this

new idea he neither consulted the government of India nor sought the approval of the

French authorities in advance but did so purely on his personal capacity and it was

rejected by both the governments.

Actually the French government circles were not keen that Pondicherry

delegation should contact government of India but the latter’s visit to New Delhi had

82 File No: 15(58)-Eur.I/1949, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi. 83 The Hindu, 6 August 1949. 84 The Indian News Chronicle, 1 August 1949.

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some serious consequences in the French circles. Previously, the French authorities in

Paris were not responsive to arrive at any amicable understanding with the

Pondicherry delegation. Now their attitude completely changed and they were in a

hurry to reach amicable arrangements with the Pondicherry delegation on matters of

French Indian settlements. Soon after the visit of Pondicherry delegation to Paris and

New Delhi the French Overseas Minister (Coste-Floret) came to Calcutta on his way

back from Saigon. There he met Daniel Levi as well as the Pondicherry delegation.

The Pondicherry delegation which met Coste-Floret at Calcutta found a complete

change in the attitude of the French Overseas Minister. At Calcutta he received them

cordially which he, on the suggestion of Tézanas du Montcel, did not do at Paris. Now

he promised to give immediately a complete autonomy to French Indian settlements.

He also “suggested that the Constitutions granted to the territories of Laos and

Cambodia might be suitable for French India” and asked the delegation to study them

and “if they desired a similar one for French India they should let him know.”85 Soon

Coste-Floret left Paris where he submitted his report on French India to the French

Council of Ministers. Rashid Ali Baig put his faith on Edouard Goubert and he

believed that the “French India Socialist Party has fully realised that local autonomy

in the French Union is only practicable with the agreement and support of India

whereas local autonomy in the Indian Union is perfectly practicable without the

support of France.”86 Whereas the pro-merger elements in Pondicherry could not yet

bring themselves to believe that the French India Socialist Party would declare for

India. They were, however, prepared to hold their hands till the Congress of

Municipal Councils and if the expected resolution is then passed to support the

Socialist party whole-heartedly.

85 File No: D.788/1949, (15 (58)-Eur.I), Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi. 86 File No: D. 3211/49, (15 (98)-Eur.I), R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi.

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The meeting between Coste-Floret and the Pondicherry delegation, however,

proved an anti-climax in the political process. A mysterious plan of autonomy was

prepared at Paris. There were differences of opinion as to the decree of autonomy to

be granted to the four south Indian French settlements. Coste-Floret contemplated in

terms of giving autonomy as large as Vietnam. But the Overseas Department never

thought in terms of giving autonomy as large as Vietnam. They preferred to give a

status of Associated States in accordance with Article 61 and 62 of the French

Constitution.87 It was at this stage, in a telegram to the Overseas Minister Chambon

informed that the delegation was impressed with the Indian offer and expressed the

fear that the Congress of Municipal Councils might feel tempted to vote for the Indian

Union.88 Daniel Levi also gave the Minister for Foreign Affairs his reactions and

cautioned him to the effect that if France fell back on the assurance already given to

the delegation, i.e. autonomy as large as possible and comparable to that of Laos and

Cambodia, Goubert would go against France and in that case the results of the

referendum would be disastrous.89 In the urgency of the situation, the question of

whether French India was to be given the status of Associated State or an enlarged

Vietnam type autonomy was thoroughly studied.

While this was happening, an open opportunity was presented to the French

India Socialist Party to prove its strength. By-election for two vacant seats

(Pondicherry and Mannadipeth constituency) in the French India Assemblée

Représentative was held on the 28th August 1949. This election deemed as the first

round in the referendum fight. The French India Socialist Party put up two candidates

87 File No: D.788 /1949, (15 (58)-Eur.I), Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi. 88 Ajit K. Neogy. Decolonization of French India: Liberation movement and Indo-French Relations 1947-54. Institut Française de Pondichéry, 1997, p. 155. 89 Ajit K. Neogy. Decolonization of French India: Liberation movement and Indo-French Relations 1947-54. Institut Française de Pondichéry, 1997, p. 153.

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and two avowedly pro-French independent candidates opposed them. The pro-French

Progressive Democratic Party openly came out for a trial of strength against the

Socialist Party. These candidates attacked Goubert and the Socialist Party openly and

accused them of betraying France. This argument did not seem to have greatly

affected the voters since the Socialist Party candidates won by over 8,000 to under

250 votes and over 5,000 to under 500 votes respectively.90 The voting pattern

illustrated the hold of the French India Socialist Party over the local population.

Circumstances demanded that the French government clarified its decision

towards her Indian possessions without further delay. Accordingly the French Council

of Ministers, in its meetings held on 14th and 21st September 1949 respectively took

two important decisions. It decided that in order to ensure the fairness of the

forthcoming referendum in the four south India settlements and make its results

incontestable the number of neutral observers should be increased.91 The Council of

Ministers, in its meeting on 21st September, also approved the status of autonomy

within the French Union (See Appendix -VIII) to be granted to the French settlements

of south India in the event of the verdict of referendum going in favour of France. For

rallying the French offer, a flow of prominent officials of the French government

visited Pondicherry. The French officials Bruniquel and Escargueil visited

Pondicherry in August 1949. Papussamy, the envoy of the French Ambassador in

New Delhi arrived in Pondicherry just two days before the meeting of the Congress of

Municipal Councils which was held on 17th and 18th October 1949.92 This was

followed by members of the French Union Assembly Le Brun Keris and Schock who

come from Paris on a private visit to Pondicherry. There they met Chambon and also

90 File No: D. 3211/49, (15 (98)-Eur.I), R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi. 91 The Statesman, 16 September 1949. 92 File No: D. 3905/49, (15 (98)-Eur.I), R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi.

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the leaders of the French India Socialist Party. The French officials conversed with

the Municipal members of Pondicherry and Karaikal assuring them that the law of

autonomy would be passed very shortly (meaning even before the referendum) and

that the French India question could be solved without a referendum.93 This had its

full impact on the decision of the Congress of Municipal Councils which met again on

17th and 18th October 1949, to hear the report of the delegation.

The Congress of Municipal Councils of the four south Indian settlements met

at Pondicherry on 17th and 18th October 1949 after hearing the report of the

delegation sent out to Paris and New Delhi, recommended the acceptance of the

French government’s offer of federal autonomy within the French Union to the people

of the French India.94 It demanded that the necessary legal procedure should be

urgently adopted to bring the draft in question and discuss it before the French

parliament and the law passed by the latter in this regard should come immediately

into force without waiting for the result of the referendum.95 The Congress

enumerated various types of hardships which the people of settlements were

undergoing consequent on the revival of the customs regulations and declared their

inability to participate in the referendum.96 It made it clear that referendum should not

take place as long as the enclaves continued to suffer under the present system. The

Municipal members demanded that the pre-1941 regime should be re-established

before holding the referendum. It, therefore, resolved that the referendum would not

be held on 11th December and that a later date should be fixed for the same. It urged

the French government to take up the matter with the government of India and to see

that these hardships were removed within six months. The Congress of Municipal 93 The Indian Express, 29 October 1949. 94 The Hindu, 19 October 1949. 95 File No: 15(11) Eur-I Vol-II/49, R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi. 96 The Hindu, 19 October 1949.

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Councils even resolved that if the French government failed to come to a settlement

with the government of India and remove the hardships, they should hand over the

affected communes to the Indian Union and denounce the June agreement of 1948.

After these resolutions the Congress of Municipal Councils adjourned sine die.97 The

postponed referendum was to take place in February 1950.

The expeditious manner in which the Congress of Municipal councils accepted

the French offer of autonomy and called on the people of the settlements to accept it,

confirmed that manoeuvres by French authorities had taken place behind the scenes in

French India during the months of August and September. The French attempted to

secure unanimous acceptance of the offer by the members of the Congress of

Municipal councils and to keep the French India Socialist Party under French tutelage

especially in the light of the latter’s ability to change colour, as and when required.

The French officials who had visited Pondicherry and Karaikal during the preceding

months were the real actors “behind the scenes” and they might have either coerced or

cajoled the Municipal Councillors to take the above decision.98 The Hindu wrote

“The Indian Government began at last to understand what a “domestic affair” is for

France and to regret the blind faith which it had placed in France.”99 The decision of

the Congress of Municipal councils surprised the Indian government and stunned the

pro-mergerists. Moreover Goubert, who dominated the whole scene from the

beginning to the end, in his report to the Congress of Municipal councils made no

reference to India’s attitude and about the Indian offer of autonomy to the French

settlements. What he had committed in New Delhi was totally different from what he

pledged in the Congress of Municipal councils. This forced the government of India

97 Dinamani, 28 October 1949. 98 Liberation, 10 November 1949. 99 The Hindu, 14 November 1949.

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to issue a rejoinder clarifying its stand on this subject. The communication, issued on

27th October 1949, declared

There seems to be some misunderstanding with regard to the policy and intentions of the Government of India concerning the future of French Settlements in India in the event of their deciding to join Indian Union. The Government of India have decided that in that event French possessions in India will be administered as autonomous units in direct relations with the Central Government. Any changes in the administrative set-up will be carried out only after consulting local public opinion. The special linguistic and cultural interests of the people will be preserved. The Government of India will provide adequate funds for carrying on the administration of these possessions. The existing financial commitments of the French administration will be taken over by the Government of India.100

Change in India’s Policy towards French India

The recent development in French India had actually upset the pro-mergerists,

R.L. Purushothama Reddiar criticised that “this is entirely due to the wrong policy of

the Government of India on this question.”101 Apart from this, pro-merger leaders and

parties pointed out their fingers on Rashid Ali Baig, the Indian Consul General as

responsible for this unfortunate situation and demanded his immediate removal from

Pondicherry. The demand for his removal was mostly spearheaded by young

Congressites. Rashid Ali Baig became controversial for many reasons, at a time when

the pro-mergerists were fighting against Goubert’s Socialist party, Rashid Ali was

pampering him in the belief that he would be able to win over Goubert and his party

and rally them round the merger movement. He had secret parleys with Goubert and

he strongly believed that only the Socialist party could deliver the goods and any

attempt to defeat them would not only result in failure but might drive them in the

French direction. This policy was unacceptable to the pro-mergerists who believed

that he was working against their interests. Moreover they felt they had not received

100 Cited in Francis Cyril Antony, ed. Gazetteer of India: Union Territory of Pondicherry. Vol.I, Pondicherry, 1982, p. 260. 101 The Hindu, 20 October 1949.

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the necessary support and patronage from him. Resentment against him mounted after

the Municipal Congress of 17th and 18th October 1949 which actually accepted the

French offer of autonomy and postponed the referendum indefinitely. A number of

telegrams were sent to Nehru, Patel, Sitaramya, Rajkumar, and Goplassamy Ayngar

holding Baig responsible for the whole development.102 They complained that

whatever Baig had done during the last two years had ultimately strengthened the

hands of Goubert. His policy had a demoralising effect on the pro-mergerists. New

Delhi had shown so much courtesy to the Municipal delegation because of Baig.

Disgusted with his politics posters bearing epithets like “Baig your dishonest politics

have failed,” “You are traitor to the cause of liberation of French India,” “This is not

your place, either go to Pakistan or to Paris” were pasted in all the principal places of

Pondicherry.103 The Indian National Congress Party instructed N.V. Rajkumar to hold

an enquiry into the grievances of the pro-mergerists.

The set back India had suffered in the Municipal Congress decision came as a

great blow to the Indian government’s policy towards French India. Indian Consul

General himself admitted that “though some ground had certainly been lost, matters

were not as bad as they appeared in the press and that with firm action on the part of

Government the lost ground could be regained.”104 The understanding reached

between Nehru and Goubert broke down. The whole policy needed to be revised.

Immediately after the Congress of Municipal councils was over, N.V. Rajkumar

visited Pondicherry and Karaikal and discussed with the pro-merger elements about

the forthcoming referendum. He had widened the scope of the pro-merger groups in

Pondicherry and Karaikal by persuading the local Congress Committees to merge into

102 R. L Purushothama Reddiar Papers, N.A.I. Pondicherry. 103 File No: D. 3905/49, (15 (98)-Eur.I), R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi. 104 File No: D. 3905/49, (15 (98)-Eur.I), R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi.

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a non-Congress body. This enabled the inclusion of some independents that hitherto

had refused to join the Congress due to the fact that the Congress groups largely

consisted of adventurers and opportunists. Rajkumar’s effort to form the Pondicherry

Merger Committee was crowned with success. Andre and Lakshmanaswami, who had

earlier resigned from the Conseil du gouvernement in 1948, joined the Pondicherry

Merger Committee. The committee was further strengthened by the participation of

pro-merger leaders like D. Zivarattinam, S. Perumal, Victor Mariadas, D. Mariappa,

A. Laheche, L. Satyamurthi, Dorai Munussami, L. Selvanathan and G. Munussami. A

person of the stature of Sellane Naicker was made President of the committee and

Ambroise was made working President to help the former. A similar committee called

Karaikal Merger Congress was also formed in Karaikal with Xavery as President and

Leon Saint Jean as Vice-President.105 A common program was set to unite the

committees. In his report to the government of India of Rashid Ali Baig noted:

“(1) nothing much more or less than what is being done can be done for the

time being.

(2) It is imperative to have the referendum at the earliest possible date and

even more important to have neutral observers in French India as early as possible.

(3) But, however necessary it is to have the date of referendum finalised, we

should not give way on any item of the modalities desired by us.

(4) The Customs and import and export control regulations should be enforced

as strictly as possible. The minimum help in other ways should be given to French

India.

(5) The above rules should also apply to Mahe and Yanam since French India

must be regarded as a whole unit and not as four separate ones.

105 The Hindu, 31 December 1949.

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(6) Every step should be taken to prevent the new autonomy scheme being

introduced before the referendum.”106

Since then New Delhi again tightened the economic pressure by hardening its customs

policy and a rigid enforcement of the customs restrictions on the movement of

merchandises from one commune to another and between the communes and

Pondicherry. Added to this, was the introduction of the ‘permit system’ which strictly

regulated the travel between the French settlements and India. This was done of

course in order to force the French government to hold the referendum which it was

delaying on one pretext or other.

Baig was finally recalled from Pondicherry and replaced by S.K. Banerjee, in

Pondicherry on 31st December 1949. The new Consul General identified certain

defects in the policy of the government of India so far followed in handling the

French Indian situation. He, in his confidential note, wrote

There is none among the political leaders of French India who could get us the votes in a Referendum. We have alienated people by unnecessary restrictions on their freedom. We have lowered our prestige by letting our diplomatic representative dabble in local politics. We have insulted our own countrymen by using useless slanders to be spread against the Ashram; we have looked askance at the motives of Sri Aurobindo who thought us the meaning of patriotism. The petty officials of Pondicherry make marry and laught up their sleeves whilst we try to settle the details of the Referendum.107 Apart from the pro-merger Congress, the French India Communist Party led

by V. Subbiah, renewed its functions, which it had switched off for a short time

following the government clampdown on Communists within India. The Communists

continued to have group meetings in parks and secluded corners, in spite of the

official ban. V. Subbiah absconded and still hiding “underground” continued his

106 File No: D. 3983/49, (15 (98)-Eur.I), R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi. 107 File No: D.167-R&I (35/50-R&I), R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi.

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propaganda for workers’ affairs and gave slogans like “Smash the Imperialist police

forces and destroy Goubert’s goondas,” “Down with Congress-Fascist Government,”

“Down with French Imperialism.”108 The party was strengthened after the release of

several Communists including two members of the Assemblée Représentative,

Clemenceau and Annoussamy who had been sent to jail for creating troubles in 1947.

Moreover Captain Bouhard, the Chief of the French India police and a pro-

Communist, encouraged the Communists and pitted them against the Socialists to

keep the latter under control.

In the meantime the modality of the referendum in the four south Indian

settlements was discussed by India and France. Actually both the governments came

to an understanding regarding the necessity of holding the referendum as early as

possible. Presuming that the referendum would be held in February 1950, the local

French authorities of Pondicherry had started revising the electoral list starting from

20th December 1949. But the government of India insisted on the solution of some

urgent issues without which referendum would be meaningless. As regards the

observers Guerrero, Vice-President of the International Court of Justice, prepared a

list of 12 neutral observers. Both the governments agreed to retain 8 of them and

decided to have in addition 6 observers in order to ensure maximum guarantee of

electoral operation. Both India and France agreed to nominate 2 members each

selected from the Asian and African countries.109 The Municipal Congress insisted on

61 percent of voters must cast their votes in referendum. The government of India

agreed that in order to justify the results of the referendum in the eye of the world a

certain number of voters must participate and informed the French government in the

108 File No: D. 5159/49, (15 (98)-Eur.I), R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I, New Delhi. 109 The Hindu, 17 December 1949.

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light of past experience, it would be highly speculative to accept anything more than

40 percent of the electors to vote in the referendum. Another question which was the

subject to almost endless correspondence was the complaint of the French

government that customs and frontier regulations introduced by the government of

India after the termination of the customs agreement were intended to put political

pressure on the local population. For this the Indian government made it known to the

French government that it was not a political measure but a step taken to combat

contraband trade.110

Apart from this in its Aide-mémoire of 16th February 1950 to the French

Foreign Ministry the Indian government had demanded that the revision of electoral

rolls should restart after the arrival of the neutral observers and it stressed that simply

checking the electoral lists by the observers would be clearly “insufficient”. The

government of India demanded the imposition of a general prohibition on all French

officials from participating in the electoral campaigns. It also demanded that the

political parties should have full liberty to appeal to the people assuring them free and

fair vote. Aide-mémoire also demanded that grant of amnesty for political prisoners

and the political refugees, those who had taken part in the revolt or riot of Mahe in

October 1948 and who had been, since then, living outside Mahe as political exiles,

must be permitted to return to their settlements for registering their names in the

revised electoral lists and participate in the electoral campaign.111 The French

government found itself unable to subscribe to the latest demand formulated by India.

This meant a virtual surrender to India.112 The corps of neutral observers who

assembled at Paris en route to Pondicherry by the beginning of February 1950 to 110 The Hindu, 17 December 1949. 111 Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol: 15, Part-II, p. 565. 112 Ajit K. Neogy. Decolonization of French India: Liberation movement and Indo-French Relations 1947-54. Institut Française de Pondichéry, 1997, pp.162-163 and 181.

217

ascertain whether the local situation was congenial for holding referendum had been

dispersed at the end of March 1950. With this the Indo-French negotiations on the

modalities of referendum had come to a dead lock.113

The merger and anti-merger alignments became solid after the Municipal

Congress, which was dominated by the French India Socialist Party, met on 17th and

18th October 1949 and decided to postpone the referendum and urged the French

Indian people to accept the French offer of federal autonomy. The French

government’s determination to retain the French Indian settlements further

strengthened by the decision of the French India Socialist Party in favour of France. It

was a matter of prestige for France and the French Indian officials, including

members of the police force and the judiciary, who were given definite instructions to

see to it that India does not win the referendum. At the same time the merger

alignment gained considerable strength after the visit of N.V. Rajkumar and his effort

to form pro-merger committees in Pondicherry and Karaikal. Since then the

government of India backed the pro-mergerists with material as well as moral support.

India put pressure on French settlements by tightening its custom regulations and

imposed restrictions on freedom of movement and denied the essential requirements

of the French Indian population. Apart from the two alignments, there was a third

force, viz., the French India Communist Party which still possessed considerable

influence among the working class population through its unions. Both Goubert and

V. Subbiah were locked in a bitter rivalry for a long time. Goubert’s official position

enabled him to lynch his Communist rivals. The clash between the two was inevitable

and the Communists were waiting for their opportunity to strike back.

113 Liberation, 26 March 1950.

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Political Violence in French India: the Referendum Deferred

To counter India’s economic pressure, French Indian administration took

strong measures, resulting in what India called the “internal pressure” on the pro-

mergerists. Considerable ‘internal pressure’ was being exerted following the visit of

N.V. Rajkumar. Meetings, processions and political activities of the pro-merger

groups were banned. In Karaikal Léon St. Jean the leader of the Karaikal Merger

Congress, was summoned before a magistrate and accused of subversive activities. A

similar enquiry was lodged against the Mayor of Tirnoular commune where a meeting

was arranged for N.V. Rajkumar. The Karaikal administration suspended the Mayor

of Tirnoular for a month from his Municipal council.114 G. Ratthinavelu, a member of

the executive committee of the Karaikal Merger Congress and his brother

Maruthalingam and P. Rathinasami Pillai, M. Muthuvaithilingam and Sheriff

Maraikair members of the same organisation were assaulted by the anti-merger

rowdies on the ground that they joined the pro-merger committee.115 ‘Kudi Arasu’ the

pro-merger paper of Karaikal was banned for publishing an article protesting against

difficulty and delay in obtaining election identity cards.116 In Pondicherry miscreants

staged demonstration in front of the house of Ambroise, the working President of the

pro-merger committee formed by N.V. Rajkumar, and they threatened to kill him. The

rowdies also raided the house of Venugopalassami, a Congress worker of Pondicherry

and threatened him in similar manner.

The bye-election for the Assemblée Représentative of January 1950 was the

occasion for the outbreak of new violence in Pondicherry with all its attendant evils.

Three Communist members of the French India Assemblée Représentative V.

114 File No: D.5260/49, (15 (98)-Eur.I), R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi. 115 The Hindu, 27 November 1949. 116 File No: D.13/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi.

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Subbiah, Clemencou and Annoussamy had been declared to have lost their seats for

“continued absence from the House for two consecutive sessions” and the Assemblée

Représentative decided to declare the seats vacant.117 Goubert was the brain behind

the dismissal of the three Communist members; He desperately wanted to drive out

Communists completely from the French Indian political field. Bye-election to the

vacant seats was announced to be held on 22nd January 1950. A public meeting was

held to support the Socialist party candidates for the Mudaliarpet commune (a strong

Communist basin), in connection with the bye-election. The meeting was addressed

by Goubert, President of the French India Socialist Party, on whose life an attempt

was made by the throwing of a country-made bomb, allegedly by Communists. Two

persons were killed, and several injured. Goubert narrowly escaped from the

attempt.118 The event created great sensation and spread terror in Pondicherry and the

adjoining communes. As a reprisal against the bomb incident, the French India

Socialist Party rowdies were let loose on those who dared to oppose Goubert. Aided

and abetted by the administration the goondas ran on rampage, looting and burning

the headquarters of the French India Communist Party which was located in the house

of V. Subbiah. On 13th January 1950 the fire which reduced to ashes the house of V.

Subbiah, spread rapidly to adjacent shops and houses. The police Chief Bouhard was

personally present there, but did nothing to stop this.119 The houses of Clemenceau

and Annoussamy were all set on fire. More than 30 houses in Pondicherry were looted

and burnt by goondas who received no resistance from anywhere.120 A series of

incendiarism also occurred in the commune of Oulgaret. No one was arrested. The

people became panic-stricken. Shops, hotels and restaurants were closed down. Anti-

117 The Hindu, 13 December 1949. 118 File No: D.167/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi. 119 File No: D.167/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi. 120 The Hindu, 16 January 1950.

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social elements were reigning supreme in Pondicherry. A leaflet was distributed

“expressing indignation of the public against the misdeeds of Communists and its

determination to put down their activities by violence and taking life for life, if

necessary.”121 Another leaflet announced a reward of a thousand rupees for the

apprehension of V. Subbiah the leader of the Communist party.122 With these the

French India Socialist Party had succeeded in liquidating V. Subbiah and brought

about his downfall. V. Subbiah again was forced to go underground.

Goubert wanted to destroy all his opposition. Having gained control of the

administrative machinery and with the coalition of the French authorities, Goubert

used it to ruthlessly suppress the pro-merger groups who were themselves fragmented

and hamstrung by petty squabbles. The French Indian authorities had to overlook the

Socialist party’s acts of omissions as they depended to a great deal on the support of

the latter for their continued stay in India. In January 1950 the Municipal Councillors

of six communes of Karaikal adopted a resolution in favour of the integration with

Indian Union and Pakkirisamy Pillai, Sénateur and the Mayor of Karaikal, who had

been elected by Goubert and the Socialist party, was among one. Because of his

declaration that he stood for merger he had to pay a price. This was not taken kindly

either by Goubert’s party or by the French Indian authorities. Taking advantage of his

absences in Paris undue pressure was exercised on ten Municipal Councillors of

Karaikal to resign so that the Municipal council could be dissolved and Pakkirisamy

unseated. Chambon, the acting Commissaire had merely obliged Goubert by

dissolving the Municipal Council and set up a commission consisting of 12 nominees

of the government.123 Moreover, a conspiracy was being hatched to declare

121 R. L. Purushothama Reddiar Papers, N.A.I, Puducherry. 122 File No: D.356/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi. 123 The Hindu, 23 February 1950.

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Pakkirisamy an Indian by nationality with a view to banishing him permanently from

French Indian politics and a petition for the declaration of Pakkirisamy as an Indian

and the elimination of his name from the electoral rolls had been filed before the

Administrative Council of the electoral rolls verification committee.124 Pakkirisamy

however regained his lost position and tried to get rid of Goubert by forming a new

political party called the “Socialist Party” in collaboration with M.R.P. (Mouvement

Républicain Populaire) in France. In the Municipal election, held on the 23rd and 24th

April 1950, all the members who had recently been made to resign with a view to

displace Pakkirisamy were returned to power. They again elected Pakkirisamy as their

Mayor.125

A dangerous situation prevailed in Mahe in the absence of Mahajana Sabha

whose leaders were either in exile or in jail. Three men named Sahadevan,

Purushothama and Govindan, members of the Mahe Municipal council and supporters

of Goubert, backed by goonda elements, ran a reign of terror in collaboration with the

administration in Mahe.126 On 5th February 1950 there was a clash between the French

Indian police and the political refugees outside Mahe. Following the incident the

French authorities tightened their repressive rule and took strong reprisals against the

relatives of the exiles, who were harassed and their houses and garden produce looted.

Some of the pro-mergerists who had been recently released after serving a term of

imprisonment were being harassed and some of them rearrested. Their ration cards

were seized and supply of food delayed or stopped.127 The Hindu wrote, “such lawless

acts particularly the incendiarism of French India as a measure calculated to strike

124 The Hindu, 23 February 1950. 125 File No: D.1018/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi. 126 File No: D.356/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi. 127 File No: D.427/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi and the Indian Express, 12 February 1950.

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terror among the pro-Indian elements.”128 The overall situation in French Indian

settlements was thus far from peaceful. Arrests, arson and incendiarism were taking

place without any let or hindrance. Political vendetta was the order of day.

Meantime, on 4th January 1950, the Overseas Territory Commission of France

had adopted a resolution proposed by Lambert Saravane (Député of the French

Assemblée nationale from French India) urging the French government to negotiate

with the Indian government to draw up a statute for the four settlements and submit

the statute to the inhabitants in a referendum. Saravane said that the statute of the four

town (settlements) should take into account both “French traditions” and “needs,”

particularly economic and social, “which oblige these establishments to share very

closely the life of the great Indian Community”. The resolution said that the four

settlements “should constitute the affirmation of link between France and Indian

Union.”129 At the same time, it passed a resolution sponsored by the French

government for the immediate holding of the referendum. These two apparently

contradictory resolutions suggested that France was in two minds with regard to her

overseas possessions in India.

Saravane on his way back from Paris met Nehru and officials of the Indian

External Affairs Ministry at New Delhi. In his talk with them, again he stressed his

noble idea of avoiding a referendum to decide the future of the French Indian

settlements. At Madras in a press conference he said many of the members of the

French Assemblée nationale wanted the French government to make a gesture of

handing over the sovereignty over the settlements to Indian Union government. This,

they believed, would strengthen the bonds of friendship between India and France.

128 The Hindu, 12 February 1950. and File No: D.427/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi 129 The Hindu, 6 January 1950.

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“As for myself,” he said, “I am working in this direction in the National

Assembly.”130

The pro-French elements in French India protested against the Saravane’s

plan. Telegrams were sent by the members of the French India Assemblée

Représentative, the Mayors of the various communes and the Councillors expressing

indignation at Lambert Saravane’s proposal and make it known to the government in

Paris that the people of French India are fully in favour of joining the French Union

and that the earlier a referendum is held the better it would be for all concerned.131

The French Assemblée nationale which met on 24th February 1950 rejected

Saravane’s proposal, Letourneau, the French Overseas Minister, replied that the

French government had been able to agree with the Indian government only on one

point: “the holding of a referendum”. Rather the assembly authorised the French

government to fix the date and organisation of the referendum in the four French

settlements in India.132 The assembly also authorised the French government to meet

all travelling and living expenses of the neutral observers of the referendum.133

Disappointed, Saravane reportedly told R.K. Tandon (the Indian Consul General at

Pondicherry) that

Whenever he has taken up the cause of merger in the French National Assembly and elsewhere in Paris, frantic telegram had been received from the Ministers, Mayors and other India Officials and leaders-all inspired by Goubert-avowing loyalty to the French Union and protesting any scheme to surrender. This has, he states, confused the politicians in France who, not knowing the real condition, feel that it would be unfair to hand over French India to Indian Union against the wishes of the local people.134

130 The Hindu, 7 February 1950. 131 File No: D.533/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi. 132 By Décret no 50-406 of 3rd April the French Assemblée nationale authorized the French government to organize referendum in the four settlements of India. 133 The Hindu, 25 February 1950. 134 File No: D.1467/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi.

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The date for holding referendum had already been deferred. Not even an

agreement on the modalities of the consultation between the two governments had so

far taken place. The Municipal Congress and the Pondicherry Conseils du

gouvernement blamed India for all the misery and economic pressures exerted by

New Delhi were aimed at forcing the inhabitants of the French Indian settlements to

vote for Indian Union. They demanded the immediate restoration of the customs

regime as it existed before 1941.135 India ruled out the possibilities of withdrawal of

its customs posts set up around the enclaves rather tightened its position. The whole

situation was really complex and the two governments remained firm in their

respective position-one blaming the other for the mess. The Mahe trial case played no

less an important role in driving a wedge in the relations between India and France. In

April 1950, the Mahe tribunal was presided over by Cousin, Chief Justice of French

India tried altogether 68 persons-15 in person and 53 in absentia. After a brief session,

judgement was pronounced on 1st May 1950. The accused persons were condemned

to 5 to 20 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 1.000 francs was imposed on the

absconding for participation in the October 1948 riot or revolt. The French citizenship

of those accused was suspended and the properties of the absconding accused was

forfeited.136 The judgement created quite a stir among those fighting for merger. They

looked to the government of India for an amnesty and wanted India to look after the

families of the accused, jailed in Mahe.137 New Delhi strongly reacted against the

manner in which the rebels of Mahe were treated. In June 1950 the government of

India lodged a strong protest to France for the harsh sentences pronounced by the

135 Customs agreement of 1941 which the French Indian government concluded with the British Indian government was not only guaranteed the stability of the French Indian budget but also saved the people of French India by supplying them with essential commodities like rice, sugar, vegetables, petrol etc., 136 File No: D.1018/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi. 137 File No: D.1106/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi.

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Mahe Tribunal.138 It also, time and again, approached the French government for the

grant of amnesty (to those who for fear of reprisals from the French government had

been, since then, living outside Mahe as political exiles) to conduct free and fair

referendum.

India was concerned over the situation prevailing in French Indian settlements

and the desperate condition of the pro-mergerists. N.V. Rajkumar was very active in

the French Indian affairs since October 1949. He took charge of uniting all the pro-

merger groups in French India to organize a pro-merger movement. He was visiting

Pondicherry and Karaikal with a view to consolidating the pro-merger groups much to

the chagrin of the French Indian authorities. Concerned over political violence in

French India, N.V. Rajkumar observed that the situation prevailing there was charged

with intimidation and terrorization. People were living under the shadow of threat and

rowdyism was particularly directed against the suppression of all pro-Indian elements

in view of the coming referendum and thus no free and fair referendum could be

possible.139 Moreover the pro-merger groups were completely frustrated and

disorganised and they looked to New Delhi for security and protection against

terrorism by the supporters of the French India Socialist Party before any movement

for integration of the settlements could be launched. Ménard, the new Commissaire of

French India strongly refuted the allegation made by N.V. Rajkumar and told the

press that N.V. Rajkumar’s information had been obtained from unrepresentative

138 It was possibly in the face of this protest that the French Foreign Ministry announced its intention on 15th December 1950 to grant an amnesty by presenting a bill in the forthcoming session of the French Assemblée nationale. Time and again, the government of India asked the French Foreign Ministry about the bill, but unfortunately the bill was never presented before the Assemblée nationale. An appeal was also made to the French Court of Causation, the highest legal court of appeal, but the court rejected the appeal because the counsel for defense failed to pursue the appeal. By April 1954, all the convicted persons had almost served out their sentences in full and had been released at the expiry of their respective terms of imprisonment (File No: D. 1538/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi). 139 The Hindu, 4 June 1950.

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sources in French India and that there was no “naked rowdyism” in these settlements

as he alleged and everybody lived in peace without any fear of his life or property. He

also expressed that the referendum was a purely French affair but in order to ensure

absolute impartiality in its conduct France had agreed to its supervision by neutral

observers appointed by the highest judicial tribunal in the world.140 This prompted

India’s doubt of the fairness of the referendum in French India to be held under the

administration of Ménard and they were feeling shaky and feared that a referendum

held in present conditions would go against India’s favour.141 R. K. Tandon who

succeeded S. K. Banerjee as Consul General of India at Pondicherry (on 10th June

1950) reported to New Delhi

The referendum is bound to loom large in the discussions among the French circle and it is not impossible that the French might try to cash in on their present strength by announcing an early date. There can be no doubt that a referendum held in present conditions would go against India. I have also no doubt that if democratic conditions are allowed to exist and there is freedom of association and speech followed by an impartial referendum, the decision would be in favour of India. We should however be under no delusions that the French authorities would allow democratic and fair conditions to exist as their power is founded not on any genuine love or admiration emanating from the people but on fear and force. They have attempted to cater to the weaknesses of the people. Thus the smuggler is openly encouraged and there are at present one to two ships a week in Pondicherry harbour whereas during the Customs Union in 1948 not more than about eight ships arrived in a year. The goods are hardly to be seen in Pondicherry and soon disappear obviously into the Indian Union. Similarly there is an abundance of cheap liquor.142 Day by day the political situation in French India got worse, in the absence of

V. Subbiah, the Communists had either been crushed or driven out or gone

underground, Goubert and Saravane involved in a rivalry of building their workers

union in the three textile mills of Pondicherry, whose workers numbered about

10,000. The labourers in the three textile mills were drawn into three Workers’

140 The Hindu, 4 June 1950. 141 File No: D.1262/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi. 142 File No: D.1467/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi.

227

Syndicates by Goubert. The May Day celebration of 1950 was an indication of

Goubert’s success in this field. A mammoth procession consisting of about 4,000 mill

workers flying the French flag and the red ensign of labour marched through the town

and gathered at a maidan where a public meeting was held with Goubert in the chair.

At the meeting Goubert assured the workers that his heart was with them and that he

would do all in his power for their lot. Ramaswamy Naicker, the Dravida Kazhagam

leader from India had been specially invited by Goubert to address the meeting.

Naicker told his audience that the condition in French India was much better than that

of the people in India and that they must thank Goubert for that. He also told them

that there was no question of French India merging in India.143

Lambert Saravane, still a Député of the French Assemblée nationale from

French India, founded a new party called the Republican Party with an eye on the next

elections to French parliament which was due in 1951. He was also reported to have

the support of Camouilly, former Commissaire and present Secretary General of

French India, who attempted to curb the power of Goubert. The declared policy of his

party was to restore democratic conditions in the settlements- “to make the French

settlements safe for democracy” and end corruption in French Indian political life.

The party demanded immediate transfer of power to Indian Union without

referendum.144 Since his party found no real foundations out side of Pondicherry, his

success in the elections largely depended on the Pondicherry mill workers. His

Communist lineage enabled him to make a dent among the working class population

of Pondicherry. This was done to provoke the ire of Goubert who with great difficulty

had destroyed V. Subbiah’s unchallenged supremacy over the working class

population of Pondicherry. Now began the period of hostility between Saravane and 143 File No: D.1106/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi. 144 File No: D.1467/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi.

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Goubert. Goubert’s lieutenants followed the policy of liquidating their new rivals;

they spared neither Saravane nor his adherents.

Goubert was said to have a private army of paid goondas who found

employment in the local Municipal bodies, government departments and the three

textile mills. The slightest semblance of opposition was ruthlessly crushed by murder,

arson, loot and intimidation and a reign of terror was perpetually maintained. Lambert

Saravane too extended patronage to a goonda organization of his own with which he

wished to strike Goubert and his strongholds.145 The clashes between them were

inevitable. Between the 15th and 19th June (1950), about 50 houses and huts were set

on fire in villages around Pondicherry. Most of these houses belonged to supporters of

Lambert Saravane. Some of them were, of course, owned by the Socialist party

workers. The house of Lambert Saravane was also pelted with stones. Saravane

blamed the Socialists party for these acts of incendiarism.146 The house of

Thambidorai, who was a French India delegate to the Preparatory Asian Regional

Conference of International Labour Organisation at New Delhi, was attacked because

he had made a statement to the press condemning insecurity in French India, the

attack on the labourers, dismissal of workers on political grounds and the harassment

and exploitation of labourers by political parties.147 Saravane sought India’s help for

weakening Goubert’s power. For this he met R.K. Tandon and N.V. Rajkumar and

asked for a vehicle, 25 revolvers with 25 rounds of ammunition each, 1,000 rupees

per month for three months and a lump sum of 1,500 rupees to start with. He

promised N.V. Rajkumar to completely alter the political situation in French India

within three months provided he was given this help. He also assured N.V. Rajkumar

145 File No: D.1467/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi. 146 File No: D. 1538/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi. 147 File No: D. 1752/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi.

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that he stood for merger of French settlements with Indian Union but on account of

his position as Député of the French Assemblée nationale and a member of the French

Foreign Relations Committee he was not in a position to announce this publicly.148

The political rivalry reached its climax when an attempt was made on the life of

Saravane on the night of 15th August 1950. A bomb was thrown on his car (he and his

wife were the only occupants of the car) when he was returning home from the Indian

Consulate where he had gone to attend a function in connection with the Indian

Independence Day celebration.149 In all, there were 125 houses put on fire in 1950 in

Pondicherry alone.150 Hundreds of workers were thrown out off their mill jobs most of

these labourers were in opposition to Goubert and were removed from the textile mills

on flimsy pretexts. They were all forced to flee from Pondicherry and set their refugee

camps along the frontier villages.151 These refugee camps later became the centres of

pro-merger activities. The refugees soon found a new leader Dadala Ramanaiyya, the

French Inspector of police, from Yanam who resigned his post in protest against the

French Indian authorities and joint the pro-merger groups.152

Goubert however, blamed the Madras press for considering him responsible

for the prevalence of hooliganism in French India. He explained that measures taken

by the French Indian authorities to put down the Communist menace with the

cooperation of the people were given a wrong twist by interested persons to suit their

own purpose and misrepresented as acts of rowdyism.153 In this connection Dinamani,

a Tamil daily, which had been giving full publicity of the state of affairs in French

148 File No: D. 1616/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi. 149 File No: D. 1864/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi. 150 Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol-15, Part-I, p. 489. 151 File No: D. 2349/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi. 152 File No: D. 2197/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi. 153 The Indian Express, 13 June 1950 and File No: D. 1538/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi.

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India, was banned in Pondicherry for publishing “all lies and one-sided malicious

propaganda.”154

Internal situation in Karaikal was also violent. The fishermen who were

attached to the Karaikal Merger Congress were rapidly weaned away by acts of

intimidation and some fishermen’s huts were burnt by the Socialists who were led by

Sivasubramania Pillai, Minister for food and agriculture, who followed the same

technique of oppression and violence of his party in Karaikal.155 Pro-merger tenants

occupying temple properties in Néravy commune in Karaikal were harassed and

evicted by the Mayor and temple Trustees. The Mayor denied irrigation facilities to

lands owned by people in favour of merger. If the Panchayat of a particular temple

was slow in taking action against its pro-merger tenants, its members were

immediately removed from office by the authorities.156

Political rivalry in French India was allowed to degenerate into terrorism and

poor and illiterate people were exploited by the political parties to serve their narrow

interests. There was demand for an early settlement of the question of merger as

otherwise the present situation was likely to lead to bitterness and serious

consequences.157 Moreover the French Indian authorities were really getting tired of

the rowdy behaviours of political parties. Apart from the prevalence of a reign of

terror, the authorities were concerned over the misuse of public funds by ministers

and other members of the ruling clique, steeped in corruption. It is said that top

ranking politicians including ministers indulged in smuggling and men of little means

have amassed wealth within a short period, building houses and keeping motor

154 File No: D. 1752/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi. 155 File No: D.1467/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi. 156 File No: D.1538/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi. 157 Karai Mail, 18 July 1950.

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cars.158 Actually this short-cut method of growing rich lured others including Indian

citizens and induced them to join the ranks of ruling party. Many people were

engaged in this trade and even some Indian sympathisers favoured the continuation of

Goubert’s regime for their benefit.

The Referendum Issue and the Report of the Neutral Observers

The Indian parliament expressed its concern on the progress of talks between

the two governments in connection with the south Indian settlements and the

prevailing grave situation in French India. Keskar, the Deputy Minister of External

Affairs said in parliament that although referendum would be supervised by neutral

observers, no formal agreement had so far taken place between the two governments.

The revision of electoral lists was not yet finalized and the question of amnesty was

banging fire.159 He also protested against the widespread oppression being practised in

French India against persons who stand for merging with India. On 4th August 1950,

Nehru said in a press conference that the talks between the two governments had

made no headway. India would not accept the referendum in French settlements

unless the French government gave a satisfactory reply to the Indian protest against

the sentences passed against certain people in Mahe.160 In his address inaugurating the

French India Assemblée Représentative on the 26th August 1950 Ménard also stated

that the date of the referendum could be fixed only after completion of the

negotiations now in progress between India and France and he refuted certain mala

fide propaganda according to which there was no democracy in French India but only

totalitarian regime. The Commissaire said that the presence of the members in the

158 File No: D.1467/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi. 159 Proceedings of the Parliamentary Debates of the Lok Sabha, Vol-1V, Part-I, 1-14 August, 1950, pp. 13-16 and 217-219. 160 The Hindu, 5 August 1950.

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Assembly was standing proof of the standard of French democracy obtained there.161

Thereafter Keskar visited Pondicherry and Karaikal with a view to making an on the

spot study of the situation. Observing the alarming situation prevailing in French

India, he made it clear that as long as terrorism continued in French India, New Delhi

would neither accept the referendum nor would be bound by is verdict.162 Thus there

was no hope of conducting referendum as long as the existing conditions prevailed.

At this juncture, the demand for merging the French settlements with the

Indian Union without referendum was voiced and with the passage of time it was

gathering momentum. Lambert Saravane who took up this cause had failed earlier.

His Republican Party passed a resolution on 8th August 1950 stated that a referendum

would not solve the problem of French settlements since it gave room to false

propaganda and for activities (either anti-French or anti-Indian) prejudicial to good

relationship between France and India. It, therefore, appealed to the French

government to enter into negotiations with the government of India for scraping the

agreement of June 1948 and to find a common friendly solution by agreeing to

transfer sovereignty to the Indian Union.163 On the same day the Karaikal Merger

Congress also passed a resolution earnestly requesting France to cease on the 15th

August 1950 her sovereignty on the French Indian territories and to settle the details

with the Indian government.164 Similar voices also arose from all quarters of pro-

merger groups. The Pondicherry authorities protested against these proposals. Ménard

said that the people of the French Indian settlements were the final authorities to

161 Procès- verbaux des délibérations de l’Assemblée Représentative de l’Inde Française, Session Ordinaire 26 Aout 1950, pp.4 -5. 162 File No: D. 2048/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi. 163 File No: D.1864/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi. 164 File No: D.1864/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi.

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decide whether they wished to remain within or outside France.165 Goubert pointed

out that legally under the French constitution, consultation with the people of the area

(French India) concerned was incumbent whenever a major political change was

contemplated. The idea of abandoning the referendum could therefore not be

entertained.166 The Nasik Congress of September 1950 adopted a resolution and

reaffirmed the 1949 Jaipur resolution on foreign possessions and the resolution was

passed by the Nasik Congress Working Committee on 17th September read:

The Congress is strongly opposed to any foreign colonial Powers continuing to hold any part of India. It, therefore, reaffirms the Jaipur Congress resolution on foreign possessions in India and declares that it is essential that these territories should be incorporated in the Republic of India.167

Unfortunately, the government of India did not denounce the 1948 agreement, as had

been insistently demanded by the pro-merger parties in French India.

Saravane, on his return from Paris, told at Madras on 25th December 1950 that

he had modified his original resolution and submitted it to the French parliament. In

his opinion the integration of the French India settlements with Indian Union should

not be looked upon as cession of French territories to Indian Union but only a natural

return of territories which actually belonged to Mother India. Such a gesture on the

part of France would build up friendship and good understanding between the two

countries. He tried to impress upon the French politicians that if this plan was acted

upon, would simplify the obstacle created by Article 27 of the French Constitution

and avoid all constitutional controversies.168 But the statesmen of France thought

otherwise. Maurice Schuman, President of the Popular Republican Party said that “an

agreement has been concluded between the government of India and the French

165 Procès-verbaux des délibérations de l’Assemblée Représentative de l’Inde Française, Session Ordinaire 26 Aout 1950, pp.4 -5. 166 File No: D.1954/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi. 167 Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol-15, Part-I, p. 487. 168 The Hindu, 26 December 1950.

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government to hold a referendum. There is no reason for not respecting this

agreement.”169 The French Radical Party thought likewise, a spokesman of the party

said that “the problem of the future of the four Settlements must be settled by free

consultation of the people there. This is the only solution.”170 The powerful

Communist Party, though it advocated freedom for Indo-China, was somewhat naïve

on this issue so far as India was concerned.

At the time Lambert Saravane was preparing to submit his new proposal to the

French parliament, the Paris authorities were engaged in a detailed discussion on the

future status of the four south Indian settlements. While maintaining the principle of

referendum, Daniel Levi once again proposed his theory of co-sovereignty which he

had been advocating for a long time. Delteil, Deputy Directory of Political Affairs,

presented the new project of Fédération des villes autonomes within the framework of

French Union. Ménard was in favour of giving French Indian settlements a special

status-something more than the existing status and something less than the status of an

Associated State. In his opinion the small towns like Mahe and Yanam were not

suited to the scheme of Fédération des villes autonomes. The proposals of Levi and

Ménard were not accepted in the interministerial meeting held at Quai d’orsay on 20th

November. In this meeting Mitterand, French Overseas Minister presented and

defended the theory of autonomy. Schuman fully supported it because of the need to

maintain contact with India in the preparation of referendum.171 Immediately after this

the French government unanimously reiterated its desire to obtain for the south Indian

settlements an autonomous status within the French Union. Such a status the

Pondicherry delegation had earlier asked for when it visited Paris. They also urged

169 The Hindu, 9 November 1950. 170 The Hindu, 9 November 1950. 171 Cited in Ajit K. Neogy. Decolonization of French India: Liberation movement and Indo-French Relations 1947-54. Institut Française de Pondichéry, 1997, p.176.

235

Ménard for immediate grant of this autonomy scheme. Goubert and his Councillors

asked Ménard for the transfer of the two reserved subjects, namely, police and law

and justice to their charges.172

The circumstances under which neutral observers waiting at Paris on their way

to India had been dispersed at the end of March 1950 have been discussed already. At

the time of their departure, the neutral observers suggested the French and Indian

governments to reach an agreement on the modalities of referendum. No improvement

had occurred between the two governments. The government of India had been

consistently complaining that certain essential conditions were required for holding a

free and fair referendum in French settlements, such as amnesty for political

prisoners, equal opportunities for propaganda for all political parties and cessation of

official interference in politics. The French government, on the other hand, held India

responsible for causing economic difficulties to the people of French India by

denouncing the customs agreement. The whole question of the referendum was hung

up because of objections from both the governments. Moreover political rivalries

among the political parties and its subsequent violence within French India rendered

the holding of free and fair referendum impossible.

At this juncture, the French government might have thought that the Indian

complaints could be countered by the despatch of a corps of neutral observers to

French India believing that a favourable report would help absolve France of Indian

charges.173 Accordingly, it was decided to send a small batch of four neutral observers

to French India on a fact finding mission. They were not to take any decision but only

to report whether or not Indian charges had any basis and whether or not referendum

172 File No: D. 2620/50, (35 -R&I) R&I Branch, Ministry of External Affairs, N.A.I., New Delhi. 173 Karai Mail, 25 March 1951.

236

could be possible.174 The government of India dissociated itself from the visit of the

corps of neutral observers since it was unconnected with the question of referendum

and declared that they would not recognise the findings of the neutral observers’ team

nor would allow themselves to be bound by their report. Reacting strongly against the

visit of the neutral observers N.V. Rajkumar said in New Delhi that they were coming

under the patronage of the French government and the motive was to get from them a

certificate to the effect that the condition of the settlements was perfectly all right for

holding the referendum. He did not consider them competent to judge the existing

situation simply because they had been sent by the International Court of Justice.175

In spite of India’s objection the French government decided to send a party of

neutral observers to French India on a “mission of observation and information”. The

neutral observers’ commission consisting of Holder Anderson, François Perréard,

Manuel O Chan from Manila and Krabbe of Denmark reached Pondicherry on 31st

March and went back to Paris on 25th April 1951. It visited all the four French Indian

settlements (Pondicherry, Karaikal, Mahe and Yanam) and met a large number of

people including the political elite, lawyers, doctors, journalists, merchants, students,

workers etc. it talked to them on the problems of French India and listened to their

views and prepared a report. According to the report, the people of the settlements had

been reduced to the status of prisoners consequent on the policy of the government of

India and the Indian measures were designed to coerce them into voting for Indian

Union in the referendum. In order to organize the referendum in the best possible

conditions the report stressed that it was essential to resume commercial and

economic relations between the settlements and India to make the referendum

174 Karai Mail, 25 March 1951. 175 Dinamani, 1 April 1951.

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“sincere and honest.”176 The neutral observers pointed out certain defects

characterising the political life in the French settlements and reported that the

prevailing conditions in the settlements “would prevent the elector from responding in

a calm and calculated manner to the question referendum would put to him.”177 They

also explained how the system of terror came to be established in the settlements. In

their report they stated that the leaders of the political party in power recruited groups

of “handymen”, commonly designated by the name of “goondas” or rowdies. The

“goondas” were recruited from the working class and armed with sticks and clubs

attack political adversaries during elections or during meetings organised by them.178

The neutral observers’ report urged the necessity to clean up the situation for making

referendum free and fair. As noted above New Delhi refused to be bound by the

findings of the neutral observers’ delegation. However, the neutral observers report

did nothing to alter the Indo-French relations or existing conditions in French India

except giving international publicity to the French Indian problems. Their observation

on French Indian politics and the nature of elections in French India was proved once

again in the Député and Assemblée Représentative elections of 1951.

Edouard Goubert: the Political Master of French India

Edouard Goubert, the leader of the powerful French India Socialist Party was

an important advocate of the continuance of French rule in Indian settlements. He was

an adept in manipulative politics and a master in mobilising elite and public support

by all means. He had skilfully managed to rope in local stalwarts such as Muthu

Pillai, Karunendra Mudaliar and Muthukumarappa Reddiar of Pondicherry, Siva

Subramanian Pillai of Karaikal, Vanmery Nadayi Purushottaman of Mahe and

176 Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol:20, p.528 177 Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol:20, p.528 178 French Pockets in India. Free India Publications, Madras, 1952, p.18.

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Kamichetty Parasuramarao of Yanam to toe his line of thinking in French Indian

politics by keeping at bay all opposition through a regime of terror. The French

thought that Goubert probably because of his Franco-Indian origin was a staunch anti-

mergerist favourable to them and their interests. But what they never realised was that

Goubert was a slippery and tricky customer to deal with, His party strategy was not to

come out in the open till they knew for certain, which country either France or India,

was favourable to them. He played his game holding all his cards to his chest.

Goubert’s present regime was constantly under threat from Saravane’s demand for

direct transfer of sovereignty of the settlements to the government of India without

referendum, his infiltration among the working class and the retaliatory measures

taken by his men along the borders. N.V. Rajkumar’s propaganda tour, the formation

of Merger Committees etc. were causing headache to the ruling clique and the

authorities of French India.

Rivalry between Goubert and Saravane intensified; the former waited for an

opportunity to eliminate the later and disfigure pro-mergerists. Saravane’s term as

Député having ended in 1951 he sought re-election. He was contested by Goubert in

the Député election. An election which enabled all the qualified voters to vote at a

time to elects a representative to the French Assemblée nationale in Paris. In the past,

it repeatedly exploited innocent voters and manipulated all the electoral process in

favour of government sponsored candidates. This was again evident from the election

to the French Assemblée nationale which had taken place on 17th June 1951. Goubert

trounced his rival Lambert Saravane by a huge margin. Goubert obtained 90,053 votes

while Saravane managed to get only 149.

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Table 5.4 Results of the Député election of June 1951

Total voters 104,405 Voted 90,667 Valid Majority voters 90,656 Absences 13,750

Goubert 90,053 Lambert saravane 149 Moreteau 98 Graoult 314 Gaebélé 24

Sources: Stephanie Samy. ‘Une histoire singulière: Pondichéry de 1947 à 1954, in La Lettre du C.I.D.I.F, Décembre 1995, p125.

The results of the election evoked suspicion and surprise. All sort of

manipulations and manoeuvrings were unabashedly resorted to. Official patronage

was extended and administrative resources were placed under the disposal of Goubert.

Moreteau, one of the candidates from France, was not aware of the conditions

Pondicherry politics. He alleged electoral frauds; he found it impossible either to get

his manifesto and other election material printed or to hire a taxi, everyone in

Pondicherry having been intimidated against working for him. He printed his

manifesto in Indian Union territory but when the printed material was brought to

Pondicherry it was burnt and his agents were assaulted. He was dubbed as a

Communist. He was also assaulted and the house where he stayed was stoned179.

Fifteen houses belonging to pro-mergerists were burnt during the elections. Voters

were frightened and rigging was unprecedented. Saravane was unseated and this

defeat ultimately sealed his political fate. Both Moreteau and Saravane lodged

protests against Goubert’s election for rightful reasons on legal grounds.180 Despite

this Ménard submitted a different version of the election. In his report to the Overseas

Minister he wrote that the election passed off in a peaceful manner and that the

election of Goubert was more a victory of the cause of French Union than the

Socialist Party, but nevertheless he described Goubert as the “Champion de notre

179 French Pockets in India. Free India Publications, Madras, 1952, p. 14. 180 French Pockets in India. Free India Publications, Madras, 1952, p. 14.

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cause.”181 As a matter of fact, however, Goubert had not uttered a word either in his

speech or in his election pamphlet about his or his party’s attachments to France for

this was never an issue in the elections.

The same kind of story repeated once again on 16th December elections to the

French India Assemblée Représentative were held. The pro-merger parties decided to

boycott the elections “because in a territory where a sort of dictatorship is

camouflaged under democratic institutions with the help of French imperialists, no

opposition party can expect fair elections” and because it was an “electoral

comedy.”182 “Saravane’s efforts to weld together all pro-merger forces failed in spite

of the promise of money support by R.K. Tandon. Failing to forge unity Saravane

cabled unsuccessfully to France for adjourning the elections in order to gain time.”183

The French India Socialist Party was much ahead of its opponents and was too

hopeful of its success. Because of absence of a united opposition Goubert’s

candidates registered a hundred percent victory in Pondicherry and in other

dependencies without issue any single election manifesto. The République française,

a pro-French weekly wrote, “A kind of exclusivism is at the height here. Absence of

opposition even symbolic during recent elections to the Assemblée Représentative

does only confirm this truth.” It added,

Neither the Assembly nor the Ministry do follow the course of events and counter-currents because politics in French India is concentrated in the hands of a few ambitious men who have seized power thanks to betrayal and hooliganism. Consequently, France and the French Government are denounced. Discontent has become general.184

181 Ajit K. Neogy. Decolonization of French India: Liberation movement and Indo-French Relations 1947-54. Institut Française de Pondichéry, 1997, p. 188. 182 “French Pockets in India,” Free India Publication. p. 15. 183 Patrick Pitoëff, “ L’Inde française en sursis 1947-1954,” Revue Française d’Histoire d’Outre-mer, 78 (1991), pp.105-31. 184 Quoted in, the Hindu, 10 January 1952.

241

This was another mockery of elections no doubt. The internal bickering among

the pro-merger parties enabled Socialist party to win the battle without firing a shot.

Ménard again wrote to the French Overseas Minister that election had taken place in a

peaceful atmosphere in French India without any untoward incident.185 Having gained

control of the Municipalities, the Assemblée Représentative, the Conseil du

gouvernement, Sénateur and Député, Edouard Goubert thus emerged as the political

master of French India. Since the referendum in French India depended on the voters

who were bound by political alignments, Goubert, with his control over the electorate,

became an important element in deciding the future of French India.

These elections were an eye opener to the government of India. Fraud, deceit,

goondaism and manipulation of voters were common during elections and people

submitted to all this because they dared not question the acts of the French India

Socialist Party in power for fear of vendetta. Replying to a question, Nehru said in

parliament on 1st October 1951:

The Government of India’s attitude has been and is that until and unless conditions for a free referendum come into being in these settlements, the Government of India cannot accept the result thereof. Such conditions are unfortunately still remote; in fact the situation seems to have deteriorated as is obvious from the recent elections held in these settlements for the French National Assembly.186

Probably perturbed by the dominance of Goubert in French India and unable to mount

a credible challenge against him, the Indian government, in the middle of 1951,

finally decided to lift the arrest warrant against V. Subbiah, the Communist leader and

the traditional rival of Goubert in order to gear up the merger movement. The merger

issue entered a new phase as a movement for merger of French Indian settlements

with Indian Union intensified in the French India settlements. 185 Patrick Pitoëff, “ L’Inde française en sursis 1947-1954,” Revue Française d’Histoire d’Outre-mer, 78 (1991), pp.105-31. 186 Proceedings of the Parliamentary Debates of the Lok Sabha, Vol. X, No.6, Part, columns 1857-1858 and Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol.16, Part-II, p. 663.