Political learning and political culture:

A comparative inquiry

Thomas Denk Department of Political Science

Åbo Akademi University Finland

tdenk@abo.fi

Sarah Lehtinen Department of Political Science

Åbo Akademi University Finland

salehtin@abo.fi

Paper to be presented at ECPR General Conference, University of Glasgow, 3 - 6 September 2014, Section: “Citizenship: New Trends and Developments”, Panel: “Citizenship Education, Competence and Participation”.

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Introduction

Traditional theories on political socialisation have assumed that the political

orientations of individuals are developed by communication with other actors. Actors

are expected to send messages through communication channels that affect the political

orientations of the individuals (Easton & Dennis 1969; Greenstein 1965; Hyman 1959;

Langton 1965). Harold Lasswell (1948) summarised this conventional perspective of

political socialisation in his classic formulation: a) who b) learns what c) from whom d)

under what circumstances e) with what effects?1 Later studies have also provided

empirical support to the assumptions about the importance of political communication

for political culture. Political communication, particularly mass media, frames and

organises information that affects how citizens understand politics. It influences what

citizens regard as important and how they evaluate politics by activating some

memories before others. Additionally, political communication may provide persuasive

arguments that motivate citizens to change their opinions and engagement. Political

communication can therefore result in citizen mobilisation as well as demobilisation

(Inglehart & Norris 2009; Kinder 2003; Norris 2002; Nye & Zelikow 1997; Putnam 2000;

Zaller 1992).

This paper tests an alternative perspective on political communication and political

culture. We analyse if the use of political communication is connected with political

orientations. Instead of examining the effects of political communication on political

orientations, we investigate whether individuals with different political orientations

tend to use different channels for political information. However, our ambition is not to

explain the use of communication channels for political information but to investigate if

there are differences in the use of communication channels for political information

between political subcultures. Previous studies have mostly analysed the differences in

political communication between social groups (e.g., Inglehart & Norris 2009; Putnam

2000), while the main question for this paper is whether there are differences between

political subcultures, which consist of individuals with similar political orientations,

concerning the use of communication channels

1 This formulation is also a summary of the differences between the theories about political socialisation as they present diverse expectations concerning the five aspects (Greenstein 1968; Merelman 1986; Wasburn 1994).

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If there are differences between political subcultures concerning the use of

communication channels, it indicates that the processes of political learning and how

they receive information are different between political subcultures. It could also

indicate that the opportunities to reach individuals with political information are

different between political subcultures. For example, we need to use one communication

channel to reach individuals in one subculture, while communication with another

subculture requires the use of other channels. This provides motives to examine the

connection between political communication and political subcultures.

This paper is organised in five sections. After this introduction, the second section

presents a theoretical explanation of why individuals, based on their political

orientations, may be expected to use different communication channels to learn about

politics. The third section presents how the use of communication channels for political

information and political culture is measured. The fourth section consists of empirical

analyses that test the expected connection based on material from cross-national

surveys in six states (World Value Survey, wave 6: 2010-2012). Conclusions from these

analyses are formulated and discussed in the last section, which also discusses the main

contribution from the analyses, which is that there are differences between political

subcultures concerning the use of communication channels for political information, but

that the differences are moderate and vary between communication channels as well as

between countries.

Analytical framework

The expectation that there are differences in the use of communication channels for

political information between political subcultures is based on three theoretical reasons.

First, the use of communication channels requires different amounts of resources. For

example, the amount of time to select and read an article is supposed to be higher than

to watch a news report. Individuals with a political interest are expected to prioritise

political communication to a higher degree than individuals with less interest in politics

(Downs 1957; Zaller 1992). We therefore expect differences in the use of

communication channels for political information based on political interests. Second,

political agents use different communication channels to communicate their messages.

Citizens have different degrees of trust toward political agents and are expected to be

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more open to using channels where the trusted agents tend to send their messages

(Coleman 1990; Tilly 2005; Zaller 1992). We therefore expect differences in the use of

communication channels for political information based on political trust. Third, the use

of communication channels requires different degrees of engagement by the individuals.

Watching news reports on TV requires less engagement than discussing politics with

friends or seeking information on Internet. Individuals with political interest and

political trust are more likely to be politically active than individuals without political

interest or political trust (Dahlgren 2005; Norris 2002). As a consequence, individuals

who are politically interested and have political trust are expected to be more willing to

use communication channels that require that an active receiver. We therefore expect

differences in the use of communication channels for political information based on

political interests and political trust.

In sum, to be used as a source of political information, the channels for political

communication require different conditions and the occurrence of these conditions are

expected to be connected to political orientations, which creates expectations about

differences in the use of communication channels for political information between

political subcultures. Based on the theoretical reasons for our expectations, two aspects

of political orientations are regarded as the most relevant: political interest and political

trust. These two aspects are, according to the seminal works on political culture, central

aspects of political cultures (Almond & Verba 1965; Inglehart 1977; 1990). Furthermore,

according to their definitions of political culture, political orientations are combined and

aggregated into political subcultures, which together constitute the political cultures of

states. Based on this conceptual framework, we combined political interest and political

trust into the four categories of political subcultures. As presented in Table 1, these four

categories are termed with inspiration from later studies on political cultures as civic

citizens (Almond & Verba 1965; Inglehart 1977), critical citizens (Norris 1999), stealth

citizens (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 2002) and disenchanted citizens (Hay & Stoker 2009;

Stoker 2006; 2010).2

2 We only use the labels from previous studies. The concepts used in these studies have more complex structures than the structure—with two dimensions—presented in Table 1.

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Table 1 Political subcultures based on political interests and political trust Political interest Political trust Low High High Stealth citizens Civic citizens Low Disenchanted citizens Critical citizens

Materials

To measure the use of communication channels for political information and political

cultures, we use material from the World Value Survey (WVS wave 6: 2010-2012). The

uses of communication channels for political information are indicated by questions

where the respondents state if they use sources to obtain political information daily,

weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Based on this information, we calculate the

probability that an individual uses the communication channel for political information

on a random day (se Appendix for more information). If all individuals use the channel

to obtain political information daily, then the probability is one (1), while a probability

of zero (0) indicates that no individual ever uses the channel for political information.

This probability is calculated for five communication channels: daily newspapers,

television news, radio news, Internet and talks with friends or colleagues.3

Based on the typology presented in Table 1, political orientations are measured with

survey items on political interest and political trust. Individuals are classified as

politically interested if they state that they are very or somewhat interested in politics,

while they are classified as politically uninterested if they answer that they are not very

or not at all interested in politics. Political trust is measured with an additive index that

consists of three survey items about confidence in government, parliament and political

parties (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81). Individuals are regarded as having a high level of

3 The survey also includes printed magazines, mobile phones and emails as sources of political information. These sources are for various reasons excluded from the analyses. Printed magazines are periodically published (weekly or monthly), which makes it difficult to compare the use of printed magazines with sources that are not periodised in the same way. The use of mobile phones as a political source is quite diffuse as mobile phones are multifunctional; for example, you may use the Internet or discuss politics with friends by mobile phones. This creates an overlapping with other sources for political information. Email is also diffuse as a source of political information as it, not by itself, contains political information, but it can be used by different senders to communicate political information. For example, email can be used for discussions with friends or to obtain information from journalists. To avoid overlapping between channels, we initially excluded mobile and email as sources of political information.

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political trust if they respond that they have a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in

two or three institutions, while not very much or no confidence at all in two or three

institutions, indicating a low level of political trust. This classification of political trust is

then combined with the classification of political interest to provide the classification of

political subcultures in Table 1.

The sample includes 12,495 respondents in six countries: Australia, Germany, Japan,

Netherlands, Sweden and United States. We selected these countries based on three

reasons. Firstly, the selection of cases is a way to ensure a reasonable comparative

equivalence in the analyses (van Deth 2013). More countries than the six selected are

included in the round of World Value Survey (WVS). However, it is questionable whether

the meaning of the survey items is the same in Azerbaijan or Uzbekistan as in Japan or

the Netherlands as the cultural, economic and political contexts are diverse. Secondly,

the theories about political communication and political culture concern democratic

systems in modern societies. The selected cases are consolidated democracies with a

high level of modernisation.4 Thirdly, the selection of countries provides opportunities

to empirically investigate the connection between political communication and political

culture in different institutional contexts. The selected countries represent different

forms of democratic systems. Australia, Germany and the United States are federations,

while Japan, Netherlands and Sweden are unitary states. The United States and Australia

are also regarded as majoritarian democracies, while Germany, Japan, the Netherlands

and Sweden are viewed as consensus democracies (Lijphart 1999; Powell 2000).

Additionally, the countries also have different media systems, where, for example, the

relations between media and political institutions differ (Hallin & Mancini 2004).

Table 2 presents the composition of political subcultures in the six selected countries. As

the contingency coefficient indicates, there are differences in the composition between

the countries. Australia, together with the United States, has the highest share of

disenchanted citizens, but also the lowest share of civic citizens. The highest share of

civic citizens and the lowest share of critical citizens are in Sweden. Japan combines the

highest share of critical citizens with the lowest share of stealth citizens as does the

4 New Zealand is also included in the sixth wave of World Value Survey. However, the sample for New Zealand was considerably smaller than for the selected cases, which may indicate problems with non-response that affects the significance of the cross-national analyses.

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Netherlands, while Sweden has the highest share of stealth citizens. The next section

analyses whether these differences in political subcultures among the citizens and

countries are connected with the use of communication channels for political

information.

Table 2 Political subcultures within selected countries Political subcultures Countries Disenchanted

citizens Critical citizens

Stealth citizens

Civic citizens

Total

Australia 38.2% 39.0% 8.3% 14.5% 100.0% (n = 1428)

Germany 26.5% 34.4% 10.5% 28.7% 100.0% (n = 1960)

Japan 26.2% 52.8% 4.4% 16.6% 100.0% (n =2032)

Netherlands 26.2% 43.7% 6.2% 23.9% 100.0% (n = 1750)

Sweden 23.6% 19.8% 18.3% 38.3% 100.0% (n = 1152)

USA 32.8% 47.5% 7.1% 12.5% 100.0% (n = 2142)

Total 29.0% 41.2% 8.5% 21.3% 100.0% (n = 10464)

Contingency coefficient = 0.275 (sign. = 0.000)

Empirical analysis

Table 3 presents the probability that individuals within political subcultures use a

channel of communication for political information on aa random day. According to the

analyses presented in Table 3, there are three general patterns in the connection

between the use of communication channels for political information and political

subcultures. Firstly, there are significant, but modest, differences in the use of

communication channels between political subcultures. As indicated by the eta-

coefficients, the largest differences are found in the use of newspapers and television,

while the differences in the use of radio, Internet, and talks with friends or colleagues for

political information are minor. Secondly, television is the channel used most frequently

for political information in all political subcultures. In a similar way, news on the radio is

the least frequently used channel for political information, with the exception of civic

citizens and disenchanted citizens who use conversation and newspapers, respectively,

as channels with the least frequency for political information. Thirdly, civic citizens and

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critical citizens use communication channels more frequently than stealth citizens and

disenchanted citizens. The least frequently used are the communication channels used

by the disenchanted citizens. However, the use of talks with friends and colleagues is an

exception to this pattern. Stealth citizens and civic citizens are using friends and

colleagues as sources for political information more frequently than disenchanted

citizens and critical citizens. According to the analyses, critical citizens use this channel

least frequently among the four subcultures.5

Table 3

Political subcultures and use of communication channels for political information

Channels of Communication Political subculture

Newspapers TV Radio Internet Talks

Disenchanted (n=3204)

0.4269 (0.4601)

0.6852 (0.4355)

0.4551 (0.4699)

0.5166 (0.4728)

0.5470 (0.4547)

Critical (n=4553)

0.6062 (0.4594)

0.8353 (0.3501)

0.5617 (0.4711)

0.5790 (0.4696)

0.5290 (0.4488)

Stealth (n=944)

0.5145 (0.4685)

0.7112 (0.4233)

0.5017 (0.4705)

0.5573 (0.4723)

0.6183 (0.4450)

Civic (n=2414)

0.6809 (0.4380)

0.8481 (0.3386)

0.6125 (0.4615)

0.5997 (0.4682)

0.5887 (0.4460)

Total (n=11115)

0.5629 (0.4659)

0.7843 (0.3876)

0.5370 (0.4723)

0.5637 (0.4714)

0.5547 (0.4505)

Eta (Significance)

0.207 (0.000)

0.187 (0.000)

0.126 (0.000)

0.068 (0.000)

0.066 (0.000)

The table presents the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of the probability that individuals within political subcultures use a channel of communication for political information on a random day.

However, there are differences between countries in the use of communication channels

for political information. Table 4 presents the probability that individuals within

countries use a channel of communication for political information on a random day,

which indicates how the communication channels are used as sources for political

information in different countries. According to the eta-analyses, there are significant

differences in the use of all channels between the countries. The differences are the

5 The five items about the uses of communication channels as sources for political information have been analysed with factor analysis (Varimax as a rotation method). According to the analysis, there are two dimensions in the use of political channels. One dimension is channels with one-way communication (newspapers, TV and radio), while the other dimension consists of interactive channels (Internet and conversations) that provide opportunities for two-way communications. However, the factor solution is weak in several aspects: the variance explained is quite low (57.2%), the sampling adequacy is weak (KMO = 0.55) and the degree of extraction for the use of radio is low (0.390). Additionally, reliability analyses indicate a low degree of internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha < 0.5) for the different indexes. Based on these results, the factor solution is not used in the analyses.

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largest in the use of newspapers and news on radio as sources for political information.

In Japan and Sweden, newspapers are frequently used for political information, while

newspapers are more seldom used in Australia and United States as a source for political

information. In Australia, news on the radio is used more frequently, as is also the

situation in the Netherlands and Germany. News on radio is least used for political

information in Japan and the United States. There are also differences concerning news

on television, Internet and talks with friends or colleagues. News on television is the

channel of communication that is most frequently used for political information in all

countries, except Japan, the Netherlands and Germany where the use of this channel is

prominently high. Internet and talks with friends or colleagues are used most frequently

in Sweden for political information. Neither of these channels is used regularly in Japan

as sources for political information. Talks with friends or colleagues are also used more

seldom in the Netherlands and the United States, but citizens in the Netherlands use the

Internet more frequently as a source of political information.

Table 4 Cross-national comparison of the use of communication channels Channel of communication Country Newspapers TV Radio Internet Talks Australia (n=1456)

0.4090 (0.4409)

0.7383 (0.4083)

0.6770 (0.4422)

0.5590 (0.4695)

0.6136 (0.4429)

Germany (n=2046)

0.5674 (0.4637)

0.7848 (0.3833)

0.6468 (0.4531)

0.5545 (0.4745)

0.6693 (0.4268)

Japan (n=2424)

0.7513 (0.4128)

0.9491 (0.2084)

0.3177 (0.4403)

0.3765 (0.4628)

0.4676 (0.4507)

Netherlands (n=1886)

0.5766 (0.4681)

0.8012 (0.3761)

0.6115 (0.4627)

0.6618 (0.4462)

0.3963 (0.4290)

Sweden (n=1200)

0.7286 (0.4205)

0.7690 (0.3967)

0.5360 (0.4693)

0.7196 (0.4292)

0.7365 (0.4047)

United States (n=2193)

0.3457 (0.4392)

0.6228 (0.4559)

0.4153 (0.4579)

0.5469 (0.4691)

0.4815 (0.4508)

Total (n=12020)

0.5638 (0.4660)

0.7875 (0.3855)

0.5296 (0.4721)

0.5515 (0.4731)

0.5488 (0.4513)

Eta (Significance)

0.314 (0.000)

0.269 (0.000)

0.296 (0.000)

0.221 (0.000)

0.250 (0.000)

The table presents the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of the probability that individuals within countries use a channel of communication for political information on a random day.

There are also cross-national differences in correlations between political subcultures

and the use of communication channels for political information. Table 5 presents the

correlation coefficients between political subcultures and use of communication

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channels within the six countries. When the coefficients for political subcultures and

newspaper are compared, we notice that there are significant differences within all

countries, but that the strengths of the differences are different. The strongest

coefficient is found in Sweden, while Australia has the weakest. This indicates that the

differences between political subcultures are larger in Sweden than in Australia. In a

similar way, the correlation coefficients concerning news reports on TV are the highest

in Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany, while Japan and Australia have the weakest

correlation coefficients. Sweden and the United States have the strongest correlation

between political subcultures and news reports on radio, whereas the weakest

coefficient is found in the Netherlands. However, concerning the use of the Internet as a

communication channel for political information, there are no significant differences

between political subcultures in Sweden. The strongest correlation for the use of

Internet is instead found in United States. Also concerning the correlation between

political subcultures and talks with friends or colleagues, the United States has the

strongest correlation. However, in Australia, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, the

correlations are not significant. We found significant correlations between political

subcultures and talks with friends or colleagues only in the United States and Japan.

Table 5 Political subcultures and use of communication channels within countries Channel of communication Countries Newspapers TV Radio Internet Talks Australia 0.145

(0.000) 0.158

(0.000) 0.154

(0.000) 0.106

(0.001) 0.067

(0.095) Germany 0.229

(0.000) 0.217

(0.000) 0.146

(0.000) 0.101

(0.000) 0.036

(0.478) Japan 0.207

(0.000) 0.119

(0.000) 0.131

(0.000) 0.066

(0.034) 0.090

(0.001) Netherlands 0.187

(0.000) 0.218

(0.000) 0.087

(0.004) 0.111

(0.000) 0.052

(0.194) Sweden 0.261

(0.000) 0.232

(0.000) 0.190

(0.000) 0.064

(0.193) 0.056

(0.311) USA 0.182

(0.000) 0.201

(0.000) 0.169

(0.000) 0.141

(0.000) 0.113

(0.000) Total 0.207

(0.000) 0.187

(0.000) 0.126

(0.000) 0.068

(0.000) 0.066

(0.000) The table presents the eta-coefficients and the level of significance (in parenthesis). More detailed information is presented in Table A1 (appendix).

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Are there differences between political subcultures in the use of communication

channels even when cross-national effects are included in the analyses? Table 6 presents

analyses that include political subcultures (Table 3), countries (Table 4), and

interactions between these two factors (Table 5).6 According to these analyses, there are

significant differences between the political subcultures when countries and interaction

effects are included in the analyses. However, there are no differences between political

subcultures in the use of talks with friends and colleagues. Instead, the largest

differences between political subcultures are found in the use of newspapers, news

reports on TV and on radio as the sources of political information, while the differences

between political subcultures are minor in the use of the Internet. Compared to the

cross-national differences, the differences between political subcultures are quite

moderate. According to the analyses, the differences between the political subcultures

are lower than four per cent in the use of all communication channels. This indicates

that there are considerable differences within the political subcultures.

Table 6 Use of communication channels: differences between political subcultures and countries Channel of communication Factor Newspapers TV Radio Internet Talks

Political subcultures 0.033 (0.000)

0.027 (0.000)

0.016 (0.000)

0.003 (0.000)

0.000 (0.305)

Countries 0.067 (0.000)

0.043 (0.000)

0.050 (0.000)

0.032 (0.000)

0.048 (0.000)

Interactions 0.004 (0.001)

0.009 (0.000)

0.002 (0.096)

0.005 (0.000)

0.005 (0.000)

Total model (Eta2

adj) 0.142 (0.000)

0.112 (0.000)

0.100 (0.000)

0.057 (0.000)

0.073 (0.000)

N 10511 10531 10499 10504 10491

The table presents the partial eta squared coefficients (Eta2) and level of significance (in parenthesis).

6 General linear models are used as method to analyze the material.

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Conclusion

According to these analyses, there is no general connection between the use of

communication channels and political orientations. Firstly, the strength of the

connection to political subcultures varies among the different channels of

communication. There are moderate connections among political subcultures and the

use of newspapers, news reports on TV and radio as sources for political information,

while there are weak or no connections among the political subcultures and the use of

the Internet and talks with friends or colleagues. As Figure 1 illustrates, there is a

pattern in the differences among political subcultures. Civic citizens and critical citizens

use the channels of communication more frequently as sources for political information

than stealth citizens and disenchanted citizens. Secondly, the strength of the connection

between the use of communication channels and political subcultures are different in

the investigated countries. These differences do not follow any specific pattern, but

there are significant differences in the use of communication channels for obtaining

political information among the countries.

This paper presents initial analyses about the connections between political

communication and political orientations. The conclusions are therefore only

preliminary and there are several questions for future studies. One question is if there

are other aspects of political orientations than political interest and political trust that

are relevant. For example, internal and external efficacy has been regarded as important

aspects of political orientations (Almond & Verba 1965). Another question is if there are

other measurements of the use of communication channels for the political information.

For example, the categories of the communication channels used in the analyses include

sub-channels, such as different TV channels or homepages. The differences among

political subcultures may be on the sub-channels level instead of the channel level. A

third question for future studies is if there is a theoretical framework that stipulates

alternative connections between political communications and political orientations.

This question is critical in the development of a model that explains how the use of

political communications for political information is connected to political orientations.

Related to this is the question about an alternative research design. We have used a one-

level design. An alternative design is a multilevel design. However, the use of a

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multilevel design requires a theoretical model that is an alternative to the model used in

this paper.

Figure 1 The use of communication channels for political information and political subcultures

00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.9

1Newspapers

TV

RadioInternet

TalksDisenchanted

Stealth

Critical

Civic

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References

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Appendix Calculation of the probability that an individual uses the communication channel i (CCi) for political information on one random day: P(CCi) = ∑(((1/1)*SD) + ((1/7)*SW) +((1/30)*SM)+((1/60)*SL)+(0*SN))/100 where SD = share that state that they use the channel i for obtain political information daily SW = share that state that they use the channel i for obtain political information weekly SM = share that state that they use the channel i for obtain political information monthly SL = share that state that they use the channel i for obtain political information less than monthly SN = share that state that they never use the channel i for obtain political information

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Table A1: Political subcultures and use of communication channels within countries II Channel of communication Political subculture

Newspaper TV Radio Internet Conversation

Australia (n= 1419) Disenchanted 0.3386 0.6846 0.6050 0.5021 0.6177 Critical 0.4451 0.7853 0.7453 0.5941 0.5961 Stealth 0.3585 0.6099 0.6023 0.5996 0.7069 Civic 0.5088 0.8160 0.7273 0.6253 0.5977 Total 0.4065 0.7369 0.6771 0.5640 0.6138 Eta (Significance)

0.145 (0.000)

0.158 (0.000)

0.154 (0.000)

0.106 (0.001)

0.067 (0.095)

Germany (n=1961) Disenchanted 0.4223 0.6731 0.5567 0.5198 0.6812 Critical 0.6144 0.8513 0.7120 0.6076 0.6756 Stealth 0.5021 0.6902 0.5809 0.4649 0.6366 Civic 0.6921 0.8471 0.6776 0.5807 0.6905 Total 0.5738 0.7860 0.6473 0.5617 0.6773 Eta (Significance)

0.229 (0.000)

0.217 (0.000)

0.146 (0.000)

0.101 (0.000)

0.036 (0.478)

Japan (n=2020) Disenchanted 0.6265 0.9136 0.2305 0.4072 0.5313 Critical 0.8028 0.9671 0.3518 0.4092 0.4510 Stealth 0.6521 0.9464 0.2895 0.3800 0.5289 Civic 0.8387 0.9705 0.3843 0.3263 0.4266 Total 0.7558 0.9527 0.3226 0.3936 0.4714 Eta (Significance)

0.207 (0.000)

0.119 (0.000)

0.131 (0.000)

0.066 (0.034)

0.090 (0.001)

Netherlands (n =1744) Disenchanted 0.4524 0.6990 0.5610 0.5905 0.3827 Critical 0.6556 0.8841 0.6413 0.6964 0.3953 Stealth 0.5267 0.6994 0.5744 0.6840 0.4780 Civic 0.6365 0.8275 0.6599 0.7136 0.4121 Total 0.5900 0.8108 0.6206 0.6721 0.4012 Eta (Significance)

0.187 (0.000)

0.218 (0.000)

0.087 (0.004)

0.111 (0.000)

0.052 (0.194)

Sweden (n = 1147) Disenchanted 0.5532 0.6357 0.4431 0.7542 0.7590 Critical 0.7314 0.7229 0.5247 0.7075 0.7244 Stealth 0.7450 0.7631 0.4617 0.6729 0.7761 Civic 0.8393 0.8706 0.6492 0.7310 0.7212 Total 0.7336 0.7663 0.5417 0.7212 0.7408 Eta (Significance)

0.261 (0.000)

0.232 (0.000)

0.190 (0.000)

0.064 (0.193)

0.056 (0.311)

United States (n = 2125) Disenchanted 0.2526 0.4977 0.3149 0.4723 0.4263 Critical 0.4173 0.6968 0.4868 0.6075 0.5085 Stealth 0.2424 0.5662 0.3645 0.4733 0.4132 Civic 0.4008 0.6867 0.4349 0.6056 0.5685 Total 0.3490 0.6213 0.4156 0.5535 0.4825 Eta (Significance)

0.182 (0.000)

0.201 (0.000)

0.169 (0.000)

0.141 (0.000)

0.113 (0.000)