Political Law} Case Survey 2000 - 2001} Made 2002} by Ateneo} 36 Pages

8/13/2019 Political Law} Case Survey 2000 - 2001} Made 2002} by Ateneo} 36 Pages

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POLITICAL LAW DIGESTS 2001-2002ATENEO CENTRAL BAR OPERATIONS 2002

Carrie Bee, Aldrich, She, Cayo, Thel, Ronald, Gem, Karen, Evelyn

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Prefatory: Cases written by Justice V. V. Mendoza will be marked with an asterisk (*).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

BILL OF RIGHTS

Due Process

Request of Radio-TV coverage of plund er cases of Estrada

Perez v. Estrada

A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC (June 29, 2001)* Digest of this case is part icularly lon ger because of the novelty of the issue.

FACTS: The Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter requestingthe SC to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and othercriminal cases filed against former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order"to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in

our history." The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 05 April2001 to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and AttorneyRicardo Romulo

HELD: Petition denied. In the case of Estes vs. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court heldthat the television coverage of judicial proceedings is an inherent denial of due processto the accused. The Court in this case also identified the following as being likelyprejudices:"1. The potential impact of television . . . is perhaps of the greatest significance. . . .From the moment the trial judge announces that a case will be televised it becomes acause clbre. The whole community, . . . becomes interested in all the morbid detailssurrounding it. The approaching trial immediately assumes an important status in the

public press and the accused is highly publicized along with the offense with which he ischarged. Every juror carries with him into the jury box these solemn facts and thusincreases the chance of prejudice that is present in every criminal case. . . ."2. The quality of the testimony in criminal trials will often be impaired. The impactupon a witness of the knowledge that he is being viewed by a vast audience is simplyincalculable. Some may be demoralized and frightened, some cocky and given tooverstatement; memories may falter, as with anyone speaking publicly, and accuracy ofstatement may be severely undermined. . . .. Indeed, the mere fact that the trial is to betelevised might render witnesses reluctant to appear and thereby impede the trial as wellas the discovery of the truth."3. A major aspect of the problem is the additional responsibilities the presence oftelevision places on the trial judge. His job is to make certain that the accused receives a

fair trial. This most difficult task requires his undivided attention. . ."4. Finally, we cannot ignore the impact of courtroom television on the defendant. Itspresence is a form of mental if not physical harassment, resembling a police line-up or the third degree. The inevitable close-up of his gestures and expressions duringthe ordeal of his trial might well transgress his personal sensibilities, his dignity, and hisability to concentrate on the proceedings before him sometimes the differencebetween life and death dispassionately, freely and without the distraction of widepublic surveillance. A defendant on trial for a specific crime is entitled to his day in court,


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not in a stadium, or a city or nationwide arena. The heightened public clamor resultingfrom radio and television coverage will inevitably result in prejudice."

Unlike other government offices, courts do not express the popular will of the people in

any sense which, instead, are tasked to only adjudicate justiciable controversies on thebasis of what alone is submitted before them. A trial is not a free trade of ideas. Nor is acompeting market of thoughts the known test of truth in a courtroom.

The Court is not all that unmindful of recent technological and scientific advances but tochance forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use and apply them,even before ample safety nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed areaptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.

* Re: Request fo r live radio-tv c overag e of the trial, etc. v. Joseph E. Estrada, et al.

A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC (September 13, 2001)

FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners requestfor permission to televise & broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada beforethe Sandiganbayan. The petition was filed by the DOJ, claiming that there is no conflictbetween the right of the people to public info & the freedom of the press, on one hand, &the right of the accused to a fair trial on the other.

HELD: With a vote of 9-6, the SC denied the motion. An audio-visual recording wasordered to be made, under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan, fordocumentary purposes only. There will be no live broadcast before the promulgation ofthe decision. Upon release for broadcast, the original shall be deposited with theNational Museum & Archives Office. The reasons for the audio-visual recording of thetrial are as follows:

1. the hearings are of historical significance. They are an affirmation to ourcommitment to the rule that the king is under no man, but he is under God & the law;

2. the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our people who have afundamental right to know how their government is conducted; and

3. audio-visual presentation is essential for the education & civic training of thepeople.

Warrantless arrests / Searches and Seizures

People v. Pasud ag

G. R. No. 128822. (May 4, 2001)

FACTS:SPO2 Pepito Calip urinated at a bushy bamboo fence behind the public school.About five (5) meters away, he saw a garden of about 70 square meters. There weremarijuana plants in between corn plants and camote tops. He inquired from astorekeeper nearby as to who owned the house with the garden. The storeowner toldhim that Pasudag owned it. A team was dispatched and the team arrived and wentstraight to the house of accused Pasudag. The police looked for accused Pasudag andasked him to bring the team to his backyard garden which was about five (5) metersaway. Upon seeing the marijuana plants, the policemen called for a photographer, who


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took pictures of accused Pasudag standing beside one of the marijuana plants. Theyuprooted seven (7) marijuana plants. The team brought accused Pasudag and themarijuana plants to the police station. At the police station, accused Pasudag admitted,in the presence of Chief of Police Astrero, that he owned the marijuana plants. SPO3

Fajarito prepared a confiscation report which accused Pasudag signed. Arrest andseizure valid?

HELD:As a general rule, the procurement of a search warrant is required before a lawenforcer may validly search or seize the person, house, papers or effects of anyindividual. In the case at bar, the police authorities had ample opportunity to secure fromthe court a search warrant. SPO2 Pepito Calip inquired as to who owned the house. Hewas acquainted with marijuana plants and immediately recognized that some plants inthe backyard of the house were marijuana plants. Time was not of the essence to uprootand confiscate the plants. They were three months old and there was no sufficientreason to believe that they would be uprooted on that same day. With the illegal seizureof the marijuana plants subject of this case, the seized plants are inadmissible in

evidence against accused-appellant.The arrest of accused-appellant was tainted with constitutional infirmity. Thetestimony of SPO3 Jovencio Fajarito reveals that appellant was not duly informed of hisconstitutional rights. It has been held repeatedly that custodial investigation commenceswhen a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission ofa crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on thesuspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission. Obviously, accused-appellant was a suspect from the moment the police team went to his house andordered the uprooting of the marijuana plants in his backyard garden.

People v. Hindoy

G.R. No. 132662 (May 10, 2001)

FACTS:A woman informant came to the station and reported that a certain "Bella" of248 Sto. Rosario St., Mandaluyong, would be receiving a shipment of illegal drugs thatday. On the strength of that information, Antiojo organized a team that would conduct abuy-bust operation. At around 3 a.m., the team, headed by Antiojo himself and guided bythe woman informant, went to said address. Eugenio and Cariaga acted as poseur-buyers, while SPO4 Rolando Cruz, SPO3 Antonio Nato, and Prianes served as backup.They knocked on the door and BELLA's live-in partner ENRIQUE opened it. Eugeniosaid, "May bagong dating, kukuha kami (If there's new stuff, we'll get some)," referring tomarijuana. ENRIQUE answered, "Meron" (Yes, there is) so Eugenio gave him oneP500.00 and five P100.00 marked bills. After counting the money, ENRIQUE askedBELLA to get the stuff. She complied and brought a brick of marijuana, with an

estimated weight of one kilogram, which was wrapped in newspaper. ENRIQUE, in turn,handed it over to Eugenio. That was when they identified themselves as police officers.After giving the prearranged signal to the backup operatives, he and Cariaga entered thehouse then announced that they were going to conduct a search. Under a table, theyfound a bag made of abaca containing twelve more bricks of marijuana. The evidencewas marked then turned over to Prianes, who transmitted the same to the NBI forchemical analysis.


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HELD: The identity of ENRIQUE and BELLA as the sellers and possessors of theseized marijuana cannot be doubted, for they were caught in flagrante delicto in astandard police buy-bust operation. Such positive identification prevails over their feebledenial and declaration that the

abaca bag which contained twelve blocks of marijuana was only left to their custody by acertain Marlyn. Moreover, under the circumstances, it was the duty of the police officersto conduct a more thorough search of the premises after a successful entrapment, thenmake the necessary arrest of the suspects and seizure of suspected contraband. Thesearch, being incident to a lawful arrest, was valid notwithstanding the absence of awarrant. In fact, the warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawfularrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises orsurrounding under his immediate control. In the case at bar, upon consummation of theillicit sale, PO3 Eugenio introduced himself and SPO1 Cariaga as police officers.ENRIQUE and BELLA were apprised of their constitutional rights. Thereafter, the officerssearched the room where BELLA supposedly got the first block of marijuana. There,they found an abaca bag under a folding table. Upon inspection, the bag yielded twelve

more blocks of compressed marijuana inside a plastic bag. The trial court, therefore, wascorrect in admitting all thirteen blocks of marijuana in evidence.

* Peopl e v. Cubc ubi n, Jr.

G.R. No. 136267. (July 10, 2001)

FACTS:Witnesses identified Accused-Appellant as the last person to have been seentogether with the murdered victim. Policemen went to his house and asked permissionto search. They found a bloodied white shirt and two .38 caliber shells. The policemenasked him to go with them to the caf where he was last seen with the victim where thewitness positively identified him. The Policemen asked for his permission to go back tothe house to search for the gun. They found the weapon and arrested Accused-

Appellant.

HELD: The arrest without warrant was illegal because the police officers did not havepersonal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused-appellant had committed thecrime. Their knowledge of the circumstances was based entirely on what the witnesseshad told them. The police officers did not have probable cause either because at thetime of his arrest, accused-appellant was not doing anything overtly criminal. However,accused-appellant cannot question the validity of his arrest without warrant because hepleaded not guilty when arraigned. He also did not move to quash the information forlack of jurisdiction due to the illegal arrest.

The bloodied shirt, shells, and firearm are inadmissible as evidence for being the

product of an illegal search. The search was illegal because it was not proven that theaccused-appellant gave his consent to the search. Even assuming that the arrest wasvalid, the search cannot be justified as incident to a lawful arrest because the items thatwere seized were not within the immediate control of the accused. In fact, the policemenseized the firearm only after going back to the house of accused-appellant. Neither canthe plain view doctrine apply in this case since the policemen did not come upon theobjects inadvertently.


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People v. Licayan

G. R. Nos. 140900, 140911 (August 15, 2001)

FACTS: Licayan and Lara were found guilty of Kidnapping for Ransom under Art. 267

of the RPC as amended. They were sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethalinjection. In their appeal, they contended that they were illegally arrested since thecircumstance under which they were arrested do not fall under the warrantless arrest. Inaddition, they claim that after their arrest, they were already under custodial investigationand therefore, should have been informed of their constitutional rights which thearresting officer did not do. They did not have counsel when Lara made an admission ofparticipation in the commission of the crime.

HELD: The accused have already waived their rights to question the legality of theirarrests when they pleaded not guilty during the arraignment without moving to quash theinformation on the ground that their arrest was invalid. Any irregularity attendant toaccused-appellants arrest was cured when they voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction

of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and participating in the trial.With regards to the contention they there was no counsel when the extrajudicialconfession was made, the Court held that the admission was made voluntarily and withthe assistance of a counsel de oficio who assisted the accused while he was giving hissworn statement.

People v. Gonzales

G. R. No. 121877 (September 12, 2001)

FACTS: The police were tipped that a woman wearing maong pants and Ray Bansunglasses carrying a black travelling bag would be riding a trisikad to transportmarijuana. On the basis of this tip, the police conducted a patrol and found a woman

who matched the description. The police asked her if she owned the bag and if the bagmay be opened. The woman, who is the accused herein, refused. The police opened thebag and found marijuana inside. The accused was arrested. Later, the trial courtconvicted her of illegal possession of marijuana. Was the search and seizure of themarijuana illegal?

HELD: No. Although the search of the accused was not made through a warrant,nevertheless, it was still valid, as there was probable cause to search the accused.When the police were tipped on the transport of marijuana, there was no sufficient timeto procure a warrant. Furthermore, the police were given a sufficient description of theperson who will be transporting the illegal drugs.

People v. Del Mundo

G.R. No. 138929 (October 2, 2001)

FACTS: During a stakeout, the policemen observed accused-appellant hand somethingover to the other person. Upon their approach, accused sped away with his tricycle. Twoof the policemen caught up with him. Accused was subjected to a body search butnothing was found. When they searched the tricycle, they found a package wrapped innewspaper inside a plastic bag. They detected the distinct scent of marijuana. Uponopening the package, they found two bricks of marijuana fruiting tops. Accused was


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charged and convicted for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act. Further, the trial courtupheld the validity of the warrantless arrest and seizure of plastic bag containingmarijuana.

HELD: The warrantless arrest and seizure of the marijuana was valid and legal.Accused was caught attempting to flee from the pursuing policemen. Such act wasindicative of his guilt which gave the police reasonable grounds to believe that he wasdealing or transporting prohibited drugs, having been so informed by a reliable policeinformer. Even if the arrest was invalid, any objection must be made before a plea isentered. Having failed to move for the quashing of the Information before arraignment,accused is estopped.

The police did not even have to open the package to determine its contents. It isof judicial notice that marijuana has a distinct, sweet and unmistakable aroma verydifferent from that of ordinary tobacco. There is thus no merit in accuseds argument thatthe evidence presented was obtained through an illegal warrantless search. Besides,there is no showing that accused objected to the search of this vehicle and opening of

the package. Drugs discovered as a result of consented search are admissible inevidence.

People v. Whisenhunt

G. R. No. 123819 (November 14, 2001)

FACTS: The accused was charged with the crime of murder. After the crime occurredand the body of the victim disposed, the NBI arrested the accused at Apex Motors Corp.The trial court convicted the accused of murder. The accused appealed, claiming that hewas illegally arrested.

HELD: The accused is barred from contesting the illegal arrest. The proper thing to do

was to object to the illegal arrest before entering his plea during arraignment. Failing todo so, the accused waived to any objections to his illegal arrest.

Constitutional Presumption of Innocence

People v. Amestuzo

G.R. No. 104383. (July 12, 2001)

FACTS:Accused was convicted on the basis of an out of court identification made bythe complainants. Before the complainants identified accused, they were informed by thepolicemen that the accused had been previously identified by an eye witness. Accused

also had a solid alibi, which was supported by credible witnesses.ISSUE:Whether the conviction of accused was proper.

HELD: No. Where there are two possible explanations for the circumstances and theinculpatory one does not satisfy the moral certainty required for a conviction, theconstitutional presumption of innocence shall prevail.

The identification made by the complainants was faulty for being practicallysuggested to them by the officers.


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Right to BailYap v. CA

G. R. No. 141529 (June 6, 2001)

FACTS: Yap was charged and convicted of estafa in the RTC of Pasig City. On appealto the CA, Yap applied for bail. The CA set the bail at P5.5 million and required Yap tonotify the court and private complainant that he will change his residence. Yap claimedthat the bail is excessive and violative of his constitutional right against excessive bail.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the bail was too excessive. The amount set didnot have any factual basis to support itself.

Right to AbodeYap v. CA

G. R. No. 141529 (June 6, 2001)

HELD: The right to abode and travel is not absolute. It may be restricted, especially ifthe accused tried to flee when the case against him was still pending. Moreover, theaccused here was not prevented from changing abode. He was merely required to notifythe court when he wishes to change abode.

People v. Del Rosario

G. R. No. 131036 (June 20, 2001)

FACTS: Del Rosario was charged with the crime of roberry with homicide. Duringcustodial investigation, Del Rosario, assisted by counsel, signed a confession. The trialcourt convicted him of robbery with homicide. Del Rosario questions the validity of theconfession, stating that his constitutional rights were violated when he signed it.

HELD: The confession was valid and admissible. There was no violation of DelRosarios constitutional rights. There was no proof that Rosarios counsel was remiss inhis duties when the confession was signed.

People v. Salonga

G. R. No. 131131 (June 21, 2001)

FACTS: The Department of Internal Affairs of Metrobank conducted an investigationregarding anomalies made in the issuance of cashier checks. Salonga was interviewedand was appraised of his constitutional rights during the interview. Salonga admitted thathe committed the anomalies and signed a confession. The trial court and the CA

convicted Salonga of qualified theft. Salonga contends that his confession isinadmissible as evidence as it violated his constitutional right to counsel.

HELD: The confession was admissible. His right to counsel only existed when he isunder custodial investigation. He was not under custodial investigation during hisinterview. He was interviewed by a bank officer, not a police officer.

Alv arez v. CA

G. R. No. 141801 (June 25, 2001)


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FACTS: Alvarez was convicted of the crime of homicide. Alvarez contests the ruling ofthe court, claiming that the statement of police officer Bugnot testifying that he admittedkilling victim in self-defense is inadmissible for being violative of his right to counsel.

HELD: The statement was held to be admissible. No proof was shown that the accusedwas under custodial investigation. The rights of the accused do not apply tospontaneous statements given in an ordinary manner.

Estelito Remo lon a v. CSC

G. R. No. 137473 (August 2, 2001)

FACTS: Estelito Remolona is the Postmaster at Post Office Service in Quezon. He wasdismissed from service upon his admission in a preliminary investigation of the CSC thathe had paid a certain Atty. Salupadin to acquire a fake eligibility for his wife in the CivilService Commission. The CSC found him guilty of possession of fake eligibility,

falsification and dishonesty. Estelito now contends that he was deprived of his right todue process because (1) he was not assisted by counsel during preliminaryinvestigation, and (2) he was removed from his position without cause which is contraryto Section 2(3), Article XI B of the Constitution which provides that no officer oremployee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause. It is hiscontention that although the offense of dishonesty is punishable under CS laws, such actmust have been committed in the performance of his function and duty as a Postmaster.Since the charge of dishonesty involves falsification of the certificate of rating of his wife,the same has no bearing on his office.

HELD: The right to counsel guaranteed by the Bill of Rights is meant to protect asuspect in a criminal case under custodial investigation. It is only at this stage that the

right to counsel attaches. The exclusionary rule under paragraph 2, Section 12 of theBill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to thosemade in administrative investigation. Under existing laws, a party in an administrativeinquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the chargesand of the respondents capacity to represent himself. Administrative inquiries areconducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measureagainst erring public officers and employees and with the purpose of maintaining thedignity of government service. Admissions by Remolona during such investigation maybe used as evidence to justify his dismissal.

People v. Morial

G. R. No. 129295 (August 15, 2001)

Facts: Edwin Morial, Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abinon were convicted of Robberywith Homicide. During the custodial investigation, Leonardo Morial made an extrajudicialconfession admitting to the crime. However, later on, he recanted his confession sayingthat the police tortured him into admitting the crime. On appeal, Morial moved to quashthe extrajudicial confession claiming that such confession was made without theassistance of counsel as guaranteed by the constitution during a custodial investigation.

Apparently, the counsel given to him by the police was not present during the wholeinterrogation. He left to attend to some personal matters while the interrogation of Morial


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was still going on. However, said attorney claimed that he was present when Morialsigned the admission.

Held: The extrajudicial confession cannot be used against the accused. An accused

under custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from thevery start until the termination of such investigation. An effective and vigilant counselnecessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise andassist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by theinvestigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. Section 2A of RANo. 7438 requires that any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigationshall at all times be assisted by counsel. In the absence of any lawyer, no custodialinvestigation shall be conducted. Additionally, there was an invalid waiver of the right tocounsel since this right cannot be waived unless the same is made in writing and in thepresence of counsel. No such written and counseled waiver of these rights was offeredin evidence.

Right to be informed of the charges

People v. Panganib an

G. R. No. 138439-41 (June 25, 2001)

HELD: Although the victim testified that she was raped more than three times, theaccused can only be convicted for three counts of rape for which he was charged. Toconvict him of more than three counts of rape would be to violate the right of theaccused to be informed of the accusations against him.

People v. Asoy

G. R. No. 132059 (June 29, 2001)

FACTS: The accused was charged with the crime of rape. Upon arraignment, heentered a plea of guilty to the charge against him. The trial court convicted him of rape.The accused appeals, contending that he made an improvident plea of guilty.

HELD: The Supreme Court agreed with the accused. The information was read to theaccused in English. The accused being a probinsyano, he cannot be expected to knowof the charges filed against, as he is not accustomed to the English language. Theinformation should have been interpreted in the local dialect for the accused tounderstand what is being charged against him. For its failure to interpret the informationin the local dialect for the accused, the trial court violated the right of the accused to be

informed of the charges against him.

People v. Supn ad

G. R. No. 133791-94 (August 8, 2001)

FACTS: The accused was charged with rape by his 12-year old niece. The trial courtconvicted him of rape. The sentence was death because the trial court found that theaccused was the guardian and was related to the victim. The accused appealed and


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contended that he can only be convicted of simple rape as the information did not allegethe fact that the victim was related to him.

HELD: The Supreme Court sustained the argument of the accused. Since the

information did not allege that the accused was related to the victim, the accused canonly be convicted of simple rape. Qualifying circumstances must be alleged in theinformation to convict the accused of qualified rape. Otherwise, there would be aviolation of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges.

People v. Toralba

G. R. No. 139411 (August 9, 2001)

FACTS: Agapito Toralba who fathered complainant Cornelia with his own daughter wasaccused of raping Cornelia. The mother of Cornelia found him raping Cornelia. He wasfound guilty of qualified rape because Cornelia was mentally retarded. Toralba appealedon the grounds that it is incredulous to suppose that the accused despite his advanced

age would design to and succeed in raping a full grown woman. Also, the appeal drewattention to the conduct of the accused at the time of the arrest, when he voluntarily andunresistingly went with the police. Alternatively, the appeal stated if the court should findhim guilty of the crime, he should only be convicted of simple rape and not of qualifiedrape since mental disability of the offended party was not alleged in the information.

HELD: There is no inconsistency with the testimonies of Cornelia and her mother.Further, the argument that Toralba was so advanced in age as to render it doubtful forhim to have committed the crime is belied by his having been caught inflagrante delicto.

Advanced age is not known to render sexual intercourse impossible nor to deter sexualinterest and capability. Non-flight is not a conclusive gauge of innocence-it is simplyinaction, which may be due to several factors. There is merit however to the contention

that Toralba should only be found guilty of simple rape. The information should allegethe circumstances which would qualify the crime. If not, the accused can only beconvicted of simple rape.

People v. Salalima

G. R. No. 137969-71 (August 15, 2001)

FACTS: Rafael Salalima was convicted of three counts of rape and sentenced to sufferthe maximum penalty of death by lethal injection for each of the three conviction.Salalima was accused by his step granddaughter, a 13 year old minor of raping her 3times. Salalima denied the accusations against him claiming that as he was sickly andtoo old to be capable of the sexual acts being imputed against him. In his appeal, the

appellant alleged that the information filed was defective because the date and time ofthe commission was not stated with particularity, therefore, the indefiniteness of theinformation deprives him of his right to be informed of the offense charged against himand of the opportunity to prepare his defense. Further, he contends that the deathpenalty was improperly imposed.

HELD: With regards the first issue, the failure to specify the exact dates or time whenthe rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. Theprecise date and time when the victim was raped is not an element of the offense. The


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gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstanceenumerated under Art. 335 of the RPC.

With regards to the second issue raised, the trial court erred in imposing the

death penalty. The seven circumstances in Art. 335 of the RPC partake of specialqualifying circumstances which must be properly pleaded. If they are not properlypleaded in the information, their proof as such by evidence offered at the trial cannotsanction the imposition of the penalty. The information in the said case failed to allegethe relationship of the appellant to the complainant, hence he cannot be convicted underParagraph 7 of Art. 335 of RPC as amended by Section 11 of RA no. 7659.

People v. Catubig

G.R.NO.137842 (August23,2001)

FACTS: The accused was found guilty of raping his 18 year-old daughter on November27, 1997 and was sentenced to death. The case was brought to the Supreme Court for

automatic review and the accused raised the issue that the complaint did not state thathe was the victims father and that the victim was only 18 years old which are qualifyingcircumstances under R.A. 7659.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that because the complaint was, in fact, defective, thelower court erred in imposing the death penalty on the accused. Thus, Catubig is onlyguilty of simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetuaunder the Revised Penal Code.

People v. Bord omeo

G. R No. 138358-59 (November 19, 2001)

FACTS: Bordomeo was charged with the crime of rape. The RTC convicted him of

qualified rape and sentenced him to death. Bordomeo appeals, contending that since thequalifying circumstance of minority or use of deadly weapon was not alleged, he canonly be convicted of simple rape.

HELD: The Supreme Court agreed with Bordomeo. Bordomeo can only be convicted ofsimple rape, not qualified rape. The information did not allege that the victim was aminor, or that Bordomeo used a deadly weapon in raping the victim. To convictBordomeo of qualified rape is to violate his right to be informed of the charges againsthim.

Right to counsel

* Cesin a Eballa v. Judg e Estrell ita Paas, Doctolero and Depalobo sA. M. No. MTJ-01-1365 (August 9, 2001)

FACTS: Eballa is accused of trespass to dwelling and malicious mischief in a casepending before the respondent judge. Eballa filed a complaint charging Judge Paas withignorance of the law for having cited her in contempt and ordering her detention, shealso claimed violation of her right to choose her own counsel. According to her sherequested Judge Paas for postponement of hearing when her cases were called forarraignment because her counsel was absent and she had filed a motion for


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reinvestigation with the Prosecutors Office. Instead of granting her plea, the judgeassigned a counsel de officio and ordered the reading of the information in open courtwith intent to humiliate her. On the other hand, the judge claims that upon reading of thecomplaint, Eballa made faces at the court which embarrass the judge and therefore she

was cited with contempt.

HELD: Upon the filing of the complaint or information, jurisdiction of the case lies withthe court and the disposition of the case rests upon its sound discretion. Since Eballafiled her motion for reinvestigation with the Prosecutors office instead of the court,Judge Paas cannot be faulted for proceeding with complainants arraignment. Neithercan Eballa claim violation of her right to have counsel of her own choice. Her counselfailed to appear despite due notice to her, and therefore, respondent Judge was justifiedin appointing a counsel de oficio to assist her during her arraignment.

Judge Paas cannot be administratively held liable for citing complainant incontempt and ordering her detention. If complainant believes that she has been cited forcontempt without cause, her remedy was to file a petition for certiorari.

Right to a speedy trial

Dela Pea v . Sandigan bay an

G.R. No. 144542 (June 29, 2001)

FACTS: In this petition for certiorari, petitioners ascribe to public respondentSandiganbayan grave abuse of discretion in denying their motion to quash or dismissCriminal Case No. 23662, which was premised on the ground of inordinate delay in theconduct of the preliminary investigation amounting to a violation of their constitutionalrights to due process of law and to a speedy disposition of the case against them. Theprosecution explained the delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation by

claiming that (a) herein petitioners and their co-accused sought on several occasions foran extension of time to file their counter-affidavits; (b) GIO Tolentino received queries,requests, and other communication, which she had to take into consideration, reply to,and act upon; and (c) the case was transferred to GIO Coresis, who thereafterterminated the investigation.

HELD: The right to a speedy disposition of cases is guaranteed by the Constitution.This right, however, is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended byvexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.

The first two reasons cited do not justify the delay. Indeed, as pointed out by petitioners,it took them only three months to complete their counter-affidavits. There were several

requests or inquiries made. However, not much time was needed to act on thoseinquiries or requests.

The third cited reason could have been one of the causes of the delay. The case wastransferred to GIO Coresis sometime between the last quarter of 1994 and first quarterof 1995 as can be gleaned from the letters on record. He had to go over the lengthyCOA report and counter-affidavits of the five respondents, as well as the numerousreceipts and other evidence forming part of the voluminous records. It took him more or


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less two years to evaluate the evidence and come up with a resolution. In any event, thedelay could scarcely be considered as vexatious, capricious and oppressive.

Moreover, it is worthy to note that it was only on 21 December 1999, after the case was

set for arraignment, that petitioners raised the issue of the delay in the conduct of thepreliminary investigation. They slept on their right a situation amounting to laches.Their silence may, therefore be interpreted as a waiver of such right.

Licaros v. Sandiganbayan

G. R. No. 145851 (November 22, 2001)

FACTS: A case was filed against the petitioner in the Sandiganbayan. After thepresentation of evidence, the case was submitted for decision. The Sandiganbayan didnot act on the case for 10 years after it was submitted. The petitioner filed a case beforethe Supreme Court to have the case dismissed, as there was a violation of petitionersright to a speedy disposition of his case.

HELD: Case against petitioner is dismissed. The failure of the Sandiganbayan toresolve the case of petitioner for 10 years after it was submitted to the court for decisionwithout any valid reason violated petitioners right to a speedy disposition of his case.

Right of Confrontation

Cariaga v. CA

G. R. No. 143561 (June 6, 2001)

FACTS: Jonathan Cariaga was charged with the crime of qualified theft. The RTCconvicted him and based its ruling on the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga who was

not presented in court as a witness. Is the sworn statement of Ricardo admissible?

HELD: No. Ricardo was not a witness who cannot be found despite due diligence,unavailable or unable to testify. He was only subpoenaed once, in which he did notappear. The court was informed that Ricardo was in a place that was 4 hours away fromit. The admission of Ricardos statement was violative of Jonathans right to confront thewitnesses against him.

Double Jeopardy

* Sarabia, PNP v. People

G. R. No. 142024 (July 20, 2001)

FACTS: Sarabia, a police officer, poked his gun at two lovers. He forced them to dosexual acts and extorted them for money. A complaint for grave coercion was filedagainst him by the victims. The MTC convicted him, and its ruling was affirmed by theRTC. The CA denied Sarabias appeal. Sarabia now contends that double jeopardy hasattached to his case, as the incident in the present case was also the subject of acriminal case for robbery with violence against or intimidation of person wherein he wasconvicted.


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HELD: The Supreme Court held that double jeopardy did not attach. There was noidentity of offenses. The crime of grave coercion is not the same as the crime of robberywith violence against or intimidation of person. The former is not an attempt or afrustration to commit the latter. The former does not necessarily include, and is not

necessarily included in the latter.

Argel v. Jud ge Pascua

A. M. No. RTJ-94-1131 (August 20, 2001)

FACTS: In the case entitled People v. Miguel Argel, Judge Pascua rendered ajudgment of acquittal in Argels favor. However, a lawyer called the judges attention tothe fact that a witness was able to positively identify the accused and such feat wasrecorded in the judges notes. On the basis of such findings, the judge ordered the arrestof the accused Argel and rendered a new judgment finding Argel guilty of murder. Argelfiled an administrative case against the judge for gross ignorance of the law. Thequestion is whether Argel may be convicted of the crime of murder.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Argel cannot be convicted of murder. A judgmentof acquittal becomes final upon promulgation. It cannot be amended, recalled orwithdrawn by another order after attaining finality. Since Argel was acquitted, JudgePascua cannot issue another order amending the previous judgment of acquittal, as todo so would place Argel in double jeopardy.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Prohibition on Cabinet Members

De la Cruz v. COA

G. R. No. 138489 (November 29, 2001)

FACTS: Petitioners were members of the Board of Directors of the NHA. The COAdisallowed the payment of per diems to each of the petitioners, as this was a violation ofthe prohibition on extra compensation. Petitioners appealed, claiming that the prohibitiondoes not apply to them, as they are not Executive Department Secretaries. The appealwas denied.

HELD: The Supreme Court upheld the COAs ruling. Petitioners were the alternates ofExecutive Department Secretaries. As such, they are not entitled to extra compensation,inasmuch as their principals cannot claim extra compensation.

State of Rebellion

Lacso n v. Perez

G.R. No. 147780 (May 10, 2001)FACTS:

On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an angry mob assaultingand attempting to break into Malacaang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring thatthere was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issuedGeneral Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine


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National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantlessarrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion were thereaftereffected.

Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a state of rebellion,which allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, four related petitions werefiled before the Court assailing the declaration of a state of rebellion by the Presidentand the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis bothin fact and in law.

HELD:On May 6, 2001, the President ordered the lifting of the declaration of a state ofrebellion in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered mootand academic.

As to petitioners claim that the proclamation of a state of rebellion is being used bythe authorities to justify warrantless arrests, there are actually general instructions to law

enforcement officers and military agencies to implement Proclamation No. 38 and obtainregular warrants of arrests from the courts. This means that preliminary investigationswill be conducted.

Moreover, petitioners contention that they are under imminent danger of beingarrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies ofmandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is notwithout adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.

Petitioners cannot ask the Court to direct the courts before whom the informationsagainst the petitioners are filed to desist from arraigning and proceeding with the trial ofthe case. Such relief is clearly premature considering that as of this date, no complaints

or charges have been filed against any of the petitioners for any crime.

Hold departure orders issued against petitioners cannot be declared null and voidsince petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the subject hold departureorders in their petition.

Petitioner Defensor-Santiago has not shown that she is in imminent danger of beingarrested without a warrant. Hence, her petition of mandamus cannot be issued sincesuch right to relief must be clear at the time of the award.

Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the Peoples Movement against Poverty (PMAP),argues that the declaration of a state of rebellion is violative of the doctrine of

separation of powers, being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary to interpretwhat took place on May 1. The Court disagreed since the President as the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, may call out such armed forces to preventor suppress lawless violence.

As for petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), it is not a real party-in-interest. LDP has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to theCourt. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to bethreatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members and


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supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime ofrebellion.

Even if instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, the

Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition.

PETITIONS DISMISSED (However, petitioners cannot be arrested without the requiredjudicial warrant for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001siege)

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Period to Render Decisions

Re: Report o n the Judic ial Au dit v. Judge Arin day, Jr.

A.M. No. 99-5-162-RTC. May 11, 2001

FACTS:An audit showed that on February 19, 1999, the Regional Trial Court, Silay City, Branch 69 had a total caseload of 231 which included twenty-four (24) cases submittedfor decision. The Court directed former Judge to explain within ten (10) days from noticewhy no administrative sanction should be imposed upon him for failure to decide/resolveCriminal Cases and Civil Cases within the reglementary period. Judge explained that hecould not decide some of the cases on time either because of unavailability of thetranscripts of stenographic notes or delay in the submission of the same; the non-compliance of either the prosecution or the defense in criminal cases with the orders ofthe court; the motions of inhibitions filed by counsel in civil cases; and the opportunitygiven to litigants to amicably settle their differences.

HELD:Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to dispose oftheir business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Under Article VIII,Section 15 of the Constitution, lower courts have three months within which to decidecases submitted to them for resolution. The Court has constantly stressed upon judgesthe need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously, for it cannot be gainsaid that

justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in the disposition of cases undermines thepeople's faith and confidence in the judiciary. Hence, judges are enjoined to decidecases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants theimposition of administrative sanction on them. On the unavailability of the transcripts ofstenographic notes, judges are required to take down notes and to proceed in thepreparation of decisions even without the transcripts. The Court has held that the three-month reglementary period continues to run, with or without the transcripts ormemoranda, if required.

Office of the Court A dminis trator v. Judge Casti l lo

A.M. No. RTJ-01-1634 (October 25, 2001)

FACTS: Respondent Judge allegedly failed to decide a land registration case within the90 day reglementary period, the case being submitted for decision on December 12,1995. Although respondent judge explained that a decision has been rendered, JusticeDavide ruled that respondent Judge still failed to account for the delay. Hence, it was


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recommended that an appropriate administrative sanction be imposed against him. TheOCA however prayed for the dismissal of the case. They found that the land registrationcase was actually submitted for decision only on June 24, 1998 after the completion ofthe ex-parte hearings. The decision was handed down on July 23, 1998 or within the

prescribed term.

HELD: Art. 8 Sec 15(1) of the Constitution requires judges of lower courts to decidecases or resolve matters within three months from the date of their submission forresolution. There is no gainsaying, however, that the ninety-day period applied only afterthe case is submitted for decision, not from the start of the trial. A case or matter shall bedeemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, briefmemorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the Court itself.

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

Civil Service Commission

Primarily Confidential Positions

Monteci l lo v. Civi l Service Commis sion

G.R. No. 131954 (June 28, 2001)

FACTS: Petitioners applied for promotional appointment to the position of Secretary tothe Assistant General Manager or Private Secretary C. When their appointments wereforwarded to the CSC Field Office, the latter refused to approve petitionersappointments as permanent on the ground that the position applied for was a primarilyconfidential and co-terminous position. This ruling was upheld by the CSC RegionalOfficeand affirmed on appeal by respondent.

Petitioners contend that respondent abused its power to promulgate rules andregulations by issuing the challenged circular, because the grant of rule-making power torespondent did not authorize it to amend the law by adding to the statutory enumeration.Petitioners conclude that since said memorandum circular was issued in excess of thepowers granted to respondent, it is null and void and consequently, the assailed CSCresolution has no leg to stand on.

HELD: In the present case, there is no clear and persuasive showing that respondentgrossly abused its discretion or exceeded its powers when it issued the assailed circular.On the contrary, respondent was expressly empowered to declare positions in the CivilService as may properly be classified as primarily confidential under Section 12, Chapter3, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. To our mind, this signifies that the

enumeration found in Section 6, Article IV of the Civil Service Decree, which defines thenon-career service, is not an exclusive list. Respondent could supplement theenumeration, as it did when it issued Memorandum Circular No. 22, s. of 1991, byspecifying positions in the civil service, which are considered primarily confidential andtherefore their occupants are co-terminous with the official they serve.


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Computation of Terminal Leave Pay

Belic ena v. Secretary of Finance

G.R. No. 143190 (October 17, 2001)

FACTS: Former President Ramos designated Belicena as Acting Secretary of Financefor the duration of the trip to Hongkong of Secretary of Finance de Ocampo. He took hisoath of office as Acting Secretary on May 22, 1997. For the purposes of computing theterminal leave pay of Belicena, the latter alleges that his highest monthly salary shall bethat corresponding to the position of Secretary of Finance.

HELD: When the President designated the petitioner as Acting Secretary on May 22,1997, he did so under a well considered opinion that the absence of Secretary deOcampo was of such an extent that the latter would be unable to perform his duties andby reason of such opinion, the President extended a temporary designation of petitionerunder Section 17 of the Administrative Code of 1987.

The COA has held that a government official appointed or designated in anacting capacity pursuant to Sec 17 Chap 5 Title 1 Book 3 of the 1987 AdministrativeCode is entitled to salary differential and that his highest monthly salary for purposes ofcomputing his terminal leave pay shall include such salary differential. Belicenas highestmonthly salary is that corresponding to position of Sec of Finance which petitionerreceived while he was Acting Secretary. Highest monthly salary means the highest ratereceived.

Dishonesty as a Ground for Dismissal

Estelito Remo lon a v. CSC

G. R. No. 137473 (August 2, 2001)

HELD: Remolona was dismissed for cause. The rule is that dishonesty, in order towarrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance of duty bythe person charged. The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or employeeis dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects ofcharacter are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office.

Neglect of Duty

Phil ippine Retirement Au thori ty v . Rupa

G. R. No. 140519 (August 21, 2001)

FACTS: Respondent Thelma Rupa was Human resources Management Officer of thePhilippine Retirement Authority, a government agency tasked to promote the Philippinesas a retirement destination for foreigners. Her squabbles with PRA Gen. Manager andCEO Atty. Paco started when, tasked to convert the retirees deposits into investments,she refused to do so for two Indian nationals. Similar incidents occurred wherein sherefused to do her task saying she cannot be rushed. She was then reassigned toanother post which she refused to assume. Thus, she was charged with three (3)offenses: Insubordination, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and


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Neglect of Duty in the Civil Service Commission. The CSC found respondent guilty of thegrave offense of Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service solely forneglecting to promptly process the requests of the two (2) Indian retirees. She wasmeted the penalty of one (1) year suspension without pay. The CSC absolved the

respondent from the other charges. However, the CA found the respondent guilty of theless grave offense of simple neglect of duty and imposed on her the lesser penalty ofthree (3) months suspension without pay.

The PRA contends that the CA erred in modifying the decision.

HELD: Gross Neglect of Duty denotes a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness ofa person to perform a duty. Simple Neglect of Duty, however, signifies a disregard of aduty resulting from carelessness or indifference. The SC found that the respondent wasproperly adjudged guilty only of Simple Neglect of Duty. The respondents offense is notgrave or odious as to amount to Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service orGross Neglect of Duty.

Security of TenureAdio ng v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 136480. (December 4, 2001)

FACTS: Mayor Batua issued a permanent appointment to Nuska to the position ofMunicipal Local Civil Registrar. On June 30, 1995, Mayor Adiong issued a memoranduminforming all municipal employees of the termination of their appointment and directingthem to clear themselves from money and property accountabilities. On July 1, 1995,another memorandum clarified this by specifying that the mass termination of servicesapplied only to temporary or casual workers and requiring those holding approvedpermanent appointments to submit copies of their appointments. Due to respondent

Nuska's failure to submit a copy of her appointment coupled with her failure to make acourtesy call on the petitioner as the new mayor, he terminated her services andappointed a certain Samporna in her stead. Nuska appealed to the Civil ServiceCommission, which held that the termination of the services of Nasiba A. Nuska asMunicipal Local Registrar not in order.

HELD: The petition is without merit. In this case, respondent Nuska had a permanentappointment to the position of municipal civil registrar. She thus enjoyed security oftenure as guaranteed by law. As an employee in the civil service and as a civil serviceeligible, respondent Nuska is entitled to the benefits, rights and privileges extended tothose belonging to the classified service. She could not be removed or dismissed fromthe service without just cause and without observing the requirements of due process.

Generally speaking, a person holding a public office may abandon such office by non-user or acquiescence. Non-user refers to a neglect to use a right or privilege or toexercise an office. However, nonperformance of the duties of an office does notconstitute abandonment where such nonperformance results from temporary disability orfrom involuntary failure to perform. Abandonment may also result from an acquiescenceby the officer in his wrongful removal or discharge. In this case, respondent Nuska'sfailure to perform her duties was involuntary and cannot be considered as acquiescence.


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Commission on Audit

Olaguer v. Doming o

G. R. No. 109666 (June 20, 2001)

FACTS: The NHMFC resident auditor conducted an audit. The auditor resolved todisallow the loan granted to the SPCDFI-AMAKO and to hold petitioners liable forgranting the loan. The COA affirmed the ruling of the auditor. Petitioners filed a casequestioning the COAs ruling holding them liable and disallowing the loan.

ISSUE: Should the ruling of the COA be upheld?

HELD: The COAs ruling is affirmed. Rulings made by government agencies in theexercise of their special technical knowledge and training will be respected. More so ifthe ruling is affirmed and reaffirmed along the administrative hierarchy.

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Powers of the Ombudsman

Judg e Caoibes v. Ombud sman and Judge Alum bres

G.R. No. 132177. (July 19, 2001)

FACTS: Because of a physical altercation, Judge A filed against Judge C, before theOmbudsman, a criminal complaint for physical injuries, etc. Judge A also filed anadministrative complaint with the SC, praying for the dismissal of Judge C from the

judiciary.

Judge C, instead of responding to the complaint with a counter-affidavit as was required

by the Ombudsman, filed for referral of the matter to the SC this was denied by theOmbudsman.

ISSUE:Whether the Ombudsman has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter.

HELD:No. The Ombudsman only has primary and not exclusive jurisdiction. It cannotdeprive the SC of its constitutionally vested power of administrative supervision over allcourts and its personnel. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against

judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court fordetermination as to whether an administrative aspect is involved therein.

Nava v. COA

G.R. No. 136470 (October 16, 2001)

FACTS: Commission on Audit conducted an audit investigation on the procurement ofthe DECS Division Office of Davao City of school construction materials for its 1991School Building Program. Report revealed that the items sold to DECS exceeded theprevailing market prices in the city ranging from 6.09% to 695.45%, resulting to agovernment loss. Report was transmitted to the Deputy Ombudsman. The latter, findingprima facie evidence to proceed with preliminary investigation, ordered petitioner to filetheir answer.


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Nava denied the charges. But the Ombudsman still issued a resolution findingsufficient evidence to hold that there was a violation of the Anti Graft and CorruptPractices Act. A complaint was later filed before the Sandiganbayan. Nevertheless, theSpecial Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges, which was disapproved

by Ombudsman Desierto.

HELD: Ombudsman Desierto did not commitgrave abuse of discretion. In disapprovingthe recommendation of the Special Prosecutor, Desierto was merely exercising hispowers based upon constitutional mandate and the courts should not interfere in suchexercise. His determination of the existence of a reasonable ground to believe that thecrime has been committed and that petitioner is probably guilty thereof, is nottantamount to grave abuse of discretion. There is a policy of non-interference in theexercise of the Ombudsmans constitutionally-mandated powers.

Judge Fuentes v. Off ice of the Ombudsm an-Mindanao

G.R. No. 124295 (October 23, 2001)

ISSUE:Whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in theexercise of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and CorruptPractices Act, in the absence of an administrative charge for the same acts before theSupreme Court.

HELD: No. RA 6770, Sec. 21 provides that the Ombudsman shall have disciplinaryauthority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions,instrumentalities and agencies, including members of the Cabinet, local government,government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officialswho may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and theJudiciary.

Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrativecomplaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigatepublic officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Suof Terminal Leave Pay

Belicena v. Scretary of Finance

G.R. No. 143190 (October 17, 2001)

FACTS: Former President Ramos designated Belicena as Acting Secretary of Financefor the duration of the trip to Hongkong of Secretary of Finance de Ocampo. He took hisoath of office a

Acting Secretary on May 22, 1997. For the purposes of computing the terminal

leave pay of Belicena, the latter alleges that his highest monthly salary shall be thatcorresponding to the position of Secretary of Finance.

HELD: When the President designated the petitioner as Acting Secretary on May 22,1997, he did so under a well considered opinion that

he absence of Secretary de Oc


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po w as of such an extent that the latter would b e unable to perform hi

duties and by reason of such opi

on, the President extended a temporary designation of petitioner under Section 17 of

the Administrative Code of 1987.

The COA has held that a government official appointed or designated in anacting capacity pursuant to Sec 17 Chap 5 Title 1 Book 3 of the 1987 AdministrativeCode is entitled to salary differential and that his highest monthly salary for purposes ofcomputing his terminal leave pay shall include such salary differential. Belicenas highestmonthly salary is that corresponding to position of Sec of Finance which petitionerreceived while he was Acting Secretary. Highest monthly salary means the highest ratereceived.

Dishonesty as a Ground for Dismissal

Estelito Remolona v. CSCG. R. No. 137473 (August 2, 2001)

HELD: Remolona was dismissedfor cause. The rule is that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not becommitted in the course of the performance of duty by the person charged. Therationale for the rule is that if a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty ofoppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected withhis office, they affect his right to continue in office.

Neglect of Duty

Philippine Retirement Authority v. RupaG. R. No. 140519 (August 21, 200)

FACsman later dismissed the complaint of PCGG.

HELD: The prescriptive period for the offenses with which BUSCO was charged shouldbe computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of suchcommission. It is well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have knownthe violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were madebecause the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the beneficiaries ofthe loans.

The sole basis for the dismissal of the complaint was insufficiency of evidence orlack of probable cause. To insulate the Ombudsman from outside pressure and improperinfluence, the Constitution as well as RA 6770 has endowed it with a wide latitude ofinvestigatory and prosecutory powers virtually free from legislative, executive or judicialintervention. As a rule, the Court shall not unduly interfere in the Ombudsmans exerciseof his investigatory and prosecutory powers.

Coconut Levy Funds


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Republ ic v. COCOFED

G.R. Nos. 147062-64. December 14, 2001

FACTS:Executive Order No. 14 empowered the PCGG to sequester shares of stock in

the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) registered in the names of the alleged "onemillion coconut farmers," the so-called Coconut Industry Investment Fund companies(CIIF companies) and Private Respondent Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. (hereinafter"Cojuangco") purchased with the Coco Levy funds. The PCGG voted on thesequestered UCPB shares. A petition was filed to enjoin the PCGG from voting theUCPB shares of stock registered in the respective names of the more than one millioncoconut farmers The court gave them their rights to vote their shares of stock andthemselves to be voted upon in the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) at thescheduled Stockholders' Meeting. A petition was filed questioning this.

HELD:This Court holds that the government should be allowed to continue voting thoseshares inasmuch as they were purchased with coconut levy funds -- funds that are prima

facie public in character or, at the very least, are "clearly affected with public interest." Atthe outset, it is necessary to restate the general rule that the registered owner of theshares of a corporation exercises the right and the privilege of voting. This principleapplies even to shares that are sequestered by the government, over which the PCGGas a mere conservator cannot, as a general rule, exercise acts of dominion. In short,when sequestered shares registered in the names of private individuals or entities arealleged to have been acquired with ill-gotten wealth, then the two-tiered test is applied.However, when the sequestered shares in the name of private individuals or entities areshown, prima facie, to have been (1) originally government shares, or (2) purchased withpublic funds or those affected with public interest, then the two-tiered test does notapply. Coconut funds are levied for the benefit of the coconut industry and its farmers.The coconut levy funds are likened to the sugar levy funds, both being special public

funds acquired through the taxing and police powers of the State. The COA audit showsthe public nature of the funds and the BIR has pronounced that the coconut levy fundsare taxes. Laws governing coconut levies recognize their public nature. Having beenacquired with public funds, UCPB shares belong, prima facie, to the Government.

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

Classification of Land

Republic v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 106763. (May 9, 2001)

FACTS: On 1964, the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, represented by its Mayor, Pablo G.Sarino, pursuant to Act No. 3312 and Municipal Resolution No. 89 as amended byResolution No. 289. Prior to the sale, private respondents' predecessor-in-interest,Brigida Francisco, had been in possession of the subject lot and paid the real estatetaxes thereon as early as 1907. The land was registered in their name. 25 years later,the Office of Solicitor General (OSG) filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to annulthe decision for registration, alleging that the registration proceedings were null and voidfor lack of jurisdiction because the parcels of land subject thereof were still classified asforest land, having been released therefrom only on February 21, 1972; that the OSG


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was not furnished with a copy of the application for registration and other records asmandated by Section 51, of the Public Land Act; and that the applicants have not shownpossession and occupation of the lands in the manner and for the length of time requiredby section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended.

HELD:A scrutiny of the foregoing documents fails to conclusively establish the actualclassification of the land prior to its release as alienable and disposable in February 21,1972. The aforesaid Land Classification Map drawn several years after the issuance ofthe decree in 1965 merely shows that the subject lots were part of a big tract of land inBacoor, Cavite which was certified and declared as alienable or disposable land. TheRepublic does not stand to be deprived of its patrimony, as the said parcels of land hadalready been declared alienable and disposable and if there is any reversion in favor ofthe Republic, the land recovered would not be for public use, but for eventual dispositionto other private persons.

Proscription against Aliens in Acquiring Private Lands

Lee v. Republic of the Phil ippin es

G.R. No. 128195 (October 3, 2001)

FACTS:Petitioners filed a petition for reconstitution of title of a certain lot of the CapizCadastre. Petitioners alleged that they were the widows of the deceased Lee Bing Hooand Lee Bun Ting, who were the heirs of a Chinese national, Lee Liong.

The Register of Deeds issued a certification that a TCT was issued in the nameof their predecessor but the records were burned during the war. Hence, RTC orderedreconstitution of the lost certificate of title. However, Solgen filed with the CA a petitionfor annulment of judgment alleging that petitioners were not proper parties since theirpredecessor did not acquire title to the lot because he was a Chinese national and

constitutionally not qualified to own the subject land. CA ruled in favor of the Solgen.

ISSUE: Whether the predecessor has qualification to own land in the Philippines

HELD: Sale of the land was consummated sometime in March 1936 during theeffectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Under such constitution, aliens could not acquireprivate agricultural lands save in cases of hereditary succession. Thus, Lee Liong wasdisqualified.

In sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding title thereto by virtue of theprovisions of the Constitution both the vendor and the vendee are deemed to havecommitted the constitutional violation and being thus in pari delicto the courts will notafford protection to either party. The proper party to assail the sale is the Solgen. He caninitiate an action for reversion or escheat.

However, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedingsbecause the land is now in the hands of Filipinos. The original vendee has since diedand the land has been inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs, petitionersherein. Petitioners are Filipino citizens so the flaw in the original transaction isconsidered cured and the title is rendered valid.

Franchises


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Del Mar v. PAGCOR

G. R. 138298 (August 24, 2001)

FACTS: Respondents sought a clarification of the issues raised in their motion for

reconsideration, namely:a. whether PAGCOR itself has a valid franchise to conduct jai-alai games, andb. whether PAGCOR can operate, maintain or manage jai-alai games in

association with BELLE and FILGAME

HELD: The court ruled that only PAGCOR alone possesses a valid franchise tooperate, maintain and/or manage jai-alai games. PAGCOR may not operate jai-alaigames in association with BELLE and FILGAME.


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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

DELEGATION OF POWER TO HEAR CASES

Mollaneda v. UmacobG. R. No. 140128 (June 6, 2001)

FACTS: Mollaneda was charged with sexual harassment. The records were elevated tothe CSC, which designated Atty. Buena as the hearing officer. After the hearing, theCSC issued a resolution finding Mollaneda guilty of the charges. Mollaneda appealed tothe CA, which upheld the findings of the CSC. Did the CA err in giving weight to thefindings of the CSC?

HELD: No. An administrative agency can delegate the power to hear and receiveevidence to a hearing officer, as long as the administrative body makes its ownindependent conclusions. Such findings shall be conclusive upon the courts.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

Gonzales v. Court of A ppeals

G.R. No. 106028. (May 9, 2001)

FACTS: Gonzales received two Orders from the Regional Office of the Department ofAgrarian Reform (DAR), signed by the respondent DAR Regional Director where shewas directed to surrender the titles to her land and to submit the other requirements ofthe respondent Land Bank of the Philippines, while the said bank was ordered to pay thepetitioner an aggregate amount of P55,690.74 as compensation for the two parcels ofland. Gonzales claims in her petition for CERTIORARI and PROHIBITION that she

never filed a land transfer claim and was not notified of nor heard in the execution of thefinal survey plans and the valuation of her land. The Court of Appeals rendered aDecision denying due course and dismissing the petition for failure of the petitioners toexhaust administrative remedies.

HELD: Questions as to the propriety of the issuance could have still been raised beforethe proper administrative forum. Instead of going directly to the Court of Appeals oncertiorari, the petitioner should have sought redress in the DARAB, and the latter'sofficials should have been given an opportunity to review the matter and resolve thecontroversy. The Court was not convinced that any of the exceptions to the rule obtainshere. The issue is not to be resolved by the Court of Appeals in the first instance oncertiorari.

Garcia v. CA

G. R. No. 100579 (June 6, 2001)

FACTS: Leandro Garcia was charged with an administrative case. He asked forpostponement of hearing and for the creation of a new investigating committee. ThePCA governing board denied the request. Leandro filed a petition for certiorari,mandamus and prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction with the RTC.


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ISSUE:Can Leandro file the petition without exhausting administrative remedies ?

HELD: No. When administrative remedies are still available, a recourse through thecourts is unavailing. Courts should not take cognizance of a case the jurisdiction of

which lies with an administrative body.

Bord al lo v. The Professional Regulat ions Commis sion

G. R. No. 140920 (November 19, 2001)

FACTS: Petitioners in this case took the examinations for the marine deck officers. ThePRC informed petitioners of the results of the exam. Petitioners were said to have failedthe exams, as they were not able to obtain the passing mark of 75%. Petitionersprotested and filed a petition with the Board of Marine Deck Officers. The Board deniedthe petition. On appeal to the CA, the CA ruled against petitioners as petitioners failed toexhaust administrative remedies.

ISSUE: Is there a need for petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies?

HELD: No. The general rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits ofexceptions, as when the case involves pure questions of law. The case at hand involvespure questions of law. The issue boils down as to what law to apply in order to determinethe passing mark for the marine deck officers exam, whether it be the law setting thepassing mark at 70%, or the law setting the passing mark at 75%. The CA and the Boardapplied the law that was already repealed by a subsequent law lowering the passingmark to 70%.

DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

Criso stom o Magat, et al. vs. Alb ert M. Delizo, et al.G.R. No. 135199 (July 5, 2001)

FACTS: Slim Realty sold a piece of property to the Delizo spouses. Slim refused toreceive payment until it had delivered title to the spouses. The spouses filed a complaintfor specific performance with the RTC, where the parties entered into a Compromise

Agreement. The Magat spouses, to whom Slim had previously sold the property, filed aMotion to Declare the Proceeding Null and Void alleging that the complaint for specificperformance involved a subdivision lot, which was exclusively cognizable by the Housingand Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) pursuant to PD 1344 and not by the trialcourt.

HELD:There is no showing that the property was a subdivision lot or condominium as tofall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB. The complaint simply stated that thesubject matter was a piece of real estate. The records strongly suggest that theproperty involved was simply a house and lot. The controversy is thus cognizable by thetrial court.

Castro v. Gloria

G.R.NO.132174(August20,2001)


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FACTS: Porfirio Gutang, Jr. filed with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports(DECS) a complaint for disgraceful and immoral conduct against petitioner GualbertoCastro, a teacher in Guibuangan Central School, Barili, Cebu. It was alleged that he hadan illicit affair with Gutangs wife, petitioners co-teacher at the same school. Castro was

dismissed by the DECS Regional Director. He then filed a motion to set aside thedecision which was ultimately denied by Secretary Gloria of DECS. Thereafter, Castrofiled a petition for mandamuswith the RTC asking it to set aside the order of dismissaland reduce it to a one-year suspension.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner failed to exhaust administrativeremedies since the Civil Service Commission still has the power to review, revise ormodify the Secretarys order. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant acourt to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction overwhich is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.

ELECTION LAW

PARTY-LIST SYSTEMS

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC

G. R. No. 147589 (June 26, 2001)

ISSUE: Can political parties participate in the party-list elections?

HELD: Yes. Political parties can participate in the party-list elections. The Constitutionprovides that members of the House of Representatives may be elected through a paty-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. The

Constitution also allows political parties to register under the party-list system. However,the candidates of political parties must be those:

a. who belong to marginalized and under represented sectors, organizationsand parties; and

b. who lack well-defined constituencies; butc. who could contribute to the formation and enactment of appropriate

legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.

PUBLIC OFFICERS

CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEESPAGCOR v. Rillor aza

G. R. 141141 (June 25, 2001)

FACTS: Rilloraza was a casino operations manager. He was dismissed by PAGCORfor gross misconduct, dishonesty and loss of confidence. The CSC and CA foundRilloraza guilty only of simple negligence. PAGCOR contends that since Rilloraza is aconfidential employee, he may be dismissed for lack of confidence.

HELD: Rilloraza is not a confidential appointee. Although his tasks require faith andconfidence in his competence to perform it, such does not by any means elevate


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Rillorazas position as primarily confidential. It is the nature, not the name of the position,that classifies it as primarily confidential.

LIABILITY

Olaguer v. Doming oG. R. No. 109666 (June 20, 2001)

FACTS: The NHMFC resident auditor conducted an audit. The auditor resolved todisallow the loan granted to the SPCDFI-AMAKO and to hold petitioners liable forgranting the loan. The COA affirmed the ruling of the auditor. Petitioners filed a casequestioning the COAs ruling holding them liable and disallowing the loan.

ISSUE:Are petitioners liable for the grant of the loan?

HELD: Petitioners are liable. Although they did not personally approve the loan,nevertheless, they exercised the power of processing, evaluating and reviewing the

applications for the loan. In effect, they had a hand in the grant of the loan.

IMMORALITYLauro v. Lauro

A. M. No. P-91-642 (June 6, 2001)

FACTS: Efren Lauro was charged with having illicit relations with Nida Montante.Documents signed by Nida identifying herself as Lauros spouse were shown to proveEfrens illicit relationship with Nida.

ISSUE:Is Efren administratively liable?

HELD: Yes. Disgraceful and immoral conduct is a grave offense under Rule XIV, Sec.2(o) of the Civil Service Rules.

Floria v. Sunga

A. M. No. CA 01-10-P (November 14, 2001)

FACTS: Floria, a CA employee, was charged in an administrative case with immoralityfor having illicit relations with Rodrigo, a married man. She is also charged with falsifyingher childrens certificates of live birth, as she indicated therein that she was married toRodrigo when in fact she was not. Floria alleged that she did not know that Rodrigo wasmarried and that she terminated her relationship with Rodrigo upon knowing that he wasmarried. The complaint was dismissed.

ISSUE:Is Floria liable?

HELD: Floria is liable. A public officer is bound to observe the highest standard ofmorality. Floria should have investigated the civil status of Rodrigo before entering into arelationship with him. Normally, this is what women do when they enter into arelationship with a man. Her defense could have been sustained were it not for the factthat Rodrigos wife was also an employee of the CA. Furthermore, the case cannot be


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dismissed simply because she broke up with Rodrigo. The stigma of immorality stillattaches to Floria who as a public officer is sworn to uphold the highest standards ofmorality.

PUBLIC CORPORATIONS

Prefatory: Due to lack of current jurisprudence on this subject matter, respective Pubcorp casesfound in last years digests are included.

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

MMDA v. B el-Air Vil lage Ass ociat ion, Inc.

G.R. NO. 135962 (March 27, 2000)

FACTS: Respondent filed a case against petitioner enjoining them from opening the

Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial courtdenied issuance of a preliminary injunction. On appeal, the appellate court ruled that theMMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, and cause thedemolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council ofMakati by ordinance. Hence this petition.

HELD: The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community.Hence, its proposed opening of Neptune Street which was not mandated by theSangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City, is illegal.

POWERS

Expr

Political Law} Case Survey 2000 - 2001} Made 2002} by Ateneo} 36 Pages

Documents

Transcript of Political Law} Case Survey 2000 - 2001} Made 2002} by Ateneo} 36 Pages