Villavicencio vs Lukban - A case digest

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.

Issue:

The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce around 170 women

whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the

Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.

Facts:

Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170

women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao

specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in

Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.

That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were

already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the

bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of

sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits

to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present.

Held:

The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal

damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could

forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called

upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he,

the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.

We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to

obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the

party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no

reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these

women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao

to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by

forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her

birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

People Vs Lagman

In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being compelled by Section 60 of Commonwealth Act 1 (National

Defense Law) to join the military service. Lagman refused to do so because he has a father to support, has no military

leanings and he does not wish to kill or be killed. Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the said law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.

HELD: Yes. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the

organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no

sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. Hence, the National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory

military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith.

“The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law

to render personal military or civil service

AGLIPAY Vs RUIZ

G.R. No. L-45459             March 13, 1937

FACTS: The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from

this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps

commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.

In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of postage stamps

commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the

Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto,

Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the

petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage stamps

for printing

ISSUE : WON the selling of stamps in commemorating the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. constitutional

HELD: YES .The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from

the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936,

incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise

the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event

considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people

MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940

Doctrine: Social Justice                   

LAUREL, J.:

Facts:

 

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public

Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing

along the following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:

1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas

Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and

2)  along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to

Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works with the

approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of

thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 

which authorizes said Director with the approval from the

Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and

traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the Chairman

of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on

August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the

rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the

places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

Issues:

1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO.

548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom

of locomotion?

2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion

of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?

Held:

1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest

and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public

convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety.

Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare

may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject

to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this

fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be

made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty

because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is

precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.

2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the

equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may  at

least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of

measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a

proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the

adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of

all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a

society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and

economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet

of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”

JOSE ALMEDA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, digested

GR # 121013 July 16 1998

(Remedial Law, Appeal)

FACTS: Petitioner Jose Almeda filed a notice of appeal which was disapproved by the trial court due to it being filed five (5)

days late beyond the reglementary period and subsequently denied of motion for reconsideration. Respondent court

dismissed the petition contending that the requirement regarding perfection of an appeal was not only mandatory but

jurisdictional such that the petitioner’s failure to comply therewith had the effect of rendering the judgment final.

Subsequently, petitioner motions for reconsideration and is denied. Also, it was found that there was lack of merit in the

petitioner’s reason for the late filing of the notice of appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not failure to comply with the requirement regarding perfection of an appeal within reglementary period

would render a judgment final and executory.

HELD: Yes, the period to appeal is prescribed not only by the Rules of Court but also by statute, particularly Sec 39 of BP 129,

which provides:

Sec.39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases

shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from…

The right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of it must strictly comply with the statutes or rules as they

are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for an orderly discharge of judicial business. Due to

petitioner’s negligence of failing to perfect his appeal, there is no recourse but to deny the petition thus making the judgment

of the trial court final and executory.

 

Meyer vs Nebraska

Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute that outlawed the

teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet completed the eighth grade.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from creating legislation that restricts liberty

interests when the legislation is not reasonably related to an acceptable state objective.

Facts. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute that outlawed the teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet completed the eighth grade. The Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld the conviction.

Issue. Does the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringe on the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment?

Held. The statute as applied is unconstitutional because it infringes on the liberty interests of the plaintiff and fails to

reasonably relate to any end within the competency of the state.

The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more than merely the freedom from bodily restraint. The state argues that the

purpose of the statute is to encourage the English language to be the native tongue of all children raised in the state.

Nonetheless, the protection of the Constitution extends to those who speak other languages. Education is a fundamental

liberty interest that must be protected, and mere knowledge of the German language cannot be reasonably regarded as

harmful.

Discussion. Liberty interests may not be interfered with by the states when the interference is arbitrary and not reasonably related to a purpose which the state may permissively regulate

People vs Ritter

Brief Fact Summary. Appellees, two non-public schools, were protected by a preliminary restraining order prohibiting

appellants from enforcing an Oregon Act that required parents and guardians to send their children to public school.

Appellants appealed the order.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The 14th Amendment provides a liberty interest in a parent’s or guardian’s right to decide the

mode in which their children are educated. State’s may not usurp this right when the questioned legislation does not

reasonably relate to a viable state interest.

Facts. Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to establish and maintain academies or schools and

Appellee Hill Military Academy, a private organization conducting an elementary, college preparatory, and military training school, obtained preliminary restraining orders prohibiting appellants from enforcing Oregon’s Compulsory Education Act. The Act required all parents and guardians to send children between 8 and 16 years to a public school. The appellants appealed the granting of the preliminary restraining orders.

Issue. Does the Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control?

Held. The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected liberty interests and has no reasonable

relationship to any purpose within the competency of the state.

The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be destruction of the appellees’ schools. The state

has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians have the right and duty to choose the appropriate

preparation for their children.

Discussion. While the state has the right to insure that children receive a proper education, the 14th Amendment provides parents and guardians with a liberty interest in their choice in the mode in which their children are educated.

Rissa M. Mira - Case Digest

DECS vs. San Diego

G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989

Facts:

Respondent San Diego has flunked the NMAT (National Medical Admission Test) three times. When he applied to take again,

petitioner rejected his application based on the  “three-flunk-rule”.  He then filed a petition before the RTC on the ground of

due process and equal protection and challenging the constitutionality of the order. The petition was granted by the RTC

therefore this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the NMAT “three-flunk-rule” order is valid and constitutional.

Ruling:

Yes. It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to

whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not

irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The right to quality education is not absolute. The

Constitution provides that  “ every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable

and equitable admission and academic requirements”. It is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a

guarantee of the Constitution but one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. Petition was

granted and the RTC ruling was reversed.

Virtuoso v. Municipal Judge Case Digest™Virtuoso v. Municipal Judge, 82 SCRA 191, March 21, 1978

Facts:On February 23, 1978, petitioner Francisco Virtouso , Jr., who filed an application for the writ of habeas corpus, premised his plea for liberty primarily on the ground that the preliminary examination which led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him was a useless formality as respondent Municipal Judge of Mariveles, Bataan, (1) failed to meet the strict standard required by the Constitution to ascertain whether there was a probable cause. (2) He likewise alleged that aside from the constitutional infirmity that tainted the procedure followed in the preliminary examination, the bail imposed was clearly excessive. (3) It was in the amount of P16,000.00, the alleged robbery of a TV set being imputed to petitioner.

As prayed for, the Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to it on Wednesday, March 15, 1978. Respondent Judge, in his return filed on March 8, 1978, justified the issuance of the warrant of arrest, alleging that there was no impropriety in the way the preliminary examination was conducted. As to the excessive character of the bail, he asserted that while it was fixed in accordance with the Revised Bail Bond Guide issued by the Executive Judge in Bataan in 1977, he nevertheless reduced the amount to P8,000.00.

Issue:Whether or not the procedure by respondent Judge in ascertaining the existence of probable cause was constitutionally deficient?

Ruling:The Supreme Court declared that the petition is granted in accordance with the terms of the Resolution of this Court of March 15, 1978. The Court issued the following Resolution:“Acting on the verbal petition of counsel for petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr., the Court Resolved pursuant to section 191of Presidential Decree No. 603, petitioner being a 17-year old minor, to order the release of the petitioner on the recognizance of his parents Francisco Virtouso, Sr. and Manuela Virtouso and his Counsel, Atty. Guillermo B. Bandonil, who, in open court, agreed to act in such capacity, without prejudice to further proceedings in a pending case against petitioner being taken in accordance with law.” This Court should, whenever appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare Code.

Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive.