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Political Dynasties and The Emergence of Local Oligarchs

In Post Suharto Indonesia and The Philippines1

Najmu L. Sopian2

Abstract

This paper analyzes the relationship between local oligarchs and the emergence of political dynasties in Indonesia and the Philippines. In particular, this paper employs an oligarchic theory to examine political behavior of local oligarchs in Banten, Indonesia and compare it with the case of the Philippines. Sets of literature argue that political dynasties in Indonesia are less prevalent than in the Philippines. In addition, unlike in the Philippines, the use of coercive power to gain political power is considered uncommon in Indonesia. However, recent developments show a salient trend of the emergence of family dynasties and the increasing use of violence undermining Indonesias democracy. Keywords: Political dynasty; local oligarchs; Jawara; local bossism; Banten.

This paper examines the changing political behavior of oligarchs3 at the local level

in Indonesia through the lens of oligarchic theory.4 Decentralization policies and local direct

elections have opened new channels for local oligarchs to pursue wealth defense5 through 1 This work was conducted under the auspices of an Arryman Fellow award from the Indonesian

Scholarship and Research Support Foundation (ISRSF) through generous academic donations from PT Djarum, Bank BCA, PT AKR Corporindo, PT Adaro, the William Soeryadjaya Foundation, the Rajawali Foundation, and the Ford Foundation, and has been submitted to meet requirements of course on Politics of Southeast Asia at the Department of Political Science, Northwestern University.

2 2013 Arryman Fellow and pre-doctoral visiting scholar at the Equality Development and Globalization Studies (EDGS), Northwestern University.

3 Winter defines oligarchs as, actors who command and control massive concentration of material resources that can be deployed to defend or enhance their personal wealth and exclusive social position. Jeffrey A. Winters, Oligarchy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 6.

4 Oligarchic theory claims that, the extreme concentration of wealth empowers small numbers of actors over much larger groups or communities. Winters, ibid., p. 275. According to Ford and Pepinsky, a core feature of analyses of Indonesia using the oligarchy framework is the claim that democratization has changed the form of Indonesian politics without eliminating oligarchic rule. Michele Ford and Thomas B. Pepinsky, Beyond Oligarchy? Critical Exchanges on Political Power and Material Inequality in Indonesia, in Beyond Oligarchy. Unpublished manuscript.

5 Oligarchs maintain their power and position through sets of strategic behaviors that is called wealth defense. Wealth defense is the core of oligarchs political struggle, which consist of two forms: (1) property defense, and (2) income defense. The main distinction of these two forms lies on whether or not secure property rights present in a given country. See: Winter, op.cit., p. 6-7.

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the acquisition of elective offices and build their political dynasties 6 within their

respective regions. Since the fall of Suharto, running for office has become a common

feature of Indonesian local oligarchs as part of their wealth defense strategies. For example,

Chasan Sochibs, arguably the most powerful local oligarch in Banten,7 exhibited wealth

defense behavior by positioning his family members and cronies in almost every strategic

business and political positions. Securing political positions is vital for local oligarchs to get

access to governmental projects and gain more economic and political power. Another

common feature in recent Indonesian politics is the increasing trend of use of force and

intimidation to mobilize votes in local elections.

Decentralization and the Emergence of Political Dynasties

Political dynasty is far from a new phenomenon because it has been long present in

Indonesia.8 The so-called elite families exist throughout Indonesian society; family members

hold strategic positions in government, business, and society. In fact, many powerful

families and clans have played an important role in local Indonesian politics. For example,

6 Asako, Iida, Matsubayashi, and Ueda define political dynasty as, those whose family members

have also served in the same position in the past. Yasushi Asako, Takeshi Iida, Tetsuya Matsubayashi, Michiko Ueda, Dynastic Politicians: Theory and Evidence from Japan, Waseda University Organization for Japan-US Studies Working Paper No. 201201, Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2118350 (accessed on January 14th, 2014). Meanwhile, Querubin (2011) in Kenawas argues that political dynasty is, an example of the elites persistence, where one or a small number of families dominate the power distribution. Yoes C. Kenawas, The Rise of Political Dynasties in Decentralized Indonesia, Master Thesis at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Academic Year 2012/2013, p. 10-11.

7 Abdul 'Dubbun' Hakim, Jawara and Political Dynasty in Banten , Available at: http://indonesiasynergy.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/jawara-and-political-dynasty-in-banten1.pdf (accessed on November 12, 2013), p. 2.

8 Yoes C. Kenawas, Political Dynasties in Indonesia: What Went Wrong? Available at: http://kenawasdaily.blogspot.com/2012/01/as-predicted-several-indonesian-survey.html (accessed on January 11, 2014).

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the Latuconsina clan has dominated local politics in Maluku region for decades. 9 The

Nasution and the Lubis are other examples of prominent clans in Mandailing, North

Sumatra.10

Nevertheless the role of these families in politics and public office before 1998 was

not ubiquitous, due mainly to the nature of Suhartos authoritarian regime. At that time,

local leaders were chosen by regional legislatures which were still under control of the

central governmental.11 Suhartos politics of proximity12 made it almost impossible for

someone to hold office without having a close relationship to or, at least, a blessing from

Suhartos dynasty and his cronies.13

Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, many significant changes have occurred in

Indonesia, including the implementation of direct local elections through the enactment of

Law Number 32 Year 2004 concerning Regional Government. Direct local elections

generated more open political competition and at the same time triggered peoples

9 The Latuconsina clan is originated from district Pelauw, Central Maluku. Their domination in

politics has began, at least, since the appointment of Ruswan Latuconsina as the speaker of Maluku regional parliament from 1982 to 1997. The clan strengthen their powers when M. Akib Latuconsina was appointed as the Governor of Maluku province 1993-1998, continued by M. Saleh Latuconsina (Governor of Maluku Province 1998-2003, previously the head of Provincial Development and Planning Board 1992-1997), and Irwan Latuconsina (the speaker of Maluku regional parliament). In 2003, Muhammad Abdullah Mehmed Latuconsina was elected as vice Governor of Maluku, and in 2006 Olivia Latuconsina was elected as vice mayor of Ambon city. To date, the clan continues their domination not only in politics but also in economic sector, particularly in Central Maluku. Source: Author obtains some of the information from the interview with informant from Maluku and from Birgit Brauchler, Mobilizing Culture and Tradition for Peace, in Birgit Brauchler (ed), Reconciling Indonesia: Grassroots Agency for Peace (Asias Transformations) (New York: Routledge , 2009), p. 114.

10 Mandailing.org, Marga-Marga Mandailing Available at http://www.mandailing.org/ind/kekrabatan.html (accessed on January 14th, 2014).

11 According to Article 15 (2) and Article 16 (2) of the Law Number 5 of 1974 on Regional Government, the candidacy for governors, regents, and mayors were chosen by regional/local legislature upon approval of the President through the Ministry of Home Affairs. Therefore, final decision eventually lies in the hand of central government.

12 In this politics of proximity, Suharto built some sort of imaginary circles where the closer someones relationship with Suharto, the more protection and benefits that he will gain. See: Jeffrey A. Winters, Who Will Tame the Oligarchs, Available at http://www.insideindonesia.org/feature-editions/who-will-tame-the-oligarchs (accessed on January 10th, 2014).

13 Yoes C. Kenawas, The Rise of Political Dynasties in Decentralized Indonesia, p. 16-17.

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democratic participation. However, this new form of election also brought about a new

model of dynastic government, which was evidenced by the growth of family politics in

several regions that duplicated the style of the New Order Era. Since the installation of

local direct elections, many families have established their own political dynasties,

including the Sochibs in Banten, the Limpos in South Sulawesi, and the Sjachroedins in

Lampung.14 Furthermore, in the 2009 local elections 57 politicians who were elected to

carry on their relatives office positions.15

These familial dynasties employ corruption, collusion, and nepotism to consolidate

power at the local level. They exploit electoral mechanisms to accumulate power and wealth

for their own benefit, leaving a large segment of the population to live in poverty. The

Sochib dynasty in Banten provides a perfect example of this phenomenon. The Sochibs have

concentrated both political power and public resources within their family, controlling

almost every strategic position in Banten.

The Rise of the Sochib Dynasty in Banten

The explanation of political dynasty in Banten is centered on one figure named

Tubagus Chasan Sochib, the godfather of the Sochib dynasty. He is a Bantenese oligarch

whose financial and social power was accumulated through the procuration of governmental

development projects and his status as Jawara since Suhartos era. Born in Serang in 1930, 14 The Sjachroedin dynasty is built by Sjachroedin Zainal Pagaralam, the current governor of

Lampung. Two Sjachroedins sons are currently occupying office positions, namely Rycko Menoza as the regent of South Lampung (2010-2015) and Handitya Narapati as the deputi regent of Pringsewu (2011-2016). Source: The Jakarta Post, Political Dynasties Rampant Country, Available at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/10/17/political-dynasties-rampant-country.html (accessed on January 14th, 2014).

15 The report from Director of Regional Autonomy in Berly Martawardaya, Toward Fair Competition, an End to Political Dynasty, The Jakarta Post (March 25, 2013), Available at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/03/25/toward-fair-competition-end-political-dynasty.html (accessed on November 12, 2013).

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Sochib got involved in the Indonesian revolutionary war during 1945-1949 as a guerilla

fighter.16 Apparently, this is when his connection with the military began.

According to a report from Tempo magazine, Sochib started his business in the

1960s by providing security for the rice and corn trading business in Java and Sumatra. In

addition, he also supplied logistical needs for Kodam VI Siliwangi (a military unit in West

Java) which had an interest in maintaining political stability in Banten. He was frequently

entrusted to handle large-scale construction projects because of his close connections with

the military and the West Java provincial government. In 1967 he established PT Sinar

Ciomas Raya, the biggest construction company in Banten to date. With even more

governmental procurement, he began to build his imperium.17

In addition to his financial power, Sochib is a well-known Bantenese Jawara.18 He is

one of the founders of the most influential armed organization in Banten, namely Indonesian

Association of Champions of Banten Martial Arts (Persatuan Pendekar Persilatan dan Seni

Budaya Banten Indonesia, PPPSBBI). The organization now claims to have 500,000 local

martial arts practitioners scattered in 15 provinces.19

Sochib achieved the peak of his power in the PPPSBBI when he became chairman of

the organization. Even though PPPSBBI is not officially affiliated with the Golkar party, the 16 Tempo Magazine, November 10th 2013. 17 Ibid. 18 According to Wilson, in common usage the word Jawara literally means champion, an expert at

fighting, or indeed anyone who has made a name for them selves in a particular field. In contemporary Sundanese society Jawara can be interchanged meaning with jago, jeger, garong, and preman, covering a range of meanings from champion and tough through to robber and hoodlum. For further reading about the history of Jawara see: Ian Douglas Wilson, The Politics of Inner Power: The Practice of Pencak Silat in West Java, Ph.D. Thesis, School of Asian Studies Murdoch University Western Australia 2002; and Okamoto Masaaki and Abdul Hamid, Jawara in Power, 19992007, Indonesia 86 (October 2008).

19 Syarif Hidayat, The Shadow State? Business and Politics in the Province of Banten, in Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken (eds), Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), p. 208. See also: Persatuan Pendekar Persilatan dan Seni Budaya Banten Indonesia, Haji Tubagus Chasan Sochib The Jawara, Pendekar from Banten, Available at http://pppsbbi.blogspot.com/2011/08/haji-tubagus-chasan-sochib-jawara.html (accessed on November 12, 2013).

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organization played an essential role in facilitating Sochibs rise to power in the Golkar

party. As Masaki and Hamid note, as a senior politician in the Golkar party, he acted as a

bridge between the military and the bureaucracy, as well as to Bantens society, including

the underground (criminal) world.20 Needless to say, Sochib used the Golkar party to

increase his sphere of influence in Banten. He used the party not only as a tool to obtain

political power but also as an instrument to expand and secure his business interests.21

In addition to politics, Sochib also controlled business organizations by holding key

positions, among others in the Provincial Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Banten

(Kamar Dagang dan Industri Daerah Banten/Kadin), the Indonesian National Contractors

Association of Banten (Gabungan Pengusaha Konstruksi Nasional Indonesia

Banten/Gapensi), and the Indonesia National Construction Services Development Institute

of Banten (Lembaga Pengembangan Jasa Konstruksi Nasional Indonesia Banten). 22 With

these positions, Sochibs business kingdom is unimpeded. He has invested his money in an

array of business areas from the steel industry to tourism and real estate, 23 making him the

most notable local oligarch in Banten.

Decentralization policies as one of the agendas of reformasi opened a new channel

for the Bantenese to advocate their demands to separate Banten from West Java province.

As a result, Banten was established as an independent province in 2000 through the

enactment of Law Number 23 Year 2000 concerning the Formation of Banten.24 The Sochib 20 Okamoto Masaaki and Abdul Hamid, Jawara in Power, 19992007, p. 117. 21 Yanwar Pribadi, Strongmen and Religious Leaders in Java, Al-Jamiah, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2011, p.

170. 22 Okamoto Masaaki, Local Politics in Decentralised Indonesia: The Governor General of Banten

Province, IIAS Newsletter: July 2004. Available at http://www.iias.nl/nl/34/IIAS_NL34_23.pdf (accessed on November 12, 2013)

23 Ibid. 24 Banten was part of West Java province until 4 Oktober 2000 when it was declared as a new

province. Banten is divided into four cities and four regencies with Serang as the capital city. The four cities

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family seen the establishment of Banten province as an opportunity to secure their business

monopolies and gain more political power through local governmental positions. As local businessmen who depend on the acquisition of governmental projects, holding office

guarantees their access and promises further enrichment. To do so, they did not have many

choices but to invest their money in political competition in order to secure and maintain

their power in the province.

As a newly established province, most of the development programs from 2001-

2004 in Banten have been focused on upgrading the economic infrastructure and basic

services, particularly in Education and Health. Given the huge amount of budget allocated,

the procurement of these projects has surely tantalized and attracted many businessmen,

including Sochib. 25 Through his material and coercive power, Sochib seized the opportunity

to build his political dynasty in Banten, making him and his family the most powerful

oligarchs in the province.

Table 1 Banten Regional Budget Allocation for Infrastructure/Transportation Facilities and Other Physical

Structures from 2001-200426

Year 2001 2002 2003 2004

Total Budget Allocation (in billion rupiahs)

116 130 150 216

In the 2001 election, Sochib fully supported the candidacy of his daughter Ratu Atut

Chosyah as deputy governor and her running mate Djoko Munandar as governor, both

representing the Golkar party. Sochib deployed support for his daughter not only by his consist of Serang, Cilegon, South Tangerang, Tangerang city, while the four regencies include Serang, Lebak, Pandeglang, and Tangerang. For a more detail discussion about the history of the establishment of Banten as new province, see: Abdul 'Dubbun' Hakim, Jawara and Political Dynasty in Banten , loc.cit.

25 Syarif Hidayat, The Shadow State? Business and Politics in the Province of Banten, op.cit. p. 207.

26 Ibid., table is created by the author.

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funding but also by mobilizing his Jawaras association PPPSBBI. The Jawaras played a

role in mobilizing support for Atuts candidacy, using intimidation and shows of force

against supporters of other candidates. For example, on September 18th, 2001 the PPPSBBI

sent a letter of support, declaring their full support for Atut as candidate for deputy

governor of the Province of Banten.27

Following the victory of Djoko and Atut, Sochib had a dominant influence over the

conduct of local government where in he was able to consolidate control over important

bureaucratic positions and developmental projects in the province. 28 His power increased

when Atut replaced governor Djoko following his arrest for corruption in 2005.29

Although Sochib remained in a back stage role, he was known as the governor

general, private-sector governor or kingmaker because of his ease in obtaining regional

projects.30 He established a network known as the Rau Group consisting of Jawaras, local

oligarchs, and bureaucrats. As its name suggests, the group was concentrated around the

Rau market in the provincial capital Serang.31

The implementation of direct local elections in 2007 did little to dismantle the

Sochib dynastys dominance in Banten.32 In fact, Atut was elected governor of Banten for

2007-2012 term and reelected for 2012-2017 term. Although Sochib died in 2011, his

family continues the upward trajectory to monopolize local politics in Banten. 27 Ibid., p. 213-214. 28 Okamoto Masaaki, An unholy alliance, Inside Indonesia 93: Aug-Oct 2008 Available at:

http://www.insideindonesia.org/feature-editions/an-unholy-alliance (accessed on November 12, 2013). 29 Djoko was alleged for misusing Rp14 billion of provincial budget to enrich 75 of local parliament

members. The Serang district court found him guilty, charged him two years imprisonment and Rp100 million fine. Djoko died in 2008 before the Supreme Court finally approved his appeal and annulled the sentenced declaring he was innocent in 2009. See: The Jakarta Post, Banten Governor Gets Two Years Corruption, Available at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/12/22/banten-governor-gets-two-years-corruption.html (accessed on January 14th, 2014).

30 Tempo Magazine, November 10th 2013. 31 Okamoto Masaaki, An Unholy Alliance, loc.cit. 32 Ibid.

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As the oldest daughter of Sochib and the current governor of Banten, Atut replaced

her father as patron of the family. In her second term as governor, she is more famous for

her glamorous life style and fancy dress than her accomplishment in developing Banten. Her

wealth is spread throughout the region from properties to hotel and gas station ownership. In

the 2011 report to the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), she claimed to have a

total wealth of Rp42.9 billion (around USD 3.6 million). However, she clamed that she

earned most of her wealth on her own before she became deputy governor of Banten in

2002.33

In addition to Atut, almost all strategic politics and businesses, at the regencies,

municipalities, and provinces levels of Banten, are controlled by Atuts family or people

related to Atuts family. The following table displays the salient of the clans domination in

Banten, making Banten is often referred as Atuts family province.

Table 2 Political Biodata of the Sochib Clan34

33 Tempo Magazine, November 10th 2013. 34 This data is mainly taken from Tempo Magazine, November 10th 2013 with authors table and

additional data from other local newspapers.

No Name Office Position Wealth First Wife, Wasiah Samsudin (Married November 2, 1960 in Serang, Divorced 1991) 1. Ratu Atut

Chosiyah (Sochibs first child)

Governor of Banten 2007-2012 and 2012-2017 terms. Chairman of the Golkar Central Leadership Board (DPP).

Rp42.9 billion (2011) - Land & Buildings: 77 =

Rp21.7 billion - Vehicles: 38 = Rp3.89 billion - Gold: 50 kg = Rp5 billion - Diamonds: Rp2.7 billion - Stock: Rp7.8 billion - Saving & Cash: Rp1.2 billion

Hikmat Tomet (Atuts husband)

Member of the House of Representatives (DPR), Commission V, Golkar Party Faction, 2009-2014 term Chairman of Indonesian Craft Council Banten (Dewan Kerajinan Nasional Daerah) Chairman of the Golkar Regional Leadership Board (DPP) of Banten.

Rp32.99 (2010) - Land & Buildings: 49 =

Rp19.6 billion - Vehicles: 9 = Rp4.3 billion - Stock: 4 companies = Rp3.8

billion - Saving & Cash: Rp1 billion

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35 Tempo Magazine, November 10th 2013.

Andika Hazrumy (Atuts oldest son)

Member of Regional Representatives Council (DPD), 2009-2014 term Active in number of youth organizations such as Chairman of Taruna Tanggap Bencana (Tagana) Banten, Treasurer of Karang Taruna Banten, and Vice Chariman of Ansor Youth Movement (Gerakan Pemuda Ansor) Banten.

Rp19.8 billion (2009). - Land & Buildings: 25 = Rp5.2

billion - Vehicles: 9 = Rp8 billion

- Lexus (2008) = Rp2 billion - Mercedes (2006) = Rp1.8

billion - Range Rover (2008) =

Rp1.4 billion - Hummer (2008) = Rp1.2

billion - Harley-Davidson (2008) =

Rp400 million - Gold = Rp120 million - Diamonds: Rp80 million - Stock & Bond: Rp2.8 billion - Saving: Rp220 million

Ade Rossi Khoerunnisa (Andikas wife /Atuts Daughter-in-law)

Member of Serang City Regional House of Representatives, 2009-2014 term Chairman of The National Sports Committee of Indonesia (Komite Olahraga Nasional Indonesia/KONI) of the City of Serang.

Andiara Aprilia (Atuts second child)

- Some of Atuts wealth is kept in the name of her, including Atuts house standing on 12,806 square meters in Serang

2. Ratu Tatu Chasanah (Second child)

Deputy regent of Serang Regency, 2010-2015 term and Chairman of the Golkar Regional Leadership Board (DPP) of Pandeglang Active as chairman in number of organizations such as Indonesia Red-Cross of Banten, Indonesia Co-operation Council of Banten, National Movement for Social Solidarity of Banten, Indonesian Agribusiness and Agroindustry Community of Banten

Rp9 billon (2010) - Land & Building: 45 = Rp4.1

billion - Vehicle: 12 = Rp1.6 billion - Gold = Rp265 million - Stock = Rp2.3 billion

3. Tubagus Chaeri Wardana (aka. Wawan) (Third child)

He is a treasurer of the Banten Golkar Party and Chariman of the Banten Golkar Youth Wing. He is known to be very close to executive and legislative officials.35 He is chairman of the Banten Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Golkar Youth Wing (Angkatan Muda Partai Golkar)

In her report the the KPK, Wawan and Airins wealth are combined. Rp103.9 billion (2010). - Land & Building: 102 = Rp59

billion - Vehicle: 9 = Rp22 billion

- Range Rover (2007) = Rp2.1 billion

- Mercedes (2008) = Rp1.5 billion

- Lamborghini (2009) = Rp9 billion

- Ferrari (2009) = Rp3.5 billion

- Porsche Panamera (2009) Rp3.5 billion

- Rolls-Royce (not reported) - Nissan GTR (not reported) - Ferrari California (not

Airin Rachmi Diany (Wawans wife)

Former Priangan beauty contest winner, Miss Indonesia Finalist in 1996. Mayor of South Tangerang, 2011-2016 term. Chairman of Indonesia Red Cross of the City of South Tangerang. She previously run for Deputy Mayor of Tangerang in 2009 but failed.

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Based on the data from Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW), in 2011-2013 Atuts

dynasty captured at least 175 provincial projects valued at a total of Rp1.14 trillion (US$100

million). ICW further report that Atuts family owned 10 private companies and 24 other

affiliated firms, and it acquired the governmental projects through those enterprises.36 In

addition, according to the estimate data from the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), in 2007-

2010 Atut embezzled nearly Rp1 trillion (US$87 million) from the regional budget to

36 Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), Membongkar Gurita Bisnis Atut CS, October 11, 2013,

Available at: www.antikorupsi.org (Accessed on October 28, 2013).

reported) - Platinum = Rp300 million - Diamonds = Rp300 million - Stock = Rp2.7 billion - Saving = Rp10.6 billion

Second Wife, Ratu Rapiah Suhaemi, Married May 2, 1969 in Serang 1. Tubagus Haerul

Jaman (first child) Deputy Mayor of Serang 2008-2013 term and Mayor of Serang, 2013-2018 term

Rp2.4 billion (2008)

2. Ratu Lilis Karyawati (second child)

II Chairman of the Regional Leadership of Golkar Party, City of Serang 2009 2014.

Together with her husband have an estimated wealth of Rp14.5 billion (2012)

Aden Abudl Khalid (Ratu lilis husband)

Member of the Banten Regional House of Representatives, 2009-2014 term

Third Wife, Chaeriyah, Married May 21, 1968, divorced in 2002 1. Ratu Heni

Chendrayani (first child)

Board of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 2012 2017 term

2. Ratu Wawat Cherawati (second child)

Board of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 2012 2017 term

Fourth Wife, Imas Masnawiyah, Married June 6, 1969 in Pandeglang. Died February 17, 1986 Fifth Wife, Heryani Yuhana, Married May 30, 1988 in Pandeglang 1. Heryani Yuhana

(Fifth Wife) Member of Pandeglang Regency Regional House of Representatives, 2009-2014 term

Rp25.6 billion (2009) - Land & Building: 25 = Rp13.4

billion - Vehicle: 4 = Rp2.8 billion - Gold = Rp128 million - Diamonds = Rp146 million - Stock = Rp8.6 billion

Sixth Wife, Ratna Komalasari, Married April 8, 1991 1. Ratna

Komalasari (Sixth Wife)

Member of Serang City Regional House of Representatives, 2009-2014

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finance her election campaign.37

The dynasty, however, is currently under threat following the recent detention of

Tubagus Chaeri Wardana (aka. Wawan), Atuts younger brother. He was arrested by the

KPK in October 2013 for bribery case involving the chief justice of Constitutional Court

Akil Mochtar with regard to the election in Lebak regent. He was also investigated by the

KPK for a number of discrepancies in health equipment procurement and in various

infrastructure development projects in Banten and South Tangerang.38

The case of political dynasty in Banten sheds lights on the phenomena in recent

Indonesian politics where decentralization and regional autonomy have created greater

space for the coalition of oligarchs and bureaucrats who capture states revenue for their

own private gain. Reno called this phenomenon Shadow State. 39 The case of Banten

clearly proves that the local government is unable to perform its function in delivering

goods and public services due to its own weakness and public malfeasance.40

It is then not surprising that despite an annual budget of nearly Rp6 trillion, the

Banten local government failed to deliver basic peoples need such as infrastructure,

education and poverty-reduction program, putting the province left behind compared to

other provinces. According to data from the Disadvantaged Regions Ministry, Pandeglang

and Lebak are among the most disadvantaged regions in the country, where Lebak is home

37 The Jakarta Post, Banten Rises up Against House of Atut, Available at:

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/10/08/banten-rises-against-house-atut.html (accessed on November 30, 2013).

38 Tempo Magazine, November 10th 2013. 39 Describing the phenomenon present in various parts of post-colonial Africa, Reno defines Shadow

State as, a form of personal rule, where decisions and actions are taken by an individual ruler and do not conform to a set of written laws and procedures, although these might be present. See: William Reno, Clandestine Economies, Violence and States in Africa, Journal of International Affairs (Volume 53, No. 2, 2000).

40 Ibid.

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to 579,373 poor people out of 1.27 million of its total population.41

The Changing Behavior of Local Oligarchs

Compared to national oligarchs, the material resources of local oligarchs are almost

always far less in absolute terms. However, this fact does not imply that local oligarchs

possess less power than national oligarchs. Local oligarchs dominate social and economic

positions in a particular place, giving them special privileges and power in that locality.42

The democratization process at the local level has a backfire effect in aggravating this

domination.

The case of Banten shows the changing political strategies of local oligarchs as their

response to the political changes in the region. They have successfully adopted the process

of democratization and decentralization by establishing power through local electoral

politics.43 From the oligarchic theory perspective, their adaptive behavior as part of their

wealth defense strategies can be classified according to two features:

First, they are relying more on formal democratic institutions to maintain their

political ascendance and to secure further advancement.44 These strategies typically

include control over local executive government (regents, mayors, governors), legislative

bodies, and other important political and business organizations. The Sochibs clan seeks

direct influence over local formal institutions, making it possible for them to get access to

41 The Jakarta Post, The Clan and the Damage Done, Available at:

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/10/09/the-clan-and-damage-done.html (Accessed on November 30, 2013).

42 Ford and Pepinsky, op.cit. 43 Abdul 'Dubbun' Hakim, Jawara and Political Dynasty in Banten , loc.cit. 44 Vedi R. Hadiz, Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia Perspective

(California: Stanford University Press, 2010).

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and monopolize local governments resources for their private gain. 45 The collusive

practices between local oligarchs and bureaucrats exacerbate rampant corruption in local

government because the ratio in the decision-making process and policy implementation is

based on political bargains and economic calculations. 46 Second, the case of Banten presents the collusive relation between Jawaras and local

oligarchs, where they both control myriad key positions in politics and business through

patron-client network relation.47 According to Masaaki and Hamid, it is in Banten that a

violent local oligarch has most successfully entrenched himself economically and

politically, at least to this date.48

The use of coercive methods to consolidate local power and build political dynasty

also occurs in other regions in Indonesia, for example the Limpo Dynasty in South

Sulawesi. Muhammad Yasin Limpo, the former regent of Gowa district, formed a political

dynasty, with his children and relatives occupying various elective positions in the

province.49 As Buhler notes, they use intimidation and money to gain power. In order to

secure their political position,

[t]he Limpo family owns several private security forces, such as the Brigade 9-11 and Brigade 02, and controls hundreds of thugs. Syahrul Yasin Limpo, for example, is the head of several motorcycle clubs which control 45 John T. Sidel, Bossism and Democracy in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia: Towards an

Alternative Framework for the Study of Local Strongmen, available at: http://www.uio.no/studier/emner/sv/iss/SGO2400/h05/undervisningsmateriale/Sidel.pdf.

46 Abdul 'Dubbun' Hakim, Jawara and Political Dynasty in Banten , loc.cit. 47 Ibid., p.1. 48 Okamoto Masaaki and Abdul Hamid, Jawara in Power, 19992007, p. 112. 49 Five of Yasins children are currently holding office positions, namely: (1) Irman Yasin Limpo

(member of the Provincial Development and Planning Board/Bapeda) (2) Syahrul Yasin Limpo (currently reelected as governor of South Sulawesi for the second term, after previously served two terms as regent of Gowa), and (3) Ichsan Yasin Limpo (the current regent of Gowa), (4) Haris Yasin Limpo (member of the Makassar local parliament) and, (5) Tenri Olle Yasin Limpo (the speaker of Gowa local parliament and the head of Golkar party in Gowa). The familys political dynasty list is getting longer with the involvement of Yasins grandson and granddaughter including Adnan Purichta Ichsan Yasin Limpo (member of South Sulawesi local parliament) and Indira Chunda Thita Syahrul Yasin Limpo (member of the Indonesian House of Representatives). See: The Jakarta Post, Political Dynasties Rampant Country. loc.cit.

15

nightclubs and provide security during social and political events in the province.50

The political behavior of political dynasties in Indonesia is similar to the situation in

the Philippines where rent-seeking behavior and crony capitalism among elite families

have been commonplace over the past two centuries.51 The result of these behaviors has

been a high level of wealth disparity between local oligarchs and poor inhabitants who are

subject to the arbitrary rule of the oligarchs.52

The Political Dynasties and Local Bossism in The Philippines

Political dynasties have been established in the politics of the Philippines for well

over a century.53 Based on data from the Centre for People Empowerment in Governance,

the 2010 national election was dominated by 178 political dynasties which consist of old

elites (56%) and new elites (44%). At the local level, 94% of the provinces (73 out of 80

provinces) have political dynasties; six families have monopolized their respective regions

for 25 years, and 19 families exclusively control elections in their congressional districts.54

The resilience of clan dynasties both in prevalence and magnitude has made the Philippines

a notable case of what Sidel has termed local bossism.55 50 Michael Buehler, Rise of the clans, Inside Indonesia 90: Oct-Dec 2007. Available at:

http://www.insideindonesia.org/weekly-articles/rise-of-the-clans (accessed on November 12, 2013). 51 Alfred W. McCoy (ed), An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines (Wisconsin:

University of Wisconsin Press, 1999). 52 Ronald U. Mendoza, Political Dynasties and Poverty: Chicken or the Eggs? Available at:

http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_9551-1442-2-30.pdf?130430060342 (accessed on January 14th, 2014). 53 Tuazon even argues that family dynasty has presented in the Philippines for six centuries, which

can be traced since pre-colonial era (before the arrival of Spanish in 1521) with the emergence of Maharlika class. See: Bobby M. Tuazon, Six Centuries of Political Dynasties: Why the Philippines will Forever be Ruled by Political Clans? Center for People Empowerment in Governance, Available at: http://www.cenpeg.org/2012/governance/december2012/CenPEG%20Tuazon%206%20centuries%20of%20dynasties%2012%2010%2012.pdf (accessed on January 14th, 2014).

54 Ibid. 55 According to Sidel, the term of bosses refers to, local brokers who enjoy an enduring

16

However, the key difference between Indonesia and the Philippines is that local

bossism that has emerged in Indonesia is less common and less violent than in the

Philippines. 56 In this regard, Sidel provides a compelling distinction between the specific

manifestations of the local bossism phenomenon in post-authoritarian Southeast Asia,

particularly in the respective cases of the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. He shows the

origins of local bossism in their respective historical settings and argues that the aspects of

timing and context distinguish local bossism in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia.57

According to Sidel, the Philippines colonial experience is the most significant factor

in the emergence of bossism in the country. The formal democratic institutions, such as

democracy and decentralization policy, which were introduced by US colonialism at the

beginning of the twentieth century, gave rise to politically powerful, even dynastic, local

families.58

While the existence of local oligarchs in the Philippines can be traced back for more

than a century, Indonesian oligarchs are nowhere to be found until the Suharto era.59 This

timing difference sheds light on the different nature of local oligarchy in those two countries

and explains why local oligarchs in the Philippines perpetuate in a more powerful role both

monopolistic position over coercive and economic resources within their respective bailiwicks. See: John T. Sidel, Bossism and Democracy in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia: Towards an Alternative Framework for the Study of Local Strongmen, p. 4.

56 See among others: Vedi R. Hadiz, Decentralization and Democracy in Indonesia: A Critique of Neo-Institutionalist Perspectives, Development and Change 35(4): 697718. Institute of Social Studies: Blackwell Publishing; John T. Sidel, Bossism and Democracy in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia: Towards an Alternative Framework for the Study of Local Strongmen, Available at: http://www.uio.no/studier/emner/sv/iss/SGO2400/h05/undervisningsmateriale/Sidel.pdf (accessed on November 4, 2013); Julius Cesar I Trajano and Yoes C Kenawas, Political Dynasties Dominate in Indonesia and the Philippines, RSIS Commentaries No. 018/2013 dated 31 January 2013.

57John T. Sidel, Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines, Contemporary Issues in Asia and Pacific (Stanford University Press, 1999).

58 Ibid. 59 In fact, Suharto is the one who has created Indonesias oligarchs at the beginning of his regime in

the second-half decade of 1960-s. For an extensive explanation about the rise of oligarchs in Indonesia see: Winter, op.cit. p. 157-159.

17

in economic and political positions than those in Indonesia. For another reason, Hadiz

argues, the politics of local bossism in Post-Suharto Indonesia are more fluid than in the

Philippines due to the wider range of interested parties as well as the widely dispersed local

centers of power.60

However, the pattern of local bossism in the Philippines seems to be more similar to

that of Indonesia in the Post-Suharto era, particularly after the installment of local direct

elections in 2004 in which the institutional obstacles that Sidel described have

disappeared. 61 As Sidel argues, it is Indonesias electoral system that impeded the

proliferation of local strong-men and political dynasties.62

Indonesias recent politics shows the emergence of clan dynasties and a collusive

relationship between local oligarchs and mafias. This phenomenon is well argued by Hadiz

that in recent Indonesian politics there are emerging phenomena of money politics and the

use of political violence even though it is not at levels often associated with the

Philippines.63 However, the further question that arises as the localization of power

increases is whether local bossism in Indonesia will continue to develop features such as in

the Philippines in terms of prevalence and magnitude. 64 Another question is whether the

phenomenon of the use of Jawaras and thugs by local strong-men and local oligarchs in

gaining powers will exacerbate political violence in Indonesia. 60 Vedi R. Hadiz, op.cit. p. 57-58. 61 Sidel argues that, local bossism in Post-Soeharto Indonesia is less dominated by individual

strongmen or dynasties than in Thailand and the Philippines than it is by more fluid clusters and cliques of businessmen, politicians and officials. Sidel further notes that, in the Indonesian system, the heads of local and provincial governments are elected by their respective parliaments; this is in sharp contrast with the direct electionsand unrestricted powersof mayors, governors and congressmen in the Philippines, and parliamentarians (MPS) in Thailand. Hence, there are supposed to be institutional obstacles in Indonesia to the rise of Thai-and Filipino-style local bossism. Sidel, loc.cit. p. 70.

62 Ibid. 63 Vedi R. Hadiz, Decentralization and Democracy in Indonesia: A Critique of Neo-Institutionalist

Perspectives, p.133. 64 Vedi R. Hadiz, Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia, p.60

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Closing

The domination of Jawaras in Banten and South Sulawesi at both provincial and

district levels during the period of decentralization has confirmed the analysis of Hadiz that

the democratization process in Indonesia has been hijacked by the predatory patronage of

local elites and local oligarchs.65 Direct elections opened the way for local oligarchs to gain

more power through the possession of elective office. Some of them show elite

persistence 66 by building political dynasties in their respective bailiwicks and undermining

political equilibrium in the region. Furthermore, the success of the Indonesian local

oligarchs using Jawaras and thugs demonstrates the tendency to use coercive power to gain

political influence in their regions.

In this regard, the recent detention of Wawan and the investigation of Atut as well as

other members of the Banten dynasty indicate the interesting feature of vulnerability of

Indonesian local oligarchs. They show that Indonesia, at least, has institutional barriers to

tame a rampant political dynasty through external surveillance such as KPK. Masaaki and

Hamid shed light on the susceptibility and limitations of Indonesian local oligarchs noting

that they are still subject to the central government surveillance. Therefore, local oligarchs

are not fully independent to the central government and still need their supports in the case

of criminal investigation such as corruption.67 While the case is still in process now, the

question remains as to whether the Banten dynasty will survive and continue to maintain

65 Vedi R. Hadiz, Decentralization and Democracy in Indonesia: A Critique of Neo-Institutionalist

Perspectives, loc.cit. 66 Pablo Querubin, Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the

Philippines, Available at: http://www.econ.yale.edu/conference/neudc11/papers/paper_242.pdf (Accessed on January 10th, 2014).

67 Okamoto Masaaki and Abdul Hamid, Jawara in Power, 19992007, loc.cit, pg. 111.

19

their domination and power.

***

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