Political Drivers of Air Pollution in the U.S.: A Time-Series Analysis (1959-1998)
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Transcript of Political Drivers of Air Pollution in the U.S.: A Time-Series Analysis (1959-1998)
Political Drivers of Air Pollution in the U.S.: A Time-Series
Analysis (1959-1998)
A.C. McCreery
The Ohio State University
Outline
OverviewTheory &
HypothesesData & MethodsResultsDiscussion
Overview
Political factors that lead to changes over time in the ecological impact of U.S. society, focusing on air pollution
Influential factors:Political ProcessesMedia attentionPublic policy
Contributions
Previous research has addressed:The effect of policyEconomic theories
Previous research as not addressed:The role of the environmental movementPolitical agenda settingDrivers of different pollutants
Air Pollution
3 measures of air pollution, based on EPA criteria pollutants:Index of Sulfur dioxide (SO2), Carbon Monoxide
(CO), and Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.904
Nitrogen OxidesParticulate Matter smaller than 10 micrometers
Air Pollution Trends
Driving Factors
Political ProcessesThe environmental movementPolitical opportunities for the movement
Political Agenda-SettingMedia attention
Policy & ImplementationQuality of policyEnforcement/implementation of policy
Political Processes
Political ContextPresence of Allies: Democrats in fed. gov’tWeak opposition: business interests
Organizational resources: environmental movement actions
Political Agenda
Congressional hearings on the environmentAct as political openings
Media AttentionProvides legitimacy &
saliencePlaces the environment
on the political agenda
Policy & Implementation
Strength of policyImplementation of policy
Policy implementation influenced by:environmental movementpolitical opportunitiesmedia
Measurement of Policy
Coded federal legislation1 on 3 criteria:Enforcement powers (weighted double the other 2
criteria)Scope (broad or narrow)Whether $ was earmarked into the bill
Clean Air Act and Amendments coded separately and weighted higher
Yearly policy = positive laws - negative laws
1 Reitze, Arnold W. 2001. Air Pollution Control Law: Compliance and Enforcement. Washington D.C.: The Environmental Law Institute.
Methodology
All variables first-differenced to detrend, and IVs lagged 1 year
OLS regression with base variablesInteraction analyses, with 1 interaction
per regression
Very conservative model, with possible Type II errors
Results: Index of SO2 CO & VOCs
Base Variables Coefficient
Real GDP / capita 153.90
Real GDP / Capita, squared -276384
Democratic Unity -0.073
Congressional Hearings (Logged)
9.79 E-04
Corporate Taxes -1.66 E-02
Media Attention (Logged) -6.18 E-04 *
Air Pollution Policy -3.64 E-03
Implementation Funding 0.320
Movement Actions 3.72 E-03
Constant -6.106
Adjusted R-squared 0.110
Durbin-Watson D-statistic 1.705
n = 38
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05; one-tailed
Results: NOx
Base Variables Coefficient
Real GDP / capita 102.45 *
Real GDP / Capita, squared -207073 **
GDP & GDP squared F-Test for joint significance (P > F)
**
Democratic Unity -0.038
Congressional Hearings (Logged) 5.94 E-04
Corporate Taxes 1.16 E-03
Media Attention (Logged) -2.05 E-04 *
Air Pollution Policy -3.93 E-03
Implementation Funding 0.080
Movement Actions 1.88 E-03
Constant -1.436
Adjusted R-squared 0.470
Durbin-Watson D-statistic 1.618
n = 38
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05; one-tailed
Results: NOx Interactions
Interaction Variable Coef.
Adjusted R2
Main Effects Coef.
Movement actions * Air Pollution Policy
-4.30 E-04 ** 0.560 Movement Actions
2.15 E-03 aa
Air Pollution Policy
-3.04 E-03
Movement actions * Democratic Unity
-2.51 E-03 * 0.512 Movement Actions
1.44 E-03 a
Democratic Unity
-5.18 E-02
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05; one-tailedaaa p < 0.001, aa p < 0.01, a p < 0.05; two-tailed.
NOx Explanatory Power
Results: PM-10
Base Variables Coefficient
Real GDP / capita 60.92
Real GDP / Capita, squared -134973 *
GDP & GDP squared F-Test for joint significance (P > F)
Democratic Unity 0.030
Congressional Hearings (Logged) 2.55 E-04
Corporate Taxes 8.81 E-04
Media Attention (Logged) -1.96 E-04 *
Air Pollution Policy -4.40 E-03
Implementation Funding 0.184
Movement Actions 5.96 E-04
Constant -3.555 *
Adjusted R-squared 0.198
Durbin-Watson D-statistic 1.762
n = 38
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05; one-tailed
Results: PM-10 Interactions
Interaction Variable Coef.
Adjusted R2
Main Effects Coef.
Movement actions * Media Attention
-7.09 E-06 ** 0.330 Movement Actions
1.12 E-03
Media Attention
-4.85 E-05
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05; one-tailed
PM-10 Explanatory Power
Significant Effects
Media Attention
Air Pollution Policy
Environmental Movement Actions
Democratic Unity
NOx Emissions
-
-
+
+
Significant Effects
Media Attention
Environmental Movement Actions
PM-10 Emissions-
Index Emissions(SO2, CO, &VOCs)Media Attention
-
Conclusions
Media Attention & the Political Agenda
Environmental movement must rely on political opportunities to be effective
Results not generalizeable across pollutants
Acknowledgements
Colleagues
Dr. J. Craig Jenkins
Dr. Robert Brulle
Dr. Jon Agnone
Funding & Resources
Ohio State University Dept. of Sociology
Ohio State University Environmental Science Graduate Program
The Fay Graduate Fellowship Fund in Environmental Sciences
NSF Grant #SES-0455215, “Civil Society & the Environment”