Policy influence process in Research ICT Africa - Alison Gillwald

Policy influence process in Research ICT AfricaDIRSI Young Scholar Programme, Santiago, May 2012.

Prof Alison Gillwald, University of Cape Town.

Research ICT AfricaRIA seeks to build an African evidence and knowledge base in support of ICT policy and regulatory processes, and to monitor and review policy and regulatory developments on the continent. Part of this effort is the generation of relevant information for policy makers and regulators. The RIA 2011 e-Access & Usage Survey delivers nationally representative indicators on household, individual and small business level. The survey uses national census sampling frames in co-operation with National Statistical Offices to deliver crucial data in a cost effective way.

Parliament

Ministry

Informs laws

Regulator &Competition Commission

Stake-holders/

Civil society/

Consumers, citizens,

operators, service

providers, academia,

unions

inputs

initiates & formulates

Policy Formulation

Process

inputs

Ministry of Communication develops overall policy for the telecommunications sector from which Department develops

strategies

It is required that the regulator and competition authorities are consulted and that public hearings are held before a policy is gazetted. Once it is a bill Parliament, through a multiparty

parliamentary committee, will also hold public hearings before pasing the law

Parliament

Ministry

Informs laws


Stake-holders/

Civil society/

Consumers, citizens,

operators, service

providers, academia,

unions

inputs


Policy Formulation

Process

inputs

The Parliaments passes laws based on policies

The Minister can provide policy directives to the regulator between major policy reviews.

laws

policy

directives

Parliament

Ministry

Informs laws

(institutional arrange-ments)

Regulator

Competition Commission

Universal Service Agency

Market Structure

conduct

laws

policy

directives

Civil society

Stake-holders/Consumers,

citizens, operators,

service providers, academia,

unions.

inputs


regulation

Policy Formulation

Process

inputs

The policy determines the institutional arrangement for the sector - the degree of autonomy of the regulator, competition commission

and USA - through the appointment process, funding, and delegation of powers.

The policy also determines the market structure through requiring the regulator to licence certain categories of operators/service

providers and exempting others. Market conduct is in response to the market structure and determines the nature of the regulation.

licensing

market failure

Parliament

Ministry

Informs laws


Market Structure

conduct

laws

policy

directives

Civil society/

Stake-holders/Consumers,

citizens, operators,

service providers,academia,

unions.

inputs


regulationPolicy

Formulation Process

inputs

Policy outcomes: competitiveness - choice, prices, quality of infrastructures, services and products

The performance of the sector - competitiveness reflected in access, range choice of services, price and quality - is the outcomes of the policy and legal framework and creates the conditions either

conducive to investment in the sector or not.

Integrated strategy

Training Networking

Dissemination

Publication

POLICY INFLUENCE

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

CAPACITY BUILDING

RESEARCH INFLUENCE

RESEARCH

Evidence-based policy

HH SurveySME Survey

Demand Side Data

Telecom Regulatory Enviro (TRE) (stakeholder perception survey)

NRA website analysis

ICT Sector Performance Review

Supply Side Data

Indicators

Regulatory & Policy Impact Assessment

Data-mining and economic modelling- gender, mobile-banking, informal sector usage

Case Study Namibia

International trends and best practice

‘Best practice’: Termination rate = cost of termination of efficient operator:

Promote economic efficiencyProvide incentives to invest in new technologies to reduce costs and expand product offeringsPromote competition Promote universal service (through low access/retail prices) if passed on/effectively regulated

NGN / IP based: voice traffic will become insignificant...new pricing principles RPNP...hence SKA

Mobile termination costs Namibia (N$/ZAR): MTC being the most efficient operator

Current MTR

MTC total expenditure per minute

MTC opex per minute

MTC direct cost and depreciation per minute

MTC direct cost per minute

MTC 50% of dircet cost and depriciation per minute 0,24

0,34

0,48

0,97

1,02

1,06

CellOne Telecom Namibia MTC

Model 1: Immediate N$0.30

Model 2: Symmetric glide path to N$0.30 that started 1 July 2006Model 3: Symmetric glide path to N$0.30 starting 1 July 2009

Model 4: Asymmetric glide path to N$0.30 starting 1 July 2009

MTC model: reduction to N$0.60 until 2011

2nd choice: if accompanied by other

regulatory interventions

2nd choice: Removing distortionary factors immediatelybut request higher transit charge for outgoing international calls

No comment

2nd choice: if accompanied by other

regulatory interventions

1st choice: Compensates for market distortions of past

years

No comment

Rejected: sees no reason to wait to remove market

distorting factors

Rejected: only gradually removes market distortions and

disadvantage TN and consumers unjustifiably for two years longer

No comment

1st choice: because of current traffic

imbalance

Rejected: only gradually removes market distortions and

disadvantage TN and consumers unjustifiably for two years longer

No comment

Rejected: same as for Model 3

Rejected: same as for Model 3 Otherwise: Drop in EBITDA margin to 37% because

of having to compete on a

level playing field

After several consultations with all operators: Industry consensus

Immediate drop of termination rates to N$0.60 to catch up with the region and international developmentsGlide path to the estimated cost of an efficient operator + 25% mark-up, ie NS0.30Immediate fixed-mobile convergence of termination ratesIt gives time to MTC and CellOne to conduct LRIC studies and contest the results

The best outcome for NamibiaFair competition among telecommunication operators

Lower consumer pricesBetter servicesMaximum job creationHighest income for government through company tax and individual income taxReasonable returns for shareholders / investors (including government)

Termination Rates US cents

Jan 2009 July 2009 Jan 2010 July 2010 Jan 2011

4,105,50

6,808,20

9,00

4,105,50

6,808,20

14,40

MTR FTR

MTC key performance indicators

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Subscribers in million 0,40 0,56 0,74 1,00 1,28 1,53

EBITDA Margin 61% 60,2% 52,2% 50,9% 53,8% 55,8%

After-tax profit millionUS$ 39,90 45,94 46,27 48,53 52,79 54,10

Dividend paid in million US$ 14,99 10,90 33,38 30,11 50,41 52,26

Capital Expenditure in million US$

35,4 55,9

Tax payments in million US$ 19,96 23,35 24,11 24,62 27,10 25,5

Namibia now among the 10 cheapest countries in Africa: moved from rank 22 to 9

Cheapest Low User USDCheapest Low User USDCheapest Low User USDCheapest Low User USDCheapest Low User USDMar-11Mar-11 Jun-11Jun-11

1 Egypt 1,54 D.R. Congo 1,36

2 Sudan 1,89 Egypt 1,54

3 Kenya 1,90 Sudan 1,89

4 Tanzania 2,21 Kenya 1,9

5 Algeria 2,25 Algeria 2,09

6 Uganda 2,30 Tanzania 2,21

7 Mauritius 2,39 Mauritius 2,39

8 Ghana 2,87 Ethiopia 2,61

9 Sierra Leone 3,09 Namibia 2,81

10 Ethiopia 3,16 Ghana 2,87

22 Namibia 7,67Source: Research ICT Africa

Case Study South Africa

Multiple cross cutting interventionsBuild research capacity and rigorous research for evidence based policy.

Advocacy through capacity/building technical assistance

Leverage outcomes in other jurisdictions in which we have had success and share experiences

Adjust and align to national/local context

!40.93!!

!89.48!!

!201.52!!

68.18!!

140.33!!

285.52!!

OECD!low!user!basket! OECD!medium!user!basket! OECD!high!user!basket!

Cheapest!Namibia!June!2009! Cheapest!South!Africa!June!2009!

All Operators

Termination Rates April 2009 MTR N$India

CyprusAustria

SwedenFinlandKenya

TanzaniaBotswanaSlovenia

FranceUganda

UKNamibia

South Africa PeakSouth Africa Off peak 0,75

1,251,06

0,930,86

0,830,77

0,710,630,62

0,590,550,54

0,240,04

2010/11/17 10:17 AMBusinessDay - ALLISON GILLWALD: Cellphone rates

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ALLISON GILLWALD:Cellphone ratesLower termination fees may spark telecomsturnaroundPublished: 2010/11/17 07:36:18 AM

MUCH has been made of Vodacom ’s R800m loss of revenue in the six months to September, owing tothe reduction in termination rates from R1,25 to 89c in March, reported in its interim results last week.

As if to confirm the dire warnings by MTN and Vodacom following the decision by the IndependentCommunications Authority of SA (Icasa) late last month to cut further the rates of dominant operators,this loss of revenue has been used to flag the threat of a future loss of earnings that would have beenreceived from terminating the calls of their competitors on their networks.

From a policy and regulatory perspective, these results demonstrate a far more positive outcome thanwas widely reported in the media. Despite the loss of earnings from interconnection — an expectedoutcome of the introduction of regulated cost-based pricing following years of extractive pricing —overall revenue and operating profits have continued to grow.

It is true that this was at a slower rate, with Vodacom’s earnings before interest, tax, depreciation andamortisation (ebitda) increasing by only 7% in the first six months of this year, compared with 10,5%for the whole of last year. But ebitda margins remain constant at a healthy 33,2% over the past threeyears, and Vodacom’s share price is constantly on the rise.

Historically, prices have been exceptional as a result of unregulated pricing in a duopoly market. In thefive years before the impending entry of the third cellphone operator, Vodacom and MTN increased theirtermination rates by 500%, where they have remained since 2002, despite world prices dropping to afraction of this.

Cost-based termination rates limit these pricing distortions in the market and reduce barriers to faircompetition.

The transfer between operators caused by above-cost termination rates is generally to the disadvantageof fixed-line operators, small cellphone operators and new entrants to the markets, while it is to theadvantage of the dominant cellphone operators.

While the focus has been on the loss of revenue, reduced termination rates of course also decrease thecosts of termination for operators. This produces efficiencies in the network that can reduce end-userprices and offset losses in interconnection revenue through increased demand and usage, and the moreproductive use of the network.

Usage has indeed increased, with average revenue per user and minutes of use up, though this is bestexplained by the disconnection of millions of subscribers unable to comply with the statutorily requiredregistration of SIM cards.

From a policy perspective, the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision ofCommunication-Relation Information Act (Rica) has alienated poorer South Africans fromcommunications services, with debatable security gains. With the effects of this stabilising, however,Vodacom gained more than 1-million voice subscriptions in September alone. This, together with MTN’scontinued subscriber growth over this period, suggests SA will soon follow the trends elsewhere in theworld, where subscriber growth has accompanied the reduction of termination rates. The speed anddegree to which this happens depends on the speed and degree to which the reduced cost ofterminating calls on competitors’ networks is passed to consumers.

Despite warnings from the dominant operators that this cost saving in interconnection charges does notautomatically get passed through to customers and that retail prices could even be used to offsettermination-rate losses, Vodacom reports that effective rates per megabyte have fallen by 16%, andeffective rates per minute on voice have declined by 16,9% in the six months to September 30,demonstrating some competitive pressure on pricing, most likely attributable to greater pricing flexibilityenabled by reduced termination rates.

The question for the regulator is whether these reductions are sufficient in relation to the termination-rate reductions of about 30% and, if not, will it prompt a review of cellphone retail rates?

In most countries where termination prices have already been reduced to bring them towards cost, this

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Africa Prepaid Mobile Price Index 2012: South Africa

Among 46 African countries studied, South Africa ranks poorly for prepaid mobile telephony affordability. Ranked 30th out of 46 African states, South Africa is now far behind countries where the regulator, has en-abled competition by enforcing cost-based mobile termination rates. The resulting competition has in many cases driven down prices for consumers. Not long ago, South Africa and Namibia shared the same mobile

termination rates and had similar end-user prices. Today, Namibia enjoys amongst the cheapest mobile pre-paid prices in Africa, as a result of the slashing of its termination rates to close-to-cost, which pressured the

incumbents towards cost-based pricing, thereby increasing demand and remaining highly profitable.

RIA Policy Brief No 1 March 2012SA ranks 30th Mobile prices are cheaper in over 30 African countries than they are in South Africa with prices in Kenya, Mauritius, Egypt and Namibia only a fraction of the price of even the lowest priced services in South Africa.

Neighbouring countries several times cheaperSouth African prepaid mobile prices are three times more expensive than in Namibia.

Lack of pass-through of price reductions to end-usersIn South Africa, even the modest reductions imposed on termination rates have generally not been passed on to end-users.

Cell C and 8taTwo relatively late market entrants, Cell C and the most recent entrant 8ta, have attempted to introduce cheaper mobile prepaid products, but these products have not forced down the general price level.

SA operators do not compete for priceThe dominant mobile operators, Vodacom and MTN, have been able to withstand the pricing pressure from price cuts by later entrants, and all operator’s prices have settled around the levels set by the dominant operators.

IntroductionPricing is the key indicator of the competitiveness of markets. Yet in South Africa there is very little pricing transparency to allow for any meaningful assessment by consumers or even the regulator of mobile communication prices. Operator tariffs are filed with the regulator, ICASA, without any process of assessment or objection and lowest-price tariff calculators, set up by regulators and consumer groups in countries such as the UK, do not yet exist in South Africa. With more than 100 voice products currently on offer in the market, no South African consumer can readily determine the best-priced package for her/his purposes.

Prepaid Mobile Prices across AfricaTable 1 illustrates the potential weakness just described by compar-ing the cost, based on the OECD 2006 low-user basket calculation, of the cheapest product available in a country with the cost of the cheapest product from the country’s dominant operator. The sixth column compares these two costs and shows the difference between the cheapest lower-user product of the dominant operator and the cheapest low-user product across all operators in that country. Where the price of the dominant operator’s cheapest low-user package is significantly higher than the cheapest low-user package in the coun-try, then this should indicate an absence of pricing pressure on the dominant operator in that market.However, several of the countries surveyed in Table 2 which are in actual fact experiencing high levels of competition have low-user packages much cheaper than the dominant operator’s cheapest low-user package – thus misleadingly suggesting a lack of competition, and showing the potential weakness of the basket method. In Kenya, for instance, Orange Kenya cut both on-net and Orange-fixed off-

peak prices between May 2011 and June 2011, while the dominant operator, Safaricom, which dominates both the voice and data mar-ket with market shares of 75.9% and 92.18% respectively (CCK, 2011, September 2010 data), increased both on-net and off-net tariffs be-tween September 2011 and October 2011.Also in Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda, the state-owned operators are the cheapest in the country. In Tanzania, TTCL is the cheapest operator and it managed to keep its prices at a lower level than the dominant operators (Airtel and Vodacom) throughout 2011. Also, since January 2011 Rwandatel has been the cheapest in Rwanda, and it further reduced its tariffs in August 2011. In Uganda, Uganda Telecom has the lowest tariffs in the country and has kept the same tariff plan throughout the year. In South Africa, new entrant 8ta, which is the mobile arm of Telkom South Africa, the partially state-owned incumbent fixed operator, kept its prices at a lower level compared to its competitors until August 2011, when Cell C introduced its ZAR 0,99 on-net rates, a drop from ZAR 1,50, thus becoming the cheapest operator.Meanwhile, in Mauritius, Namibia, Egypt, Sierra Leone, Libya, Congo Brazzaville, Senegal, Sao Tome & Principe, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Togo, Central African Republic, Angola, Malawi and Cape Verde, the dominant operator is the cheapest.Table 1 shows that in Namibia, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Mali and Senegal, the cheapest product available from dominant operators, using the OECD 2006 low-user basket calculation, decreased in 2011 by between USD 0,7 (in Senegal) and USD 11 (in Namibia).

R E S E A R C H I C T A F R I C A P O L I C Y B R I E F N O . 1

RIA Policy Brief SA No 1 2012

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• Coverage in Business Day, Mail & Guardian (weekly), Tech Central, IOL , and News 24.

Budget vote May 2012

• Minister of Communications ask for transparency in mobile pricing

• Head of Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Communication (ANC) cites Policy Brief in opening response and announces Parliament to hold public hearing on pricing in June 2012.

• Official Opposition Party response draws verbatim on brief request on challenges within sector.

• Opposition Party (COPE) extensively quotes RIA SA Sector Performance Review.

• Operators call for off -the-record meeting.

• This research is made possible with the support of IDRC, Google and OSI.

• See www.researchICTafrica.net

Policy influence process in Research ICT Africa - Alison Gillwald

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Transcript of Policy influence process in Research ICT Africa - Alison Gillwald