policy brief POLS2095
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Transcript of policy brief POLS2095
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Executive Summary Brazil has a big problem with transport and consequently, urban mobility. The number of cars has
doubled in the last ten years, while transport infrastructure funding has lagged behind (Doug, 2013). In
2013, dissatisfaction with the public transport system culminated in huge public protests, amidst the
context of hosting the costly FIFA world cup. In 2014, Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro won various
awards for outstanding achievements in sustainable urban transport development (Boscaini, 2015).
What happened in just under two years? Have these two cities managed the balance between a
burgeoning middle class, extricated favelas, tourist hotspots and major events such as the FIFA World
Cup and Olympics? At the request of the Australian government, I intend to answer two questions.
First, have the range of policies implemented improved public transport outcomes? Second, would it be
worth donating aid money to fund similar projects in other developing cities?
Introduction
“congestion costed the cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo R$ 98 billion (roughly
USD 43 billion) in 2013 alone”
One of the most important issues in the urban developing world is mobility. Without efficient transport
to different areas of a city, employment opportunities become inaccessible, environmental costs become
larger and for those with cars, congestion becomes insurmountable. A recent study undertaken by the
Rio state government estimated that “congestion costed the cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo R$
98 billion (roughly USD 43 billion) in 2013 alone” (Lobo, 2014). The loss amounts to about 8% of each
metropolitan area’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and 2% of Brazil’s entire GDP (Lobo, 2014). In
order to effectively tackle this issue, the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) issued R$50 billion
(20.69 billion AUD) for wide-sweeping public transport reforms (Bland, 2015). This policy brief will
examine two such programs, in the two largest Brazilian cities, Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. It will
assess the impact of the policy of The State of Sao Paulo “Dá licença para o ônibus” (make way for the
bus), dedicated cycling infrastructure and work on micro-accessibility with EMBARQ. I will then look
at Rio´s expanded Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system, and the introduction of cable cars in one of its
largest favelas. It will argue that there were several successful policies implemented, which can be
diffused into other projects around the world. But it will also critique some policy initiatives undertaken,
which have failed to increase urban mobility in poorer neighbourhoods.
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Sao Paulo
“commutes have reportedly been shortened by on average 38 minutes”
Sao Paulo is the fastest growing city in the world, with a greater metropolitan population of around 20
million people. It also suffers great levels of inequality, with an estimated 20% of urban territory
occupied by slum housing (Fitzpatrick, 2011). In order to address its resident´s mobility frustrations,
Sao Paulo implemented a major series of sweeping reforms to the public transport sector. The main
policy introduced in 2013, is called Dá licença para o ônibus (make way for the bus) (Boscaini, 2015). It
aimed to construct 220km of dedicated bus lines in under a year. The program actually delivered
exceeded this goal, achieving 344km (Joseph. Hidalgo, Rocha, Evers, 2014). Impressively, commutes
have reportedly been shortened by on average 38 minutes. As well as the BRT system, Sao Paulo has
pledged to increase its dedicated bicycle lanes to 400km by the end of 2015, up from 63km at the start
of the project (Joseph. Hidalgo, Rocha, Evers, 2014). It must then be acknowledged, that empirically,
the project has had strong initial success.
One of the key factors in this success has been the consultation process undertaken, both with the
public and private sector. An initiative called MobiLab called upon entrepeneurs to use publically
available data, in order to “create applications and smart solutions to urban mobility problems” (Zottis,
2014). This is a world first, and over 60 new apps have been created out of this initiative (Zottis, 2014).
It is difficult to judge whether it will have tangible impacts on urban mobility at this stage, but it must
be acknowledged for its innovation. Sao Paulo has also been working with an organisation called
EMBARQ, which helps provide technical advice for sustainable urban mobility across the world
(Rocha, 2015). Its main success in Sao Paulo has been to increase micro-accessibility. Micro-
accessibility works on the basis that people need to walk or cycle to stations, in order to access public
transport (Rocha, 2015). If this initial commute is impeded, either by distance, safety issues or
unsuitable footpaths, people are less likely to use the public transport options (Rocha, 2015). EMBARQ
asked local architects how micro-accessibility could be improved in the Pinheiros River business
district, one of Sao Paulo’s busiest areas (Rocha, 2015).
The proposals included:
• Sidewalk resizing and quality improvements
• New lighting and people-friendly street furniture
• Renovation of vacant land into public spaces
• New bike parking and bike lanes
• Emphasis on integration with other modes of transport
• Support for commercial activity (Rocha, 2015)
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These are ongoing projects, so it is difficult to determine their long-term impact at this stage, but early
sign are promising.
“Protests erupted in January 2015 after a R0.50 increase to bus fare prices”
Despite some of the successful outcomes of this project, there are still several issues to be addressed.
Protests erupted in January 2015 after a R0.50 increase to bus fare prices (Leahy, 2015). The political
climate in Brazil is particularly unstable recently, however this proves that the public is not completely
satisfied with the transport reforms. As well as this financial inaccessibility, geographic exclusion is
prominent in the Sao Paulo transport system. 20% of urban territory is occupied by slum housing, and
a quick look at transport maps (see appendixes 1 & 2) reveals these residents are not being serviced
(Sertich, 2010) (Schwandl, 2014). These two images show the transport map, and location of slum
housing. As one can see, especially to the south and south-west of the city centre, there are significant
areas that are not being serviced at all. This casts serious doubts on whether the project is suitable to
serve a city’s poorest citizens.
Rio de Janeiro
“The TransBrasil will have a 900,000 person per day transport capacity”
The Rio de Janeiro case is similar, but with the complication of hosting the Olympics in 2016. Rio has
begun to implement a wide-scale BRT system like Sao Paulo. Such a system is efficient when compared
to rail, and is much cheaper to implement. It features the same characteristics as Sao Paulo; exclusive
bus lanes, regular services, paying fares off-bus and raised station platform for easy access and efficiency
(Johnson, 2014). To date, over 78km of bus lanes have been built (Johnson, 2014). Rio will have
implemented four transport lines by 2016 (Johnson, 2014). The TransCarioca and TransOeste are now
functional, and have improved accessibility and travel times significantly (Johnson, 2014). The
TransBrasil will have a 900,000 person per day transport capacity, bringing people from the domestic
airport into downtown Rio (Johnson, 2014). Whilst this, and in some ways the entire BRT, is another
step forward for urban mobility in Rio, many are critical of the chosen lines. Professor Chris Gaffney,
of the University of Fluminense, notes that “all of the major daily flows in Rio come from the North
and West to downtown, South Zone, and part of the North Zone, which together concentrate 60% of
Rio’s formal employment sector” (Johnson, 2014). As seen in appendix 3, these new lines in one way or
another are increasing accessibility to Barra da Tijuca, one of Rio’s most affluent suburbs, but more
importantly the heart of the 2016 Olympic games (Johnson, 2014).
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“all of the major daily flows in Rio come from the North and West to downtown,
South Zone, and part of the North Zone, which together concentrate 60% of Rio’s
formal employment sector”
The recently constructed cable car in Providência looks to have similar issues. Its aim, as stated by
Mayor Paes, is that it “will serve as transportation for the local population, but will also be a new tourist
destination” (Johnson, 2014). The issue was that there was no community consultation in this process.
There are already Kombi and Minivan transport options for residents of Providência, while basic
sanitation and water needs are non-existent (Johnson, 2014). Furthermore, the favela’s main public
urban space has had a station built over it, frustrating the community even more (Johnson, 2014). This
has led community members to again questioning whether this new development is really about urban
mobility, or staging an attractive Olympic games
“There are already Kombi and Minivan transport options for residents of
Providência, while basic sanitation and water needs are non-‐existent”
Conclusion
Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro have achieved great transport outcomes in a short space of time. Their
Bus Rapid Transit systems have greatly reduced travel times and congestion. The BRT has increased
mobility for sections of the burgeoning urban middle classes in both Rio and Sao Paulo, this much can
not be denied. However, there has been little improvement to urban mobility prospects for the lower
class. Transport lines are still not servicing favelas in Rio or Sao Paulo. The improvements in dedicated
cycling infrastructure in Sao Paulo have been phenomenal, as has the community consultative process
there, resulting in technological innovations and micro-accessibility improvements. However, there are
several problems to be addressed. Sao Paulo residents are not satisfied with the pricing structure, as
evidenced by the recent protests. While residents in Rio have been frustrated at the lack of consultation
process for the new cable cars, the failure to service the crucial North and West transport corridors and
the focus on spending for the upcoming Olympics.
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Implications and Recommendations
“I would recommend that perhaps this is too much of a luxury for the Australian
Government to finance, and that there are more urgent issues present to focus on.”
Successes and failures in these two case studies provide key lessons for future projects. In answer to the
two key questions this paper set out to answer, I can make several recommendations. It is the BRT that
has empirically proved the most successful, with great public transport outcomes recorded so far. A
BRT would be a great project to invest in, on the proviso that transport corridors would service the
wider population, not just the urban middle class. Otherwise, it becomes a different type of
development project aimed at a growing middle class. I would recommend that perhaps this is too
much of a luxury for the Australian Government to finance, and that there are more urgent issues
present to focus on. The effect of cable cars in Rio has been negligible though, and it is not a good
example to follow in other projects. Many cable car projects such as in La Paz and Medellin have had
greater success, due to a more comprehensive level of community consultation. Any investment from
the Australian Government into cable car initiatives must require a consultative process with locals first
and foremost. It does seem that the timing for Rio has meant that spending on the Olympics has been
prioritised, perhaps impeding what may otherwise have been a successful idea. One recommendation I
would make is that the work of the EMBARQ organisation has been worthy from all accounts. As well
as playing a pivotal role in planning the BRT, their work on micro-accessibility in Sao Paulo is
something that could be applied to poor neighbourhoods, and even slum housing. It is my opinion, that
giving funding to EMBARQ may be the most effective use of aid money in such projects.
“Giving funding to EMBARQ may be the most effective use of aid money in such
projects”
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Bibliography
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