Policingpersonalitydisordered

offenders in thecommunity;

Robert Oliver -a case study

Michael Lewis discusses an inter-agency response.

BackgroundIn addressing issues of publicsafety in the context of offenderswith personality disorders I will bedealing with Non Registered SexOffenders and Registered SexOffenders. I will also look at issuesaround the use of Sex OffendersOrders and good practice issues indealing with registered sexoffenders from a policeperspective. I have been asked

specifically to talk about theRobert Oliver case that came toprominence in Brighton almosttwo years ago, using ourexperience as a case study. I willalso discuss the subsequent workof a home office working grouplooking at similar releases.

Let me first deal with theOliver case. The case may benearly two years old but it is stillvery relevant. Only recently the

preferred Home Office solutionhas manifested itself here inNottingham. The resolution hasraised huge issues over 'civilliberties' and public safety and Iwill return to these later. Manyother issues also remain and itwould be naive to pretend thatthere is not another Robert Olivercurrently in the prison systemawaiting release.

The question for me is, wouldanything be different? Or wouldcolleagues in this room be facingthe same dilemmas that facedpolice, social services andprobation in Brighton for somefour months.

The 'health warning' I wouldgive is that this case is in manysenses still 'live' - the underlyingproblem as to what to do withRobert Oliver and his like remainsfirmly on the agenda.

Oliver was convicted ofmanslaughter in 1989 andsentenced to fifteen years1

imprisonment. With time onremand he served a total of tenyears of this sentence and wasreleased in September 1997. As hewas sentenced before 1992 he wasnot on licence nor under anysupervision order on release.

Prior to his arrest he had livedin London. On release he visitedaddresses in London and thenmoved to Swindon, where he infact registered under the SexOffenders Act 1997. Already,though, the media were on histrack and the police in Wiltshiretook the decision to disclose. Themedia and public attention droveOliver out of Swindon and he

I

travelled across to Dublin, but waspromptly intercepted by the Gardaiand put on the next ferry forLiverpool. He then made his wayto Manchester.

Again he was in contact withpolice locally and on the eveningof Thursday 9th October, hearrived by train in Brighton. Wewere notified by GreaterManchester Police and he was metby the divisional pro-active teamand kept under surveillance. Hisfirst action, before leaving thestation, was to make a telephonecall to a local man with knownpaedophile connections. To oursubsequent knowledge, Oliver hadonly ever visited Brighton oncebefore - on a day trip as a youngster- and had no other connectionswith the town. And yet, here hewas within minutes of his arrivalmaking a contact. Overnight hespent his time at a night shelter.

A 'risk assessment' meetingwas held at Brighton Police Stationon Friday 10th October involvingsocial services and probation.Neither of these agencies had anyimmediate suggestions regardingaccommodation and it was agreedthat he should be kept undersurveillance over the weekend.

Over the weekend ll/12thOctober, Oliver met a convictedpaedophile living at an address inShoreham and stayed one nightwith him. On the Saturday he wasfollowed into Brighton where hewas seen to frequent theamusement arcades on the PalacePier. He was then seen to go intoHove Library where he wasobserved with another man, taking

an interest in theyoungsters in thechildren's section.On the Sunday hewas again seen in thevicinity of the PalacePier and wasobserved taking aclose interest inchildren on thebeach. He had foundt e m p o r a r yaccommodation inthe St Patrick's NightShelter and policewere able to persuadethe management toallow him to stay foran additional night -so at least we knewwhere he was.

52 CJITl no. 37 Autumn 1999

Public pressureOn Monday 13th October, mediainterest had become intense andlocal communities were becomingincreasingly anxious aboutOliver's presence in the Brightonand Hove area. One of the"aggravating" factors was thatOliver had damaged his leg andvisited the locai hospital fortreatment, so the likelihood of hisexposure was therefore furtherincreased, It was clear that thetabloid press 'knew' he was inBrighton and the decision todisclose was taken. A letter wassent by the Director of Educationto all schools for the attention ofparents.

On Tuesday 14th October, thepress became aware that Oliverhad been staying at the St Patrick'sNight Shelter and camped outsideawaiting his return. The staffindicated that. quiteunderstandably, they would notaccept Oliver that night.

Oliver was therefore 'met' bya Detective Inspector in the towncentre and came voluntarily toBrighton police station seeking a"place of safety". Neither probationnor social services had been ableto find suitable accomm-odationand it was agreed that he shouldbe housed vol-untarily at a localpolice station as an interimmeasure.

A full press conference washeld at Brighton police station onWednesday 15th October, attendedby representatives of the nationaland local media. From that time,considerable effort was made onthe part of the probation serviceand police to provide suitableaccommodation, to no avail.

Whilst at the police station hewas interviewed by seniorrepresentatives of the probationservice. They concluded that:• he remained a serious risk to

children;

• public hostility meant that hecould not live out in thecommunity:

• psychiatric referral was apossibility, but it would bedifficult to find anywhere totake him

In view of the high risk he posed,the probation service did notconsider he was suitable forplacement within a probation

hostel. As a result of thatassessment, Oliver was seen by apsychiatrist from the local secureunit. Their assessment noted;• Oliver is not mentally ill and

cannot be 'sectioned':

• he is in total denial and willoffend:

• he remains a high risk and isviewed as extremelydangerous, particularly whenwith 'like-minded" people:

• secure establishments wereunlikely to take Oliver as avoluntary patient and the twospecialists could suggest noother establishment that mightbe willing to accept him.

Every subsequent assessment saidthe same. The man is not mentallyill and therefore does not comewithin the remit of the Mental

suitable accommodation that metthe needs of both the individualand the public.

A local issue?For some time Oliver was seen bythe Home Office simply as a 'localoperational issue*. We lobbied longand hard for Oliver to be seen as anational issue that required anational solution. Our assessmentfrom the outset was that, jointly,we needed to be professional in ourapproach. Oliver had beenhounded from place to place and.potentially, was becoming moredangerous as time went on. He wasbecoming increasingly desperateand frightened. We needed to finda way of breaking that cycle in thebest interests of all concerned.Initially, it is fair to say that we feltlet down for taking such a stance.What we did in Brighton was notthe answer. But every assessmentindicated that whilst he was not

"As we unpack the process of registering,profiling and risk-assessing, the nextlogical step is targeting, both theindividual and potential offending'hotspots'. Let me say from the outsetthat the ability of police to targetindividuals is extremely limited given thenumber of 'high risk' offenders that are inthe community."

Health Act provisions.At the time that Oliver was

being initially assessed, there wasa small, but vociferous,demonstration outside Brightonpolice station, attended bymembers of the press. Theprotesters were seekingreassurances with regard to publicsafety and were seeking changesto the legislation to prevent arepeat of the Oliver scenario. Wenever revealed where Oliver wasbeing held, and very largely wemanaged to maintain that position.mainly to avoid precisely the sortsof protest that were seen in Yeovil.The division was aware that boththe Even ing A rgus and B BC Southknew where Oliver was being heldbut. to their credit, agreed not todivulge his whereabouts at thetime.

It then took four long monthsfor that 'interim solution* to beresolved. Four months duringwhich probation sought to find

mentally ill - and therefore couldnot be dealt with under the MentalHealth Act - he neverthelesspresented an extremely high risk.We needed to break the cycle.

The key good practice pointsemerging from the Oliverexperience were:• the existence of established

protocols and a commitment tojoint working - rehearsed longbefore the critical incident:

• agreeing a joint media strategy- and being seen to begenuinely working together:

• the use of an independent layvisitor for the period he washeld in a police station toensure he was not being heldagainst his will;

• keeping local politicians -especially police authority,social services and probationcommittee members - properly

briefed. And using them tolobby in government quarters.

Throughout the Oliver scenario wewere warning Home Officeofficials that the rest of the team,including Sydney Cooke. wereawaiting release. As responsibleagencies we needed to plan forthose releases in a way that wasnot done for Oliver. Colleagues inthe Metropolitan Police and Avonand Somerset would havesomething to say about whetherthis planning proved successful inthe case of Cooke. I would suggestCooke highlighted the difficultiesfacing the agencies.

On a more positive note, fromthese quite difficult earlynegotiations emerged a jointagency Home Office workinggroup that is now looking at thecases of some 90 sex offenders,currently in the prison system, andwho are due for release withoutrestrictions and without the needto register. The group will examinethe "release strategy' some two tothree months beforehand and willprepare the relevant agencies forthat managed release, as far as theyare able. The role of the group, has.I understand, also expanded toexamine the concept of"dangerousness" - a concept thatwas pushed very hard by PennyBuller. the Chief Probation Officerfor East Sussex when handling theOliver case.

Overall, I think there has beenprogress - but there remains muchto do in developing a long termstrategy for dealing with those whoare 'outside the system' but whoremain a significant risk.

Let me turn now to the secondstrand of my presentation:• the implications of the Sex

Offenders Act:

• the use of Sex Offenders"Registers and

• some practical good practiceissues for police.

Overall. I understand the ACPOposition is that implementation ofthe Act is seen as broadlysuccessful, although there aresignificant gaps that are currentlyunder debate. Let us be clearthough. The Sex OffendersRegisters are a start, but cannot bethe complete answer. There arethose who would say that theregisters simply allow politicians

CJtTI no. 37 Autumn 1999 53

to 'pass the buck1 to already hard-pressed agencies in the field.Nevertheless, no register per se hasprotected any vulnerable group orindividual, but at least we nowknow, with some degree ofcertainty given the high level ofregistrations, more than we didpreviously as to who might beliving in the area.

The Register, of course, isdependent upon the offenderactually remaining at his registeredaddress, and experience elsewherehas shown that in some areas avery high percentage of thoseregistered had moved on from thataddress soon after registration.With regard to Sex OffendersOrders, again the legislationpotentially offers the agencies auseful tool, but to date it remainslargely untested. There are twocases currently being considered inHampshire and I understand thatGMP have used the power.

For police, a key issue - andone that has restricted applications- is that of community notificationas required under the order. Thequestion we would ask nationallyis, how does that publicnotification assist the police?

I do understand that this is oneagency's perspective and certainlynot that of a parent. But with260,000 sex offenders in the UK,and 110,000 of them offendingagainst children, how can parentskeep tabs on all of these? Bynotifying too often, do we simplyraise fears unnecessarily?

In Oliver's case, disclosure ina letter from schools to parents wasperhaps the only source ofpotential tension between theagencies. Certainly, the policeview is tempered by the 'name andshame' experience in the US wherethe naming and shaming meantthat offenders simply could not behoused and therefore became moredangerous. I know that wasprecisely the experience when alocal paper in Bristol chose toreveal the identity andwhereabouts of a known sexoffender who, to the knowledge ofthe relevant agencies, was livingnear a school. The agencies hadtaken a professional assessmentthat it was better for the individualto remain in a stable environmentwhere he could be monitored. Thepaper took a different view and theman disappeared and went toground as a direct result of thepublicity generated by the paper.

Inter-agencystrategiesAs I mentioned earlier, it isimportant that the respectiveagencies have clear strategies andprotocols for dealing with sexoffenders. In Brighton webenefited immensely frompreviously agreed protocolsbetween the agencies. We each ofus knew our roles and respectivepositions and this made mattersmuch easier to handle when thepressure was on. What has provedmore difficult has been agreeing aworking protocol with housing. Iunderstand fully their position, butsomehow we need to place theseindividuals.

Accurate profiling ofindividuals is essential. .What is therisk for future offending? What ishis cycle of offending? Whatmakes him vulnerable? What islikely to increase his'dangerousness'? Do weunderstand the 'grooming' processadopted by certain individuals?Where is he most likely to begravitating? What are his networksand how does he make contactwith others of a similarinclination? Oliver had only visitedBrighton once before as a child,and yet within an hour of arrivingin the town he had met up with aconvicted paedophile - a man, toour knowledge, with whom he hadnever before been in contact. Theuse of expert advice in establishingthis profile and gaining anunderstanding of the individual iscrucial.

A second element in buildingthis picture is go to go back tosource - i.e. to obtain the fullestbackground to previous offenceswherever possible directly fromthe officer who dealt with theoffender on previous occasions.The need to build up as accurate apicture of the individual is vital,especially as towns like Brightonattract those with no previousconnections with the area. Withtime, the risk assessment processwill become more refined andthere are already a number of verypractical 'guides', but it willalways be an impressive scienceand the professional agencies needto make difficult judgementsalmost as a matter of routine.

As we unpack the process ofregistering, profiling and risk-assessing, the next logical step istargeting, both the individual and

potential offending 'hotspots'. Letme say from the outset that theability of police to targetindividuals is extremely limitedgiven the number of 'high risk'offenders that are in thecommunity.

The surveillance option, in thetraditional sense of highly skilledsurveillance teams, is a non-starter.No force has access to that levelof specialist support, certainly notfor any extended period. Someforces, GMP for example, havesuccessfully adopted otherstrategies to provide some degreeof surveillance, using CBO's,hostel managers, local authoritystaff etc, to provide information onthe individual, usually to indicatethat he is not following his normalroutine. It does not place theindividual, but it does alert officersto changes in behaviour.

Where appropriate, 'in yourface' policing has been used as afairly standard tactic. 'We knowwho you are and we know whereyou are'. But there is always therisk that by adopting such tacticsyou drive the offender away, towho knows where? It is a very finebalance. Target hardening in thiscontext does not mean 'locks andbolts' for those potentially at risk,but it does mean warning thoseworking in and around likely'hotspots'.

As I mentioned earlier, Oliverand his friend spent an afternoonin the children's section of the locallibrary. In Brighton we had verypositive relationships with securitystaff on the pier and with theproprietors of the amusementarcades, places where vulnerableindividuals might be targeted bysex offenders. We were seeking toraise levels of awareness amongstswimming pool staff, playgroundsupervisors, school crossingwardens, etc.

Finally, I include in thetargeting process the need toinvestigate every reported sexoffending incident thoroughly,because it might provide just asnippet of information that,together with the accurate profile,will begin to build a picture thatcould lead to a conviction. Anoffender was recently sentencedlocally to six years' imprisonmentfor 'drying' a young girl with atowel, a conviction that wassecured by building a picture thatput that single act in a context ofsimilar and repeated behaviours

over a period of time.Finally, let me quickly address

training issues. It goes withoutsaying that, wherever possible, weshould be engaging in jointtraining, and there is plenty of goodpractice here, for example, in thechild protection arena.

ACPO Crime Committee hasrecently agreed a nationalframework for risk assessmentsand is now proposing national jointtraining based in five centresacross the country. Certainly, anumber of forces have alreadyestablished joint training locally soit will be interesting to see whetherACPO's proposal receives anysupport.

In drawing this session to aconclusion, the key messages forpolice good practice are these:• establish your joint working

relationships and establishthem early;

• have clear and agreedprotocols;

• work to secure an accurateprofile of the individual;

• use practised intelligencesystems to target only thosewho present the highest risk.

Collectively, we have come a longway in joint agency working andthis has, in my view, allowed us toimplement the Sex Offenders Actwith confidence. Registration is afirst step, but what remains highon the agenda, both politically andsocially, is what can yourealistically do with the'untreatable personality disorder'?Perhaps the Nottingham solutionis a second option. But there mustbe more.

Michael Lewis is Assistant ChiefConstable, South Wales Police.

CJm no. 37 Autumn 1999