Poland Campaign History (1939)

8/8/2019 Poland Campaign History (1939)

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THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

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CGSC Form 13 11 Dec 72USACGSC3P3-178312M22 D ec 72


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Hi T K I C T k*-4X

THE CAMPAIGNIN POLAND1939

DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY ART AND ENGINEERINGUNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY

WEST POINT, NEW YORK1945


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RESTRICTED

FOREWORD

This account of the campaign in Poland has been written for usein the instruction of cadets at the United States Military Academy.It is based for the most part on material prepared by the MilitaryIntelligence Service, W ar Department. However, while acknowledging the great indebtedness to the M. I. S., it is not desired toplace on it the responsibility for any factual errors, or for anyconclusions drawn.July, 19 U.

U.S.M.A. PRINTING OF FIC E-B -3O -45 -25 00


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R E S T R I C T E D THE CAMPAIGN IN POL AND, 1939

INTRODUCTIONMost military men emerged from the First World War with abelief in the impossibility of a future European war of maneuver.They thought the theater too limited and the defensive too strong

to perm it new wars to be other than tes ts of endurance. MostContinental nations, accepting their soldiers' new doctrine and beingsatisfied with the Versailles boundaries, devoted their military energies to constructing defensive lines instead of developing newoffensive weapons and tactics.Only Germany failed to adopt these new beliefs. Refusing toaccept a doctrine that gave no possibility of regaining her lostprovinces, she continued to cling to the teachings of Clausewitz, whohad w rit ten:

If the defensive is the stronger form of conducting war, buthas a negative object, it follows of itself that we must only-make use of it so long as our weakness compels us to do so, andwe must give up that form as soon as we feel strong enough toaim a t a positive object A wa r in which victories are merelyused to ward off blows, and where there is no attempt to returnthe blow would be . . absurd.Let us not hear of generals who would conquer without bloodshed. If a bloody slaugh ter is a horrible sight, then th at is groundfor paying more respect to war, but not for making the swordwe wear blunter and blunter by degrees . . ., until someone stepsin with a sword that is sharp and lops off the arm of our body.

Basically, Germany's superiority has been due less to Germandevelopment of the two modern weapons, the airplane and tank,than to the stra tegic doctrine which limited Allied production. TheAllies might have outdistanced Germany had their plans contemplated offensive action. All too soon, the Allied plan of a "bloodlesswar" was shattered by that one nation which clung to the age-oldprinciple of the attack. Too late, the victim nations realized tha t,through neglect of the possibility of maneuver, they had failed to keeppace in the production of the most vital war equipment. Throughsubscription to a false doctrine, they had allowed their "sword" tobecome "blunter and blunter by degrees" until Germany could stepin with a sharper weapon.


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Poland, with the fifth largest army in Europe, was the first nationto feel the attack of the rejuvenated Nazi war machine. Because oflater German conquests, the world has largely forgotten this initialsuccess. Yet in one respect the rapid annihilation of the PolishArmy was Germany's most important conquest. This campaigndemonstrated to Germany, if not to the rest of the world, the correctness of her military doctrine. It furnished the proving groundfor her organization and weapons.

The rapid ity of Po land's complete destruction came as a shockingsurp rise to the world at large . Eigh t days after th e beginning ofthe war, all Polish forces were in demoralized retreat; and a monthlater, the entire fighting force of a million men had been annihilated.Military history offers no prior example of a conquest so rapid andcomplete. In this victory the new German air and mechanized forcesplayed an unprecedented pa rt. Nevertheless, it would be wrong tosay th at German success was due to these two arms alone. Simplystated, Germany's stupendous conquest may be attributed to thesuperiority of the entire German Army over the outmoded Polishwar machine. Germany's balanced, well-trained, and ably led forcesfound no match in those of her smaller rival.

COMPARATIVE FIGHTING STRENGTHSPotentially, Poland as a nation could never be a match for thenewly armed N azi might, backed by the tremendous German industry,rich resources, and plentiful reserves. Poland's near bankruptcyand indus trial backwardness would always ham per g reatly any mod

ern armam ent program . She possessed a fairly large iron and steelindustry, an oil output of one eighth her peacetime needs, and anewly created, but small, airplane industry . In all other productionnecessary for a modern war, including the manufacture of automobiles and trucks, she was totally lacking. W ith agricu ltural produce her only exportable surplus, her international credit was low.Thus, lack of home production caused her to maintain equipmentlong considered obsolete by most major powers, while limited purchasing power compelled her to accept any foreign equipment shecould buy. Furth er , the poor Polish road net, the famous Polishmud, and the local abundance of good horseflesh caused her militaryleaders to overemphasize the importance of horse cavalry and t ransport. The result was such that the outbreak of war found Polandin possession of an army patterned closely after those of the FirstWorld War.


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With Hitler's ascent to power in 1933, Germany had inaugurated a program designed to train and arm a fighting force secondto none. In 1935, she had resumed universal tra ining . By the summer of 1939, she had succeeded in tra in in g 2,500,000 of her 86,000,000population, and had available equipment reserves for more thantwice th at number. Approximately 900,000 of those trained weremembers of the active Army, 200,000 were in the active Air Force,while 1,400,000 had completed their two years of service and hadbeen released to the reserve. In addition, Germany had within herborders 1,700,000 men who had seen active service in the F irst WorldW ar. The members of this latter group, though relatively unfamiliar with the technique of modern weapons, were capable ofrapid and easy conversion to first-line troops.Germany's peacetime Army consisted of 35 horse-transport infantry divisions, 3 mountain divisions, 4 motorized divisions, 5 heavymechanized (panzer) divisions, and 4 light mechanized divisions.These were grouped into 18 corps and 6 armies. ' On 1 September,Germany had 90 peacetime and reserve divisions ready for activeoperations. Sixty of these had been concentrated for the Polishcampaign. The mobilization of some 50 to 60 additional divisionswas either in process or was begun immediately. It appears th atnone of these were considered fully fit for field operations during thefirst month of the war.The basic fighting unit of the German Army w as the more numerous horse-transport infan try division. This division was trian gu larin formthree infantry regiments of three battalions eachandhad a stren gth of 15,261 officers and men. The fire power of thedivision was tremendous. It contained 342 light and 100 heavyair-cooled machine guns, 81 light infan try morta rs (50-mm.), 54heavy infantry mortars (81-mm.), 72 antitank guns (37-mm.), 18infantry howitzers (75-mm.), and 6 infantry howitzers (150-mm.).Of these weapons, 12 of the antitank guns, 27 of the light and 12 ofthe heavy mortars, 6 of the 75-mm. howitzers, and 2 of the 150-mm.howitzers were organically assigned to each regiment.Artillery support for the division was provided by three battalionsof light and one battalion of medium artillery. All light-artillerybattalions were composed of twelve 105-mm. howitzers, while themedium battalion contained two batteries (8 pieces) of 150-mm. howitzers and one ba tte ry (4 pieces) of 105-mm. guns.Germany had about 6,000 tank s. Three quarters of these wereorganized into panzer and light mechanized divisions. The remainder were formed into a number of GHQ tank regiments, to beused for close infantry support. The panzer division, with its


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strength of about 14,000 men and 3,000 vehieles, was organized intothree echelons: a reconnaissance force, a shock force, and a ground-holding element. The reconnaissance echelon contained a motorizedreconnaissance battalion of 50 armored cars, a motorcycle infantrycompany, and certa in supporting weapons. The second echelonconsisted of 450 tanks organized into two tank regiments, each ofwhich contained both light and medium tan ks . The ground-holdingechelon contained one motorized infantry brigade of two regiments,an artillery regiment, and certain engineer, antitank, and signaltroops.The German motorized division was identical with the horse-transport infantry division, except that motor transport was furnishedfor all men and equipment and a mechanized reconnaissance battalionwas added. The infan try themselves were transported in four-wheel-drive light trucks. The heavy infantry weaponsheavymachine guns, m ortars , infan try howitzers, and antitank gunsweretranspo rted in or behind one-ton half-track trucks. These vehicles,with their low silhouette, excellent road speed, and cross-countrymobility, gave considerable tactical mobility to the unit.A difference between the German Army of 1939 and that of 1914was the function and quan tity of horse cavalry. At the outbreakof war in 1939 Germany had only one two-regiment brigade of Tiorsecavalry, located in Eas t Prussia. This was later expanded into acavalry division. There were approximately fifteen independent cavalry regiments, located in Germany proper and train ed as reconnaissance un its. Each independent regiment was organized so th at uponmobilization it could be split up into reconnaissance detachments ortroops of 300 men each for the infantry divisions. In addition, eachinfantry regiment was given a mounted reconnaissance platoon.*By the summer of 1939, Germany had achieved her dream of anAir Force second to none. Through the means of flying and soaringclubs, as well as more formal civil and military training, she hadbuilt up a reserve pilot streng th of approximately 100,000. Herpotential production was estimated as high as 2,000 airplanes per* Fo r corps and armies, the reconnaissance units were motorized. The samewas, of course, true for the reconnaissance units of motorized divisions.

A report dated 22 September, 1941, states that the cavalry division wasbeing converted into a motorized division, and that the only mountedunits then in the German Army were the platoons assigned to infantryregim ents. Ap parently the mounted detachments assigned to divisionshad been abolished. A late r report, dated November 22, 1941, state sthat the conversion of the cavalry division to a motorized division waspostponed and that the division operated as horse cavalry on the RussianFr on t as la te as October, 1941.


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month. She possessed a fighting force of 7,000 first-line planes,organized into four air fleets. In addition, she had available parachute and air infantry , whose use she postponed till a later campaign.Poland, with her population of 34,000,000, had an active Army of266,000 and partially trained reserves of nearly 3,000,000. Owing toprior mobilization, 600,000 were ready and available on M day, whilean additional 400,000 were mobilized before the campaign ended.Howing, owing to the rapid German advance and the immediate destruction of Polish ra ilroads, most of the latte r took little pa rt in thecombat. Except for an estimated two divisions, they were throw ninto battle by regiment or smaller unit when the situation became

desperate.The 600,000 men already mobilized were organized into 30 infan trydivisions, 12 independent cavalry brigades, and certain army, corps,and special troops. The Polish infantry division, though nearlyequal to the German in man power, was woefully weak in supporting weapons. Its light and medium artillery consisted of aheterogeneous lot of 75-mm. and 105-mm. pieces. Although 45 ligh tantitank guns were authorized for each division, only about halfwere on hand on 1 September. Only 200 light and 200 heavy antiaircraft guns were available to the en tire Arm y.

Poland's Air Force, a part of the Army, contained 900 first-lineplanes and about 600 in second line. All were of a design greatlyinferior to those of her opponent. Her mechanized streng th consisted of 600 well-designed light tanks, organized into one tankbrigade and several independent regiments.Man for man, the Polish soldier has always been an able opponentof any foe he has met. On many fields and under many flags, hisancestors have demonstrated their bravery and endurance. In 1939,the average Polish soldier was fairly well trained, could march longdistances, and was possessed of a high morale. Company officershad reached a high degree of efficiency and were uniformly wellconsidered. Above the company, however, the Polish command wasquestionable. Limited schooling, lack of large-scale maneuvers,political influence upon promotion, and an outmoded strategic doctrine, all combined to make the higher officers compare unfavorablywith the Germans of like grade.

Very little has yet been published on the detailed Polish commandand staff organization. It is known, however, that no group* com* The Poles called their field armies "groups".


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manders existed in peacetime, and th at upon mobilization th e Polishchain of command included no link between the group and the division. Smigly-Ritz, the commander in chief, was a virtual dictator,controlling the country's political as well as military affairs. Sincesuccessful operatipn in wartime necessitated extreme decentralization of command, able staffs and group commanders familiar withtheir duties should have been available to absorb some of the manyduties which otherw ise would fall upon GHQ. The results of thewar indicate that such was probably not the case.Since 1933, Hitler and his subordinates had done all in the ir powerto improve the stamina, training, and morale of the manhood ofGermany. Youth organizations, mass civilian drills, group calisthenics, and organized athletics raised the physical endurance of thenation as a whole. The work battalions and universal m ilitaryconscription furthered this physical development and added discipline and military tra in ing . Service with the armed forces, evenin peacetime, became a serious business. Military housekeepingand adm inistration by the troops themselves was cut to a minimum.The tra in ing prog ram provided for ten hours of drill and instructionfor six days a week. There were frequent forced marches andextended maneuvers under simulated war conditons. The Germantrained reserves and the men of the active Army and Air Force werewithout peers in the military world of 1939.The officer corps of the German Regular Army has long beenrecognized as the greate st stabilizing influence in the German nation .To be a member of that class has always been considered a highhonor. This corps, while small between 1918 and 1932, maintainedits traditions of efficiency and devotion to duty . Only men of goodfamily, long military experience, and demonstrated ability could hopeto receive important command or staff assignments. The highcommand had repeatedly been given the opportunity to handle forcesas large as 100,000 in the annual fall maneuvers. In addition, muchvaluable command and staff experience had been gained when Aus triaand Czecho-Slovakia were overrun. Th at the German comm andersin the higher grades proved their worth when real war began isshown by the fact t hat two years later those who had been the seniorcommanders in the Polish cam paign still held the key positions.

At the beginning of the invasion of Poland there was doubt in theminds of many regarding the efficiency of the junior leaders, mostof whom were reserve officers. How ever, they proved to be quitesatisfactory.


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7In the following table are listed the principal commanders duringthe Polish campaign:

COMMANDER IN CHIEF HITLERChief of Staff KeitelARMY Von BrauchitschChief of Staff % HaiderSouthern Group of Armies Von RundstedtEighth Army Von BlaskowitzTenth Army Von ReichenauFourteenth Army ListNo rthern Group of Armies Von Bock

Third Army Von KuechlerFourth Army Von KlugeAIR FORCE GoeringAir Fleet One KesselringAir Fleet Four LoehrNAVY RaederNaval Units in Polish Campaign AlbrechtThat these men, without exception, measured up to their tasks,speaks volumes for the German system of training and selection.One advantage tha t a number of them had was their knowledge ofthe Polish theater. Von Brauchitsch had been the commander inEast Prussia in 1936, with von Kluge as his chief of staff. VonKuechler was in command there at the outbreak of war. VonRundstedt arrived on the Polish border some months before Germany attacked. Von Reichenau had once been in command of theKonigsberg garrison.Two features of German military organization are of particularinterest. First, the German military machine consists of threeseparate arms: the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. To gainproper coordination, Hitler's chief of staff, Keitel, controlled allthree. To insure cooperation on the Eastern Front, von Brauchitschcommanded all elements of the Navy and Air Force that were usedagainst Poland. Second, the seacoast defenses are under the Navy,while the antiaircraft artillery is controlled by the Air Force.Poland might have increased the fighting power of her inferiorArmy through the construction of a detailed system of permanentfortifications, had it not been for Hitler's able political strategy . In1934, Poland and Germany signed a non-aggression pact. Because ofthis and her limited resources, Poland for the next five years devotedher means to the construction of a fortified line on her Russian border(Map 1). In April of 1939, when war became imminent, she trans


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ferred her energies to the vital Narew, Vistula, Warta, and UpperSilesian lines, but Hitler did not wait for these fortifications to becompleted. Germany, having misdirected her future enemy, proceeded to build a fortified zone near Frankfurt, for the protection ofBerlin, a "pillbox" line on the E ast Prussian frontier, and the powerful West Wall, which effectively guarded her western frontier.

GERMAN PLANSOn 1 September, 1939, when Hitler released his forces againstPoland, he was following a basic stra teg ic principle of von Schlieffenfor Germany to eliminate quickly and completely one hostile fron tso that she might turn with her full strength against her other enemies. The Allied Powers had been seriously frightened by Munich,and England was beginning to rearm . A dangerous militaryUnion of England, France, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Poland wasthrea tening to develop. It was time for Hitler to seize the in itiativeand gain the advantage of surprise. Th at he decided to attackPoland instead of France in 1939 may be attributed to many factors,some of which w ere:

1. A quick decision could be reached in Poland.2. The West Wall could hold longer than the German fortifications in the Ea st.3. The Allies probably could not be ready to act before Polandcould be destroyed.4. The Maginot Line might delay an offensive against Francelong enough to allow the Poles to attack the German rea r.5. A quick victory in the Eas t might have a tremendous effectupon the future actions of Rumania, Yugoslavia, andHungary.6. The elimination of Poland would allow an easy flow ofRussian goods to Germany.

Poland, as a theater of war, was admirably suited to the capabilitiesof the modern Nazi war machine. A vast plain, 300 to 1,000 feetabove sea level, extends north to the Baltic from a line through Cracow and Lwow. At only thre e points within this plain are thereelevations above 2,000 feet: the Lysa Gora Hills near Radom, anuneven plateau between Czestochowa and Cracow, and a spur ofthe Carpathians reaching north through Lwow to Lublin. Onthe southern border is the only major terrain obstacle, the HighTatra and Carpathian Mountains, rising to heights above 8,000 feet.Cutting through these mountains from Slovakia are two major


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9passes, the Jablunka and Dukla, at 1,800 and 1,650 feet respectively,and a third somewhat higher and narrower pass south of NowySacz.

During most of the months of the year the broad, gentle rivers ofPoland are formidable obstacles. In September and October, however, ra ins may or may not follow the long summer drought. In1939, the autumn rains did not arrive until after the Germans hadcompleted their advance. The rivers , as a consequence, were extremely shallow, even the Vistula being fordable at many pointsabove W arsaw . The Polish mud, made famous by Napoleonic campaigns and the Fir st World W ar, failed to materialize. Germanmechanized divisions, which m ight have been partially bogged downfor days, swept easily over the dry, level plains.In general, the German plan (Map 2) was to be an application ofthe principle of "Cannae," as expounded by von S.chlieffen. Eightyper cent of Germany's fully mobilized strength, to include all of themotorized and mechanized divisions and two air fleets, was concentrated on the Polish border before the attack. A light center,resting upon the fortifications of Frankfurt, was to defend in place;while two strong wings were to penetrate the dispersed enemy defenses and envelop the Polish divisions. Fur ther , and contingentupon the success of the primary envelopment, a secondary envelopment was to be inaugurated to trap any enemy units which mightescape the primary attack.One glance at the map of Poland will show how admirably suitedwas such a plan to the Polish terrain . Most of the country's heavyindustry was centered in an area between Teschen and the Wisloka

River. Lodz was Poland's grea test manufac turing city, and Gdyniawas her only outlet to the sea. West of the Vistula, Poland wasrelatively wealthy; but east of that river the land is poor and wassparsely populated. To the German GHQ it appeared probable,therefore, that the Poles would hold as long as possible a forwardposition along the ir weak, six-hundred-mile western frontier . Infact, the German high command had received information of aPolish concentration plan which contemplated using all divisionsalong the border. Nazi troops in Eas t Prussia and German-heldSlovakia would be well on the flank of any such forward position.Germany's detailed plan contemplated that the Tenth Army ofvon Reichenau and the Third Army of von Kuechler would deliverthe main attacks of the primary envelopment, directing themselvestoward the area between Warsaw and Siedlce. On the north flank,von Kluge was to push rapidly across the Corridor, protecting von


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10Kuechler's righ t. He was to make contact with von Kuechler nearGraudenz and was to reinforce the latter's army with some of theelements of the Fo urth Arm y. Blaskowitz and List were to pushforward to protect the flanks of the southern pincer. List, in addition, was to have the mission of enveloping, without destroying,the industrial area of Teschen, Cracow, and Tarnow. To executethis secondary mission, he was to direct a main effort from MarischOstrau toward Cracow, to be met by successive drives from Slovakiathrough the mountain passes near Neumarkt, Nowy Sacz, andSanok. Still fur ther, he was to move as rapidly as possible to thevicinity of Lwow and there block the retreat of the enemy intoneutral Rumania.The execution of the secondary double envelopment was to beextremely flexible as to time, place, and forces engaged. Its scopewas to depend on Polish reaction to the prim ary envelopment. Unitswere to be concentrated as rapidly as possible near Johannisburgand Lwow for use in this later phase of the attack.Many reasons have been advanced for Germany's having used twoseparate envelopments instead of a single attack whose pincerswould join well to the east of W arsaw . Probably the principal consideration was Germany's inability to concentrate sufficient forcesin Eas t Prussia and Slovakia prior to the attack. Though somereinforcements were brought into East Prussia before the outbreakof hostilities, others had to be transfer red across the Corridor as theadvance progressed.

POLISH PLANSThe detailed Polish plans have not as yet become known; so theirexact na ture is still the subject of much argum ent and doubt. Fromthe original dispositions, it appears that, desiring to hold as long aspossible her richer western terrain, Poland adopted a cordon defenseof her thousand-mile border. It is possible th a t she planned a delaying action if pressure on her border position became too great, withthe intention of taking up a final position behind the strong Narew-Bug-Vistula-San River line. There is also some evidence to indicatethat Polish cavalry planned a diversion from the Posen salient onBerlin.Polish plans for defense contemplated the formation of six groupsof divisions, each group being roughly th e equivalent of a field arm y.The 30 infantry divisions, 10 cavalry brigades, and one mechanizedbrigade which were available at the outbreak of war were all assigned


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11to the six groups. Smigly-Ritz evidently planned to create hisgeneral reserve from divisions not yet mobilized. When the GermanAir Force disrupted the mobilization of these divisions, he was leftwithout a general reserve.The initial dispositions of the six groups of the Polish Army areshown on Map 2. Only two cavalry brigades were left along theeastern frontier to observe the Russians.Until the last moment the Poles expected aid from France andEngland. They hoped for a determined diversion, such as the self-crucifying attacks of Russia in the Fi rs t World W ar. The Allieswere ill-prepared for such an effort; and, except for the half-heartedFrench advance into the Saar, no attempt was forthcoming.

OPERATIONSThe Break-Through, 1-5 September (Map 3).At 5:00 A. M.,1 September, 1939, the German armies struck.In the south, the Fourteenth Army (List) aimed a double blowat Cracow. One attack group struck east from Marisch Ostrau; asecond moved northeast from the Zilina area via Neum arkt. By 5September, these groups had broken the resistance opposed to themand had made contact near Cracow, and on this same day a thirdattack group from List's army advanced north from Zips on NowySacz. Their action, combined with a deep penetration by theTenth Army to the north of Katowice, rendered the important UpperSilesian ind ustrial area untenable, and its hurried evacuation by thePolish troops precluded any effective destruction of its mines orfactories.The strong Tenth Army (von Reichenau) consisted of at least twocorps composed of infantry divisions and of two mechanized corps,the latte r being the XVI of Lieutenant General Hoepner and the XVof General Hoth. This army concentrated its forces along theSilesian-Polish frontier between the towns of Kreuzberg and Tarnowice. One of the mechanized corps was on its left flank. Additional active and reserve divisions were disposed in rear to givedepth to this the main-attack force of the German offensive.The advance of the Tenth Army was opposed in its initial stagesby four Polish infantry divisions and one cavalry brigade.* Thesetroops were concentrated close to the frontier. P a rt were behindthe half-completed pillbox line of the Warta River; part were in thearea west of Czestochowa. The remaining four divisions of the PolishSilesian Group were far to the east and out of supporting distance.* Another Polish division was on the frontier initially, but apparently retirednortheastward without opposing the advance of the Tenth Army.


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12Striking hard along its front, the Tenth A rmy quickly overran theW arta line and captured the city of Czestochowa. The mechanizedcorps on its north flank reached Radomsko, a town 50 miles from,

the frontier, by 3 September. This advance outflanked the Polishdefenses to the south, along the Warta, which were being attackedfrontally by the infantry of the Tenth Army. Portions of themechanized corps struck south and enveloped th is resis tance. By4 September, the Polish front opposite the Tenth Army was disinteg rating . Three divisions retreated tow ard Tomaszow Maz, andone toward Lodz. The remaining division of the frontier forceswas encircled and annihilated ne ar Czestochowa.The retreat of four of the Polish divisions to the northeast andthe annihilation of the division near Czestochowa created a gap inthe Polish front. Through th is gap raced the two German mechanized corps. By evening of 5 September, they reached the linePiotrkow-Checiny, closely followed by the in fan try moving by forcedmarches.The Polish Silesian Group had lost all cohesion. One division hadbeen destroyed. Four were withd rawing northeastward, while the

remaining four, initially in reserve, were withdrawing eastwardtow ards the security afforded by the Vistula River. The Tenth .German Army had won a' tactical success of the first magnitude and hadadvanced 70 miles in five days.The Eigh th German Army (Blaskow itz), much the weakest of thesouthern group of armies, concentrated its forces in middle Silesiabetween Trebnitz and Kreuzberg. Its mission was to protec t thenorth flank of the Tenth Army. Having disposed its divisions inechelon to its left rea r, to guard against a possible Polish th ru st fromthe direction of Posen and Kalisz, this army pushed aside the singlePolish division on its front and by evening of 5 September hadcaptured Zdunska Wola and had established bridgeheads to the eastof the Warta River from which its further advance toward Lodzcould be launched.The Fourth Army (von Kluge) effected its concentrations priorto 1 September in two group ings. The stronger, consisting of threecorps, was drawn up along the German frontier in the area aroundSchneidemuhl and faced the broad base of the Corridor. A weakercorps concentrated in the vicinity of Butow, opposite'the seacoastsection of the Corridor.Von Kluge's mission was to reduce the Corridor in the shortestpossible time by an advance with the bulk of his a rmy to the VistulaRiver between Brom berg and Graudenz. He was then to effect acrossing of th a t river on both sides of Chelmo and continue to advancein the direction of Modlin and Warsaw.


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13The main effort of the Fou rth Arm y was to be made by the I I Corpsunder General Strauss, consisting initially of three divisions in firstline and several more in reserve. Its south flank was secured by a

weak corps. On its north flank was a mixed corps of mechanizedand motorized divisions under General Guderian, the peacetime inspector of tiie German mechanized troops. This main effort was tobe supported by a supplementary attack by the XXI Corps of vonKuechler's Third Army, which had been given the independent mission of attacking Graudenz. The combined attack was intended topinch off the Corridor and cut off all Polish troops that might remainthere.The attack of von Kluge's army proved extremely successful. By4 September, the line of the Vistula" and Netze R ivers betweenMarienwerder and Naklo had been reached. This rapid advance,which trapped some 25,000 Polish troops, had been materially aidedby the bold movements of General Guderian's mechanized corpsoperating on the north flank. Here the 3d Panzer Division openedup afive-milegap in the Polish line and, without regard to the security of its flanks, pushed speedily on to the Vistula River.The advance of the German corps from Butow into the maritimeregion of the Corridor encountered strong resistance from Polishreserve and naval shore formations. The fighting in this area, although not of any strategic importance, was of an extremely fiercena ture. It was not until 15 September th at the Germans occupiedGdynia, and the Hela peninsula held out until 1 October.Following the crossing at Chelmo on the night of 4-5 September, theFourth Army pushed out strong bridgeheads and made contact withthe XXI Corps near Graudenz.The Third Army (von Kuechler) concentrated its main forcesprior to 1 September in the area Osterode-Neidenburg-Allenstein,preparatory to breaking through the Polish fortified lines on bothsides of Mlawa. It was then to push its advance southeastward overthe Narew and Bug Rivers to the area east of Warsaw. The occupation of this area was the principal army objective.As already noted, the XXI Corps of the Third Army was given themission of cap turing Graudenz, thereby assisting von Kluge's army inclosing the Corridor. This task was completed on 5 September, andcontact was established south of the city with units of the FourthArmy. 'The main-attack force of von Kuechler's army, consisting of threeinfantry divisions, one panzer division, and one cavalry brigade,plus a number of reserve units, concentrated to the north of Mlawa.During the 1st and 2d, this force met strong Polish resistance in its


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14efforts to captu re the town. German tank attacks were repulsed.During the night of 2-3 September, the main effort of the attack wasshifted to the east, and the motorized elements of the army movedfrom the vicinity of Mlawa to Willenberg. This move caught thePolish forces unawares, and by evening of 3 September the ThirdArmy had captured the importan t road junction of Przasnysz. Thisadvance caused the Polish forces defending Mlawa to withdrawtowards Warsaw.During the 4th and 5th, the German troops continued the ir advancetowards the N arew River, and by the evening of 5 September the leftwing of these forces had reached Rozan, while the right wing hadcaptured Ciechanow. The frontier line of Polish fortifications hadbeen pierced, and contact had been made with the main defensivepositions along the N arew River.

General von Brauchitsch, on 5 September, began a regrouping ofhis northern forces. Strong reinforcements (23d Division and 3dPanzer Division) were transferred to von Kuechler's Third Armyfor its attack on Bialystok and Brest Litovsk, an operation fromwhich the German high command hoped for decisive strategic results. These divisions crossed the Corridor in trucks and on footduring the 5th and 6th of September, and after reaching the EastPrussian railheads, entrained for new concentration areas in theeastern part of East Prussia.

While the ground troops w ere gaining brillian t successes, the German Air Force was playing a most important pa rt. It opened itsattack at dawn on 1 September with a mass bombardment of theground installations of the Polish Air Force. During the next threedays every known Polish airdrom e was repeatedly bombed. Sodevastatingly efficient was this all-out air offensive that the PolishAir Force ceased to exist before it had had an opportunity to function. As early as 3 September, the weight of the German air a ttackwas shifted to the railroad lines west of the V istula, in order to prevent the use of these lines for the regroup ing and w ithdrawal of th ePolish forces, and by 5 September air attacks were being directedagainst Polish troop columns. During this period, also, most of theknown Polish aircraft factories were destroyed, as well as the largeammunition works at Sandomir.

The Exploitation, 6-8 September (Map 4).We next turn to therenewed operations of the ground and air forces for the period 6-8September, during which the Germans exploited their successfulpenetrations.


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15From the west and south of Cracow, General List's FourteenthArmy moved rapidly no rtheast and east against the re trea ting PolishCracow and Przemysl Groups, which were striving to reach the San

River line without offering decisive battle to the ir pu rsuers . Thereare indications that Polish GHQ at Warsaw, even this early in thecampaign, had lost touch with its southern groups, and that, in consequence, the commanders of these groups were left to act on theirown responsibility.On 6 September, the Marisch Ostrau attack group captured Cracow, the principal city of southern Poland . No opposition wasoffered. The Zips attack group occupied Nowy Sacz and pushed ontoward the Wisloka River. On 8 September the Galician towns ofTarnow and Gorlice were taken and a bridgehead seized at Debicaon the east bank of the Wisloka.The Tenth Army, on the evening of 5 September, lay stretched outon a broad front of some seventy miles from Piotrkow to Checiny.A panzer corps under Hoepner was concentrated around Piotrkow,while the other panzer corps of the army, under Hoth, stood on therig ht flank observing the enemy divisions to the south around Cracowand guarding against a hostile attack from that direction.The Polish divisions of the Silesian Group, which had opposed\Reichenau's initial assault, were on this day withdrawing northw ardtoward Lodz, while the four reserve divisions of that group, originally near Tomaszow Maz, were returning eastward towards theVistula with the intention of halting a German pursuit along the lineof the Lysa Gora Hills in front of Radom. This eccentric withdrawal opened up a gap in front of Reichenau's left w ing and center.Between Piotrkow and Warsaw no Polish force of any strength opposed Reichenau's advance. The best paved road in all Polandstretched between the two cities. At Piotrkow, Hoepner's powerfulpanzer corps stood ready. A situation had developed which permitted mechanized troops, for the first time in history, to show theirstrategic capabilities.Reichenau's advance on the 6th, 7th, and 8th assumed the characterof a headlong race. Hoepner's panzer corps reached Tomaszow Mazon 6 September. From this city the advance continued towardWarsaw. One mechanized column captured Rawa Mazowiecka onthe 7th, and reached the southwestern suburbs of Warsaw by theevening of tfie following day. The right column of the panzer corpstook a more easterly route, via Gora Kalwaria and thence along thewest bank of the Vistula. This column also reached the outskir tsof W arsaw on the evening of the 8th. Neither column, however,was sufficiently concentrated to undertake the occupation of the city,


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16although resistance at first appeared to be slight and unorganized.Hoepner's corps had far outstripped the Tenth Army's infantrydivisions, which on this evening were reported to be some seventymiles in rear of the mechanized un its. Caution was called for.Very strong and undefeated Polish forces were believed to be locatedin and around Lodz, threaten ing the left flank and re ar of the panzercorps.Hoepner's penetration had altered the strategic situation. - Strongelements of the T horn, Posen, and Silesian Groups lay to the w est ofthis German wedge. From this time on the further ret rea t of thesetroops was to be a difficult operation . Po land 's m ilitary situationwas desperate, and only a miracle could postpone the destruction ofher forces.While Reichenau's left wing was advancing on Warsaw , his centerand right continued to advance in the direction of the Lysa GoraHills and Radom. The importan t city of Kielce was taken on the6th, and by the 7th the army was engaged in a frontal battle w ith the3d and 12th Polish Divisions in and around Skarzysko Kamienna.The 19th and 29th Divisions of this Polish group were on this daywithdrawing from Tomaszow Maz through Radom to the safetyoffered by the Vistula River.The withdrawal of the Polish Cracow Group from Cracow eastward had relieved General Hoth's panzer corps of the necessityof further protecting Reichenau's right flank, which was no longerin danger. Reichenau's mission was now to prevent the successfulwithdraw al of the enemy's divisions at Radom and in the Lysa GoraHills. Hoth's panzer corps, concentrated to the southeast of Kielce,was directed to advance along the west bank of the Vistula in thegeneral direction of Zwolen and to cut the lines of Polish retreatbetween Radom and the river. The advance of the corps was extremely rapid . It captured both Zwolen and Radom during theafternoon and evening of the 8th. This movement cut across the lineof retreat of four Polish divisions.The advance of the Eighth Army (Blaskowitz) during this phaseof the operations continued in a northeasterly direction withoutimportant incidents. On the 6th and 7th of September, advances ofnormal depths were made from the W arta bridgeheads. On the 8th,the army passed on both sides of Lodz, without, however, occupyingthe city, and towards evening reached Ozorkow and Brzeziny.During this advance the 30th Division marched echeloned to theleft flank of the E ighth Army, so as to preven t interference with thearmy's movements by the strong Polish forces known to be locatedin the province of Posen. It is noteworthy th at , on the 8th, Blasko


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17Witz was entirely unaware of the fact that a strong Polish force ofabout five divisions, which had begun to withdraw from Kalisz,Posen, and Thorn, was fast approaching the army 's left flank. Thefailure of the German intelligence service to function on th is occasionwas to result in the grave crisis which befell the E ighth Army duringthe succeeding week. It was momentarily to threa ten the successof the entire German plan of campaign.The German Fourth Army, which had been weakened by thetransfer of some of its troops to the Third Army, continued itsadvance on both sides of the Vistula River. By 8 September, theIII Corps, operating on the right of the army, had advanced close toHonensalza, pushing on the heels of the Polish forces withdrawingfrom Posen and Thorn on Warsaw. On this same day the II Corps,moving along the east side of the Vistula, had captured Strasburgand had crossed the Drewence River. Only weak detachmentsbarred the further advance of this corps on Modlin.By the night of 5 September, the striking force of the Third Army(von Kuechler) stood in two groupm ents, one at Ciechanow and theother facing Rozan on the Narew R iver. Up to the 5th, the directionof attack of the army had been due south, towards Modlin and Warsaw. However, it had been the intention of the army commanderfrom the outset not to run frontally aga inst the fortifications protecting the Polish capital on the north , but ra ther to drive southeastwardover the N arew and Bug Rivers toward Siedlce, a city fifty miles eastof Warsaw, the capture of which would result in isolating the Polishcapital. During 5 September, the troop movements necessary toeffect this change of front were in progress.The Narew was crossed on 7 September at Pultusk and Rozan,and on the 8th the German pursuit towards the Bug River, in thedirection of Wyzkow and Brok, was, initiated. This forcing of theNarew was an important success and profoundly influenced the entire strategic situation. The line of the Narew was the only Polishdefensive position north of Warsaw, and on its retention dependedthe ultimate fate of both the Polish capital and the whole Vistulaposition. Once across the Narew, the road into the interior of Polandwas open to the Third Army. The crossing of the river startedthe sequence of events which led to the surrender of Warsaw andthe Polish field forces..While the Narew was being crossed, a new and strong concentration of the Th ird Army was being effected in the area Lyck-Johannisburg, preparatory to advancing in the directions of Bialystok andBrest Litovsk. However, the movement of th is force across thefrontier did not take place until 9 September.


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18During the period 6-8 September, the German A ir Force continuedits operations against the Polish air fields and the communicationssystem of western Poland. Repeated heavy bombing attacks were

made against the railroads leading from Thorn, Posen, and Kalisztoward the Polish capital. The object of these attacks was to retardthe regrouping of the Posen and Thorn troops, which were knownto be attempting to retire eastward.On the 8th, the German Air Force struck atelling blow by destroying the Vistula bridges near Deblin. This added further to thedifficulties of the four Polish divisions near Radom, whose retreatto the Vistula was already menaced by General H oth's panzer corps.On 8 September, the main Polish forces west of Warsaw were ina critical situation. W ith transpo rtatio n and communication facilities destroyed by the German Air Force, these confused and harasseddivisions were now at the mercy of the ir opponents, who proceeded toclose the already partially drawn net.The Encirclement, 9-14 September (Map 5).The operations ofthe Fourteenth Army (List) during the period September 9-14 tookon the charac ter of a pu rsu it. Nowhere did the Polish divisions of

the Cracow and Przemysl Groups seek to offer strong resistance.By the evening of the 8th, the troops of the Fourteenth Army hadreached the general line Gorlice-Debica-Pinczow. In their front thePolish units were seeking to withdraw to defensive positions behindthe San River. This withdraw al, which was not everywhere carriedout in an orderly manner, was made in two directions. The CracowGroup adopted a northeasterly direction of retirement toward Chelm,in order to defend the lower San and the Vistula from Zawichost toLezajsk; the Przemysl Group, on the other hand, retired due eastward in the direction of Lwow, so as to bar the upper San Riverto the German pursue rs. The latte r group now consisted of bu t twodivisions.The advance of the Fourteenth Army during this period was exceptionally rap id. It appears th at the two mechanized divisions ofthe arm y cut loose from the foot divisions and sought to take advantage of their high speed to seize the San crossings before these couldbe organized for defense.On the 9th and 10th of September, the Fourteenth Army seizedcrossings over the San at Radymno, Jaroslaw , and Sanok and duringthe next three days pursued the re trea ting Polish forces w ith increasing speed. On the 12th, the army's righ t wing reached Sambor andsent forward towards Lwow a strong detachment of infantry inrequisitioned trucks . Mechanized units , coming from Przem ysl,


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19reached the outskirts" of Lwow on the same day. For the nex t fewdays a series of confused battles occurred in the environs of thafrlargecity. Thir ty miles to the west, two Polish divisions seeking to ret ireto the east were intercepted near Grodek and their retreat broughtto a standstill.To the northwest of Lwow, mechanized units succeeded, on 13September, in getting across the Lublin-Lemberg highway at Tomaszow and Rawa Ruska. The main elements of the Polish CracowGroup were on this day in the vicinity of Bilgoraj, along the eastbank of the San, far in rea r of these German mechanized forces.The seizure of the San River line was an important strateg ic success for the Germans. This was the last suitable defensive positionin southern Poland. Eas tern Galicia now stood defenseless beforethe German invader, and the retirement of the Polish forces in thesouth to Rum ania was no longer possible. Nothing remained for theCracow Group at Bilgoraj but to seek to continue its retreat to thenortheast, in the hope of finding temporary respite in the roadlessand resourceless Pripet Marshes.During the period 9-14 September, the Tenth Army (Reichenau)fought in two distinct combat groups in far-separated area s. Theleft wing of the army suffered a check in its first efforts to captureW arsaw, and then participated with varying fortune in the desperatebattles fought by the Eighth Army against the Polish forces thatwere seeking to cut the ir way through to the capital. During thesedays the right wing of the army was engaged seventy miles to thesouth and won an annihilating victory at Radom, where four Polishdivisions were surrounded and captured. The operations of th iswing of von Reichenau's army furnish a most interesting exampleof the German use of mechanized units . On 8 September, as alreadynoted, General Hoth's panzer corps had cut across the line of withdrawal of the 3d, 12th, 19th, and 29th Polish Divisions at Radom andZwolen, ba rrin g the ir retreat across the Vistula. This interceptiondid not, however, insure the destruction of these units. The panzercorps was not strong enough to force the surrender of over 60,000men. Assistance was necessary. This was provided by the pursuing German foot divisions, which were enacting th e role of th e direct-pressure force in the pu rsu it. During the 9th and 10th, the encirclement of the Polish divisions was completed, and these troops, afterfutile efforts to break the ring, surrendered on the 12th. A fewstragglers alone succeeded in finding their way across the Vistula.

The action on the front of Reichenau's left wing did not progressso favorably for the Germans. The efforts made by detachments ofHoepner's panzer corps to capture Warsaw were repulsed, and be


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20 fore reinforcements could arrive in sufficient numbers to launch adetermined attack against the city, developments on the front of theEighth Army made it imperative to move all available troops fromthe Tenth Army to reinforce the former.On the evening of 8 September, the columns of the Eighth Army(Blaskowitz), after passing Lodz to the east and west, had reachedOzorkow and Brzeziny. Lodz itself, according to the plan, was notto be occupied until the 9th. The army commander hoped to seizethe line of the Bzura on the next day and thereby to carry out hismission of protecting the left flank of the Tenth Army. Polish unitswere known to be in and around Kutno and along the Bzura. Theseforces, however, were gravely underestimated. The German highcommand estimated the strength at five infantry divisions and twocavalry brigades; the actual strength was twelve infantry divisionsand two cavalry brigades. Over half of these units had not beenengaged. They outnumbered the Eighth Army by more than twoto one.From the opening day of the campaign, General Blaskowitz hadcarefully watched his left flank. He had echeloned the 30th Divisionbehind his left-flank corps. As events developed, this dispositionproved to be the arm y's salvation.Early on the 9th, the Eighth Army took the offensive against theline of the Bzura. Vague as was the situation on the army's front,Blaskowitz was merely following the German military doctrine,which is that in a doubtful situation the offensive is the best policy.The initial attacks of the German E igh th Army were successful inspite of heavy casualties. Soon, however, Polish streng th asserteditself. The forward progress of the Germans was stopped, andPolish counterattacks began along the entire front. On the Germanleft, in the zone of the 30th Division, a crisis developed. Five Polishdivisions struck this unit in flank, cut off its advance guard, andforced it to withdraw.The situation was saved by three German counteractions. TheTenth A rmy diverted every available man and tank from the vicinityof Warsaw to the zone of Blaskowitz's army. The Polish attackswere stopped by these reinforcements. As a second measure, reserve divisions following closely on the heels of the Eighth Armywere rushed into action. Finally, strong bombardment elements ofthe German Air Force were taken off their strategic missions andlaunched against the Polish ground forces facing Blaskowitz. By15 September, all danger to the Eighth Army had passed and theGermans resumed the offensive.


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21The operations of the Fourth Army (von Kluge) during thisperiod consisted principally of march ing. On the 8th, this armywas divided into two groups, one on each side of the Vistula. One

group, consisting only of foot divisions, moved southeastward in aseries of forced marches to join in the great battle raging betweenKutno and Lodz. By the 15th, this group was approaching theformer city and was preparing to assist the efforts of the E ighth andTen th Armies. By the evening of the same date, the daily advancesof the other group had placed it in front of the fortress of Modlin,from which it effectively blocked the re trea t to the north of the Polishforces around Kutno.By 8 September, the Third Army (von Kuechler) had forced thefortified line of the Narew River between Pultusk and Rozan. During the succeeding days the army exploited this success and movedagainst the rea r communications of W arsaw. By the 12th, therailroad lines leading from that city to Bialystok and Siedlce hadbeen cut. By the 14th, a line of investment opposite the capital cityhad been occupied and its encirclement completed. One Polish division had retreated in the direction of Siedlce, followed by elementsof the German Third Army.The second major operation of the Third Army commenced on 9September. On this day the strong group of divisions which hadassembled in the Lyck-Johannisburg area moved on Brest Litovsk.The advance of th is force was weakly opposed, and by the 14th it hadcaptured Brest Litovsk. Small Polish forces in the area were eithercut up or cap tured. Any possibility of a Polish stand east of Warsaw was ended by this m aneuver.During the encirclement of the Polish forces by the ground troops,the German Air Force, as in the previous period, carried out a seriesof large-scale bombardment operations designed to paralyze theentire railroad net east of the Vistula and to prevent the transportwestward by rail of the reserve units known to be completing theirorganization in eastern Poland. These operations were interruptedbetween the 11th and 14th of September by the diversion of sqtfad^rons to the assistance of the hard-pressed Eighth Army north ofLodz.The Annihilation, 15-28 September (Map 6).The final phase ofthe campaign deals with the annihilation of the trapped Polish divisions. It was during this period that Poland was invaded from theeast by Russian arm ies. However, this invasion did not have animportan t effect on the final outcome of the campaign. At the timethe invasion began, Polish resistance had been completely brokenand all avenues of r etreat had been blocked.


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22By the evening of 14 September, the center group of the Fourteenth Army (List) had reached, with its advanced mechanizedelements, the outskirts of Lwow and had placed a thin outpost

line around three sides of the city. The right wing of the army wasin the vicinity of Sambor. The bulk of the'mechanized forces, functioning as the advance guard of the left wing, were across theLublin-Lwow highway between Tomaszow and Rawa Ruska.The Polish forces in Galicia, already half demoralized by theirlong retreat and much weakened by straggling, stood in two maingroups. The larger, comprising some five infantry divisions and amechanized brigade, was slowly withdrawing to the northeast andby the 15th was along the San River to the southeast of Sandomir.The smaller group, composed of two infantry divisions, lay betweenPrzemysl and Lwow. The furthe r withdrawal of thi s lat ter forceto Lwow had been blocked by the German mechanized forces nearth at city. Its line of retreat to Rumania had been barred by theGerman detachments in Sambor.On the 16th, serious fighting began between the left wing ofGeneral List's arm y and the strong Polish Cracow Group around thetown of Bilgoraj. The Polish withd raw al had been ^intercepted byGerman mechanized troops in the region between Zamosc and Chelm,and German in fantry divisions had come up from the w est and southwest to join in the fighting. The battles around Bilgoraj, in whichunits of von Reichenau's army participated , continued until the 20th.On that day some 60,000 Poles laid down their arms, among themthe commanding general of the Polish groups of the south, GeneralPekor. Remnants of this Polish force eluded the German net, onlyto fall victims to the advancing Russian armies a few days later.

Of the Polish Przemysl Group,' some 10,000 were captured nearRawa Ruska on the 18th. Small detachm ents of th is force escapedto the southeast and, eluding the Russians, reached safety and intern ment in Rumania and Hungary.On the 17th, scouting elements of the motorized reconnaissancebattalions of General List's army made contact with similar unitsfrom General Kuechler's army nea r Wlodawa. This junction com

pleted the first stage of the outer double envelopment of the Polishforces. The outer net was still bu t a thin screen and might havebeen penetrated by any Polish attack in force. The surrender ofthe Polish troops at Warsaw, Kutno, and Bilgoraj made the outernet unnecessary, but its existence shows the thorough indoctrinization of the German high command in the principles of annihilationlaid down years before by Count von Schlieffen.


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23The Tenth Army (Reichenau), during this phase of the operations,continued, to fight in two groups. While the left wing of the armycooperated with General Blaskowitz's Eighth Army and a part of

General von Kluge's Fourth Army in forcing the surrender of thePolish forces between Kutno and the Bzura, the right wing continuedits advance towards Lublin, an advance initiated on the 13th whenbridgeheads across the Vistula had been established near Pulawy andAnnopol. It was a par t of th is wing that assisted the troops underList in forcing the surrender of the Polish units at Bilgoraj.The concentric attack of the German armies on the Polish forcessurrounded near Kutno began on the 15th. The Tenth Army attacked west from W arsaw. The Eighth Army pressed from thesouth against the line of the Bzura. The right column of the F ou rthArmy advanced southeast from Wloclawek on Kutno. Other forcesof the Fourth Army stood along the north bank of the Vistula fromPlock to Wysogrod, barring a Polish withdrawal across the river.This concentric attack by large German forces rapidly broke allPolish resistance. All efforts to break out of this ring of fire provedfutile. By the 17th, the Polish forces had been pressed toge therinto a veVy narrow area between the Vistula and the Bzura southwestof Wysogrod. There, harassed on all sides by the ever-increasingpressure of the encircling forces and bombed from the air by theGerman Air Force, 170,000 Poles laid down their arms in one of thegreatest surrenders of a field army in all military history.While this gigantic battle of annihilation was being brought to aclose west of Warsaw, un its of the German T hird and Fourth Armieswere draw ing tight the lines of blockade around W arsaw and Modlin;and to the east, near Siedlce, other elements of the Third Army wererounding up Polish forces seeking to escape to the southeast. In thisarea, 12,000 officers and men of the Polish 1st Division were forcedto surrender.The air operations during this phase were much less extensivethan in previous periods, bu t were nevertheless important. Bombing expeditions were carried out agains t Polish troop concentrationsand columns in the regions east of the Vistula. The airfields adjoining the Russian border were extensively bombed, and the last remaining Polish radio stations were destroyed. As already noted, theGerman A ir Force also played an important role in the las t phase ofthe Battle of the Bzura, bombing enemy troops and spreading thedemoralization that was fast seizing the Polish forces in this area.The only Polish troops at large on 20 September in the German-occupied portion of Poland were: the garrison of Warsaw; thegarrison of Modlin; the naval garrison of the Hela peninsula;


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24 small forces in Lwow; and a considerable number of Polish units,mostly reserve formations, in the area between Deblin and Lublin.Lwow surrendered on 21 September. On 22 September, theGerman forces in this region began a withdraw al to the San River inaccordance with an agreem ent with Russia. The naval garrison onthe Hela peninsula su rrendered on 1 October.Of particular interest during this final phase of the campaign isthe capture of W arsaw and its sister fortress , Modlin. On 22 September, Blaskowitz and von Kuechler were beseiging Warsaw fromtheir positions on the two sides of Vistula, while Strauss with aspecial group was operating agains t Modlin. On th is day, bothBlaskowitz and von Kuechler delivered a successful series of limitedattacks, drawing in their siege lines about the city.Commencing on the 24th, an intense artillery and aerial bom bardment was loosed on the capital and continued unabated until the 27th.It is reported that as a result of this bombardment about 20 per centof all the houses in W arsaw were destroyed and th a t about 60 per centreceived one or more hits.On 25 September, a coordinated in fantry attack was made again stthe city. The following intere sting account is an extract from therep ort of an A merican officer who visited the field of battle immediately after the fall of W arsaw. It describes attacks *>n an antiquatedfort line along the western outskirts of the city near the suburb ofMokotow:

Another interesting action*was the attack of an infantry regiment, reinforced with one regiment of light and one battalion ofmedium artillery, against the southern part of Warsaw, throughthe suburb of Mokotow.This attack was described in much detail by General Gallwitzer,the regimental commander, who had been promoted to general inrecognition of his conduct of the atta ck . He took us over theground, largely on foot, and pointed out even individual housesthat had been stubbornly defended.Mokotow, with an old fort lying about 1,500 yards west thereof,was a completely fortified are a. A deep ditch connected the townwith the fort. This ditch served as a tan k obstacle to pro tect theareas between the two against tank attacks, and also as a coveredroute to transfer troops from one to the other.A main road entered the town from the southwest, each sideflanked by separa te villas constructed of stone and bricks. Towardthe center of the suburb the buildings became larger, up to fourstories high and fifty yards square, and included such buildings asa hospital and apartm ent houses. Much of this construction wasnew and of concrete.The Poles had organized each and every building for defense.Outside doors, as well as stairways, were barricaded from the


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25inside with sandbags. Holes were broken through the floorsand roof and communication maintained by means of ladders.Where buildings had common walls, holes were broken throughon each floor. One of these houses was the dwelling of a Peruv iandiplomat.Machine guns were so placed at street crossings that the intersecting streets could be swept with fire. Artille ry was emplacedat the ends of streets so that the guns could fire point-blankdown the street. Stone sidewalks were then torn up and usedto build barricades across the streets. Stree tcars were also usedfor this purpose.Riflemen in pairs were placed in rooms behind sandbags, wellback from windows. From such positions they could fire withoutbeing located.Artillery was placed in parks and open squares all through thethe city so that it was screened from observation from the front.On 24 September, the German Air Force bombed all military objectives, first with explosives and then with incendiary bombs.After a fifteen-minute artillery preparation, commencing at noonon 25 September, the German regiment attacked with two battalions in the front line. One battalion advanced astride the mainroad, leading from the southwest, with the r igh t battalion eastthereof. The approach led over cut grassland and potato patches,and was, for 500 yards, quite easy until both battalions were metby heavy well-aimed rifle fire from the edge of town. The firecould not be returned effectively because it was impossible to observe from where it was coming. The atta ck suffered considerablelosses in continuing another 500 yards to the edge of the suburbitself. There it w as brought to a complete stop by the heavy flanking fire coming from all directions from the houses.

In renewing the attack, the Germans either had to destroyeach building by artille ry fire or ca rry on operations with engineersand infa ntry agains t each house. After tak ing one, they had tocover each window of the next house with fire and then breakthrou gh its walls. Several unsuccessful attem pts were made withinfantry heavy weapons to silence a Polish field piece, which wasset up in strong earthworks so that it enfiladed a main streetand was breaking up the whole attac k of the battalion. It wasfinally necessary to bring up a 105-mm. gun to silence the fieldpiece and allow the attack to proceed.The Germans sustained exceptionally heavy losses in this actionin spite of the ir stro ng artille ry support. It shows again thegreat defensive value of towns and villages when properly utilized.Under great difficulties, the attack continued about one kilometerfar the r into the town. A t noon on the 27th, it w as-discontinuedbecause of an armistice preceding the surrender of the city.

On 27 September, the garrison of Warsaw capitulated, and thatof Modlin, no doubt influenced by the fall of the capital, followedsuit. Forces in the area east of Deblin offered resistance until 5October. The campaign in Poland was at an end.


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26

COMMENTS*Thus in about four weeks one of Europe's great armies was enveloped, disorganized, and annihilated . Yet from th is campaign themajor Allies profited but little. Military men, studying the conquests, condemned the Poles instead of recognizing German potentialities. Certain lessons, which now seem apparen t, went unheeded;and France continued to make only halfhearted prep ara tions behindher fortifications. Looking backward and comm enting after the factis always easy. Many men have been able to find fault w ith Napoleon, bu t no man has approached his achievem ents. Nevertheless, itis now apparen t th a t certain lessons could have been learned from theconquest of Poland. It might have been realized th at the offensivehad again become the king of the battlefield; that Germany oncemore had a powerful, well-trained army, and that it was capable ofturning the war into one of maneuver; that modern weapons, morethan man power and fortifications, might be the proper index of anation's combat power.The erroneous impression has arisen from the rap idity with whichit was concluded, and from the overwhelming success of the GermanArmy, that the campaign was little more than a maneuver whichfailed to afford a real te st of German,battle efficiency. This viewneglects the fact that the German casualties, as officially published,were over 10,000 killed, 30,000 wounded, and 3,000 missing; Whenit is remembered th at the most of the casualties were incurred withina period of eight days, the campaign in Poland can be recognizedas a major military operation in which the Polish Army offered astubborn resistance, and which required a major effort on the partof Germany.Although the Polish plan was faulty in its strategic conception,the complete collapse of the defense was due not so much to poorstrategy and leadership as to the overwhelming superiority of theGermans, who broke Polish resistance during the first four days ofthe campaign and prevented the Poles from carrying into execution

their plan to make a final stand behind the Vistula. Fur ther , thisremarkable success of the Germans was not due solely to the AirForce and the mechanized troops , bu t must be ascribed to a field forcewith a balanced organization and a balanced arm ament, executing aplan under excellent leadership. Like the backfield of a football* A number of these comments have been taken almost ve rbatim from materialprepared by the Military Intelligence Service of our War Department.


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27team, it was the A ir Force and the mechanized troops th at receivedthe pub licity; but, like the line, it was the German infantry that borethe brun t of the atta ck.

It would be unfair at this time, with only incomplete evidence athand, to condemn too severely the strategy of the Polish high command. We do not know for certain whether it was the intentionto accept ba ttle a t the frontie r or merely to fight a series of delayingactions and then withdraw to the strong Narew-Vistula-San Riverline. In either case, however, it would appear that the Poles areopen to criticism. For them to offer to meet the German Army inopen warfare , on equal term s, suggests that either the Polish intelligence service had been seriously deficient, or th at GHQ had made afaulty estimate of the worth of the German Army. If it was thereal Polish plan merely to fight a series of delaying actions alongthe frontier and then to withdraw to the Vistula, a very strong casecan still be made again st the initial troop concentrations. Only onedivision was held originally on or in rear of this final line, while 95per cent of the entire Polish Army took post along or closely in rearof the frontier. The dispositions actually adopted suggest that thePolish war plan envisaged a cordon defense.

Of the fifty German divisions used on the Polish Front, ten weremechanized, four were motorized, three were mountain, and thirty-three were infantry divisions. These figures show th a t the extentof the mechanization of the German Army has been greatly exaggerated. In some of the la ter campaigns the proportion of infantrydivisions was even grea ter. The Germans believe, and th is beliefwas justified in Poland, that no mechanization and motorization hasyet been able to give the same degree of tactical mobility and flexibility on the field of battle that foot soldiers possess.

In general, the infantry divisions attacked on broad fronts, eachdivision within the corps being assigned a zone of action and anobjective. W ithin the division zones of action the advance was conducted by reinforced regiments. These reinforced regiments (called"march combat groups"*), operating almost independently, werelargely responsible for the rapidity of the German advance.After the First World War, many officers of the German Armybelieved that the infan try division as then constituted was too largeand unwieldly for open warfare, lacking sufficient strategic as wellas tactica l mobility. Too many small divisions would complicate thesupply system; so a compromise was arrived at by which the comparatively large infantry division was retained, but with an organ

* Called "regimental combat teams" in our Army.


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28ization which permitted its division into three groups, each providedorganically with sufficient striking power to make it almost an independent command. The entire division could, of course, be assembled for concerted action. While the tra ins were motorized, thecombat elements retained much of the ir horse-drawn transporta tion .In the tactical employment of the German division, the marchcombat group is retained until enemy resistance necessitates employment of the division as a whole, when all the attached troopsimmediately revert to division control. This is particula rly true ofthe artillery, which is almost invariably employed under direct control of the artillery commander, once the division is committed toconcerted action.German tactical doctrine and train ing stress the responsibility forindividual leadership and initiative of subordinate commanders.Each combat unit is organized and armed to provide for both fire andmovement. In ba ttle, appropria te objectives are assigned to eachunit, and subordinate troop leaders accomplish their individual tactical missions with a minimum of interference from higher commanders. W ritten orders in the division are ra re. It was to thistactical doctrine and training that the extraordinary speed of theGerman attack can largely be attrib ute d. Again to quote fromClausew itz: "Happy the army in which the untimely boldness frequently manifests itself; it is an exuberant growth which shows a,rich soil. Even foolhardiness, th at is, boldness withou t an object,is not to be despised . . . "

No discussion of the German ground forces would be completewithout reference to the remarkable marching ability and superbphysical condition of the German soldier. An infan try division ofthe II Corps, crossing th e C orridor, marched 45 miles ag ains t enemyresistance and forded the V istula in a period of three days. La terthis same unit marched 31 miles per day for three successive days.In contrast with their later use in succeeding campaigns, the employment of panzer divisions on the Polish Front was conservative.As far as is known, in only two instancesin the Teschen area andin the attack of the fortified line of Mlawawere tanks used in acoordinated attack with the infantry . It is not known whetherthese supporting tank units were from armored divisions or from theindependent tank regiments th at were available. Employing thesoft-spot tactics of von Hutie r, the German in fan try divisions locatedweak spots and created gaps. The mechanized and motorized forceswere then sent through the gaps in the execution of what were formerly called "cavalry missions." They exploited the break-throughby attacking the flanks and rear of the Polish divisions, disrupting


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29their communications, preventing their taking up delaying positions,and cu tting off their re trea t to a final defensive line. When on thesemissions, the mechanized divisions would operate far in advance ofthe infantry, at times as much as 30 or 40 miles in rear of the Polishfront line.In the Fourteenth Army on the south and in von Reichenau'sTenth Army, it is known that the mechanized and motorized divisionswere organized into corps consisting of one or two mechanized divisions and a motorized division. Organically, the panzer divisioncontained sufficient reconnaissance and security troops to seize terrain fea tures along the route of advance, and sufficient infantryand artillery to occupy and hold the terra in taken . In the tankcolumns themselves, close artille ry support was furnished bythe medium tanks, armed with either the 37-mm. or 75-mm. gunand having the same maneuverability as the light tanks.German tank units had enough organic transportation to makethem self-sufficient. Gasoline was supplied to combat units in five-gallon tins. These containers , about two feet high and cylindricalin shape, were made of an extremely hard but light metal. Extracontainers were carried on the tanks and when empty were droppedoff along the road to be picked up by the trains. When the tankunits of the Tenth Army first arrived at Warsaw, they were completely cut off for several days, during which time they were suppliedby air, the gasoline containers being dropped from planes.As already noted, the German Air Force contributed to both thestrateg ical and tactica l success of German arms in Poland. ThePolish air arm was completely neutralized from the outset. Aftera few days it was no longer a factor. Rail lines were in terruptedwhen and where the German high command desired. This continuous bombardment prevented the completion of Polish mobilization. Telephone and telegraph lines were cut by bombing. Polishmilitary headquarters, which were thus forced to use radio, weresoon located and bombed. Civil as well as military control brokedown rapidly, owing to the destruction of rail and wire communications. During the entire campaign, air observation units providedthe German Army with as complete information of its own and enemytroops as could be expected. Special airplanes for liaison work infriendly territory performed valuable service by disseminating information and orders to German troops. The use of dive-bomberunits on the field of battle again st Polish reserves and the extensiveemployment of bombardment squadrons against retreating Polishcolumns contributed materially to the final result. The integration


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30of the Air Force into the combined German military effort was socomplete that its operations cannot be identified as decisive, butrather as indispensable in hastening the ultimate issue of battle.

From the German viewpoint, a most imp ortant result of the Polishcampaign was that they learned that their organization, armament,and tactical doctrine were correct. Especially was this tru e for themechanized division, which received a thorough tes t. The F irstWorld War had indicated the tremendous striking force of anarmored vehicle. The Spanish Civil W ar had demonstrated the necessity for heavier tank s, to be used in mass. The invasion ofAustria and Czechoslovakia had solved the technical problems ofsupply and rep air. The Polish campaign showed th a t the organization of the armored division was satisfactory, and th at these divisionswere capable of independent action. Now the stage was set for thenext act, the break-through at Sedan.


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THE CAMPAIGN IN POLAND, 1939(7)Terrain, Communicat ions, ^E. A 3 I and Permanent Forti f ications

P a v e j RO v 'J sGood Unpoxjc1 HoodsR o i l r o a d sP e im c n e n ! Fo ! i f i c o t t o n s

r^.Vt ' I.-';


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THE CAMPAIGN IN POL AN D, 1939KON-IGSBERG L A J I Dispositions of Opposing ForcesP R U S S I A 31 August, 1939, and German Pla n

MLAWANORTH GROUPoCI ECHANOW 2 cav. brigs, guardedRussian frontier.

4 German motorizeddivs. were used inPoland; exact ini- P0SEN GROUP \LECZYCAtial locations are no?known.

m_R^s_Hk),E_ s_.P10TRK0WnTlvonBLASKqWITZ SILESTAN GROUPB R E S L A U inf. divs. \2 ca\i brigs,/


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THE CAMPAIGN IN PGLANDJ939(3KON1GSBERG Q A J I

-R U S S I" A Situation at Dark, 5 September, 1939By nightfall of 5 Sept,25,0 00 of the ThornGroup were cut offand were surrendering.

/Elf T.W"!

H U V " G A R t f l a A N I A


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THE CAMPAIGN IN POLAND, 1939(4KONIGSBERG Q A J T

' R U S S I A Situation at Dark, 8 September, 1939German concentrafor 2 d phose attack.

' * , p l rm S\f. I ^ A / lt


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THE CAMPAIGN IN POL AND, 1939 ( 5KQNIGSBERG L A J I

P R U S S I A ; Situation at Dark, 14 September, 1939

eS|ASNYS

Remnants of Thorn, Posen,and j SilesianGrougs.

The greater part ofthe North Group withdrew into the fortressesof Modlin and Warsaw


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THE CAMPAIGN IN POLAND J939KONiGSBERG t_ " "* !

Situation at Dark5 20 September, 1939

0 20 5___2? 8 0S C A L E OF M I L E SQ v o N K U E C H L E R

Scottertt! unitsten ptblinondKocK conlinued retit tonce unh! 5 Oct

of P7 Fe in yii 6reu pd n tft orec18 Sept. A few escaped oerots

H U N


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DATE DU E DA Pom 28-30)AUG 2 8 n74

MOV 3 0 K *i, N - 1 ; . , . . & ^

JAN 77 2(]05

D A F O R M 1 8 8 1 . 1 J A N 5 7 * CPO : i 9eo OF-24S 341


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MAIN 940.542 U575cThe Campaign In Poland, 1939.United States. Military Academy, West Po

3 1695 00083 665 0 N75154

940.542U575cc.lU. S. Military Academy, West Point.

Dept. of Military Art and Engineering.The campaign in Poland, 1939.


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Poland Campaign History (1939)

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Transcript of Poland Campaign History (1939)