Sine Zine, Vol. 2 No.1

an essay by Thom Millary

A Pluralist Ontology

The foundation of philosophy is ontology.

Insights within the realms of cosmology,

epistemology, religion, politics, science,

and theology depend upon an understand-

ing of what constitutes existence. Thus, an

answer to the ontological question (what

does it mean to be?) must predicate any

coherent philosophical project. To articu-

late the place of humanity within the cos-

mos, we must gain a sense of what the

cosmos is like. Traditionally, ontological

projects have appealed to a sense of basic

unity or totality. Ontologies of unity include

theisms which posit God as the source or ground of Being (onto-theology), pantheisms,

and reductionist-materialisms that view the cosmos as the deterministic totality of

particles in motion. This paper is an attempt to present an alternative perspective, one

which allows us to retain the reality that we cannot abandon the vantage point of the

human perspective while pushing out that perspective past some of its perceived lim-

its.

Drawing on the work of thinkers such as Ilya Prigogine, Jane Bennett, William Connolly,

Stuart Kauffman, and Bruno Latour, I shall attempt to articulate an ontology of multi-

plicity rather than totality, a pluralist ontology that does not reduce the cosmos to a

primordial unity. However, not an ontology that posits existence as absolutely chance-

based or entirely devoid of real connection. In a vibrant and active cosmos, existence

includes experiences of encounter within the plurality of Being. Within this paper, I will

articulate an ontology (and cosmology) that accounts for intimacy and connection with-

out evoking an artificial all-encompassing wholeness. To evoke Adam Miller’s para-

phrase of Alain Badiou, “Though the One is not, there are unities”.1

Vibrant Actors

To begin, we must name some of the most crucially defining aspects of existing things.

Firstly, things act. Existing things are vibrant actors. The agency of things is a vital point

for a pluralist ontology, as it cuts through unhelpful dualisms between human and non-

human or life and non-life. This is a challenge to the traditional Newtonian view of mat-

ter as inert. Jane Bennett, in her 2010 work Vibrant Matter, posits that conceiving of

matter as fundamentally passive and inactive is no longer a useful framework for politi-

cal and philosophical projects. Holding to the view that matter is essentially inert rein-

forces anthropocentric worldviews that fail to take into account the wide and pluralistic

ways that agency is distributed amongst things. Bennett uses the term “thing-power” to

denote the “active, earthy, not-quite-human capaciousness”2 possessed by vibrant

matter. Thing-power reveals to us that matter is active independently of human subjec-

tivity. We do not merely project thoughts and ideas onto otherwise lifeless matter. Ra-

ther, things act upon us.

The imperfect is completed

The crooked is straightened

The empty is filled

The old is renewed

There is something perfect in its

disorder

Which is born before heaven

and earth

Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching

© 2014, Essay By Thomas Millary, Originally Titled, “Pluriverse: On Multiplicity in Becoming” // pub-

lished and directed by EKM Knapp // art by Cecil Touchon, http://ceciltouchon.blogspot.com /// Sine

Zine is a free distro by students at Eastern Mennonite University /// Special thanks to Dr. Christian

Early / Dr. Ted Grimsrud // non-commercial use permitted, please cite

theSineZine.blogspot.com Volume 2 Number 1, August 2014

Bennett notes a time she encountered debris (which humans are especially prone to

dismiss as irrelevant and non-vital) which was on a grate over a storm drain in a Balti-

more street.3 Among the things that commanded her attention were a black plastic

work glove, an oak pollen mat, a dead rat, a bottle cap, and a stick of wood. Things,

even debris, have a complexity and liveliness that exists in excess of their association

with human affairs. The complexity and unpredictability of things gives them the capa-

bility “to make things happen, to produce effects”.4 Things can (and frequently do) act

upon each other in relational ways that do not involve human subjectivity at all. When

a human interacts with something, that thing has agency that can generate effects

upon human experience (perhaps fascination, or disgust, or maybe pure surprise) even

if that particular thing is non-human or not biological life.

Emphasizing the ontological status of things as actors serves a political purpose in

addition to being a philosophical clarification. Failure to recognize the vitality of matter

lends itself to the “hyperconsumptive necessity”5 that drives a capitalist system that

whenever possible commodifies supposedly raw, inactive matter. Thing-power stands

in strong opposition to typical human conceptions concerning interaction with non-

human things. Bennett cites Bruno Latour’s insight that it is much easier for humans to

note our affect upon nature than it is to admit the extent to which nature effects cul-

ture.6

Acknowledgment of the agency of things has consequences for many facets of human

life. “Our trash is not ‘away’ in landfills but generating lively streams of chemicals and

volatile winds of methane as we speak.”7 Or consider the example of food. Eating is

not merely the consumption of passive material but rather an encounter with non-

human entities with their own agency and vitality. Consider the ability of certain foods

to alter human cognition and moods. Bennett cites the demonstrated ability of omega-

3 fatty acids to lessen violent behavior, relieve depression, and promote focus.8 Exam-

ples such as these show the need for acknowledgment of the ways that agency and

vitality are distributed throughout materiality rather than unique to humanity. Latour’s

suggestion is to view the constant interactions between vibrant actors of various cate-

gories as a “parliament of things.”9 Things of all kinds – animals, dirt, trees, food, litter,

etc… - are acting upon us, and we upon them, and them upon each other. Existence

entails agency. Being is active.

Availability and Resistance

Things that exist are characterized by a combination of resistance and availability.10

Latour makes the key point for a pluralistic ontology that “whatever resists is real”.11

The term resistance is used here not to imply that things are wholly isolated or unavail-

able but rather to highlight the fracture between all existing things that allows for

uniqueness as well as relation. While Latour makes use of resistance language, he

readily states that other terms could be used to describe the nature of existing things

(things curdle, things fold, things obscure, things sharpen, things slide, etc...).12 By

stating that things resist, Latour is positing a “principle of irreducibility”13, meaning that

no existing thing can be entirely reduced to any other existing thing. Miller summarizes

Latour’s principle as “an industrial grade blender that emulsifies heaven and earth, the

global and the local, the human and the nonhuman, into a single messy metaphysical

pulp”.14 Actors manifest their forces of resistance in a vast plurality of ways -

Some forces are evil and used to be associated with magic and the devil. Oth-

ers are Aristotelian and seek to realize the shape that lies within them. There

are Malthusian or Darwinian forces which always want more of the same and

would invade the world with their exponential growth if other equally greedy

forces did not check them. There are Newtonian forces which always want the

same thing and travel along the same trajectory so long as they are left in

peace. There are Freudian forces which do not know what they lust for-

displacing, substituting, metamorphosing, or paralyzing themselves as the need

arises. There are Nietzschean forces, stubborn yet plastic, wills of power giving

shape to themselves.15

Latour maintains that acknowledgment of the vast plurality of actors and forces, the

ways they manifest, and their varied expressions of resistance, need not be existential-

ly paralyzing. Rather, once we “give up this burden, this passion, this indignation, this

obsession, this flame, this fury, this dazzling aim, this excess, this insane desire to

reduce everything”16 we find ourselves free to “feel the island, and to explore the jun-

gle”17 of an active, resistant, pluralistic world. Accepting the reality of resistance

means accepting the potential for true surprise. Other acting things are not irretrieva-

bly withdrawn from us, but they are never entirely knowable or predictable. An innocu-

ous non-living object can produce profound unexpected effects upon us in the right

circumstances, a bitter enemy can become a good friend, a good friend can become a

bitter enemy, a mundane space can become the site of fantastic enlightenment. A

vitally dynamic aspect of Being lies in the surprises made manifest by the resistance of

things.

The resistance of things makes availability possible. Things resist but their existence

becomes coherent when Being is plural, when availability is a factor. Because things

are multiple rather than One, interaction and relation are key elements of a pluralistic

ontology. Latour holds to the principle that nothing is wholly irreducible to anything else

just as strongly as the principle that nothing is wholly reducible to anything else, mean-

ing that existence lies between isolation and unity in a state of dynamic relational frac-

ture. Miller summarizes this point thusly – “Given an original multiplicity, (1) no object

can be entirely reduced without remainder to any other object or set of objects, and (2)

no object is a priori exempt from being reducible in part to any other object or set of

objects”.18 In principle, all that exists is available on some level to everything else,

though whether or not a given thing can overcome another given thing’s resistance

depends entirely on provisional and contingent circumstances. Without contact with

that which is other than self, the resistance and distinction which characterize exist-

ence are impossible. “Nothing is by itself ordered or disordered, unique or multiple,

homogeneous or heterogeneous, fluid or inert, human or inhuman, useful or useless.

Never by itself, but always by others”.19 The journeys of becoming that existing things

undergo are intelligible only through meaningful encounter (for good or ill) with other

things that possess their own unique agency.

Ontological Equality

The principle of irreduction has a crucially important implication for ontology. If no ex-

isting thing can be entirely reduced to another, than existing things are ontologically

equal. Ontological equality signifies that every existing thing has the same potential to

undergo journeys of becoming (in vastly different forms). Such a framework prevents

two forms of ontological bias that privilege some existing things over other. The first

form is the reduction of existence to an Absolute, a “substantial preformatted One”20,

the notion that all existing things can in some form be reduced to an all-encompassing

unity. Another prominent form of an attempt to ontologically totalize the multiplicity is

the reduction of existence to a totality of building blocks (such as particles or strings)

that are more foundational and thus more real than what they compose. In Latour’s

framework, both forms of reductionism are equally egregious and metaphysically disre-

spectful to unique objects. Reducing the multitude to a totality of particles is not cate-

gorically different from supplementing the multitude with a supernatural Absolute.

A Christian loves a God who is capable of reducing the world to himself because

he created it. A Catholic confines the world to the history of the Roman salvation.

An astronomer looks for the origins of the universe by deducing its evolution from

the Big Bang. A mathematician seeks axioms that imply all the others as corollar-

ies and consequences. A philosopher hopes to find the radical foundation which

makes all the rest epiphenomenal. A Hegelian wishes to squeeze from events

something already inherent in them. A Kantian reduces things to grains of dust

and then reassembles them with synthetic a-priori judgments that are as fecund

as a mule.21

Ontological Emergence and the Biosphere

To demonstrate the irreducibility of things to fundamental elements and illustrate the

emergently complex nature of Being, it is helpful to turn to some fascinating ideas ex-

plored within the natural sciences. In his 2008 work, Reinventing the Sacred, Stuart

Kauffman presents a case for a natural world characterized by irreducible emergent

processes. From his perspective, humans are members of “a universe of ceaseless

creativity in which life, agency, meaning, value, consciousness, and the full richness of

human action have emerged”.22 Kauffman sets this view in opposition to a trend of

scientific reductionism, the origin of which he attributes to Galileo. Such reduction is

exemplified by physicist Steven Weinberg’s assertions that explanations of all entities

can be found in physics (the explanatory arrows always point downward) and that

greater knowledge of reality increasingly reveals its lack of meaning.

Another archetypal instance of reductionism is found in the theories of Pierre Simon

Laplace, who took the Newtonian vision of reality to its logical conclusions. Newton

conceived of a time-reversible universe, analogous to a billiard table with balls in mo-

tion. “If there are N balls, then the combined positions and velocities (or momenta) of

the N balls can be specified by 6N numbers in what is called a 6N-dimensional ‘state

space’…each unique set of positions and velocities of all the balls on the table corre-

sponds to a single point. The time evolution of the whole system can thus be repre-

sented as a single trajectory in this massively multi-dimensional state space.”23 Based

upon this view, Laplace imagined a hyper-intelligent demon that possesses the

knowledge of “the instantaneous positions and velocities of all the particles in the uni-

verse”24. Working within the Newtonian conception of reality, the demon would then be

able to calculate “the entire past and future of the universe”.25 Laplace’s thought ex-

periment reveals two significant consequences of the mechanistic Newtonian view-

point – total determinacy and “that all events of the universe, from asteroid collisions,

to a kiss, to a court in France finding a man guilty of murder, are ‘nothing but’ the mo-

tions of particles”.26 Kauffman notes that despite their subversion of some classical

Newtonian assumptions, significant post-Newtonian theories such as Schrodinger’s

equation or string theory maintain a strong level of reductionism (again to particles in

the former and to strings in the latter). Against this reductionism, prevalent through so

much of the natural sciences within the past several centuries, Kauffman notes that

Darwinian evolution has introduced true emergence both epistemologically (an evolu-

tionary biosphere cannot be thought from physics alone) and ontologically (organisms

possess causality and thus are entities as real as particles). From this Darwinian emer-

gence, he declares our presence within a radically creative biosphere.

Kauffman provides a number of arguments to substantiate his claim concerning the

non-reducibility of biology. He asks us to consider the example of the heart, the func-

tion of which is to pump blood.27 The function of a part of an organism is “a subset of

its causal features” and which particular feature constitutes its function (a heart

makes a thumping sound but that is not its function) can be determined only through a

Darwinian analysis of the selective environment that provides the context to the organ-

ism’s lifecycle. “The heart works by evolved structure and the organization of its pro-

cess”.29 Reductionist physics could calculate the many characteristics of the heart but

without providing an account of its emergent context within the biosphere could never

determine its function.

The question now evident is whether it is theoretically possible for a simulation to pre-

dict the evolutionary variables of the biosphere. Kauffman denies this possibility be-

cause of continuous space including what Georg Cantor described as second-order

infinity.30 In first-order infinity, a set such as even numbers or rational numbers can be

counted out infinitely with a full set of integers. However, on the real line (the continu-

ous line of numbers) there are a great many irrational numbers in addition to the ra-

tional ones. Between any two rational numbers or any two irrational numbers, an infi-

nitely greater amount of the same type can be added, making it impossible to count

the irrational numbers with the integers. This second-order infinity of irrational num-

bers is infinitely greater than the first-order infinity of rational numbers. The implication

of this mathematical insight is the theoretical impossibility of a physicist producing a

predictable simulation of the evolution of the biosphere. “Among all the possible

throws of the quantum dice there is a second-order infinity of alternative events whose

probabilities are achieved by squaring the amplitudes of the appropriate Schrodinger

equation, where that equation extends over continuous space. The physicist would

have to carry out infinitely many – indeed a second-order-infinitely many – simulations

in order to model our specific biosphere with perfect precision”. Even if it were possible

for a physicist to infinitely calculate these simulations then deduce which of these infi-

nite simulations align with the biosphere, they would still be unable to account for the

random quantum phenomena of cosmic rays from deep space, which may at times

have profound effects upon the evolutionary course of our biosphere.

Kauffman’s most poignant exemplar of the irreducible emergence of the natural world

is perhaps the Darwinian preadaptation. A preadaptation is when a previously non-vital

causal feature of an organ gains selective significance when exposed to a new environ-

ment. A prime example of such a preadaptation is the swim bladder in fish. The func-

tion of a swim bladder (filled partially with air and partially with water) is to “allow the

fish to adjust their buoyancy in the water column”31. However, the evolutionary origin of

swim bladders is found in early fish with lungs. These early fish would swallow the oxy-

gen-poor water they lived in, some of which entered the lungs. The fish needed the

lungs so that air bubbles could be absorbed within them. However, for modern fish in a

significantly different selective environment, the same organ now has an entirely differ-

ent function. The potentiality of such shifts in function is incalculable in advance be-

cause of the uncountable amount of pairings between selective environments and

organs with a variety of causal features. The capability of the biosphere to produce

preadaptations shows the capacity of reality for novelty and surprise, that which is

unexpected and unpredictable. Crucially, this Darwinian phenomena is not entirely

governed by any reductive law.

Ontological Emergence and Physics of Disequilibrium

Though Kauffman skilfully demonstrates the ontologically emergent creativity of evolu-

tionary processes and the irreducibility of the biological world to the laws of physics, it

would be inaccurate to portray mechanistic determinism as the only way to conceptual-

ize physics. In his 1996 work, The End of Certainty, Nobel Prize winning chemist Ilya

Prigogine presents a view of physics that includes the irreversibility of time, indetermi-

nacy, and self-organization. Prigogine declares that “Classical science emphasized

order and stability; now, in contrast, we see fluctuations, instability, multiple choices,

and limited predictability at all levels of observation”32. As Karl Popper articulates in

The Open Universe, the conception of physics presented here regards “Laplacian de-

terminism…as the most solid and serious obstacle to our understanding and justifying

human freedom, creativity, and responsibility”.33 Kauffman has aptly demonstrated the

creative evolutionary flow of the biosphere. The question that Prigogine seeks to an-

swer is “How are these evolutionary patterns rooted in the fundamental laws of phys-

ics?”34

Prigogine argues that not only does nature contain processes that are irreversible in

addition to processes that are reversible, it is the reversible processes which are the

exception. “Reversible processes are idealizations: We have to ignore the friction to

make the pendulum move reversibly. Such idealizations are problematic because there

is no absolute void in nature”.35 The position that irreversibility is essential to an under-

standing of reality stands in great contrast to the equations of both Newton and

Schrodinger, whose deterministic universes were entirely reversible. What distin-

guishes reversible and irreversible processes is

entropy, as irreversibility is responsibility for entro-

py and its increase. Prigogine declares that simple

experiments such as thermal diffusion demon-

strate that entropy is often a cause of order, rather

than just disorder. “Let us consider a box contain-

ing two components (such as hydrogen and nitro-

gen) where we heat one boundary and cool the

other. The system evolves to a steady state in

which one component is enriched in the hot part

and the other in the cool part. The entropy pro-

duced by the irreversible flow leads to an ordering

process, which would be impossible if taken inde-

pendently from the heat flow. Irreversibility leads to

both order and disorder.” 36

An examination of near-equilibrium systems begins

to show why the emergence of life could only take

place in a non-equilibrium cosmos. Prigogine reads

the second law of thermodynamics in the following

way –

The law is based on an inequality: The entro-

py, S, of an isolated system increases mono-

tonically until it reaches its maximum value

at thermodynamic equilibrium. We therefore

have dS≥0 for the change in entropy over the

course of time. How can we extend this

statement to systems that are not isolated,

but which exchange energy and matter with

the outside world? We must then distinguish

two terms in the entropy change, dS: the

first, de S is the transfer of entropy across the

boundaries of the system; the second, di S is

the entropy produced within the system. As a

result, we have dS=de S+di S. We can now

express the second law by stating that what-

ever the boundary conditions, the entropy

production diS is positive, that is, di S≥0 .

Irreversible processes are creating entropy. 37

The connection between entropy and irreversibility

shows the connection between thermodynamics

and the nonequilibrium that makes emergent

structure possible. In linear nonequilibrium thermo-

dynamics (near-equilibrium situations), a stable steady state exists, allowing non-

deterministic structure to come into being. “…the steady state corresponds to a mini-

mum of entropy production per unit time:

At equilibrium , P=O , entropy production vanishes, while in the linear regime around

equilibrium, P is minimum”.38 Irreversible processes allow systems that lack equilibri-

um to increase in complexity over time. Even more important than near-equilibrium

system behavior is a study of far-from-equilibrium systems. Prigogine’s example is a

chemical reaction:

..in which {A} is the initial set of products, {X} is the intermediate set, and {F} is the final

set. If the system is isolated, the {A}/{F} (the initial-to-final product ratio) has a clearly

defined value that corresponds with maximum entropy. However, an open system

where the flow of matter is controllable (and thus {A}/{F} being possible to progressive-

ly increase) would provide the opportunity to see what happens to {X} as we move away

from equilibrium.

Chemical reactions are generally described by nonlinear equations. There are

many solutions for the intermediate concentrations {X} for given values of {A} and

{F}, but only one corresponds to thermodynamic equilibrium and maximum entro-

py. This solution, which we call the “thermodynamic branch,” may be extended to

the domain of nonequilibrium. The unexpected result is that this branch generally

becomes unstable at some critical distance from equilibrium. The point where this

occurs is known as the bifurcation point.39

The bifurcation point leads to the fascinating phenomena of the spatiotemporal organi-

zations known as dissipative structures, such as non-equilibrium spatial structures,

oscillating chemical reactions, and chemical waves. Such nonequilibrium systems

show the connection between bifurcation points and what Prigogine calls deterministic

chaos. Far-from-equilibrium, fluctuations play a critical role in the emergent structure

of complex systems. When the thermodynamic branch becomes unstable at the bifur-

cation point, a symmetrical pair of new stable solutions emerge and fluctuations of the

system that are not justified by the macroscopic equations decide which branch is

selected. “Bifurcations are the manifestation of an intrinsic differentiation between

parts of the system itself and the system and its environment”40. Such dissipative

structures show the incoherence of seeing time and space as homogenous. As the

number of bifurcations increase, the system gains structure and complexity while mov-

ing farther away from equilibrium. The emergence of life and complex systems are

intelligible only in a heterogeneous reality that is far-from-equilibrium.

Prigogine’s work demonstrates that the irreversible emergent processes evident in

physics and chemistry point to the incoherence of reductionism and obsolete nature of

a mechanistic time-reversible Newtonian conception of the universe. The multiplicity of

existence evolves in a non-deterministic manner, brimming with potentialities rather

than certainty. The creativity and risk integral to the human experience does not show

our alienation from the cosmos but rather that human subjectivity reflects a trend of

possibility and emergence that is essential to Being itself. Neither total chaos nor de-

terminism are accurate ways to discuss cosmology or ontology and a dichotomy be-

tween being and becoming is profoundly unhelpful. We exist within a creative, emer-

gently complex, non-totalizing, unpredictable multiplicity.

Networks within the Multitude

Having established some vital experiential characteristics of Being, we now can say a

great deal about what it means to exist. Existing things are complex, have agency, are

resistantly-available, and are ontologically equal. The last two of those attributes of

existing things demonstrate the absence of a One, the incoherence of ontologies of

unity. But what of the second part of Miller’s Badiouan paraphrase? “Though the One

is not, there are unities”. These unities can be seen as integral to the processes of

becoming that shape the pluralistic multiplicity. It is relevant to this discussion to ex-

plore what unities look like in a non-totalizing pluralistic multiplicity of resistantly-

available things in becoming.

Much of Latour’s work has characterized those unities as “a plurality of loose, local,

and transient networks”.41 The word network is useful because it describes connec-

tion that is neither absolute nor universal by “[indicating] that resources are concen-

trated in a few places- the knots and the nodes- which are connected with one another-

the links and the mesh”.42 Similarly to how connection is retained in Latour’s frame-

work through networks, the multiplicity also still contains macros, albeit in a way that

does not supersede the micro and the local. “Macro no longer describes a wider or a

larger site in which the micro would be embedded like some Russian Matryoshka doll,

but another equally local, equally micro place, which is connected to many others

through some medium transporting specific types of traces. No place can be said to be

bigger than any other place, but some can be said to benefit from far safer connec-

tions with many more places than others”.43 The existence of macros and networks

demonstrate that unity is a definite possibility within the multiplicity, but it is intelligible

only “as a product, not a given”.44 “There is no preestablished harmony…harmony is

postestablished locally through tinkering”.45 Harmonies, networks, connections, and

relationality are all potentialities of the multiplicity but depend upon emergent com-

plexity of local growth rather than any pre-substantialized ontological immanence. “To

be a realistic whole is not an undisputed starting point but the provisional achievement

of a composite assemblage”. 46

Assemblages and Things

A notable form of unity is the presence of what can be described as assemblages of

things. Jane Bennett has described the compatibility of assemblage-based thinking

with the individuality of existing things. In recent years, some within the movement of

Object-Oriented ontology (notably Graham Harman and Timothy Morton) have attempt-

ed to articulate an absolute distinction between relational-materialism and thinking

which defends the aloof nature of the object. Jane Bennett has a very different take on

that matter.

But perhaps there is no need to choose between objects or their relations.

Since everyday, earthly experience routinely identifies some effects as coming

from individual objects and some from larger systems (or, better put, from indi-

viduations within material configurations and from the complex assemblages in

which they participate), why not aim for a theory that toggles between both

k i n d s o r m a g n i t u d e s o f u n i t ” ?

One would then understand “objects” to be those swirls of matter, energy,and

incipience that hold themselves together long enough to vie with the strivings of

other objects, including the indeterminate momen-

tum of the throbbing whole. The project, then, would

be to make both objects and relations the periodic

focus of theoretical attention, even if it is impossible

to articulate fully the “vague” or “vagabond” essence

of any system or any things, and even if it is impossi-

ble to give equal attention to both at once.47

Just as it is possible to maintain a framework of multiplicity

and include unities, it is possible to retain the conception of

things as resistant (or withdrawn, as the Object-Oriented

thinkers have put it) while allowing for the formation of com-

plex assemblages.

Harman has accused assemblage thinkers such as Deleuze

and Guattari of smothering the individuality of objects with

relational thinking but Bennett points out “that despite their

robust attempts to conceptualize groupings, Deleuze and

Guattari also manage to attend carefully to many specific

objects, to horses, shoes, orchids, packs of wolves, wasps,

priests, metals, etc. Indeed, I find nothing in their approach

inconsistent with the object-oriented philosopher’s claim that

things harbor a differential between their inside and outside

or an irreducible moment of (withdrawn-from-view) interiori-

ty”.48 That point recalls our discussion of the unpredictable

nature of things that results from their resistant nature.

Harman and Morton fear that thinking of things in terms of

complex systems (and the creative flow of processes that

shape them) fails to leave behind the anthropocentric

worldview, as a model of the multiplicity based upon relation-

al fluidity would be meaningful only to humans, as opposed

to neutrinos or hypothetical four-dimensional sentient beings

(for example). Furthermore, Morton asserts that systems

theory is unable to properly account for “hyperobjects”, the

subject of his 2013 book of the same name.49 Hyperobjects are massively distributed

objects that distort human notions of locality and time. Examples of hyperobjects in-

clude global warming, radioactive materials, massive oil fields, and black holes. The

fact that objects so relevant to the current human predicament possess ahuman time-

scales and vast diffusion through space and yet can still be considered entities in their

own right rather than just relational assemblages is why Morton is so incredibly ada-

mant about adopting a vantage point from beyond the human perspective. In re-

sponse, Bennett has said that if we find it an impossibility to conceptually transcend

the human vantage point entirely “then a good tack might be to stretch and strain

those modes to make room for the outlooks, rhythms, and trajectories of a greater

number of actants,50 to, that is, get a better sense of the “operating system” upon

which we humans rely”.51 It is possible to do politics from

the edges of human perspective and thus begin to see how

capitalist systems interact with hyperobjects and systems

that may be nonhuman in origin, outside of human control,

or both. That process begins when we recognize the earthy

assemblages that constitute some of the local (and hyper)

unities existing within the multiplicity.

Another instance of a potential helpful intersection of vibrant

materialist and object-oriented thought is on the topic of

causality. We see that agency is pluralistically distributed

amongst a vast multiplicity of active things. We also see that

ontologically distinct things interact, forming networks and

assemblages. Clearly a universally mechanistic Newtonian

conception of causality, with an absolute distinction be-

tween cause and effect, is irrelevant to such a view of the

cosmos (though action that resembles efficient causality can

certainly take place during systems’ periods of near-

equilibrium). As Bennett says, “If one extends the time frame

of the action beyond that of even an instant, billiard ball

causality falters”.52 Part of the reason effect is not an entire-

ly predictable phenomenon is because cause and effect

often alternate positions during processes that can be said

to themselves possess agency to varying degrees. Further-

more, causality must be taken into account within the con-

text of complex systems within which things operate. Ben-

nett cites William Connolly’s insight that effects at one level

of a self-organizing system will inevitably effect a second

level in unpredictable ways that integrate into the very fabric

of that second level, thus creating a stabilizing feedback

loop of cause and effect between levels of the system. In

this way, causality is emergent as well as efficient.

Force-Fields

Zooming out further, what of the interactions between complex systems? We have

examined in detail the agency of things and their capacity to form emergent assem-

blages, networks, and systems. By now it is evident that the multiplicity of existence

and the pluriverse (surely a more accurate term than universe) which that multiplicity

constitutes contains an unfathomable number of interacting, complex, emergent sys-

tems. How can we conceptualize such a pluriverse in ways comprehensible to our

(existential and political) human predicament? Helpful here is William Connolly’s cate-

gory of “force-fields”. “A force-field, roughly speaking, is any energized pattern in slow

or rapid motion periodically displaying a capacity to morph, such as a climate system,

biological evolution, a political economy, or human thinking…different force fields dis-

play differential capacities of agency. We inhabit a world composed of heterogeneous

force-fields”.53

Continuing the trend of emergence within the multiplicity, force-fields are evolutionary

entities, like things, that resist and are available to each other. Force-fields are incredi-

bly differential in ways that include their compositions (as some cosmic, some cultural,

some economic, some geological, some biological, etc…), their scale, the speeds at

which they move, the degree of agency and energy which they possess, their level of

complexity, and the degree in which they flow through, over, and around other force-

fields. Contrary to the views of Harman and Morton, a cosmology that accounts for

force-fields need not diminish the coy, resistant, unpredictability of the thing (or object,

if the term is preferred), but rather can be seen as the characteristics of things being

reflected onto more vast complex scales of spacetime. Similarly, the complex encom-

passing nature of force-fields reflects the obsolete nature of dualisms between human

and non-human or life and non-life.

A core part of Connolly’s political project is advocacy for “close engagement with devel-

opments in complexity theory, opening up new avenues to enhance sensitivity to the

world”.54 For this reason, Connolly meaningfully engages with thinkers such as Kauff-

man, Bennett, and Prigogine. Sensitivity to world means (amongst other things) aware-

ness of the incredible numbers of force-fields of different categories acting upon us

moment to moment, of the differing degrees of agency, speed, and creativity pos-

sessed by actants of all kinds, and of the possibility of the novel and surprising to

emerge at every level of existence. Connolly’s cosmology shows us that Darwinism

goes all the way up and all the way down. There is no level of complexity in existence

that does not involve emergent multiplicity. The One is always absent and there are

always unities. The pluriverse is always relational, resistant, available, individual, com-

plex, evolutionary, and in becoming.

Duration and Becoming

The process of becoming described by Connolly prompts our final examination of a

parallel between systems and things. The universal applicability of the Darwinian para-

digm shows that the experience of becoming is universal in existing entities, from the

smallest of things to the most awesome of force-fields. Such a principle is evident from

Prigogine’s demonstration of the irreversibility of time. As Prigogine states in The End

of Certainty, “the arrow of time is common to all parts of the universe”.55 Everything is

multiple, all that is shared is the experience of becoming. Prigogine’s brilliant creative

experimentation leads to the conclusion that “physical systems…periodically pass

through imperfect equilibrium toward radical disequilibrium and then sometimes to a

novel organization of imperfect equilibrium”.56 Irreversible journeys of becoming thus

contain “two registers of temporal experience”57, a concept explored in depth within

the work of Henri Bergson. What has been classically conceptualized as static absolute

Being is merely an overzealous conception of one of these two temporal registers,

which together comprise the experience of Becoming. Time is often experienced as

chrono-time, which can be called clock time, when things are experienced as imperfect

equilibrium. The feeling of equilibrium produces a stability that allows things to exist

within “the secular time of everyday judgment, perception, and action”. Bergson sees

this experience of time as an indispensable simplification, necessary for the daily activ-

ities integral to life. However, this sense of equilibrium is never perfect, with resonanc-

es from the past and perceptions of the future regularly influencing these everyday

experiences. Sometimes these intrusions of perceptions of past and future into the

present lead to the experience of what Bergson calls “time as duration”.58 Dwelling in

duration is the experience of a moment when “multiple layers of the past resonate with

things unfolding in the current situation, sometimes issuing in something new as if

from nowhere. The new is ushered into being through a process that exceeds rational

calculation or the derivation of practical implications from universal principles”.59 Con-

nolly imagines a moment from the life of Jesus to demonstrate a human moment of

such a “phase transition”.

As Jesus stoops and draws dreamily on the ground with his finger, he may allow

the indignity of his earthly conception, the shame born by an unwed mother, the

plight of his people under the yoke of empire, the danger of the vengeful crowd,

the Mosaic code he and they have absorbed, the acute danger facing the accused

woman before him, and his own unconventional relation to Mary Magdalene to

mingle in a crystal of time. A new maxim crystallizes, as these layers of memory,

pressure, and concern reverberate in a distinctive situation. Care for the world,

informed by exquisite sensitivity to an unpredictable moment, merely set condi-

tions of possibility for it.60

Such moments of flux, shift, and awareness are vital to the experience of becoming.

They are experienced by humans as crystals of time but these moments of accelerated

becoming apply to things and systems (force-fields, assemblages, networks) of all

kinds. Most do not perceive time as humanity does but all things belong to time, which

is irreversible becoming. The novel organization of imperfect equilibrium brought about

by moments of radical disequilibrium is a paradigm shift within evolutionary becoming,

which things and systems both have the capacity to experience. Both registers of tem-

poral experience are integral to existence and sensitivity to one may help cultivate

creative experience of the other. By realizing that through becoming we belong to time,

we can see that cultivation of narrative is necessary to understand the experience of

existence.

What then of moments of disequilibrium that are more severe than just adjustments,

fluxes, or swerves in journeys of becoming? Some total paradigm shifts are prompted

by moments of absolute reinvention or radical change in direction. Badiou and John

Caputo have a roughly similar conception of such an occurrence, which they describe

as an Event - a disruption in Being itself, a rift within what is that evokes a transforming

sense of “hyper-reality”, the truth concealed within the current paradigm.61 An Event

can be traumatic, as when the human subject radically experiences the inhuman core

within their own subjectivity. Alternatively, the radical cut of such an Event can be a

transformative experience of conversion, such as the biblical Paul being blinded on the

road to Damascus or a practitioner of Zen Buddhism experiencing Kensho. Cosmic

examples of Events within becoming could include the Big Bang, the emergence of

biological life, and the emergence of self-consciousness. Events are not differentiated

from processes of emergent complexity but rather are a radical potentiality of those

processes.

Multiplicity in Becoming

Creative and rigorous thinking across disciplines all point in the same direction, toward

a creative, unpredictable, active pluriverse. Such characteristics that we as humans

can find resonance with and take joy in are not the result of a Oneness, Absolute, or

Totality but rather the product of fracture, distance, and multiplicity that goes all the

way up and all the way down. The multiplicity of the pluriverse has no guarantees, the

only real universals are the principles that cultivate and allow for particularity. All that

is is differentiated, resistant, available, and in becoming. The old dichotomies between

being and becoming, transcendence and immanence, physics and metaphysics can

finally be removed from the forefront of philosophical conversation. There are no limits

(either upwards or downwards) to emergent multiplicity.

Existence is plural, existence is becoming. The only possible real ontology of Being is

an ontology of Becoming. Only an ontology and cosmology of robust pluralism that

accounts for groundless emergent structure can begin to conceptualize the awe-

inspiring indeterminate creativity of the multiplicity. Some may find such a stance terri-

fying, as it removes any metaphysical guarantees or determinate predictability from

existence. Let us not despair over the lack of the One, for it is this very lack that allows

there to be unities. The risk of trauma is inseparable from the promise of creative joy.

Sensitivity to the pluriverse means entering into conversation with systems and things

of all categories and letting our own narratives be open to the narratives of actants of

all kinds. With all these things in mind, let us begin to cultivate art, science, theology,

and politics that embraces the emergent multiple. We would do well to take Latour’s

advice - feel the island, explore the jungle. The pluriverse is calling.

Notes

1. Adam Miller, Speculative Grace: Bruno Latour

and Object-Oriented Theology (New York, Fordham

University Press, 2013).

2. Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter (Durham, Duke

University Press, 2010), 9.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., 4.

5. Ibid., 5.

6. Ibid., 115.

7. Ibid., preface.

8. Ibid., 40.

9. Bruno Latour, “From Multiculturalism to Multinat-

uralism: What Rules of Method for the New Socio-

Scientific experiments?” in Nature and Culture,

(Berghahn Journals, 2011).

10. Miller, Speculative Grace.

11. Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France

(Harvard University Press, 1993), 184.

12. Ibid., 159.

13. Ibid., 158.

14. Miller, Speculative Grace.

15. Ibid., 154.

16. Ibid., 157.

17. Ibid., 156.

18. Miller, Speculative Grace.

19. Latour, The Pasteurization of France, 161.

20. Miller, Speculative Grace.

21. Latour, The Pasteurization of France, 162.

22. Stuart Kaufman, Reinventing the Sacred: A New

View of Science, Reason, and Religion (Basic Books,

New York, 2008),2.

23. Ibid., 13.

24. Ibid., 14.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., 15.

27. Ibid., 34.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., 35.

30. Ibid.,

31. Ibid., 132.

32. Ilya Prigogine, The End of Certainty: Time, Chaos,

and the New Laws of Nature (The Free Press, New

York, 1996), 4.

33. Ibid., 14.

34. Ibid., 15.

35. Ibid., 18.

36. Ibid., 26.

37. Ibid., 61.

38. Ibid., 63.

39. Ibid., 66.

40. Ibid., 69.

41. Miller, Speculative Grace.

42. Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow

Scientists and Engineers through Society (Harvard

University Press, Cambridge, 1987), 180.

43. Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social, (Oxford

University Press Inc., New York, 2005), 176.

44. Miller, Speculative Grace.

45. Latour, The Pasteurization of France, 164.

46. Latour, Reassembling the Social, 208.

47. Jane Bennett, "Systems and Things: A Response to

Graham Harman and Timothy Morton," New Literary

History, 43, no. 2 (2012): 225-233, 227.

48. Ibid.

49. Timothy Morton, Hyperobjects: Philosophy and

Ecology After the End of the World (University of Min-

nesota Press, Minneapolis, 2013).

50. Actant is Latour’s term for anything with agency,

whether individual actors or systems

51. Bennett, Systems and Things, 229.

52. Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 32.

53. William Connolly, A World of Becoming (Duke

University Press, 2011), 5.

54. Ibid., 69.

55. Prigogine, The End of Certainty, 56.

56. Connolly, A World of Becoming, 169.

57. Ibid., 4.

58. Ibid., 2.

59. Ibid., 69.

60. Ibid.

61. John Caputo, The Weakness of God: A Theology of

the Event, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,

2006).

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