PLINY THE FABULIST: PLINY THE ELDER AND ANIMALS AS ROLE...

PLINY THE FABULIST: PLINY THE ELDER AND ANIMALS AS ROLE MODELS

By

RACHEL L. ASH

A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT

OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2016

To my parents, who raised me to love learning.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Dr. Konstantinos Kapparis of the Classics

Department at the University of Florida. First, because he introduced me to the author at

the center of my thesis and taught me to enjoy and appreciate Pliny’s enthusiasm for

knowledge and science, and second, because Dr. Kapparis encouraged my interest in

Pliny and helped me develop Pliny’s purpose in my own paper. He offered me advice

and encouragement throughout the research process, and helped me resolve my ideas

into the paper here.

I would also like to thank Dr. Andrew Nichols for joining Dr. Kapparis to complete

my review committee and for reading my paper; his feedback was invaluable for helping

me improve the clarity of my paper.

In addition, I would like to acknowledge the Department of Classics and

especially the head of the Distance program there, Velvet Yates, for their

professionalism and support.

Finally, I would like to thank my family for sacrificing so much while I sequestered

myself to research and write.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...................................................................................................... 4

LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................ 6

ABSTRACT.......................................................................................................................... 7

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 8

2 VOCABULARY SURVEY ANALYSIS ........................................................................ 21

3 THE MORALITY OF ANIMALS .................................................................................. 42

The Hunters: Lions and Panthers .............................................................................. 45 The Hunted: Deer and Bovines .................................................................................. 49

Man’s Best Friends: Dogs and Horses ...................................................................... 53 Birds that Talk: the Raven .......................................................................................... 57 Hunters and Prey: Eagles, Kites, Pigeons and Doves .............................................. 60

Birds and Aesthetics: Peacocks and Nightingales .................................................... 63 Fleas, Bees, and Other Small Things ........................................................................ 65

Models of Morality: Bees and Ants ...................................................................... 65

Behaving Badly: Flies and Moths ........................................................................ 72

4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 76

LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................... 84

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH................................................................................................ 85

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LIST OF TABLES

Table page 2-1 Words describing the sacred ................................................................................. 23

2-2 Words describing luxury and excess ..................................................................... 24

2-3 Words of pride and humility ................................................................................... 26

2-4 Words implying loss of control ............................................................................... 27

2-5 Words measuring greed and generosity ............................................................... 28

2-6 Words of anger ....................................................................................................... 29

2-7 Words implying malicious intent ............................................................................ 31

2-8 Words measuring usefulness ................................................................................ 32

2-9 Words of intelligence, both prudent and sinister ................................................... 33

2-10 Words of honesty and deceit ................................................................................. 35

2-11 Words about insult.................................................................................................. 37

2-12 Words of contentment ............................................................................................ 37

2-13 Words describing virtues ........................................................................................ 38

2-14 Words of admiration and worth .............................................................................. 40

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Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

PLINY THE FABULIST: PLINY THE ELDER AND ANIMALS AS ROLE MODELS

By

Rachel L. Ash

August 2016

Chair: Konstantinos Kapparis Major: Latin

Pliny the Elder has commonly been criticized by scholars as unscientific,

disorganized, and undiscerning, dismissed as a mere collector of stories. This paper

explores Pliny’s books on animals and offers commentary on a pattern of moralizing

that implies that there was organization to his compendium, and further, deliberate

intention to use engaging stories as mediums for instructing his readers on ethical

behavior. The paper utilizes another author, Phaedrus, who explicitly wrote stories

about animals to teach morals and acceptable behavior (i.e., fables), as a foil for Pliny’s

subtler approach. Using animal-to-animal and lexical comparisons, the paper draws

connections between fables and the commentary Pliny included within his descriptions

of animals, commentary that invites the reader to either approve or disapprove of the

animal’s actions, and thus apply that same judgement to himself. The paper concludes

that Pliny’s digressions from pure scientific report are not due to flippancy but to his

intent that the stories act as vehicles for moral and ethical change.

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Pliny the Elder died doing what he loved best: seeking knowledge. The author of

a lost history and an extant natural catalogue enjoyed a successful military career and a

close relationship with the emperor of Rome before perishing in an investigation of the

unusual phenomena haloing Mt. Vesuvius. Aside from knowledge he gathered in person

during his military travels, Pliny read historians, philosophers, and the natural collections

authorized by Alexander the Great. His fascination with nature is reflected throughout

his Naturalis Historia, and has led some critics to misinterpret that enthusiasm as

unscientific and his unmodern system of organization as meaningless. Viewing the

Pliny’s books through a modern lens is unproductive, however; the only means to

understand his approach is by finding the objective of his writing. The Naturalis Historia

is composed not only as a scientific treatise, but a philosophical guide, educating the

reader in morality by using the behavior of animals to communicate expectations.

Long disparaged by Classicists as a “gullible”1 sensationalist who was not

capable of discerning truth from fiction, Pliny the Elder has been neglected in the

scholarly world until relatively recently; perhaps this is due to earlier scholars’ wish to

distance themselves from the “gullible” catalogue writers of the medieval period, for

whom Pliny was a favorite resource of the weird, monstrous, and fantastic. However,

starting in the 1990s, Plinian scholarship has changed in tone, from one of gentle

mockery to an increasingly interesting focus on what, if anything, Pliny was trying to

1 Heironimus (1935) 297 says it all: “The gullible Pliny often had his leg pulled by nature fakers.”

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achieve with his immense work, the Naturalis Historia. Pliny himself downplays the

value of his work, as he states in the preface (12-14):

Meae quidem temeritati accessit hoc quoque, quod levioris operae hos

tibi2 dedicavi libellos. nam nec ingenii sunt capaces, quod alioqui in nobis perquam mediocre erat, neque admittunt excessus aut orationes sermonesve aut casus mirabiles vel eventus varios, iucunda dictu aut

legentibus blanda sterili materia: rerum natura, hoc est vita, narratur, et haec sordidissima sui parte ac plurimarum rerum aut rusticis vocabulis aut externis, immo barbaris etiam, cum honoris praefatione ponendis.

praeterea iter est non trita auctoribus via nec qua peregrinari animus expetat. nemo apud nos qui idem temptaverit, nemo apud Graecos, qui unus omnia ea tractaverit.

Indeed this work of mine approaches impertinence, since I have dedicated these little books of frivolity to you. For they aren’t capable of great talent,

which, in myself, is most certainly otherwise and middling, nor do they allow digression or speeches or conversations or strange accidents or other various matters, or material pleasant to talk about or charming to

read, due to the sterile subject: the nature of the universe, life as it is, is told within, and these things told in their grittiest details; the terms for very many of the topics must be set down in rustic, or foreign, or even barbaric

words, honored with a preface. Besides, this path is not a well-trodden one by other historians, nor does the soul crave to wander it. There is no one among us who has tried the same undertaking, and no one among

the Greeks who has drawn all of these things together into one work.

Pliny dissembles; he must believe in the worth of what he has done, whether or not

anyone before him in Greek and Roman history has thought the same work worth taking

on. His dedication to the work exposes a fundamental faith in the Naturalis Historia, as

evinced in his nephew’s description of Pliny’s zeal (ep. 3.5.8-12):

Reversus domum quod reliquum temporis studiis reddebat. Post cibum saepe - quem interdiu levem et facilem veterum more sumebat - aestate si

quid otii iacebat in sole, liber legebatur, adnotabat excerpebatque . . . Memini quendam ex amicis, cum lector quaedam perperam pronuntiasset, revocasse et repeti coegisse; huic avunculum meum dixisse: 'Intellexeras

nempe?' Cum ille adnuisset, 'Cur ergo revocabas? decem amplius versus hac tua interpellatione perdidimus.'

2 Vespasian

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When he returned home [after work] whatever was left of his time he surrendered to his studies. Often in the summer after a meal—which he

took daily in the old-fashioned way: a light and easy fare—if some leisure was left to him, he’d lay in the sun, a book would be read to him, and he would take notes and choose excerpts . . . I remember one of his friends,

when a reader incorrectly pronounced a particular word, called him back and made him repeat it; my uncle said to him: “I’m sure you understood him?” When he nodded, “Then why did you call him back? We’ve wasted

ten extra lines with your interruption.”

Pliny was so dedicated that he would not pause in his writing, and could not stand even

a small interruption of his endeavor. This discredits his humble apology for the scope

and focus of his Historia. His work was meaningful to him. He wanted to do something

with it.

Which leads to the point: what, exactly, did Pliny mean to do with the Naturalis

Historia? Scholars in the past have rarely seemed to take his approach to cataloguing

information and science seriously;3 due to his seemingly random and disordered

collection of stories and facts they paint him as a bumbling collector of oddities, which

could not be farther from the truth. As Wallace-Hadrill (1990) points out, “Our cultural

rules set up a sharp cleavage between scientific analysis, and the passion of rhetoric,

persuasion, moralization. But Pliny’s obviously did not” (81). Critics of the Naturalis

Historia focus on a perceived lack of organization and judgement because his chapters

progress in a way that differs from modern scientific cataloguing and he includes stories

and facts that from our modern perspective seem obviously false. However, I agree with

Cummings (2004) when he says that Pliny (171-173)

3 Williams (1904) 266 is particularly critical of Pliny’s approach: “Pliny’s trait of mind is essentially that of a compiler. He was no philosophical thinker, no generalizer, no path-maker in science . . . it is a vast jumble of more or less uncritical statements,” and Lewes (1867) 279 dismisses him soundly: “for untrustworthiness of statement he cannot be easily surpassed.” See also Fögen’s (2007) list of detractors

on 184 n.1.

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distinguishes critically between authorities, rejecting some as fanciful even while including them. Careful attention must be paid to the way in which

he introduces a story, and not just to the fascination with which he recounts every detail as the story unfolds. Concealed in his apparently eclectic method is a complex epistemology, but it is not one based on the

preconceptions of the postempiricist world. This epistemology is (in Calvino’s words) “unstable and unpredictable” and involves both a sophisticated handling of textual authority and a prevailing skepticism

about the certainties of any system of knowledge based on perception.

Pliny often pronounces stories dubious,4 but the fact he still includes them should not be

mistaken as proof that the work is a haphazard and unplanned collection of anecdotes.

As Cummings succinctly explains (196): “Equally important is the intellectual agenda of

these texts.” Pliny’s purpose matters, and that purpose can illuminate a clear path

where his critics only found convoluted rubble.

Pliny is an educator. Education was not his career, but his passion for it clearly

shows in his numerous publications. It is as an educator that he structures his Naturalis

Historia; as Fögen (2007) further clarifies, “Pliny did not intend to address a limited

circle of specialists, but rather a wider group of interested laymen” so “factual

knowledge is presented along with anecdotal material that has no direct, if any,

relevance to the more scientific passages” (190; 192). He mixes stories in with the lists

of breeding practices, habitats, and specific uses for animal skins, bones, and blood so

the average man would have a reason to read his books. As Beagon (1992) affirms,

“His readers will be educated for everyday life, by the examination of all aspects of the

world around them” (13). Pliny is looking to offer something useful to his fellow citizens.

4 For example, the werewolf (8.80): homines in lupos verti rursusque restitui sibi falsum esse confidenter

existimare debemus (“We should confidently judge that men changed into wolves and restored back to

themselves is false”).

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Wallace-Hadrill (1990) expresses this in even stronger terms (85): “Pliny is a crusader,

with a passionate mission . . . the magnitude of his labours is justified because, like

those of Hercules, they benefit mankind.” He is bringing “the subject-matter of the usual

education of the ruling classes” to Rome as a whole—at least to anyone who can read

or have the books read to him—and beneath the surface, mixed in with the anecdotes

and factual knowledge he offers, Pliny has layered in the moral teachings of the Stoics

(Beagon (1992) 15). According to Beagon, the Naturalis Historia can “be viewed as the

end-product of developments in the last two centuries BC which aimed to bring Greek

philosophy to a wider audience” (15). Pliny is offering a moral education to Rome,

wrapped enticingly in the mysteries and wonders of Nature.

He is not the first to do so. Far predating Pliny, Aesop’s fables have long

connected human behavior to that of animals; the fables were designed “in association

with wisdom poetry” which “could be employed in various settings, in iambos for

example, or at the symposium or in the law courts” (West (1984) 127). Aesop’s fables

are morality tales, and, whether or not the author of the fables was truly a Phrygian

slave,5 their influence on common thought was substantial enough to warrant notice by

many ancient philosophers and orators. The fables’ propensity for offering a difficult

truth while leaving room for the reader to dissociate himself (the actors are, after all,

animals) proves useful for making powerful points without direct insult. Clayton (2008),

in an article delineating the use of Aesop’s fables as moral guides in Athens, points to

5 West (1984) 128 expresses doubt, and instead describes the story of Aesop as “the legend of a repulsively ugly and worthless-looking slave, who was unjustly put to death by the Delphians in circumstances like those of the pharmakos rite” and offers that this legend enticed ancient audiences enough that it “was developed into a fully-fledged novella in which the slave was a shrewd and witty

fellow, given to impressing points on his superiors by means of apt parables.”

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their use by Plato (who “accepted fables as having a useful role to play in philosophy

and did not consider them out of place in philosophical discussions if properly used”)

and Aristotle (whose “wide use of fables reveals their validity as a method of illustration

and instruction in a range of contexts” 187). He emphasizes the use of animals as

models of what not to do (183),

Human beings, because of their unique capability of reason, have the

opportunity to live differently than animals. In fact, rather than providing lessons on how to survive in a brutal, predatory world, the fables can point towards a means for escaping that world. They can actually point towards

democracy, equality, and justice rather than hierarchy, power, and exploitation.

That is to say, the animals offer humanity a choice; mankind does not need to copy the

value system represented by the animal kingdom and promoted in the fables. On the

other hand, Morgan (2007) offers the opposite viewpoint; she says that the fables “take

a pragmatic view of the good: on the whole, the good is what is; the usual state of

affairs” (83). If the fables are more direct representations of expected moral behavior,

they (67)

paint a picture of mostly hostile and fearful relations between the more and less powerful, tempered by advice to the powerful to be circumspect in exploiting the poor and to the poor that their position is at least relatively

safe, that there may be people even worse off than themselves, and that they may occasionally succeed in either wooing or stinging the powerful for their own benefit.

According to Morgan, the fables are not intended to inspire mankind to improve upon

the situations within the fables but just to represent life as it is. The truth of the matter

seems to lie in between these viewpoints; in fact, the fables often simply represented

the truth that the orator or author was trying to convey, and the same fables were often

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appropriated for different causes. That is why Aesop’s fables could be used to address

citizens as a talking point yet still be appropriate for children’s education.6

The focus on animals in Aesop’s fables certainly helps lessen what would most

likely simply be considered mockery or vilification in any other context. The Stoics

especially, but ancient Greeks and Romans in general, considered animals as “other”

and “deprived . . . of the logos,” thus removed from any direct relation or correlation to

humankind (Bodson (1983) 313). Though “there is a wealth of evidence on how many

among the ancient people experienced and admired the ability of animals to learn,

progress, and react” (consider the example of Odysseus and Argos, above), that

admiration did not include a belief that animals possessed the power of reason or logic

(316); thus within the fables, the use of animal characters distanced the expression of

morality in the stories so that men made uncomfortable by the values implicated could

console themselves with the refrain, “they’re just animals.” This makes animals a safe

means of communicating morality.

Pliny takes advantage of the comfort afforded moral teaching through animal

characters, and, by making animals the ostensible focus of his books, furnishes his

readers with both explicit and implicit moral instruction. Pliny is concerned with what he

sees as the moral decline of the state of Rome, and he is in good company. Just a few

generations previous, Livy complained “of vice and a decline in morality” while still

bragging that “no state had fallen to avarice and luxury so late or had honoured poverty

6 Morgan (2007) 129 says that “there is also evidence that exempla were used in education, not only

rhetorical education but also at the more elementary level.” Bradley (1998) 539 agrees that the fables “to

some degree prepare children for life.”

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and thrift so much or so long” (Earl (1969) 77). The leading minds of the time pointed to

peace as the origin of this moral decline; As Earl (1969) elaborates (19):

To men who had easily borne toil, danger, doubt, and difficulty, peace and

riches, which would have been desirable at other times, became a burden and a misery. There grew up first the lust for money, then the lust for power.

Romans in the early Empire wrestled with the realities that came with ruling a large

empire compared with the idealized lifestyles promoted in the Republic when the state

was smaller and more uniform. Pliny likewise seeks to promote the values glorified as

those of the Republic (Earl (1969) 71): “frugality, agreeability, simplicity and courage;

honesty and modesty; good sense and prudence.” In Naturalis Historia, “peace is seen

as creating a state of intellectual lethargy, to which may be added the desidia produced

by the spread of luxury corrupting the artes” (Beagon (1992) 58).

Pliny often rails against luxuria in the books; Wallace-Hadrill (1990) tells us

“luxuria alone occurs in over 60 passages,” and that “the whole work is underpinned by

the simple idea that Nature supplies, unasked and ungrudgingly, everything man needs,

but that man, blinded by luxuria, abuses nature and turns it into a tool of his own

destruction” (86). Pliny seeks to make his readers better Romans. He is not irrationally

against enjoyment and comfort, and “he condoned the comfortable trappings of

civilization, so long as their dispensability was recognized” (Beagon (2005) 115). Pliny

worries that the level of luxury and idleness that has passed into Rome along with the

Empire’s expanded lands and wealth is eroding the nation’s morals. If Nature supplies

everything mankind needs to be hale and happy, there is no need to pervert Nature and

twist her into supplying more (especially for the purpose of ostentation; his hatred of

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waste in display of wealth is described in numerous passages).7 Pliny is “not using his

science to reveal what is unnatural, and therefore luxurious, but using his science, with

considerable ingenuity, to legitimate the list of what the Romans rejected on moral

grounds” (Wallace-Hadrill (1990) 90). Pliny, moreover, is using his science to offer

suggestions of what is acceptable on moral grounds. Most often, a story within the

passages “provides his narrative with a moral dimension” and, in addition to pointing out

the faults that come with venerating luxury, he promotes “qualities which characterize

human beings in general, those which make for a good or impressive human being and

those which make for a good society” (Fögen (2007) 192; Morgan (2007) 156). Pliny

values the human ratio and advocates for using man’s intelligence for the benefit of all

mankind, instead of selfishly inventing more personal luxury.

Even within the four books he wrote about the animal kingdom (books 8-11),

Pliny continues to write stories and details about other species that have “important

ethical and political connotations” for any Roman who would choose to notice them

(Fögen (2007) 193). He, like Aesop long before him, uses animals as a foil for humanity,

revealing both good and bad behaviors. Most revealing is a passage found, not in books

8-11 of Naturalis Historia, but in book 7, a book dedicated to the study of man (7.5):

uni animantium luctus est datus, uni luxuria et quidem innumerabilibus

modis ac per singula membra, uni ambitio, uni avaritia, uni inmensa vivendi cupido, uni superstitio, uni sepulturae cura atque etiam post se de futuro. nulli vita fragilior, nulli rerum omnium libido maior, nulli pavor

confusior, nulli rabies acrior. denique cetera animantia in suo genere probe degunt. congregari videmus et stare contra dissimilia: leonum feritas inter se non dimicat, serpentium morsus non petit serpentes, ne

7 See Nat. His. 9.112-124 for Pliny’s thoughts on the extravagance and wastefulness concerning pearls; 9.124,9.126-7, 9.128, and 9.133-141 for Pliny’s discussion of purple dye and its use to produce luxury items; and even 11.76 for Pliny’s complaint that silk is just a means ut denudet feminas vestis (“to make

women naked even while wearing clothes”).

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maris quidem belvae ac pisces nisi in diversa genera saeviunt. at Hercule homini plurima ex homine sunt mala.

sorrow has been given to only one organism, and undeniably to only one organism, luxury in its innumerable forms for each part of the body, to only

one, ambition, to that one greed, to him a vast desire of living, to him superstition, to him the fear of death and even about the future after his life ends. For no other animal is life more delicate, lust for all things

greater, fear more troubling, madness more harsh. Furthermore the rest of the animal kingdom live appropriately among their own kind. We see them gathered and standing together against those who are not like them: the

ferocity of the lions does not put them at risk among themselves, the bite of the snakes does not attack snakes, nor do even the beasts and fish of the sea attack except against other kinds. But, by Hercules, the greatest

number of evils against humanity are by humanity.

Mary Beagon (1992), does not believe that Pliny is writing literally here (72 n.37):

“Pliny’s unfavorable contrast of man’s attacks on his own kind with the behavior of the

animals is exaggerated; there are examples of such aggression among animals of the

same species” in his own books on the animal kingdom. If Pliny is exaggerating here,

he is highlighting his approach to the books that follow this tome dedicated to humanity.

Pliny will be using the animals as examples of correct and incorrect behavior, providing

yet another manual of moral living for his readers.

Pliny’s appreciation of animals has created confusion among scholars. Pliny is

well-known to have followed Stoicism, yet “Stoic thought also conventionally denied to

animals any such concepts [as reason and emotion]” (Cummings (2004) 175). Stoics

believed “animals lacked soul or reason ( logos, ratio)” and therefore “they could not

experience emotions” (Beagon (2005) 114). However, when Pliny writes about animals,

he often seems to portray them as equals or even superior to human beings. Perhaps

because of this, “Pliny’s animal stories were of prime importance in influencing later

writers who assigned to animals intellectual or moral qualities equal to or greater than

man’s,” whether or not this was Pliny’s initial intent when portraying the animals in this

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way (Beagon (1992) 129). Beagon is convinced that within the Naturalis Historia “beasts

possess qualities which are only analogous, not identical” to human qualities (134).

Pliny is not ascribing real human ratio to animals, he is only recognizing that they

sometimes seem to feel and think the same as a man. Cummings (2004) allows that

“Pliny’s position on such matters is puzzling,” since “a connection between a sense of

mutuality and a concept of justice . . . seems to structure Pliny’s moral assumptions. Yet

this is not something he denies to animals” (175). If animals can possess a sense of

justice and mutual interest, it seems likely that there is room in Pliny’s worldview for at

least some of the animal kingdom to possess ratio.

Whether or not that is the case, Pliny is not afraid to use animals to teach

behavior to his readers, who not only possess ratio but are undoubtedly expected by

Pliny to use it to the benefit of others. Beagon (1992) herself noted Pliny’s intention,

“The animal is not portrayed as it really is but is idealized and becomes a symbol of

whatever the moralist is extolling” (137). This sounds remarkably close to a fable. Using

animals to represent expected behavior and teach moral lessons is an essential

component of Aesop’s stories.

In Fögen’s article (2007) “Pliny the Elder’s Animals: Some Remarks on the

Narrative Structure of Nat. Hist. 8-11,” he argues that Pliny’s unusual mixture of animal

fact and story is purposeful and pointed at educating his audience. His article, of

necessity, is of limited scope; to further explore Pliny’s wish to educate and to expand

the inquiry into what, precisely, Pliny is teaching, the books in question have been

compared with Aesop’s fables and their intended moral lessons. To prevent a framing of

the morality of Pliny and Aesop within a modern and American sense of morality, or as

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Morgan (2007) phrases it, “falling back on what are probably inadequately examined

notions of our own moral values, and failing to look with impartial eyes at Greek and

Roman ones” (17), the comparison is with an author of an Aesop collection who is as

contemporary as possible with Pliny the Elder (for a nicer comparison), and an impartial

vocabulary survey of Pliny’s books 8-11 and the collection of fables was conducted.

Phaedrus, composer of five books of Aesopic poetry in Latin, is conveniently

more or less contemporary with Pliny the Elder.8 His books set the scope of my inquiry;

they limit and direct my research into Pliny’s animals, redirecting my focus toward

animals mentioned both by Pliny and by Phaedrus. Pliny, as a collector of fact and

science, includes a surfeit of animal species in his writings, which, even as I am seeking

to widen the scope of analysis to more than elephants and ravens, must necessarily be

limited to be sure I reliably evaluate Pliny’s purpose within his reports on animal life. By

comparing the moral aims of Phaedrus’ fables to Pliny’s animal passages, I am sure of

avoiding the bias that my own moral experiences are prone to produce when left without

the contemporary guideline that Phaedrus provides.

I also prevent that bias by a performing nonpartisan vocabulary survey of both

works. Teresa Morgan, in her book Popular Morality in the Early Roman Empire (2007),

expresses the unambiguous importance of vocabulary in moral representation (333):

One obvious overlap between philosophical doctrine and popular wisdom is in vocabulary. We have seen that popular sayings and stories employ a

very wide range of terms for good and bad qualities and behaviors.

8 Scholars are unsure as to the exact dates of the writing of the fables; Perry (1965) gives a thorough history of Phaedrus’ life at the time of his writing the fables, reconstructed from tidbits mentioned by Phaedrus himself in his dedications, introductions, and framing of the tales, as well as perhaps two mentions by other authors. He places the poet’s work in the first half of the first century A.D., and I do not believe a better or more thorough dating exists. That places the poems’ publication during the life of Pliny the Elder, meaning that, as much as possible, they were influenced by the same political and cultural

experiences.

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Philosophers do not use quite so many terms, but many of those they do use are the same.

Other scholars of Pliny also focus on his vocabulary use when trying to determine

whether he believed in animal intelligence. Beagon (1992), opining that Pliny definitely

did not suggest the existence of ratio in animals, says that “imitation rather than identity

is reflected time and again in Pliny’s language” (139), and Fögen (2007), expressing, if

not an opposing view, a view that Pliny is deliberately reflecting human capabilities,

points out that he “employs terms taken from the world of humans” and thus transposes

those proficiencies onto the animals he describes (189). Important here is not the

question of his belief in animal intelligence—a question to which I do not intend to

attempt an answer—but the validation of vocabulary as a means for uncovering the

intention of the author. The vocabulary an author chooses means something to that

author. I have used trends within the vocabulary used by Pliny to uncover the moralizing

purpose behind books 8-11 of the Naturalis Historia, and to compare the results to the

vocabulary used by Phaedrus, considering whether the moral goals of each are similar

or different.

Following the vocabulary survey, I have compared animal-to-animal the

“characters” of both Phaedrus’ and Pliny’s works, seeking similarities and differences

within the characterization of the animals’ moral actions in each work to prove Pliny’s

intention to create within the stories and traits of the animals in the Naturalis Historia a

network of examples of behavior, both morally good and morally abhorrent.

Finally, this paper is intended to continue the work of Beagon, Fögen,

Cummings, and others in redefining Pliny as an intentional writer with a clear goal,

whose work is invaluable in the study of Rome, Roman history, and scientific thought.

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CHAPTER 2 VOCABULARY SURVEY ANALYSIS

Consulting with several general works on Roman morality,1 especially focused in

the first century C.E., as well as the discussions of Plinian morality contained in the

works of Beagon and, to a lesser degree, Cummings, Fögen, and Wallace-Hadrill, I

compiled a list of 137 words representing both desirable and undesirable Roman traits

with which to survey books 8-11 of Naturalis Historia and all five of Phaedrus’ books of

fables. The survey discerns vocabulary trends within the works and those trends trace

out any moral goals in each work, and, by comparison, describe the possible

educational foci of Pliny’s writing using differences and similarities between his lexicon

and that of Phaedrus.

To compare analogous samples of work, the vocabulary survey has been limited

to only those fables of Phaedrus that concern animals, and, within Pliny, to only those

uses of the terms that refer to animals and animal behavior (i.e., not when describing

humans). A further limit restricted the survey to only applications of the vocabulary with

the correct connotation, e.g., only tallying generosus when it expresses nobility of spirit,

instead of nobility of breeding stock, another common use of the word in Pliny. Variants

of the same word are represented together (e.g., fides, fidelis, and fideliter are all

represented together as the word fides) to concentrate the discussion on the overall

meanings of the vocabulary, and the words are organized into themes to offer a macro-

as well as a microscopic perspective of moral vocabulary usage in the works. Lastly,

1 Specifically, Popular Morality in the Early Roman Empire by Morgan (2007), “The Moral and Political

Tradition of Rome” by Earl (1969), and Roman Manliness: “Virtus” and the Roman Republic by McDonnell

(2009).

22

words in neither collection are not included in the final representation of the survey: the

tables offered as evidence for my discourse. This significantly reduced the number of

words for discussion; the final list only contains 97 words which were represented

throughout both works.

Although every effort has been made to maintain uniform comparisons between

Pliny’s work and Phaedrus’, some differences do exist which can alter the significance

of the data presented here. The first and most obvious difference is the absolute

disparity in length between the two book collections. Books 8-11 of Naturalis Historia

contain 49,387 words—over five times the length of Phaedrus’ fables: 9,349 words.

When comparing the number of occurrences of a single word within the texts, it is not

surprising if the Plinian text contains more repetitions; rather, the accurate measure of

lexical importance will be found within the trends that the vocabulary survey discloses. A

second difference is in the vocabulary itself that each author uses. Out of the 97 words

examined, only 39 of those words overlap both works. That means almost 60% of the

words are not common to both, a significant disparity that would be difficult to overcome

without considering the importance of the common themes the individual words

suggest.

Common themes are invaluable in this analysis; they reveal the parallels

between a work ostensibly created to promote values and examples for decent Roman

living (Phaedrus’ fables) and a work ostensibly created to be a collection of the facts of

nature (Pliny’s Naturalis Historia). A lack of direct correspondence between the lexicons

does not eclipse the affinity in the themes the two authors highlighted, and the

differences between their moral subjects should serve to highlight more sharply those

23

concerns that were particularly Pliny’s. The morality that Pliny promotes is primarily

Stoic in source,2 and as will be made obvious below, the influence of Stoicism is readily

apparent in the themes that he expounds upon. The most obvious are strong emotions,

which the Stoics considered obstructive to ratio (which itself is the most important value

because it leads to considerate and civic-minded behavior);3 others may be concerns all

his own, unrelated to the Stoic philosophy Pliny follows.

Almost immediately when considering the tables in the Appendix, discord in the

values of the two authors is manifest. Table 2-1 concerns itself with words describing

the sacred, and it is the only theme in the entire vocabulary survey that belongs solely

to one author:

Table 2-1. Words describing the sacred

Word Number of occurrences in Pliny (passage numbers)

Number of occurrences in Phaedrus (passage numbers) Total

pietas 1 (8.224) 0 1

religio 3 (8.1, 8.3, 10.116) 0 3

veneratio 1 (8.1) 0 1

total 5 0 5

Pliny references pietas, religio, and veneratio especially when discussing elephants in

book 8, and points to actions by the elephants that seem to him to reveal a religious

leaning, rich in ritual. As will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 3, Pliny’s writing

on the elephants reveals a high regard, and his discussion of their religious tendencies

reflects his esteem for the creatures. While few in number (there are only five

2 See p. 11 above.

3 See Beagon (2005) 70 “Stoics tended to see emotions as the malfunctionings of a disturbed soul” (114),

and further, “The really important human frailty for Pliny is that of the emotions. The mind is capable of

moral choice; ratio risks being perverted by the emotions.”

24

occurrences of religious vocabulary in books 8-11 that refer to animals), these

references to religion are offered as positive attributes for the animals.4 Phaedrus,

however, uses no religious vocabulary, and his references to religion in his animal

fables contain mocking in general, and outright sacrilege in one specific example.5 The

difference between the two authors here could disclose strong feelings towards religious

piety in Pliny, though with the low number of occurrences I view this as unlikely; Pliny’s

fascination with religion as manifested in elephants is due to its similarity to human

intellect and perhaps as an encouragement to value devotion and good behavior in one

of its forms.

Surprisingly,6 discussions of luxury also have a seemingly low number of

occurrences: table 2-2 offers only six references to luxury in both authors.

Table 2-2. Words describing luxury and excess

Word

Number of occurrences in Pliny

(passage numbers)

Number of occurrences in

Phaedrus (passage numbers) Total

lucrum 0 1 (1.23) 1

luxuria 4 (8.7, 8.31, 8.197, 9.2) 0 4

ornatus 0 1 (4.17) 1

total 4 2 6

4 Surprising considering Pliny’s normal dismissal of religio and superstition as against ratio and limiting to the proper use of intelligence. According to Beagon (1992) 95 “The attack on certain religious ideas is based on their inherent opposition to facets of this outlook. They may degrade the supremacy of man in his use of ratio and his positive independence in facing life.” Though Beagon 72 also offers a reason for Pliny to sympathize with the religious: “In spite of his rational skepticism, he displays an appreciation of the attractions such a belief has for the mass of mankind.” Perhaps it is the level of devotion involved that

attracts Pliny to represent this as a positive animal attribute.

5 In fable 1.2 the frogs ask Jupiter for a king, and then, when they are not satisfied with the log he sends, are eaten by the viper he sends next. Also, in fable 4.25, a fly brags about crowding altars and tasting

sacrificial entrails.

6 Surprising, because of Pliny’s intense interest in the folly of luxury, which will be discussed later in the

next paragraph.

25

Phaedrus only alludes to luxury twice in his fables about animals. The first, in his fable

“Canis Fidelis,” is simply the lucrum a thief hopes to gain after bribing a dog. The

second, in his fable “De Capris Barbatis,” describes an empty token, a beard, taken up

by the she-goats in imitation of the bravery of the he-goats. In this case, the luxury is

implied in the vanity of the ornatum; it has no meaning on the she-goats. Pliny himself

mentions luxury only four times when discussing animals themselves, though in three of

those mentions, the animals themselves are not benefiting from the luxuria, and in the

fourth, he dismisses life within water as naturally lux and softening.

This almost implies that Phaedrus is more concerned with luxury than Pliny is.

That would be a grievous misinterpretation of the data, though. In this case, it is not that

Pliny is unconcerned with luxury, it is that he cannot view luxury as something naturally

occurring within the animal kingdom. Animals do not seek luxury because they are part

of Nature; luxury for Pliny is defined as constructed, man-made excess,7 and therefore

no animals are responsible for its existence or for its undermining effect on humanity

aside from humanity itself. If I broaden the scope of my vocabulary analysis to search

for the word luxuria in all of Naturalis Historia, I can find 96 occurrences of the word in

26 books (though there are a total of 36 books, there are no mentions of the word in the

ten dedicated to medicine), and, significantly, the book that contains the most

occurrences of luxuria is book 9, on water-based lifeforms, the livelihood of which he

describes as umoris luxuria (9.2). There are thirteen uses of the word luxuria in book 9,

7 Beagon (1992) 70 Pliny believes that “the good things in life, wealth and power, are to be preferred but not sought after to an ‘unreasonable’ extent” and that “for man to use his superior gifts to attain mere pleasure” is a misuse and waste of ratio, possibly best exemplified in Emperor Nero, who “is not just luxurious, but shows the perverted ingenuity for innovations and refinements in luxury which Pliny finds

particularly degenerate” (17).

26

mostly centered around pearls and dye as lavishly overvalued signs of wealth,8 and

invariably Pliny points out the wasteful nature of luxury and its erosion of the morality of

the people who value it. This is not a man unconcerned with luxury; this is a man

distressed by what he sees as a decline in the nature of mankind and occupied with

educating and arming humanity with the information needed to combat it. While he does

not use animals directly to educate his readers in this case, it is worth noting that Pliny

still embeds a large amount of moral direction between the descriptions of animal life.

Luxury denotes a loss of control, a wish to push past what is required for a

comfortable life into an unnatural level of ostentation. It is irrational and therefore

against the highest good within human reach. Pliny often pairs strong emotions, which

he believes override human rationality, with a vulnerable sense of self: looking at table

2-3, the conflicting emotions of humilis and superbia are both in the same passage; in

the passage, the emotions are used to control a mare’s behavior (10.180).

Table 2-3. Words of pride and humility



despicit 0 1 (1.12) 1

humilis 1 (10.180) 3 (1.27-1.28, 1.30) 4

pudicitia 2 (10.44, 10.104) 0 2

superbia 2 (10.47, 10.180) 3 (1.3, 3.16, 4.25) 5

total 5 7 12

Although Phaedrus is obviously much more concerned with the theme of pride and

humility than Pliny is (note his seven occurrences versus Pliny’s five, and this is in a

significantly briefer work than Pliny’s), his concern is entirely different. Phaedrus’ stories

containing pride examine the consequences of a person aspiring to be greater than he

8See above, n. 7 in Chapter 1: Introduction.

27

is; the value communicated is the importance of knowing one’s station and not fighting

against it, considerably different from Pliny’s interest in self-command.

The vocabulary in table 2-4 reflects this interest; Pliny concerns himself with

words related to loss of control twelve times in describing his animals,9 and here

Phaedrus does not show the same interest: he only mentions libitus and licentia once

each, while Pliny does not limit his examples of permissiveness to the assumed

ignorance of animals but even includes a diatribe against the lack of sexual satiety

within mankind, who should have enough ratio to prevent such intemperance.10

Table 2-4. Words implying loss of control

Word


(passage numbers)



libido 11 (8.42, 8.108, 8.112-8.113, 8.164, 10.100-10.102)*

0 11

libitus 0 1 (3.15) 1

licentia 1 (9.142) 1 (1.2) 2

total 12 2 14

*Some passages contain more than one occurrence of a word; this accounts for the discrepancy here and later in this collection of data between the given number of occurrences and the number of passages listed in this and any later tables.

In table 2-5, Pliny’s concern extends to humanity’s lack of satiety in objects of

ostentation; his interest in greed is obvious: 23 mentions of greed or jealousy, with

forms of aviditas used 21 times. This word is by far the word Pliny repeats the most

within this survey, and it ties in well with his discussions of and aversion to luxury. Only

9 libido in this case has only been counted if it reflects a loss of control in the animal or has negative

consequences, not as a general breeding term.

10 Passages 10.171-172 include the statements ceteris satias in coitu; homini prope nulla (“for all the other [animals] there is satisfaction in sexual intercourse; for mankind there is nearly none”) and quantum in hac parte multo nocentiores quam ferae sumus! (“we are so much guiltier in this capacity than wild beasts!”). Human lust is compared unfavorably to animals’ practical breeding, implying a lack of control

and morality in humanity.

28

greed could cause humanity to warp Nature to create forms of luxury; if man could be

satisfied and self-controlled, he would not need to change the status quo. Greed in the

animal kingdom is always either harmful to the creatures it affects or associated with a

creature considered inherently evil. Greed regularly appears in the form of gluttony,

which is often punished by injury or even death,11 or as an intensifying factor for malice

in the evil species.12 Even passive greed is represented as a danger to other species.13

Table 2-5. Words measuring greed and generosity



avaritia 1 (9.168) 2 (1.27, 4.21) 3

aviditas 21 (8.46, 8.57, 8.100, 8.113, 8.149, 8.229, 9.36, 9.46, 9.132, 10.8, 10.22, 10.27, 10.163, 11.3,

11.15, 11.66-11.67, 11.96, 11.200, 11.281)

3 (1.4, 2.1, 4.6) 24

cupidus 0 2 (1.25, 1.27) 2

invidia 1 (8.115) 1 (1.24) 2

liberalis 0 1 (1.23) 1

total 23 8 32

Phaedrus, too, has a number of references to greed and envy, as can be seen in

the table (2-5). In almost all cases, however, while the message Phaedrus’ fable

promotes is still that greed is destructive, it is accompanied by an underlying message

11 See 8.57 (a lion has a bone blocking its throat), 8.100 (gluttony is used to trap and kill leopards), 9.36

(turtles’ overeating leaves them open to being hunted), 9.132 (purples are trapped by greed), 10.163 (goslings die from gluttonous greed), and to a lesser degree 8.46 (lions have to extract food when they

eat too much) and 8.113 (stags overeat to their shame).

12 See 8.149 (crocodiles), 8.229 (snakes), 10.8 (hawk-eagle), 10.27 (cuckoo), 11.3 (flea), 11.96 (biting

insects), 11.281 (wasps).

13 See 10.22 (raptors endanger other birds), 11.15 (bees protect their honey from others’ greed), 11.66-

67 (moths attack honeycombs and gorge on flowers).

29

about the status quo, implying that the animal deserves its ruin due to its ambition.14

Pliny does not seem to care about ambition; his interest is just in the dangers of wanting

too much. His concern is about what is best for the human race as a whole (i.e.,

Romans) and teaching his reader to value the attributes that help society and discard

the flaws that harm it. Greed is harmful because it is selfish; the best use of a man’s

ratio is not to exhaust it accumulating excess.

Also harmful is anger, because it also overrides ratio to cause irrational behavior

and actions harmful to the self and to society. The emotion, as shown on table 2-6, is

fairly frequentative in Phaedrus, and in most iterations represents a loss of control and a

lack of reason.

Table 2-6. Words of anger



furor 1 (8.20) 1 (1.30) 2

ira 3 (10.122, 11.45, 11.59) 4 (1.29, 3.2, 4.4) 7

odium 3 (8.68, 9.185, 10.205) 0 3

saevus 7 (8.48, 8.52, 8.66, 8.112, 8.146, 11.87-11.88)

2 (1.12, 1.31) 9

total 14 7 21

This aligns itself to Pliny’s treatment of strong emotion, granting one theme where the

two authors seem completely in harmony. Pliny offers several instances of anger in

animals, but most notably saevus is used seven times, a word describing rage,

animalistic and irrational. If any description of anger denotes a lack of sense or control,

it is saevus. Yet, though most of Pliny’s examples of savagery or rage are described as

14 There are two exceptions. One is fable 2.1, which imagines a perfect world in which the powerful give to the weak and needy, and the greedy get none, only to follow this tale with the adage verum est aviditas dives et pauper pudor (“Truly, greed is rich and humility is poor”). The other is fable 4.21, in which a

dragon accumulates wealth but does not enjoy it.

30

uncontrolled, there are two noteworthy exceptions. The lion is described as saevus

twice, indicating a lack of control or reason, and still Pliny writes ubi saevit, in viros

potius quam in feminas fremuit, in infantes non nisi magna fame (“when it rages, it roars

after men rather than women, and never against babes unless it’s wracked with

hunger”), showing a great deal of discretion by the lion in the midst of its furor, which

must serve as an example to his readers of self-control (8.48). If a lion in all its savagery

can still show restraint, surely a man, with his superior ratio, can overcome his own

anger and make sound decisions. A lesser example, due to its domesticated nature, yet

still pointed, is the dog, which can be calmed in the depths of frenzy ab homine

considente humi (“by a man sitting on the ground” 8.146). Neither beast is recognized

as logical, containing true reason, yet both are able to reign in their fury when

necessary. Pliny values constraint, and displays it for his audience while urging them to

perform at least as well as an animal.

Less justification is needed to explain why malicious intent is considered a

negative attribute. Both Pliny and Phaedrus describe maleficence with a comparatively

large frequency; table 2-7 shows 24 occurrences of malice in Pliny and 19 in Phaedrus.

It also brings forth the generic word malus as extremely frequentative in Pliny,

accounting for sixteen of the 24 occurrences. These uses of malus are more or less

evenly distributed among the different books and represent a wide variety of animals.

Phaedrus’ mentions of evil intent are comparatively (relative to the size of each author’s

corpus) even more frequent, and his lexicon for this topic is twice that of Pliny’s. Clearly,

while this is a concern for Pliny, Phaedrus’ work reflects an even greater concern about

evil actions and intentions; however, this should be expected in a collection of fables.

31

Taking a broad view of the fables containing words of malicious intent, the message of

each fable tends toward two main themes: that evil happens and the weak and

subjected masses should learn to accept that and live with it,15 and that there is always

someone seeking to take advantage of others.16

Table 2-7. Words implying malicious intent



crimen 1 (9.9) 1 (1.10) 2

crudelis 1 (8.15) 0 1

dedecus 0 1 (1.21) 1

indignus 1 (8.158) 4 (1.8, 1.21, 3.12, 3.18) 5

ingratus 0 1 (1.8) 1

inquinare 0 1 (1.2) 1

insidiosus 4 (8.34, 9.29, 9.90, 11.61) 1 (2.4) 5

malus 16 (8.78, 8.87, 8.89, 8.112, 8.131, 9.34, 9.151, 9.153, 10.17, 10.44, 11.47, 11.88, 11.106)

4 (1.19, 2.4, 2.6, 4.13) 20

nequitia 0 1 (2.6) 1

peccare 0 1 (1.8) 1

pravus 0 1 (1.25) 1

scelestus 0 1 (2.4) 1

turpis 1 (8.50) 2 (1.10, 1.25) 3

total 24 19 43

The import of Pliny’s usage of this theme is much simpler: all evils that exist in Nature

can be and should be overcome by ratio. Mankind does not have to live with evil or act

in evil ways, because humanity can rise above instinct, unlike animals, which can

sometimes be only described as evil in nature. Pliny strives against the inevitability of

evil within society, and Phaedrus describes it as necessary and inescapable.

15 See Phaedrus, Fabularum Aesopiarum, 1.2, 1.8, 1.10, and 1.21.

16 See Phaedrus 1.19, 1.25, 2.4, and 2.6.

32

Pliny prefers to improve society instead of accept its failings. Table 2-8 reveals

that both authors wrote about utility, both praising the useful and censuring the useless.

Pliny and Phaedrus use the term iners (unskilled, inactive) in common to describe

underperforming bees (Pliny 11.25, Phaedrus 1.29).

Table 2-8. Words measuring usefulness



debilis 1 (8.147) 1 (4.2) 2

ignavus 7 (10.15, 11.35, 11.45, 11.50,

11.63, 11.65, 11.67)

1 (1.29) 8

inanus 0 1 (1.22) 1

iners 4 (8.80, 9.13, 9.44, 11.25) 1 (3.13) 5

inops 0 1 (1.24) 1

potens 1 (10.109) 3 (1.24, 1.30, 2.6) 4

utilis 0 3 (1.12, 4.4, 4.13) 3

total 13 11 24

For both, the important feature of bees is their hard work and skillful contribution to the

hive, and this common word (iners) reveals the similarity of their point of view.

Interestingly, Pliny’s vocabulary seems to focus more on the chastisement of the lazy

with all but one of his word occurrences discussing inaction and unproductivity.

Judging from table 2-8 above, Phaedrus seems to have a greater focus on utility,

though this superficial interpretation of the data is dispelled with further and deeper

analysis. In each story that contains potens the character so described is a powerful

character overwhelming a weaker character. The stories with utilis have more varied

themes, but similarly grim outcomes: a deer despises his useful legs until his beautiful

antlers are tangled and he is eaten alive (1.12); the horse seeks help from a man only to

have the man realize how useful he is—and enslave him (4.4); the saying that utilius

homini nil est quam recte loqui (“there is nothing more useful to a man than speaking

33

true”) introduces a story that rebuffs it (4.13). Instead of focusing on utility as a positive

trait, Phaedrus offers it as something dangerous, either to others or to the self. This sets

him up in contrast to Pliny, who uses ignavus several times to describe lethargic

behavior in a negative comparison with the diligence of other creatures, such as bees.

Pliny’s passion for hard work is acutely pronounced when contrasted against Phaedrus’

dismissal of utility.

Phaedrus is much more interested in the intelligence—or, rather, the stupidity—

of his characters. As shown in table 2-9, stultus appears in eight different poems.

Table 2-9. Words of intelligence, both prudent and sinister

Word


(passage numbers)



callidus 0 2 (4.2, 4.9) 2

doctus 0 1 (5.9) 1

peritus 1 (10.93) 1 (1.23) 2

prudentia 4 (8.1, 8.11, 8.23, 8.136) 0 4

sapiens 2 (8.208, 10.51) 0 2

stultus 2 (8.131, 8.199) 8 (1.9, 1.13, 1.20, 1.23, 1.29, 2.4, 3.15, 4.8)

10

stupor 2 (8.114, 8.204) 1 (1.13) 3

subdolus 0 1 (1.13) 1

vafer 0 1 (2.6) 1

total 11 15 26

In four of these fables (1.9, 1.13, 1.29, and 2.4), Phaedrus’ character dies due to its

stupidity. In two more (1.20 and 4.8), stupid characters are unable to eat due to folly.

Only two fables are lacking dire or even inconvenient consequences of stupidity: in 3.15

the term stultus is an empty insult aimed at a clever subject, and in 1.23 no stupidity at

all is demonstrated, only the fierce loyalty of the dog, with the claim that repente liberalis

stultis gratus est/ verum peritis inritos tendit dolos (“sudden generosity is pleasing to

fools, but a man lays only useless traps for the wise”).

34

Paradoxically, this theme is more common to Phaedrus than to Pliny, and taking

the relative sizes of their works into account, the disparity is even larger than it appears

at first. A number of explanations could be proffered: the insistence within the fables

that stupidity leads to death and loss is a topic that is much more suited to the

pragmatic advice fables often expound; Pliny’s Stoic leanings leave little room for him to

theorize on intelligence or lack thereof in animals; Pliny did not consider intelligence

something under the control of his readers (thus something he could effectively

instruct); Phaedrus considered intelligence relative to actions, so his readers could be

warned away from ill-advised decisions. Of these, it is most likely that Pliny did not

consider the intelligence of animals worth discussion; Aristotle dismisses animals as

incapable of reason17 and Pliny rarely, if ever, offers a differing opinion.18 It is not his

objective to prove the intelligence of animals, but instead to educate his reader about

the purpose of his own ratio.

Perhaps also due to his ambivalence toward animal intelligence, Pliny does not

spend much of his ink on the theme of honesty and deceit when discussing animals and

animal behavior. If animals do not have reason, they cannot truly seek to deceive

someone; honesty in a creature that cannot lie is not worth mention. Therefore, the few

occurrences of this theme in Pliny’s work merit examination. Table 2-10 displays the six

occurrences within books 8-11; these occurrences are limited to three words out of the

twelve searched in the vocabulary survey. Fallacia can be found in two passages: in

passage 8.6 Pliny describes elephants deliberately deceiving themselves into crossing

17 See NE 1097b24-1098a3.

18 See n. 18 in Chapter 3: Animals and Morality.

35

a body of water, and in passage 10.100 he describes a “deception” of male partridges

(breaking healthy eggs) to trick the females into intercourse.

Table 2-10. Words of honesty and deceit

Word


(passage numbers)



fallacia 2 (8.6, 10.100) 4 (1.31, 4.13-4.14) 6

falsus 0 1 (1.17) 1

fides 3 (8.142, 8.145, 10.104) 3 (1.5, 1.23, 4.14) 6

fraudis 0 5 (1.10, 1.16-1.17, 2.4, 4.14) 5

improbus 0 10 (1.1, 1.5, 1.8, 1.16, 1.22, 1.31, 2.1, 4.8, 4.20, 5.3)

10

mendax 0 2 (1.17, 4.13) 2

periurium 0 1 (4.21) 1

honestas 0 1 (4.13) 1

modestia 0 1 (2.1) 1

probitas 1 (8.1) 1 (1.5) 2

sinceritas 0 1 (4.13) 1

veritas 0 1 (4.13) 1

total 6 31 37

In passage 10.104, he discloses that pigeons are loyal to their mates, though that pales

in comparison to dogs’ loyalty. Pliny describes the fides of dogs twice; first, in 8.142 he

simply describes the dog as fidelissimum ante omnia homini (most faithful of all animals

to humans), and second, in 8.145 Pliny describes the extreme fidem of a dog who stays

by his master’s side even after death. Finally, there is probitas, ascribed to elephants in

8.1 as a trait they show that is even rare in mankind.

Though fallacia is negative in connotation, only once is the word used to imply a

negative action. This theme in Pliny is dominated by the dog and the elephant, and in

both cases the animals in question show loyalty and good character; the elephant is

even allowed probitas, a moral behavior that is usually exclusively descriptive of

36

humans.19 Here it is easy to see Pliny’s sparing application of exclusively human traits

(i.e., traits that require rational thought) to the animals he examines in his Naturalis

Historia, particularly when this close use is compared to Phaedrus’ fables and animal

characters. Phaedrus quintuples Pliny’s word count in this theme, and, in fact, this

theme is by far Phaedrus’ most commonly occurring one. The poet has 31 separate

occurrences of vocabulary of honesty and deceit, principally repeating words of deceit;

only five of the occurrences have to do with honesty. Phaedrus’ usages are spread

across seventeen stories, most of which are cautionary tales against trusting liars and

tricksters. Only four of the seventeen depart from that paradigm: 2.1, discussed above,

pessimistically declares that though it would be good for the strong to support the good

and weak, that is not how the world works; in 1.17 and 4.8 the liars in question are

punished; and in a divergence from the bleak realities described in the other stories,

1.23, “Canis Fidelis,” is the story of a dog so faithful he is unable to be bribed.

Phaedrus’ poetry, containing only this one shining example of faith among the tarnished

and jaded collection the author composed about deceit, provides a sharp contrast for

the optimism with which Pliny offers examples of moral action amongst the animals he

describes.

The gap between Pliny’s use of insults and the occurrences of insults in

Phaedrus’ fables is even more pronounced. Iniuria is only used once in Pliny (as can be

seen in table 2-11), and even then it is used not to indicate an insult but to describe the

economic harm a community suffers due to a dolphin’s fame. Contrasting that negligible

occurrence with Phaedrus’ twelve occurrences of insult, it is impossible not to seek a

19 For more on the elephant’s nearly human traits in Pliny’s Naturalis Historia, see Chapter 3.

37

rationale for the difference. The rationale paraphrases the explanation I posited above:

insult requires ratio, reasoning thought, and thus Pliny does not engage in imagining

insults for his subjects.

Table 2-11. Words about insult



contumelium 0 5 (1.2-1.3, 1.29, 4.19, 5.3) 5

impudens 0 1 (1.3) 1

iniuria 1 (9.26) 4 (1.21, 1.31, 4.19, 5.3) 5

insolentia 0 1 (3.6) 1

ludibrium 0 1 (4.19) 1

total 1 12 13

Phaedrus, on the other hand, is setting to meter a medium which is known for

personifying animals; his animals are capable of all human actions and descriptors,

including lies and insults, which require intention and intelligence.

Pliny reserves the majority of his human analogies for exempla reflecting values

he wants to promote. Tables 2-12 through 2-14 are focused exclusively on positive

traits: laudability, virtues, and contentment, though table 2-12 includes two counter

examples in Naturalis Historia: 8.88 (the mongoose is not content with defeating

snakes, but also vanquishes crocodiles) and 10.170 (the impatience of the viper’s

children causes them to burst from her womb and kill her).

Table 2-12. Words of contentment



contentus 2 (8.88, 9.31) 3 (1.3, 3.18, 4.14) 5

patientia 1 (10.170) 1 (1.5) 2

placidus 3 (8.9, 8.112, 10.197) 1 (2.1) 4

total 6 5 11

Phaedrus’ use of these terms follows the bulk of his stories in supporting the two most

common themes in Liberti Fabularum Aesopiarum: that the weak are crushed by those

38

in power and that one should be content with his lot in life. This tone of hopelessness

does not find a reflection in Pliny’s work; Pliny is seeking to better his readers, rather

than teach them to accept their circumstances as they are as Aesop’s fables normally

do.

Pliny uses his animals to demonstrate the virtues he wishes to promote. Pliny

points out examples of mercy, cleverness, justice, and duty to his readers, as

catalogued in table 2-13:

Table 2-13. Words describing virtues



aequitas 3 (8.1, 10.92, 11.44) 1 (4.14) 4

bonus 0 4 (1.23, 3.15, 4.14) 4

clementia 6 (8.9, 8.23, 8.25, 8.48, 8.56,

11.27)

0 6

constantia 1 (9.84) 0 1

fortis 4 (8.11, 8.68, 9.32, 10.143) 3 (3.7, 4.17, 5.10) 7

ingenium 7 (8.6, 8.159, 10.7, 10.92, 10.123,

10.128, 11.12)

0 7

iustitia 2 (8.15, 9.110) 0 2

misericors 0 1 (4.20) 1

mos 5 (11.11, 11.20, 11.26, 11.63) 0 5

officium 4 (10.121, 11.22, 11.54) 0 4

virtus 0 2 (1.11, 4.17) 2

total 32 11 43

Phaedrus’ additions to this table are unusual in the patterns shown thus far in this

vocabulary survey. Most often, the fables Phaedrus writes are pessimistic treatises in

support of or bemoaning the status quo, but this set of fables also includes messages

celebrating virtues. This is not to say he does not include his frequent dismissals of

39

hope for improvement,20 particularly evident when comparing Phaedrus’ use of

misericors in fable 4.20 with Pliny’s description of clementia in lions (8.48 and 8.56):

Pliny mentions the mercy of the lion while implying an expectation for men as well, but

mercy offered an enemy brings death in Phaedrus’ employ. However, Phaedrus not

only illustrates the loyalty of a good dog in 1.23, he reinforces that real bravery is shown

in actions in 1.11 and 4.17, that freedom is more important than comfort in 3.7, and that

goodness matters more than biology in 3.15.

Still, Phaedrus’ offering of virtues is only one third that of Pliny’s. Pliny exhibits

multiple examples of virtues incorporated into his scientific exploration of animals and

animal traits. Most strikingly, he includes ingenium among their traits, used almost

exclusively to mean “cleverness” or “ingenuity.”21 This would seem to be in conflict with

Pliny’s previous practice of refusing to assign traits that require intelligence to animals.

Instead, because ingenium indicates an innate quality, something a man or creature is

born with, by using ingenium instead of ratio for animal cleverness, Pliny is implying that

the signs of intelligence are driven by instinct, not ratio, but resembling ratio. He

describes an elephant who has a slow wit in passage 8.6, making the elephant difficult

to train. He also declares swallows and mice to have too little intelligence to train in

10.128. Despite those examples, Pliny almost consistently describes animals with

ingenium that helps them solve problems (the eagle in 10.7 uses height to crack tortoise

shells), build complex structures (the kingfisher in 10.92 and insects—especially bees—

20 See 4.14, in which a lion fails to maintain the good traits of aequitas and bonus, and 5.10, in which an

old dog’s past fortis is forgotten and unappreciated.

21 Ingenium appears at first glance to apply more to table 2-9 than table 2-13. However, the word itself

implies internal character and the true self, something more than simply “intelligence.”

40

in 11.12), and adapt to training easily (horses in 8.159 and lions and elephants in

10.128). The ingenium of the raven in 10.123 so impresses the community where it

resides that they hold a formal funeral at its death.

Such virtues can only inspire praise and admiration, which Pliny readily supplies;

in addition to the previously mentioned positive traits, he graces them with words of

worth and admiration.

Table 2-14. Words of admiration and worth



adulatus 2 (10.103, 10.127) 1 (4.13) 3

beniloquus 0 1 (4.14) 1

decus 2 (8.154, 10.118) 2 (1.13, 4.25) 4

dignitas 4 (8.142, 10.48, 10.81, 11.79) 2 (1.21, 4.17) 6

egregius 1 (11.51) 1 (2.1) 2

generosus 7 (8.42, 8.48-8.50, 8.55, 8.181,

10.47)

1 (1.29) 8

gloria 11 (8.1, 8.48, 8.88, 8.156, 8.159, 10.18, 10.43, 10.46, 10.108,

10.180)

3 (1.7, 1.11, 4.17) 14

gratus 3 (8.58, 8.60, 10.18) 2 (1.22-1.23) 5

honor 4 (10.6, 10.48, 10.62) 1 (1.7) 5

laus 0 5 (1.12-1.13, 4.25) 5

maiestas 1 (11.52) 0 1

meritus 0 1 (3.15) 1

mirabilis 7 (8.20, 8.122, 8.124, 9.178, 10.201, 11.11, 11.79)

1 (3.18) 8

nobilis 8 (8.50, 9.60, 9.64, 9.97, 10.3-10.4, 10.48, 10.135)

0 8

sublimis 0 1 (1.28) 1

total 50 22 72

Indeed, Pliny’s list of praises in Table 2-14 is the most populated of any of the

catalogues created from the vocabulary survey. These praises do not just reflect a

fascination with animals and animal life; Pliny’s praise communicates to his readers that

animals have traits worthy of praise and therefore are worth emulating. Conversely,

41

Phaedrus continues his parade of negative consequences, this time for pride and empty

flattery; his occurrences of terms of praise are most often spent either to swindle

characters out of food or to flatter the pride of a person in power. Phaedrus represents

the world as it is in his poetry, but Pliny is trying to create a better world with his

Naturalis Historia. His praise has a purpose: instruction.

Though both Pliny and Phaedrus employ moral vocabulary in their works, the

vocabulary itself is very disparate because they are emphasizing different ideas in their

writing. Pliny is teaching Roman values, highlighting piety, modesty, self-control,

reverence for the ratio, bravery, mercy, and duty, all attributes that contribute to the

health of the state. Phaedrus is extending the values of Aesop, founded in ancient

Greece, and focused on preserving the status quo with exhortations to be content with

one’s social standing and sympathetic reinforcements that the mighty regularly

overpower and harm the weak. Pliny shows no wish to support stagnation; he is

displaying characteristics within his scientific study of animals that are meant to inform

his audience of acceptable and unacceptable behavior. The differences between

lexicons used by the two authors reflect the differences in their moral goals, but do not

preclude an attempt to provide a moral education by either. Instead, a review of the

vocabulary survey discussed above only clarifies an intention in Pliny’s work to fold

exempla of correct behavior into the factual passages about animals. An additional

perspective reinforcing this interpretation has been provided in the following chapter

which analyzes specific exempla Pliny provides, side-by-side with Phaedrus’ equivalent

animal-based fables.

42

CHAPTER 3 THE MORALITY OF ANIMALS

Pliny begins his exploration of animals and morality with elephants. No other

topic in Naturalis Historia books 8-11 has been more discussed by scholars than the

elephant; Pliny’s obvious fascination with the animal has, in turn, fascinated those who

study him. Most provocative is his treatment of elephants as worthy human analogs.

Beagon (1992) points out elephants “are assigned the ‘human’ qualities of

understanding (intellectus, 8.1), language, of appreciating affection and honour, of

possessing such virtues as justice and reverence, and of understanding the obligations

of religion” (139). Elephants introduce the eighth book with a list of attributes that are

either equivalent with or even better than those humans most commonly display. They

are described as proximumque humanis sensibus (“closest to human feelings”), and in

the same passage Pliny declares that elephants exhibit vero quae etiam in homine rara,

probitas, prudentia, aequitas, religio quoque siderum solisque ac lunae veneratio (“in

truth, things that are even rare in men: honesty, wisdom, justice, reverence for the stars

and veneration of the sun and moon,” 8.1). Although elephants lack a parallel for

comparison in Phaedrus, Pliny creates a precedent for Aesopic treatment of animals by

offering this list of virtues; animals will be described in these books, but behavior will be

displayed as well, and morality will be measured for the consumption of the reader.

Fögen (2007) chooses the elephant as one of the two topical animals for his

discussion of Pliny’s purpose, writing “elephants are described in human terms; indeed

a variety of moral qualities that are normally associated only with humans are attributed

to them as well” (186). Fögen even emphasizes the list of virtues itself, “the catalogue of

virtues makes them almost appear as good Roman citizens . . . having better mores

43

than depraved citizens and thus as role models for certain humans” (186). Worth noting

is the focus on the human aspect of these attributes; as Cummings (2004) recognizes,

“To ascribe to the elephant a sense of justice, however tangentially, is for any Roman of

learning a serious philosophical statement” (177). Yet, Pliny makes that philosophical

statement without diluting it with a rationale or limit. Pliny’s elephants are like humans;

they care about prestige1 and seek aid when distressed,2 mirus namque pudor est

(“their modesty is extraordinary,” 8.12), and they are community-minded.3 Cummings

agrees, “even though it runs against most ancient philosophical principles, Pliny

attaches the elephant’s elevated principles of communality to a refined emotional and

ethical life of the mind” (175).

It is interesting that the books on animals open with the advanced moral qualities

of a foreign and even alien species. This sets a tone for the following tomes that

welcomes moral commentary and suggests interpreting the passages as exempla,

parading ideals to follow and vices to avoid. The elephant is even a blank canvas in

terms of moral imagery; since the animal is not native to Italy and Greece, it is not

1 Pliny tells a story about Ajax the elephant, who, when replaced in leadership because he refused

orders, inedia mortem ignominiae praetulit (“preferred death by starvation to disgrace”), and died (8.12).

2 Pliny, 8.21: sed Pompeiani missa fugae spe misericordiam vulgi inenarrabili habitu quaerentes

supplicavere quadam sese lamentatione conplorantes (“But when Pompey’s [elephants] lost hope of escaping they begged, asking for the pity of the crowd in an indescribable manner and mourning for themselves with a type of wailing”). The crowd soon curses Pompey instead of appreciating his show.

3 This shows itself in more than one passage. In 8.11, Elephanti gregatim semper ingrediuntur; ducit agmen maximus natu, cogit aetate proximus (“Elephants always walk in a herd; the eldest leads the line, the next in age herds from behind”); elephants are protected by being kept in line by their most experienced herd members. In 8.23, equitatu circumventi infirmos aut fessos vulneratosve in medium agmen recipiunt, aciei velut imperio aut ratione per vices subeunt (“With a cavalry surrounding them, they take their weak or tired or wounded into the middle of their formation, as if by command or strategy they assume a battle line in succession”); they protect their weakest members even when in a hopeless

situation.

44

featured in fables common to the area and perhaps burdened by fewer preconceptions

among Pliny’s intended audience. This allows Pliny to shape the message that the

elephants provide, and, by praising the superior qualities of elephants, he

communicates his wish to see those qualities in his fellow man.

Pliny thus connects animals to moral teaching in the first passage of his first book

on animals. He progresses from alien to familiar species, and, like the Aesopic tradition,

uses animals and animal behavior to showcase morality for his readers. Aesopic

tradition “has treated all sides of human life in his fables, and has made his animals

speak in order to point a moral. For he checks greed and rebukes insolence and deceit,

and in all this some animal is his mouthpiece” (Bradley (1998) 539). Before Pliny there

was Aesop, and before Aesop others;4 it is certain that Pliny was exposed to and

influenced by fables, and recognized the utility of providing a moral lesson cleverly

woven between animal characters. The compelling nature of animal narrative disguises

the less enticing moralizing intended by the creator, and Pliny, while only sometimes

telling the same story or even promoting the same values with his animals, still

appropriates the Aesopic method of animal intermediation for his own use. By

comparing Phaedrus’ representation of Aesop’s works to Pliny’s scientific discussion of

animals in books 8-11 of Naturalis Historia, the moral education Pliny intends for his

audience can be elucidated.

Elephants fascinate Pliny, but Phaedrus does not employ any elephants in his

poetry; further understanding of Pliny’s moral teachings arises from comparing animals

4 For a detailing of the moral stories that predate and influenced Aesop’s fables, see Perry (1965) xix-

xxxiv.

45

the two write about in common. As was revealed in lexical analysis, Phaedrus

commonly promotes the same themes throughout his fables, so instead of the fables

being consistent from animal to animal, animals are utilized in differing ways and in

different scenarios to display consistent themes. This is dissimilar to Pliny’s approach,

and the difference, proceeding from their particular objectives, highlights the morals

Pliny is attempting to teach. To further realize the moral implications of Pliny’s writing, I

have compared like animals between the two authors, using Phaedrus’ offerings to

clarify the moral leanings of Pliny’s books.

The Hunters: Lions and Panthers

One characterization that remains the same between the two authors is that of

lions, as powerful creatures whose mercy, or lack thereof, significantly impacts other,

lesser creatures. Phaedrus’ lion proves his power over others in two poems in

particular; in fable 1.5 (“Vacca et Capella, Ovis et Leo”), the source of the “lion’s share,”

the lion confiscates the entirety of a deer he had agreed to share with a cow, goat, and

sheep. He justifies his action (1.5.7-10):

Ego primam tollo nomine hoc quia rex cluo; secundam, quia sum consors, tribuetis mihi;

tum, quia plus valeo, me sequetur tertia; malo adficietur si quis quartam tetigerit.

I am taking the first share since I am called by the name “King”; You will offer me the second share, since I am your partner; Then, since I am the most powerful, the third share will follow;

If any of you touch the fourth share, you’ll not have a nice time.

The lion’s share is the entire beast, and the other animals find themselves in the

unenviable position of being too weak to challenge him for their fair portions. The lion’s

power is absolute in this story, and he exercises it only for his own gain. In 4.14, “De

Leone Regnante,” though the lion begins his rule in an attempt at aequitas, he

46

eventually turns to fallacia so he can seem incorrupt to his subjects while satisfying his

ceaseless hunger. Even an ape who quasi cinnamomum dixit fragrare et quasi deorum

altaria (“said his breath smelled like cinnamon and the altars of the gods,”)5 is sacrificed

to his avarice, since the lion mutare non posset naturam (“could not change his nature,”

4.14). The danger of the lion’s power is recognized in these stories, as is his

uncontrollable nature.

Pliny also offers examples of leonine gluttony; however, in his records, the

gluttony is more harmful to the lions themselves than the animals around them. He

writes that quae possint in mandendo solida devorare, nec capiente aviditatem alvo

coniectis in fauces unguibus extrahere (“they swallow whole everything they can while

they chew, and when their stomachs no longer hold their greedy meal they pull it out by

thrusting their claws down their throats,” 8.46), and they do this because they know that

gorging themselves can put them in danger if they need to flee, though that in itself

does not prevent them from eating too much. Gluttony is dangerous for even stationary

lions; in an anecdote Pliny shares, a lion pays for his voracious appetite (8.57): os

morsu avidiore inhaeserat dentibus cruciabatque inedia (“a bone had embedded itself in

the lion’s teeth when he was eating too greedily and it was torturing the lion with

starvation”). The lion has to beg help from a man, who eventually overcomes his fear

and removes the bone; unlike the lions in Phaedrus’ tales, this lion does not respond by

eating his helper. Instead, the lion shows gratitude by bringing its kills to the man in

thanks. In this one story, Pliny is able to express, like Phaedrus, a disapproval of

5 Line numbers are not given for this particular fable because much of the original poem is lost, and this

section of the fable has been pieced together by later authors. It will be the same for any future

occurrences.

47

gluttony and avarice, yet, unlike Phaedrus, he incorporates approbation of both the

decision to aid a distressed animal and the gratitude the animal shows afterward. This

single passage offers three different moral lessons.

Pliny continues to praise the clementia of lions (8.56): sunt vero et fortuita eorum

quoque clementiae exempla (“but there are even some examples of lions’ mercy”). The

emphasis on mercy even among lions is suggestive: if lions are merciful, then mankind,

without the bestial tendencies of lions, should have no difficulty showing mercy to those

who deserve it. According to Pliny, leoni tantum ex feris clementia in supplices (“only

lions, out of the wild animals, have mercy for suppliants”), and because of this they also

show compassion for women and children, only attacking them magna fame (8.48). This

has implications for human behavior. Lions control their truly bestial instincts to avoid

harming those who have submitted to them and those who cannot fight back. Surely

humans, with the added benefit of ratio, can do the same.6

Phaedrus’ fable “Iuvencus, Leo, et Praedator” imagines a lion who is likewise

generous to the deserving; though the lion rebuffs the request of a praedator to share in

his recent kill, he offers it to a frightened but innoxius man, saying Non est quod timeas .

. . en, quae debetur pars tuae modestiae/ audacter tolle (“There’s nothing for you to fear

. . . look, and boldly take the share that your modesty has won,” 2.1.6-8). This lion does

not claim the entire reward for a shared effort but offers to share the profit of his own

6 Beagon (1992) 150 reinforces that this would be an expectation for Roman warfare: “The asking for and granting of clementia is as much a part of the fighting ethos as is the skill and bravery of combat.” Morgan (2007) 142 agrees, stating that in his writings on ethics and generosity, “Nearly all Valerius’ examples of humanity and mercy (humanitas et clementia) concern acts of mercy by Rome towards its enemies.” She continues, “It befits those who are shown mercy and humanity to be grateful,” which reflects the gratitude the lion shows the man who removes the bone from its mouth. By this standard, lions, as Pliny depicts

them, are model Roman citizens.

48

work with another because that person is blameless. Naturally, Phaedrus modifies this

message with an epimythium that is suitably dour (2.1.11-12): exemplum egregium

prorsus et laudabile/ verum est aviditas dives et pauper pudor (“this is an utterly

magnificent example, and praiseworthy; but the truth is that greed is rich and modesty is

poor”). While this is indeed how the mighty should behave, Phaedrus suggests that his

audience would be foolish to expect such behavior to manifest itself. In “Panthera et

Pastores,” the author relents, and allows the panther, a powerful creature and

reasonable stand-in for the lion, to show mercy and gratitude without diminishing the

impact of his example with a pessimistic declaration that such actions are not likely in

the real world. The panther, trapped in a pit, is assailed with rocks and clubs by

shepherds who hope to see her die; other shepherds in the community drop bread in

the pit so she might not starve. Once she frees herself, the panther takes revenge on

those who hurt her, but spares those who fed her, saying Memini quis me saxo petierit,/

quis panem dederit; vos timere absistite;/ illis revertor hostis qui me laeserunt (“I

remember who attacked me with stones, and who gave me bread; don’t fear—I return

as an enemy to those who hurt me,” 3.2.17-19). The panther models proper gratitude,

while those who fed her serve as examples of mercy proffered to a seemingly

conquered foe.

Pliny’s panther also models gratitude. After a man overcomes his initial fearful

reaction to a panther’s approach, he rescues her cubs from a pit, and the panther, ea

cum his prosequente usque extra solitudines deductus laeta atque gestiente, ut facile

appareret gratiam referre et nihil in vicem inputare, quod etiam in homine rarum est

(“escorting him with her cubs, led him all the way outside the wilderness with happy

49

gestures, so that she easily appeared to offer thanks and expect nothing in exchange,

which is rare even among men,” 8.60). Pliny points out the panther’s gratitude, then

praises the gratitude and its unselfish manifestation with an incisive statement that

explicitly recommends this behavior to men.

The Hunted: Deer and Bovines

Providing a clear contrast to this feline generosity, Pliny writes about the

stinginess of the deer. The deer, quamquam placidissimo animalium (“though the

gentlest of the animals”), is described possessing malignitas concerning its antlers

(8.112). Pliny describes the animal’s selfish behavior (8.115):

cornua mares habent, solique animalium omnibus annis stato veris tempore amittunt; ideo sub ista die quam maxime invia petunt. latent

amissis velut inermes, sed et hi bono suo invidentes . . . defodi ab iis putant.

The males have horns, and only they, out of all the animals, lose them every year at the same time in the spring; thus, on that dreaded day, they seek unused paths as much as possible. They stay hidden as if

defenseless while their horns are lost, but they are also begrudging of their gift . . . some think they are buried by the deer.

Pliny considers this burial of antlers a selfish act; the Romans believed that antlers had

medicinal properties, including cures for epilepsy,7 and the fact that deer prevent easy

access to something they shed once a year is appalling to him. As Pliny repeatedly

emphasizes, the good of the community is always the highest priority, and withholding

gifts that can aid the common good is an unworthy action. Pride in their endowments

causes deer to behave in a duplicitous manner.

7 Pliny describes this in the same passage.

50

Phaedrus also implies that the deer is naturally duplicitous in “Ovis Cervus et

Lupus”; when a deer attempts to secure a loan from a sheep, the sheep replies that the

deer has a habit of de conspectu fugere veloci impetu (“fleeing from sight with a quick

bound,” 1.16.6). Phaedrus’ deer, like Pliny’s, admires its antlers; this vanity proves fatal

in fable 1.12 (“Cervus ad Fontem”). Truly enamored of his ramosa (“branch-like”)

antlers, though hating his tenues (“delicate”) legs, a deer is startled while marveling at

his reflection. In trying to escape, branches entangle his antlers, and he laments his

misplaced pride (1.12.13-15), o me infelicem, qui nunc demum intelligo, utilia mihi quam

fuerint quae despexeram, et quae laudaram quantum luctus habuerint (“oh, I am truly

wretched, now that I finally understand the usefulness of what I had disdained [his legs]

and how much grief what I praised [his antlers] would offer”). It is only due to the loss of

his life that the deer finally sees the folly of his antlers, which, though attractive, are not

nearly as useful to him as his legs are. Along with his foolishness, his pride costs him

his life.

Pliny considers the deer animal simplex et omnium rerum miraculo stupens (“a

simple animal and stupefied in awed contemplation of all things,” 8.114). He then

describes its tendency to stare at danger until escape is no longer possible, and its

inability to recognize danger; a habit more thoroughly explored in Phaedrus’ “Cervus ad

Boves.” This fable features another stag on the run from hunters, but this one avoids the

forest and instead enters a much more dangerous territory: human habitation. The deer

hides in a bovili, where he is hidden and cared for by the bulls in the stall. The bulls

attempt to warn the deer away (2.8.18-19), ille qui oculos centum habet, si venerit/

magno in periclo vita vertetur tua (“if the man who has a hundred eyes comes, your life

51

will be in great danger”). Unfortunately for the deer, he does not heed the warning, and

when the master—who seems to have a hundred eyes, noticing everything—arrives, he

finds the deer thanks to those troublesome antlers, and has the beast slaughtered. The

animal’s lack of sense causes comment by both authors, and that is paired with an

emphasis on its misplaced pride in its antlers, which consistently bring it misfortune in

Phaedrus’ stories.

The bulls in the same fable are an outstanding foil to the deer’s flippant disregard

of danger and general idleness. Not only do they warn him of the perilous situation in

which the deer has placed himself, but the bulls take care of him, sharing their food and

allowing him to hide among them. Bulls are represented positively by both authors; they

are generous to the deer in Phaedrus and praised for their utility by Pliny. Indeed, Pliny

says that all bovines are useful (8.179): non degeneres existimandi etiam minus laudato

aspectu: plurimum lactis Alpinis quibus minimum corporis, plurimum laboris capite non

cervice iunctis (“even cattle with a less pleasing appearance must not be considered

inferior: the Alpine cows produce the most milk even though they have the smallest

bodies, and do the most work even though they are yoked not by the neck but by the

head”). This makes them the ultimate animal partners in most of man’s labors (8.180):

socium enim laboris agrique culturae habemus hoc animal, tantae apud

priores curae ut sit inter exempla damnatus a p. R. die dicta qui concubino procaci rure omassum edisse se negante occiderat bovem, actusque in exilium tamquam colono suo interempto.

for we have this animal as a comrade in work and the field, of such importance among our forefathers that there is in their documented cases

a man condemned by the republic on a given day who, on behalf of a pushy catamite denying he had eaten bullock’s tripe, killed a bull on his farm, and was driven into exile as if he had killed his own tenant-farmer.

52

In this passage, the Romans have more interest in a bull than as food; it is the stalwart

nature of the bull that is valuable, an animal that will work hard and always be of use,

making it as important as a man. The case example offered more than emphasizes the

importance of diligence; that the Roman people equate slaughtering this animal to the

murder of a man communicates clearly the significance and worth of utility and, by

including it, Pliny evinces his own value for that characteristic.8

Phaedrus does not feature the utility of the bull in his fable collection; instead he

focuses on the magnificence of the bull and the its ferocity. Even in “Leo Senex, Aper,

Taurus et Asinus,” where the bull is a bit player in a story that is written to accentuate

the pride of the lion and the fool’s bravery of the donkey, he is held up as fortis

(1.21.10). In “Rana Rupta et Bos,” however, the story revolves around the grandeur of

the bull. An animal even Pliny describes as in aspectu generositas, torva fronte, auribus

saetosis, cornibus in procinctu dimicationem poscentibus (“noble in appearance, with a

grim brow, bristly ears, and horns readied and demanding combat,” 8.181), the bull has

a presence that can only inspire awe. In Phaedrus’ poem, the bull’s appearance

overwhelms an unfortunate frog, who at once becomes invidia tante magnitudinis

(“envious of such size”) and attempts to achieve the same (1.24.3). As expected, she

fails and instead of finally equalling the bull, the object of her aspiration, she rupto iacuit

corpore (“fell when her body burst”). A lowly creature like the frog cannot hope to equal

8 Also noteworthy is the degree to which the Roman people must have identified with the creature if they sought to punish its slaughter as a murder. See also n. 2 above, then the finish in 8.21 of Naturalis Historia; the elephants’ grief over their situation in the amphitheater causes a strong reaction from the crowd: tanto populi dolore ut oblitus imperatoris ac munificentiae honori suo exquisitae flens universus consurgeret dirasque Pompeio (“the grief of the crowd was so great that, forgetful of the general and his generosity displayed here in honor of them, weeping, they rose together and called down curses on

Pompey”). Romans were not unsympathetic towards animals whether or not they granted them ratio.

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a handsome and useful creature such as the bull. In Phaedrus’ writing, a lesser creature

is never able to improve itself, and the frog dies due to its attempt to become something

better.

Man’s Best Friends: Dogs and Horses

There are twenty-five passages in book 8 devoted to dogs and horses, described

by Pliny as fidelissimumque ante omnia homini (“most loyal to man of all the animals,”

8.142). Of the twelve passages describing dogs, only four of those do not contain

anecdotes of fidelity, bravery, and intelligence. Less impressive, but also telling, is that

half of the thirteen passages about horses in Pliny’s work contain anecdotes of bravery

and intelligence. Both animals are described in extremely positive terms by the author of

Naturalis Historia, and both animals are displayed in his work as models of Roman

virtue.

Pliny extols the loyalty of both animals, apportioning a significant amount of his

writing to the description of faithful actions by dogs and horses. In passage 8.142 he

writes, pugnasse adversus latrones canem pro domino accepimus confectumque plagis

a corpore non recessisse, volucres ac feras abigentem (“we have heard that a dog

fought against thieves to protect his master and when the man was dead he would not

retreat from the body, driving vultures and wild animals away”). Another dog in the same

passage reveals his master’s murderer, and a dog owned by one of Sejanus’ slaves,

when the slave was imprisoned (8.145),

nec in carcere abigi potuisse nec a corpore recessisse abiecti in Gradibus

Gemitoriis maestos edentem ululatus magnae p. R. coronae, ex qua cum quidam ei cibum obiecisset, ad os defuncti tulisse; innatavit idem cadaver in Tiberim abiecti sustentare conatus, effusa multitudine ad spectandam

animalis fidem

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could not be driven from him in prison nor would it retreat from his body when he had been thrown down the Steps of Lamentation, crying in grief-

stricken howls to the great crowd of the Republic circling it, and when one of the crowd threw food to it, it brought the food to the dead man’s mouth; it tried to save the same man’s body when it floated in the Tiber, and the

crowd spilled out to watch the animal’s loyalty.

Pliny even records that a dog, in its grief for its murdered master, cibum capere noluit

inediaque consumptus est (“refused to eat and starved to death,” 8.143). Pliny displays

canine loyalty in these anecdotes9 for his readers to marvel at and appreciate; humanity

would be much improved by following the example of dogs.

The fidelity of horses is also offered in multiple passages, including the example

of the Sybarite horses, who amissos lugent dominos: lacrimas interdum desiderio

fundunt (“grieve over their lost masters and sometimes shed tears in their grief,” 8.157),

and the brave and loyal actions of Antiochus’ horse 8.158: in proelio occiso Antiocho

potitum equo eius conscendisse ovantem, at illum indignatione accensum domitis frenis

ne regi posset praecipitem in abrupta isse exanimatumque una (“when Antiochus was

killed in battle, an enemy captured his horse and climbed it, gloating, but it was

infuriated by resentment and, taking its own reins so it could not be controlled, it

galloped headlong off a cliff and died together with its rider”). The horse’s fidelity makes

it seek revenge for the death of its master.

Phaedrus only offers one story of a dog’s loyalty; most of his stories containing

dogs focus on other attributes, most of those negative. The poet offers two different

stories about the stupidity of dogs in his works: in “Canis per Fluvium Carnem Ferens,”

a dog loses its meal when it quem tenebat ore dimisit cibum, nec quem petebat adeo

9 As well as others; see Pliny 8.142-145 for a complete collection of his stories about dogs’ loyalty.

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potuit tangere (“dropped the food which it held in its mouth, and was not even able to

touch the food it sought”), a reflection in the water (1.4.6-7). In Phaedrus’ “Canes

Famelici,” a group of dogs decide to aquam coepere ebibere (“begin to drink up the

water”) in a lake so that they comesse extractum possent facilius (“might be able to

easily pull out and eat”) an animal hide (1.20.4-5). However, before they can complete

their task, the dogs burst (rupti). In both cases, the animals only display stupidity and an

inability to solve problems, unlike the murderer-capturing dog Pliny records.

Nonetheless, Phaedrus does have one poem celebrating the devotion of a dog: in

“Canis Fidelis,” a dog not only shows its loyalty by not deserting its post for a loaf of

bread, but it even shows disdain for the ploy, berating the would-be thief (1.22.7-8), ista

subita me iubet benignitas vigilare/ facias ne mea culpa lucrum (“that insidious and

sudden kindness tells me to be watchful, lest you profit from my mistake”). The dog

does not leave its post for a quick treat but guards even more vehemently than before,

proving both its loyalty and its intelligence.

It is intelligence, instead of stupidity, that Pliny offers his readers with his

examples of dog and horse behavior. Phaedrus’ horse may lose its freedom in a foolish

venture to seek revenge on an enemy (4.4), but Pliny’s horses are resourceful and

ingenia eorum inenarrabilia (“their cleverness is beyond words,” 8.159). He relates a

story about the horse of the tyrant Dionysius I (8.158): a Dionysio relictum in caeno

haerentem, ut se evellisset, secutum vestigia domini examine apium iubae inhaerente

(“left by Dionysius because it was stuck in a mire, so that it had to pull itself out, his

horse followed its master’s footprints with a swarm of bees stuck in its mane”). This

story showcases loyalty, intelligence, and diligence, all ideal qualities not only for a

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Roman, but especially for a Roman soldier. Dionysius’ horse offers a perfect example of

worthy soldierly behavior.

Dogs are also described by Pliny as valuable soldiers. According to Pliny,

Garamantum regem canes CC ab exilio reduxere proeliati contra resistentes (“two

hundred dogs escorted the king of the Garamantes back from exile and fought against

anyone resisting them,” 8.142). In another passage, two different communities train

dogs propter bella, and the dogs primae dimicabant in acie numquam detrectantes,

haec erant fidissima auxilia nec stipendiorum indiga (“fought in the front line and never

refused battle, were an incredibly loyal aid to the armies, and did not need wages,”

8.143). Dogs are better soldiers than humans; they are never overcome by cowardice

and are loyal to a fault. The bravery of both dogs and horses can only be inspirations for

Pliny’s Roman audience, and dogs are recorded by Pliny to continue service even into

advanced old age. He points to dogs’ sollertia and sagacitas in hunting as the reason

for this, then describes the lengths to which men go in order to help their canines

continue using this skill when they are too old to walk (8.147): ergo etiam senecta

fessos caecosque ac debiles sinu ferunt ventos et odorem captantes protendentesque

rostra ad cubilia (“therefore men carry them even when they are tired, blind, and

crippled from old age, sniffing the winds for an odor and stretching their muzzles toward

animal lairs”). The dog’s utility does not end even when it can no longer work for itself,

and its work ethic and dedication to its duty is demonstrated in this continued effort to

please its master.

This canine dedication to duty is repeatedly praised by Pliny in book 8, and is

appreciated even by Phaedrus, in “Canis Vetulus et Venator.” In this poem by

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Phaedrus, the dog is fully aware of his past diligence and points it out to his ungrateful

master (5.10.9), quod fuimus lauda, si iam damnas quod sumus (“praise what I was, if

you are going to condemn what I am now”). As often is the case in Phaedrus’ writing,

the tone is pessimistic, and the dog, who is described as fortis and velox in his youth, is

admonished when he is unable to hold on to a catch any longer. As the dog maintains,

though (5.10.8), non te destituit animus, sed vires meae (“my will did not abandon you,

but my strength”). The hunter in Phaedrus’ poem does not maintain his gratitude for the

dog’s past service but only measures the animal by its current capability, unlike the men

in Pliny’s passage who are willing to aid the dog in its duties as it becomes too old to

carry them out itself. Though Phaedrus dedicates ten stories to dogs, his stories do not

honor the dog’s loyalty, bravery, or cleverness; only two of those stories are favorable

towards their canine characters, and only one allows its dog to succeed and have a

positive trait. Pliny, on the other hand, praises the dogs’ good qualities and by following

their passages directly with passages discussing horses, is able to present the Roman

people with exempla of bravery, determination, and fidelity worth emulating.10

Birds that Talk: the Raven

Pliny expresses a strong interest in birds that can humanes voces reddunt

(“render human voices”), dedicating eight passages of his tenth book to them (10.117).

He describes their training and their various capabilities. He even expresses disgust

10 There is one story in Phaedrus that, if it reflects a previously existing Aesop’s fable, was taken directly as fact by Pliny the Elder and recorded as such in his Naturalis Historia. Compare Phaedrus 1.25.3-4: canes currentes bibere in Nilo flumine/ a corcodillis ne rapiantur, traditum est (“it is handed down that dogs drink from the Nile while running so they are not caught by crocodiles”); and Pliny 8.148: certum est iuxta Nilum amnem currentes lambere, ne crocodilorum aviditati occasionem praebeant (“It is well-established that dogs drinking along the Nile river do it while running, so that they don’t offer an opening to the crocodiles’ rapaciousness”). While the vocabulary differs in each account, there is no mistaking the

similarity of the content.

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with the actor Clodius Aesop, who, to flaunt his wealth—something Pliny does not

approve of in any case—by hosting a lavish dinner, serves only birds with the capability

of speech. Pliny calls this act imitationem hominis manderet (“eating a human stand-in”

or, more colloquially, “pretending cannibalism”) and considers it an insult to the voice

that had won the actor his fortune (10.142). These birds are another example of the

miracle of Nature, and he treats them with the reverence he turns towards all of

Nature’s mirabilia.

Pliny discusses ravens extensively when compared to other birds, and, in

particular, a certain raven who wins popularity through its piety and obsequiousness to

the imperial household. Fögen (2007) notes that Pliny uses this anecdote, as he does

others, to teach proper behavior (191):

The story is much more concerned with the moral qualities of the bird than with its speech faculty, or, in other words, with its officium towards the royal family as well as the Roman public rather than with its ingenium.

With its respectful conduct, the raven behaves almost like a good Roman citizen...it is a sign of superbia to kill an animal that has a better

understanding as to how to honour the Romans and their political leaders than some human beings like the cobbler himself.

In the anecdote, as alluded to by Fögen, a raven captures the attention and

appreciation of the Roman public because omnibus matutinis evolans in rostra in forum

versus Tiberium, dein Germanicum et Drusum Caesares nominatim, mox transeuntem

populum Romanum salutabat, postea ad tabernam remeans, plurium annorum adsiduo

officio mirus (“every morning it would fly onto the rostra in the forum across from

Tiberius, and would greet him, then the Caesars, Germanicus and Drusus by name, and

soon the Roman people as they walked by, then return to its shop. The raven was

extraordinary, continually completing this duty for quite a few years,” 8.121). This daily

obsequiousness pleases the Romans who see it and causes it great renown.

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Unfortunately for the bird, this also causes jealousy in a local cobbler whose shop is not

graced by the presence of the dutiful bird, and the man kills it.

This raven exhibits several virtues Pliny values: piety, duty, and respect. The bird

inspires the Roman citizens around it not only to follow its example, but to mourn its

loss, and Pliny records an astonishing response among the public (8.122):

exanimavit tanta plebei consternatione ut primo pulsus ex ea regione, mox

et interemptus sit, funusque aliti innumeris celebratum exequiis, constratum lectum super Aethiopum duorum umeros praecedente tibicine et coronis omnium generum ad rogum usque

that it died caused so much uproar among the plebians that at first they ousted the shopkeeper from that area, and soon he was killed, and they

held a funeral for the bird, crowded by too many attendees to count, and a draped platform was carried on the shoulders of two Ethiopians, with a flute player leading the procession and all kinds of wreaths tossed all the

way to the pyre.11

This is an extravagant funeral for an animal, especially for an animal that is no one’s

pet. Rather, the raven captures the imagination of the Roman people and they see in

the bird the attributes they value the most, and are grieved to lose the example that the

Raven provides.

Pliny recounts this story in full because it is an effective example of Roman

reverence for duty and piety. Pliny notes that this all occurs in ea urbe in qua multorum

principum nemo deduxerat funus, Scipionis vero Aemiliani post Carthaginem

Numantiamque deletas ab eo nemo vindicaverat mortem (“in that same city in which no

one had led a funeral procession for many leaders, and indeed where no one avenged

the death of Scipio Aemilianus after his destruction of Carthage and Numantia,” 8.123).

The raven had clearly impressed the Roman people. Unlike Pliny, Phaedrus barely

11 For similarly strong reactions to the deaths of animals among the Roman public, see above, n. 8.

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mentions ravens; the raven is briefly paired with prophecy in “Pavo ad Iunonem de Voce

Sua” (fable 3.18), and while this emphasizes its speaking ability, it does not reflect much

in terms of moral judgement. In contrast, Pliny’s anecdote does not encompass the

entire species of ravens, but it does use the story of one raven to create discussion

about morality and an implication that the Roman people value the same attributes that

he promotes.

Hunters and Prey: Eagles, Kites, Pigeons and Doves

Pliny praises the eagle’s ingenium in 10.7, describing its technique of killing

tortoises: frangere e sublimi iaciendo (“breaking them by dropping them from high up”).

Phaedrus also mentions this tactic of the eagle, though he credits the brilliance of the

idea to the crow, who advises the eagle, as he flies high with a captured tortoise, ut

scopulum super/ altis ab astris duram inlidat corticem (“to smash the hard shell from the

height of the stars onto the rocks below,” 2.6.11-12). The eagle that Phaedrus

describes, though much more powerful than the tortoise and the crow, cannot discover

this approach on his own, but needs the help of a cleverer bird. The eagle in Phaedrus’

tales is represented as very powerful but less intelligent than the other creatures around

it; in “Vulpis et Aquila” the eagle easily steals a fox’s cubs as food for her own brood, but

is outsmarted by the fox when she ab ara rapuit ardentem facem/ totamque flammis

arborem circumdedit (“took a burning torch from an altar and circ led the entire tree in

flames”) and forces the eagle to return her cubs (1.28.8-9). The eagle dies in “Aquila,

Feles et Aper” due to the contrivances of the cat, who terrifies the eagle so that she

never leaves her nest and starves to death with her chicks (2.4). In both of these

stories, Phaedrus’ eagle is undoubtedly more powerful than its antagonist, but unable to

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maintain its lofty position when challenged by the less prestigious but cunning animals it

targets as weak.

Pliny records a story of eagles’ greed and resultant downfall when hunting

waterfowl (10.9): saepe et aquilae ipsae non tolerantes pondus adprehensum una

merguntur (“and often the eagles themselves are unable to endure the weight [of the

other bird] and are drowned together with their catch”). Pliny, like Phaedrus, writes

about an eagle whose avarice defeats it, and Pliny’s eagle not only fails to escape with

its meal, it is drowned alongside it. This cupidity is nicely contrasted with the gratitude of

another eagle in 10.18, who was raised by a young woman and retulisse gratiam aves

primo, mox deinde venatus adgerentem, defuncta postremo in rogum accensum eius

iniecisse sese et simul conflagrasse (“paid back its gratitude by bringing her birds at

first, and soon after that big game, and finally, after her death, threw itself onto her lit

pyre and burned with her”). Not only does this eagle exemplify the gratitude due a

benefactor, but it even exhibits loyalty to such a degree that it sacrifices itself rather

than survive her death.

Phaedrus describes another bird of prey, the kite, in his poem “Milvus et

Columbae.” In the poem, the kite convinces the doves, a weaker species, to regem me

creatis icto foedere (“make a treaty and make me king,” 1.31.8). As a bird of prey, he is

represented as the more powerful creature, and once the doves are under his

command, he proceeds to eat them one by one. The kite’s actions reinforce the

recurring theme in Phaedrus’ tome: the mighty use and abuse the vu lnerable. The kite

uses his power to secure a consistent stream of food for himself, and gluts his appetite

on the smaller birds. In Naturalis Historia, the kite is described as rapacissimam and

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famelicam semper, though Pliny underscores that nihil esculenti rapere umquam ex

funerum ferculis nec Olympia ex ara (“it never takes any of the food from funerary food

trays nor from the altars of the gods”), showing the kites’ appreciation of and reverence

for holy rites (10.28). Once again, the obsequiousness of the animal should pave the

way for the obsequiousness of men. If a kite can show respect, even as it hungers,

even though it does not have the benefit of ratio, then men should have no difficulty

doing the same.

Pigeons, whether displayed as foolish victims by Phaedrus,12 or vainglorious

fools by Pliny, also demonstrate actions which should be avoided. Not only should a

subordinate refrain from putting himself within the power of a reprobate, as in Phaedrus

above, but a creature (or man) vulnerable to attack should not flaunt itself in pride, as

Pliny illustrates in his passage on pigeons; he accuses them of having gloriae intellectus

(“a sense of conceit”) as if nosse . . . suos colores varietatemque dispositam (“they are

familiar with their colors and the variety with which they are arranged”), and claims that

they fly in unusual patterns to parade them (10.108). Because of their unusual flight, the

pigeons are easy prey for the hawk, which gaudentem in ipsa gloria rapit “snatches

them while they glory in their own vanity,” 10.108). The empty vanity of the pigeons

provokes their own deaths; unlike Phaedrus’ doves, the pigeons are not passive victims

who seek protection from the wrong source but are active participants in their own

doom, and therefore forfeit the right to safety. Ambition and vanity, interest in one’s

appearance rather than one’s contribution, all are faults that only cause deterioration of

12 Technically, as doves in Phaedrus; however, as they are in the same family of birds, and are both

offered as examples of prey for hawks, kites, and eagles, they can be associated here in terms of use.

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the self and, by extension, of Roma. Pliny is able to communicate a great deal in a

single passage.

Birds and Aesthetics: Peacocks and Nightingales

The peacock, unlike the pigeon, is accused of pride by both authors. Pliny calls

the peacock gloriosum, and depicts its enjoyment of attention (10.43):

gemmantes laudatus expandit colores adverso maxime sole, quia sic

fulgentius radiant; simul umbrae quosdam repercussus ceteris, qui et in opaco clarius micant, conchata quaerit cauda, omnesque in acervum contrahit pinnarum quos spectari gaudet oculos.

when it is praised it spreads its jewel-toned feathers, especially facing the sun, since they shine more brightly that way; at the same time it causes

reflections of shadow to hit certain feathers, which glitter even more clearly in the dark, and seeks a shell-like shape for its tail, and gathers all the eyes of the feathers into a cluster which it loves to be looked at.

Pliny imagines the peacock to be narcissistic, and Phaedrus even portrays the bird as

so intent on being the most impressive bird that it complains to Juno in envy over the

nightingale’s voice. In Phaedrus’ fable 3.18, “Pavo ad Iunonem de Voce Sua,” the

peacock bemoans to Juno that se derideri simul ac vocem miserit (“he is mocked as

soon as he utters a note”) and requests a voice like the nightingale’s (3.18.4). Juno

does not comply, and offers the advice (3.18.14-15): noli adfectare quod tibi non est

datum/ delusa ne spes ad querelam reccidat (“don’t aspire to things with which you are

not given, lest a false hope lead you to grief”). The message again is one of

contentment; though less pessimistic than many of Phaedrus’ aforementioned morals,

not especially inspirational. It offers no hope for self-improvement; even Pliny does not

seek to improve upon the vanity of the peacock, but includes this distinctly human

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emotion as part of its description.13 Vanity, another emotion that can override ratio,

causes the peacock, pudibundus ac maerens quaerit latebram (“ashamed and grieving,

to seek a place to hide”) for six months of the year (10.44). Its vanity makes the

peacock useless for half the year. A similar vanity in mankind would cease progress for

the individual and the community.

Pliny offers hope in the artistry of the nightingale, about which he writes at a level

of appreciation only equalled by his fascination with insects (10.81-82):14

tanta vox tam parvo in copusculo, tam pertinax spiritus; deinde in una perfecta musicae scientia: modulatus editur sonus, et nunc continuo spiritu trahitur in longum, nunc variatur inflexo, nunc distinguitur conciso,

copulatur intorto, promittitur revocato; infuscatur ex inopinato, interdum et secum ipse murmurat, plenus, gravis, acutus, creber, extentus, ubi visum est vibrans—summus, medius, imus; breviterque omnia tam parvulis in

faucibus quae tot exquisitis tibiarum tormentis ars hominum excogitavit.

such a huge voice in such a tiny little body, its breath so long-lasting; and

then in just one bird there is an accomplished knowledge of music: the sound is emitted already musical, and is now drawn out in length with a single breath, and now changed with altered breath, now broken into

staccato, connected by pushing the breath, sent forth with withheld breath; it is lowered as a surprise, now and then so that it murmurs with itself, loud, low, high, trilling, smooth, inflecting when it seems good—soprano,

treble, bass; and in short as many things in its little throat as human skill has come up with in the exquisite instrument of the flute.

Pliny even records nightingales choosing to die rather than lose a singing contest

against another bird (10.83). This pride exposes a competitive spirit that inspires

ingenuity among the birds and artistry that is unrivalled by human capabilities. It also

requires a level of diligence that exemplifies the focus artistic achievement requires.15

13 Though he soundly rejects personifying them as spiteful in 9.44.

14 See below for Pliny’s praise of insects, especially the flea.

15 Pliny is not unsupportive of the arts; this would seem counter to his stance on luxury, but for Pliny, the line is drawn at self-indulgence and harm to the self and the state. Beautiful music does no harm. In

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Fleas, Bees, and Other Small Things

There can be no doubt that Pliny valued insects as a validation of the power of

nature; his amazement is displayed in rapturous praise over the functioning of the flea

(11.2):

in his tam parvis atque tam nullis quae ratio, quanta vis, quam inextricalbilis perfectio! ubi tot sensu collocavit in culice?—et sunt alia dictu minora—sed ubi visum in eo praetendit? ubi gustatum adplicavit? ubi

odoratum inseruit? ubi vero truculentam illam et portione maximam vocem ingeneravit? qua subtilitate pennas adnexuit, praelongavit pedum crura, disposuit ieiunam caveam uti alvum, avidam sanguinis et potissimum

humani sitim accendit!

in these beings, so small, so nearly nothing, what organization, how much

power, what a tangled ideal is there! where are all the senses collected in the flea—and there are other smaller creatures to discuss—but where did she [Nature] place sight in it? where did she apply taste? where did she

insert smell? where indeed did she implant that voice, fierce and loud for its size? with what detail did she bind the wings, lengthen the legs for the feet, place a hungry hollow as its stomach, greedy for blood and especially

thirsting for human blood!

He continues from there, bragging on the genius of Nature in her tiniest creations, and

justifying insects as a topic for study and discussion in his Naturalis Historia. Book 11

includes investigations into many different insects, but I want to first focus in particular

on bees and ants as examples of dedicated labor and their correlations in Phadrus’

books of fables.

Models of Morality: Bees and Ants

Bees are not the only creatures praised in Book 11 of Naturalis Historia, yet they

receive more attention from the author than any other species in all four books he

addition, Morgan (2007) 156 explains that Pliny is interested “in the contributions of poets, philosophers, and scientists to a good society,” with room to explore the import of the humanities. Here and in describing the peacock, Pliny reveals an interest in aesthetics and an appreciation for the beauty they can

contribute.

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devoted to animalia: they are discussed from 11.11 through to 11.70, with considerable

praise for tam munificum animal (11.67). Bees (11.11)

mella contrahunt sucumque dulcissimum atque subtilissimum ac

saluberrimum; favos configunt et ceras mille ad usus vitae, laborem tolerant, opera conficiunt, rempublicam habent, consilia privatim ac duces gregatim, et quod maxime mirum sit, mores habent praeter cetera.

gather honey and the sweetest, finest, and most beneficial nectar; they construct combs and wax good for a thousand things, they endure labor,

build works, have a government, private plans and leaders of the masses, and especially surprising, their mores are better than all other animals’.

They are extremely valuable to the Romans, but not simply as suppliers of honey; bees

offer a practical model of appropriate behavior for all animals, including humans.

Phaedrus must agree, and though he does not devote the same attention as Pliny to

bees, Phaedrus’ collection does offer “Apes et Fuci Vespa Iudice,” a fable praising the

craftsmanship of bees, albeit indirectly. Drones (fuci), serving-class bees considered by

the Romans far inferior to other bees,16 are attempting to appropriate the masterful

honey combs and honey which the apes in alta fecerant quercu (“bees had made in a

tall oak” 3.13.1). Unwilling to settle the dispute fairly, the drones bring the bees before a

judge (vespa iudice) who recognizes the source of the drones’ claim: Non inconveniens

corpus et par est color, in dubium plane res ut merito venerit (“Your body is not

dissimilar and your coloring is equal, so obviously the case has rightfully come into

question,” 3.13.6-7). However, when threatened with a requirement to recreate the

superior works of the bees, the drones refuse and the wasp declares: Apertum est quis

16 See (e.g.) Pliny 11.27, sunt autem fuci sine aculeo, velut inperfectae apes novissimaeque, a fessis et iam emeritis inchoatae, serotinus fetus et quasi servitia verarum apium; quamobrem imperant is primosque expellunt in opera, tardantis sine clementia puniunt (“but there are drones, without stingers, just like unfinished and very new bees, created by those who are now worn out, who are late offspring and similar to servants of the true bees; for which reason they give them orders and send them out to

work first, and punish the sluggish drones without mercy”).

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non possit et quis fecerit. quapropter apibus fructum restituo suum (“It is obvious who

could not do it and who did the work. Thus I return the fruit of their labor to the bees,”

3.13.14-15). The bees, willing to prove themselves by reenacting their previous

accomplishments, win the suit.

Perhaps Phaedrus composed this fable to protect himself against imitators.17 If

that is the case, it does not detract from the praise that is being offered bees as authors

of worthy works. In this fable, the bees are able to construct works so fine and produce

honey so perfectly flavored that the drones cannot hope to match their skill. They refuse

the wasp’s test, proving their lack of confidence. Much like the bees’ imagined enemies,

against whom Pliny claims bees coat the interior of their hives with amarioribus sucis

(“rather bitter juices”) so that these juices protect contra aliarum bestiolarum aviditates,

id se facturas consciae quod concupisci possit (“against the greed of other little beasts,

[the bees] knowing that they were going to make something that could be longed for,”

11.15), the drones covet the honey and structure they cannot make themselves. The

drones do not deserve the honey or the comb; they are not the perfect examples of

efficaciae industriaeque (“efficiency and industry”) that the bees are (11.12). In all of

Naturalis Historia, Pliny honors no other species as much as the bees. All the praise he

amasses on the bees highlights attributes to which men should aspire, and it is possibly

because of their numerous virtues that Pliny compliments them with a characteristic that

17 Perry (1965) 280 notes that Phaedrus’ moral for the poem, Hanc praeterissem fabulam silentio, si pactam fuci non recusassent fidem (“I would have passed over this fable in silence, if the drones had not refused to agree to the truth”), “may be referring to imitators of his fables, or to persons who claimed that they themselves or someone else had written them.” This could imply the fable has been fabricated for Phaedrus’ own uses, especially considering that it does not appear elsewhere, although I am drawn to the word praeterissem as an indication that Phaedrus, like a long line of the best and best-known orators before him, instead found a fable perfectly suited to make his point, and used the epimythium to make

sure his point is clear.

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is attributed to no other animal in his books: ratio.18 Ratio is a multi-faceted word that

has many uses in the Latin language. However, in this particular instance, it is used to

describe the ability to think, to reason; an ability that is not only generally limited to

human capacity by Pliny himself,19 but, as previously pointed out, by the Stoic

18 Pliny uses the word ratio a total of thirty times in Naturalis Historia; its meanings include “method”, as in 8.54: casus rationem docuit (“an accident taught this method”), 9.141: ratio qua se virorum iuxta feminarumque forma credit amplissimam fieri (“method by which the beauty of men and women equally believes itself to be made most plentiful”), 11.2: qua ratio, quanta vis, quam inextricabilis perfectio (“what method, what strength, what impossibly intricate perfection”; in this I believe ratio is describing Nature’s design), 11.85: vix ulla alia ratio est (“there is barely any other method [of reproduction]”); “practice” or “rule”, as in 8.73: varieque infesta aut obliqua, utcumque ratio monstravit (“and [horns] that are variously en guarde or laid down, whatever practice dictates”), 9.129: in victu frugum noscitur ratio (“the rules of produce is learned on a diet”), 9.152: adempta ratione contra eundi (“with the practice of a good offense against them taken away”), 9.159: naturae perinde occulta ratione (“likewise by some hidden rule of nature”), 9.178: est in his quidem, tametsi mirabilibus, tamen aliqua ratio (“but indeed there is some rule in these [reports], however amazing”), 10.63: Simili anseres quoque et olores ratione commeant (“geese and swans also migrate by a similar rule”), 10.86: Alia ratio ficedulis (“the practice of fig-peckers is different”), 11.10: quaecumque est ratio vitalis (“whatever is their rule of life”); “reason”, “cause” or “plan”, as in 8.89: dies in terra agit, noctes in aqua, teporis utrumque ratione (“it spends its days on the land and nights in the water, in both cases for warmth”), 9.29: simili ratione in altum protinus tendunt (“they strive into the deep sea for a similar reason”), 9.71: evidens ratio est (“the reason is apparent”), 10.104: spectantur simili ratione mores (“their habits are observed for a similar reason”), 10.211: quaque fiant ratione (“and for what reason they occur”), 11.5: idque ratione persuadentes (“and arguing the point with this reason”), 11.46: quae enim ratio ut idem coitus alios perfectos, inperfectos generet alios (“For what reason is there that the same union would produce some complete and some incomplete offspring?”), 11.76: gloria cogitate rationis (“the renown for thinking up the plan”), 11.81: per se tenax ratio tramae (“the layout [plan] of the weave is taut in itself”), 11.102: tam frivola ratione morientes (“dying for such a frivolous reason”); and a few specialized meanings such as 8.136: urinae et duobus aliis animalibus ratio mira (“and the property of the urine of two other species is marvelous”), 8.162: diversa autem circo ratio quaeritur (“however, for racing, a different build is sought”), 11.13: locorumve ratio (“or the climate”), and 11.108: reipublicae ratio (“system of government”). Pliny offers that elephants act as though they utilize ratio in 8.23: aciei velut imperio aut ratione per vices subeunt (“they charge the battle line in waves as if by command or rational thought”). He even uses ratio to mean “rational thought” in 11.42 when discussing human strategy in collecting honey: relinqui ex ea duas partes apibus ratio persuadet (“rational thought persuades us that two parts from each [comb] should be left for the bees”). However, in only one case does Pliny apply ratio meaning “rationality” or “rational thought” to an animal, and in that passage,

he is referring to bees.

19 Beagon (1992) 134 argues against the likelihood of Pliny as an “animalitarian”: “with regard to human qualities of mind—practical knowledge, wisdom, and understanding (HA 8.1, 588a28-31)—beasts possess qualities which are only analogous, not identical.” cf. Cummings (2004) 174: “In fact, it is far from clear that he follows the Aristotelian first principal of denying the animal ratio.” Especially concerning elephants, scholarship seems split concerning Pliny’s view of animal ratio. However, as per n3 above, he is careful not to recognize thought in animals; even regarding the elephants, it is “as if” they were

intelligent.

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philosophy to which he subscribes.20 Exalting the bees’ unity, Pliny offers the tiny

creatures as examples of the purest rationality, surpassing that of men (11.12): quos

ratione medius fidius iis viros, hoc certe praestantioribus quod nihil novere nisi

commune? (“What men use rationality more faithfully than these [bees], who surely

surpass them in this one thing, that they have known nothing except the public good?”).

He may limit the scope of bees’ ratio, but within that scope, the bees’ reason surpasses

even that of humans; they are the most rational beings in existence when specifically

considering the ability to act in favor of the common good.

Pliny then folds this praise of the bees’ ratio into his overall praise of Natura,

attributing to the force and intellect of Nature the outstanding capabilities of bees

(11.12): tanta est natura rerum ut prope ex umbra minima animalis incomparabile

effecerit quiddam (“The Nature of the universe is so great that she has created

something almost incomparable out of a miniscule ghost of an animal”). Nature has

made bees incomparabile quiddam and thus a perfect model of behavior for mankind.

Men would do well to put their country before themselves; to value hard work and the

good of the community before their own wishes for luxury. Pliny praises the bees’

industry (11.14), exeunt ad opera et labores, nullusque, cum per caelum licuit, otio perit

dies (“They go to their jobs and duties, and not one day perishes in idleness as long as

weather permits”), and although he does not explicitly state it, he leaves no doubt that

he believes this is an example worth following. Like the bees in Phaedrus’ fable, these

bees leave no room for laziness to find gain in their work; instead mira observatio

20 Cummings (2004) 175: “Stoic thought also conventionally denied to animals any such concepts” of

rational thought.

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operis: cessantium inertiam notant, castigant, mox et puniunt morte (“their observation

of their work is remarkable: they take note of the sloth of any that stop working,

reprimand them, and soon punish them with death,” 11.25). Nor do Pliny’s bees tolerate

wastefulness within their own ranks (11.67): praeparcae et quae alioqui prodigas atque

edaces non secus ac pigras et ignavas proturbent (“they are very frugal and in general

expel the wasteful and gluttonous bees no differently than the sluggish and lazy”). Pliny

uses bees to highlight good attributes (hard-working, community-minded, detail-

oriented) and undesirable attributes (slothful, lazy, wasteful). His bees are like

Phaedrus’; both examples are industrious and good at their tasks, both produce fine

products and refuse those products to the lesser undeserving ranks who desire them.

Phaedrus and Pliny do not limit their insect-related moralizing to bees; ants offer

another model of exceptional morality, especially of industry. Pliny even begins his

section on ants by comparing their industrial nature to that of bees (11.108):

vere, mirabiles opere21 et hae communicantes laborem ut apes, sed illae faciunt cibos, hae condunt. ac si quis comparet onera corporibus earum, fateatur nullis portione vires esse maiores.

Indeed, they are wondrous workers who also divide their labor like the bees, though the bees make their own food and the ants forage theirs.

And if someone were to compare their burdens to their bodies, he would have to admit that no other animals have a greater strength in respect to their size.

Ants, though they produce nothing of their own, are extremely strong and work very

hard. Pliny makes special note of their proportional strength, implying value in

demanding the top performance from one’s body that it can produce. In addition to their

21 The Loeb collection of Pliny’s books removes mirabiles operae, though Mayhoff’s Teubner edition

(1892-1909) inserts the words as a recommendation, and I chose to include them for clarity.

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unusual strength, ants also outperform bees in consistent labor; Pliny expresses

complete approval of their work ethic (qui labor, quae sedulitas!) while noting that ants

operantur et noctu plena luna (“even work at night if the moon is full,” 11.109). Pliny

even wonders at the results of their constant and consistent labor (11.110): silices

itinere earum adtritos videmus et opere semitam factam, ne quis dubitet et qualibet in re

quid possit quantulacumque adsiduitas (“We see stones worn down by their journeys

and paths made by their work, lest anyone doubt what the tiniest amount of diligence is

capable of in any sort of situation”). Ants, with their constant focus on their goals and

the good of their community, model exactly the sort of resolve that Pliny recommends,

who even explicitly offers the example as proof that anything can be accomplished with

true steadfastness.

The worth of this steadfastness is challenged in Phaedrus’ “Formica et Musca”

by a lazy fly (musca) who wonders at the amount of work the ant (formica) performs,

especially as she (the fly) is able to enjoy multiple distinctions without toil (4.25.9):

laboro nihil atque optimis rebus fruor (“I don’t work at all and I enjoy the best of

everything”). Preserving her dignity, the ant retorts, nihil laboras? ideo, cum opus est,

nihil habes (“You don’t work at all? That’s why you have nothing when it’s needed,”

4.25.16). The ant is not embarrassed by her assiduity; she defends it (4.25.17-20):

ego grana in hiemem cum studiose congero, te circa murum pasci video stercore;

mori contractam cum te cogunt frigora, me copiosa recipit incolumem domus.

While I am diligently collecting seeds against the oncoming winter, I see you grazing on shit22 around the city wall;

22 This may seem like strong language, but I am persuaded that it is the better translation of stercore for the purpose of this poem, due to two reasons: first, the fly calls the ant rustica in line 10, implying a lack of culture and therefore eliminating the need for formal or genteel speech; second, the word stercore is

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but when the cold causes you to die all curled up, my bountiful home will keep me safe and sound.

The ant knows her worth; she recognizes the importance of hard work. She offers

Phaedrus’ audience a lesson in diligence and directs them to value industry by pointing

out its long-term benefits. The fly only feels secure enough in her worldly situation in the

summer; as the ant points out, cum bruma est siles (“You are silent when the day is

shortest,” 4.25.21), i.e., in winter, the time the fly’s lack of enterprise hurts her the most.

Phaedrus’ ant harmonizes nicely with Pliny’s; both value hard work and abhor laziness.

For both authors, the ant is a model Roman citizen, and all men benefit who follow its

behavior.

Behaving Badly: Flies and Moths

The fly, however, is featured in two of Phaedrus’ poems, and in both cases

considers itself cleverer and more deserving than it actually is. The first is the fable

previously discussed, “Formica et Musca.” Until the ant asserts its own worth as greater

than that of the fly, the fly boasts about her far-reaching experience and privilege

(4.25.5-8):

moror inter aras, templa perlustro deum;

ubi immolatur, exta praegusto omnia; in capite regis sedeo cum visum est mihi, et matronarum casta delibo oscula

I rest among the altars, I wander throughout the temples of the gods; when there is a sacrifice, I taste all the entrails first;

I sit on the king’s head when I feel like it, and I skim the pure kisses of married ladies

placed at the end of the line, emphasizing the word and its repulsive quality, as well as the disgust

expected at the act of eating stercorem.

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The fly acts despicably; Romans reading this poem would recognize these actions as

shocking and recognize in the fly a character not to be emulated. The fly shows no

remorse for her actions and counts them among her laudibus (4.25.4). The ant,

reflecting the attitude expected of a moral being, chastises the fly (4.25.15): super etiam

iactas tegere quod debet pudor (“you even boast over things shame should keep

hidden”). The fly’s boasts show a flagrant disregard for authority, both human and

divine. The fable makes sure to confirm that such a character is not successful;

ultimately the fly can expect a painful death, the just reward for such atrocious behavior.

Continuing as an illustration of undesirable behavior, the fly is featured in another

of Phaedrus’ fables, “Calvus et Musca.” A fly bites a bald man (calvus) on the head and

when the man slaps himself while attempting to kill the fly, it gleefully blusters (5.3.3-5):

Punctum volucris parvulae voluisti morte ulcisci; quid facies tibi, iniuriae qui addideris

contumeliam? (“You wanted to punish the sting of a little flying thing with death; what

will you do to yourself, who added insult to injury?”). The fly taunts the man with his

unsuccessful attack, and suggests he must now offer the same reward or punishment to

himself that he was originally aiming for her. However, the man calls the fly contempti

generis animal improbum (“shameless beast of a despised species,” 5.3.8) and accuses

it of delectaris bibere humanum sanginem (“delighting to drink human blood,” 5.3.9). He

refuses to acknowledge the cleverness that the fly sees in herself. Instead, the man

points out the fly’s absolute lack of worth: she has no use and seeks to harm others.

That is why he is willing to kill her for her crime; himself he absolves by pointing out his

lack of intention. These stories present the fly as an example of flawed pride. The first

offers a fly that boasts of shocking behavior, the second a fly who expects equal

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treatment without making a fitting contribution to society. These animals are offered in

Phaedrus’ fables not as models of behavior, but cautionary tales.

Pliny himself, however, does not write much about the fly. As can be imagined, a

man who describes the intricate perfection of the flea in a tone nearer to ecstasy than

horror is not a man to be very aggravated by the bites of stinging flies. Within his

eleventh book, a closer approximation to the revulsion Phaedrus’ stories devote to flies

is aimed instead at the moth (papilio), specifically a particular moth which breeds in

beehives.23 This moth is the antithesis of Pliny’s bee. The bee is productive; the moth is

ignavus et inhonoratus (11.65). The bee has a degree of ratio that allows it to act in the

interest of its community; the moth cannot control its compulsions,24 luminibus accensis

advolitans (“flying into burning lamps,” 11.65). The bee practices frugality and not only

limits its consumption but removes greedy consumers from the hive; the moth cannot

control its appetite: infestat et aviditas pastus, nimia florum satietate verno maxume

tempore alvo cita (“avaricious hunger impairs moths, especially in the springtime, when

their stomachs awaken, only to be satisfied by an excessive number of flowers,” 11.66).

This moth is held up as the enemy of the bee, and instead of all the positive

characteristics the bees model, the moth offers only sloth and despicability, irrationality

and greed, and Pliny writes of them with a distaste that is thrown into sharp relief by the

ebullient extolment he offers most other insects. He makes it clear, without saying it in

so many words, that a Roman citizen should not seek to be like the moth.

23 According to Rackham (1940) 472 n.b, and as those are the actions the moth takes in Pliny’s

description, I have no reason to disregard his opinion.

24 An action abhorred by stoics, who valued reason and counseled men to control their natural urges.

See Beagon (2005) 114-115.

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The moth and the fly, though different animals, are used to similar effect in both

authors’ collections, as are the bee and the ant. Using these creatures, Phaedrus and

Pliny set forth the same values for men to emulate and the same faults for men to

beware.

While that is an unusual example of harmony between the two writers, it cannot

be denied that, while only rarely explicitly directing his audience to copy the actions

found there, Pliny uses his Naturalis Historia as a means to bring morality to the

forefront. In all of the animal descriptions above, Pliny embeds a lesson for his

audience, not unlike a fable, though his lessons will never appear as epimythia; he is

too clever to make his moralizing obvious. Instead, Pliny lets the animals teach through

example.

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CHAPTER 4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Pliny consistently references morality in Naturalis Historia, particularly in books 8-

11, describing animalia. Interspersed between descriptions of foreign animals,

incredible feats of courage, shockingly intelligent adaptations, and flowery prose

describing his own awe at the products of Nature, Pliny also offers approbation of some

acts, disapproval of others, and implications for human behavior. With his work

contrasted against the earlier animal morality tales of Aesop, as written by Phaedrus,

not only Pliny’s intention to use the animals as examples of behavior but even the

morals he prefers become obvious. Within the limited scope of this inquiry (only

surveying vocabulary concerning animals and only comparing animals discussed by

both authors), usefulness, fidelity, gratitude, piety, mercy, bravery, and intelligence are

promoted by Pliny as traits that improve men and the society they live in, while laziness,

loss of control, avarice, and vanity are discouraged as traits that bring harm to others

and the community, and it is now possible, when considering the occurrences and

exempla for each of these attributes in turn, to discern the difference between Pliny’s

goals and Phaedrus’, and to confirm his purpose in writing the Naturalis Historia.

Two creatures, bees and moths, are described in common by Pliny and

Phaedrus with the word ignavus.1 Moths are disregarded as ignavus in nature,

worthless insects that produce nothing of their own and devour the supplies of others

(11.56). Bees are only mentioned in conjunction with ignavia as a negative side-effect of

overconsumption; if the bees do not control themselves and their eating, they become

1 That is, if you accept my equivocation of the moth in Pliny with the fly in Phaedrus in chapter 3.

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slothful and their production suffers (11.35). Laziness, Pliny suggests, harms the

community; the unproductive member of society offers nothing to his fellow man and

wastes his human capabilities. Table 2-8 shows the unequal distribution of Pliny’s

vocabulary: he mentions debilis, ignavus, and iners twelve times, and potens only once.

The examples of laziness he includes in his books are limited; the occurrences often

reflect situations of feebleness and inability to be productive, leaving the moths and

bees as the true examples Pliny intends to deter his audience from similar idleness.

The vocabulary survey records one paltry occurrence of usefulness in Pliny

(table 2-6), one that more specifically describes power, creating the illusion that Pliny is

more concerned with the faults of laziness than the benefits of utility. Pliny is not

dependent on the vocabulary of use, however, choosing to display examples of

diligence, hard work, and capability instead of describing the virtues directly. The

animals that he shares with Phaedrus include five industrious creatures, the least of

which is the nightingale, that sings itself to death rather than concede a victory in song

(8.83). The bull is humanity’s partner in labor (8.180), and the bee is an example of

uniform diligence yet to be matched by any human society (11.12). Horses and dogs

are the most useful to mankind, constant in their work and unwavering in their devotion;

dogs in particular are described by Pliny continuing to work into extreme old age,

proving their utility even when Pliny applies the word debilis to them (8.147). Though

Pliny’s verbiage does not immediately reveal the prestigious place diligence holds in his

ideals, the number of examples he provides for his audience cannot be mistaken. Pliny

wishes his readers to value hard work and to understand its import in creating a

powerful society.

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There are few occurrences of fidelity within Pliny’s lexicon (table 2-10), but the

few animals to which he applies the term fidelis are praised in glowing terms and are

themselves examples of unmitigated loyalty taken to the ultimate extreme: death over

betrayal. In book ten, Pliny shares the story of an eagle who was raised by a young lady

which, upon her death, throws itself into her burning pyre rather than be left by her

(10.18). Antioch’s horse runs off a cliff when it is mounted by an enemy after the death

of its master (8.158). Pliny includes more than one story of canine fidelity; one dog

protects its master’s dead body and attempts to pull it to safety when it is discarded in

the Tiber (8.145), and another starves to death because it refuses to eat once its master

dies (8.143). These animals live and die with the discipline of Roman soldiers; their

loyalty to their masters parallels the loyalty soldiers are expected to show to their

generals and the empire. The intensity of the examples Pliny provides outweighs the

relatively low frequency of the word fides.

Dogs are referenced as examples of control as well as loyalty, even able to calm

their fury when commanded or when facing an unthreatening suppliant (8.146). While

Pliny writes about control, or the loss of control, he is more concerned about specific

ways men and animals lose control than the general loss or maintenance of control;

table 2-4 only records a few occurrences of terms for loss of control, and those are

supplemented with just one exemplum: the moth flies into fire repeatedly, unable to

suppress its compulsion due to its lack of ratio (11.65). Avarice is afforded much more

of Pliny’s attention, with twenty-two occurrences within his vocabulary (table 2-5), and

thus Pliny must have regarded greed as a true vice, dangerous to man and empire.

Three of his four examples of greed reference consumption and the animals involved

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harm either themselves or others through their gluttony. The moth eats beehives and,

by eating more than its fair share of flowers, deprives the bees of valuable resources

(11.66), the lion eats so quickly that sometimes it chokes on the bones of its prey (8.46),

and the eagle focuses on its catch so exclusively that it is drawn under water and

drowns (10.9). Excessive consumption is an analogy for luxury; within the animal

kingdom there is little else to abuse aside from the food supply. Greed only creates, in

animals and men, a waste of resources and a focus away from the good of the

community.

One lion, in its rush to swallow its meal, finds itself plagued by a bone stuck in its

teeth; when a man aids it by removing the bone, the lion thanks the man by bringing him

its prey (8.57). Gratitude is folded among other vocabulary usages in table 2-14,

sometimes taking the form of gratus, sometimes taking the form of honor. It is better

represented among the exempla, where appreciation is enacted by the animals: the

eagle mentioned above who throws itself on its mistress’ pyre also brings her gifts of his

kills in gratitude for her care; the lion, mentioned earlier in this paragraph, with its gifts of

food to thank the man for relieving the pain of the bone in its teeth; and a panther,

helping a man find his way out of a desert in return for his rescue of her cubs (8.60). In

this passage about the panther, Pliny invites comparison with human behavior with his

words etiam in homine rarum est (“it’s rare even in a man”). Proper gratitude creates

strong connections between men and maintains order in a society; if men are thankful

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when they receive aid or favors, they reinforce their relationships with those more

powerful than themselves.2

Piety is rarely referenced in Pliny’s vocabulary (table 2-1 only includes five

occurrences of sacred vocabulary in books 8-11), but, like utility, its animal examples

are clear and offer a message: deference and respect are necessary, as is gratitude, for

a healthy society. Pliny may not approve of religion as a corruptor of reason, but he

speaks of the elephant’s rituals and reverence for the stars and sun with approbation

(8.1). A raven’s daily diligence toward the emperor and his heirs was so honored by the

Roman people that they avenged its murder and held an extravagant funeral (10.123),

and Pliny describes the kite’s refusal to feed on sacrifices (10.28); in each of these

examples, the importance of the animal’s deference is emphasized. The importance is

not in the religious implications but in the respect the animals are showing, acting as

citizens ought to.

Another bird, the peacock, is described by Pliny seeking a hiding place, made

worthless for half the year because it sheds its feathers (10.44). Its vanity causes the

peacock to hide, preventing it from being of any service to itself or others. Vanity can

have direr effects; the pigeon in 10.108 is easy prey for hawks when it flaunts its multi-

colored feathers. Such negative results for vanity are rare, however, and Pliny does not

argue against it often or even very effectively (see table 2-4 for occurrences), possibly

because it does not harm society, unlike laziness and greed. Vanity is empty pride and

2 Opposite of the expectations created in Phaedrus’ poetry, that those with power exercise it against the

weak, instead of in their favor.

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wastes energy that could be spent improving both the self and the community, but does

not endanger progress and thus is not as important to suppress.

Also low in occurrence, but offering one of the most obvious examples of Pliny’s

educational focus is clementia. Table 2-13 shows only six occurrences for the word

itself, but those occurrences are heavy in impact. In particular, when the clementia of

the lion causes it to spare both the weak and whoever acts as suppliant, Pliny’s

unstated intention that the lion in this action should be a model for mankind is evinced in

his sentence structures; in 8.56 Pliny uses the word et to emphasize that even lions

show mercy and in 8.48 he points out that tantum in extreme hunger do lions attack the

weak (women and children). These comments are pointed. If a wild, undomesticated

animal can control itself and its fiercest urges, if it can even show mercy and only harm

when absolutely necessary, then men can do at least as well. Mercy is important to

Roman society; offering clementia brings humanity to the battlefield and helps Rome

turn enemies of the state into willing provincials.

The same table (2-13) lists even less occurrences for forms of fortis, yet Pliny

includes examples of bravery using animals which have already been discussed above

as the most useful and loyal animals: the horse and the dog. Pliny recounts three

stories of horse bravery in passages 8.154, 8.156, and 8.157. In the first, Bucephalus,

the famed horse of Alexander the Great, continues to fight and protect Alexander, even

when wounded. In the second and third, horses maim and kill enemies in battles. Dogs

also supply Pliny with examples of bravery, including a fighting force comprised entirely

of dogs (8.143), a dog defending its master’s corpse from brigands (8.142), and another

two dogs, one defending its master from a robber and the other defending its invalid

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master (8.144). Bravery is indispensable in a society that is built upon military strength

and constantly defending and expanding its borders. Praise for bravery in animals

mirrors praise for bravery in men, especially in the stories about war dogs and horses.

The attribute that receives the most attention from Pliny in both exempla (five

different animals display this virtue) and lexical occurrences (fourteen between tables 2-

9 and 2-13) is intelligence. Intelligence, or in this case, the ability to learn or adapt, is

reflected in the horse and the dog, both of which are capable trackers and extremely

easy to train (8.147; 8.157). The eagle adapts its ability to fly as a tool for opening the

tough shells of tortoises (10.7). The elephant shows constant prudence in its actions as

well as an ability to learn almost anything (8.1). Most importantly, bees are praised for

using their ratio for the common good (11.12). These animals’ intelligence and

adaptability are praised in the highest terms by Pliny, and the focus on bees’ communal

interest proves Pliny’s aim in presenting these examples. Intelligence is progress, and

intelligence focused on the community is progress for Rome. Human intelligence, logical

reason, which Pliny believes to far surpass animal understanding, can and should be

used to improve society.

Contrasting Pliny’s focus on attributes that either bring good or harm to society

against Phaedrus’ tales supporting societal stagnation, the difference soon becomes

apparent: agency. Pliny offers his readers the chance to become better humans and the

belief that they can choose actions that improve themselves and those around them.

The majority of Phaedrus’ characters are passive victims who are either too weak or

stupid by nature to protect themselves or predators by nature who cannot choose to act

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differently.3 Pliny’s animals make decisions, choosing clementia, hard work, and

gratitude when they are not required by their natures to do so. Man, Pliny implies in his

books on animalia, is even more capable of change and improvement. Pliny is providing

a guideline for humanity and society in these books.

To make his purpose more appealing, Pliny hides it among animal tales. He is

not a fabulist in the strict sense of the term; Pliny does not set out to collect fables nor

does he promote his books as moralistic readings. Pliny is creating a new science and

collects more information in one place than any previous writer in Greece and Rome.

Yet it is almost certain that fables, especially Aesop’s fables, were part of his education

as a child, and it is well-established that the fables were utilized to guide moral thought

by two influential public speakers, Plato and Aristotle. The idea of using animals to

promote moral teachings is not new when Pliny is setting pen to paper, and this must

have influenced his writing so that he shapes his animals into exempla, displaying

proper behavior to Romans and giving agency to his readers to improve themselves

and, by extension, Rome.

3 See especially Phaedrus 4.14.

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LIST OF REFERENCES

Beagon, M. 1992. Roman Nature. The Thought of Pliny the Elder. Oxford.

Beagon, M. 2005. The Elder Pliny on the Human Animal: Natural History Book 7.

Oxford. Bodson, L. 1983. “Attitudes Towards Animals in Greco-Roman Antiquity.” International

Journal for the Study of Animal Problems 4: 312-320.

Bradley, K. 1998. “The Sentimental Education of the Roman Child: The Role of Pet-

Keeing.” Latomus 57: 523-447.

Clayton, E. 2008. “Aesop, Aristotle, and Animals: The Role of Fables in Human Life.”

Humanitas 21.1: 179-185.

Cummings, B. 2004. “Pliny’s Literate Elephant and the Idea of Animal Language in

Renaissance Thought.” In Renaissance Beasts: Of Animals, Humans, and Other Wonderful Creatures, edited by E. Fudge. Urbana. Pp. 164-185.

Earl, D. 1969. “The Moral and Political Tradition of Rome.” AJP 90.4: 490-492.

Fögen, T. 2007. “Pliny the Elder’s Animals: Some Remarks on the Narrative Structure of

Nat. Hist. 8-11.” Hermes 135: 184-198.

Heironimus, J.P. 1935. “Pliny and the Nightingale.” CJ 30: 297-298.

Lewes, G.H. 1867. The History of Philosophy From Thales to Compte Volume 1.

London.

McDonnel, M.A. 2009. Roman Manliness: “Virtus” and the Roman Republic. New York.

Morgan, T. 2007. Popular Morality in the Early Roman Empire. New York.

Perry, B.E. 1965. Babrius and Phaedrus: Fables. Cambridge.

Rackham, H. 1940. Pliny: Natural History Books 8-11. Cambridge.

Wallace-Hadrill, A. 1990. “Pliny the Elder and Man’s Unnatural History.” Greece &

Rome 37: 80-96.

West, M.L. 1984. “The Ascription of Fables to Aesop in Archaic and Classical Greece.” La Fable 30: 105-136.

Williams, H.S. and E.H. Williams. 1904. A History of Science: In Five Volumes, Volume

1. New York.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Rachel Ash graduated from the University of Oklahoma with a Magna Cum

Laude in Letters and Latin. She then began a teaching career that has spanned three

states and grades five through twelve. In August, 2016, Rachel graduated after her third

year of study in the Distance Classics Program at the University of Florida with a Master

of Arts in Latin.

Rachel has presented at various state, regional, and national conferences,

including, but not limited to: the American Classical League Institute, the American

Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages Convention, the Georgia Classical

Association Conference, the Southern Conference on Language Teaching, and the

Foreign Language Association of Georgia Conference. Rachel has also served on the

boards of local, state, and national Classics and language teaching associations, most

recently as the secretary of the Georgia Classical Association, the treasurer of the

Georgia Junior Classical League, and the treasurer of the American Classical League.

Rachel has published several Latin readers for beginning students of Latin.

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