http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schelling/ Schelling adopts the idea from the early Romantic thinkers Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis, whom he knew in Jena at this time, that art is the route to an understanding of what cannot appear as an object of knowledge. Philosophy cannot represent nature in itself because access to the sphere of the unconscious must be via what appears to consciousness in the realm of theoretical knowledge. The work of art is evidently an empirical, appearing object like any other, but if it is not more than what it isquadeterminable object it cannot be a work of art, because this requires both the free judgement of the subject and the object's conveying of something beyond its objective nature. Although theSystem's own very existence depends upon the transition from theoretical to practical philosophy, which requires the breaking-off of Jacobi's chain of conditions by something unconditioned, Schelling is concerned to understand how the highest insight must be into reality as a product of the interrelation of both the conscious and the unconscious. Reality is not, therefore, essentially captured by a re-presentation of the objective by the subjective. Whereas in theSystemnature begins unconsciously and ends in conscious philosophical and scientific knowledge, in the art work: the I is conscious according to the production, unconscious with regard to the product (SW I/3, p. 613). The product cannot be understood via the intentions of its producer, as this would mean that it became a conditioned object, something produced in terms of a pre-existing rule, and would therefore lack what makes mere craft into art. Art is, then, the only true and eternal organ and document of philosophy, which always and continuously documents what philosophy cannot represent externally (ibid., p. 627). The particular sciences can only follow the chain of conditions, via the principle of sufficient reason, and must determine any object via its place in that chain, a process which has no necessary end. The art object, on the other hand, manifests what cannot be understood in terms of its knowable conditions, because an account of the materials of which it is made or of its status as object in the world does not constitute it as art. Art shows what cannot be said. Philosophy cannot positively represent the absolute because conscious thinking operates from the position where the absolute identity of the subjective and the objective has always already been lost in the emergence of consciousness