Platform Strategy: Openness, Innovation & Control
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Transcript of Platform Strategy: Openness, Innovation & Control
Open / Closed Platform Strategies:How, When & Why
Geoffrey ParkerFreeman School of Business, [email protected]
Marshall Van AlstyneBoston University & [email protected], [email protected]
MVA Information Economics Research
Platforms &Network Effects
CommunicationsMarkets
Information &Productivity
Economics ofIP
Why we are here today
How can firms such as IBM, AT&T and others create nonlinear shareholder value from platforms in ways that Apple, Google, Facebook and Salesforce.com do?
1981-1997 Microsoft beats Apple
Apple launched the personal computer market but Microsoft licensed widely, building a huge developer ecosystem. By the time of the antitrust trial, Microsoft had more
than 6 times the number of developers.
© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne
Apple 1996
Michael Dell “I’d shut it down and give the money back to the shareholders.”
Apple 2000
Apple passes Microsoft May 26, 2010
Using a platform strategy, Apple becomes the most valuable tech firm in the US, representing $310Bn to Microsoft’s $204Bn. Chart shows % growth.
© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne
Technology Smackdown
9
Google vs. Microsoft
vs. Apple
Technology Smackdown
11
Technology Smackdown
12
Network vs ComputerNetwork as the Computer Computer as the Network
Managerial Implications
• Understand: Winners in a platform market generally have the “best” platform strategy, not necessarily the “best” product
• Best platform?1. Open (but not too open) interfaces2. Modular architectures (easy to build on/extend)3. Compelling complements (generally result of vibrant ecosystem)
• Best product? Best standalone value proposition, but while starting here is good, usually not enough to win a platform market
13Source: Cusumano 2011
Decision for YOU and IBM: product strategies or platform strategies?
Agenda
Understanding platforms
Externalities and network effects in ecosystems
Winner-Take-All
Elements of platform strategy
Choke points and platform evolution
Pla
15
Ongoing Platform Battlegrounds
16
Platform Definition
A foundation technology or set of components (could also be a service) used beyond a single firm
Allows multiple parties (“market sides”) to transact across the platform
Value of the platform may increase non-linearly with more users – depends on strength of network effects.
Platform Examples
1. Desktop OS: Unix, Mac, Windows
2. PDAs: Palm, Psion, Newton
3. Game Consoles: Wii, Xbox, Playstation
4. Network Switches: Cisco, IBM, HP
5. Multimedia: Adobe/Flash, MS/Silverlight, Google-Apple/HTML5
6. Payment Systems: Paypal, Google Checkout, Visa, Apple, Mobile Felica
7. Mobile Devices: iPhone, Android, Symbian, Blackberry
8. Enterprise Systems: Salesforce, Oracle, i2, IBM, SAP
9. Social Networks: Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn, Monster, Twitter
10.Batteries: Sony, Panasonic, Sanyo, A123
11.Web Search: Google, Bing+Yahoo!, Baidu
12.Ebooks: Amazon, iPad, Nook, Sony
13.Smart Grids: IBM etc.
14.Health Care: Microsoft, WebMD, IBM etc.
Agenda
Understanding platforms
Externalities and network effects in ecosystems
Winner-Take-All Effect
Elements of platform strategy
Choke points and platform evolution
AT&T Platforms: Breakout exercise
Pla
© 2010 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
19
Pop Quiz: What are “network externalities?”
Hint: they matter for pricing, winner-take-all markets, and
strategy…
© 2010 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
20
A “network externality” is a demand economy of scale.
Examples: phone, fax, IM, email networks.
© 2010 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
21
Supply vs. Demand Scale Economies
Price
Quantity
Demand
Supply
• Rising average costs• More competitive supply• Oil, Soda, Bread
Standard Goods
Demand
Supply
• Falling average costs• Monopolistic supply• Utilities, Semiconductors
Cost Econ of Scale
Demand
Supply
• Often falling avg cost• Monopolistic supply• OS, IM, MMOG
Demand Econ of Scale
22 FAX
(Re)interpreting Network Externalities
• “Network Externalities” are demand economies of scale.
• They imply at least some level of interaction as when I email you, or you FAX or IM me.
Phone E-Mail
IMSee: Parker & Van Alstyne (2005). “Two Sided Network Effects,” Management Science.
© 2010 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
23
Reinterpreting Network Externalities
• Where is the interaction when your neighbor rents “Lord of the Rings”?
• In fact, his rental may mean you have to wait!
24
Traditional Linear Value Chain
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Value accumulates from stage to stageMinimal Network Effects
$ $$
Apple iPod pre-Platform
UserApple Content
$ $
(1) Product First Thinking(2) Standard linear value chain (3) User matches MP3 player to library(4) Minimal network effects
© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne
Apple iPod post-Platform
Apple
$ $User Content
(1) Triangular platform supply network(2) Apple owns financial chokepoint(3) Apple matches users to content
(4) Stronger network effects© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne
27
A two-sided network has four network effects
A same-side effect for each side, i.e., preference regarding number of other users on own side
A cross-side effect in each direction, i.e., preference regarding number of users on other side
$ $Side 1 Side 2
Platform
28
Managing network effects often involves subsidy; Who should get it?
Pricing1. Ability to capture cross-
side effects1. Mistake of Netscape
See: Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne (2006). “Strategy for Two-Sided Markets,” Harvard Business Review.
Pricing1. Ability to capture cross-
side effects
2. User sensitivity to price & quality
1. Mistake of Netscape
2. Denver vs. Boston real estate markets
See: Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne (2006). “Strategy for Two-Sided Markets,” Harvard Business Review.
Pricing1. Ability to capture cross-
side effects
2. User sensitivity to price & quality
3. Value added
1. Mistake of Netscape
2. Denver vs. Boston real estate markets
3. Mistake of 1984 Apple
See: Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne (2006). “Strategy for Two-Sided Markets,” Harvard Business Review.
Pricing1. Ability to capture cross-
side effects
2. User sensitivity to price & quality
3. Value added
4. Marginal costs
1. Mistake of Netscape
2. Denver vs. Boston real estate markets
3. Mistake of 1984 Apple
4. Mistake of FreePC
See: Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne (2006). “Strategy for Two-Sided Markets,” Harvard Business Review.
Pricing1. Ability to capture cross-
side effects
2. User sensitivity to price & quality
3. Value added
4. Marginal costs
5. Interfering same-side effects
1. Mistake of Netscape
2. Denver vs. Boston real estate markets
3. Mistake of 1984 Apple
4. Mistake of FreePC
5. Mistake of Covisint
See: Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne (2006). “Strategy for Two-Sided Markets,” Harvard Business Review.
Pricing1. Ability to capture cross-
side effects
2. User sensitivity to price & quality
3. Value added
4. Marginal costs
5. Interfering same-side effects
6. Marquee users
1. Mistake of Netscape
2. Denver vs. Boston real estate markets
3. Mistake of 1984 Apple
4. Mistake of FreePC
5. Mistake of Covisint
6. Mistake of Microsoft
See: Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne (2006). “Strategy for Two-Sided Markets,” Harvard Business Review.
Agenda
Understanding platforms
Externalities and network effects in ecosystems
Winner-Take-All Effect
Elements of platform strategy
Choke points and platform evolution
AT&T Platforms: Breakout exercise
Pla
Homing and Switching Costs
2 SETUPS + 2 ONGOING
1 SETUP + 1ONGOING
Mono-homing
Switching
Multi-homing
2 SETUPS + 1 TERMINATION + 1 ONGOING
See: Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne (2006). “Strategy for Two-Sided Markets,” Harvard Business Review.
When do Winner-Take-All Networks Emerge?
1. Large Supply/Demand Effects (FB vs gas engine)
2. Large Multi-Homing Costs (OS vs credit cards).
3. Niche specialization is less feasible.
Windows
© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne
How Apple is killing standalone platforms
Kindle
Usr Book
PSP
Usr Gam
MP3
User Music
Video
TV
Games
Dvpr
Web
HTML
eBooks
Publi
Calls
User
Zune
Usr Mus
MicrosoftSonyAmazon
Apple has vastly stronger network effects.
© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne
How Apple is killing standalone platforms
Kindle
Usr Book
PSP
Usr Gam
MP3
User Music
Video
TV
Games
Dvpr
Web
HTML
eBooks
Publi
Calls
User
Zune
Usr Mus
MicrosoftSonyAmazon
Sony could have done this – has many great standalone products.Google is not making this mistake with Android
© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne
How Apple is killing standalone platforms
Kindle
Usr Book
PSP
Usr Gam
MP3
User Music
Video
TV
Games
Dvpr
Web
HTML
eBooks
Publi
Calls
User
Zune
Usr Mus
Amazon
© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne
0.16
0.62
0.22 0.32
0.47
0.21
Message for IBM: A great standalone product might not be sufficient.
Sony MS Zune
How Apple is killing standalone platforms
Kindle
Usr Book
PSP
Usr Gam
MP3
User Music
Video
TV
Games
Dvpr
Web
HTML
eBooks
Publi
Calls
User
Zune
Usr Mus
MicrosoftSonyAmazon
See: Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne (2011). “Platform Envelopment,” Strategic Management Journal.
Agenda
Understanding platforms
Externalities and network effects in ecosystems
Winner-Take-All Effect
Elements of platform strategy
Choke points and platform evolution
AT&T Platforms: Breakout exercise
Pla
Identifying choke points that matter• PC – OS, applications, microprocessor; Pheonix BIOS story
• Telecom – CPE equipment, physical pipe (last mile), billing
• Online retail (Amazon.com) – customer base, distribution infrastructure, affiliate relationships
• SAP – Access rights of developers to participate on the platform, certification, in-store sales, billing.
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
44
Openness vs. Control
You
r S
hare
Industry Value Add
Open
Proprietary
Your reward = (Value added to industry) x (Your share)
Based on: Shapiro & Varian ‘99
Maximum protection ≠ Maximum Value
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
45
Openness vs. Control
You
r S
hare
Industry Value Add
Open
Proprietary
Set-Top Boxes were too closed, 3rd parties never added value.
Maximum protection ≠ Maximum Value
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
46
Openness vs. Control
You
r S
hare
Industry Value Add
Open
Proprietary
Linux is so open (viral GPL) it’s difficult to control and make money.
Maximum protection ≠ Maximum Value
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne
Does Openness Work?
What did Facebook do in early 2007?
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne
Does Openness Work?
It opened to developers and overtook MySpace!
Why does openness work?
• Platform sponsor gives away (yellow) platform value
Price
q1
p1
Quantity
V1
Downstream enhancements add value
See: Parker, Van Alstyne (2011). “Innovation, Openness & Platform Control,” SSRN.com.
Why does openness work?
• Platform sponsor gives away (yellow) platform value
• Developers build apps for installed base, adding new layers of value.
• Benefits:– Sponsor from increased sales, and
downstream royalties.– Developer from cost savings and
installed base.
Price
q1
p1
Quantity
V1
V2
Downstream enhancements add value
See: Parker, Van Alstyne (2011). “Innovation, Openness & Platform Control,” SSRN.com.
V4V3
Why does openness work?
• Platform sponsor gives away (yellow) platform value
• Developers build apps for installed base, adding new layers of value.
• Benefits:– Sponsor from increased sales, and
downstream royalties.– Developer from cost savings and
installed base.
• Repeat
Price
q1
p1
Quantity
V1
V2
Downstream enhancements add value
See: Parker, Van Alstyne (2011). “Innovation, Openness & Platform Control,” SSRN.com.
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
Platforms get enormous value from 3rd party developers
Most firms can only concentrate on most
valuable apps
Profits increase when others add to platform’s
“Long Tail”
Consider an operating system like MS Windows, Apple Mac, or Google Android
53
What does control mean?
Split IP rights from point of customer contact.
1) Open access
2) Extend platform
3) Touch customers
4) Change platform
Platform Provider
Side 1 Side 2
Platform Sponsor
Side 1 Side 2
Platform Provider
Platform Sponsor
Platform
54
What does control mean?
Split IP rights from point of customer contact.
1) Open access
2) Extend platform
3) Touch customers
4) Change platform
Platform Provider
Side 1 Side 2
Platform Sponsor
Side 1 Side 2
Platform Provider
Platform Sponsor
55
Actually Parallels Concepts from OSS
Split IP rights from point of customer contact.
Consider 4 “freedoms” of open source:
1)Ability to access & executePlatform Provider
Side 1 Side 2
Platform Sponsor
Side 1
56
Actually Parallels Concepts from OSS
Split IP rights from point of customer contact.
Consider 4 “freedoms” of open source:
1)Ability to access & execute2)Ability to study how the
program works and change it.
Platform Provider
Side 1 Side 2
Platform Sponsor
Side 1 Side 2
57
Actually Parallels Concepts from OSS
Split IP rights from point of customer contact.
Consider 4 “freedoms” of open source:
1)Ability to access & execute2)Ability to study how the
program works and change it.
3)Ability to redistribute copies.
Platform Provider
Side 1 Side 2
Platform Sponsor
Side 1 Side 2
Platform Provider
58
Actually Parallels Concepts from OSS
Split IP rights from point of customer contact.
Consider 4 “freedoms” of open source:
1)Ability to access & execute2)Ability to study how the
program works and change it.
3)Ability to redistribute copies.4)Ability to distribute mods.
Platform Provider
Side 1 Side 2
Platform Sponsor
Side 1 Side 2
Platform Provider
Platform Sponsor
59
Apple tried to control too much of the original Mac
• Remember MacWrite, MacPaint?
• Charged ~$10,000 for SDKs.
• Controlled OS & HW and dominant Apps.
• Vertical integration choked network effects.
Apple Mac
Users Claris
Mac OS
60
Microsoft opened much more of its ecosystem
• Microsoft had 6-10X developers
• Open APIs / Cheap SDKs• Controlled OS, licensed.• Strong network effects.
Dell
Users Dvprs
MS Windows
IBM … HP
61
For real profits, control full layer
Dell
Users Dvprs
Acer …H
PRed
Hat
Debian
Ubuntu
…
Linux: No one driving the bus.
Limited scope of control.
Users Flights
Provider
Joint Venture: e.g. Orbitz airline
collaboration
Users Dvprs
Sponsor
Licensing: e.g. Google Android
Sponsors
Providers
62
Danger!
Users Dvprs
Sponsor
Watch for new control points closer to
customer.
Providers
See: Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne (2006). “Opening Platforms: How, When & Why” Ch 6 in Platforms, Markets and Innovation (ed Gawer).
63
Danger!
Users Dvprs
Sponsor
Watch for new control points closer to
customer.
Providers
See: Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne (2006). “Opening Platforms: How, When & Why” Ch 6 in Platforms, Markets and Innovation (ed Gawer).
When should you close (absorb) parts of a platform ecosystem?
Windows: Multithreading, Disk Compression, Internet Browsing,
Streaming Media, Instant Messaging, …
Openness & Time: Having opened its platform, does Microsoft (or Cisco or Google or Apple) kill its ecosystem by bundling developer value into
Windows?
iPhone: Flashlight, Voice Memo, shake-to-shuffle, iBooks, Voice
Control, …© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
Should Apple have opened the iPod?
65
No! It does 1 thing only, so make it “insanely great” and own it.
Most firms can only concentrate on most
valuable apps
Profits increase when others add to platform’s
“Long Tail”
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
Should Apple have opened the iPhone?
Most firms can only concentrate on most
valuable apps
Profits increase when others add to platform’s
“Long Tail”
Of Course! It has video, wifi, camera (scanner), accelerometer, mobile, MP3, web browsing, etc. Platforms benefit from broad contributions.
But control the top several complements.
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
Which applications to absorb?
Apps offered by Platform Sponsor
Apps offered by Developers
Rule 1: Absorb the highest value applications from the ecosystem. This adds value for users and mitigates threat of disintermediation.
Example: Apple iPad absorbed e-booksExample: Microsoft Windows absorbed web browsing
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
Anything else to absorb?Apps offered by Platform Sponsor
Apps offered by Developers
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
Anything else to absorb?
Rule 2: Absorb features that emerge in multiple places in the ecosystem. This increases compatibility, ensures efficient implementation, and benefits other apps. Examples: Operating systems support for (i) spell check (ii) cut & paste (iii) PDF.
We have explored the platform strategies of many firms
How will you build IBM’s platform strategy?
Background• G. Parker, M. Van Alstyne (2000). “Information Complements, Substitutes, and Strategic Product
Design.” SSRN.com
• A. Gawer, M. Cusumano (2002). Platform leadership: How Intel, Microsoft, and Cisco drive industry innovation. Harvard Business School Press.
• A. Gawer, M. Cusumano (2002). “The elements of platform leadership,” MIT Sloan Management Review
• G. Parker, M. Van Alstyne (2005). “Two-Sided Network Effects: A Theory of Information Product Design.” Management Science.
• T. Eisenmann, G. Parker, M. Van Alstyne (2006). “Strategy for Two-Sided Markets,” Harvard Business Review.
• A. Gawer and M. Cusumano (2008). “How Companies become Platform Leaders.” MIT Sloan Management Review
• A. Gawer, (2009). Platforms, Markets, and Innovation. Elgar.
• G. Parker, M. Van Alstyne (2009). “Opening Platforms: How, When & Why Ch. 6 in Gawer, A. (ed) Platforms, Markets and Innovation.
• M. Cusumano (2010). Staying Power: Six Enduring Principles for Managing Strategy and Innovation. Oxford University Press.
• M. Cusumano (2010). The evolution of platform thinking. Communications of the ACM.
• T. Eisenmann, G. Parker, M. Van Alstyne. (2011) “Platform Envelopment.” Strategic Management Journal.