Plaintiffs Closing Argument 28mar2014_CONFORMED

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Law Office of Chris Ford 125 East Coronado Road

Phoenix, AZ, 85004 602-688-5571

PLAINTIFFS’ CLOSING ARGUMENT

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CHRIS FORD, ESQ., SBN 029437 LAW OFFICE OF CHRIS FORD 125 East Coronado Road Phoenix, AZ 85004 t: 602-688-5571 f: 888-447-3714 [email protected]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs, JOSE ROBERTO SOTO, MARIA SALAZAR, MAYRA MIRANDA

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS

Defendant John Mireles, LULAC’s director for the state of Arizona, invited Socorro

Esquibel, a longtime LULAC member, to a meeting at the Desert Diamond Hotel in Tucson the

night before LULAC’s 2013 Arizona convention, which took place on June 8, 2013. Transcript of

Evidentiary Hearing, Jan. 16, 2014 (“TRX1”), at 21:6-11, 21:23-24. This June 7, 2013 gathering

JOSE ROBERTO SOTO, MARIA SALAZAR, MAYRA DISCUA MINRANDA, Plaintiffs, v. LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS, ARIZONA CHAPTER (LULAC); JOHN MIRELES, in his capacity as an officer of LULAC, Arizona Chapter; DAVID HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as executive director of LULAC, Arizona Chapter; ANA VALENZUELA, in her capacity as national vice-president for youth for LULAC; MARI ALVARADO, in her capacity as president, LULAC Council # 1083; DOES 1-20, Defendants.

Case No. CV2013-008731 PLAINTIFFS’ CLOSING ARGUMENT Assigned to: Hon. Michael Herrod

Michael K Jeanes, Clerk of Court*** Electronically Filed ***

K. Dyer, Deputy3/28/2014 9:37:00 PM

Filing ID 5790127

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turned out to be a strategy meeting the purpose of which was to prevent certain LULAC members

from Phoenix, San Luis and other locations from voting in the Arizona convention.1 TRX1, at

21:11-13, 21:20-22. Attending the meeting were Mr. Mireles, Defendant Ana Valenzuela, LULAC

president Margaret Moran and her husband, Oscar Moran, president of LULAC’s San Antonio

Chapter. TRX1 at 22:7-12, 220:11-221:2.

These leaders suspected that certain members from Phoenix, San Luis and other areas

(referred to herein at times as “Plaintiffs and class members”) were no disposed to vote for Ms.

Moran and their favored candidates in Arizona, and therefore they planned to prevent those

members from voting. TRX1, at 22:25-23:2; 24:4-23, 33:6-12; 79:2-8; 254:19-255:1. Defendants

even plotted to prepare for the eventuality that Plaintiffs and class members would become upset at

Defendants for thwarting their vote at the Arizona convention set to take place the next day and

engage in protest, so they made sure there would be security or police present. TRX1, at 33:18-

34:4.

The Ploy to Invalidate Miguel Zazueta’s Membership

To accomplish their objective of thwarting Plaintiffs and class members from voting,

Defendants created a pretext: They claimed that longtime member Miguel Zazueta was not a

member in good standing, and therefore the approximately 38 councils he sponsored, which

counted among their members Plaintiffs and class members, hand not been properly chartered.

Testimony revealed that Defendant Mireles had a motive to rid LULAC’s rolls of Mr.

Zazueta: He was running against Defendant Mireles for Arizona state director. Transcript of

Evidentiary Hearing, Feb. 12, 2014 (“TRX2”), at 245:13-17.

The genesis of Defendants’ plot is unclear. For example, one of Defendants’ witnesses

testified that Mr. Zazueta was deemed ineligible “around the end of May” 2013, “because questions

were already being asked,” TRX2, at 246:8-13. Another of Defendants’ witnesses, Defendant

1 Defendants’ witnesses consistently insisted on referring to this meeting as a “reception.”

E.g. TRX2, at 220:2-3 (“It was not a meeting. It was a reception”), 244:11-14 (meeting was “like a reception”).

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Hernandez, testified that he had an “ongoing conversation” with Manuel Escobar, LULAC’s

national legal advisor who later issued a so-called “legal opinion” invalidating Mr. Zazueta’s

membership, as early as late April 2013 regarding standing of Arizona delegates. See TRX2, at

300:13-301:7.

After the June 8, 2013 Arizona convention, Mr. Hernandez asked Mr. Escobar for a legal

opinion concerning the standing of Mr. Zazueta’s membership. TRX2, at 300:13-19. Before Mr.

Escobar responded, Guadalupe (“Lupe”) Morales, LULAC’s national membership director,

informed Mr. Zazueta that he supposedly was not a member in good standing on June 11, 2013, one

day before the date of Mr. Escobar issued his legal opinion, which was June 12, 2013. Exhibits 16-

18; TRX2, at 76:15-17, 135:18-20, 136:13-137:10. Defendants were unable to explain how the

national membership director was empowered to issue what is in effect a legal opinion one day

before Mr. Escobar issued his legal opinion. See TRX2, at 139:23-140:10, 151:13-24, 154:8-23;

Exhibits 16-18.

Mr. Escobar’s testimony was equivocal as to whether Ms. Morales relied on his legal

opinion in communicating that Mr. Zazueta supposedly was not a member in good standing or

whether she came up with that idea on her own. See TRX2, at 73:3-15. For her part, Ms. Morales

testified that she “found out” that Miguel Zazueta supposedly was not a member in good standing.

TRX2, at 140:17-20.

However, under questioning from the Court, Ms. Morales conceded that she did not check

the database to determine Mr. Zazueta’s status when the new councils he sponsored applied for

membership. See TRX2, at 157:14-24. The witness then, after having given clear and concise

testimony, suddenly professed to have memory problems when the Court asked her who called her

after the Arizona convention to tell her about Mr. Zazueta, but when pressed, she said Defendant

Mireles – Mr. Zazueta’s opponent for LULAC’s Arizona state director – made that call. TRX2, at

158:5-23. This testimony leads to the inference that Defendant Mireles made sure Mr. Zazueta was

declared ineligible so as to eliminate competition for the Arizona leadership post.

Generally, it is against LULAC’s practice to admit councils than suddenly reject them,

unless the councils (not their sponsors) have not paid dues, or if there is some sort of error, then

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LULAC would send the money back and assist the council in getting chartered. TRX2, at 116:6-14,

127:15-24. In the present matter, LULAC initially admitted all of the 38 councils to which Plaintiffs

and class members belonged plus up to a dozen others councils, took their registration money, but

then “corrected” themselves by deciding that Mr. Zazueta supposedly was not a member in good

standing, and therefore those councils had not validly been formed. See TRX2, at 72:21-73:16;

Exhibit 18; see TRX2, at 127:6-10 (defendants approved new councils’ charters “then arbitrarily

and capriciously” took then away). Defendants never did return the registration money. TRX2, at

159:19-162:6; Exhibit 25.

The Evidence Shows the Determination Regarding Mr. Zazueta Was Without Merit

Defendants failed to process the membership for 2013 of Miguel Zazueta, claiming he was

not a member in good standing for having failed to pay his membership dues. TRX1, at 23:3-24:3.

Mr. Zazueta had submitted a check with his 2013 membership application, but Defendants held the

check rather than cashing it. TRX1, at 23:9-14. Significantly, although Connie Martinez and Miguel

Zazueta came from the same company and both applied and sent checks for membership, LULAC

prevented only Miguel Zazueta from attaining membership in good standing while allowing Connie

Martinez to attain membership. TRX1, at 106:11-107:1.

According to LULAC’s governing documents, an active member who is in arrears on his

dues for 3 months is suspended from membership “and so advised by the Secretary of his/her

Council immediately,” but can reinstate membership simply by paying his dues. LULAC bylaws,

art. III, §3(a); TRX2, at 83:11-23. Mr. Escobar testified that reinstatement of voting privileges are

delayed for 30 days past the date a member pays up his dues so as to be reinstated as a member.

TRX2, at 80:14-21. However, Mr. Escobar could find no support in the LULAC constitution or

bylaws for that assertion. E.g. TRX2, at 84:14-19.

Defendants’ witnesses, including their national membership director, testified that councils

must register 30 days prior to a national convention to be considered in good standing and be

accorded voting privileges. E.g. TRX2, at 148:21-23. However, Defendants waived this rule when

convenient. For example, Ms. Esquibel to registered four days prior to the Arizona convention (thus

18 days before the National convention), yet she was credentialed to vote at both. E.g. TRX2, at

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148:24-149:4; see TRX2, at 225:17-226:12 (Ms. Esquibel did not have paperwork showing her

councils had been chartered 30 days before the Arizona convention, yet those councils were

credentialed to vote), 265:21-267:6 (credentialing committee chair for 2013 National convention

did not deny that Ms. Esquibel was credentialed and certified to vote, even though she registered

only two weeks prior to the National convention).

Testimony reveals that notwithstanding Defendants’ too-convenient position that Miguel

Zazueta was not a member of good standing for allegedly not having paid his dues, it is far from

clear whether he in fact was not in good standing on June 12, 2013, when Mr. Escobar issued his

legal opinion. First, LULAC offers extensions to members in a given year within which to pay dues

before their memberships lapse, and in 2013 the extension lasted until April 10, 2013 or April 15,

2013. Compare TRX2, at 111:9-24 (April 10, 2013) with TRX2, at 155:13-19 (April 15, 2013). The

three-month grace-period could begin at the end of the extension, so in effect a person who was a

member in 2012 could have remained in good standing until July 10, 2013, so long as before the

latter date he paid his dues. See TRX2, at 111:25-114:13.

Defendants conceded that Mr. Zazueta had been a member in 2012 TRX2, at 138:14-15,

155:8-12. And there was no testimony as to whether LULAC’s secretary or his/her council notified

Mr. Zazueta of his alleged lapse in membership, a necessary predicate for the grace period to

terminate. LULAC bylaws, art. III, §3(a). Moreover, Mr. Escobar was unable to ascertain whether

Mr. Zazueta’s had been given an extension of time within which to pay his dues, and thus whether,

in fact, he was not a member in good standing at the relevant time. See TRX2, at 62:9-24.

Thus, in summary, while Defendants elicited repeated testimony that theoretically a new

council would have to be registered 30 days prior to the national convention for its members to be

eligible to vote, e.g. TRX2, at 156:20-157:6, given the extensions for allowed to 2012 members in

good standing – such as Miguel Zazueta – lasting as late as April 15, 2013 to pay to renew their

memberships, plus the three-month grace period enunciated in the bylaws, Defendants never did

establish for certain that in fact Miguel Zazueta actually was not a member in good standing

when he sponsored the new Arizona councils in April 2013, see Exhibit 25; they merely opined

such to be the case. E.g. Exhibit 16.

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Arizona Convention

Fearing that election results in Arizona may not go their way, Defendants created schemes

to thwart Plaintiffs and class members (i.e., newer LULAC members from Phoenix and San Luis)

from voting at the Arizona convention, which took place June 8, 2013. Approximately four dozen

LULAC members from among Plaintiffs and class members attended the Arizona convention.

TRX1, at 120:14-16; TRX2, at 233:17-21. Defendants hatched these plans, despite, as testimony

reveals, the fact that the names in Exhibit 8 represent those of LULAC members in good standing

from Arizona, including Plaintiffs and class members. See TRX1, at 250:3-253:21, 261:23-25.

Defendants admit to having prepared the Arizona membership roster dated on June 7, 2013

admitted as Exhibit 8, but they also gave instructions to shred that roster. TRX2, at 146:12-19,

152:5-154:7, 158:24-159:6.

Defendants then issued another roster – apparently prepared especially for of use at

the second evidentiary hearing on February 12, 2014, considering that it is dated January 28,

2014, long after it could have been useful for the June 2013 conventions – showing Arizona

councils to which Plaintiffs and class members belonged to be in “bad” standing. TRX2, at 141:13-

144:14; Exhibit 19.

The Arizona convention was advertised to offer registration from 8 a.m. to 10 a.m. that day.

Exhibit 1, at 2. Testimony makes clear that LULAC did not adhere to that schedule, at minimum

raising questions as to the fairness of the registration process for that convention. E.g., TRX1, at

31:4-32:10; 256:3-10. In fact, Defendants’ witnesses could not keep their stories straight as to when

registration took place at the Arizona Convention. E.g. TRX2, at 215:6-14, 218:24-219:2

(registration open only from 8 a.m. to 9 a.m.), 231:6-8 (registration from 8:30 a.m. to 9:30 a.m.),

238:2-17 (registration from 8:30 a.m. to 9 a.m.), 238:24-239:6 (same witness, shown Exhibit 1,

changes her mind, testifies that registration was from 8 a.m. to 10 a.m.); see Exhibit 24 (purported

minutes of Arizona Convention, with no notation as to opening or closing of registration), TRX2, at

240:17-20, 241:7-13; see also TRX2, at 221:8-16, 221:23-223:10, 231:24-25, Exhibit 28

(Defendants issued a revised agenda, the only change for which was to shorten the registration time

by an hour, to 8 a.m. to 9 a.m.; testimony did not make clear exactly when or to whom the revised

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agenda was sent).

Plaintiff Soto, a dues-paying member of LULAC who was secretary of LULAC council no.

1152, arrived at the Arizona convention site at 9:15 a.m. and registered, but Defendants made no

credentialing table available. TRX1, at 111:5, 111:15-112:1, 113:9-14, 114:18-19, 155:12-13,

171:24-172:8, 196:15-19. Nonetheless, Defendants led Plaintiff Soto to believe “with no

ambiguity” that he was credentialed and thus qualified to vote at the Arizona convention, having

registered and purportedly been credentialed at the registration table. TRX1, at 112:1-11, 167:21-

168:1, 171:24-172:8, 172:11-173:9, 201:8-10 (Plaintiff Soto brought the proper documentation, and

he “was led to believe that [he] was a delegate explicitly by the registration table”); see also TRX1,

at 256:17-23. Yet Defendants barred Plaintiff Soto from voting. E.g. TRX1, at 148:25-149:24,

194:9-13. Later, Defendants so much as admitted at hearing that LULAC members should

“know better than” to trust Defendants’ word as to whether the member has been registered

and credentialed to vote at a convention. TRX1, at 167:24-168:9.

In addition, Defendants allowed groups of members they perceived as supportive of Ms.

Moran’s chosen candidates to breeze through the registration process without going through the

requirement of submitting delegate letters – i.e. those members were given “preferential treatment,”

according to unchallenged testimony, TRX1, at 29:16-17, 34:5-36:13. On the other hand,

Defendants initially refused to accept delegate letters from the Phoenix and San Luis councils, of

which named and class Plaintiffs were members. TRX1, at 28:19-30:14.

Defendants did end up Plaintiffs and class members the exact same sort of badge that

Plaintiff Soto had been given, which displayed the member’s name and council number and which

Defendants had “with no ambiguity” led Plaintiff Soto to believe qualified him to vote in the day’s

proceedings. TRX1, at 112:1-11, 117:17-118:20. However, Defendants outright prevented

Plaintiffs and class members from becoming credentialed to vote at the Arizona Convention.

TRX1, at 127:6-15. Thus, Plaintiffs and class members had paid registration fees to attend the

Arizona convention but they were not allowed to participate in the nomination vote; i.e.,

Defendants had no problem taking Plaintiffs’ and class members’ money, but they did have a

problem with letting Plaintiffs and class members vote that day. TRX1, at 118:11-21.

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At least some Plaintiffs and class members arrived after the 10 a.m. registration cut-off time

on June 8, 2013, according to sworn testimony, but testimony also reveals that Defendants

nonetheless registered and gave delegate badges to certain Plaintiffs or class members,

misleading them into believe that they would be permitted to vote that day, yet ultimately

preventing them from voting. Verified Complaint, June 14, 2013, ¶¶ 27-29; see TRX1, at 157:22-

158:5. Defendants’ flimsy excuse for taking Plaintiffs’ and class members’ money, giving them

badges indicating that they were registered and credentialed to vote, then prohibiting them from

voting, was that they had not been credentialed “by the credentials committee.” TRX1, at 122:21-

123:1.

In the morning, Defendants directed Plaintiffs and class members to remain in a cafeteria

that was physically separate from the location where Defendants held nominations on the morning

of June 8, 2013. TRX1, at 31:13-32:10, 113:21-24, 114:13-115:12, 116:3-19. Defendants held

nominations of their chosen candidates by acclimation while keeping Plaintiffs and class members

secluded in the cafeteria. TRX1, at 116:3-117:7.

During the afternoon voting session, Defendants did permit Plaintiffs and class members

into the room where the vote took place, but they refused to seat Plaintiffs and class members to

vote. TRX1, at 32:11-33:17; TRX1, at 121:12-122:25. Defendants failed to follow Robert’s Rules

of Order during the voting session. TRX1, at 119:25-120-2. Defendant Mari Alvarado led the

afternoon voting proceedings. TRX1, at 121:7-12.

Upon learning that Defendants would not seat them to vote, Plaintiffs attempted to obtain

clarification from Defendants regarding why they were not allowed to participate in the vote.

TRX1, at 123:13-16. Ms. Alvarado became “frustrated” and proclaimed candidates from her list to

be elected by acclamation, putting a sudden end to the proceedings. TRX1, at 123:17-124:19,

187:17-24. While the members seated to vote – who constituted about 60 percent of those in the

room – were “confused” by the sudden election by acclamation, the Phoenix members (i.e.

Plaintiffs and some class members), or 40 percent of those in attendance, were left standing, cut off

from participating. TRX1, at 124:16-126:25; compare TRX2, at 233:17-21 with TRX2, at 288:9-14

(Defendants’ witnesses testified that Phoenix and San Luis delegations barred from voting at

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the Arizona convention numbered 40 to 50, while 82 other delegates were credentialed to

vote).

Defendants purposely created the confusion so as to get the sudden vote by acclamation to

go the way they had planned, such that Ms. Alvarado proclaimed the election of Defendants’ pre-

determined candidates by acclamation before the voters’ hands were raised to indicate for whom

they voted. TRX1, at 187:4-188:10. Thus, even though some raised their hands in an attempt to

vote, the delegates whom defendants permitted to be seated to vote appeared to have no effect on

the outcome of the election. TRX1, at 187:11-188:17; see also TRX1, at 188:24-189:14 (“it was

fast track, expedited, confusing”). According to further testimony, “Mari Alvarado . . . should know

and explain clearly . . . the procedures. And that was not done.” TRX1, at 190:16-18. Defendants’

own witness ultimately admitted that it “is correct” that “[t]here was no democracy” at the

Arizona convention, because Defendants’ own candidates constituted the only one slate put up

for a vote that day. TRX2, at 249:5-250:9.

National Convention

At LULAC’s National convention in Las Vegas, Defendants plotted ways to rig the election

by adding voters to the rolls of LULAC councils they believed supportive of incumbents that

Defendants supported and prepared to thwart or prevent Plaintiffs and class members from voting

in the national assembly, which took place on June 22, 2013. E.g. TRX1, at 180:2-9.

Approximately 147 LULAC members from 38 councils constituting Plaintiffs and class members

attended the National convention. TRX1, at 131:18-22. According to testimony, had Defendants not

blocked Plaintiffs and class members from voting at the national assembly, the outcome of the

election may well have been different. TRX1, at 180:10-13.

Defendants attempted to win the favor of Ms. Esquibel and the Tucson Councils by

paying for at least some of the cost to transport the Arizonans to Las Vegas and for their

lodging during the convention. See, e.g., TRX1, at 224:3-20, 238:2-239:21, 245:9-247:18.

Specifically, according to testimony, Oscar Moran, husband of LULAC’s national president, signed

checks from the account of LULAC council no. 4303 – of San Antonio, Texas, of which Mr. Moran

is president – to Joseph Cordero, president of LULAC council no. 1191, TRX1, at 247:20-248:19,

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one of the Tucson Councils, to pay for two vans for transportation of Tucson Council members to

Las Vegas. TRX1, at 218:21-222:5.

Luis Vera, national general counsel for LULAC, and thus at minimum an agent for

Defendants, had cut a deal: if the Tucson Councils would support Ms. Moran, LULAC would pay

for vans to transport those members from Arizona to Las Vegas and for their lodging, and all

Tucson Council members would need to pay for is food and fuel for the vehicles. TRX1, at 225:1-8.

As part of that deal, Oscar Moran offered to pay for the vans and the lodging, but he welched on

that promise once he became aware that his attempts to buy allegiance were doomed to failure.

TRX1, at 239:5-240:4, 241:25-242:6; 239:20-21 (“agreement was to pay all amounts, and we were

going to vote for him until they got mad at us”). His failure to keep his end of the bargain

financially harmed Plaintiffs or class members. TRX1, at 241:17-24, 242:6-19 (LULAC member

Sandra Cordero DeSoto is owed approximately $1,800, money she needed to pay for her husband’s

dialysis).

In fact, Mr. Moran gave Ms. DeSoto, a delegate, not only checks as reimbursement for the

rental the vans on June 21, 2013, the day before the vote, but he also gave her $500 in cash so as

to buy her and other members’ votes, according to testimony that drew no objections and was not

controverted. TRX1, at 225:13-226:13, 230:20-23, 235:3-13, 242:21-23; see also TRX1, at 234:1-

21 (Mr. Moran pressured Ms. DeSoto to vote for Ms. Moran, saying, “you need to vote for her”).2

Defendants apparently paid to register council no. 1191, of which Joseph Cordero was president

and his mother, Sandra Cordero DeSoto, was a member. TRX1, at 223:20-24, 247:20-249:9.

As a further example of their efforts to corrupt the election process, Defendants deliberately

engaged in a practice of transferring alternates from councils that had their maximum number of

delegates available to vote to other councils that did not have a full complement of voters, so as to

2 Defendants may argue that Ms. DeSoto ended up voting for an opponent of Ms. Moran, and therefore she was not “deprived of due process.” See TRX1, at 227:4-230:15. However, whom Ms. DeSoto voted for is irrelevant. The testimony supports various causes of action asserted herein including fraud and deprivation of due process, the latter because obviously even an attempt to corrupt an election by buying votes taints the entire election, depriving all delegates, not merely Plaintiffs and class members, of due process.

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bolster the ranks of councils politically friendly to Ms. Moran et al. In Las Vegas two days before

the June 22, 2013 national assembly, Defendants, during a meeting in the Pompeii Room at

Caesar’s Palace (the National convention site), exposed their delegate-transferring plot to a witness

for Plaintiffs, Ms. Esquibel. TRX1, at 37:21-38:23.

According to testimony of Paul A. Martinez, LULAC member since 1980 who served as a

state LULAC director in New Mexico from 2006-2010, has served on the national board, served on

a committee that updated and finalized the LULAC constitution in effect in 2013, and ran the

elections for LULAC’s 2008 convention in Washington, D.C., delegate transferring, if it occurs,

must occur no fewer than 30 days prior to the convention and can involve only transfers

within a state. TRX2, at 92:16-93:24, 95:5-13, 102:1-16. Thus, Defendant’s attempts to transfer

delegates at the 2013 National convention violated LULAC’s constitution. TRX2, at 102:14-19.

Defendants pestered and pressured Ms. Esquibel, whose Tucson councils had between them

18 alternates, and others throughout the following day, June 21, 2013, to allow them to transfer

those alternates to Puerto Rico councils politically supportive to Defendants. TRX1, at 38:13-39:18,

233:3-23, 243:1-7, 258:25-259:24; see also TRX1, at 259:25-261:8 (LULAC council no. 1191

president Joseph Cordero was pressured to sign a letter transferring his alternates, but he

declined because he believed delegate-transferring was a means to rig elections). Ms. Esquibel also

declined to participate in Defendants’ delegate-transferring scheme,3 because she did not feel it was

right, prompting Mr. Moran to complain to her that he “invested so much money” to pay for her

councils’ hotel rooms “just to make sure” she would support Defendants, according to undisputed

testimony.4 TRX1, at 44:16-45:10 (internal quotation marks omitted), 54:21-25, 260:2-19.

3 Defendants asked witnesses on the stand regarding whether Tucson council delegates

actually were transferred, apparently attempting to set up the inference that there was no delegate transferring, there was no harm to the election. E.g. TRX1, at 231:1-232:8, 262:15-22. However, the very fact the Defendants attempted to transfer and pressured council leaders to transfer delegates provides factual support for Plaintiffs’ assertions that the elections were rigged, and defendants deprived Plaintiffs and class members of due process.

4 Defendants elicited testimony from their national fiscal officer, who handled hotel reservations for the 2013 convention, that LULAC typically does not obligate itself to pay for members’ rooms, except for its staff and board members. TRX2, at 165:20-166:7, 168:3-7, 171:3-

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Defendants also set up a two-tier system of registration, wherein they allowed their

political allies to register quickly and conveniently. For example, Defendants set up a special

location in the Senate Room at Caesar’s Palace, where they allowed politically favored councils to

registered expeditiously, and sometimes whole councils or groups of councils were registered by

one member, according to undisputed testimony – in one case, a member from Brownsville, Texas

registered and obtained voting credentials for 65 people. TRX1, at 40:4-42:5, 257:23-258:11; see

TRX2, at 96:22-97:1. Mr. Moran managed affairs in the Senate Room much of that time, and he

even gave money from a bank pouch to politically favored registrants, along with T-shirts and

red ribbons signifying they were registered, credentialed and qualified to vote at the national

assembly, according to undisputed testimony. TRX1, at 41:10-43:5; TRX2, at 61:18-21. Defendants

did not accord Plaintiffs and class members such preferential treatment. TRX1, at 133:9-22.

Instead, Defendants gave LULAC members they suspected of not supporting the

incumbency second-class treatment. TRX1, at 44:7-15. For example, once Defendants learned that

Ms. Esquibel would not go along with their delegate-transferring ploy, they turned against her,

ejecting her from the Senate Room and requiring that she register her councils in extremely lengthy

registration lines reserved for Defendants’ political nemeses. TRX1, at 43:6-44:15, 45:14-20, 86:4-

6, 258:12-24.5 The two-tier registration system Defendants employed in 2013 was not typical for

national conventions. See TRX2, at 97:18-98:19. Ultimately, Defendants punished Ms. Esquibel for

declining to go along with their delegate-transferring plot by credentialing as voters in the national

assembly only seven of the 44 delegates and alternates who traveled to Las Vegas from Tucson and

Phoenix with Ms. Esquibel to attend the National convention. TRX1, at 49:1-20, 99:23-24.

(...Continued)

15. That fact, however, does not prove Defendants did not stray from their typical practice and attempt to persuade or pressure Ms. Esquivel and her Tucson Councils to vote for the incumbents by offering to and actually paying some portion of their travel expenses to the convention, as testimony demonstrates.

5 Mr. Escobar testified that he was in the Senate Room at relevant times and was not aware of any attempts by Defendants to engage in delegate transferring or expedite credentialing of politically favored councils, but that testimony is contravened by voluminous evidence and should be discarded. See TRX2, at 56:21-59:3, 61:5-14.

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Plaintiff Soto was one of the few among Plaintiffs and class members to be registered and

credentialed to vote in Las Vegas, but he witnessed Defendants’ subjecting numerous other

Plaintiffs and class members to second-class treatment and ultimately slamming the door on their

participation in the national assembly. For example, Mr. Soto guided other Plaintiffs and class

members through registration and attempted credentialing process. TRX1, at 132:20-133:5, 135:5-

7. Defendants did allow Plaintiffs and class members to register and took their registration money,

but they “rejected” Plaintiffs and class members from obtaining credentials. TRX1, at 133:1-5,

134:1-6. On June 21, 2013, the day before the national voting assembly, Defendants’ credentials

committee made Plaintiffs and class members wait hours in line, only to close the credentials

table two hours before the advertised time of closure on that date, claiming the committee was

“overwhelmed”. TRX1, at 134:11-135:3, 191:15-18, 192:20; TRX2, at 97:2-8.

Plaintiffs and class members attempted to appeal Defendants’ failure to credential them but

initially were given the run-around, ultimately ending up addressing Brandon Wilkes, LULAC’s

executive director. TRX1, at 136:1-7, 176:18-177:1. Mr. Wilkes told Plaintiff Soto that Manuel

Escobar, national legal advisor to LULAC, had issued his legal opinion claiming that because

Miguel Zazueta allegedly was not a member in good standing when he sponsored the new councils

from Phoenix and San Luis, members of those councils were deemed to be not in good standing.

TRX1, at 136:9-18; TRX2, at 42:25-43:25, 51:5-17, 62:3-8.

Though asked, Mr. Wilkes refused to show Mr. Escobar’s legal opinion to Plaintiffs and

class members, and he offered no explanation as to why LULAC closed the credentialing table two

hours early on June 21, 2013. TRX1, at 136:19-137:14. Addressed regarding Defendants’ having

closed down the credentialing table two hours early on June 21, 2013, Mr. Wilkes informed

Plaintiffs and class members that there would be another opportunity the following day. TRX1, at

192:6-13. Thus, having waited hours in line on June 21, 2013 only to face closure of the credentials

table before they could become credentialed, Plaintiffs and class members arose very early in the

morning on June 22, 2013, the day of the national voting assembly, so as to attempt once again to

get credentialed. On arrival to Caesar’s Palace, Plaintiffs and class members were greeted with a

400-person-long line to access LULAC’s credentialing table. TRX1, at 138:22-139:3.

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Moreover, Defendants erected a roadblock in the corridor guarded by private security to

prevent those without the red ribbons signifying that they were credentialed to vote from entering

the voting assembly area. TRX1, at 139:13-20. Significantly, the credentials committee was beyond

the roadblock and inaccessible to all except those already credentialed. TRX1, at 139:21-24.

Accordingly, Defendants set up a Catch-22 situation in which a member who wanted to appeal

Defendant’s failure to credential him would have to appeal to the credentials committee, but

to access that committee he would need already to be credentialed. See TRX1, at 139:17-140:4,

192:6-18.

As a result, Defendants physically prevented LULAC members, including Plaintiffs and

class members, from appealing Defendants’ refusal to credential them to vote. TRX1, at 140:5-6,

179:19-180:1; see also TRX1, at 176:18-177:18 (Plaintiffs and class members had documentation

but could not get past the roadblock). Furthermore, the credentials committee refused to meet

Plaintiffs and class members at Defendants’ guarded roadblock, so Mr. Soto, who did have a

red ribbon, took Plaintiffs’ and class members’ registration files past the roadblock in an attempt to

address the credentials committee. TRX1, at 140:15-20. The credentials committee refused to hear

his case, giving him the “cold shoulder.” TRX1, at 140:20-141:8; accord, TRX2, at 130:5-11.

Former LULAC president Rick Dovlina, upon learning that the credentials committee6

refused to take Mr. Soto’s appeal on behalf of Plaintiffs and class members, requested that Mr.

Escobar’s legal opinion be withdrawn. TRX1, at 141:7-11. Mr. Dovlina proposed that the assembly

vote on whether to set aside Mr. Escobar’s legal opinion.7 TRX1, at 141:9-19, 145:15-18. A

6 Yolanda Rodriguez-Escobar – wife of national legal advisor Manuel Escobar, whose legal

opinion invalidated the charters of Plaintiffs’ and class members’ councils – chaired the credentials committee at LULAC’s 2013 National convention. TRX2, at 257:17-20, 258:11-14, 264:21-265:5. Thus, Ms. Rodriguez-Escobar –who, like her husband, was appointed to her post by Margaret Moran, TRX2, at 271:12-272:2 – chaired the committee that refused to hear Plaintiffs’ and class members’ appeal from the legal opinion invalidating their councils’ charters, which had been drafted by her husband, Manuel Escobar. She saw on conflict of interest in this arrangement. TRX2, at 268:9-15.

7 A vote by two-thirds majority at a national assembly is required to overturn a legal advisor’s opinion. Exhibit 15, LULAC Const, art. VIII, § 9g.(2), p. 38; TRX, at 52:5-54:2.

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principal effect of this legal opinion is that a two-thirds vote, rather than a simple majority, was

required to seat the Arizona councils at the national voting assembly. TRX2, at 202:6-18

A vote was taken, but it was not conducted by show of hands, roll call or secret ballot, as

called for in the LULAC constitution and bylaws, but rather by a stand-up vote, in which the aye

votes stood up and their numbers were estimated, then the same procedure was carried out for the

nay votes, producing ambiguity as to the result of the vote. TRX1, at 51:22-52:9, 142:20-144:12;

see TRX1, at 208:16-209:23 (votes at National convention not taken by show of hands, roll call or

secret ballot as envisioned in the LULAC constitution); TRX2, at 49:11-23 (Manual Escobar admits

that the vote was not taken by the three methods enunciated in the LULAC constitution).8

Defendants claimed that the vote did not carry. E.g. TRX1, at 183:4-10, 183:23-25; TRX2, at

54:25-55:3.

While Defendants may assert that their stand-up/estimate-the-vote-count method is

permitted under their 2013 Convention Rules,9 e.g. Exhibit 14, rule 5, they flouted those rules by

failing to have an election judge, time keeper and three counters at the election. TRX1, at 143:2-11;

Exhibit 14, rules 3-4. In fact, Defendants outright admitted to failing to follow rule 5 of the

Convention Rules, which allows for stand-up voting but further provides, “The head of each

delegation shall announce his/her council’s vote and the Election Judge shall repeat the vote to the

floor.” TRX2, at 88:20-89:4; accord, TRX2, at 109:22-110:5. The way this method typically works

is that each council president announces the council, and all members stand up to represent the

vote, and the vote counters check each voter’s credentials to make sure the person standing up is

really a delegate, “[a]nd usually it’s done by roll call.” TRX2, at 104:16-105:9.

8 Manual Escobar, Esq., Defendants’ national legal advisor, testified that votes at the

national voting assembly on June 22, 2013 were taken by the stand-up method, but that Defendants instructed voters to “show their hands and stand up when they did it … [s]o they can be seen.” TRX2, at 47:19-48:14. Defendants did not, however, count the raised hands. TRX2, at 48:21-23, 49:11-50:18. Mr. Escobar testified that it “was obvious” that the vote to overturn his opinion did not pass, TRX2, at 54:25-55:3, but such self-serving testimony lacks credibility.

9 The 2013 Convention Rules were “railroaded through,” i.e. not adopted properly by the assembly. TRX2, at 103:16-104:8.

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Defendants, however, did not follow that process in conducting their stand-up voting at

the 2013 convention. Defendants’ national legal advisor, Mr. Escobar, admitted on the witness

stand that rather than counting the voters’ supposedly raised hands, Defendants “estimated,” i.e.

Defendants’ purported vote counters “looked at the crowd and that [the vote did not carry] was their

determination.” TRX2, at 50:3-51:2. Thus, Defendants did not count votes. TRX2, at 105:10-16

(Defendants “basically judged by the naked eye and . . . guessed”), 109:13-19 (“no one” counted

votes), 117:19-23 (close vote, but “no one counted”), 194:4-5 (voting by ballot “was not optioned

for”), 207:24-208:3 (neither the election judge nor the vote counters actually counted the votes),

271:7-11 (no vote counting “by head,” but rather vote tallied “in [the] estimation” of the purported

vote counters). Mr. Escobar did testify, however, that the vote counters are “supposed” to count

votes then gave seemingly conflicting accounts of whether the vote counters in fact counted the

votes:

“Q: Did you observe these vote counters specifically counting votes?

“A: Yes, I mean, I saw them up there. The were – they were standing up above everybody.

They were on a – on a platform so that they could view the - the floor.” TRX2, at 90:12-16. On the

other hand, he conceded that no vote counts were announced, in violation of rule 5 of the

Convention Rules. See TRX2, at 90:17-25; accord, TRX2, at 105:14-106:3 (no counting of votes),

109:9-15 (no vote counting, just the election chair with “discretion to say – to declare the winner”).

Vote Counters Relegated to the Role of Affirming the Election Judge’s Opinion

LULAC’s election judge, Roger Rocha – who like Mr. Escobar and Ms. Rodriguez-Escobar

was appointed to his position by Margaret Moran – testified that he did use vote counters at the

2013 convention. See TRX2, at 194:13-195:6, 201:23-25. However, he conceded that the vote

counters did not actually count votes. E.g. TRX2, at 202:19-25 (asked for an exact vote count, Mr.

Rocha testified, “Cannot give you the exact numbers . . . [b]ecause it was a stand-up vote”). Instead,

when Defendants conducted a stand-up vote, Mr. Rocha, who told the court he supported Ms.

Moran’s candidacy, told the counters, “this is how I see the election. Do you agree of disagree?”

TRX2, at 194:20-23, 202:1-3. Thus, “the role of the three counters is to verify results of the

election” as determined by Mr. Rocha, rather than to actually count votes. TRX2, at 194:19-23.

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Not surprisingly, in “each one” of the elections, the vote counters confirmed the election

judge’s view of the election. TRX2, at 194:20-195:6. Also unsurprisingly, Defendants’ election

judge opined the uncounted vote regarding whether to overturn Mr. Escobar’s legal opinion barring

Plaintiffs and class members from voting in the national assembly was not close. TRX2, at 199:3-

200:5; but cf. TRX2, at 269:16-24 (Defendants’ witness “can’t even approximate” the number of

votes regarding seating the Arizona delegations at the voting assembly).

Mr. Rocha attempted to excuse his failure to follow convention rule 5 in conducing the vote

over whether to seat the Arizona delegation by distinguishing that vote as “regular business” rather

than an election, such that “an election rule does not apply,” but he cited no specific rule or LULAC

governing document provision supporting his position, and he ultimately admitted there was no

rule distinguishing votes on regular business from election contests. TRX2, at 204:5-205:18,

210:1-13. Worth noting is that Mr. Escobar self-servingly opined that there was “no need” for a roll

call of the vote to overturn the legal opinion he drafted that barred Plaintiffs and class members

from voting in the national convention. TRX2, at 207:12-17.

In summary, Defendants’ legal advisor testified that Defendants’ purported vote

counters “estimated” the number of voters on one side of an issue or the other, admitted that

the vote counters are supposed to count the vote, then testified that no vote counts were

announced as envisioned under convention rule 5. Further, Defendants’ election judge

admitted that for each vote, the supposed vote counters did not actually count votes, but

merely confirmed the election judge’s opinion, formed by “look[ing] at” the assembly hall, as

to who had won an election. See TRX2, at 194:13-195:6.

Defendants also cut off debate on Mr. Dovlina’s motion to set aside Mr. Escobar’s so-

called legal opinion, by cutting off electricity to and physically removing a microphone intended to

be used by delegates who have a right to address issues brought to a vote. TRX1, at 183:11-186:14,

213:21-23. Ms. Esquibel and Raymond Serra, among others, attempted by way of “point of order”

to request that a roll call vote be taken, since it was not clear whether the vote carried. TRX1, at

51:22-24, 210:2-212:17. As mentioned above, no roll call was taken on Mr. Dovlina’s motion. E.g.

TRX2, at 270:19-21.

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Defendants specifically cut off access to the microphone to delegates who supported

setting aside Mr. Escobar’s legal opinion and allowing Plaintiffs and class members to advocate on

that issue. TRX1, at 185:24-186:14; see also TRX1, at 50:24-51:21 (Defendants “turned the

microphone off,” with LULAC president Margaret Moran “pushing the button”). 211:10-213:8

(microphone “muted” then taken away and controlled by Defendants or their personnel, making it

inaccessible to delegates who wished to address the assembly). By controlling the microphone,

Defendants ensured that only voices friendly to their political objectives would be heard in the

assembly room. TRX1, at 214:2-215:7.

Defendants again flouted their own 2013 LULAC National Convention Rules – which

provide that delegates and other attendees “must maintain proper decorum at all times,” note that

“whistles are not allowed,” and punish intentional disruption of election proceedings by

“expel[ing]” offenders from the assembly, Exhibit 14, rule 2010 – and the LULAC constitution,

which requires that “[g]ood order must be maintained if business is to be carried out. Courtesy

would demand that there should be no whispering or commotion while any speaker has the floor.”

Exhibit 15, LULAC bylaws art. VI, p. 80. For example, during the “stand-up” voting process

Defendants conducted, some stood on chairs, others beat drums and many attendees were “making

all kinds of noise.” TRX1, at 51:15-19; TRX2, at 106:6-8; see also TRX2, at 124:1-125:8

(delegations from Puerto Rico banged drums and yelled out names, and delegates from Texas were

“getting into fights”). Defendants failed to take control and stop the noise. TRX2, at 107:17-24,

133:4-17.

As custom at past LULAC national conventions, members not credentialed to vote have

nonetheless been allowed into the voting assembly to observe. TRX2, at 115:2-12. However, at

the 2013 National convention in Las Vegas, Defendants, clearly seeking to minimize the number of

witnesses to their sham election, barred observers from the voting assembly. TRX1, at 144:24-

10 On the other hand, the cited provision of the 2013 LULAC National Convention Rules

empowered the convention chair to “determine[]” what constitutes disruption of the assembly, allowing for inequitable application of the rule, and Defendants used the provision as a tool to stifle dissent. See Exhibit 14, rule 20.

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145:8; TRX2, at 115:2-19,180:7-19, 182:21-23 (No observation area in national voting assembly).

During the national assembly, Defendants intimidated attendees and thwarted participation

in the vote by Plaintiffs and class members, as well as others, by posting numerous security guards

around and near the assembly room. TRX1, at 46:21-47:10, 49:24-50:5, 92:11-19, 93:9-13. As with

Defendants’ registration system, there was a two-tier system for entry into the voting assembly,

where politically favored delegates went in unimpeded, while security guards ordered others to

show not only their delegate badges, but their identification. E.g. TRX2, at 100:2-101:3.

As mentioned, Defendants offered to pay and made partial payments to some class members

to reimburse them for use of rental vans to transport themselves from Arizona to Las Vegas.

Exhibits 11, 13; TRX1, at 54:4-16; 60:19-64:24, 99:12-102:3. Defendants attempted to paint the

Tucson councils’ use of rented vans to travel to Las Vegas to participate in the National convention

as a family vacation. TRX1, at 95:22-98:15. However, testimony shows such not to be the case, and

the vans were used strictly for transportation to and from the convention. TRX1, at 105:14-106:6.

Defendants’ counsel, when taking testimony, averred that no agreement existed between Ms.

Esquibel and Luis Vera, national general counsel to LULAC, by which he (on behalf of LULAC)

would reimburse Ms. Esquibel for the six vans that were rented to transport members of the Tucson

councils to Las Vegas for the National convention. E.g. TRX1, at 64:19-20, 76:2-9, 101:6-10.

However, that assertion is contradicted by uncontroverted testimony. E.g. TRX1, at 100:13-101:6.

Moreover, Defendants’ own national fiscal officer testified that Mr. Vera is authorized by

LULAC to pay for delegates to go to a national convention. TRX2, at 172:7-18.

Damages

Defendants accepted registration and council chartering fees from plaintiffs and class

members, but they never refunded the $18,084 paid for those fees. TRX2, at 23:20-40:23; TRX2, at

159:19-162:6 Defendants implied that the money was to be held pending the instant litigation.

TRX2, at 163:2-3. Plaintiffs are aware of no provision in LULAC’s governing documents that

allows Defendants to keep money of members they refused to register and charter during a legal

case or when the status of councils is “on hold” for nearly eight months after the convention the

participation in which was the purpose the councils and members paid their dues. TRX2, at 164:3-

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6. On the other hand, Defendants made clear their opinion that no one is allowed under LULAC’s

constitution to sue over election outcomes. E.g. TRX2, at 120:15-121:9, 122:11-123:18. Plaintiffs

and class members paid at minimum $2,960 (148 members at $20/member) to register at the 2013

National convention. TRX2, at 174:5-18.

ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs have demonstrated that Defendants are liable under the following causes of action

as asserted in Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint:

Violation of A.R.S. § 10-3721

A.R.S. section 10-3721 provides, as relevant here, “Unless the articles of incorporation or

bylaws provide otherwise, each member is entitled to one vote on each matter voted on by

members.” Moreover, LULAC’s constitution makes clear that members have a right to vote on

matters of interest to and for the welfare of their Council or the League. LULAC Const., art. 4, §

1b.(2)-(4). LULAC’s Bylaws further provide that voting “at all conventions shall be by show of

hands, roll call or secret ballot.” LULAC Bylaws, art. II, § 8a; accord, Exhibit B to Ford Aff.,

LULAC Constitution, art. VIII, § 5d.

The evidence summarized above shows that Defendants failed to comply with LULAC’s

governing documents and Arizona statute. First, Defendants ultimately have not demonstrated that

Miguel Zazueta was not a member in good standing at the times relevant to the instant case, taking

into account their customary extension of time with which members may pay dues, plus the grace

period enunciated in the bylaws. The theory that Miguel Zazueta was not a member in good

standing when he sponsored the Arizona councils to which Plaintiffs and class members belonged

is the linchpin to Defendants’ claim that those councils were not validly chartered, a claim which

underlay their thwarting Plaintiffs and class members from voting at both the Arizona and National

conventions.

Because the theory is invalid, Defendants lack any basis for having thwarted those members

from voting. Even if their theory were considered to be valid, the obvious lack of clarity to the

outcome of the vote to reinstate the Arizona councils at the National convention – because of the

stand-up voting method and Defendants’ “estimation” instead of actual counting of votes –

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undermines the validity of that vote. In summary, Defendants wrongfully deprived Plaintiffs of

their right to vote.

Conversion

Conversion is “an act of wrongful control or domination over personal property in denial of

or inconsistent with the rights of another.” Huskie v Ames Bros. Motor & Supply Co., 139 Ariz.

396, 402, 678 P.2d 977, 983 (App. 1984) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 223(A), 237

(1965)). Here, defendants accepted funds from Plaintiffs for chartering and membership fees, plus

fees to register at the Arizona and National conventions. Even though they thwarted Plaintiffs from

participating in any voting, Defendants did not return any of the funds. Defendants converted

Plaintiffs’ money.

Common Law Fraud

The nine elements of common law fraud in Arizona are “(1) a representation; (2) its falsity;

(3) its materiality; (4) the speaker’s knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) his intent

that it should be acted upon by and in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer’s

ignorance of its falsity; (7) his reliance on the truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; and (9) his

consequent and proximate injury.” Peery v. Hansen, 120 Ariz. 266, 269, 585 P.2d 574, 577 (Ariz.

App. 1978).

Clearly, Defendants conducted fraudulent elections at both the Arizona and National

conventions. In Arizona, Defendants did not allow registration at the posted times and had no

provision for credentialing delegates at all during at least part of the posted registration hours. They

took Plaintiffs’ and class members’ chartering, membership and registration money and misled

them into believing they had been credentialed to vote, only to reveal at the last possible moment

that there was no intention that Plaintiffs or class members would participate in the Arizona

elections. Defendants’ acts were deliberate, having been plotted out the night before and at other

times prior to the convention, according to evidence that they had been looking to invalidate Miguel

Zazueta’s membership as far back as April 2013, so as to (1) eliminate competition for Defendant

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Mireles’ bid for state directorship and (2) prevent Plaintiffs and class members from voting and

affecting the outcomes of LULAC’s elections.

In Las Vegas, Defendants led Plaintiffs to believe that, notwithstanding Manuel Escobar’s

legal opinion invalidating their councils’ charters issued more than a week earlier, they would be

able to participate in the election. Defendants did so by having Plaintiffs wait in hours-long lines

and navigate Defendants’ appeals process in hopes of obtaining voting credentials. Defendants

ultimately shut the door on Plaintiffs and class members, preventing them from voting. Defendants

conducted a vote to overturn their legal opinion invalidating the Arizona charters, but their stand-

up-with-hands-raised vote-tallying system not only violated LULAC’s governing documents, but

because votes were “estimated” rather than actually counted, it was impossible to determine with

any accuracy the outcome of the votes.

The above-cited facts also demonstrate that Defendants are liable for promissory estoppel,

engaged in ultra vires acts and breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Defendants Deprived Plaintiffs, Class Members and All Delegates of Due Process

In taking jurisdiction in this case, the Court sought to determine (1) whether LULAC has a

reasonable and orderly process for admission of its members and for continuation of membership;

(2) whether LULAC has established a due process procedure for review of denial of membership,

and (3) whether LULAC acted reasonably and not in an arbitrary manner in applying its

membership rules and due process procedures. Ruling, CV2013-008731, Oct. 14, 2013.

LULAC’s governing documents provide that membership maybe attained, as relevant here,

by application to a local council or “recommendation” of a member in good standing. Exhibit 15,

LULAC Const., art. IV, p. 4. A council may be organized under sponsorship of an active council or

officer of a district, state or national board of directors. Id., art VI, § 8b. There was testimony that

new councils must be registered for 30 days before their members can vote in a convention. E.g.

TRX2, at 148:21-23.

LULAC offers extensions to members in a given year within which to pay dues before a

membership lapses, and in 2013 the extension lasted as late as April 15, 2013. E.g. TRX2, at

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155:13-19. Nonetheless, an active member who is in arrears on his dues for 3 months is suspended

from membership but can reinstate membership simply by paying his dues – thus, LULAC

governing documents provide a grace period within which a member may pay his dues before

losing good standing. See LULAC bylaws, art. III, §3(a), p. 71.

The evidence adduced in this case makes clear that Defendants applied the above-cited

rules arbitrarily to suit their agenda, which was to cling to power no matter the will of the

entirety of the membership. Defendants accepted money for membership and to register charters for

Plaintiffs’ and class members’ Arizona councils. Then, once they became aware that Miguel

Zazueta could pose a threat to Defendant Mireles’ bid for power as Arizona director and the

councils Mr. Zazueta sponsored could pose a threat to their grip on power by voting for opposing

candidates in the national elections, Defendants reneged on their acceptance of those memberships

and ruled those councils to be improperly chartered by way of Ms. Morales’/Mr. Escobar’s legal

opinion.

Testimony shows that Defendants colluded and came up with a plan that was as simple as it

was fraudulent: Rule Miguel Zazueta, a member since at least 2000, to be not in good standing and

snuff out both his threat to Defendant Mireles’ bid for power and the potential threat the Arizona

councils he sponsored pose to the electoral status quo. The evidence presented herein leaves

unclear whether Miguel Zazueta was a member in bad standing, as defendants claim, based

on LULAC’s customary dues-paying extensions and the grace period provided in the bylaws.

Defendants got around that uncertainty by (1) holding Mr. Zazueta’s check so they could

claim he had not paid his dues, and (2) issuing a legal opinion invalidating the Arizona charters so

that it would take a 2/3 vote, instead of simple majority, to seat the Arizona councils to vote at the

national voting assembly. Also, upon issuing their legal opinion, Defendants placed the Arizona

charters “on hold” within 30 days of the National convention, making it impossible for those

councils to become reinstated in time for their members to vote in Las Vegas without engaging in

the uphill battle of winning a 2/3 majority vote to overturn the legal opinion.

Then, to make absolutely certain they remain in power, Defendants conducted rigged,

fraudulent elections. In Arizona, they misled many new delegates into believing they were

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credentialed, when in fact Defendants made no mechanism available by which delegates could

become credentialed during the entire time registration was open. They kept Plaintiffs and class

members sequestered in a separate room while they conducted nominations, then they refused to

seat Plaintiffs and class members to vote in the Arizona election, and they suddenly conducting a

vote by acclamation so as to end the election before Plaintiffs and class members could make their

case that they should have been allowed to vote.

In Las Vegas Defendants carried out a two-tier registration system, allowing their political

allies to register and become credentialed quickly and conveniently, while forcing the disfavored

members to wait for hours over the course of two days in lengthy lines, only to deny credentials to

the Arizona councils and refuse to give audience to their appeal. Defendants then conducted “stand-

up” voting not contemplated in their governing documents and out of compliance with their own

convention rules. Defendants admitted that they never counted the votes, never conducted a roll

call, never carried out secret ballots. Instead, Defendants openly admit that they “estimated” the

vote tallies, and the individuals whose job it was to count votes instead were relegated to affirming

the opinion or estimate of the election judge. The processes to which Defendants adhered in

conducting the national assembly votes are nowhere contemplated in any governing document or

rule or at law. In short, Defendants conducted sham elections designed and intended to ensure

that they remain in power.

Even though Plaintiff Soto was credentialed to vote and did vote at LULAC’s National

convention, Defendants’ actions described herein deprived him of due process by (1) subjecting

him to a rigged, or at least irregular, vote due to the use of “stand-up” voting and vote “estimating,”

(2) preventing him from presenting Plaintiffs’ and class members’ case to the credentialing

committee, and (3) depriving him and all delegates and members of a fair and clean election in

which all paid-up members – including Plaintiffs and class members – would have been allowed to

vote E.g. TRX1, at 180:14-183:2, 185:5-10, 203:8-204:2, 204:13-207:24.

Even those from among Plaintiffs and class members who were registered and credentialed

were harmed, because they were cheated out of an honest election and subjected to a sham election

in which Defendants made every effort, while ignoring LULAC constitutional and bylaw provisions

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and the concept of due process, to keep a substantial group of people from voting for their preferred

candidate. Indeed, considering that Mr. Garcia ultimately withdrew his candidacy as a result of

Defendants’ shenanigans, Defendants robbed all LULAC members who supported Mr. Garcia

or were considering voting for him of the opportunity to vote for the candidate of their choice.

Indeed, Defendants’ acts subject them to impeachment. Exhibit 15, LULAC Const. art. IV, p. 3.

Defendants asked several witnesses whether there is a provision in LULAC’s constitution

allowing a member to “go to court” when the member disagrees with how LUCAC conducts a vote.

E.g. TRX2, at 120:15-121:9, 122:11-123:18. In so contending, defendants in effect are renewing

their failed challenge to this Court’s jurisdiction over the within matter; the court, on considering

arguments made by both parties, accepted jurisdiction, and thus the premise that a LULAC member

my sue if she or he believes the group’s leaders ran a rigged or corrupt election, as happened here.

See Order, CV2013-008731, Oct. 14, 2013. In any case, nothing in LULAC’s governing documents

explicitly forbids a member from going the court to challenge an election. TRX, at 129:22-25.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant all relief

requested in their First Amended Complaint. FAC, ¶¶ 136-143, p. 17.

DATED this 28th day of March, 2014 Respectfully Submitted, LAW OFFICE OF CHRIS FORD Attorney for plaintiffs __/s Chris Ford__________ By: Chris Ford, Esq. ORIGINAL of the foregoing E-FILED this 28th day of March, 2014 with: Clerk of the Court Maricopa County Superior Court

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201 West Jefferson Phoenix, Arizona 85003 FOR Hon. Judge Michael Herrod COPY of the foregoing E-MAILED this this 28th day of March, 2014 to: Anthony Guajardo Counsel for defendants Fax: 602-957-0801 __/s Chris Ford__________ By: Chris Ford

Plaintiffs Closing Argument 28mar2014_CONFORMED

Documents

Transcript of Plaintiffs Closing Argument 28mar2014_CONFORMED