PIRPAU JETTY
Transcript of PIRPAU JETTY
REPORT
ON
COMPREHENSIVE CUMULATIVE
CHEMICAL HAZARD MANAGEMENT PLAN
FOR
PIRPAU JETTY (FIRST, SECOND AND PROPOSED NEW BERTHS)
At PirPau Jetty, Mumbai Gulf, West Coast of India OF
M/s MUMBAI PORT TRUST Prepared By
PROJECTS & DEVELOPMENT INDIA LIMITED
(A Govt. of India Undertaking) PDIL Bhawan, A-14, Sector – 1, Noida
Gautam Buddh Nagar, UP List ‘A’ - Accredited EIA Consultant Organization by QCI-NABET
PDIL JOB NO: EN-00255 SEPTEMBER, 2021
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
EN-00255-QRA-MBPT PirPau Jetty 1
DOCUMENT NO. REV SHEET 2 OF 4
FORM NO: 02-0000-0021 F2 REV 1 All rights reserved
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Description Page No. 1.0 Introduction 01
1.1 Brief about MbPT 01
1.2 Location of Berths 01
1.3 Details of Consultant 03
2.0 Facility Description 04
2.1 Introduction 04
2.2 Proposed Berth 04
2.3 Details of the First, Second and Proposed Berth 05
3.0 Hazard Identification 11
3.1 Definitions 11
3.2 Chemical Hazard Management Plan 12
3.3 Hazard identification 13
3.4 Classification of Major Hazardous Substance 13
3.5 Hazards of Equipment/Pipeline Handling Petroleum Products &
Chemicals 16
3.6 Dow Fire and Explosion Index 17
4.0 Risk Assessment 19
4.1 Hazard Assessment and Evaluation 19
4.2 Maximum Credible Accident Analysis (MCA) Approach 19
4.3 Consequence Analysis 21
4.4 Consequence Analysis for Selected Failure Cases 30
4.5 Risk Assessment 55
4.6 Acceptability of Risk 65
4.7 Risk Results 65
5.0 Controlling the Risk 67
5.1 Hierarchy of Control 67
5.2 Elimination and Substitution 68
5.3 Engineering Control at First, Second & Proposed Berths 68
5.4 Administrative Controls 70
5.5 Personal protective equipment (PPE) 71
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
EN-00255-QRA-MBPT PirPau Jetty 1
DOCUMENT NO. REV SHEET 3 OF 4
FORM NO: 02-0000-0021 F2 REV 1 All rights reserved
6.0 Monitor & Review 74
7.0 Emergency Preparedness & Response 75
7.1 Emergency Mitigation Measures 75
7.2 Emergency Preparedness Measures 80
7.3 Response Plan 84
7.4 Hazard specific Response Plan 84
7.5 Evacuation Routes 91
7.6 Medical & First Aid 92
7.7 Mutual Aid Response Group Chembur - Mahul & Wadala - Sewree
Area 92
7.8 Important Telephone Numbers 94
8.0 Conclusion & Recommendation 97
8.1 Conclusion 97
8.2 Specific Recommendations 97
8.3 General Recommendations 98
LIST OF TABLES
Fig No. Description Page No.
3.1 Properties of LPG, POL & Chemicals used in the Study 12
3.2 Toxicity Level of LPG & Chemicals 15
3.3 Degree of hazard potential of F & EI 18
3.4 Fire Explosion Index (F & EI) 18
3.5 Fire Explosion Index for LPG, POL & Chemicals handling 18
4.1 Damage Due to Incident Thermal Radiation Intensity 26
4.2 Pasquill stability classes 27
4.3 List of Failure Cases with input data 28
4.4 Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation Due To Jet Fire 30
4.5 Toxic dispersion of products at IDLH concentration 54
4.6 Leak Failure frequencies as per OGP, 2010 55
5.1 Engineering Controls at Berths 69
5.2 Personal Protective Equipments used at Berths 72
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
EN-00255-QRA-MBPT PirPau Jetty 1
DOCUMENT NO. REV SHEET 4 OF 4
FORM NO: 02-0000-0021 F2 REV 1 All rights reserved
LIST OF FIGURES
Fig No. Description Page No.
1.1 Location of Berths at PirPau Jetty 02
2.1 Location of First, Second and Proposed Berth at PirPau Jetty 04
4.1 Generalized Event Tree for Consequences in the Safety Program 24
5.1 Hierarchy of Control 68
7.1 Safety Policy of Mumbai Port Trust 79
ATTACHMENTS
Annexure No. Description Page No.
1. Location Plan of FCB, SCB, TCB A1 –A2
2. ISO Risk Contour A3
3. F-N Curve A4
4. FCB, SCB & TCB firefighting layout A5 – A8
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Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Introduction
CHAPTER – 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Brief about Mumbai Port Trust (MbPT)
Mumbai Port has long been the principal gateway to India and has played a pivotal role in
the development of the national economy, trade & commerce and prosperity of Mumbai city
in particular.
Traditionally designed to handle general cargo, over the years, the port has adapted to
changing shipping trends and cargo packaging from break bulk to unitization / palletization
and containerization. Besides, it has also developed specialized berths for handling POL and
chemicals.
For decades, Mumbai Port was India’s premier port. Even today, with the development of
other ports, it caters to 8.61 percent of the country’s sea-borne trade handled by Major Ports
of the country in terms of volume. It caters to 16.07 percent of POL Traffic handled by
Major Ports.
Marine Oil Terminals
For handling Crude oil and Petroleum products, there are four jetties at Jawahar Dweep. One
of the jetties at Jawahar Dweep, which was commissioned in 1984 can handle tankers with
the maximum loaded draft of 12.7 metres corresponding to 125,000 Displacement tons.
Two of the jetties can accommodate tankers upto 70,000 Displacement Tons and 228.6 m
length and the third one can take tankers of 213.4 m length and upto 48,000 Displacement
Tons. Chemical and POL products are handled at two jetties at Pir Pau.
Old Pir Pau jetty can accommodate tankers of 170.7 m length while the new one
commissioned in December 1996 can handle tankers with a length of 197 m and a draft of
10.5 m. All the jetties are connected to Oil Refineries by a network of pipelines.
1.2 Location of Berths
The Mumbai Harbor is a natural deep-water harbor, situated, on the west coast of India
(Latitude 18° 54’, N, Longitude 72° 49’E) and inside the protected waters of the Mumbai
Gulf area.
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Introduction
The geo-coordinates of the Berths are:
S. No. Name of the Berth Latitude Longitude
1. First Chemical Berth 18°58'48.34"N 72°55'11.44"E
2. Second Chemical Berth 18°58'33.96"N 72°54'55.39"E
3. Proposed Third Chemical Berth 18°58'56"N 72°55'18"E
The location of the berths shown in below image:
Fig 1.1: Location of Berths at PirPau Jetty
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Introduction
Road and Rail Connectivity to MbPT Jetty
Mumbai Port is well connected to the hinterland through major arterial road network of
suburbs of Mumbai city. The main road networks connecting the hinterland to Mumbai Port
are as follows. The NH-8 from North & Gujarat, NH-3 from Central part and Nashik, NH-4,
Mumbai – Pune Expressway and NH-17 from Southern Part of country bring the traffic to
Mumbai port.
1.3 DETAILS OF CONSULTANT
Projects & Development India Limited (PDIL – A Govt. of India Undertaking), a
premier Engineering Consultancy and NABET accredited EIA consultancy organization
(Certificate No. NABET/EIA/1821/SA 0124), have been retained as Consultant by Mumbai
Port Trust (MbPT) for conducting and preparation of Cumulative Chemical Hazard
Management Plan for Berths at Pirpau Jetty. PDIL is a Mini Ratna, Category-I, under
Department of Fertilizers. PDIL is an ISO 9001:2015 & ISO 45001:2018 Certified
and ISO/IEC 17020:2012 accredited premier Consultancy and Engineering Organization. It
has over six decades of experience in providing Design, Engineering and related project
execution services from concept to commissioning of various Projects.
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Facility Description
CHAPTER – 2
FACILITY DESCRIPTION
2.1 Introduction
The first deep draft liquid chemicals/specialized grades of POL berth was Commissioned in
December, 1996 on the northern side of the Gulf near the explosive vessels anchorage area,
about 2.85 km offshore at Pir Pau. The Second Liquid Chemical Berth is constructed 650
meter on the south of existing First Chemical Berth off Pir Pau and in the same alignment as
that of the First Chemical Berth.
2.2 Proposed Berth
Mumbai Port has proposed the construction of Third Chemical Berth at the North of existing
First Chemical Berth at a distance of 300m at PirPau Jetty. With the construction of the
Mumbai Trans-harbor Link, the Old PirPau is now being restricted to handle only small
barges of lesser than 2000 tonnes. The capacities of first and second chemical berth are 2
MMTPA and 2 MMTPA, respectively. Even though the berth occupancy is high, due to
lesser parcel size, the traffic handled is less than the capacity of berths. Considering the berth
occupancy of more than 70% and also as requested by the users, it would be necessary to
construct the third chemical berth.
Fig 2.1: Location of First, Second and Proposed Berth at PirPau Jetty
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Facility Description
2.3 Details of First, Second and Proposed Berth
S.No. Description Value First Berth
1. Location Latitude Longitude
New Pirpau Jetty (FCB) 18°58'48.34"N 72°55'11.44"E.
2. Products Handled LPG, POL and Chemicals 3. Products imported from Various countries 4. Max. Size of Ship tankers LOA - 197 m
Draft – 10.6 m 5. Ship parcel size received 600 MT to 25000 MT 6. Frequency of unloading (no. of ship parcel per month) 20 Ships 7. Monthly import capacity 100,000 MT 8. No. of Unloading Arms for
a. LPG b. Chemicals c. POL
02 01 01
9. Loading arm dia. (in) and length (m) a. LPG b. Chemicals c. POL
dia. (in) - 10”& 12” dia. (in) - 10” dia. (in) –12”
10. Arm unloading rate/pumping capacity (MT/hr.) a. LPG b. Chemicals c. POL
400 MT/hr 450 kL/hr 1800 kL/hr
11. Pressure (bar) of unloading through arm a. LPG b. Chemicals c. POL
7.5 Bar 7.5 Bar 15 Bar
12. Temp. (oC) of unloading through arm a. LPG b. Chemicals c. POL
-40 Deg C Ambient 90 degree C
13. Area of Berth 14. Water Source MCGM
Consumption 30 m3/ month
Power Source Tata Power Consumption 8000 kWh (Avg.)
15. Firefighting Facilities a. Fire water system
Storage tanks Capacity
As per OISD guidelines. The sea water is used for firefighting purpose. No storage facility
b. Fire water pumps (no’s) Capacity Discharge pressure (bar)
3 pumps of 1440 m3/ hour.
c. Jockey fire water pumps (no’s) 2 pumps of 144 m3/hr
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Facility Description
Capacity Discharge pressure (bar)
d. Tower monitor Flowrate / Discharge pressure (bar)
7570 LPM at 7 Bar
e. Ground monitors Flowrate/ Discharge pressure (bar)
NA
f. Hydrant System Flowrate/ Discharge pressure (bar)
1100LPM at 7 Bar
g. Foam System Tank capacity Discharge pressure (bar)
15000 Litres 15 bar
h. Gas monitoring System (GMS) number and locations NA i. Jumbo water curtain nozzle 4Nos of each 6000LPM at 7Bar j. Remote control system (for firefighting system) Wired remote control system k. Fire detection, Alarm and communication system Manual Call point, Siren and VHF
communication l. Fire shore connection NA m. Fire extinguishers number and locations As per OISD 156 n. Mobile and water borne firefighting equipment NA o. First aid (list and locations) p. Public Address System NA q. Fire Tenders Available at combined building fire
control room. 16. No. of Employees/Personnel (at the time of unloading and
idle time) Aegis: 05 No’s
17. List of PPEs’ Aegis: Hard Helmet: 05 Safety Shoes:05 Life Jackets: 06 Splash Goggles: 05 Chemical Suit: 02
18. Distance from the other berths From OPJ – 2.5km & from SCB – 0.8km
19. Layout Plan of Berth 20. Fire extinguishers and GMS locations Layout Aegis Fire extinguishers:
CO2 – 02 No’s ABC - 02 No’s GMS:01 No
21. Fire hydrant layout Annexure - 4 22. Mutual Aid agreement (if any) Available (MARG)
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Facility Description
S.No. Description Value Second Berth
1. Location Latitude Longitude
Second Chemical Berth 18°58'33.96"N 72°54'55.39"E
2. Products Handled LPG, POL and Chemicals 3. Products imported from Various countries 4. Max. Size of Ship tankers LOA - 230 m
Draft - 11.4 m 55,000 DWT
5. Ship parcel size received 600 MT to 35000 MT 6. Frequency of unloading (no. of ship parcel per month) 20 Ships 7. Monthly import capacity 150,000 MT 8. No. of Unloading Arms for
a. LPG b. Chemicals c. POL
2 1 1
9. Loading arm dia. (in) and length (m) a. LPG b. Chemicals c. POL
dia. (in) – 10”&12” dia. (in) –10” dia. (in) – 12”
10. Arm unloading rate/pumping capacity (MT/hr.) a. LPG b. Chemicals c. POL
400 MT/hr 450 kL/hr 1800 kL/hr
11. Pressure (bar) of unloading through arm a. LPG b. Chemicals c. POL
7.5 Bar 7.5 Bar 15 Bar
12. Temp. (oC) of unloading through arm a. LPG b. Chemicals c. POL
-40 Deg C Ambient 90 Deg C
13. Area of Berth 14. Water Source MCGM
Consumption 30,000 T Power Source Tata Power
Consumption 8000 kWh (Avg) 15. Firefighting Facilities a. Fire water system
Storage tanks Capacity
As at First Chemical Berth
b. Fire water pumps (no’s) Capacity Discharge pressure (bar)
As at First Chemical Berth
c. Jockey fire water pumps (no’s) Capacity Discharge pressure (bar)
As at First Chemical Berth
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Facility Description
d. Tower monitor Flow rate / Discharge pressure (bar)
4Tower monitors of each 6000LPM at 11Bar
e. Ground monitors Flow rate/ Discharge pressure (bar)
2 ground Monitors of each 3000LPM at 7Bar
f. Hydrant System Flow rate/ Discharge pressure (bar)
27sets of double headed hydrant valve & 6Nos. of single headed hydrant valve.
g. Foam System Tank capacity Discharge pressure (bar)
30,300 Litres
h. Gas monitoring System (GMS) number and locations 4Nos. at Jetty berth i. Jumbo water curtain nozzle 4 Jumbo curtains each 6000LPM at
12bar j. Remote control system (for firefighting system) At SCB Control Room k. Fire detection, Alarm and communication system Gas detector, Flame sensor, MCPs,
siren & PA system l. Fire shore connection Available m. Fire extinguishers number and locations As per OISD 156 n. Mobile and water borne firefighting equipment NA o. First aid (list and locations) p. Public Address System Available q. Fire Tenders Common fire tender located at
combined building fire control room 16. No. of Employees/Personnel (at the time of unloading and
idle time) Aegis: 05 No’s
17. List of PPEs’ Aegis: Hard Helmet: 05 Safety Shoes:05 Life Jackets: 06 Splash Goggles: 05 Chemical Suit: 02
18. Distance from the other berths From FB-0.8km & from OPJ – 3.3km
19. Layout Plan of Berth Pl. provide the document 20. Fire extinguishers and GMS locations Layout Aegis Fire extinguishers:
CO2 – 02 No’s ABC - 02 No’s GMS: 01 No
21. Fire hydrant layout Annexure - 4 22. Mutual Aid agreement (if any) Available (MARG)
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Facility Description
S.No. Description Value Proposed New Berth
1. Location Latitude Longitude
18° 58’ 56” N 72° 55’ 18” E
2. Products Handled LPG, POL and Chemicals 3. Products imported from Various countries 4. Max. Size of Ship tankers LOA 230m
Draft-13m DWT-55,000T
5. Ship parcel size received 600 t to 35,000 T 6. Frequency of unloading (no. of ship parcel per month) 20 Ships 7. Monthly import capacity 1,50,000T 8. No. of Unloading Arms for
a. LPG b. Chemicals
2 4
9. Loading arm dia. (in) and length (m) a. LPG b. Chemicals
12” 8”
10. Arm unloading rate/pumping capacity (MT/hr.) a. LPG b. Chemicals
400 MT/hr 450 kL/hr
11. Pressure (bar) of unloading through arm a. LPG b. Chemicals
7.5 Bar 7.5 Bar
12. Temp. (oC) of unloading through arm a. LPG b. Chemicals
-40 Deg C Ambient
13. Area of Berth 14. Water Source MCGM
Consumption 30,000T Power Source Tata Power
Consumption 8000 kWh (Avg.) 15. Firefighting Facilities a. Fire water system
Storage tanks Capacity
As at First Chemical Berth
b. Fire water pumps (no’s) Capacity Discharge pressure (bar)
As at First Chemical Berth
c. Jockey fire water pumps (no’s) Capacity Discharge pressure (bar)
As at First Chemical Berth
d. Tower monitor Flow rate / Discharge pressure (bar)
4 Tower monitors of each 7570 LPM @ 11 bar
e. Ground monitors Flow rate/ Discharge pressure (bar)
2 No’s each of 3000 LPM @ 11 bar
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Facility Description
f. Hydrant System Flow rate/ Discharge pressure (bar)
1100 LPM @ 7 bar
g. Foam System Tank capacity Discharge pressure (bar)
As per OISD-156. Tank Capacity 30 m3
h. Gas monitoring System (GMS) number and locations As per OISD-156 i. Jumbo water curtain nozzle 4 Nos. each of 6000 LPM @ 7 bar j. Remote control system (for firefighting system) As per OISD-156 k. Fire detection, Alarm and communication system As per OISD-156 l. Fire shore connection 2 No’s International shore
connections at unloading platform. m. Fire extinguishers number and locations As per OISD 156 n. Mobile and water borne firefighting equipment As per OISD 156 o. First aid (list and locations) As per OISD 156 p. Public Address System As per OISD 156 q. Fire Tenders Available at combined building fire
control room 16. No. of Employees/Personnel (at the time of unloading and
idle time) NA
17. List of PPEs’ As per OISD 156 18. Distance from the other berths 350 m from First Chemical berth
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Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Hazard Identification
CHAPTER – 3
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 3.1 Definitions
The common terms used in Hazard identification & Risk Assessment are elaborated below:
Hazard: Anything (e.g. condition, situation, practice, behavior) that has the potential to
cause harm, including injury, disease, death, environmental, property and equipment
damage. A hazard can be a thing or a situation.
Hazard Identification: This is the process of examining each work area and work task for
the purpose of identifying all the hazards which are “inherent in the job”. Work areas include
but are not limited to machine workshops, laboratories, office areas, agricultural and
horticultural environments, stores and transport, maintenance and grounds, reprographics,
and lecture theatres and teaching spaces. Tasks can include (but may not be limited to) using
screen based equipment, audio and visual equipment, industrial equipment, hazardous
substances and/or teaching/dealing with people, driving a vehicle, dealing with emergency
situations, construction. This process is about finding what could cause harm in work task or
area.
Hazard analysis is the evaluation of tasks and processes for potential loss-causing events.
Losses can be injury (legislative requirements), equipment (insurance implications), or loss
of process time.
“Hazardous Substance” means any substance or preparation, which by reason of its
chemical or physico-chemical properties or handling is liable to cause harm to human
beings, other living creatures, plants, micro-organisms, property or the environment.
“Hazardous Process” is defined as any process or activity in relation to an industry, which
may cause impairment to the health of the persons engaged or connected therewith or which
may result in pollution of the general environment.
Risk: The likelihood, or possibility, that harm (injury, illness, death, damage etc) may occur
from exposure to a hazard.
Risk Assessment: Is defined as the process of assessing the risks associated with each of the
hazards identified so the nature of the risk can be understood. This includes the nature of the
harm that may result from the hazard, the severity of that harm and the likelihood of this
occurring.
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Hazard Identification
Risk Control: Taking actions to eliminate health and safety risks so far as is reasonably
practicable. Where risks cannot be eliminated, then implementation of control measures is
required, to minimize risks so far as is reasonably practicable. A hierarchy of controls has
been developed and is described below to assist in selection of the most appropriate risk
control measure/s.
Monitoring and Review: This involves ongoing monitoring of the hazards identified,
“Emergency” is defined as a situation where the demand exceeds the resources. This
highlights the typical nature of emergency. It will be after experience that enough is not
enough in emergency situations. Situations of this nature are avoidable but it is not possible
to avoid them always.
“Emergency Preparedness” is one of the key activities in the overall Management.
Preparedness, though largely dependent upon the response capability of the persons engaged
in direct action, will require support from others in the organization before, during and after
an emergency.
Responsibilities
Effective risk management requires the commitment to MbPT from managers and Officer as
well as the input and involvement of workers.
It is the responsibility of all managers and supervisors to ensure that this HSE policy is fully
implemented in their area(s) of control and to consult with workers as part of undertaking the
hazard identification, risk assessment and control process. It is the responsibility of workers
to cooperate and comply with HSE policy. This includes providing effective and constructive
information and feedback to aid the risk management process.
Officers have a responsibility to ensure that the areas under their control are complying with
legislative requirements. This includes the Officer understanding the hazards and risks
associated with their operations and ensuring that appropriate resources and processes are in
place to eliminate or minimize these risks.
3.2 Chemical Hazard Management Plan
Hazard management is essentially a problem-solving process aimed at different problems,
gathering information about them and solving them.
The main steps involved in the management plan are:
1. Hazard Identification
2. Risk Assessment
3. Controlling the Risk
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Hazard Identification
4. Monitoring and Review &
5. Emergency Preparedness
3.3 Hazard identification
The first and most important step in any risk management program is to identify the hazards.
Hazard analysis is the most important step in risk analysis because, unless hazards are
identified, consequence and likelihood reduction cannot be implemented.
• Identified potentially hazards that can cause loss of human life/injury, loss of properties
and deteriorate the environment due to loss of containment.
• Identified potential scenarios, which can cause loss of containment and consequent
hazards like fire & explosion and toxic release.
• Identification of representative failure cases;
• Identification of possible initiating events;
• Assess the overall damage potential of the identified hazardous events and the impact
zones from the accidental scenarios;
• Consequence analysis for all the possible events
Hence, all the components of Jetty operations need to be thoroughly examined, to assess
their potential for initiating or propagating an unplanned event/sequence of events, which
can be termed as an accident.
3.4 Classification of Major Hazardous Substance
Hazardous substances may be classified into three main classes namely flammable/explosive
substances, unstable substances and toxic substances.
Flammable substances require interaction with air for their hazard to be realized. Under
certain circumstances, the vapors arising from flammable substances when mixed with air
may be explosive especially in confined spaces. However, if present in sufficient quantity
such clouds may explode in open air also.
Unstable substances are liquids or solids, which may decompose with such violence to give
rise to blast waves.
Finally, toxic substances are dangerous and cause substantial damage to life when released
into the atmosphere. The ratings for a large number of chemicals based on flammability,
reactivity and toxicity are given in NFPA Codes.
3.4.1 Properties of LPG & Chemicals
The hazard failure scenarios of following chemicals were studied in this report.
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Hazard Identification
Table 3.1: Properties of LPG, POL & Chemicals used in the Study
Sr. No.
Product/ Chemical Name
Chemical Formula
Molecular Weight in g/mol
Specific gravity at 25°C
Density in kg/m3
B.P
in ºC
Flash point in ºC
AIT
in ºC
Tc
in ºC
Flammable limits.
Vol.% in air
NFPA Classification and
Hazard Rating
LEL UEL N(H) N(F) N(R)
LPG
1. LPG [C3H8(60%) +C4H10 (40%)]
44.09 0.51-0.58 510 >-40
-104.4
(CC)
470-550 -96.7 1.9 9.5 1 4 0
POL
2. MS BS IV Mixture of HC (C5-C12) 150-250 0.69-
0.77 690-770
30-180 -45 257 280 1.3 7.6 1 3 0
3. HSD BS IV Mixture of HC (C13 - C18)
150-250 0.86-0.90
860-890
215-376 >35 225 447 0.6 6.0 1 2 0
4. BASE OIL Heavy Paraffinic - - 950-
980 >280 >208 >320 - 1.0 10.0 1 1 0
CHEMICALS
5. METHANOL CH3OH 32.04 0.791 792 64.7 11 464 240 6 36 1 3 0
6. TOLUENE C6H5CH3 92.14 0.86-0.87 867 110.6 4 480 319 1.1 7.1 2 3 0
7. ACETONE C3H6O 58.08 0.786 784 56 -17 465 508 2.0 12.8 1 3 0
8. BUTYL ACETATE C6H12O2 116.16 0.882 882 126 27 370 306 1.7 7.6 2 3 0
9. STYRENE MONOMER C8H8 104.15 0.909 909 145 31 490 373 1.1 6.1 2 3 2
10. ORTHO XYLENE C6H4(CH3)2 106.17 0.880 880 144 17 463 358 0.9 6.7 2 3 0
11.
ETHYL ALCOHOL DEN.
C2H5OH 46.04 0.790 790 78 16.6 363 243 3.3 19.0 2 3 0
12. ISO PROPYL ALCOHOL
CH3-CH(OH)CH3 60.1 0.786 786 82.5 12 425 235.6 2.0 12.0 1 3 0
13. ISO NONYL ALCOHOL C9H20O 144.3 0.833 -
0.839 837 98 94 280 - 0.9 6.0 0 1 0
14. PROPYL HEPTANOL C10H22O 158.3 0.83 830 218.4 100 265 559.9 0.8 5.7 1 1 0
15. DIMETHYL C3H7NO 73.09 0.949 944 156.1 58 473 345 2.2 15.2 2 2 0
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Hazard Identification
FORMAMIDE
* Ref. MSDS of Materials & NFPA Rating
Table – 3.2: Toxicity Level of LPG & Chemicals
Sr. No.
Product/ Chemical Name
State Hazard Involved
Class of chemicals
TLV in
ppm
LD50mg/kg
LC50mg/m3
Odor Threshold
in ppm
IDLH value
in ppm
1. LPG Gas Flammable A 1000
LC50(oral rat)- not listed
Inhalation LC50 Rat 658 mg/L 4 h
5000-20000 2000
2. MS BS IV Liquid Flammable A 300 - - -
3. HSD BS IV Liquid Flammable B 800 L.D50 (Oral-Rat): > 5g/kg
L.C 50: (rat 4hrs) 5g/m3 - -
4. BASE OIL Liquid Flammable C -
Oral LD50 > 15000 mg/kg Rat, Dermal LD50 > 5000 mg/kg Rabbit
- -
5. METHANOL Liquid Flammable A 200
LD50 oral rat 5628 mg/kg; LC50 inhalation rat 64000 ppm/4H; LD50 skin rabbit15800 mg/kg;
- 6000
6. TOLUENE Liquid Flammable A 20
Rat, Oral, LD50: 636 mg/kg
Rat, Inhalation, LC50: >26 700 ppm (1 h); 12.5 mg/L (4 h); 49 g/m3(4 h) Rabbit, Dermal LD50: 8390 mg/kg;
0.16-100 500
7. ACETONE Liquid Flammable A 750
LD50 oral rat-5800 mg/kg, LD50 dermal rabbit-20000 mg/kg, LC50 inhalation rat (mg/l)- 76 mg/l
160 2500
8. BUTYL ACETATE Liquid Flammable B 150 LD50 oral rat-12789
mg/kg, LD50 dermal 0.63-7.4 1700
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Hazard Identification
Sr. No.
Product/ Chemical Name
State Hazard Involved
Class of chemicals
TLV in
ppm
LD50mg/kg
LC50mg/m3
Odor Threshold
in ppm
IDLH value
in ppm
rabbit-14000 mg/kg,
9. STYRENE MONOMER Liquid
Flammable &
Reactive B 20
LD50, Oral rat 5,000 mg/kg, Inhalation LC50, 4 h, Vapor, rat 11.8 mg/l
0.0016 700
10. ORTHO XYLENE Liquid Flammable A 100
Lethal Dose - Inhalation (LCL): 6125 ppm 12 hours [Rat]; 6125 ppm 12 hours [Human] Lethal Dose - Oral: 5000 mg/kg [Rat]
1 7350
11. ETHYL ALCOHOL DEN.
Liquid Flammable A 1000
Oral LD50 = 7060 mg/kg (Rat) Inhalation=20000 ppm/10H (Rat)
80 3000
12. ISO PROPYL ALCOHOL Liquid Flammable A 200
Oral, rat: LD50 = 5000 mg/kg Skin, rabbit: LD50 = 12800 mg/kg, Inhalation, rat: LC50 = 6000 ppm/8H.
40-200 2000
13. ISO NONYL ALCOHOL Liquid Flammable B - Oral, rat: LD50 =
>2.0g/kg - -
14. PROPYL HEPTANOL Liquid Flammable C - - - -
15. DIMETHYL FORMAMIDE Liquid Flammable B 10
LD50 Oral - rat - 2,800 mg/kg, LC50 Inhalation - rat - 4 h - 9 - 15 mg/l, LD50 Dermal - rabbit - 1,500kg/kg
0.47-100 500
* Ref. MSDS of Materials
3.5 Hazards of Equipment/Pipeline Handling Petroleum Products & Chemicals
The hazard of unloading arm/equipment/pipeline handling petroleum products and chemicals
is the potential loss of integrity of the containment with subsequent release of gas/liquid
causing fire. A rare pipeline fracture releases large quantities of hydrocarbons. The product
gets collected on the platform/trestle area/neighbourhood of the pipeline and may lead to a
fire hazard if it gets source of ignition due to lack of proper precautions.
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Hazard Identification
Catastrophic failure of the arm/pipeline is a very rare phenomenon, which may occur due to
floods/earthquake or due to aerial bombardment during war. Corrosion in the pipework may
cause small holes causing release of petroleum liquid. In case of oil spill collected on ground
an oil pool shall be formed. An ignited pool of oil is called as Pool Fire. It creates long
smoky flames, the wind may tilt the flame towards ground causing secondary fires and
damages. Radiation from the flame can be very intense near the fire but falls off rapidly
beyond 3-4 pool diameters. Such fires are very destructive within the Jetty area and near the
source of generation. In case of release of considerable quantity explosion may occur.
In case of formation of small holes on the arm/pipeline pressurized, the liquid may escape in
the form of jet and may catch fire if it gets an ignition source. Damage due to heat radiation
from such jets is mostly limited to objects in the path. However, the ignited jet can impinge
on other arms/pipelines causing domino effect.
3.6 Dow Fire and Explosion Index
The Fire and Explosion Index (F & EI) calculation is a tool to help determine the areas of
greatest loss potential in a particular process. It also enables one to predict the physical
damage that would occur in the event of an incident.
The Material Factor (MF) is the basic starting value in the computation of the F&EI and
other risk analysis values. The MF is a measure of the intrinsic rate of potential energy
release from fire or explosion produced by combustion or chemical reaction. The MF is
obtained from the flammability and instability rankings according to NFPA 704.
After the appropriate Material Factor has been determined, the next step is to calculate the
Process Unit Hazards Factor (F3), which is the term that is multiplied by the Material Factor
to obtain the F&EI.
The numerical value of the Process Unit Hazards Factor is determined by first determining
the General Process Hazards Factor and Special Process Hazards Factor listed on the F&EI
form. Each item which contributes to the Process Hazards Factors contributes to the
development or escalation of an incident that could cause a fire or an explosion.
The degree of hazard potential is identified based on the numerical value of F&EI as per the
criteria given below:
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Hazard Identification
Table 3.3: Degree of hazard potential of F & EI
S. No. Range Degree
1. 0 - 60 Light
2. 61 - 96 Moderate
3. 97 - 127 Intermediate
4. 128 - 158 Heavy
5. > 159 Severe
By comparing the indices F&EI, the unit is classified into one of the following three
categories for the purpose (Table-3.4).
Table 3.4: Fire Explosion Index (F & EI)
Category Fire and Explosion Index (F & EI)
I F&EI < 65
II 65 < or = F&EI < 95
III F&EI > or = 95
Certain basic minimum preventive and protective measures are recommended for the three
hazard categories.
Fire and Explosion are the likely hazards, which may occur due to the improper handling of
LPG and other chemicals. Hence, Fire and Explosion index has been calculated for
unloading operations of PirPau Jetty of FCB, SCB and proposed new Berth. Detailed
estimates of FE&TI are given in Table- 3.5.
Table 3.5: Fire Explosion Index for LPG, POL & Chemicals handling
S. No. Material Flow Rate F & El Degree Category Radius of Exposure (ft)
1. LPG 400 MT/hr 97 Intermediate III 81 2. POL (MS) 450 kL/hr 74 Moderate II 62 3. Acetone (Chem.) 450 kL/hr 46 Light I 39 4. Methanol (Chem.) 450 kL/hr 74 Moderate II 62
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CHAPTER – 4
RISK ASSESSMENT
4.1 Hazard Assessment and Evaluation
Safety of hazard prone section is studied using Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA). PHA is
a part of the US Military Standard System Safety Program requirements. The main purpose
of this analysis is for an early recognition of hazards, thus saving time and cost, which could
result from major plant redesigns, if hazards are discovered at a later stage. It is generally
applied during concept or early development phase of a process plant and can be very useful
in site selection. PHA is a precursor to further hazard analysis and is intended for use only in
the preliminary phase of plant development for cases where past experience provides little or
no insight into any potential safety problems, e.g. a plant with a new process. The PHA
focuses on the hazardous materials and major plant elements since few details on the plant
design are available and there is likely not to be any information available on procedures.
The PHA is sometimes considered to be a review where energy can be released in an
uncontrolled manner. The PHA consists of formulating a list of hazards related to:
● Pipeline / equipments;
● Interface among system components;
● Operative environment;
● Operations (tests, maintenance, etc.);
● Facility; and
● Safety equipment
The results include recommendations to reduce or eliminate hazards in the subsequent design
phase. The PHA is followed by evaluation of MCA and Consequence Analysis.
4.2 Maximum Credible Accident Analysis (MCA) Approach
4.2.1 Introduction
A Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) can be characterized, as an accident with a
maximum damage potential, which is still believed to be probable.
MCA analysis does not include quantification of the probability of occurrence of an
accident. Moreover, since it is not possible to indicate exactly a level of probability that is
still believed to be credible, the selection of MCA is somewhat arbitrary. In practice, the
selection of accident scenarios representative for a MCA-Analysis is done on the basis of
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engineering judgment and expertise in the field of risk analysis studies, especially accident
analysis.
Major hazards posed by flammable storage can be identified taking recourse to MCA
analysis. MCA analysis encompasses certain techniques to identify the hazards and calculate
the consequent effects in terms of damage distances of heat radiation, toxic releases, vapor
cloud explosion etc. A host of probable or potential accidents of the major units in the
complex arising due to use, storage and handling of the hazardous materials are examined to
establish their credibility. Depending upon the effective hazardous attributes and their impact
on the event, the maximum effect on the surrounding environment and the respective
damage caused can be assessed.
As an initial step in this study, a selection has been made of the processing and storage units
and activities, which are believed to represent the highest level of risk for the surroundings in
terms of damage distances. For this selection, the following factors have been taken into
account:
• Type of compound viz. flammable or toxic;
• Quantity of material present in a unit or involved in an activity; and
• Process or storage conditions such as temperature, pressure, flow, mixing and presence of
incompatible materials.
In addition to be above factors, the location of Jetty operations with respect to adjacent
berths is taken into consideration to account for the potential escalation of an accident. This
phenomenon is known as the Domino Effect. The units and activities, which have been
selected on the basis of the above factors, are summarized; accident scenarios are established
in hazard identification studies, while effect and damage calculations are carried out in
MCAA Studies.
4.2.2 Common Causes of Accidents
Based on the analysis of past accident information, common causes of accidents are
identified as:
• Poor housekeeping
• Poor maintenance
• Improper use of tools, equipment, facilities
• Unsafe or defective equipment facilities
• Lack of proper procedures
• Improvising unsafe procedures
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• Failure to follow prescribed procedures
• Jobs not understood
• Lack of awareness of hazards involved
• Lack of proper tools, equipment, facilities
• Lack of guides and safety devices
• Lack of protective equipment and clothing
4.3 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
4.3.1 Intro
The products mainly poses fire hazard due to unwanted and accidental release. However, due
safeguard has been taken in design, installation and operation of the system to prevent any
unwanted release of hydrocarbons from their containment/pipework. In the event of release
of hydrocarbons from their containment, there is a risk of fire. The chance of explosion is
less. This section deals with various failure cases leading to various hazard scenarios,
analysis of failure modes and consequence analysis.
Consequence analysis is basically a quantitative study of hazard due to various failure
scenarios to determine the possible magnitude of damage effects and to determine the
distances up-to which the damage may be affected. The reason and purpose for consequence
analysis are manifolds like -
• Computation of risk.
• Aid better layout.
• Evaluate damage and protective measures necessary for saving properties & human lives.
• Ascertain damage potential to public and evolve protective measures.
• Formulate safe design criteria and protection system.
• Formulate effective Disaster Management Plan.
The results of consequences analysis are useful for getting information about all known and
unknown effects that are of importance when failure scenarios occur and to get information
about how to deal with possible credible events. It also gives the authorities, workers, district
authorities and the public living in the area an understanding of the hazard potential and
remedial measures to be taken.
4.3.2 Consequence Analysis Modeling
Modelling refers to the calculation or estimation of numerical values (or graphical
representations of these) that describe the credible physical outcomes of loss of containment
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scenarios involving flammable, explosive and toxic materials with respect to their potential
impact on people, assets, or safety functions.
Computer models are used to predict the physical behavior of hazardous incidents. The
model uses below mentioned techniques to assess the consequences of identified scenarios:
• Modeling of discharge rates when holes develop in process equipment/pipe work.
• Modeling of the size & shape of the flammable/toxic gas clouds from releases in the
atmosphere.
• Modeling of the flame and radiation field of the releases that are ignited and burn as jet
fire, pool fire and flash fire.
• Modeling of the explosion fields of releases which are ignited away from the point of
release
• Modeling of Toxic dispersion in downwind.
The different consequences (Flash fire, pool fire, jet fire and Explosion effects) of loss of
containment accidents depend on the sequence of events & properties of material released
leading to the either toxic vapor dispersion, fire or explosion or both.
4.3.3 Modeling Software
A site-specific consequence analysis of the accidental release scenarios was conducted using
the commercially available Process Hazards Analysis Software Tool (PHAST) consequence
modeling software, v8.4 of M/S DNV, is responsible for the development of a number of
established, world leading, hazard and risk modeling software tools. These tools include the
consequence modeling package PHAST, the risk analysis tools SAFETI.
4.3.4 Discharge Rate
The initial rate of release through a leak depends mainly on the pressure inside the
equipment, size of the hole and phase of the release (liquid, gas or two-phase). The release
rate decreases with time as the equipment depressurizes. This reduction depends mainly on
the inventory and the action taken to isolate the leak and blow-down the equipment.
4.3.5 Dispersion Modeling
The PHAST Unified Dispersion Model (UDM) was used to assess the impacts of the
releases, the downwind dispersion distance, the concentration profile and the width of
flammable/toxic releases.
Dispersion models use an average time to calculate the maximum concentration and the
plume width. The values used in this QRA are detailed below and consistent with the
PHAST default parameters. A short averaging time is usually used for flammable gas
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dispersion effects since the peak concentration is more important, and a longer averaging
time is usually used for toxic dispersion effects since the long-term concentration is more
important.
• All flammable dispersion models used an averaging time of 18.75 seconds (PHAST
default)
Releases of gas into the open air form clouds whose dispersion is governed by the wind, by
turbulence around the site, the density of the gas and initial momentum of the release. In case
of flammable materials the sizes of these gas clouds above their Lower Flammable Limit
(LFL) are important in determining whether the release will ignite. In this study, the results
of dispersion modelling for flammable materials are presented as LFL quantity.
4.3.6 The Consequence Event Tree
Each accidental release scenario in the QRA involves the potential for ignition or no ignition.
If ignited, a range of fire and/or explosion consequences could occur. For each release
modelled in the QRA, a range of potential outcomes is assessed, each with its own
probability of occurrence, and include:
• Jet Fire
• Pool Fire
The ultimate consequence resulting from an accidental release is determined by the
following factors:
• The duration of the release (continuous or instantaneous);
• The phase after release (vapor/liquid/two-phase);
• The time of ignition (immediate or delayed); and,
• The level of obstruction in the area of the vapor cloud.
The generalized event tree shown in Figure 4.1, illustrates the potential outcomes of an
accidental release of a flammable material.
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Figure 4.1: Generalized Event Tree for Consequences in the Safety Program
4.3.7 Pool Fires, Jet Fires, Toxic Release
Pool Fire: The fire hazards examined in this study include pool fires and jet fires, where
impacts to people are the result of thermal radiation generated by the fire. Thermal radiation
emanates from the visible portions of the flame. The actual radiation received by a person
depends on the distance from the flame surface, location (indoors vs. outdoors), building
construction as well as other atmospheric conditions, with sheltering reducing the magnitude
of the thermal radiation hazard.
Upon ignition, a spilled flammable liquid will burn in the form of a large turbulent diffusion
flame. The size of the flame will depend on the spill surface and the thermo-chemical
properties of the hazardous material. If the spill is confined, the confined area will determine
the pool size which will then dictate the size of the fire. If the spill is unconfined, the pool
dimensions will depend on the amount of liquid released (liquid volume), burning rate of the
liquid and the terrain surface characteristics.
A Jet fire can result when the material released is a gas or high-pressure liquid that ignites
immediately. The size of the jet flame depends primarily on the release rate of the gas or
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high pressure liquid. The thermo-chemical properties of the substance are also taken into
consideration in determining the size of the jet flame.
Toxic Hazards
The extent of the toxic hazard ranges will be product released from the failure scenarios of
Dimethyl Formamide &Toluene. Toxic impacts will depend on the combination of the
exposure duration and the toxic concentration.
The aim of the toxic risk study is to determine whether the operators in the jetty, people
occupied control room building and the public are likely to be affected by toxic substances.
Toxic gas cloud e.g. Dimethyl Formamide, Toluene & Styrene was undertaken to the
Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health concentration (IDLH) limit to determine the
extent of the toxic hazard created as the result of loss of containment of a toxic substance.
4.3.8 Release Quantity
Release Quantity or release rate refers to the quantity of (or the rate at which) a hazardous
chemical is released in the event of an accident. For gaseous and high-vapor-pressure liquid
releases, the vapor release rate will be the same as the discharge rate. However, for non-
flashing liquids, the vapor release rate is governed by the evaporation rate of the liquid and
will always be less than the liquid release rate. Release rate in our study is mentioned for
every failure scenario as kg/s.
4.3.9 Duration of Release
The dispersion model used in this study is encoded in PHAST and takes into account the
actual duration of release. The discharge duration in this study is taken as 3 minutes for
continuous release scenarios as it is considered that it would take jetty personnel about 3
minutes to detect and isolate the leak.
4.3.10 Damage Criteria
The damage effects are different for different types of failure scenarios. The physical effects
of ignition of hydrocarbon vapors, e.g. blast wave, thermal radiation due to release of
hydrocarbons from the containment are discussed below:
i. Hydrocarbon vapors released accidentally will normally spread out in the direction of the
wind. If it comes into contact with an ignition source before being dispersed below the
Lower Flammability Limit (LFL), a flash fire is likely to occur and the flame may travel
back to the source of leak. Any person caught in the flash fire is likely to suffer from
severe burn injury. Therefore, in consequence analysis, the distance to LFL value is
usually taken to indicate the area, which may be affected by flash fires. Any other
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combustible material within the flash fire is likely to catch fire and may cause secondary
fires. In the area close to the source of leakage of hydrocarbon there is a possibility of
Oxygen depletion since the vapors are heavier than air. A minimum of 19.5% Oxygen in
air is considered essential for human lives.
ii. Thermal radiation due to pool fire, jet flame may cause various degrees of burn on human
bodies. Also its effects on inanimate objects like equipment, piping, building and other
objects need to be evaluated. The damage effects with respect to thermal radiation
intensity are elaborated in Table-4.1.
In case of transient fires total thermal dose level (total incident energy) is used to estimate threshold damage level.
Thermal Radiation
Damage due to various levels of incident thermal radiation level has been given in Table 4.1.
Table-4.1: Damage Due to Incident Thermal Radiation Intensity
Incident Thermal Radiation Intensity,
kW/m2 Type of damage
Casualty Probability
37.5 Sufficient to cause damage to process
equipment 1.00
32 Maximum allowable radiation intensity on thermally protected and pressurized storage tank
1.00
12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, melting of plastic tubing etc.
0.50
8 Maximum allowable radiation intensity on thermally unprotected and pressurized storage tanks
--
4.5 1st degree burn 0.00 1.6 Will cause no discomfort to long exposure 0.00 0.7 Equivalent to solar radiation 0.00
The hazard distances to the 37.5 kW/m2, 12.5 kW/m2and 4.5 kW/m2 radiation levels are
selected based on their effect on population; buildings and equipment were modeled using
PHAST/SAFETI.
4.3.11 Dispersion and Stability Class
In calculation of effects due to release of hydrocarbons dispersion of vapor plays an
important role as indicated earlier. The factors which govern dispersion are mainly Wind
Velocity, Stability Class, Temperature as well as surface roughness.
Pasquill has defined six stability classes ranging from A to F
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Table 4.2: Pasquill stability classes
S. No. Stability Class Description 1. A Extremely unstable 2. B Moderately unstable 3. C Slightly unstable 4. D Neutral 5. E Slightly Stable 6. F Highly stable
Selected Wind velocity (2, 3, 5 m/s) and Stability class (B, D, F) for the study are 2B, 3D, 5D, 2F.
4.3.12 Modes of Failure
There are various potential sources of large/small leakages in any installation. The leakages
may be in the form of gasket failure in a flanged joint, snapping of small diameter pipeline,
leakages due to corrosion, weld failure, leakages due to wrong opening of valves & blinds,
pipe bursting due to overpressure and any other sources of leakage.
4.3.13 Selected Failure Cases
A list of failure cases was prepared based on process knowledge, engineering judgment,
experience, past incidents associated with such facilities and considering the general
mechanisms for loss of containment. The cases have been identified for the consequence
analysis is based on the following:
• Cases with high chance of occurrence but having low consequence:
Example of such failure cases includes two-bolt gasket leak for flanges, seal failure for
pumps, welding joints failure, corrosion failure, sample connection failure, instrument
tapping failure etc.
• Cases with low chance of occurrence but having high consequence.
Example of such failure cases includes full bore rupture of arm/lines etc.
This approach ensures at least one representative case of all possible types of accidental
failure events, is considered for the consequence analysis. Moreover, the list below includes
at least one accidental case comprising of release of different sorts of highly hazardous
materials handled in the Pirpau Jetty. Although the list does not give complete failure
incidents considering all equipment’s, units, but the consequence of a similar incident
considered in the list below could be used to foresee the consequence of that particular
accident.
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The failure scenarios selected are indicated in Table –4.3.
Table–4.3: List of Failure Cases with input data
S. No. Failure Scenarios Likely Consequences Credible/ Non-Credible
Input Data
Existing First Chemical/POL Birth
1.
LPG Marine 10” Unloading Arm No.1 –
a. Leak of hole dia. 5mm, 25mm & 50mm
b. 10” Arm rupture
Jet fire - Thermal radiation
Partially Credible
Material = LPG Flow rate =400MT/hr P = 7.65 kg/cm2 T = - 40°C
2.
LPG Marine 12” Unloading Arm No.2 –
a. Leak of hole dia. 5mm, 25mm & 50mm
b. 12” Arm rupture
Jet fire - Thermal radiation
Partially Credible
Material = LPG Flow rate =400MT/hr P = 7.65 kg/cm2 T = - 40°C
3.
POL and Chemicals Marine 10” Unloading Arm No. 3 –
a. Leak of hole dia. 5mm, 25mm & 50mm
b. 10” Arm rupture
Jet fire/Pool fire - Thermal radiation
Partially Credible
Material = Chemicals Flow rate =450KL/hr P = 7.65 kg/cm2 T = Ambient
4.
LPG 10” Trestle Pipeline No.1 – a. Leak of hole dia. 5mm,
25mm & 50mm b. 10” Arm rupture
Jet fire - Thermal radiation
Partially Credible
Material = LPG Flow rate =400MT/hr P = 10.20 kg/cm2 T = - 40°C
5.
LPG 12” Trestle Pipeline No.2 – a. Leak of hole dia. 5mm,
25mm & 50mm b. 12” Arm rupture
Jet fire - Thermal radiation
Partially Credible
Material = LPG Flow rate =400MT/hr P = 10.20 kg/cm2 T = - 40°C
6.
POL and Chemicals 10” Trestle Pipeline No. 3 –
a. Leak of hole dia. 5mm, 25mm & 50mm
b. 10” Arm rupture
Jet fire/Pool fire - Thermal radiation
Partially Credible
Material = Chemicals Flow rate =450kL/hr P = 7.65 kg/cm2 T = Ambient
Existing Second Chemical/POL Birth
7.
LPG Marine 10” Unloading Arm No.1 –
a. Leak of hole dia. 5mm, 25mm & 50mm
b. 10” Arm rupture
Jet fire - Thermal radiation
Partially Credible
Material = LPG Flow rate =400MT/hr P = 7.65 kg/cm2 T = - 40°C
8.
LPG Marine 12” Unloading Arm No.2 –
a. Leak of hole dia. 5mm, 25mm & 50mm
b. 12” Arm rupture
Jet fire - Thermal radiation
Partially Credible
Material = LPG Flow rate =400MT/hr P = 7.65 kg/cm2 T = - 40°C
9. POL and Chemicals Marine 10” Unloading Arm No. 3 –
a. Leak of hole dia. 5mm,
Jet fire/Pool fire - Thermal radiation
Partially Credible
Material = Chemicals Flow rate =450kL/hr P = 7.65 kg/cm2
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S. No. Failure Scenarios Likely Consequences Credible/ Non-Credible
Input Data
25mm & 50mm b. 10” Arm rupture
T = Ambient
10.
LPG 10” Trestle Pipeline No.1 – a. Leak of hole dia. 5mm,
25mm & 50mm b. 10” Arm rupture
Jet fire- Thermal radiation
Partially Credible
Material = LPG Flow rate =400MT/hr P = 10.20 kg/cm2 T = - 40°C
11.
LPG 12” Trestle Pipeline No.2 – a. Leak of hole dia. 5mm,
25mm & 50mm b. 12” Arm rupture
Jet fire- Thermal radiation
Partially Credible
Material = LPG Flow rate =400MT/hr P = 10.20 kg/cm2 T = - 40°C
12.
POL and Chemicals 10” Trestle Pipeline No. 3 –
a. Leak of hole dia. 5mm, 25mm & 50mm
b. 10” Arm rupture
Jet fire/Pool fire - Thermal radiation
Partially Credible
Material = Chemicals Flow rate =450kL/hr P = 7.65 kg/cm2 T = Ambient
Proposed New Chemical/POL Birth
13.
LPG Marine 12” Unloading Arm – a. Leak of hole dia. 5mm,
25mm & 50mm b. Arm rupture
Jet fire - Thermal radiation
Partially Credible
Material = LPG Flow rate =400MT/hr P = 7.65 kg/cm2 T = - 40°C
14.
POL Marine 8” Unloading Arm – a. Leak of hole dia. 5mm,
25mm & 50mm b. Arm rupture
Jet fire - Thermal radiation
Partially Credible
Material = POL Flow rate =400 kL/hr P = 7.65 kg/cm2 T = - 40°C
15.
Chemicals Marine 8” Unloading Arm –
a. Leak of hole dia. 5mm, 25mm & 50mm
b. Arm rupture
Jet fire/Pool fire - Thermal radiation
Partially Credible
Material = Chemicals Flow rate =450kL/hr P = 7.65 kg/cm2 T = Ambient
16.
LPG 12” Trestle Pipeline No.1/2 – a. Leak of hole dia. 5mm,
25mm & 50mm b. 10” Arm rupture
Jet fire - Thermal radiation
Partially Credible
Material = LPG Flow rate =450MT/hr P = 10.20 kg/cm2 T = - 40°C
17.
POLs 8” Trestle Pipeline No. 3/4/5/8 –
a. Leak of hole dia. 5mm, 25mm & 50mm
b. 10” Arm rupture
Jet fire/Pool fire - Thermal radiation
Partially Credible
Material = Chemicals Flow rate =450kL/hr P = 7.65 kg/cm2 T = Ambient
18.
Chemicals 8” Trestle Pipeline No. 3/4/5/8 –
a. Leak of hole dia. 5mm, 25mm & 50mm
b. 10” Arm rupture
Jet fire/Pool fire - Thermal radiation
Partially Credible
Material = Chemicals Flow rate =450kL/hr P = 7.65 kg/cm2 T = Ambient
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4.4 Consequence Analysis for Selected Failure Cases
Consequence Analysis of the selected failure cases have been completed to evaluate and
identify possible consequences as well as to include suitable measures to prevent and
mitigate such failure events.
4.4.1 Jet Fire Results
The pipework between the marine unloading arm line or trestle pipeline to loading area may
fail and cause leak through the small openings of hole dia. 5mm, 25mm& 50mm. The
material may come out in the form of jet. In case of any ignition source, there is likelihood of
formation of jet fire. Hazard distances due to thermal radiation in case of leakage in
pipework have been considered and presented below.
In the event of the spill, if liquid does not catch fire, simultaneous evaporation and spreading
on the ground without any physical obstruction of the spill shall occur. The evaporating
cloud may disperse safely to LFL value, if it does not come in contact with any ignition
source between its flammability limits. The hazard distance to LFL value of has been
calculated for wind speed of 2B, 3D&5D (Day condition) and 2F (Night condition).
Table – 4.4: Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation Due To Jet Fire/Pool Fire
S. No. Failure case Scenario Weather
Category
Flame Length
(m)
Distance (m) downwind to Intensity level LFL
4.5 kW/m2
12.5 kW/m2
37.5 kW/m2 m
Existing First Chemical/POL Birth
1.
LPG Marine 10” Unloading Arm No.1 – Leak of hole dia. & arm rupture
5mm RR: 0.36 kg/s
2/F 11 19 14 12 10 2/B 11 19 14 12 n/a 3/D 10 18 13 11 n/a 5/D 8 17 13 10 n/a
25mm RR: 9.14 kg/s
2/F 42 79 60 48 109 2/B 42 79 60 47 101 3/D 38 75 57 44 94 5/D 33 71 53 41 75
50mm RR: 36.5 kg/s
2/F 75 147 112 88 102 2/B 75 146 111 88 167 3/D 67 140 105 82 164 5/D 58 133 98 75 150
Rupture
2/F 59 105 80 63 55 2/B 63 112 86 68 64 3/D 58 109 83 66 60 5/D 53 108 82 66 58
2. LPG Marine 12” Unloading
5mm RR: 0.37 kg/s
2/F 11 19 14 12 10 2/B 11 19 14 12 n/a 3/D 10 18 13 11 n/a
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Risk Assessment
Arm No.2 – Leak of hole dia. & arm rupture
5/D 8 17 13 10 n/a
25mm RR: 9.14 kg/s
2/F 42 79 60 48 119 2/B 42 79 60 47 101 3/D 38 75 57 44 94 5/D 33 71 53 41 75
50mm RR: 36.6 kg/s
2/F 75 147 112 88 122 2/B 75 146 111 88 187 3/D 67 140 105 82 178 5/D 58 133 98 75 153
Rupture
2/F 66 120 91 72 65 2/B 71 127 97 77 74 3/D 65 124 95 75 69 5/D 61 126 95 76 65
3. POL and Chemicals Marine 10” Unloading Arm No.3 – Leak of hole dia. & arm rupture
3.a MS BS IV–
5mm RR: 0.39kg/s
2/F 10 19 14 11 12 2/B 10 19 14 11 n/a 3/D 9 18 13 10 n/a 5/D 8 17 12 10 n/a
25mm RR: 9.7 kg/s
2/F 39 79 60 47 115 2/B 39 79 60 47 106 3/D 35 76 56 44 98 5/D 30 72 53 40 78
50mm RR: 38.9 kg/s
2/F 70 148 111 87 88 2/B 70 147 110 87 164 3/D 63 141 104 81 165 5/D 54 135 98 75 155
Rupture
2/F 31 56 43 34 30 2/B 34 61 47 37 40 3/D 31 59 45 36 38 5/D 29 58 44 35 33
3.b Methanol
5mm RR: 0.46kg/s
2/F 17 20 18 n/a n/a 2/B 17 20 18 n/a n/a 3/D 15 18 16 n/a n/a 5/D 13 17 14 n/a n/a
25mm RR: 11.6 kg/s
2/F 60 76 63 n/a 22 2/B 66 82 68 n/a 23 3/D 59 77 61 n/a 24 5/D 51 71 55 n/a 25
50mm RR: 46.4 kg/s
2/F 89 114 92 n/a 34 2/B 99 127 102 n/a 34 3/D 90 121 95 n/a 35 5/D 80 115 88 83 36
Rupture
2/F 31 35 33 n/a 12 2/B 36 40 37 n/a 15 3/D 33 39 35 n/a 15 5/D 31 39 32 n/a 12
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Risk Assessment
3.c Toluene
5mm RR: 0.45 kg/s
2/F 11 20 15 12 n/a 2/B 11 20 15 12 n/a 3/D 10 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 9 18 13 10 n/a
25mm RR: 11.23 kg/s
2/F 36 70 53 42 29 2/B 39 76 58 45 30 3/D 36 75 56 43 32 5/D 33 74 54 42 34
50mm RR: 44.9 kg/s
2/F 54 107 81 63 42 2/B 59 117 88 69 49 3/D 54 115 85 66 53 5/D 48 112 82 63 58
Rupture
2/F 15 25 19 16 13 2/B 18 30 23 19 17 3/D 17 29 23 18 16 5/D 16 29 23 18 13
3.d Acetone
5mm RR: 0.45 kg/s
2/F 13 19 15 14 n/a 2/B 13 19 15 14 n/a 3/D 11 18 14 13 n/a 5/D 10 17 13 11 n/a
25mm RR: 11.37 kg/s
2/F 49 82 63 51 55 2/B 49 81 63 51 64 3/D 44 77 59 46 67 5/D 38 72 54 42 61
50mm RR: 45.5 kg/s
2/F 88 151 117 93 60 2/B 88 150 116 93 92 3/D 79 143 109 86 99 5/D 68 135 101 78 101
Rupture
2/F 41 61 48 43 26 2/B 45 67 52 47 36 3/D 41 65 51 43 35 5/D 38 63 50 40 28
3.e O-xylene
5mm RR: 0.31 kg/s
2/F 8 15 11 9 n/a 2/B 9 17 13 10 n/a 3/D 9 17 13 10 n/a 5/D 8 17 13 10 n/a
25mm RR: 7.87 kg/s
2/F 23 44 34 26 23 2/B 26 49 37 29 19 3/D 23 48 36 28 20 5/D 21 48 35 27 20
50mm RR: 13.6 kg/s
2/F 34 67 51 40 34 2/B 38 74 56 44 28 3/D 34 72 54 42 29 5/D 30 70 51 39 29
Rupture 2/F 9 14 11 10 5 2/B 10 17 13 11 5 3/D 10 16 13 11 5
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Risk Assessment
5/D 9 16 13 10 3
3.f Ethyl Alcohol
5mm RR: 0.44 kg/s
2/F 14 20 16 n/a n/a 2/B 14 20 16 n/a n/a 3/D 13 19 14 n/a n/a 5/D 11 17 13 12 n/a
25mm RR: 11.03 kg/s
2/F 49 72 56 51 26 2/B 55 81 63 57 25 3/D 50 78 60 52 26 5/D 43 72 55 45 27
50mm RR: 44.13 kg/s
2/F 71 107 84 73 38 2/B 80 120 94 82 36 3/D 73 116 90 75 37 5/D 65 112 85 67 38
Rupture
2/F 21 28 23 n/a 11 2/B 25 32 26 n/a 14 3/D 23 32 25 n/a 14 5/D 22 32 25 23 11
3.g Iso Propyl Alcohol
5mm RR: 0.43 kg/s
2/F 13 20 15 14 n/a 2/B 13 20 15 14 n/a 3/D 11 19 14 13 n/a 5/D 10 17 13 11 n/a
25mm RR: 10.85 kg/s
2/F 44 73 57 46 30 2/B 49 82 64 51 29 3/D 44 78 59 47 32 5/D 38 73 55 43 34
50mm RR: 43.39 kg/s
2/F 64 108 84 67 41 2/B 72 123 95 76 43 3/D 66 120 92 72 46 5/D 59 116 87 68 50
Rupture
2/F 18 26 20 n/a 13 2/B 22 31 24 23 16 3/D 20 30 24 21 15 5/D 19 30 24 20 12
4.
LPG 10” Trestle Pipeline No.1 – Leak of hole dia. & rupture
5mm RR: 0.42 kg/s
2/F 11 20 15 12 n/a 2/B 11 20 15 12 n/a 3/D 10 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 9 18 13 10 n/a
25mm RR: 10.51kg/s
2/F 44 83 64 50 137 2/B 44 83 63 50 107 3/D 39 79 60 46 100 5/D 34 75 55 43 80
50mm RR: 42.1 kg/s
2/F 79 155 118 93 319 2/B 79 154 117 93 232 3/D 70 147 110 86 209 5/D 61 140 103 79 167
Rupture 2/F 122 241 181 140 260 2/B 125 243 183 142 265
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Risk Assessment
3/D 112 234 174 135 233 5/D 100 227 168 130 178
5.
LPG 12” Trestle Pipeline No.2 – Leak of hole dia. & rupture
5mm RR: 0.42 kg/s
2/F 11 20 15 12 n/a 2/B 11 20 15 12 n/a 3/D 10 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 9 18 13 10 n/a
25mm RR: 10.54kg/s
2/F 44 83 64 50 137 2/B 44 83 63 50 107 3/D 39 79 60 46 100 5/D 34 75 56 43 81
50mm RR: 42.2 kg/s
2/F 79 155 118 93 335 2/B 79 154 117 93 232 3/D 70 148 110 86 209 5/D 61 140 103 79 167
Rupture
2/F 137 272 204 158 244 2/B 139 274 206 160 281 3/D 125 263 196 152 229 5/D 112 255 189 146 189
6. POL and Chemicals 10” Trestle Pipeline No. 3 – Leak of hole dia. & rupture
6.a MS BS IV
5mm RR: 0.47kg/s
2/F 11 20 15 12 14 2/B 11 20 15 12 n/a 3/D 10 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 8 18 13 10 n/a
25mm RR: 11.8 kg/s
2/F 42 86 65 51 137 2/B 42 85 64 51 117 3/D 37 82 61 47 108 5/D 33 78 57 44 88
50mm RR: 47.1 kg/s
2/F 75 160 120 94 152 2/B 75 158 119 94 183 3/D 67 153 113 88 179 5/D 58 146 106 81 152
Rupture
2/F 11 18 14 12 31 2/B 11 19 14 12 9 3/D 10 19 14 11 9 5/D 10 20 15 11 9
6.b Methanol
5mm RR: 0.56kg/s
2/F 18 21 19 n/a n/a 2/B 18 21 19 n/a n/a 3/D 16 20 18 n/a n/a 5/D 14 18 15 n/a n/a
25mm RR: 13.9 kg/s
2/F 50 62 52 n/a 22 2/B 59 74 61 n/a 25 3/D 55 71 57 n/a 25 5/D 50 70 54 n/a 26
50mm RR: 55.9 kg/s
2/F 61 77 63 n/a 35 2/B 75 95 77 n/a 36 3/D 69 92 72 n/a 36 5/D 63 88 68 n/a 38
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Risk Assessment
Rupture
2/F 8 9 n/a n/a 10 2/B 8 9 n/a n/a 8 3/D 7 8 n/a n/a 8 5/D 7 8 8 n/a 8
6.c Toluene
5mm RR: 0.54kg/s
2/F 11 20 16 12 n/a 2/B 12 21 16 13 n/a 3/D 11 20 15 12 n/a 5/D 9 19 14 11 n/a
25mm RR: 13.5 kg/s
2/F 31 60 45 36 26 2/B 35 67 51 40 22 3/D 32 66 50 39 23 5/D 29 66 49 37 24
50mm RR: 54.0 kg/s
2/F 41 80 60 48 38 2/B 47 93 70 55 32 3/D 44 92 69 54 33 5/D 39 91 67 51 35
Rupture
2/F 4 7 5 n/a 11 2/B 4 7 5 n/a 8 3/D 4 7 5 n/a 8 5/D 4 7 5 4 8
6.d Acetone
5mm RR: 0.55kg/s
2/F 14 21 16 15 n/a 2/B 14 21 16 15 n/a 3/D 12 20 15 13 n/a 5/D 11 19 14 12 n/a
25mm RR: 13.9 kg/s
2/F 53 89 69 55 56 2/B 53 88 68 55 57 3/D 47 84 64 50 62 5/D 41 79 59 46 59
50mm RR: 55.5 kg/s
2/F 80 137 106 85 58 2/B 92 158 123 98 71 3/D 84 155 118 93 78 5/D 73 146 110 85 89
Rupture
2/F 13 19 14 n/a 11 2/B 14 20 15 n/a 8 3/D 13 19 14 14 8 5/D 12 20 15 13 8
6.e Orthoxylene
5mm RR: 0.54 kg/s
2/F 7 13 10 8 n/a 2/B 8 14 11 9 n/a 3/D 7 14 11 8 n/a 5/D 7 15 11 9 n/a
25mm RR: 13.6 kg/s
2/F 18 35 26 21 23 2/B 21 40 31 24 21 3/D 20 40 30 23 21 5/D 18 41 30 23 21
50mm RR: 54.4
2/F 23 43 33 26 35 2/B 27 53 40 31 30 3/D 25 53 39 31 30
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Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Risk Assessment
kg/s 5/D 23 53 39 30 31
Rupture
2/F 2 2 n/a n/a 11 2/B 2 2 n/a n/a 8 3/D 2 2 n/a n/a 8 5/D 2 2 n/a n/a 8
6.f Ethyl Alcohol
5mm RR: 0.53kg/s
2/F 15 21 17 n/a n/a 2/B 15 21 17 n/a n/a 3/D 14 20 15 15 n/a 5/D 12 19 14 13 n/a
25mm RR: 13.2 kg/s
2/F 39 57 45 41 25 2/B 47 69 54 49 25 3/D 44 68 53 46 26 5/D 40 68 52 42 27
50mm RR: 52.9 kg/s
2/F 46 69 54 48 37 2/B 58 86 67 60 35 3/D 54 84 65 56 36 5/D 49 82 63 51 37
Rupture
2/F 5 5 5 n/a 11 2/B 5 6 5 n/a 8 3/D 4 5 4 n/a 8 5/D 4 6 4 n/a 8
6.g Iso Propyl Alcohol
5mm RR: 0.52kg/s
2/F 14 21 16 15 n/a 2/B 14 21 16 15 n/a 3/D 12 20 15 13 n/a 5/D 11 19 14 12 n/a
25mm RR: 13.11 kg/s
2/F 36 58 45 37 28 2/B 43 71 55 45 27 3/D 40 71 54 42 28 5/D 37 71 53 41 30
50mm RR: 52.5 kg/s
2/F 42 69 54 44 40 2/B 53 89 69 55 36 3/D 49 88 67 53 37 5/D 45 86 65 50 39
Rupture
2/F 3 4 n/a n/a 11 2/B 3 4 n/a n/a 8 3/D 3 4 n/a n/a 8 5/D 3 4 3 n/a 8
Existing Second Chemical/POL Birth
7.
LPG Marine 10” Unloading Arm No.1 – Leak of hole dia. & arm rupture
5mm RR: 0.36 kg/s
2/F 11 19 14 12 10 2/B 11 19 14 12 n/a 3/D 10 18 13 11 n/a 5/D 8 17 13 10 n/a
25mm RR: 9.14 kg/s
2/F 42 79 60 48 109 2/B 42 79 60 47 101 3/D 38 75 57 44 94 5/D 33 71 53 41 75
50mm 2/F 75 147 112 88 102
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Risk Assessment
RR: 36.5 kg/s
2/B 75 146 111 88 167 3/D 67 140 105 82 164 5/D 58 133 98 75 150
Rupture
2/F 59 105 80 63 55 2/B 63 112 86 68 64 3/D 58 109 83 66 60 5/D 53 108 82 66 58
8.
LPG Marine 12” Unloading Arm No.2 – Leak of hole dia. & arm rupture
5mm RR: 0.37 kg/s
2/F 11 19 14 12 10 2/B 11 19 14 12 n/a 3/D 10 18 13 11 n/a 5/D 8 17 13 10 n/a
25mm RR: 9.14 kg/s
2/F 42 79 60 48 119 2/B 42 79 60 47 101 3/D 38 75 57 44 94 5/D 33 71 53 41 75
50mm RR: 36.6 kg/s
2/F 75 147 112 88 122 2/B 75 146 111 88 187 3/D 67 140 105 82 178 5/D 58 133 98 75 153
Rupture
2/F 66 120 91 72 65 2/B 71 127 97 77 74 3/D 65 124 95 75 69 5/D 61 126 95 76 65
9. POL and Chemicals Marine 10” Unloading Arm No.3 –
9.a MS BS IV–
5mm RR: 0.39kg/s
2/F 10 19 14 11 12 2/B 10 19 14 11 n/a 3/D 9 18 13 10 n/a 5/D 8 17 12 10 n/a
25mm RR: 9.7 kg/s
2/F 39 79 60 47 115 2/B 39 79 60 47 106 3/D 35 76 56 44 98 5/D 30 72 53 40 78
50mm RR: 38.9 kg/s
2/F 70 148 111 87 88 2/B 70 147 110 87 164 3/D 63 141 104 81 165 5/D 54 135 98 75 155
Rupture
2/F 31 56 43 34 30 2/B 34 61 47 37 40 3/D 31 59 45 36 38 5/D 29 58 44 35 33
9.b Methanol
5mm RR: 0.46kg/s
2/F 17 20 18 n/a n/a 2/B 17 20 18 n/a n/a 3/D 15 18 16 n/a n/a 5/D 13 17 14 n/a n/a
25mm RR: 11.6
2/F 60 76 63 n/a 22 2/B 66 82 68 n/a 23
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Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Risk Assessment
kg/s 3/D 59 77 61 n/a 24 5/D 51 71 55 n/a 25
50mm RR: 46.4 kg/s
2/F 89 114 92 n/a 34 2/B 99 127 102 n/a 34 3/D 90 121 95 n/a 35 5/D 80 115 88 83 36
Rupture
2/F 31 35 33 n/a 12 2/B 36 40 37 n/a 15 3/D 33 39 35 n/a 15 5/D 31 39 32 n/a 12
9.c Toluene
5mm RR: 0.45 kg/s
2/F 11 20 15 12 n/a 2/B 11 20 15 12 n/a 3/D 10 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 9 18 13 10 n/a
25mm RR: 11.23 kg/s
2/F 36 70 53 42 29 2/B 39 76 58 45 30 3/D 36 75 56 43 32 5/D 33 74 54 42 34
50mm RR: 44.9 kg/s
2/F 54 107 81 63 42 2/B 59 117 88 69 49 3/D 54 115 85 66 53 5/D 48 112 82 63 58
Rupture
2/F 15 25 19 16 13 2/B 18 30 23 19 17 3/D 17 29 23 18 16 5/D 16 29 23 18 13
9.d Acetone
5mm RR: 0.45 kg/s
2/F 13 19 15 14 n/a 2/B 13 19 15 14 n/a 3/D 11 18 14 13 n/a 5/D 10 17 13 11 n/a
25mm RR: 11.37 kg/s
2/F 49 82 63 51 55 2/B 49 81 63 51 64 3/D 44 77 59 46 67 5/D 38 72 54 42 61
50mm RR: 45.5 kg/s
2/F 88 151 117 93 60 2/B 88 150 116 93 92 3/D 79 143 109 86 99 5/D 68 135 101 78 101
Rupture
2/F 41 61 48 43 26 2/B 45 67 52 47 36 3/D 41 65 51 43 35 5/D 38 63 50 40 28
9.e Orthoxylene
5mm RR: 0.31 kg/s
2/F 8 15 11 9 n/a 2/B 9 17 13 10 n/a 3/D 9 17 13 10 n/a 5/D 8 17 13 10 n/a
25mm 2/F 23 44 34 26 23
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Risk Assessment
RR: 7.87 kg/s
2/B 26 49 37 29 19 3/D 23 48 36 28 20 5/D 21 48 35 27 20
50mm RR: 13.6 kg/s
2/F 34 67 51 40 34 2/B 38 74 56 44 28 3/D 34 72 54 42 29 5/D 30 70 51 39 29
Rupture
2/F 9 14 11 10 5 2/B 10 17 13 11 5 3/D 10 16 13 11 5 5/D 9 16 13 10 3
9.f Ethyl Alcohol
5mm RR: 0.44 kg/s
2/F 14 20 16 n/a n/a 2/B 14 20 16 n/a n/a 3/D 13 19 14 n/a n/a 5/D 11 17 13 12 n/a
25mm RR: 11.03 kg/s
2/F 49 72 56 51 26 2/B 55 81 63 57 25 3/D 50 78 60 52 26 5/D 43 72 55 45 27
50mm RR: 44.13 kg/s
2/F 71 107 84 73 38 2/B 80 120 94 82 36 3/D 73 116 90 75 37 5/D 65 112 85 67 38
Rupture
2/F 21 28 23 n/a 11 2/B 25 32 26 n/a 14 3/D 23 32 25 n/a 14 5/D 22 32 25 23 11
9.g Iso Propyl Alcohol
5mm RR: 0.43 kg/s
2/F 13 20 15 14 n/a 2/B 13 20 15 14 n/a 3/D 11 19 14 13 n/a 5/D 10 17 13 11 n/a
25mm RR: 10.85 kg/s
2/F 44 73 57 46 30 2/B 49 82 64 51 29 3/D 44 78 59 47 32 5/D 38 73 55 43 34
50mm RR: 43.39 kg/s
2/F 64 108 84 67 41 2/B 72 123 95 76 43 3/D 66 120 92 72 46 5/D 59 116 87 68 50
Rupture
2/F 18 26 20 n/a 13 2/B 22 31 24 23 16 3/D 20 30 24 21 15 5/D 19 30 24 20 12
10.
LPG 10” Trestle Pipeline No.1 – Leak of
5mm RR: 0.42 kg/s
2/F 11 20 15 12 n/a 2/B 11 20 15 12 n/a 3/D 10 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 9 18 13 10 n/a
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Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Risk Assessment
hole dia. & rupture 25mm
RR: 10.51kg/s
2/F 44 83 64 50 137 2/B 44 83 63 50 107 3/D 39 79 60 46 100 5/D 34 75 55 43 80
50mm RR: 42.1 kg/s
2/F 79 155 118 93 319 2/B 79 154 117 93 232 3/D 70 147 110 86 209 5/D 61 140 103 79 167
Rupture
2/F 122 241 181 140 260 2/B 125 243 183 142 265 3/D 112 234 174 135 233 5/D 100 227 168 130 178
11.
LPG 12” Trestle Pipeline No.2 – Leak of hole dia. & rupture
5mm RR: 0.42 kg/s
2/F 11 20 15 12 n/a 2/B 11 20 15 12 n/a 3/D 10 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 9 18 13 10 n/a
25mm RR: 10.54kg/s
2/F 44 83 64 50 137 2/B 44 83 63 50 107 3/D 39 79 60 46 100 5/D 34 75 56 43 81
50mm RR: 42.2 kg/s
2/F 79 155 118 93 335 2/B 79 154 117 93 232 3/D 70 148 110 86 209 5/D 61 140 103 79 167
Rupture
2/F 137 272 204 158 244 2/B 139 274 206 160 281 3/D 125 263 196 152 229 5/D 112 255 189 146 189
12. POL and Chemicals 10” Trestle Pipeline No. 3 – Leak of hole dia. & rupture
12.a MS BS IV
5mm RR: 0.47kg/s
2/F 10 20 15 12 11 2/B 10 20 15 12 n/a 3/D 9 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 8 18 13 10 n/a
25mm RR: 11.8 kg/s
2/F 41 84 63 50 146 2/B 41 83 63 50 112 3/D 37 80 59 46 104 5/D 32 76 55 43 84
50mm RR: 44.8 kg/s
2/F 73 156 117 92 243 2/B 73 154 116 92 243 3/D 65 149 110 86 220 5/D 57 142 103 79 175
Rupture
2/F 67 135 101 78 114 2/B 69 136 102 79 114 3/D 62 131 98 76 108 5/D 57 130 96 75 91
12.b Methanol 5mm RR:
2/F 18 21 19 n/a n/a 2/B 18 21 19 n/a n/a
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Risk Assessment
0.53kg/s 3/D 16 19 17 n/a n/a 5/D 14 18 15 n/a n/a
25mm RR: 13.4 kg/s
2/F 67 85 69 n/a 25 2/B 69 87 71 n/a 27 3/D 61 81 64 n/a 28 5/D 53 75 58 n/a 29
50mm RR: 53.5kg/s
2/F 98 127 101 n/a 39 2/B 111 144 115 n/a 40 3/D 101 138 108 n/a 41 5/D 90 130 101 93 43
Rupture
2/F 67 80 70 n/a 28 2/B 69 81 71 n/a 24 3/D 62 78 65 n/a 25 5/D 57 77 60 n/a 26
12.c Toluene
5mm RR: 0.52kg/s
2/F 12 21 16 13 n/a 2/B 12 21 16 13 n/a 3/D 10 20 15 12 n/a 5/D 9 19 14 11 n/a
25mm RR: 12.9 kg/s
2/F 43 85 64 50 46 2/B 45 88 67 53 54 3/D 40 85 63 49 61 5/D 35 80 59 45 56
50mm RR: 51.7 kg/s
2/F 62 125 94 74 59 2/B 70 141 106 84 71 3/D 64 139 103 80 78 5/D 57 135 99 76 85
Rupture
2/F 31 55 41 32 35 2/B 32 56 43 33 35 3/D 29 55 41 32 34 5/D 27 56 42 33 32
12.d Acetone
5mm RR: 0.52kg/s
2/F 12 21 16 13 n/a 2/B 12 21 16 13 n/a 3/D 10 20 15 12 n/a 5/D 9 19 14 11 n/a
25mm RR: 12.9 kg/s
2/F 43 85 64 50 46 2/B 45 88 67 53 55 3/D 40 85 63 49 61 5/D 35 80 59 45 56
50mm RR: 51.8 kg/s
2/F 62 125 95 74 59 2/B 70 141 106 84 71 3/D 64 139 103 80 78 5/D 57 136 99 76 85
Rupture
2/F 31 55 42 32 35 2/B 32 56 43 33 35 3/D 29 55 41 32 34 5/D 27 56 42 33 32
12.e Orthoxylene 5mm 2/F 10 19 15 12 n/a
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Risk Assessment
RR: 0.52kg/s
2/B 11 21 16 12 n/a 3/D 10 20 15 12 n/a 5/D 9 19 14 11 n/a
25mm RR: 13.1 kg/s
2/F 27 52 40 31 27 2/B 30 59 45 35 24 3/D 28 59 44 34 25 5/D 26 59 43 33 26
50mm RR: 52.4 kg/s
2/F 39 78 59 46 40 2/B 44 88 66 52 35 3/D 40 86 64 50 36 5/D 36 84 61 47 37
Rupture
2/F 17 30 23 19 12 2/B 18 31 24 19 9 3/D 16 30 23 18 9 5/D 15 31 23 18 9
12.f Ethyl Alcohol
5mm RR: 0.51kg/s
2/F 15 21 16 n/a n/a 2/B 15 21 16 n/a n/a 3/D 13 20 15 15 n/a 5/D 12 18 14 13 n/a
25mm RR: 12.7 kg/s
2/F 54 81 63 56 30 2/B 58 87 68 60 30 3/D 52 82 63 54 32 5/D 45 76 58 47 34
50mm RR: 50.8kg/s
2/F 79 120 94 81 44 2/B 90 138 108 93 42 3/D 82 133 103 85 45 5/D 73 128 97 76 47
Rupture
2/F 45 63 48 n/a 28 2/B 46 64 49 n/a 25 3/D 42 61 47 44 25 5/D 39 62 48 41 26
12.g Iso Propyl Alcohol
5mm RR: 0.49kg/s
2/F 13 21 16 14 n/a 2/B 13 21 16 14 n/a 3/D 12 19 15 13 n/a 5/D 10 18 14 11 n/a
25mm RR: 12.49 kg/s
2/F 49 83 64 51 36 2/B 52 86 67 54 43 3/D 46 82 63 49 48 5/D 40 77 58 45 49
50mm RR: 49.99 kg/s
2/F 71 122 94 75 50 2/B 82 142 110 88 56 3/D 75 138 105 83 61 5/D 67 134 100 78 70
Rupture
2/F 39 60 46 41 34 2/B 40 61 47 42 34 3/D 36 59 45 38 32 5/D 34 59 45 36 31
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Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Risk Assessment
Proposed New Chemical/POL Birth
13.
LPG Marine 12” Unloading Arm No.1 – Leak of hole dia. & arm rupture
5mm RR: 0.36 kg/s
2/F 11 19 14 12 10 2/B 11 19 14 12 n/a 3/D 10 18 13 11 n/a 5/D 8 17 13 10 n/a
25mm RR: 9.14 kg/s
2/F 42 79 60 48 119 2/B 42 79 60 47 101 3/D 38 75 57 44 94 5/D 33 71 53 41 75
50mm RR: 36.5 kg/s
2/F 75 147 112 88 122 2/B 75 146 111 88 187 3/D 67 140 105 82 178 5/D 58 133 98 75 153
Rupture
2/F 66 120 91 72 65 2/B 71 127 97 77 74 3/D 65 124 95 75 69 5/D 61 126 95 76 65
14. POL Marine 8” Unloading Arm No.2 – Leak of hole dia. & arm rupture
14.a MS BS-IV
5mm RR: 0.39 kg/s
2/F 10 19 14 11 12 2/B 10 19 14 11 n/a 3/D 9 18 13 10 n/a 5/D 8 17 12 10 n/a
25mm RR: 9.71kg/s
2/F 39 79 60 47 96 2/B 39 79 60 47 106 3/D 35 76 56 44 98 5/D 30 72 53 40 78
50mm RR: 38.9 kg/s
2/F 70 148 111 87 77 2/B 70 147 110 87 140 3/D 63 141 104 81 144 5/D 54 135 98 75 145
Rupture
2/F 27 48 37 29 26 2/B 29 51 39 31 34 3/D 26 49 38 30 32 5/D 24 47 36 29 26
14.b HSD BS-IV
5mm RR: 0.42kg/s
2/F 9 20 15 11 n/a 2/B 9 19 15 11 n/a 3/D 8 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 7 18 13 10 n/a
25mm RR: 10.5 kg/s
2/F 23 51 38 30 28 2/B 27 60 44 35 26 3/D 25 59 43 33 27 5/D 23 60 43 33 29
50mm RR: 41.8 kg/s
2/F 34 75 56 44 40 2/B 39 87 65 50 37 3/D 35 86 63 48 38
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5/D 32 83 60 45 40
Rupture
2/F 7 12 9 8 4 2/B 7 13 10 8 3 3/D 7 12 10 8 3 5/D 6 12 9 7 3
14.c Base Oil
5mm RR: 0.45 kg/s
2/F 9 17 12 10 n/a 2/B 9 18 14 11 n/a 3/D 8 17 13 10 n/a 5/D 7 16 12 9 n/a
25mm RR: 11.3 kg/s
2/F 22 45 34 27 23 2/B 25 52 39 31 22 3/D 23 52 38 30 23 5/D 21 52 38 29 24
50mm RR: 45.2 kg/s
2/F 32 67 50 39 35 2/B 36 76 57 45 31 3/D 33 75 55 43 32 5/D 29 74 53 41 33
Rupture
2/F 7 11 9 7 4 2/B 8 13 10 8 3 3/D 7 12 10 8 3 5/D 6 12 9 7 3
15. Chemicals Marine 8” Unloading Arm No.3 –
15.a Methanol
5mm RR: 0.46kg/s
2/F 17 20 18 n/a n/a 2/B 17 20 18 n/a n/a 3/D 15 18 16 n/a n/a 5/D 13 17 14 n/a n/a
25mm RR: 11.6 kg/s
2/F 60 76 63 n/a 22 2/B 66 82 68 n/a 23 3/D 59 77 61 n/a 24 5/D 51 71 55 n/a 25
50mm RR: 46.4 kg/s
2/F 89 114 92 n/a 34 2/B 99 127 102 n/a 34 3/D 90 121 95 n/a 35 5/D 80 115 88 83 36
Rupture
2/F 31 35 33 n/a 12 2/B 36 40 37 n/a 15 3/D 33 39 35 n/a 15 5/D 31 39 32 n/a 12
15.b Toluene
5mm RR: 0.45 kg/s
2/F 11 20 15 12 n/a 2/B 11 20 15 12 n/a 3/D 10 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 9 18 13 10 n/a
25mm RR: 11.23 kg/s
2/F 36 70 53 42 29 2/B 39 76 58 45 30 3/D 36 75 56 43 32
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5/D 33 74 54 42 34
50mm RR: 44.9 kg/s
2/F 54 107 81 63 42 2/B 59 117 88 69 49 3/D 54 115 85 66 53 5/D 48 112 82 63 58
Rupture
2/F 15 25 19 16 13 2/B 18 30 23 19 17 3/D 17 29 23 18 16 5/D 16 29 23 18 13
15.c Acetone
5mm RR: 0.45 kg/s
2/F 13 19 15 14 n/a 2/B 13 19 15 14 n/a 3/D 11 18 14 13 n/a 5/D 10 17 13 11 n/a
25mm RR: 11.37 kg/s
2/F 49 82 63 51 55 2/B 49 81 63 51 64 3/D 44 77 59 46 67 5/D 38 72 54 42 61
50mm RR: 45.5 kg/s
2/F 88 151 117 93 60 2/B 88 150 116 93 92 3/D 79 143 109 86 99 5/D 68 135 101 78 101
Rupture
2/F 41 61 48 43 26 2/B 45 67 52 47 36 3/D 41 65 51 43 35 5/D 38 63 50 40 28
15.d Orthoxylene
5mm RR: 0.31 kg/s
2/F 8 15 11 9 n/a 2/B 9 17 13 10 n/a 3/D 9 17 13 10 n/a 5/D 8 17 13 10 n/a
25mm RR: 7.87 kg/s
2/F 23 44 34 26 23 2/B 26 49 37 29 19 3/D 23 48 36 28 20 5/D 21 48 35 27 20
50mm RR: 13.6 kg/s
2/F 34 67 51 40 34 2/B 38 74 56 44 28 3/D 34 72 54 42 29 5/D 30 70 51 39 29
Rupture
2/F 9 14 11 10 5 2/B 10 17 13 11 5 3/D 10 16 13 11 5 5/D 9 16 13 10 3
15.e Ethyl Alcohol
5mm RR: 0.44 kg/s
2/F 14 20 16 n/a n/a 2/B 14 20 16 n/a n/a 3/D 13 19 14 n/a n/a 5/D 11 17 13 12 n/a
25mm RR: 11.03
2/F 49 72 56 51 26 2/B 55 81 63 57 25
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kg/s 3/D 50 78 60 52 26 5/D 43 72 55 45 27
50mm RR: 44.13 kg/s
2/F 71 107 84 73 38 2/B 80 120 94 82 36 3/D 73 116 90 75 37 5/D 65 112 85 67 38
Rupture
2/F 21 28 23 n/a 11 2/B 25 32 26 n/a 14 3/D 23 32 25 n/a 14 5/D 22 32 25 23 11
15.f Iso Propyl Alcohol
5mm RR: 0.43 kg/s
2/F 13 20 15 14 n/a 2/B 13 20 15 14 n/a 3/D 11 19 14 13 n/a 5/D 10 17 13 11 n/a
25mm RR: 10.85 kg/s
2/F 44 73 57 46 30 2/B 49 82 64 51 29 3/D 44 78 59 47 32 5/D 38 73 55 43 34
50mm RR: 43.39 kg/s
2/F 64 108 84 67 41 2/B 72 123 95 76 43 3/D 66 120 92 72 46 5/D 59 116 87 68 50
Rupture
2/F 18 26 20 n/a 13 2/B 22 31 24 23 16 3/D 20 30 24 21 15 5/D 19 30 24 20 12
15.g Butyl Acetate
5mm RR: 0.55 kg/s
2/F 12 16 14 n/a n/a 2/B 14 17 15 n/a n/a 3/D 13 17 14 n/a n/a 5/D 11 16 13 n/a n/a
25mm RR: 13.8 kg/s
2/F 33 44 35 n/a 18 2/B 37 49 39 n/a 19 3/D 34 47 36 n/a 19 5/D 31 46 35 33 19
50mm RR: 55.23 kg/s
2/F 48 65 51 n/a 29 2/B 53 72 56 n/a 27 3/D 49 69 53 51 28 5/D 43 66 50 45 28
Rupture
2/F 12 14 n/a n/a 4 2/B 15 17 16 n/a 3 3/D 14 17 15 n/a 3 5/D 14 18 15 n/a 3
15.h Styrene Monomer
5mm RR: 0.47 kg/s
2/F 8 13 10 8 n/a 2/B 9 15 12 9 n/a 3/D 8 15 11 9 n/a 5/D 7 15 11 9 n/a
25mm 2/F 22 42 32 25 21
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Risk Assessment
RR: 10.67 kg/s
2/B 24 46 35 27 18 3/D 22 45 34 26 19 5/D 20 45 33 25 19
50mm RR: 46.68 kg/s
2/F 33 64 49 38 32 2/B 36 70 53 42 27 3/D 33 68 51 40 27 5/D 29 67 49 37 28
Rupture
2/F 8 13 10 9 4 2/B 10 16 12 11 3 3/D 9 16 12 10 3 5/D 9 16 12 10 3
15.i Iso Nonyl Alcohol
5mm RR: 0.45 kg/s
2/F 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a 2/B 1 2 n/a n/a n/a 3/D 1 2 n/a n/a n/a 5/D 1 2 n/a n/a n/a
25mm RR: 11.31 kg/s
2/F 3 5 3 n/a 21 2/B 4 6 5 3 20 3/D 3 6 5 3 20 5/D 3 6 5 3 21
50mm RR: 45.22 kg/s
2/F 4 8 6 4 32 2/B 5 9 7 6 29 3/D 5 9 7 5 30 5/D 4 9 7 5 30
Rupture
2/F 1 n/a n/a n/a 4 2/B 1 n/a n/a n/a 3 3/D 1 n/a n/a n/a 3 5/D 1 n/a n/a n/a 3
15.j Propyl Heptanol
5mm RR: 0.45kg/s
2/F 2 4 2 n/a n/a 2/B 3 5 4 n/a n/a 3/D 3 5 4 n/a n/a 5/D 3 6 4 3 n/a
25mm RR: 11.25kg/s
2/F 6 12 9 7 22 2/B 8 14 11 9 20 3/D 7 14 11 8 21 5/D 7 14 10 8 21
50mm RR: 45.01 kg/s
2/F 9 17 13 10 33 2/B 11 21 16 12 29 3/D 10 20 15 12 30 5/D 9 20 15 11 31
Rupture
2/F 2 2 n/a n/a 4 2/B 3 3 n/a n/a 3 3/D 2 3 n/a n/a 3 5/D 2 3 2 n/a 3
15.k Dimethyl Formamide
5mm RR: 0.86kg/s
2/F 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a 2/B 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a 3/D 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a 5/D 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a
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25mm RR: 21.45 kg/s
2/F 4 4 n/a n/a 16 2/B 4 4 n/a n/a 15 3/D 4 4 n/a n/a 15 5/D 3 3 n/a n/a 15
50mm RR: 85.79 kg/s
2/F 6 6 n/a n/a 25 2/B 6 7 n/a n/a 21 3/D 6 6 n/a n/a 21 5/D 5 6 n/a n/a 21
Rupture
2/F 2 n/a n/a n/a 4 2/B 2 n/a n/a n/a 3 3/D 2 n/a n/a n/a 3 5/D 2 n/a n/a n/a 3
15.
LPG 12” Trestle Pipeline No.1/2 – Leak of hole dia. & rupture
5mm RR: 0.42 kg/s
2/F 11 20 15 12 n/a 2/B 11 20 15 12 n/a 3/D 10 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 9 18 13 10 n/a
25mm RR: 10.54 kg/s
2/F 44 83 64 50 137 2/B 44 83 63 50 107 3/D 39 79 60 46 100 5/D 34 75 56 43 81
50mm RR: 42.18 kg/s
2/F 79 155 118 93 315 2/B 79 154 117 93 232 3/D 71 148 110 86 209 5/D 61 140 103 79 167
Rupture
2/F 119 233 175 136 196 2/B 121 235 177 137 206 3/D 109 226 169 130 181 5/D 98 221 164 127 153
16. POLs 8” Trestle Pipeline No. 3/4/5/8 – Leak of hole dia. & rupture
16.a MS BS IV
5mm RR: 0.39kg/s
2/F 10 19 14 11 12 2/B 10 19 14 11 n/a 3/D 9 18 13 10 n/a 5/D 8 17 12 10 n/a
25mm RR: 9.66 kg/s
2/F 39 79 60 47 139 2/B 39 79 59 47 105 3/D 35 76 56 44 98 5/D 30 72 52 40 78
50mm RR: 38.62 kg/s
2/F 70 148 111 87 180 2/B 70 146 110 87 211 3/D 62 141 104 81 194 5/D 54 134 97 75 158
Rupture
2/F 45 86 64 50 69 2/B 47 90 68 53 72 3/D 43 87 66 51 70 5/D 41 89 67 52 60
16.b HSD BS-IV 5mm RR:
2/F 9 19 15 11 n/a 2/B 9 19 15 11 n/a
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0.42kg/s 3/D 8 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 7 18 13 10 n/a
25mm RR: 10.37 kg/s
2/F 23 50 38 29 28 2/B 27 59 44 34 26 3/D 25 59 43 33 27 5/D 23 60 43 32 29
50mm RR: 41.5 kg/s
2/F 33 75 55 43 41 2/B 39 87 64 50 36 3/D 35 85 62 48 38 5/D 31 83 60 45 39
Rupture
2/F 10 20 15 12 9 2/B 11 21 16 12 6 3/D 10 21 15 12 6 5/D 10 21 16 12 6
16.c Base Oil
5mm RR: 0.42kg/s
2/F 9 19 15 11 n/a 2/B 9 19 15 11 n/a 3/D 8 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 7 18 13 10 n/a
25mm RR: 10.35 kg/s
2/F 23 50 37 29 28 2/B 27 59 44 34 26 3/D 25 59 43 33 27 5/D 23 59 43 32 29
50mm RR: 41.4 kg/s
2/F 33 75 55 43 41 2/B 38 86 64 50 36 3/D 35 85 62 48 38 5/D 31 83 59 45 39
Rupture
2/F 10 20 15 12 9 2/B 11 21 16 12 6 3/D 10 20 15 12 6 5/D 10 21 16 12 6
17. Chemicals 8” Trestle Pipeline No. 3/4/5/8 – Leak of hole dia. & rupture
17.a Methanol
5mm RR: 0.46kg/s
2/F 17 20 18 n/a n/a 2/B 17 20 18 n/a n/a 3/D 15 18 16 n/a n/a 5/D 13 17 14 n/a n/a
25mm RR: 11.53 kg/s
2/F 60 75 62 n/a 22 2/B 65 82 68 n/a 23 3/D 59 76 61 n/a 24 5/D 51 71 54 n/a 25
50mm RR: 46.2 kg/s
2/F 89 113 91 n/a 35 2/B 99 126 102 n/a 34 3/D 90 121 94 n/a 35 5/D 80 114 88 83 36
Rupture
2/F 46 53 48 n/a 20 2/B 48 55 50 n/a 20 3/D 44 54 46 n/a 20 5/D 42 55 44 n/a 20
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Risk Assessment
17.b Toluene
5mm RR: 0.45kg/s
2/F 11 20 15 12 n/a 2/B 11 20 15 12 n/a 3/D 10 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 9 18 13 10 n/a
25mm RR: 11.15 kg/s
2/F 36 69 53 41 31 2/B 39 75 57 45 33 3/D 36 74 55 43 36 5/D 32 73 54 41 38
50mm RR: 44.6 kg/s
2/F 53 106 80 62 45 2/B 58 116 87 68 51 3/D 53 114 84 66 55 5/D 48 111 81 62 61
Rupture
2/F 21 37 28 23 24 2/B 23 39 30 24 24 3/D 21 38 29 23 23 5/D 20 39 30 23 21
17.c Acetone
5mm RR: 0.45kg/s
2/F 13 19 15 14 n/a 2/B 13 19 15 14 n/a 3/D 11 18 14 13 n/a 5/D 10 17 13 11 n/a
25mm RR: 11.30 kg/s
2/F 49 81 63 51 65 2/B 49 81 63 51 66 3/D 44 77 59 46 69 5/D 38 72 54 42 61
50mm RR: 45.3 kg/s
2/F 88 151 117 93 83 2/B 88 150 116 93 97 3/D 78 143 109 85 105 5/D 68 134 101 78 104
Rupture
2/F 59 92 71 61 59 2/B 61 95 73 63 62 3/D 55 92 71 57 59 5/D 51 92 71 56 49
17.d Orthoxylene
5mm RR: 0.45 kg/s
2/F 8 15 11 9 n/a 2/B 9 17 13 10 n/a 3/D 9 17 12 10 n/a 5/D 8 17 13 10 n/a
25mm RR: 13.6 kg/s
2/F 23 44 33 26 22 2/B 25 48 37 29 19 3/D 23 48 36 27 20 5/D 21 47 35 27 20
50mm RR: 45.2 kg/s
2/F 34 67 51 40 34 2/B 37 73 55 43 28 3/D 34 71 53 41 29 5/D 30 70 51 39 29
Rupture
2/F 12 21 16 13 8 2/B 13 22 17 14 6 3/D 12 21 16 13 6
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5/D 11 22 17 13 6
17.e Ethyl Alcohol
5mm RR: 0.44kg/s
2/F 14 20 16 n/a n/a 2/B 14 20 16 n/a n/a 3/D 13 18 14 n/a n/a 5/D 11 17 13 12 n/a
25mm RR: 10.9 kg/s
2/F 48 71 56 50 26 2/B 54 81 63 57 25 3/D 50 78 60 52 26 5/D 43 72 55 45 28
50mm RR: 43.8 kg/s
2/F 70 106 83 73 39 2/B 79 119 93 81 35 3/D 72 116 89 75 37 5/D 64 111 84 67 39
Rupture
2/F 31 42 33 n/a 20 2/B 33 44 35 n/a 21 3/D 30 43 33 32 20 5/D 29 44 35 30 19
17.f Iso Propyl Alcohol
5mm RR: 0.43kg/s
2/F 13 20 15 14 n/a 2/B 13 19 15 14 n/a 3/D 11 18 14 13 n/a 5/D 10 17 13 11 n/a
25mm RR: 10.78 kg/s
2/F 44 73 56 46 30 2/B 49 82 63 51 31 3/D 44 78 59 46 35 5/D 38 73 55 42 37
50mm RR: 43.1 kg/s
2/F 63 108 83 66 43 2/B 72 123 95 76 45 3/D 66 120 91 71 49 5/D 59 116 87 67 54
Rupture
2/F 27 40 30 28 23 2/B 28 42 32 30 25 3/D 26 41 32 28 24 5/D 25 43 33 26 23
15.g Butyl Acetate
5mm RR: 0.55 kg/s
2/F 12 15 14 n/a n/a 2/B 14 17 15 n/a n/a 3/D 13 17 14 n/a n/a 5/D 11 16 13 n/a n/a
25mm RR: 13.8 kg/s
2/F 33 44 35 n/a 18 2/B 37 48 38 n/a 18 3/D 34 47 36 n/a 19 5/D 31 45 35 32 19
50mm RR: 54.93 kg/s
2/F 48 65 51 n/a 29 2/B 53 71 56 n/a 27 3/D 48 68 53 51 28 5/D 43 65 50 45 28
Rupture 2/F 18 21 20 n/a 7 2/B 19 22 21 n/a 6
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3/D 18 22 19 n/a 6 5/D 17 23 18 n/a 6
15.h Styrene Monomer
5mm RR: 0.46 kg/s
2/F 8 13 10 8 n/a 2/B 8 15 11 9 n/a 3/D 8 15 11 9 n/a 5/D 7 15 11 9 n/a
25mm RR: 11.59 kg/s
2/F 22 42 31 25 21 2/B 24 46 35 27 18 3/D 22 45 33 26 19 5/D 20 44 33 25 19
50mm RR: 46.38kg/s
2/F 33 64 48 38 32 2/B 36 70 53 41 26 3/D 33 68 51 39 27 5/D 29 66 48 37 27
Rupture
2/F 12 20 15 13 8 2/B 13 21 16 14 6 3/D 12 20 16 13 6 5/D 11 21 16 13 6
15.i Iso Nonyl Alcohol
5mm RR: 0.45 kg/s
2/F 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a 2/B 1 2 n/a n/a n/a 3/D 1 2 n/a n/a n/a 5/D 1 2 n/a n/a n/a
25mm RR: 11.23 kg/s
2/F 3 5 3 n/a 21 2/B 4 6 5 3 20 3/D 3 6 5 3 20 5/D 3 6 4 3 21
50mm RR: 44.95 kg/s
2/F 4 8 6 4 32 2/B 5 9 7 6 29 3/D 5 9 7 5 29 5/D 4 9 7 5 30
Rupture
2/F 1 1 n/a n/a 8 2/B 2 1 n/a n/a 6 3/D 1 1 n/a n/a 6 5/D 1 2 n/a n/a 6
15.j Propyl Heptanol
5mm RR: 0.45kg/s
2/F 2 4 2 n/a n/a 2/B 3 5 4 n/a n/a 3/D 3 5 4 n/a n/a 5/D 3 5 4 3 n/a
25mm RR: 11.18kg/s
2/F 6 11 9 7 22 2/B 8 14 11 9 20 3/D 7 14 10 8 21 5/D 7 14 10 8 21
50mm RR: 44.75 kg/s
2/F 9 17 13 10 33 2/B 11 20 16 12 29 3/D 10 20 15 12 30 5/D 9 20 15 11 30
Rupture 2/F 3 4 3 n/a 8
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Risk Assessment
4.4.2 Toxic Dispersion Results
In case of 5 mm, 25mm dia. & 50mm dia. holes in pipework, the toxic gas will come out and
spread in the downwind direction causing health effects to personnel working nearby area.
a. Toluene
The Immediate Danger to Life or Health (IDLH) of Toluene is 500ppm.
Health effects of acute exposure
Acute exposure to toluene vapor can irritate the mucous membranes of the respiratory
tract. With massive exposure, accumulation of fluid in the lungs and respiratory arrest
may ensue. Pulmonary aspiration of toxic vomitus or ingested liquid toluene may
cause chemical pneumonitis.
Health effects of chronic exposure
Chronic toluene exposures at less than 200 ppm have been associated with headache,
fatigue, and nausea. Workers repeatedly exposed at 200 to 500 ppm have reported loss
of coordination, memory loss, and loss of appetite. Some workers have developed
reversible disorders of the optic nerves after chronic exposure in the workplace.
OSHA Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) - General Industry
• Limit Values: 200 ppm TWA, 300 ppm Ceiling, 500 ppm Peak (10 minutes)
2/B 3 5 3 n/a 5 3/D 3 5 3 n/a 6 5/D 3 5 3 n/a 6
15.k Dimethyl Formamide
5mm RR: 0.86kg/s
2/F 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a 2/B 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a 3/D 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a 5/D 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a
25mm RR: 21.37kg/s
2/F 4 4 n/a n/a 16 2/B 4 4 n/a n/a 15 3/D 4 4 n/a n/a 15 5/D 3 3 n/a n/a 15
50mm RR: 85.49 kg/s
2/F 6 6 n/a n/a 25 2/B 6 7 n/a n/a 21 3/D 6 6 n/a n/a 21 5/D 5 6 n/a n/a 21
Rupture
2/F 2 n/a n/a n/a 8 2/B 3 n/a n/a n/a 6 3/D 2 n/a n/a n/a 6 5/D 2 n/a n/a n/a 6
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• Health Factors and Target Organs: Central nervous system depression, causing
fatigue, headache, confusion, paraesthesia, dizziness, and muscular in coordination.
Irritation of the eyes, mucous membranes, and upper respiratory tract.
b. Dimethyl Formamide (DMF)
The Immediate Danger to Life or Health (IDLH) of Dimethyl Formamide is 500
ppm.
Exposure Routes
Inhalation, skin absorption, ingestion, skin and/or eye contact
Symptoms
irritation eyes, skin, respiratory system; nausea, vomiting, colic; liver damage,
enlarged liver; high blood pressure; face flush; dermatitis; In Animals: kidney, heart
damage
The toxic dispersion of Toluene & DMF for their IDLH values are presented below: Table 4.5: Toxic dispersion of products at IDLH concentration
S. No. Failure case Scenario Weather
Category Downwind distance
(m) at IDLH
1. Toluene (IDLH: 500ppm)
5mm
2/B 83 3/D 69 5/D 60 2/F 69
25mm
2/B 276 3/D 264 5/D 204 2/F 212
50mm
2/B 314 3/D 318 5/D 312 2/F 196
2. DMF (IDLH: 500ppm)
5mm
2/B 8 3/D 8 5/D 9 2/F 10
25mm
2/B 18 3/D 18 5/D 18 2/F 26
50mm
2/B 24 3/D 25 5/D 25 2/F 36
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Risk Assessment
The toxic dispersion of Toluene and DMF reached 83m, 276m, 314m and 8m, 26m, 36m
incase of 5mm, 25mm, 50mm hole dia. respectively downwind of the leak source. To
identify the leak of chemicals place toxic sensors in dominant direction of unloading
operations to prevent dispersion of hazardous chemicals.
4.5 RISK ASSESSMENT
4.5.1 Failure Probability
The term Risk involves the quantitative evaluation of likelihood of any undesirable event as
well as likelihood of harm or damage being caused to life, property and environment. This
harm or damage may only occur due to sudden/accidental release of any hazardous material
from the containment. This sudden/accidental release of hazardous material can occur due to
failure of component systems. It is difficult to ascertain the failure probability of any system
because it will depend on the components of the system. Even if failure occurs, the
probability of fire/explosion and the extent of damage will depend on many factors like:
• Quantity and physical properties of material released.
• Source of ignition.
• Wind velocity, direction and atmospheric stability.
• Presence of population, properties etc. nearby.
4.5.2 Frequency Estimation
An important component of risk analysis is the estimation of the likelihood or frequency of
each failure case or release scenario. None of the events considered in this analysis are
common and major catastrophic events are very rare. Leak frequencies were developed using
a parts count, and event tree analysis was used to evaluate likelihood of success or failure of
release mitigation safeguards onsite, specifically the potential for detection and isolation of
leaks.Leak Failure frequencies as per OGP, 2010 and UKHSE 2017 are given below in Table
No. 4.6.
Table No. 4.6: Leak Failure frequencies as per OGP, 2010
S. No. Failure Scenarios Material Hole Dia., d in mm
Line Size, D in mm
Failure Frequency (per
m Year)
Existing First Chemical/POL Birth
1 LPG Marine 10” Unloading Arm No.1 – Leak of hole dia. 5mm LPG 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm LPG 25 250 7.28E-06
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S. No. Failure Scenarios Material Hole Dia., d in mm
Line Size, D in mm
Failure Frequency (per
m Year)
Leak of hole dia. 50mm LPG 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture LPG 250 250 3.78E-06
2
LPG Marine 12” Unloading Arm No.2 – Leak of hole dia. 5mm LPG 5 300 1.64E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm LPG 25 300 7.08E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm LPG 50 300 5.44E-06 Rupture LPG 250 300 3.74E-06
3 Chemicals Marine 10” Unloading Arm No.3 – a. For MS BS IV
Leak of hole dia. 5mm MS 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm MS 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm MS 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture MS 250 250 3.78E-06
b.
For Methanol Leak of hole dia. 5mm Methanol 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Methanol 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Methanol 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Methanol 250 250 3.78E-06
c
For Toluene Leak of hole dia. 5mm Toluene 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Toluene 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Toluene 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Toluene 250 250 3.78E-06
d
For Acetone Leak of hole dia. 5mm Toluene 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Toluene 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Toluene 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Toluene 250 250 3.78E-06
e
For Orthoxylene Leak of hole dia. 5mm Orthoxylene 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Orthoxylene 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Orthoxylene 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Orthoxylene 250 250 3.78E-06
f
For Ethyl Alcohol Leak of hole dia. 5mm Ethyl Alcohol 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Ethyl Alcohol 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Ethyl Alcohol 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Ethyl Alcohol 250 250 3.78E-06
PDIL, Noida Page 57 of 99
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Risk Assessment
S. No. Failure Scenarios Material Hole Dia., d in mm
Line Size, D in mm
Failure Frequency (per
m Year)
g
For Iso Propyl Alcohol Leak of hole dia. 5mm Iso Propyl Alcohol 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Iso Propyl Alcohol 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Iso Propyl Alcohol 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Iso Propyl Alcohol 250 250 3.78E-06
4
LPG 10” Trestle Pipeline No.1 –
Leak of hole dia. 5mm LPG 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm LPG 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm LPG 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture LPG 250 250 3.78E-06
5
LPG 12” Trestle Pipeline No.2 –
Leak of hole dia. 5mm LPG 5 300 1.64E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm LPG 25 300 7.08E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm LPG 50 300 5.44E-06 Rupture LPG 250 300 3.74E-06
6 Chemicals 10” Trestle Pipeline No. 3 –
a. For MS BS IV Leak of hole dia. 5mm MS 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm MS 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm MS 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture MS 250 250 3.78E-06
b.
For Methanol Leak of hole dia. 5mm Methanol 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Methanol 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Methanol 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Methanol 250 250 3.78E-06
c
For Toluene Leak of hole dia. 5mm Toluene 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Toluene 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Toluene 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Toluene 250 250 3.78E-06
d
For Acetone Leak of hole dia. 5mm Toluene 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Toluene 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Toluene 50 250 5.56E-06
PDIL, Noida Page 58 of 99
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Risk Assessment
S. No. Failure Scenarios Material Hole Dia., d in mm
Line Size, D in mm
Failure Frequency (per
m Year) Rupture Toluene 250 250 3.78E-06
e
For Orthoxylene Leak of hole dia. 5mm Orthoxylene 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Orthoxylene 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Orthoxylene 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Orthoxylene 250 250 3.78E-06
f
For Ethyl Alcohol Leak of hole dia. 5mm Ethyl Alcohol 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Ethyl Alcohol 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Ethyl Alcohol 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Ethyl Alcohol 250 250 3.78E-06
g
For Iso Propyl Alcohol Leak of hole dia. 5mm Iso Propyl Alcohol 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Iso Propyl Alcohol 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Iso Propyl Alcohol 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Iso Propyl Alcohol 250 250 3.78E-06
Existing Second Chemical/POL Birth
7
LPG Marine 10” Unloading Arm No.1 – Leak of hole dia. 5mm LPG 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm LPG 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm LPG 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture LPG 250 250 3.78E-06
8
LPG Marine 12” Unloading Arm No.2 – Leak of hole dia. 5mm LPG 5 300 1.64E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm LPG 25 300 7.08E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm LPG 50 300 5.44E-06 Rupture LPG 250 300 3.74E-06
9 Chemicals Marine 10” Unloading Arm No.3 – a. For MS BS IV
Leak of hole dia. 5mm MS 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm MS 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm MS 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture MS 250 250 3.78E-06
b.
For Methanol Leak of hole dia. 5mm Methanol 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Methanol 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Methanol 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Methanol 250 250 3.78E-06
PDIL, Noida Page 59 of 99
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Risk Assessment
S. No. Failure Scenarios Material Hole Dia., d in mm
Line Size, D in mm
Failure Frequency (per
m Year)
c
For Toluene Leak of hole dia. 5mm Toluene 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Toluene 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Toluene 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Toluene 250 250 3.78E-06
d
For Acetone Leak of hole dia. 5mm Toluene 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Toluene 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Toluene 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Toluene 250 250 3.78E-06
e
For Orthoxylene Leak of hole dia. 5mm Orthoxylene 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Orthoxylene 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Orthoxylene 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Orthoxylene 250 250 3.78E-06
f
For Ethyl Alcohol Leak of hole dia. 5mm Ethyl Alcohol 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Ethyl Alcohol 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Ethyl Alcohol 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Ethyl Alcohol 250 250 3.78E-06
g
For Iso Propyl Alcohol Leak of hole dia. 5mm Iso Propyl Alcohol 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Iso Propyl Alcohol 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Iso Propyl Alcohol 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Iso Propyl Alcohol 250 250 3.78E-06
10
LPG 10” Trestle Pipeline No.1 – Leak of hole dia. 5mm LPG 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm LPG 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm LPG 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture LPG 250 250 3.78E-06
11
LPG 12” Trestle Pipeline No.2 – Leak of hole dia. 5mm LPG 5 300 1.64E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm LPG 25 300 7.08E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm LPG 50 300 5.44E-06 Rupture LPG 250 300 3.74E-06
12 Chemicals 10” Trestle Pipeline No. 3 – a. For MS BS IV
Leak of hole dia. 5mm MS 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm MS 25 250 7.28E-06
PDIL, Noida Page 60 of 99
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Risk Assessment
S. No. Failure Scenarios Material Hole Dia., d in mm
Line Size, D in mm
Failure Frequency (per
m Year) Leak of hole dia. 50mm MS 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture MS 250 250 3.78E-06
b.
For Methanol Leak of hole dia. 5mm Methanol 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Methanol 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Methanol 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Methanol 250 250 3.78E-06
c
For Toluene Leak of hole dia. 5mm Toluene 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Toluene 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Toluene 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Toluene 250 250 3.78E-06
d
For Acetone Leak of hole dia. 5mm Toluene 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Toluene 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Toluene 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Toluene 250 250 3.78E-06
e
For Orthoxylene Leak of hole dia. 5mm Orthoxylene 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Orthoxylene 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Orthoxylene 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Orthoxylene 250 250 3.78E-06
f
For Ethyl Alcohol Leak of hole dia. 5mm Ethyl Alcohol 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Ethyl Alcohol 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Ethyl Alcohol 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Ethyl Alcohol 250 250 3.78E-06
g
For Iso Propyl Alcohol Leak of hole dia. 5mm Iso Propyl Alcohol 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Iso Propyl Alcohol 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Iso Propyl Alcohol 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Iso Propyl Alcohol 250 250 3.78E-06
Proposed New Chemical/POL Birth
13
LPG Marine 12” Unloading Arm No.1 – Leak of hole dia. 5mm LPG 5 300 1.64E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm LPG 25 300 7.08E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm LPG 50 300 5.44E-06 Rupture LPG 250 300 3.74E-06
14 POL Marine 8” Unloading Arm No.2 –
PDIL, Noida Page 61 of 99
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Risk Assessment
S. No. Failure Scenarios Material Hole Dia., d in mm
Line Size, D in mm
Failure Frequency (per
m Year)
a.
MS BS-IV Leak of hole dia. 5mm MS 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm MS 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm MS 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture MS 250 200 3.84E-06
b.
HSD BS-IV Leak of hole dia. 5mm HSD 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm HSD 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm HSD 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture HSD 250 200 3.84E-06
c.
Base Oil Leak of hole dia. 5mm B. O 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm B. O 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm B. O 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture B. O 250 200 3.84E-06
15 Chemicals Marine 8” Unloading Arm No.3 –
a.
For Methanol
Leak of hole dia. 5mm Methanol 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Methanol 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Methanol 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Methanol 250 200 3.84E-06
b.
For Toluene
Leak of hole dia. 5mm Toluene 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Toluene 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Toluene 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Toluene 250 200 3.84E-06
c.
For Acetone
Leak of hole dia. 5mm Toluene 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Toluene 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Toluene 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Toluene 250 200 3.84E-06
d.
For Orthoxylene
Leak of hole dia. 5mm Orthoxylene 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Orthoxylene 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Orthoxylene 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Orthoxylene 250 200 3.84E-06
e. For Ethyl Alcohol
Leak of hole dia. 5mm Ethyl Alcohol 5 200 1.82E-05
PDIL, Noida Page 62 of 99
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Risk Assessment
S. No. Failure Scenarios Material Hole Dia., d in mm
Line Size, D in mm
Failure Frequency (per
m Year) Leak of hole dia. 25mm Ethyl Alcohol 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Ethyl Alcohol 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Ethyl Alcohol 250 200 3.84E-06
f.
For Iso Propyl Alcohol
Leak of hole dia. 5mm Iso Propyl Alcohol 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Iso Propyl Alcohol 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Iso Propyl Alcohol 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Iso Propyl Alcohol 250 200 3.84E-06
g.
For Butyl Acetate
Leak of hole dia. 5mm Butyl Acetate 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Butyl Acetate 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Butyl Acetate 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Butyl Acetate 250 200 3.84E-06
h.
For Styrene Monomer
Leak of hole dia. 5mm Styrene Monomer 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Styrene Monomer 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Styrene Monomer 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Styrene Monomer 250 200 3.84E-06
i.
For Iso Nonyl Alcohol
Leak of hole dia. 5mm Iso Nonyl Alcohol 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Iso Nonyl Alcohol 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Iso Nonyl Alcohol 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Iso Nonyl Alcohol 250 200 3.84E-06
j.
For Propyl Heptanol
Leak of hole dia. 5mm Propyl Heptanol 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Propyl Heptanol 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Propyl Heptanol 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Propyl Heptanol 250 200 3.84E-06
k.
For Dimethyl Formamide
Leak of hole dia. 5mm DMF 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm DMF 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm DMF 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture DMF 250 200 3.84E-06
16
LPG 12” Trestle Pipeline No.1/2 – Leak of hole dia. 5mm LPG 5 300 1.64E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm LPG 25 300 7.08E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm LPG 50 300 5.44E-06
PDIL, Noida Page 63 of 99
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Risk Assessment
S. No. Failure Scenarios Material Hole Dia., d in mm
Line Size, D in mm
Failure Frequency (per
m Year)
Rupture LPG 250 300 3.74E-06 17 POLs 8” Trestle Pipeline No. 3/4/5/8 –
a.
MS BS-IV Leak of hole dia. 5mm MS 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm MS 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm MS 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture MS 250 200 3.84E-06
b.
HSD BS-IV Leak of hole dia. 5mm HSD 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm HSD 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm HSD 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture HSD 250 200 3.84E-06
c.
Base Oil Leak of hole dia. 5mm B. O 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm B. O 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm B. O 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture B. O 250 200 3.84E-06
18 Chemicals 8” Trestle Pipeline No. 3/4/5/8 –
a.
For Methanol
Leak of hole dia. 5mm Methanol 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Methanol 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Methanol 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Methanol 250 200 3.84E-06
b.
For Toluene
Leak of hole dia. 5mm Toluene 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Toluene 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Toluene 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Toluene 250 200 3.84E-06
c.
For Acetone
Leak of hole dia. 5mm Toluene 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Toluene 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Toluene 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Toluene 250 200 3.84E-06
d.
For Orthoxylene
Leak of hole dia. 5mm Orthoxylene 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Orthoxylene 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Orthoxylene 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Orthoxylene 250 200 3.84E-06
PDIL, Noida Page 64 of 99
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Risk Assessment
S. No. Failure Scenarios Material Hole Dia., d in mm
Line Size, D in mm
Failure Frequency (per
m Year)
e.
For Ethyl Alcohol
Leak of hole dia. 5mm Ethyl Alcohol 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Ethyl Alcohol 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Ethyl Alcohol 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Ethyl Alcohol 250 200 3.84E-06
f.
For Iso Propyl Alcohol
Leak of hole dia. 5mm Iso Propyl Alcohol 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Iso Propyl Alcohol 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Iso Propyl Alcohol 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Iso Propyl Alcohol 250 200 3.84E-06
g.
For Butyl Acetate
Leak of hole dia. 5mm Butyl Acetate 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Butyl Acetate 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Butyl Acetate 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Butyl Acetate 250 200 3.84E-06
h.
For Styrene Monomer
Leak of hole dia. 5mm Styrene Monomer 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Styrene Monomer 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Styrene Monomer 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Styrene Monomer 250 200 3.84E-06
i.
For Iso Nonyl Alcohol
Leak of hole dia. 5mm Iso Nonyl Alcohol 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Iso Nonyl Alcohol 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Iso Nonyl Alcohol 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Iso Nonyl Alcohol 250 200 3.84E-06
j.
For Propyl Heptanol
Leak of hole dia. 5mm Propyl Heptanol 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Propyl Heptanol 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Propyl Heptanol 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Propyl Heptanol 250 200 3.84E-06
k.
For Dimethyl Formamide
Leak of hole dia. 5mm DMF 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm DMF 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm DMF 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture DMF 250 200 3.84E-06
PDIL, Noida Page 65 of 99
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Risk Assessment
4.6 Acceptability of Risk
Risk evaluation is done in order to assess the impact of the people being exposed both inside
and outside the factory premises. The values is generally presented in terms of chances of
death per million per year. Acceptability criteria for individual fatality risk are usually
judged by comparing the values obtained in the risk analysis study to the statistical risk value
of other normal human activities.
Risk of death 1 per million population per year or 1x10-6 inside the premises are generally
accepted without concern and this risk is often seen to be lower than voluntary and
involuntary risk of death from human activities and other cases an individual is exposed to.
The acceptability levels of risk for people employed within the organization are generally
higher. This is because of the fact that those employed are well aware of the risk involved
and have accepted voluntarily some amount of risk while accepting the job.
For the assessment of 'Individual Risk' due to the operation of Pirpau Jetty, the following has
been taken into consideration:
• The individual risk has been calculated as cumulative effect of all the scenario mentioned
for selected failure case as listed in Table No- 4.5 for 2B, 3D, 5D (Day condition) and 2F
(Night Condition).
• Probability of dominant wind directions has been taken from IMD data for Mumbai
location.
• No mitigation factors such as shelters, buildings etc. are considered which will result in
conservative risk estimation.
• During risk assessment population data and source of ignition has been considered.
4.7 RISK RESULTS
4.7.1 Individual Risk
The location plan of Berths used for the Risk assessment is enclosed as Annexure – 1.
The individual risk contour (enclosed as Annexure - 2) for the LPG and POL & Chemicals
Pirpau Jetty, as shown in below fig., the risk contour illustrating the risk of 1 fatality in 1
million population per year i.e., 1 x 10-6 is confined around the all Berth of Pirpau Jetty.
The risk contour is generated based on the consequence analysis, frequency of occurrence,
population and possible ignition sources in the Pirpau Jetty.
4.7.2 Societal Risk Results
The F-N curve, illustrating the societal risk (enclosed as Annexure - 3) for the Pirpau Jetty, it
is evident from the curve that the frequency per year 1x10-6 is in ALARP to ACCEPTABLE
PDIL, Noida Page 66 of 99
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Risk Assessment
region. The risk for 1x10-6, the fatality rate is approx. 5 per million populations per year. The
fatality rate estimated is inclusive of partially-credible failure and non credible scenarios,
which has the low frequency of occurrence.
Hence, the societal risk can be reduced by identifying and mitigating the hazards of the
operations of Jetty (FCB, SCB and Proposed berth) with best possible methods, controls and
following suitable standards and guidelines in operating Jetty.
PDIL, Noida Page 67 of 99
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Controlling the Risk
CHAPTER – 5
CONTROLLING THE RISK
A control measure is an action taken to completely eliminate a chemical hazard from the
workplace — or at the very least — reduce the harm it could cause and bring it to an
acceptable level.
5.1 Hierarchy of Control
For handling of chemical hazards, consider the control measures from all six groupings in
the Hierarchy of Control. They should be considered in the following order of importance:
a. Elimination — Control measures that enables to stop using a hazardous chemical and
completely eliminate a work process.
b. Substitution — These are controls that replace a hazardous substance with another less
harmful chemical or procedure.
c. Isolation — These controls separate the chemicals from workers.
d. Engineering — Controlling hazards using mechanical devices, machinery, or changes to
workplace design.
e. Administration — These controls are the systems and safe working procedures
implemented by managers and followed by staff, workers and customers.
f. Personal Protective Equipment — PPE is the least effective of the control measures
because it only places a temporary barrier between workers and chemicals handled. PPE
shall never be introduced a sole control measure.
PDIL, Noida Page 68 of 99
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Controlling the Risk
Fig 5.1: Hierarchy of Control
5.2 Elimination and Substitution
Elimination and substitution, while most effective at reducing hazards, also tend to be the
most difficult to implement in an existing operations. Eliminate all ignition sources in the
vicinity of the Jetty area.
5.3 Engineering Control at First, Second & Proposed Berths
Engineering controls are favored over administrative and personal protective equipment
(PPE) for controlling existing worker exposures in the workplace because they are designed
to remove the hazard at the source, before it comes in contact with the worker. Well-
designed engineering controls can be highly effective in protecting workers and will
typically be independent of worker interactions to provide this high level of protection. The
initial cost of engineering controls can be higher than the cost of administrative controls or
PPE, but over the longer term, operating costs are frequently lower, and in some instances,
can provide a cost savings in other areas of the process.
PDIL, Noida Page 69 of 99
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Controlling the Risk
Table 5.1: Engineering Controls at Berths
S. No. Material/Chemical Engineering Control 1. LPG/Propane Unloading arms and connected pipework/pipelines shall
be regularly checked for leakages. Gas monitors provided with alarms set at specified concentrations. Consider work permit system e.g. for maintenance activities.
2. Methanol Unloading arms and connected pipework/pipelines shall be regularly checked for leakages. Gas monitors shall be provided for methanol vapor concentrations with alarms set at specified concentrations. Consider work permit system e.g. for maintenance activities.
3. Toluene Leak detection and repair systems shall be provided. Spilled material shall be absorbed or covered will dry earth, sand or other non-combustible material and transfer to containers. Provision for eyewash stations and safety showers shall be provided for emergency use where there is a possibility of exposure.
4. Acetone Emergency eye wash fountains should be available in the immediate vicinity of any potential exposure.
5. Butyl Acetate Unloading arms and connected pipework/pipelines shall be regularly checked for leakages. Handle in accordance with good industrial hygiene and safety practice. Consider work permit system e.g. for maintenance activities.
6. Styrene Monomer Provision for eyewash stations and safety showers shall be provided for emergency use where there is a possibility of exposure. In case of spill: Absorb with an inert material and put the spilled material in an appropriate waste disposal
7. O/P-Xylene Provision for eyewash stations and safety showers shall be provided for emergency use where there is a possibility of exposure. In case of spill: Absorb with an inert material and put the spilled material in an appropriate waste disposal.
8. Ethanol Unloading arms and connected pipework/pipelines shall be regularly checked for leakages. Consider work permit system e.g. for maintenance activities.
9. MS Unloading arms and connected pipework/pipelines shall be regularly checked for leakages. Prevent from spreading by making a barrier with sand,
PDIL, Noida Page 70 of 99
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Controlling the Risk
S. No. Material/Chemical Engineering Control earth or other containment material. Use spark-proof tools and explosion-proof equipment. Consider work permit system e.g. for maintenance activities.
10. HSD Unloading arms and connected pipework/pipelines shall be regularly checked for leakages. Prevent from spreading by making a barrier with sand, earth or other containment material. Use spark-proof tools and explosion-proof equipment. Consider work permit system e.g. for maintenance activities.
11. Iso Propanol Unloading arms and connected pipework/pipelines shall be regularly checked for leakages. Absorb spill with inert material (e.g. vermiculite, sand or earth) Consider work permit system e.g. for maintenance activities.
12. Iso Nonyl Alcohol
Unloading arms and connected pipework/pipelines shall be regularly checked for leakages. Absorb with dry sand, earth or other non-combustible material and transfer to containers for later disposal.
13. 2 Propyl Heptanol
Unloading arms and connected pipework/pipelines shall be regularly checked for leakages. Absorb with earth, sand or other non-combustible material and transfer to containers for later disposal
14. Dimethyl Formamide
Absorb with DRY earth, sand or other non-combustible material. Prevent entry into sea waters.
15. Vinyl acetate Unloading arms and connected pipework/pipelines shall be regularly checked for leakages. Soak up with inert absorbent material. Remove all sources of ignition.
5.4 Administrative Controls
Administrative controls are frequently used with existing operations of First and Second
Berths at Pirpau Jetty. The same controls shall be extended to the proposed berth to control
the hazards.
Administrative controls, which may be used in conjunction with engineering controls and/or
PPE, would also be required if work was to continue while engineering controls are being
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developed. Ultimately, though, administrative controls are not the optimal solution and
cannot be the selected method of abatement if a hazard, or employee exposure to that hazard,
can be eliminated.
The most effective type of administrative control is safety training. Effective training
programs educate employees about the dangers they face and provide viable strategies for
staying safe without impeding productivity or efficiency.
Administrative controls at Jetty include:
• Restricting access to a work area.
• Scheduling maintenance and other high exposure operations for times when few workers
are present (such as evenings, weekends).
• Using job-rotation schedules that limit the amount of time an individual worker is
exposed to a substance.
• Using a work-rest schedule that limits the length of time a worker is exposure to a hazard.
Work Practices
Work practices are also a form of administrative controls. Even if there are well designed
and well maintained engineering controls present, safe work practices are very important.
Safe work practices at Jetty include:
• Developing and implementing safe work procedures or standard operating procedures.
• Training and education of employees about the operating procedures as well as other
necessary firefighting, first-aid training.
• Establishing and maintaining good house-keeping programs
• Keeping equipment well maintained.
• Preparing and training for emergency response for incidents such as spills, fire or
employee injury.
5.5 Personal protective equipment (PPE)
PPE is the least effective protective measure on the hierarchy of controls, but it’s still
critically important. In situations where workers exposed to hazardous chemicals and other
dangers, their best bet is to wear carefully chosen, well-maintained PPE.
PPE includes items such as respirators, protective clothing such as gloves, face shields, eye
protection, and footwear that serve to provide a barrier between the wearer and the chemical
or material.
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Table 5.2: Personal Protective Equipments used at Berths
S. No. Material/Chemical PPE’s 1. LPG Wear safety glasses with side shields
Wear leather safety gloves and safety shoes when handling/unloading operations at Jetty area.
2. Methanol Low risk of vapor/low risk of volume splash
High risk of vapor/low risk of volume splash
High risk of vapor/high risk of volume splash
Fire retardant clothing
Full chemical resistant suit
Full chemical resistant, impermeable suit
Gloves (Silver shield or disposable nitrile)
Chemical-resistant rubber gloves
Chemical-resistant rubber gloves
Safety glasses with side shields
Full face supplied air respirator
SCBA or compressed air breathing apparatus (CABA)
Full boot cover Chemical-resistant rubber boots
Chemical-resistant rubber boots
3. Toluene Use of respiratory devices. Wear Safety glasses, Chemical goggles are recommended if splashing is possible. Wear chemical resistant gloves and footwear.
4. Acetone Safety glasses. Gloves. Protective clothing. Face shield. High gas/vapor concentration: gas mask with filter type A
5. Butyl Acetate Use a respirator with an approved filter. Use self-contained breathing apparatus in high vapor concentrations. Safety glasses. Gloves. Protective clothing (butyl rubber)
6. Styrene Monomer Splash goggles. Full suit. Vapor respirator. Boots. Gloves. A self contained breathing apparatus should be used to avoid inhalation of the product.
7. O-Xylene Splash goggles. Full suit. Vapor respirator. Boots. Gloves. A self contained breathing apparatus shall be used to avoid inhalation of the product.
8. Ethanol Chemical safety goggles, gloves, safety shoes. 9. MS Wear chemical resistant gloves. Chemical splash
goggles. Safety shoes.
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S. No. Material/Chemical PPE’s 10. HSD Wear chemical resistant gloves. Chemical splash
goggles. Safety shoes. 11. Iso Propanol Wear Chemical splash goggles, gloves, safety shoes. 12. Iso Nonyl Alcohol
Wear full or half face piece (with goggles) respiratory protective equipment when necessary, face piece with goggles. Wear resistant-chemical glove. An eye wash unit and safety shower station shall be provided at jetty area.
13. 2 Propyl Heptanol
Tight sealing safety goggles. Chemical resistant gloves. An eye wash unit and safety shower station shall be provided at jetty area.
14. Dimethyl Formamide
Wear Chemical splash goggles, gloves, safety shoes.
15. Vinyl acetate Chemical safety goggles, e protective gloves and clothing to prevent skin exposure.
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Monitor & Review
CHAPTER – 6
MONITOR & REVIEW
It is important to monitor both the hazard and the control method to make sure that the
control is working effectively and that exposure to the hazard is reduced or eliminated.
Some tools include physical inspection, testing, exposure assessment, observations, injury
and illness tracking, accident/incident investigations reports, employee feedback/input,
occupational health assessment and other methods.
The following aspects are monitored at existing berths and the same shall be continued at the
proposed berth:
1. The coupling position of ship and loading arm.
2. Regular checking of pipework/pipelines for leakages.
3. Regular inspection of unloading arms
4. Functioning of Gas monitoring systems (GMS) and other chemical sensors/alarm systems.
5. Regular inspection pipelines along the trestle.
6. Sufficient number of firefighting equipments.
7. Fire hydrant lines
8. Pressure requirement in the hydrant line
9. Keeping walkways clear
10. Usage of PPE’s during unloading operations
11. Monitoring the health of personnel working at jetty area
12. Proper functioning of communication systems
The following are reviewed at existing berths and the same shall be continued at the proposed
berth:
1. Change in operational procedures during unloading.
2. Standard operating procedures in firefighting and other response measures
3. Work permits systems.
4. Maintenance of unloading arms and other facilities installed at Jetty.
5. New equipment installation or minor adjustments to the existing facilities.
6. Change in personnel of MbPT or other users (Aegis, BPCL etc.) at Berths.
7. Training requirements for personnel
8. The near miss incidents and accidents through root cause analysis.
9. The availability and stock/spares of firefighting equipments.
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CHAPTER – 7
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE Emergencies can create a variety of hazards for employees/workers in the impacted area.
Preparing before an emergency incident plays a vital role in ensuring that employers and
workers have the necessary equipment, know where to go, and know how to keep them safe
when an emergency occurs. The Emergency Preparedness and Response provides
information on how to prepare and train for emergencies and the hazards to be aware of
when an emergency occurs.
7.1 Emergency Mitigation Measures
Mitigation consists of various measures required for lessening or limiting the adverse
impacts of hazards and related disasters. "Mitigation" as measures aimed at reducing the risk,
impact, or effects of a disaster or threatening disaster situation. “Goal of mitigation is to
minimize risks from multiple hazards and the threats from individual hazards need not
always occur in isolation. At times, a hazardous event can trigger secondary events.
7.1.1 Resource mobilization
Resource mobilization includes manpower requirement, firefighting materials, appliances or
equipment, safety equipment, communication facilities, transport, list of emergency drugs
and appliances, etc.
Firefighting details are presented below:
S.
No.
Firefighting Facilities FCB SCB Proposed New
Berth
1. Fire water system
Storage tanks
Capacity
As per OISD
guidelines. The sea
water is used for
firefighting purpose.
No storage facility
As at First
Chemical Berth
As at First
Chemical Berth
2. Fire water pumps (nos)
Capacity
Discharge pressure
(bar)
3 pumps of 1440 m3/
hour.
As at First
Chemical Berth
As at First
Chemical Berth
3. Jockey fire water
pumps (nos)
2pumps of
144Cu.mtr./hr
As at First
Chemical Berth
As at First
Chemical Berth
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Capacity
Discharge pressure
(bar)
4. Tower monitor
Flowrate / Discharge
pressure (bar)
7570 LPM at 7 Bar 4Tower monitors
of each 6000LPM
at 11Bar
4 Tower monitors
of each 7570
LPM @ 11 bar
5. Ground monitors
Flowrate/ Discharge
pressure (bar)
NA 2 ground
Monitors of each
3000LPM at 7Bar
2 Nos each of
3000 LPM @ 11
bar
6. Hydrant System
Flowrate/ Discharge
pressure (bar)
1100LPM at 7 Bar 27sets of double
headed hydrant
valve & 6Nos. of
single headed
hydrant valve.
1100 LPM @ 7
bar
7. Foam System
Tank capacity
Discharge pressure
(bar)
15000litres
15 bar
30,300 litres As per OISD-156.
Tank Capacity 30
m3.
8. Gas monitoring System
(GMS) number and
locations
NA 4Nos. at Jetty
berth
As per OISD-156
9. Jumbo water curtain
nozzle
4Nos of each
6000LPM at 7Bar
4 Jumbo curtains
each 6000LPM at
12bar
4 Nos. each of
6000 LPM @ 7
bar
10. Remote control system
(for firefighting system)
Wired remote control
system
At SCB Control
Room
As per OISD-156
11. Fire detection, Alarm
and communication
system
Manual Call point,
Siren and VHF
communication
Gas detector,
Flame sensor,
MCPs, siren &
PA system
As per OISD-156
12. Fire shore connection NA Available 2 Nos
International
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shore connections
at unloading
platform.
13. Fire extinguishers
number and locations
As per OISD 156 As per OISD 156 As per OISD 156
14. Mobile and water borne
firefighting equipment
NA NA As per OISD 156
15. First aid (list and
locations)
As per OISD 156
16. Public Address System NA Available As per OISD 156
17. Fire Tenders Available at
combined building
fire control room.
Common fire
tender located at
combined
building fire
control room
Available at
combined
building fire
control room
18. No. of
Employees/Personnel
(at the time of
unloading and idle
time)
Aegis: 05 No’s Aegis: 05 No’s Proposed Berth
19. List of PPEs’ Aegis:
Hard Helmet: 05
Safety Shoes:05
Life Jackets: 06
Splash Goggles: 05
Chemical Suit: 02
Aegis:
Hard Helmet: 05
Safety Shoes:05
Life Jackets: 06
Splash Goggles:
05
Chemical Suit: 02
As per OISD 156
20. Distance from the other
berths
From OPJ – 2.5KM
& from SCB –
0.8KM
From FB-0.8KM
& from OPJ –
3.3KM
350 m from First
Chemical berth
21. Fire extinguishers and Aegis Fire Aegis Fire As at First
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GMS locations Layout extinguishers:
CO2 – 02 No’s
ABC - 02 No’s
GMS:01 No
extinguishers:
CO2 – 02 No’s
ABC - 02 No’s
GMS: 01 No
Chemical Berth
Incident preventing measures and procedures
The incident prevention measures and procedures at installation include the following:-
(i) Safety policy;
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Fig 7.1: Safety Policy of Mumbai Port Trust
(ii) Proper layout: Location Plan of TCB and Layouts of FCB, SCB are enclosed as
Annexure – 1 and Annexure - 4 along with report.
(iii) Work permit system: Permit to Work system is widely used in the Jetty area.
(iv) Fire detection & early warning alarm system: Gas detector, Flame sensor, MCPs,
siren & PA system, Manual Call point, Siren and VHF communication as per
OISD-156 are provided in the FCB and SCB and also shall be implemented in the
proposed berth.
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7.2 Emergency Preparedness Measures
A comprehensive and well practiced plan is essential if a jetty/berth is to respond to
emergencies in an orderly and effective manner.
The procedures covered all types of emergency that can be envisaged in the context of
particular activities at the Jetty, for example gas leak, major oil/chemical spillage resulting in
an unconfined vapour cloud, fire, explosion and ill or injured persons.
Personnel involved must be familiar with the emergency procedures, shall be adequately
trained and shall clearly understand the action they would be required to take in responding
to an emergency. This shall include the sounding of alarms, the setting up of a control centre
and the organization of personnel to deal with the emergency.
7.2.1 Firefighting set at Pir Pau Fire station for FCB & SCB
Fixed fire fighting system is provided at Pir Pau Chemical Terminal, in accordance with
Standard OISD156 and Engineering Practices/ Requirement. It is with adequate access for
Firefighting, Rescue operations & escape routes provisions, for handling any emergency to
• Extinguish the fires on the jetty head
• Extinguish fires on the surface of the sea due to spillages
• Prevent the spread of fire to the vessels
• Provide a safe escape route for jetty and vessel personnel to the shore line.
The fixed fire fighting system provides sufficient wet cover as a means of protection to
escaping personnel, the jetty head, manifold connections, and the loading arms. Sufficient
quantity of Foam stocked, is maintained for quickly dousing the fires at the point of
combustion on jetty or on ships.
Port Fire Service Set Up -
For the complete Fire protection to one of most important Installation of Port, where highly
inflammable Toxic cargo is being handled, Port Fire Service stand as ‘Fire Shied’ for entire
Pir Pau Area from last 70 years, by providing round the clock fire safety coverage with
following experienced, knowledgeable & courageous fire fighters at all vital duty points-
Total fire staff at Pir Pau for two shift - Section leader- 3, Sub leader- 5, Motor Driver –
5, Pump Operator- 5, Firemen – 24
Posting of Fire Staff in shift –
1. Pir Pau Fire control room - Firemen -2 .
2. First turn out - Section leader -01, Motor Driver-1, Pump Operator -01 & Firemen -4
3. Ambulance - Motor Driver– 1 & Firemen -2
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4. First Chemical Berth - Sub Section leader – 1, Firemen – 3/4
5. Second Chemical Berth - Sub Section leader – 1, Firemen – 3/4
7.2.2 Action Plan for Specific Cases
The best way to manage any emergency is to prevent it. Following guidelines for emergency
prevention shall be:
1. Sound engineering practice in the design, fabrication, installation and Maintenance of
facilities.
2. Careful selection and correct use of equipment.
3. Observance of safety and security regulations.
4. Proper and constant training and guidance to all personnel working in the pipeline
operation and in plant,
5. With particular reference to product knowledge and maintenance practices.
6. Good House-keeping.
7. Constant supervision and alertness.
a. Fire at small Leak in Pipeline
• Shut off the flow of LPG in the line by closing valves and by stopping pumping
• Fire at a small leak in pipeline must be attacked promptly with the nearest fire
extinguishers
• Allow the gas in the line to complete burn
• Start water sprays those exposed to fire/ heat
b. Bursting of Gasket/Leakage through Joints
• Stop pumping.
• Close line valves.
• If Fire at a gasket leakage, it must be attacked promptly with the nearest fire
extinguishers
• Allow the gas to disperse into atmosphere to safe distance beyond LFL
• Take action for replacement of gasket/repair leak with due care, as per standards &
guidelines.
• Check the gasket/flange leakages regularly.
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c. LPG/chemical spill contingency plan
Scenario Description
Jetty facilities of MbPT located at FCB, SCB and proposed new berth, the unloading
operations where LPG/chemicals will be transported to existing/proposed unloading arms. In
case of major leak in the arm/line during transfer operation LPG and other chemicals will
come out as jet and fall on the ground forming a pool. On pool, evaporation vapor cloud may
be formed which may ignite resulting vapor cloud explosion or flash fire. Pool of LPG may
be ignited if it gets contact with any ignition source. However, once pumping is stopped,
extent of leakage will reduce and flow will be less due to stoppage of pump & valve.
Action plan in case of leak resulting into pool fire at berths
i. In case of any leakage detected during transfer or hearing the information about leak and
pool fire, designated personnel of MbPT will rush to the spot along with required PPEs
and leak arresting accessories. They will inform fire and safety personnel also to rush to
the spot and stop LPG/chemicals transfer pump. Remote operated valve can be operated
to shut beforehand.
ii. MbPT personnel will arrange for identification and isolation of leak using required
techniques & PPEs.
iii. In case of small fire, the fire can be extinguished with the help of DCP Extinguishers.
iv. Area to be cordoned off for unauthorized entry.
v. LPG fires may be effectively put off by using DCP from Fire tender.
vi. In the event of any threat to the neighboring industries, alert them on the incident.
vii. Mutual Aid to be activated and district authorities shall be contacted for activating Off-
Site Emergency Plan, if required.
7.2.3 Action during Emergency
Immediate action is the most important factor in emergency control because the first few
seconds count, as LPG/chemical fires develop and spread very quickly unless prompt and
efficient action is taken. In the event of gas/Chemcial leak during operation of unloading the
products, the following action shall be taken as quickly as possible:
• Take immediate steps to stop LPG/Chemical leakage/ fire and raise alarm simultaneously.
• Initiate action as per Fire Organization Plan or Disaster Management Plan, based on
gravity of the emergency.
• Stop all operations and ensure closure of all ROVs and isolation valves.
• All out effort should be made to contain the spread of leakage/ fire.
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• Saving of human life shall get priority in comparison to stocks/ assets.
• Jetty personnel without specific duties should assemble at the nominated place.
• All vehicles except those required for emergency use should be moved away from the
operating area, in an orderly manner at pre-nominated route.
• Electrical system except for control supplies, utilities, lighting and firefighting system
should be isolated.
• If the feed to the fire cannot be cut off, the fire must be controlled and not extinguished.
• Start water spray system at areas involved in or exposed to fire risks.
• In case of leakage of LPG without fire and inability to stop the flow, take all precautions
to avoid source of ignition.
• Block all roads in the adjacent area and enlist CISF/Police support for the purpose if
warranted.
7.2.4 Firefighting Operations
• Enlist support of local fire brigade and neighboring industries if possible.
• If escaping vapor cannot be stopped, jets of water should be directed at the point of
leakage to assist controlled release of vapor and in between water fog should be used for
dilution and rapid dispersion of vapor cloud.
• Firefighting personnel working in or close to un-ignited vapor clouds or close to fire must
wear protective clothing and equipment including safety harness and manned life line.
They must be protected continuously by water sprays. Water protection for firefighters
should never be shut off even though the flames appear to have been extinguished until
all personnel are safely out of the danger area.
• Exercise care to ensure that static charge is not generated in LPG vapour cloud. For this
purpose solid jets of water must be avoided, instead fog nozzles should be used.
• Firefighters should advance towards a fire downwind if possible.
• If the only valve that can be used to stop the leakage is surrounded by fire, it may be
possible to close it manually. The attempt should be directed by trained persons only. The
person attempting the closure should be continuously protected by means of water
spraying (through fog nozzles), fire entry suit, water jel blanket or any other approved
equipment. The person must be equipped with a safety harness and manned life line.
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• Any rapid increase in pressure or noise level of product discharged through safety relief
valve of the vessel/ pipeline should be treated as a warning of over pressurization. In such
cases all personnel should be evacuated immediately.
• As in case of any emergency situation, it is of paramount importance to avoid
endangering human life in the event of fire involving or seriously exposing LPG
equipment or serious leakage of LPG without the fire.
7.3 RESPONSE PLAN
In Preparedness, MbPT has SOPs for all the emergencies, hazards and risks on the basis of
vulnerability in the port. The knowledge and capacities are developed by training as well as
governments, professional response and recovery organizations, communities and
individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to, and recover from, the impacts of likely,
imminent or current hazard events or conditions as a part of the training. Based on the
preparedness, the response process begins as soon as it becomes apparent that a disastrous
event is imminent and lasts until the disaster is declared to be over. It is conducted during
periods of high stress in highly time-constrained situations with limited information and
resources. It is considered as the most visible phase amongst various phases of management
plan.
Response includes not only those activities that directly address the immediate needs, such
as search and rescue, first aid and temporary shelters, but also rapid mobilization of various
systems necessary to coordinate and support the efforts. For effective response, all the
stakeholders have been briefed about hazards, its consequences, and plans of action as per
SOPs are implemented during the mock drills.
7.4 Hazard specific Response Plan
7.4.1 Firefighting Operations:
a. On Duty Fire man in Fire Control Room -
• On receipt of message on duty fire man will write down all information and call back
on the telephone nos. given by the caller to confirm about the fire.
• After confirming he will press the ‘Fire Bell’.
• He will contact PSFO and Asstt. PSFO.
• After obtaining necessary orders he will deploy necessary crew and send them to
attend the incidence along with necessary equipments and fire tender.
• He will maintain the communication with the riding officer turnout with fire vehicle.
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• He will inform the VTS / Harbour control.
• He will write all the information received from fire site in occurrence book
• He will provide all the help or reinforcement required at fire ground by informing the
officer present at fire station.
• He will activate the CRISIS management group if situation is beyond control &
evacuation has to be carried out, by informing P.A. of Chairman, Dy. Chairman, and
all HODs, after the message received from the Sr. Section leader from the fire ground.
b. Fire Crew
• Fire crew turn out to attend the call within 40 seconds and shall reach the spot and
inform the control room about the site situation
• Fire crew under guidance of Sr. Section leader and orders of PSFO will decide the
course of action for tackling fire and carry out the firefighting operation to extinguish
the fire.
• Fire crew will also carry out necessary rescue operation and shift the casualties to the
hospital in ambulance.
• Fire staff will communicate with seniors from the seat of the fire/ close to fire source
of fire to tackle it as quickly as possible.
• Fire crew will use the resource provided by seniors to tackle the fire and save the life
& property of Mumbai Port Trust.
c. Control Room Supervisors
Control room supervisors keep the reinforcement, ready (if required) and all emergency
nos. ready at desk
d. Sr. Section Leader
• After receiving the message of fire he immediately see that fire vehicle is turn out to
the emergency site within 40 seconds.
• He & crew will go to the fire call.
• After reaching the site he will analyses the situation, severity of fire and surrounding
risk.
• He will plan the strategy to tackle the emergency.
• He will organize the rescue operation, if required.
• He will decide the 'Extinguishing media' to be used to tackle the fire,
• He will implement the planning & strategy to tackle the fire/emergency,
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• He will evacuate the non-essential people from the site.
• He will call for the resource like heavy equipment, cranes, BA Sets, emergency
equipments etc. if required to overcome the emergency,
• He will ask for the additional help if required from other agencies,
• He will maintain overall supervision of the situation for the safety of fire fighters and
the surrounding area.
• If situation goes beyond control, PS& FO and Asst. PS & FO will inform him to
activate the CRISIS Management Group
• He will inform the Control room fireman to inform PA of Chairman, Dy. Chairman &
all HODs about the disaster.
• After the fire is extinguished, he will do the rigging of the area to check if anything is
still smouldering or fire is completely extinguished.
If something still left or reignited he will again start the fire fighting and after completely
knocking down the fire, he will return back to fire station.
7.4.2 Tanker on Fire at Marine Oil Terminal
Master of Vessel
• Will immediately report the incident to the Dock Master JD/ PirPau, and Dock Master
Control Station on channel-12 or by phone, VTS and Terminal/Jetty Fire Service in-
charge.
• Sounds alarm
• Initiates vessel response plan.
• Cease cargo operation-advises loading master-closes manifold valves and disconnects oil
transfer arms (Chickson or the Hoses).
• Fire Fighting squads commence contain fire-status-extent damage-casualties
• Advises VTS and Port fire service status on VHF
• If necessary requests additional resources or-evacuation injured
• On arrival PFS and action group- coordinates with them to fight fire
• Keeps engines on standby to move the ship from berth.
• Provide Tugs to tow away the vessel to Isolation using Fire Wires or the ETA.
Fire service
• Port Fire Service will immediately turnout to he site within 40 sec.
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• Tackle the fire, using foam or other extinguishing media to knock down the fire.
• Carryout rescue operation & save the life of people.
• Starts cooling ship side with water jet & tug fire fighting system.
• PFS will liaison with MARG-for help if required.
• On arrival of action group coordinates with Dy. Conservator and Master of the tanker for
fighting the fire.
• Arrange back up of Mumbai Sewree, Oil Terminal Companies.
Dy. Conservator -
• He will Proceed to the VTS/DMCR.
• He Will assess level of crisis.
• If at level 2 or 3 will inform Crisis Management Group through VTS
• Cooperation to Master water jets, Sprinklers fire fighting tugs, pilot, mooring, de-berthing
evacuate injured keep crisis mgmt group informed.
Dock Master JD & PP -
Dock Master is overall in-charge of Jawahar Dweep and will inform Deputy Conservator
about disaster.
• He will proceed to the berth /Jetty.
• He will alert other vessels on the adjacent berths.
• He will suspend Cargo operation on all adjacent berths by informing the Master of the
Oil companies.
• He will inform VTS / Harbour Control to provide the additional Port & Harbour Tugs,
Mooring Launches in tackling the disaster if necessary.
• He will instruct private Tug, available on Island, to assist in evacuation and any other
help.
• In consultation with DC– opt for the casting off the vessel/s to the emergency
anchorage.
• He will keep the D.C. posted the situation.
• For evacuation, if required, he will arrange Helicopter from Indian Navy.
• Instruct VTS/DMCR to keep record of event.
Crisis Mgmt Group
• Takes over charge from Action Group at control room if crisis is agreed at level 2 or 3.
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• Coordinate at district, state, national level including Ministry of Shipping if crisis level 2
or 3
• Restore berth operational
• Complete maritime accident report
• Complete situation report
• Survey and cost damage to port installation
• Hold meeting of all concerned parties
• Seek compensation
• Initiate Fact finding inquiry and submit final report.
Action/On Site Group
Apply resources monitor work and provide necessary information and feed back to Crises
Management Group for further improvement and necessary support and action.
7.4.3 Vessel on Fire
Vessel action:
• Sounds alarm
• Initiates vessel response plan
• Cease cargo operation
• Fighting squads commenc contain fire-status-extent damage-causalities
• Advice VTS and port fire services status on VHF
• If necessary requests additional resources or evacuation
• Action group coordinates to fight fire
• Keep engines on standby to movie the ship from Berth
Fire Service:
• Start cooling ship side with water jet
• On arrival of action group coordinates with Dy.Conservator and Master of the vessel for
firefighting.
• If help required, PFS will liaison with MARG.
PDIL, Noida Page 89 of 99
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Emergency Preparedness & Response
7.4.4 SPILLAGE OF OIL AT PIRPAU Jetty
Master/Captain of Vessel/ Loading Master /Any Watch Staff
Immediately informs the incident to the MOT Pir Pau, Loading/ Discharging In-charge of
the concerned Oil Company through wireless, and Superintendent/ Technical supervisor
through EPABX by raising a Fire Alarm. It can be also be operated by anybody anywhere at
Pir Pau. An information shall consists of
1. Name of the Vessel/Oil Pipe Line involved
2. Position of the Vessel/Oil Pipe Line
3. Details of oil and chemical spill
4. Severity of the situation
5. Details of help to be provided
6. In case of chemical spill – details of incompatibility, if any.
7. Any other information deemed necessary to mitigate the emergency.
Executive Engineer (w),
MOT Pir Pau
1. Takes immediate measures for the stoppage of the leakage. If the leakage is from a
running pipeline, he takes systematic steps for stopping of operation, closing of valves on
the after sufficient dropping of line pressure and plugging the leak.
2. He also takes action for the cleaning of the spillage in co-ordination with the Oil
Company involved in the operation along with the Port Fire Brigade.
3. In case of major leak he gives information to the Pollution Control Cell at BPX.
Dock Master (JD)
1. Informs Chairman/Deputy Chairman.
2. He has also to inform Coast Guards if the spill is large.
3. If necessary a help shall be sought from members of mutual aid Group as per
Memorandum of Understanding between Mumbai Port Trust, Jawaharlal Nehru Port
Trust, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited and other participating oil companies on
the implementation of the National Oil Spill Disaster Contingency Plan (NOS-DCP)
within Mumbai Harbor.
4. He informs Security/Police to cordon of the area, and regulate traffic movement.
PDIL, Noida Page 90 of 99
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Emergency Preparedness & Response
Director Pollution Control Cell
To take all necessary legal steps of sampling, analysis, sealing etc. for legal action against
the ship master/captain as laid down in the port rules for breach of Port regulations. After
cleanup operation the waste material is brought to shore for suitable disposal.
7.4.5 Toxic / Gas Leakage At Pir Pau
Terminal Mgr
• Shall immediately report the incidence to the Control Room VTMS Station
• Shall raises alarm and to the Pir Pau fire services
Pir Pau Fire Service/ Jetty Fire Service
1. Starts spraying with water jet to dilute the gas vapor concentration.
2. Will carry out rescue operation using necessary PPE.
3. On arrival of action group coordinates with Harbor Master and Master of the tanker for
detecting the source of leak
4. Liaison with MARG for additional Fire tenders.
Vessel Action
1. Sounds alarm
2. Initiates vessel response plan
3. Cease all cargo operation-advises loading master-closes manifold
4. Flighting squads commence spray-status extent damage casualties
5. Advises VTS VHF 16/12
6. Requests additional resources or-evacuation injured
7. Coordinates with PFS & Crisis Group
8. Liaison with MARG Companies for additional help.
9. Keeps engines on standby to move the ship from berth
Port VTS Station
Shall report the incident to the action group as well as crises management group.
Action Group
Harbor Master
1. Will assess level of crisis.
If at level 2 or 3 will inform Crisis Management Group thru Cooperation to Master water
spray, firefighting tugs pilot, mooring boats, unberth evacuate injured-keep crisis mgmt
group informed.
PDIL, Noida Page 91 of 99
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Emergency Preparedness & Response
CISF
1. Cordon off Area.
2. Maintain Law & Order.
3. Ensure smooth flow of Road Traffic of Rescue Operations.
Crisis Management Group
1. Takes over charge from Action Group at control room if crisis is agreed at level 2 or 3
2. Coordinate at district, state, national level
3. Including MOST if crisis level 2 or 3
4. Prepare press conferences
5. Restore berth operational
6. Question witnesses
7. Complete maritime accident report
8. Complete situation report
9. Survey /cost damage to port inst.
10. Hold meeting of all concerned parties
11. Seek compensation
12. Distribute final report
7.5 Evacuation Routes
In Case Of Major Disaster at MOT, Pir Pau
i. Through Wadala Mahul Road to Welfare Centre, Wadala.
Equipment at the assembly point:
A room equipped with:
(i) First aid box, (ii) Telephone,
(iii) List of telephone number, & (iv) Stretchers
Temporary Shelters / Safe Zones
In the event of a probable disaster like release of toxic gas from nearby industry,
affected population MbPT colony residents would have to be transported to intermediate
temporary shelter. The temporary shelters identified for Port are Welfare Centre / school at
Wadala / extended docks shed. In case of failure of the above arrangement, Municipal /
District Authority will be contacted for evacuation and shelters.
PDIL, Noida Page 92 of 99
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Emergency Preparedness & Response
Transportation:
The Executive Controller, Civil defense, should be the overall in-charge of transport as far as
relief and rescue operation is concerned. All the departments should send their idle
vehicle(s), which are not engaged in emergency duty of the department along with the driver
to the Civil Defense. Usage of those vehicle(s) will be maintained by the Civil Defence
Office.
7.6 Medical & First Aid
7.6.1 Medical & First Aid and Relief Centres
Port Trust Hospital at Wadala with 242 beds including ICU beds is working round the clock
and ready to act in case of any emergencies. At present 39 doctors are on the roster and most
of them are staying in the quarters within the Hospital compound. Most of the nurses are also
staying in the quarters located within the compound and thereby, their services can be
availed within a short period. In case of emergency, 38nos. of additional beds can be made
available. Two ambulances are kept on standby duty at Hospital and one at Hamallage
Building and another at Fire Brigade Station, Prince’s Dock. Dispensaries are located
throughout the MbPT estate at strategic locations and are operational during day time, which
can be utilized as First aid centre and relief centre. In emergency the staff at hospital has to
carry out their regular duties in war footing.
7.7 Mutual Aid Response Group Chembur - Mahul & Wadala - Sewree Area
Eight Industries in the Chembur Mahul Area and eighteen industries in the Wadala – Sewree
Area spreading over 10 Square km. have formed Two Mutual Aid Response Groups under
the guidance of the Directorate of Industrial Safety & Health (DISH). Mostly all the
members industries are handling, storing and transporting petroleum products through
pipelines and tank lorries. Major pipelines are owned by the port. The Chembur – Mahul
Mutual Aid Response Group is functioning under the chairmanship Senior most Officer of
one of the MARG company along with one conveyor of the group.
All the industries in the group have their “On-Site Emergency Plan” and are equipped with
adequate facilities and man-power for fire fighting and to cope-up with any kind of disaster
within their boundary limits. In case of major emergencies in any of the member industries
beyond the individual’s capacity to cope up the Mutual Aid Group has agreed to share
resources, information and expertise in that situation to save life and property.
PDIL, Noida Page 93 of 99
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Emergency Preparedness & Response
MARG - CHEMBUR – MAHUL AREA
Sr. No.
Name of the Member Industry Telephone No.
1. M/S. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation, Wadala
2507 6605
2. M/S. RCF, Fire Station 2552 2222 3. BARC, Fire Station 2550 5176 4. TATA Fire Station 6717 5555 5. M/S. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.
F/Stn. 2553 3701 / 4
6. CTTL Fire Station 6703 0114 / 5 7. Aegis Fire Station 2554 7366 8. IOBL, Control Room 2554 2725
MARG – SEWREE – WADALA AREA
S/ No.
Phone no. of other Industries in the area Telephone No.
1 M/S. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation, Wadala
2412 8598 2412 9801
2 M/S. Godrej Industries Ltd., (Food Division), Wadala (E)
2418 8152 / 55 / 58
3 I. B. P. Co. Ltd., Wadala 2414 6621 / 2412 3901 4 M/S. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Wadala 2418 1281 / 2411 4390 5 M/S. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.,
Wadala
2414 3477
6 M/S. Castrol India Ltd., Wadala 5684 9200 / 2454 1496
7 M/S. Mahanagar Gas Limited 2404 5785 / 2403 1720
2401 2400 (emergency)
9324941244
8 M/S. Bharat Petroleum Corporation
Ltd.,Benzene, Sewree
2414 6400 / 2412 3640
9 I. B. P. Co. Ltd., Sewree 2414 7129 / 2415 0078
10 M/S. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.,
Sewree I
2412 3284
11 M/S. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.,
(B/O), Sewree
2415 8902 / 2412 3640
12 M/S. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., 2414 3700 / 2418 0227
PDIL, Noida Page 94 of 99
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Emergency Preparedness & Response
Sewree II
13 M.S. Hisdustan Lever Ltd.,HajiBunder Road 2370 6700
14 M/S. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.,
Mazgaon
2371 3807 / 71/ 75
15 M/S. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Sewree 2413 6259/ 2412 3806
16 M/S. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. 2414 3587
17 M/S. Colgate Palmolive (I) Ltd. 2414 6457
18 M/S. Hindustan Lever Ltd. / Bon Limited 2370 6700
7.8 Important Telephone Numbers
MbPT Important Telephone Nos
Particular Office Extn.
Office Telephone
No.
Mobile No. Res. Extn.
Resident Telephone
No.
Harbor Master 4022 22612563 9820030205 4906 Sr. Dock Master 5040 22616636 9820193912
Dock Master, Control Stn. 5035 -- -- 4834
Fire & Safety Officer 6261 4946 -- 2376 7704
Dy. Chief Mechanical Engineer – I
6502 6918 -- 2377 2374
Dy. Chief Mechanical Engineer – III
6505 6903 -- 2378 1882
Dy. CE (Gen) 4033 6911 2588 4648
-- 5656 4034
Sr. Dy. Traffic Manager, Indira Dock
5480 2261 0244 -- 4903
Asst. Medical Officer 7711 -- -- 2416 6188
Asst. Security Officer 5653 -- -- 2261 3051
Dir. Pollution Control 5053 -- -- 2261 9565
Dock Master, JD &Pir Pau 5874 -- 9820282614 2454 2029
PDIL, Noida Page 95 of 99
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Emergency Preparedness & Response
Important Telephone nos. of CISF unit
Office Cell No. E-mail Fax Control Room 66565090
66565791 22613849
- - -
Sr. Commandant 22643572 66564651
66564652 (PA)
8879628013 [email protected] 66564651
Asstt. Comdt. Port / Ops 66564659 9619865895 Asstt. Comdt. /Adm 66564658 9619865887
Asstt. Comdt. / PP & JD 66566163 (PP) 15832 (JD)
9619161523
Pir Pau (Marine Gate) 66566124 Pir Pau (New Jetty) 66566136 JD Landing Point 15808
Green Gate 66565192 Blue Gate 66565191
Yellow Gate (ID) 66565173 Orange Gate (PD) 66566352
Purple Gate 66566481
Phone nos. of Port Fire Stations
Sr. No.
Location Phone No.
1. Prince’s Dock / VICTORI DOCK
201 / 6261/ 6274, 2377 8704
2. Haji Bunder (Haji Bunder Haz. Cargo Complex)
7151 7152
3. Pir Pau (Marine Oil Terminal) 6656 6119 / 2554 8553 4. Jawahar Dweep
( Marine Oil Terminal) 2294 0633 - 640 Extn. 5844/5845
5. Port Fire & Safety Officer (Res.: 26, Wilson House, Colaba)
6260 (Off) 2377 6284
98200 28881 4946 (Res)
6. Asst. Port Safety & Fire Officer (Res.: 8Anderson House,Mazgaon-10)
6275 (Off) 9820663687 6948 (Res)
PDIL, Noida Page 96 of 99
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Emergency Preparedness & Response
7. MbPT Fire Brigade Control Room, PD 201 8. Municipal Fire Service 2307 6111/101
Phone Nos. of First Aid Posts and Ambulance Service
Post Location / in charge Tel. No. First Aid Post No 1 Ballard Estate Dispensary Dr. (Mrs.) U.
M. Sagathia 4720, 4721, 4722
9969516854 First Aid Post No.2 Carnac Bunder Dispensary Dr. (Mrs.) C.
R. Sisodia 5678 / 2261 2933
9869616229 First Aid Post No.3 Dock Yard Dispensary Dr. (Mrs.)
ChitraWagh 6233 /2376 6597
9833525307 First Aid Post No. 4 Reynold Road Dispensary, Dr. S. N.
Dhanorkar 7389 / 2412 1296
9833408515 First Aid Post No.5 Antop Village Dispensary, Nadkarni Park 7688/89/98/78
2412 5778 Ambulance Service, Post No. 1 Port Department 5039 Ambulance Service Post NO. 2 Hamallage Building Asst. Manager Docks 5471, 5472 Ambulance Service Post No. 3 Fire Station, Yellow Gate, Prince’s Dock 6261/6260
PDIL, Noida Page 97 of 99
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Conclusion & Recommendations
CHAPTER – 8
CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION
8.1 Conclusion
Hazard management is the process which improves worker safety by providing measures to
reduce fatalities and injuries to workers in the operational area of jetty.
Hazards were identified and assessed the risk involved in the cumulative operation of First,
Second and proposed new Berth.
Individual Risk of Iso-risk contours have been plotted by SAFETI v8.4 of M/s DNV. It is
observed from the Iso-Risk Contour (Annexure - 2) that the acceptable limit of individual
risk of 1.0x10-6 per year remains mainly confined around Pirpau Jetty premises. Societal
Risk (F/N Curve – Annexure - 3) developed for the Jetty remains in the ALARP to
ACCEPTABLE region.
The firefighting system is designed in accordance with OISD 156. Firefighting facilities
including Fire water pumps, ESD system, and Gas Monitoring system have been installed on
the FCB and SCB. The same shall be installed on proposed new (Third) Berth. Fire
extinguishers of different types are placed as per OISD-156. Personal Protective equipments
are being used and strictly followed. All the above systems shall be maintained in good
working order at all times.
Hence, it may be concluded that Pirpau Berth Jetty may be considered safe from
environmental risk point of view.
8.2 Specific Recommendations
• Simultaneous unloading operations of berths shall be restricted in the order of First
Chemical Berth (FCB) and Second Chemical Berth (SCB) or SCB and TCB (Proposed
third Berth) to avoid hazardous events and shall ensure smooth traffic of vessels.
• Emergency Shut-Down (ESD) systems shall be considered to shut down and limit the
inventory within 30 seconds of the occurrence of a leak in the unloading equipment or
pipeline.
• Spill containment: Leaks in LPG welded piping systems shall be contained in troughs.
Sufficient deck curbing, barriers shall be provided around the perimeter of the deck.
• Foam deluge systems shall be installed at the site to mitigate LPG spills by keeping the
vapors down.
PDIL, Noida Page 98 of 99
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Conclusion & Recommendations
8.3 General Recommendations:
• Prevailing, petroleum rules and all other applicable national & international standards/
codes and practices should be adopted during design/ procurement and installation of the
arms/pipelines.
• Only trained operators should be deployed for unloading operations at the Jetty.
• In order to reduce the frequency of failures and consequent risk, codes, rules and
standards shall be strictly followed.
• Smoking within the jetty premises should be strictly prohibited. Use of naked light or hot
work must be restricted to the areas designated for the purpose.
• Electro pneumatic ON OFF valve at jetty area must be checked regularly for timely
actuation of the safety system.
• Training of all the employees for firefighting and use of safety apparatus must be
conducted regularly. Mock drills for emergency should be conducted at regular intervals
(as per MSIHC rules) keeping liaison with local administration and firefighting facilities
available in the area.
• 100% radiography to be done for all welded joints.
• Inspection and testing of the pipelines should be done at regular intervals for ensuring
their health and condition monitoring.
• The use of PPEs should be strictly followed.
• Patrolling of the pipeline along the trestle shall be done on round the clock during
unloading operation.
• Design and construction of the pipe supports should be rigid to avoid failure of the pipe
supports due to earthquake or other natural calamities.
• Enforce an inspection program of all electrical equipment at regular intervals can prevent
some fires from occurring. This can be done by either the jetty management or other
companies themselves.
• The risks of damage of the jetty & affiliated facilities due to large waves, storm surges
design shall revise during New construction.
• Ensure trestle pathways free from obstructions for normal operation and maintenance as
well as for emergency handling.
• Gas detectors (for leak detection) provided at shall be checked regularly and calibrated
periodically.
PDIL, Noida Page 99 of 99
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Conclusion & Recommendations
• Ensure regular testing, inspection and maintenance of Fire Alarm systems.
• Fixed toxic gas detectors with alarm system (with Detection and service range) to be
provided near the pipe manifold in dominant downwind direction.
• The gaskets of flange joints shall be inspected regularly for breakage of gasket or
corrosion or any defects that leads to leakage.
• The sprinkler system and remote operated valves must be checked regularly for timely
actuation of the safety system as being done.
• Firefighting equipments/systems shall be checked regularly and ensure the stock/spare
available.
• Regularly check the pressure in the fire hydrant lines, preferably during mock drills.
• Inspection and testing of the major equipment’s pumps connecting lines, etc. shall be
done at regular intervals for ensuring their health and condition monitoring.
• Rapid isolation of significant leaks will not only eliminate the risks but will also help to
minimize the hazards and, particularly, the ignition probability (by limiting the total mass
of flammable vapor released). For isolation to be effective, first requires detection to
occur and hence best practice fire and gas detection systems, with associated shutdown
systems and procedures, shall be important mitigation measures.
• Electrical/hand operated fire siren shall be installed at suitable location in installation
• Manual call points at strategic location shall be provided on Jetty for emergency
response.
• Communication systems walkie-talkie and public address system shall be checked
periodically.
• Hazard control philosophy, trained manpower and SOP adherence shall be strictly
followed in the Pirpau Jetty.
DEPARTMENT OF OCEAN ENGINEERINGI I T MADRAS, CHENNAI-36
DR.S.NALLAYARASU
LOCATION PLAN
E
N
W
S
BUOY No 3
BUOY No 2
BUOY No 5
S U
B
M
A
R
I N
E
P
I P
E
L I N
E
PROPOSED
THIRD CHEMICAL
BERTH
SECOND
CHEMICAL
BERTH
OLD
PIR-PAU
FIRST
CHEMICAL
BERTH
(NEW PIR-PAU)
ELEPHANTA
ISLAND
BUTCHER
ISLAND
2100000N
280000E
CHIEF ENGINEER
DRG.NO.
SUPTG.
ENGINEER
DY. C.E.
EX. ENGINEER
Mb P T E S T A T E
VPA
DATEREV.
TITLE :
ASSTT.
EX. ENGINEER
DESCRIPTION
DRAWN TRACED DATE
NTS
INITIAL
SCALE
A3
MUMBAI PORT TRUST
LOCATION PLAN SHOWING
PROPOSED THIRD CHEMICAL
BERTH
F:\DRAWINGS\MBPT DRAWINGS\2021\76-2021 THIRD CHEMICAL BERTH.DWG
í
NORTH
15/09/2021
76 / 2021
PDIL, Noida Page A3
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
Iso Risk Contour
Annexure - 2: Iso Risk Contour for Pirpau Berths, Mumbai
PDIL, Noida Page A4
Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust
F-N Curve
Annexure - 3: F-N Curve for Pirpau Berths, Mumbai
PG
PG
P
P
P
P
SUBJECT:
CHECKED BY :
DATEREV.SIGN.
DESCRIPTION
DRAWN:
TITLE:
( )
DATE:
DRG.NO.
SCALE: N.T.S
CHIEF MECH. ENGINEERS OFFICE
MUMBAI PORT TRUST
DESIGNED BY:
APPROVED BY:
S.V.LONDHE 14-06-2012
* *
*
DY.CHIEF MECHANICAL ENGINEER
R
V PG
PUMP WITH I/C ENGINE
PUMP WITH I/C ENGINE
PUMP WITH ELECTRIC MOTOR
B/V
TOWARD SEA
R
V PG
R
V
16
"P
IP
E
REDUCER
10
"P
IP
E
TOWARD JOCKEY PUMP No.1
16
"P
IP
E
MOV
`A'
TOWARD FOAM TANK
TOWARD JOCKEY PUMP No.2
H H
`B'
JETTY ROAD
NEW PIR PAU FIREPUMPING STATION
H
TM-1
TM-2
TOWARD JETTY
MOV
PG
10"PIPE
12"PIPE
12"PIPE
10
"P
IP
E
12
"P
IP
E
10"PIPE
12"PIPE
10
"P
IP
E
12
"P
IP
E
H
H
H
H
H
H
12"PIPE
PIR
PA
U M
AN
IFO
LD
BE
RT
HIN
G S
IDE
12"PIPE
36
32
3
8489
48
50
4080
VIEW-`A'-`A' VIEW-`B'-`B'
ML
A-1
ML
A-2
ML
A-3
ML
A-4
ML
A-5
4000
87
00
900
15000
1500
30
00
0
27
90
0
77
00
V
PG
5600
5600
400
11400
FIRE FIGHTING PIPING LAYOUT OF JETTY& BASEMENT AT NEW PIR PAU JETTY
FIRE FIGHTING PIPING LAYOUT OF PUMPINGSTATION AT NEW PIR PAU JETTY
GATE VALVE WITH FLANGE
PIPELINE CLOSED WITH FLANGE
PIPE TO PIPE CONNECTION
MARINE LOADING ARM
MOTOR OPERATED VALVE
REFERENCES
PG
PG
`A'
`B'
BYPASS GATE VALVE
NON RETURN VALVE WITH FLANGE
PRESSURE GAUGE
HYDRANT
TOWARD BASEMENT/JETTY
TOWER MONITOR
G.L
9790
1100
8"PIPE
16"PIPE
10"PIPE
PUMPING STATION
PIPE JOINED WITH FLANGE
2380
95
0
12"PIPE
12"PIPE
16"PIPE
H H
16"PIPE
TOWARD
FOAM TANK
EXISTING FIRE FIGHTING PIPELINEFROM FIR PUMPING STATION TO NEWPIR PAU JETTY
JETTY FIRE PIPELINE SHOWN THUS.
BASEMENT FIRE PIPELINE SHOWN THUS.
H
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)
No. DESCRIPTION SYMBOL
TOWARD JETTY
DEPARTMENT OF OCEAN ENGINEERINGI I T MADRAS, CHENNAI-36
DR.S.NALLAYARASU
DEPARTMENT OF OCEAN ENGINEERINGI I T MADRAS, CHENNAI-36
DR.S.NALLAYARASU