Philosophy Summer Task

[1] TASK - Complete the 'Issues with Direct Realism';[2] ESSAY - 'Do we see the world as it is?'

Issues with direct realism

Most philosophers have felt that direct realism, at least in its naive version as we have so far characterised it, cannot be maintained. The philosopher David Hume, for example, claimed that once one had engaged in 'the slightest philosophy'2 one would be forced to give it up.

Criticism 1: Perceptual variation

Many of the difficulties that direct realism faces were highlighted by the great British empiricist philosopher, George Berkeley (1685-1753) in his Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713). The character of Philonous, Berkeley's spokesman, asks Hylas to

consider what the colour of some distant clouds is (see Figure 1.5). Since the clouds may appear red from a distance, and any

number of colours from different perspectives, according to Berkeley it makes no sense to suppose that they have any real colour. This goes just as well for any objects. If we look closely at a flower through a microscope its colour will be different from how it looks to the naked eye. The conclusion that may be drawn is that the colour is merely an effect made upon us by physical things, and not something in the objects themselves. In other words, colour is an appearance to us, not something objectively real.

.. . .

.. . . ..

.. . . .

tii.}1f {}\.::: ... ·.

Someone close

Figure 1.5 Berkeley's

example of observing

clouds

The clouds appear

different colours to

different observers. But

who is right? No one has any privileged perspective, and so no one can observe the true colour.

Therefore colour is an

appearance to observers, and not something real. 7

Direct Realism: Naive Direct Realism & Scientific Direct Realism There are two versions of direct realism: naive direct realism and scientific direct real­ism. They differ in the properties they claim the objects of perception can possess when they are not being perceived.

Naive realists claim that such objects can continue to have all the properties that we usually perceive them to have, properties such as yellowness, smoothness and warmth.

Scientific realists claim that some of the properties an object is perceived as having are dependent on the perceiver, and that unper­ceived objects should not be thought of as retaining them. Such a stance has a long history. Here is Galileo in 1623 expressing this view:

I believe that for external bodies to excite in us tastes, odors, and sounds, nothing is required in those bodies themselves except size, shape, and a lot of slow or fast motions. I think that if ears, tongues, and noses were taken away, then shapes, numbers, and motions would well remain, but not odors, tastes or sounds. The latter are, I believe, nothing but names, outside of the living animal. (Galileo, 1960, sec. 47)

Scientific direct realism is often discussed in terms of Locke's distinc­tion between primary and secondary qualities. The primary qualities of an object are those whose existence is independent of the existence of a perceiver.

Locke's inventory of such qualities included shape, size, pos­ition, number, motion­or­rest and solidity, and science claims to be completing this inventory by positing such properties as charge, spin and mass.

The secondary qualities of objects are those properties that do depend on the existence of a perceiver. They comprise such properties as colour, smell and felt texture. A scientific description of objects in the world does not include an account of these secondary qualities, and thus these properties should not be seen as possessed by those objects them­selves, but rather as in some way relative to perceiving creatures.

So to take an example of a yellow cup of coffee ­ The cup itself is not yellow, but the physical composition of its surface, and the particular way this surface reflects light rays into our eyes, causes in us the experience of seeing yellow.

For the scientific realist, then, only some of the properties that we perceive continue to be possessed by objects when there are no perceivers around, these being their primary qualities.

Thus nature gets credit which should in truth be reserved for ourselves: the rose for its scent: the nightingale for his song: the sun for its radi­ance. The poets are entirely mistaken. They should address their lyrics to themselves, and should turn them into odes of self­congratulation on the excellency of the human mind. Nature is a dull affair, soundless, scentless, colourless ...(Whitehead, 1926, pp. 68­9)

This distinction between primary and secondary qualities is controversial in various ways, but that need not concern us here. What we should be clear on, however, is that the key feature of both naive and scientific direct realism is that we directly perceive objects whose existence is independent of perceivers, objects that are out there in the world.

These ideas differ from Indirect realism in that, whilst it is agreed that the coffee cup exists independently of me, I do not, however, directly perceive this cup. The indirect realist claims that perception involves mediating images. When looking at an every­day object, it is not that object that we directly see, but rather, a percep­tual intermediary, often referred to as 'sense data'.

JOHN SEARLE’S DEFENCE OF DIRECT REALISM - Pt1 - Debunking Representationalism

• For John Searle, the entire philosophical tradition since Descartes rests upon a what he refers to as “a disastrous mistake”

• Searle sets out what he commonly refers to as “THE BAD ARGUMENT”, which he thinks afflicts just about all of the major philosophers after Descartes;

• His key idea in this regard is that Direct Realism has often been rejected on false grounds, false grounds which are rooted in a blazing ambiguity concerning what it is to be ‘aware’ of something;

• He holds that there are TWO distinct types of awareness which have been long confused [1] The type of awareness which is directed towards a thing, wherein the content one’s awareness and the thing that one is aware of are two distinctly different things and, [2] The type of awareness which recognises the content of one’s own mind, wherein the content and the awareness of that ‘entity’ are in fact, one and the same thing;

• Searle holds that if he can de-bunk this “disastrous mistake” he can thereby begin to restore a view for accepting Direct Realism a position which he contends is sustainable.

• The account of perception Searle presents - as we shall see later - is a form of direct realism, which he refers to as ‘EXTERNAL REALISM’ which sets out that when we look at the world we see it “DIRECTLY” and by this he means that the relationship is UNMEDIATED:

• In saying this Searle is opposing what is known as indirect or representative realism, according to which there is a real world ‘out there’ but we cannot perceive it directly;

• Searle rejects the idea that we only perceive representations of it in the form of our impressions, ideas, or sense data.

• In doing this he is opposing famous representative realists such as John Locke.

• Searle addresses himself to the issue of why Directly Realism has been so long denied especially as it is so obviously consistent with both our ex-perience and with common sense;

• Searle sets out that even the great Philosophers such as Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, Mill and Hegel all reject Direct Realism and all of them says Searle, have accepted an argument that goes back at least to the 17th century, perhaps even to the Greeks.

• This is the standard argument which has again and again been brought against Direct Realism, the argument known as ‘The Argument from Illusion’;

• Searle sets out the argument [below] -

• I see the desk in front of me; • But - I could be having an Hallucinatory experience exactly like this; • An Hallucinatory experience would possess exactly the same content as this one and be completely indiscernible from this one; • I could have the same experience without there being a desk on the other end of the experience; • The CHARACTER OF THE EXPERIENCE in the hallucination case and the character in the veridical case - the bad case and the good case respectively - IS THE SAME; • So any analysis of one has to be applied to the other; • But in the ‘bad’ case, though one is not aware of a desk, one is certainly aware of something; • One is conscious of something, and, at least, in some sense, one “sees” something; • That something cannot be a material object, because there is no material object there in the case of the hallucination;

• Yet I am aware of something … let us give a name for such somethings; • They were called “ideas” by Berkeley, Descartes, and Locke, “impressions” by Hume, and came to be called “sense data” in the 20th century; • So I will stick with “sense data” and say we are aware of a sense datum; • A sense datum is an entirely mind dependent, ontologically subjective entity; • Now, by the principle that both the good case and the bad case should receive the same analysis, it follows that in the good case I am not aware of a material object but only of sense data; • It follows that in all experiences I am aware only of sense data, not of mind independent material objects; • And the question then arises, What is the relationships between the sense data that I do see and the material object that apparently I do not see?

“When I am looking at the desk in front of me, this is NOT like seeing the desk on television or reflected in a mirror” [JOHN SEARLE]

EXTERNAL REALISM

“There exists a real world that is totally independent of human beings and of what they think or say about it” [p. 13 Mind, Language, and Society: Philosophy in the Real World]

The Argument From Illusion … ‘The Bad Argument’ [Acc. To Searle] –

IMPORTANT DEFINITION

‘Intentionality’ understood in the philosopher’s sense, is simply the directedness or the about-ness of the mind … it identifies what our

perception is aimed at.

• Searle argues that the argument from Illusion [The Bad Argument] is rooted in a fundamental misunderstanding of what it is to be aware ‘aware’;

• He says that there are TWO CLEAR MEANINGS of what might be said to constitute an ‘awareness’ of something and the mistake lies in thinking that they are both in fact, the same;

• The problem arises says Searle because of the ambiguity [the unclear nature] of the term itself and what means to be ‘aware’;

• Searle argues that there is a first meaning of what it is to be ‘aware’ which is when a person’s consciousness is directed at an object - this Searle refers to as THE INTENTIONALITY SENSE;

• In this type of awareness the person has an OBJECT OF AWARENESS; • In the case of intentionality – the awareness and the object of the awareness are clearly NOT THE SAME

THING; • However, Searle continues, when that person has an hallucination they are NOT AWARE OF ANYTHING in

that same sense; • In the case of an hallucination the ‘ intentionality’ - which means “the directedness of conscious

awareness” - is NOT AIMED AT ANYTHING … there is nothing there and hence in this sense, the person in question could not really be ‘aware’ of anything.

• Nonetheless, when we are having a conscious visual experience such as an hallucination, it is tempting, given the way our language works, to erect a noun-phrase to stand for that awareness and make it into the object of the verbs of perception;

• Searle points out that even here we instinctively feel hesitant to say that one “sees” anything in the hal-lucination case and that is why we are often tempted to place quotes around the word “sees”;

• So – for Searle, to be “aware of”, or “conscious of”, is clearly for Searle, used in TWO DIFFERENT SENSES; • Searle sets out a second meaning of what it is to be aware, “THE CONSTITUTIVE SENSE” … this is in the

when a person is only aware the contents of their own conscious mind; • In the case of an hallucination, that conscious experience is not of something different from the experience

… IT IS IDENTICAL WITH THE EXPERIENCE; • This for Searle is clearly A DIFFERENT TYPE OF AWARENESS, the conscious experience is identical with what

Searle refers to as the ‘ENTITY AWARENESS’

• For Searle , at the heart of the ‘ Bad Argument’ lies this ambiguity between the two meanings of the crucial phrases “aware of” or “conscious of”;

• But Searle argues that if we but stop a short while to think, this difference becomes very obvious and clear. • Consider the diagram below -

• Searle contends that, once pointed out that this is such an obvious fallacy it is hard to see how anybody could have made it but nonetheless, it is there and has proved to be a flaw in the thinking of many a ‘Great Philosopher’;

• And - It is this crucial mistake over the meaning of ‘awareness’ that lies at the root of the rejection of the idea that one does not perceive the world or that one does not perceive it directly;

• It is this fundamental mistake, of thinking that an awareness of the contents of one’s own conscious mind [the constitutive sense] is in fact identical to an awareness directed at an object [the intentional sense] has been a disastrous feature in the history of philosophy since Descartes.

In the sense of INTENTIONALITY - Stanley has an Awareness of the Ostrich -

In this case THE AWARENESS IS NOT

IDENTICAL WITH THE OSTRICH

In the CONSTITUTIVE SENSE - Stanley has an Ostrich entity

awareness. In this case THE AWARENESS IS IDENTICAL

WITH THE OSTRICH.

Pt 2- The Qualitatively Unique Character Of Veridical Perception

• John Searle also defends the direct nature of our perceptual experience on QUALITATIVE grounds; • He sets out that if we carefully examine what our perceptual experience FEELS like* there is a clearly a

difference of quality between what it feels to remember something and what it feels like to see something; • In order to understand what Searle is saying here - first touch

• Searle forwards the idea that when you touch two different things that you are aware of more than just

that you are touching something …. There is also a qualitative difference between the two types of touching - they feel different;

• Searle says that this is also true of our conceptions … If I conceive of you by way of seeing, says Searle then this possesses a very different quality of experience than say if I close my eyes and recall you to mind;

• Try this for yourself … look at a friend and then close your eyes and bring that friend to mind – is Searle correct, is there a distinct qualitative difference between these two types of experience?

• Searle argues that this is also true of hallucinations … it feels very different, says Searle, to see a veridical dagger and to ‘see’ an illusory dagger of the mind;

• It is just plain false argues Searle, to suggest that these two types of experience are perceptually indistinguishable;

• Searle says that we when we are perceiving veridical objects, we can feel that our consciousness is directed towards these objects ;

• What we experience, says Searle, is different from the “representational” character of say, a memory; • The objects of our sensation have the clear sense of PRESENTATION rather than of representation … these

perceptual experiences actually FEEL DIRECT! • When we examine the raw phenomenology of our experience – the subject of our consciousness – it

becomes apparent that perceptual experiences have 4 key signatures which differ from our other mental experiences;

1 2 3

Our experience is caused by the object [see earlier – on ‘intentionality] and that is the way it feels.

We are not immediately aware of the objects we remember in way that you are if you actually see it … every time I see an event, there is a PRESENTNESS about it - I see that event as occurring right here and now.

Third, I CANNOT SHUFFLE MY PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCES … If I close my eyes and think about objects, I experience certain representations of these objects and I can shuffle them around at will. But if I open my eyes and look directly at objects in front of me, I cannot shuffle my experiences around at will.

• Moreover - Memories and hallucinations occupy what Searle terms as “the subjective field of vision”, subjective because they are utterly contingent upon the mental state of the subject perceiving them … the experiences are not shared;

• Veridical experiences, on the other hand, says Searle, occupy “the objective field of vision” and these are ontologically objective, says Searle in that the objects which occupy this ‘field’ of vision are perceivable by any similarly-endowed-and-similarly-situated person.

First - Touch your face … What does it feel like?

Now -Touch your hair … What does it feel like?

*This is what John Searle terms, the ‘raw phenomenology ‘

of our experience.

THE 5 MAIN ARGUMENTS AGAINST DIRECT REALISM & THEIR RESPONSES

The Time- Lag Argument The Causal Argument The Perceptual Relativity Argument

CLAIM

Though time lags, involving light emission, are most significant in cases of distant objects such as stars, any time lag, however minute, entails that the object of our (direct) perception must be something other than physical objects or events. What we see is not the physical object or event itself but some appearance of the physical object to our minds. These appearances or representations we call sense data. We may access these representations directly but we may only infer the existence and the features of the object/event indirectly

RESPONSE

The crux of this argument lies in the ambiguity of the phrase, ‘if something no longer exists we cannot perceive it’. Of course, if something no longer exists, we cannot now perceive it as it presently is but it does not follow that if something no longer exists, we cannot now perceive it as it used to be; we cannot (given the laws of physics) directly perceive external physical objects or events without a time lag. whatever intuitive pull there may be to the idea that direct-perception must be instantaneous-perception must be resisted. Of course it would be absurd to claim that we can now be aware of the no-longer existent object as it is now but we can sensibly claim to now be aware of the once-existent object as it used to be.

CLAIM

Given the long and complex causal series [intervening mediums such as air / nerves in eye etc.], physical objects or events cannot be immediate or direct objects of perception. Rather, they have been conveyed through a series of ‘corpuscular movements’ towards us and ultimately what we see is not the physical object or event itself but some appearance of the physical object to our minds. These appearances or representations we call sense data. We may access these representations directly but we may only infer the existence and the features of the object/event indirectly

RESPONSE

Indirect Realism has confused, here ‘causal indirectness’ with ‘cognitive indirectness’… Direct Realism concedes that perception is indirect in the sense that it involves a series of causal intermediaries but not indirect in the sense of involving a prior awareness of something other than the external object [ie. sense data].

CLAIM

A physical object, say a penny, may appear circular or of a certain colour from one angle of view and appear elliptical or of another colour from another … But it makes no sense to ask which view reveals the true shape or colour, since we have no way of choosing. What we are directly aware of is not the penny itself, but the SENSE DATA – the appearance of the penny to our minds…. the existence and the features of penny itself is only inferred indirectly via these representations.

RESPONSE

Direct Realists do hold that external physical objects or events may appear but it would be a mistake to reify* these and call them ‘appearances’ as if they were some independent entity. Variations of appearance can be explained straightforwardly by appealing to various physical and physiological considerations: EG- a round penny may look elliptical from a certain angle because of perspectival distortion; a brown penny may look to be of a different hue from another angle for a whole host of possible reasons EG - lighting effects, contrast effects, etc. There is nothing which calls for positing the existence of something other than physical objects or events as the objects of immediate awareness.

The Argument From Perceptual Illusion The Argument From Hallucination

CLAIM

A straw half immersed in my glass of water may appear to be bent when in fact most of my other perceptual interactions with it give rise to the view that it is, probably in reality, straight… it seems that the bent appearance of the straw is an illusion. What we are directly aware of in the case of the submersed straw is not the straw itself, but the SENSE DATA – the appearance of the straw to our minds.

RESPONSE

The major flaw of this argument is the same as that of the Perceptual Relativity Argument in that it involves a question-begging assumption that if something appears F to subject S, then S is immediately aware of some ‘thing’ that is F. t would be a mistake to reify* these perceptions and call them ‘appearances’ as if they were some independent entity. Direct Realists can explain why the submerged straw may appear bent because an intervening physical medium for one part of the stick (water) interacts with light photons differently than an intervening medium for the other part of the stick (air). The straight stick’s appearing bent is thus explainable without needing to posit some tertium quid [intermediary representation] which is bent.

CLAIM

During an hallucination it may not be possible for me to distinguish my experience from genuine perception. The visible appearance of the dagger is exactly the same to Macbeth as if he were seeing a veridical dagger before him. But since what the hallucinator is perceiving does not exist in the world, it must exist only as a 'dagger of the mind'. But to say that an experience is subjectively indistinguishable from a genuine experience is to say that it is the same to me whether or not there is a dagger. It follows that what I am immediately aware of even when truly perceiving a dagger cannot be the real dagger.

RESPONSE

This response comes from John Searle who argues that the there is a clear fallacy of ambiguity involved here involving what it is for an object to be conceived. For Searle there are two entirely different modes of conceiving here [1] the conception of the veridical dagger where the thought and the object of the thought are clearly distinct from each other and [2] the hallucinatory conception of the dagger where the thought and the object of the thought are one and the same thing. It is a mistake to say that the two experiences are indistinguishable.

“when I hold up the five fingers in front my face I really see the real hand or as Kant would have to say ‘the hand in itself…”

[JOHN SEARLE]